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    Block - The Ruling Class Does Not Rule Not On The Marxist Theory of The State

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    Javier Waiman

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    fron Socialist Revolution. Number 33 (May-June)s 1977 THE RULING CLASS DOES NOT RULE: NOTES ON THE MARXIST THEORY OF THE STATE Fred Block THE MARXIST THEORY of the state remains a muddle despite the recent revival of interest in the subject Substantial prog fess has been made in formulating» eritique of orthodox Marsise formulations that reduce the state (0 a mere eelleotion ‘of economic interests. However, the outlines ot an adequate alternative Marxist theory are not yet clea. This is most des ‘matically indicated by the continued popularity in Marxist circles of explanations of state policies or of coniicts within the state that are remarkably similar to orthodox formulations in their eendency co see the state as a refleetion of the interests fof certain groups in the capitalist class. Many Marxists, for example, were deawn to interpretations of Watergate that saw In alton to the Si coliccicy, Vd like to thank the McNeil Marist Group, Clarence Lo, and Theda Skocpol for their belp ou tha arte it as 4 conflict between eve different wings of the capitalise class 2 This gap fietween theory’ and the explanation of accual historical events demonstrates thac the eritigue of orthorloy Marsist formulations has noc boca carried far ent, Uke ceulier formulations seven when they have bce cartully criticized and dismissed-~ sueak buck into many current analy ses because they remain embedied 1 the baste we aeepty Marsist analyse ‘This essay proposes two elements of an altcenative Marit theory of the state. The first element isa diferent way of con ‘eptualizing the ruling class and ats relationship w the state This eexoncepeualization makes possible the vend chin the elaboration of a stenctural Framework which species ti concrete mechanisms that make the state a capitalist state whescas other structural thearies have (endl 49 snalvee sts ‘ges i am alstesct and wystifing way? Althougis these wo elements do not provide & cvinplete Murvist theory of ehe state, they: do provide 4 new way of thinking about the sources of rationality within capitalist, Contemporary: Marxists have been forced to acknont ledge that despite tts fundamental ieationality, capitalism in the sleel oped world has shown a remarkable eapacity wo rationalize iescll in response co the ‘win dangers oF economic etsis nd rauical working-class movements? Since the presene histori peril again poses forte lett the thieat of suceesstul capiealoe aionaliration, the understan capacity forse The tration ng of the sources of capitalism's rela is of dhe utmost paliticil importance Marsist explanation of eapitalstsationality is {to (000 it the consciousness oF some sector uf the tutiis lass. tn this fight, capitaat reform rellects the soinsciensy wil and understanding of some seetor of the capitalist class that has yeanped the uaynitude of the problem asl proposes a set Of solutions. "The alternative framework lxiny proposed here suggests thar the capacity af eaptaliam ro rationalize Hell is ti “atwnateaia” an “cpa cto” Lam clot paris the use the sete nee wats a vercome ccananke sagan fn es fuvte the tauren of the ‘Katonshessum ust etme leon eatgis tuto {he sts af somone comrades eo ving tandads sumed wh sve pres, the outcome of conic among he ts gens the eting cass Reiontton occurs “chin the backs” of det of actors 30 tha raionleyeannot be scen func Tin of the consciousness of one particular group “Tis argoment and. is impheations wil be taced out hough sumber of sep. Fo, Ltn sn hat tiquot of orthodox Marae theory ofthe state ate Mave thei aecepranc of the Ks of 3 clstpescious ring cl Sccom Tang that hte ea Ua in rss tng for rejcering the tea of a cseconscious rung els. Thi Cevelota structural guns that shows that ven i he “hc ling asc const et nan Strongly discouraged. fom pursuing antrspiult polices (eta tothe bse of expat ration and de he how it grows out ofthe strucete elatorsip among Spite, wothers; nd sate manages Final 1 nly ana ipfethe impiaions of es sgument foe cpa’ cutene Uiticules i he Unied Sete The Critique of tastrumentaion Inecent yeasts ben the formulation of tte of st tmentatb A numberof writers have caracterie the ortho dx slrsise view of the state 35 instamentism eesuse i Siew the sate 352 simple tol or instrument of rulings wrposes. Fist, i neglects the ideologel ole of the sate Th sae plays acl vole in maintuning the legtincy 1 the socal order, and this ries that the state appeae 60 be ewe in the cas strugle In shor, even i the state an instrament uling-lss purpose the face Mat ic muse appar ch of thee categories equ see definiion: “Capit class” oF ling ces aed to tet tothe iduas and Cais that on Chace strate quantity of capitals The cats point would vary by eta penal woul nese he sneha bi, bt the po ito disangush howween sal: businesses and Large cyan fro the “managers ofthe state apparatus” cle the leaing fies he egtne an exeeuie bance eking cn servant aswel appurated and lected polis {ig clas being uscd in she broad sense Tinlad host ot those who 12h thee tabor for wages umeaged workers, andthe unemploxc otherwise indicates the need for a more complex framework, for analyzing state policies. Second, instrumentalism fils co Fecognize that to act in the general interest of capital, the state must be able (9 take aetions against the particular iter ests of capitan estrictions on the export fof capital, for esample, might be in the general interest af capital in 4 particular period, even iF they temporarily daced the pronts of must capitaiss, To carey through aust policgs, the state mnast have mote autonomy: Frans divect cap talise control than the instrumentalist view would allow The critics oF instrumentals propose the idea of the rela tive autonomy ut tie state as an alternative traniework bn se controls of fonlee-t0 serve the general interests of capital, the state must hhave some gutonomy: from direct ruling-dlass cunteol. Siace the concept of the absolute autonomy’ of the state would he lun-Marsist and fue, the autonomy’ is clearly felarive. Hose fevers the difficalty i in specifving the astute, linits, and sl ferminants of that relative autonomy. Some writers have attempted 10 argue thar the degree of autonomy varies histor cally, and that “late espitalisin” i eharacterized by the “auton: fomization of the state apparatus.” But these arguments have at ad hoc quali, and they share an analytic problem derives from the phrase “relative autonomy from ruling-lass contol” The basic problem in foxmnblations of “relative autonomy” is the conceptuslizaton of the ruling class, Relative automo theories assume thatthe euling elas will respond effectively to the state's abuse of that autonomy. But for dhe ruling cuss to be eapable of taking sueh eorteetive actions i must have sonic degree of polivical cohesion, an understanding of its general interests, and a high degrce of politial sophistication, tn sas, the theory cequices that the euling cass, Or a portion oF i. be classconscious, that is, aware of what is necessury to repro: duce eapiralist social felations in changing historical ciecun stances. Yet if the evling class or a segment of it i clas conscious, then the degree of autonomy’ of the state bs cleats 4gite limited. At this point the theory of relative auconoas collapses back into a slihdly more sophisticated version ot instrumentals. State policies continue to be seen as the re fection of inputs by a class-vonscious ruling class The way out of this theoretical bind, the way to formulate 4 critique of instrumentalist that docs not collapse, is to eject the idea of a class-conscious ruling class. Instead of the felative autonomy framework the key idea becomes a division ff labor between those who accumulate capital and those who ‘manage the state apparatus. Those who accumulate cay conscious of their interests as capitalists, but, in general, they fre not conscious of what is necessary to reproduce the social ‘order in changing circumstances. Those who manage the state apparatus, however, are forced to concern themselves to a greater degree with the reproduction of the social order be- ‘cause theje continued power rests on the maintenance of po ‘eal and economic order. In this framework, the central theo {etial task is to explain how itis that despite this division of labor, the state tends to serve the interests of the capitalist ‘lass. It is to this task—the elaboration ofa structural theory of the state—that I will turn after a brief discussion of the ision of labor between capitalists and state managers. JON of labor between non-lass- ‘conscious capitalists and those who manage the state apparatus fan be found in Marx's writings! Two factors, however, have ‘obscured this aspect of Marx's thought. First, Marx did not spell out the nature of the structural framework in which that division of labor operated, although he hinted at the existence fof such a framework. Second, Marx's discustion of these issues is clouded by his polemical intent to fx responsibility forall tspects of bourgeois sdciety on the ruling class. Even when ‘Marx recognizes that the ruling clas lacks class consciousness, he still formulates his argument in such a way a3 to imply that the ruling clas as a whole isin conscious control of the situa tion. Marx used the idea of a conscious, directive ruling class 4 a polemical shorthand for an claboration of the structural ‘mechanisms through which control over the means of produc- tion leads to control over other aspects of society. "The tension in Marx's formulations is clearest in The Bigh- teenth Brumaire when he is explaining why the bourgeoisie ‘supported Louis Napoleon's coup d'état against the bourgeoi- sic's own parliamentary representatives. He writes: ‘The extra parliamentary mass of the bourgeoisie, on the other hand, by its erviity towards the Preset, by its lication of pulament, by the brutal maltreatment of is own prety invited Benipare to sppees is petog and wetny'ecton, ts rats ond fee hace eee a eae el one orp bebgeers Grae cnene eae ae Geers Fo get rid of the accumulating profit, and the patancn tary and Wray eepresetiines of that cas, whode cena concern ae diferent. Marx wes the notion of representation Sa subthute for spelfying she structural rlaonship that bos together the division of abo. ° In an eric sag, in dicsion ofthe petc bourgeois be tates what involved in the es of representation. Justa litle must one imagine thatthe democratic sentatives areal shopkeepers or enusastc champions Of shopkeepers. According to their education and\their inuividul postion they may be separated from them as widely as Neaven fom earth, What makes them represen: Tatives ofthe petly bourgeoisie isthe fact hatin thelr ws they do not go beyond the lms which the later do not go beyond inte, shat they ae consequenty aise abort the ame te sls o ich mmatel infres and socal position practical ahive the later. This sin general the relationship of he political and literary representatives of case tothe ass that they represen? Mack here rejects the simple reductionism s0 common amon Is followers For Mary epesentation was an abjctive eae Aonship one didnot need o be of ats tobe ite represen tative. And, in fact, repretentatives and ther clases did not always te eye 10 eye, since their diferent postion could lead to diferene perspectives. in sum, representatives are not typi Gl mmc of theca ant ha mina orto the cist a4 whole, the consciousness that paslamentary or literary representatives display. : (Marx's idea of representation suggests the general structural links between the capitalists and chose who manage the state apparatus, Marx recognized that those in the state apparatus tended to have a broader view of sociery chan the capitalists, although their view is stil far short of a general understanding ff what is necessary to reproduce the social order. After all the state managers’ preoccupation with the struggle Far polit I power distorts their understanding, This isthe source of the parliamentary cretnism” that made Louis Napoleon a better fender of the bourgeoisie’ interests than thac class's own representatives. Bue if peither the ruling cass nor its repre tives know what is necessary co preserve and reproduce apitalist social relations, why’ then does the state tend to do just that? The answer is that such policies emerge out of the Structural relationships among state managers, capitalist, and workers Subsidiary Structural Mechanisms WHEN MARXISTS #UT FORWARD a radical critique of instru mentalist views of the state, they usually do so ro justify re formist socialist politics. When one argues thac the ruling cass is diffused, lacks class consciousness and political sophistca tion, it seems to follow that if socialists could gain control of the levers of the existing tate, they would be able to use the state to effect the transition to socialism. The logic is impec cable—if the state is nor inherently a too! of the ruling clas, then i¢ ean be turned into a tool of the working clss. Th reformist view shares with instrumentalism a personalstic re dductionism—either he ruling class conteols the state penon ally and disectly o¢ i does no& control it a¢ all. in whieh ease the state can be used for other purposes. Neither view recog izes the structural mechanisms that make the state serve caps alist ends regaedless of wivether capitalist invervene dicectly and consciously. However, once these mechanisos are wader stood, itis possible to construct a critique of socialist retorm iam that is far more powerful than the critiques derived from the instcumentalis eadition Betore considering the major structural mechanisms, i is necessary to consider a number of subsidiary mechanisms. The fist of these includes all the techniques by which members of ns ine nn the ruling clas ate able (0 Influence the state apparatus cectly, Even though the members of the ruling class lack class consciousness, they ate acutely avate oftheir immediate inter ests as capitalists and ot the impact ofthe state on those inter ets. Capitalist, individually and in groups, apply pressure un the state for certain kinds of lucrative contract, for state spending sn certain areas, for legislative action in (cit favor for fx relief, for ovoee cifective action to control the labor force, and so on. Néedless to say, the pursuit of these various interests does nue ald up tu policies i the general interest of lpia. Even in the area of control of the Libor force, where the common interest among capitalists 1 strongest, the jul ies thatthe eapitaliss demand might not even bein thei sth longterm best interest. Nevertheless, capitalists attempe 1 assure Tesponsiveness by: the state through various means, ia ‘cluding campaign contributions, lobbying activities, and favors tw politicians and sil servants. While these techniques are primarily used tor increasing the state's receptivity to the special interests of particular eapitalists or groups of capital: ists, the qverall effecr of his proliferation of influence chan rel is to’ make those who run the state more likely c0 fect ‘modes of thought and behavior that conflict with the logic of capi Inveluded in the eateyory of inluence channels is the reer ment of rulingclass embers into government service, and is Fegent yeas, into participation in vatious private policy mahi, groups that have a powerlul impact on the Formulation of gos femnient policics Instrumentaliats tend to see such individ, a8 typical members of their class, and thei impact on the state is viewed ay the heat of capitalise cass rule. ln the perspective Ucing advanced here, this dipect rulingelass paticipation in policy formation iy viewed dlflerenty- For one thing ruling las members who devote substantial energy to policy forma: tion become atypieal of their class, since they see forced ( look at the world teom the perspective of stare managers, They ate quite likely” co diserge ideologically from politically un engaged ruling chss opinion, More important, even if theve ‘were no politically engiyed euling-lass members, there i sill ‘every reason to believe that the state and policy-making groups ‘would advance policies that are in the interests of the f class. Marx's formulation cited earlier makes clear that one does not need to be of the ruling cass to "represent it polit cally; when there are no rulingelass individuals around, ind viduals from other socal clisses will eagerly fil the role ot ‘ling las “representatives {All of the techniques of ruling class influence, inching direct participation, consticure a structural mechanism of sub sidiary importance. The influence channels make it less likely that state managers wil formulate policies thaccnniet directly with the interests of capitalists, But itis a subsidiary: mecha nism beeause, even in the absence of thes inluence channe!s, other structural mechanisms make it extremely dificult ter the state managers co carry through anti-apitalist poicics While instrumentalists argue thar influence i the core of ruling class control of the state, iti really more like the icing on the cake af class rule. “The sume cannot be said ofa second subsidiary mechanism — bourgeois cultural hegemony. The relevant aspect of cultural hegemony is the widespread acceptance of éertain unvritten tales about what is and what is not legitimate state actvies While these rules change overtime, a goverament that violates the unuritten rules of a particular period would stand ro lose 4 good deal ofits popular support. This acts asa powerful com straint in discouraging certain types of state action that might conflict with the interests of capital. However, simply invoking the existence of bourgeois cultural hegemony begs the prob lem of explaining how that hegemony is generated. Here, 100, there must be specific structural mechanisms that operate 10 make “the euling ideas" consistent with class rule. However the task of explaining these structural mechanisms is beyond the scope of this essay Major Structural Mechanisms A VIABLE STRUCTUKAL ‘THEORY of the state mse do O49) Separate things. IC must elaborate the structural constraints that operate (0 reduce the likelihood thar state managers will act against the general interests of capitalists, An understand: ing of these constraints is particularly important for analy ing the obstacles to reformist socialist strategies, But a structural theory must abo explain the tendency of state managers to pursue policies that are i the general interests of capital 1, fot sulcieat ta explain why the stare avoids anticapitlist Policies: it i necessary to explain why the sate has served ( Fationalize capitalism. Once one rejects the ies af ruling cls cliss consciousiess, ote needs to provide an alternate expt nation of etlorts at eationale Both tendencies can be seve How the fet chat th who manage the sate appari replies of their mm Polidtal uleloge-—are dcpcidemt on the maintenance 4 economic Activity ism din, the tate il hav dil tiancinng ie vevenics atm alee level. Second. pubic support for regime wl cline sharply if the rogime psu lover 3 Serious deop in the kel of exami sti ith a parallel xe in unemployment and shortages of he) gots Such drop in support incresss the likeli that he sua ‘And even it the deop ix ao shat rami, it wl increas the challenges t0 the regime and decrease the fegine’s poi In capitalist economy: the level of economic sciiy s tangy deterined by the private ivsstentdevsone of ap tals, This means that etpitalis im thee collcene rok investors, havea veto verte pics i hat here Co invest at adequate level can extate major poli prbieay for the stice managers. This, ioe Site sae en continued power res on shel ceonom. Thee ll be toward the gl of faetating nd encouraging peste west tent tn dotng so he state manager aes the problem o investment front broader perspective than thao the isl eaptaine This crates the Bkelnood that such pli es wil th etl terest apt Constraints on State Policies THUS 15, OF COUNSE, too simple, Both sides of the picture constraints and rationalization—must be filed out in greater etal to make this approach convincing. One problem, in pa ticular, stands out —il caputalists have a veto over state poli ces, isn’t this simply another version of instrumentalism? The ansver (0 this question les ia a more caretul analysis of the Aeterminants of investment decisions. The most uselul concept is the idea of business confidence. Individual capitalists decide ‘on thei rate of investment in particular country on the basis ‘ofa variety of spevfic variables such asthe price of labor and the size of the market for a specie pranuct- Wu there also au intangible variable —the vapitals’s evaluation of the gen eral polticalreconomie climate. Is the society stable, is the ‘working class under conteol;are tes likely to rises do yovern: ‘ment agencies interfere with business freedoms; will the econ: ‘omy grow? These kinds vf considerations are citical to the investment decisions of each firm. The sum of all of these ‘evaluations across a national economy can be termed the level ‘of business confidence. As the level of business confidence de: dines, 0 will the rate of investment, Business confidence abso hhas an intemational dimension when nations are integrated inco a capitalist world economy. Multinational eorporativas, international bankers, and curcency. speculators also make judgments about 4 particular nation’s poltica/economic el ‘mate which determine their willingness {0 invest in assets in ‘that nation, This, in turn, will affeet the internal evel of bust ress confidence and the rate of productive investment. Business confidence is, however, very diferent from “ruling: lass consciousness" Business confidence is bused on an evs tion of the marker thar considers polivieal events only as they might impinge on the market. This means that itis rooted in the narrow selfanterest of the individual eapiealse who is ‘worried about profit. Business confidence, especially because Of its critical ternational componsnt, docs not make subtle evaluations 35 10 whether a regime is serving the fongrterm ‘interests of capital, When there is political turmoil and popular mobilization, business confidence will fall, und it will rise whem there is a restoration oF order, no matter how brutal tu was busines contidence thie responded so tavurally co Louts Napalson's soup suse he promised (0 teso4e fhe conditions tor business 35 usual, despite negative impic tions forthe politcal rights of the bourgsvise. The erudeno fof buginess ebntdence makes capita peculiarly vulnerable to authoritarian regimes that are capable Of acting agains the general interests or capital" Othe dynamic of business conic a8 4 consesint on the crs ofthe state pparats ean be grasped Dy tracing ot wf what happens when lefeot enter govsenments an cm fair feome {© poser through patlasientary m push theaugi major tetris. The scenario d ‘wcutieth-cearure experiences including that of Chile der Allends. From the avomene that the leit wins the election, business eomtidence declines The most important manifests tigi af this decline is an increase in speculation agaist the hation’s cuttency. Reformist governments are always under suspicion that they will pursue inllationary poliies: 4 higher rate of ination means that the international salue of the nation’s curreney will fall. Speculators begin co discount the curteney for the expected inllation as soon 38 possible ‘This association between reformist governments and intl tion iy not atbitray. Reformist policies —higher levels of ployment, redistcibution of income toward the poor, improves Social services —clirectly ur indtectly lead to shitt of income from profits rowed the working class Businesses attempt 6 resist sugh a shite by raising prices so that profit lscls will wot bbe reduce In short, price milaion in ehis conteyt isa marker response to polices that tend to benefit the working cass, Tic feformist government, faced with the initial speculative assault fon its eurreney, has two choices. Ie can resssure the snter national and domestic business community, mahing cleat i intention (© pusue orthodox economic policies Or, it can ‘s bog he spe ofthis ey wo expat te dymamice ofan tatiana tm capi sacs Hhnnces es impertan to pee sane {content co the tant rai then that auehoraran fleet seco {est solution for capt iets ‘sored to when whe heat of tevlatonSroae Parts the anew ‘hat athortacian pies ae les vliablet serig the genes ntsc ‘capital esau te stud mechani desrbel ete do at ope Ielaihe sae way tn the inch a pariamensaah. ed 0 parame forge ahead witn its reform program. If it pursues the la course, an increased rate of jollation and an eventual ‘ational monetary crisis is likely. The international ersis results from the combination of com: tinued speculative pressure against the currency and several new factors. Domest inflation is ikely eo affect the nation’s balance of trade adversely, leading (0 a real deterioration in the nation’s balance ot payments account. In addition, inlls tion and loss uf contidence in the currency leads t0 the Hight ‘of foreign and domestic capital and incceased foreign reluc- tance to lend money to the allicted nation, The initial specula- tive pressure against the currency’ could be tolerated, che-erup tion of an acute internarioual monetary crisis requires some kind of dramatic response, The government may renounce its reformism or cede poser to 4 more “responsible” administea But if the government is committed to detending its pro: rans, it will have to aet (0 insulate its economy from the [pressures of the international marker by imposing some com= ination of price controls, import controls, and exchange controls. Escalation in the government's attempt to control the mar- ket sets off a new chain of-events. These new controls involve threats co individual eapitaliss. Price controls mean that frsns lose the ability to manipulate one of the major determinants of profit levels. tmport controls mean chat a firm may n longer be able to import goods critical co its business. Fx: ‘change concrols mean that firms and individuals no longer are able to move theie assets eely to secure international havens. The fact that assets are locked into a rapidly inflating poses the possibility that large fortunes will be lost. ‘These are the ingredients for a sharp declive in domestic business confidence. Why should business ownees continue 0 invest if they must operate in an environment in which the government violates the fundamental rules of a market sconomy? AA shatp decline in business confidence leads to a parallel economic downturn. High rates of unemployment voevint with annoying shortages uf ertical commodities. The popur larity of the regime falls precipitously: The only alternative to ency TUG MARXIST THEORY OF THE stare » ‘capitulation-eliminating controls and initial reforms — is sharp forward movement to socialize the economy. The govern ment could pur people back to work and celieve the shortazes by taking over private firs, However, the political basis ivr this hind oF action docs wor evist, even where the leaders the government are rhetorically committed & the goal of sovialism Generally, the retoenust government las not pre pared ifs electoral supporters tor esteeme action uy entire program has been based on the promise a gradual tezmition Further, the goverment leaders themselves become immerses in the politcal culture ofthe state apparatus, militating againxt a shaep break with the status qu ‘The ‘butcome of this umpase is tragically Familiar. Vie government either falls trom power through standand parli: mentary mesns loss af an election, defection of some Of ws parliamentary support-~or it 4s removed militarily Milica Actions that violate eonsticutionality mect Formilable obstacles in fiberal capitalist nations, but when economic chavs severe diminishes the legitimacy ofa regime, the chances vt a miliary coup are enhenced. When the military intervenes, it does not do 50 as a tool of the ruling class, 1 acts according to its own ideas ofthe need to restore political order and fests, Naturally, the removal of the reformist government less to 4 rapid revival of business confidence simply because otter hhas been restored. However, it should be stressed that thi revival of business eontidence might not be sustuined. since there ean be substantial conicts between the interests of the military and the capitis, ‘The key point in elaborating this seenariy is that the ebain of events en untld without any members of te eubig elas consciously deciding Go aet "politically" against the regime in power. OF course, such a scenario s usually filled out with great deal of eaitortliing against che fegine in che bourse press, much grumbling among the upper classes, nd even Somme onspiracoral activity. But te point is that onspinavies to Aescabilze the reyime are basically superuous, since deisions ‘made by individual capitalists according fo their own nartine economic rationality ate suticient to. paralyze the teyine, creating 4 situation where the regime's fall is the only puss bit Rationalization {THE BYNAMIE OF business confidence helps explain why gow cernments are constrained from pursuing ant-eaptaist policies, Ie remains co be explained why governments tend to acc in the general interests of capital. Part of the answer has already been Suggested. Since state managers are so dependent upon the ‘workings of the investment accumulation process, i is nacural, that they will use whatever resources are available to aid chat process. In administering a welfare program, for example, they ‘sill organize it to aid the accumulation process, pethaps by ‘ensuring certain industries 4 supply of cheap labor, Unlike the individual capitalist the state managers do aot have to operate fon the basis of nusrow profit maximizing rationality. They are capable of intervening in the economy on the bass of a ‘more general rationality. In short, theic structural position gives the state managers both the interest and the eapacity «© id che investment accumulatign process. ‘There is one major difficulty in this formulation —the prob: lem of explaining the dynamic through which reforms that io- exease the rationality of capitalism come about. Almost al of these reforms involve an extension of the states role in the ‘economy and society, either in a regulatory capacity or in the provision of services, The diculy is that business confidence has been depicted as so shortsighted that it is likely to decline in the face of most efforts to extend the state's role domest- cally, since such efforts threaten to restrict the freedom of individual eapitalists and/or increase the tax burden on capital iss. If the sate is unwilling to risk a decline in business conti- dence, how is ithen that the state's role has expanded! incor ably throughoue the twentieth century? “Most theorists escape this problem by rejecting the idea that the capitalists are as shortsighted as the idea of business cow Suence suggests. Even if many members of the lass share the retrograde notions implicit inthe idea of business confidence, there is supposed to be a substantial segment ofthe class that js forward looking and recognizes the value of extending the state's power. Theorists of corporate liberalism have attempted. to trace many of the major extensions of stare power in twen tieth-century America to the influence of such forward-looking members of the culing class. However, the position of these theorists ultimately requires an aceibution of a high level of conciousness and understanding (0 the ruling elas oF a s ment o? if. and assumes an’ instrumental view of the state where state polivies can be reduced €0 the input of cert ruling-eass factions.” There i, however, an alternative tent with the view of the ruling class ‘been advanced in this paper. Ie epends on the existence ot another structural mechanssm ~-elass steuggle, Whatever th ne of argument, consi: the state that has tole of cis stvggl m vancing the devlopment ut revo Sonity consciousness cys struggle betwee proetarat nd taliog els in Maras view his another important function, i pes forward the develpent of capitalism speeding the process by whi eaptaom advances the development of the Productive forces. This conservative inthe shave term, but Progress inthe longterm t bigs cloner the ime shen pitas will exhaust is capacity to develop the prose forces and wll be ripe for overthrow, Cis struggle produces this csule most cleanly in conlce over wages, When worker, de able co win wage gins, they incase the presure onthe Capitals to find ways to subtute machines for people 9s fare deste the cycle, wage gains are followed by i teoye peril of mechanization assemployers atempt €0 it reas the ate of explotaton: the commence a iners inthe sig of the andustal reste arms, a machines teplce Workers. This, im torn hininshes the capsciey oF workers co sin wage gins, wn the economic boom spun cicates a uber shortage: While thi descaion applies particulary to cont Petite eaptaion. the point that worker se acs’s ety = plan important role in speeding of technologea mnoeations ling strngle responsible for Inuch ofthe ecmvnic damian of caption “Tis pattern gues beyond the srugle over wages. Fra the leginning of ciprtaom, workers have srugled 10 impeove thei tiny contin, whic abo means upping tei poner tial ay labor force For example, unbridled ea apa through eld Iaboe and horrendously long working ly tivcatened 10 destroy the capacity of the Working cts to teprenice ill an outcome not sn the longcant tc of capitalists. So working people’ struggles against child labor against incredibly low standards of public health and housing and for the shorter day, made it possible forthe class to repre: duce itself, providing capitalism a new generation of laborers {In each historical period, the working class struggles to repro: duce itself ata higher level of existence. Workers have played an important role, for example, in demanding increased public ‘education, Public education, in turn, helped create the edt tated labor pool that developing capitalism rested. Obvi ously, not every working-class demand conteibutes to the ad ‘ance of capitaism, but it foolish to ignore this dimension of class steugle {mn es struggles co protect itself from the eavages of a mather ‘economy, the working class has played a hey role inthe steady expansion of the state's role in capitalist societies. Pressures from the working class have contributed to the expansion af the state's role in the regulation of the economy and in the provision of services. The working class has not been the ualy force behind the expansion of the state’ role in these areas, Examples can be cited of capitalists who have supported an expansion of the state's role into a cercain area either because ‘of narrow self-interest —aecess to government contracts, oF because government regulation would hamper competitors— tor because of some farsighted recognition of the need to ‘oropt the working class However, the major impetus for the extension of the state’ cole hus came from the working clas and from the managers uf the state apparatus, whore own Powers expand with a yrosving state Once workingrclass pressures sueceed in extenng the state's role, another dynamic begins €0 work, Those whio manage the state apparatus have an interest in using the stute’s resources to facilitate a smooth tow of investment. There will be + ten dency (0 use the state’ extended role forthe sume ends The capacity of the state to impose greater rationality on capital inm is extended into new areas asa result of working-class prc ‘sues. Working-class pressures, for example, might lead to an pansion of educational resvurecs available Yr the working sass, but there is every likelihood thatthe enntent of the ed sation will be geared tw the needs of accumulation —the pra duction of 4 docile work force at an appropriate vel of shill, (r similarly, working-clas pressures might force the gosesn rent fo interne in the fee market to produce higher levels Of employment. but the governeot will use its eapande powers of intervention to ai the accumulation process more general ‘This pattern is nor a smoothly working functional procs, alvays producing the sime result. Fist, workings move Inents have often been aware of the danger of aking desman that will ultinately strengeben a sate they perceive as hele For precisely this reason, socialist movements ave otten demanded that expanded socal services be wworkingelas control Howerse, working.clis sknady ae farely ganted ther original ten, Otten, de clement of the mosemient are repressed td sate tine tht soncessjons re nude. Second, thete can be 4 serous tn Lig betseen granting concessions to the working chins and i covering Way thatthe eatension of the state's power ca be sed £4 aid the accumulation process. There might in face be continuing tensions in 4 government program beticen its int grave intent and is role in the wecumulstion process Finally, some conersions 0 working ass presure might have 1) poteival Lenets for accumulation and might simp plave Suiains op the private economy. Hf these straits are imide one auld expect serious ears to revoke ut neutralize the feforms. I the sesins occur over the Tong term, then eapit:! ism faces svete problems because it becomes inicssng ii cule ca tll back concessions that have stow for some Gi.” These pits sggest thatthe tency or che stage aioe capa sure ith a peat dea nf eton nd ese, the sdeny di ait becuse ofthe partic of the state manages Wier tere tong popular promt imrkes, the ste manage ust weigh shee totus Fist they oot wnt to danoge bine cantnence, which gent sly esp wtoray an capansion ofthe powers An avis example ee the commie 9 minting “ul en lopment” His wis a concession geamed to the mort sine te Mech of the Gest Depron, but has prove ixtessigly ct ortho develops putahesnaone role in providing social services or in regulating the market Second, they do not want class antagonisms «0 escalate co 4 level thar would endanger their own rue. Third, they recog ize that their own power and resources will yeow i the state's role is expanded. If the state inanagers decile co respond to pressuve with concessions.” they are likely to shape their con ‘essions in a manner thar will last offend business confidence and will most expand thei own power. These to constraints incresse the likelihood that the eoncessions will ultimately serve to rationalize capitalism, Major Reforms ruts ANGEMENT succesTs that while some concessions will bbe made to the working class, the dhveat of a decline in busi ‘ess eontidence will block major efforts to rationalize capital jam, Since business contidence is shortsighted, ic will oppose even pro-capitalistretorm programs if such programs promise 4 husjor increase in taxes oF @ major increase in the govern rment’s capacity to regulate markets. This leaves the problem of explaining the dramatic increases ip the state's role that have occurred in all developed capitalist nations during the course of this century. The explanation is that there are cer tain periods —during wartime, major depressions, and periods of postwar reconstruction —in which the decline of business ‘confidence a a veto on government policies doesn't work, ‘These are the periods in which dramatic increases in the state's role have occurred, In wars thit require major mobilizations, business conf dence loses its sting for several reasons. Furst, international Inusiness confidence becomes les important, sive international capital Hows tend co be placed under governavent control Secon, private investment becomes secondary t0 militan’ pro- duction in maincaining high levels of economic activity, Thitd, in the general patriotic climate, ic would be dangerous for the business community to disrupt the economy: through negative ‘They ao Have che option of cesponding to prsures tough severe fepretion, The chsce between conceit sod fopeeaioa isle the sate managers on the Lass of thee perespio the pene ‘aronment sad their political onentations, actions.* ‘The result i that state managers hase the oppo tity 10 expand their own power with the unassailable justice fion thar such tions are necessary’ tor the War effort, Seine fof thee wartime measures wll be rolled back once pote fetus, but sonie will become part of the landscape, WJ postwar reconsteuetion periods, atceent, Low levels of economic In serious depressions the dynamics are some aetivity-inean chat the threat o¥ declining busines» eantidence loses its power, a€ the sime Gime that popular demands toe tn such perils, the state mas to bosiness opinion and can vs ‘economic revival are stro agers cat pay less atten centrate on respoasing to the popular pressure. while set Toexpand thsirown power However, there are still constr fon the state nuanayers, Their eaptinued rule depends on thei capacity to revive the economy. As government actions pross cticetie in reucing uneinploy ment, redistributing income. oF expanding output, the political balance shits. Pressure tom below if likely «0 diminish; business contidence teemerges a a force once economic recovery begins Ii short, suseess Ful reforms will tils the balance of power back (0 4 point ‘where capitalists regain theirveto over estensions vf te sates tole le jnereasel capacity of stare managers to intervene in the economy during these periods does now automatically rational ive eapitaisn. Stare managers can make all hinds uf austakes including excessive concessions t0 the working elass. Stite managers have no ypectal hrawlege of what is necessary (0 ‘make capitalism more cational; they: grope coward elfecive action as best they ean within existing political constesints 4nd Thee agus lh ane shat same sylicant eee of eatin molars anus shissemc, the business cnn et rongce during Viena than during Kea (in tcc ean be aga thor he Johnaon adounniration's dese to continue excising ih Vt ‘urs ra aos of desing buns sombdence} Ins ese: the bse ‘eve Community lick of enrhunay for war can peeves mubistion ‘lore from geting the ground in time, This was cealy an element {nthe French olay darng World War H But how dues busine enue evtute watt) I woul iggest thatthe anewer erin tea Shurcasmcumalratons rather than a8 calcio tthe nathan {com sntroutona aio, tn condones weak demand, te ob ‘tiaras genre ens asec bases conten with available economic teories.* The puint is simply: that ionalization can emerge us a by-product of state managers’ ddual interest in expanding their own power and in assur reasonable level of economic activity. The more pawer the State possesses to intervene in the capitalist economy, the afeater the likelihood that effective actions ean be taken 10 Facilcae investment Not every extension of state power will survive beyond those periods in which state managers have speci opportun ties to expand the state’s role. After a war, depression, or period of reconstruction, the business comunity 1s likely 10 ‘sampuign for a restoration of the status yu auc. State man agers in these new periods will be forced (0 make some eonces sions to the business community in order to avert decline in business confidence. However, the state managers also want t avoid the elimination of certain reforms important tor the stabilization of the economy and the integration of the work ing class. Setfinterest also leads them co resist a complete elimination of the state's expanded powers. The consequence is a selection process by which state managers abandon gertain, feforins while retaining others. In this process, reforms that ace most beneficial for capitalism will be reuined, while those whase effects are more questionable will be eliminated. Again, the ultimate outcome is determined by intense politcal seule Conclusion 1 PURPOSE OF THIS ESSAY has been to argue that a viable Marxist theory of the state dspends on the rejection of the ‘ea of a conscious, politeall directive, ling class, BY re This wat the case with the New Deal. The Roosevelt simply stmbled on some of the elients nese for {tthe economy. The openstued muse a he proces Sinden the fact that fll recovery wa ot achieved unl the mbes fo Word War {This kindof selection process was eat out by the Consretve gow examen that came ro power in Britain in 1931 ater Lat ha pesed ‘ver postvat reconstruction. The dangers nvoled nthe selection pros ‘i ate indicted by the fac thar Beitun’s lng cin prospects aes Salar nation might have Beem improved by the fetcnton 9 oneal be {hour seforne tb turning (© Marx's suggestions that the historic process un folds “behiod the bucks” of the actors (including the rvling class actors. itis possible to locate the structural mechanics that shape the workings of the capitaist state. These mechs mis operate independently: of any poltieal vonscivusness on the part, of the ruling eLiss. Invtexd, capitaint tamales emerges out of the three sel feltionship amg caps warkers, and stale managers. The steuctueul position ol state ‘managers. trees them tw achieve sume consciousness of what is necessary’ ro maintain the viability of the sucal utder. le this consciousness char explains both the reluctance of state managers to otfenl business conideace. and thee eapacies to sationalizg a capitalist society. Uawever, the fact of conscious ness doey not imply conttol over the historieal process. State managers ate able co act only in the terrain that matted out by, the inerecsion wf ewo factors—the intensin, of elie struggle und the level of economic activity. ‘This framework has implications for 4 wide cange of thew setical and political questions. One of the most critical ot these concerns capitalism's eapacity (0 overcome its sur ‘economic diticulties, Analests on the lett have presticted thar the forward looking segment of the American ruling tliss will favor a further extension of the sate’ role in regulating the {conomy” as 4 means co solve the problems of stugiation ™ ‘This perspective exaggerates the capacity of eapitilsn to 2 form ttelf in “normal” perio’s, and is unable to account, for ‘example, for the inabulity of Betish capitalism to ratinilice fivelf during the long period of decline since the nineteen fifties, The framework developed here predicts tat while the Working class ane the state mangers themselies might faves an expansion of state untesention, business caniulence wall sifeetively veto suc changes. te therefore quite pussible that fhe American economy will continue in Hs present state of ‘ss for many years to eome 1 For omy sveys of recent Sarsse work om the tte oe paket 3h ike other dnpaosunate see Alun Wollr “New Ducane an Marxist Theo Pulte.” Polincs and Seuety wok dae Sdn and si Too and Ba Olin Wig, “econ Fi a ee ll ds Developments in Marxist Theorie of dhe Capitalist Sate,” pats and 2sMlonbly Resicw, Octaber snd Novemer 1973, 2 Fr cies ul sch incerpretations of Watepue, sce Steve Weisiian n ‘Steve Weissman, eg Braver und etn ompany Te Wri sti rg A Ca ampats Pres, 1974), pp. 297-310; and Sehen Jonson tithe Wes Was Won: Last Shootout forthe Vankes-Cowboy Theory.” hans 2m Socologie. Winter 1973, pp 61-93. inuenced bythe arguments of Nic Poutants 1 his Problems wf the Caplan State" New haf fe fnew 58 (Noverber-December 1959) lowever, my anaysh legs fom Roulanear i cao important respec ic ces to ntsbute coe ‘tthe fling cats nde fay explain adequately the mechanisms by which the sate struct pains 'n tis eee ny pontion i hse co that of Class Otte ins umber ot areics.inslaling "Sects! ablone ot a Capalnt State im Klaus von Heya od German Polite! Sro (ewe ths Cal Sage Pubiations, 1976), ond Claus Oe Volker Ronge, “Theses on the Theary of te Sane” New Contes Cari 6 at 1375. 4 tn The German tology, tex and Engels clk about 2 dvsion ot labor and of sneres between capitate andthe produces of boss 50 that nude ths elas one pst appears asthe the lisse acthe,conceptive eclots er livelihood, wile the others" aude 0 these idest and dieses a more pave an recepive because they ue neal the sete bers of chs cla and hae es time © make op about thesis” In Mobee C. Tucker ed Tot Mare Eages Reser {New York: Norton, 1971). pp. 136-4%. This sugges a selopocs ‘vision of labor betwen captains and state managers in buco bowen, tetingidcoloptsov sate manage arpa f the sling clase olutes the nea shat cu detrmined by macs celadion soaks Imeam of production. tn shor. Mark snd Engel ‘ing the ation ofthe rating cla as poled tense, 4 “The Eighteenth Beane dp. 508, 6 wid, p 508 7 or sige of cnporte lider theory, see Fed lack, “ieyand Corporate Livers, Sisal Problems forthcoming & Secor example, Stunkey Aronowit“Modemitog Captian” Sail Poly: May"June 1973, and Jame Croty and Kato ody, Wha snip" The Bogrsie. February 1978 Such anatycs tendo assume thatthe eottndictons of esc)

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