Quan Nguyen Tran – 18319069 – Op-ed – IR of SEA

VACCINE DIPLOMACY: A CRITICAL JUNCTURE TO BOOST CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATE-VIETNAM

PARTNERSHIP

Although President Biden’s Interim National Security Guidance proposes a strategic

United States-Vietnam partnership from the current ‘comprehensive’ one, Hanoi has responded
cautiously, minding reactions from Beijing – its comprehensive strategic partner. The same
prudence can also be observed in Vietnam’s vaccine diplomacy to both great powers.
Nonetheless, China-Vietnam vaccine diplomacy narratives have been transactional that Hanoi
has to accommodate Beijing's uneasiness over Hanoi’s growing U.S. alignment. In contrast, the
United States, after a slow start, has accelerated to address its ‘comprehensive’ partner’s urgent
need for vaccines, almost all through donation, without explicit diplomatic strings like human
rights record requirements. The Biden administration should continue its current performance in
vaccine diplomacy with Vietnam and start vaccine technology transfer in the long-term, and
thereby capitalize on the “void of mistrust” in Hanoi-Beijing relationship bolstered in their
vaccine diplomacy. Thereby, Vietnam can be more confident in advancing the Washington-
Hanoi partnership that is crucial to the U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The strategic competition between China and the United States transcended into the
vaccine realm with an incident that during the three-hour delay of the U.S. Vice President’s
flight to Vietnam from Singapore with the delivery of one million donated vaccine doses, China
immediately sent an envoy to meet Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh pledging a
donation of two million doses. This signifies China’s concern over the developing Vietnam-U.S.
partnership with two consecutive cabinet-level visits of Defense Secretary Austin on July 28th
and the Vice President on August 24th.

As the vaccine diplomacy competition in Vietnam is linked to the broader U.S.-China

Indo-Pacific competition, Vietnam’s calculation of political significance based on the promised
versus delivered number of vaccine donations will be of strategic importance.

After the Vice President’s visit, the United States has established the Southeast Asian
office of the CDC in Hanoi, supported 44 million pandemic assistance and donated 6 million
doses, making its deeds meet its promise. Being outstripped in donation number, Beijing quickly
promised 3 million doses following Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Vietnam on September
Quan Nguyen Tran – 18319069 – Op-ed – IR of SEA

10th, making its promised donation doses 5.7 million to match the figure of Washington at the
time.

Notwithstanding the 36.2M doses sold, China’s promise of donation can be seen as
symbolic responses to those delivered by the United States, explaining why there is a big gap
between the number delivered and promised – 1.5M vs. 7M, which is the lowest pledged/donated
ratio in Southeast Asia.

China’s gap in promised and delivered donation numbers reflects the tenet of its vaccine
diplomacy with Vietnam, which is to counter Vietnam’s growing partnership with the United
States centered in the South China Sea disputes. Vietnam, understanding China’s motive to send
its envoy during the delay of Vice President Harris, reiterated its neutrality and “diverse foreign
policy”. Moreover, during the meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi in September – and in
every diplomatic meeting with China associated with vaccine diplomacy – Vietnam raised the
issue of South China Sea disputes and UNCLOS adherence. Nonetheless, Wang Yi insisted on
existing “high-level understanding” and stressed the two communist countries shall be cautious
against the “instigation” of external forces, implicitly referring to the United States and
criticizing Vietnam-U.S. engagement.

Meanwhile, the Biden team, despite its slow start in vaccine donation, has signaled a
pragmatic approach by addressing its partner’s urgent interests, including vaccine donation and
thus progress closer to upgrade its partnership with Vietnam from “comprehensive” to
“strategic”.

The U.S. donation to Vietnam has, perhaps, exceeded any expectation its partner may
have with 23M doses delivered, making Vietnam the biggest Southeast Asian and second largest
overall recipient of the U.S. donation. This does not only match Biden’s statement committing to
humanitarian motive: “Our vaccine donations don’t include pressure for favours or potential
concessions. We’re doing this to save lives", but also subtly shows how democracy can be
generous on humanitarian support for its partner. Thus, echoed with Defense Secretary Austin’s
humble speech in Singapore, the Biden team has been using vaccine donation to incentivize
Vietnam to work on democracy-improvement, rather than asserting the U.S values as strings to
aids like they used to.
Quan Nguyen Tran – 18319069 – Op-ed – IR of SEA

U.S. vaccine diplomacy in Vietnam facilitates the next step towards upgrading Vietnam-
U.S. partnership from a comprehensive into a strategic one, as stated in President Biden’s
Interim National Security Guidance and expressed by both Defense Secretary Austin and Vice
President Harris in their visit to Vietnam. This is a significant development compared to
Washington’s decline of Vietnam’s proposal to add the “extensive” attribute to their
“comprehensive partnership” in 2015. Despite Vietnam’s prudence due to its sensitivities over
China, the U.S. vaccine diplomacy has certainly boosted more confidence in Vietnam diplomatic
calculation.

China has used vaccine diplomacy to Vietnam as a tool for soft power and conciliation
over maritime disputes. However, in contrast to Vietnam-America positive "comprehensive"
partnership, Vietnam-China "comprehensive strategic partnership" has witnessed more
transactional narratives by which China signals its anger towards Vietnam-U.S. growing
proximity and Vietnam "reassure" the comprehensive strategic partnership to its biggest
importing source. The transactional diplomatic narrative combined with popular reluctance to
Chinese vaccines has revealed a gap of trust in the “comprehensive strategic relationship”.

Such a void of mistrust can be capitalized on by Washington via vaccine diplomacy to

encourage Hanoi’s confidence in pacing forwards the bilateral partnership, which is
‘comprehensive’ by name but ‘strategic’ in essence.

In the short term, the United States should continue the current performance in vaccine
diplomacy with Vietnam so that rising inoculation rate facilitates the Vietnamese Communist
Party to ease lockdown measures and restore daily working travel. The implication of this result
is two-fold. First, trade activities and supply chains between Vietnam and the United States will
fully resume as employment returns to Vietnam, which helps recover Vietnamese exports while
stabilizing American consumer goods price inflation. This is especially the case since the United
States is Vietnam’s biggest export market - about 1.5 times the figure to China. Second, as
lockdown measures and local travel bans are lifted in Vietnam, there will be less unemployment
and social unrest that may necessitate hardline responses from the government. Hence, it reduces
the impetus for Washington to criticize human rights records unwelcomed by Hanoi.
Quan Nguyen Tran – 18319069 – Op-ed – IR of SEA

In the long term, with Vietnam’s expression for further vaccine diplomacy and with the
assumption that the Covid-19 variant keeps changing, vaccine technology transfer from the
United States will be among the most significant moves to bolster the bilateral partnership,

Washington may value strategic competition with Beijing differently from building a
constructive relationship with Vietnam. However, regardless of which focus is to be prioritized,
Washington needs to continue the current pragmatic approach in vaccine diplomacy with
Vietnam, focusing on the partner’s urgent interests. This can be the main driver to enhance
Vietnam’s confidence in advancing its partnership with the United States in the long term, even
if there is still prudence due to its sensitivities over China. Thus, the United States can capitalize
on the void of mistrust in Hanoi-Beijing partnership that has been bolstered in their vaccine
diplomacy. This becomes a must if China is expected to ease its anti-U.S. rhetoric when
engaging Vietnam in anticipation of growing Vietnam-America partnership.