Noor Mohammed aka Khalid, G2128373, ISTAC Semester 2 (2021-2022)

Book Review
Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment:
A Global and Historical Comparison
AHMET T. KURU, San Diego State University

Edward Said sagaciously mentions in his seminal work on Orientalism that economics,

politics and sociology in the modern academy are ideological sciences, and, went on to

unequivocally state that, “No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from

the circumstances of life…” Sadly, many modern Muslim academics have been in one way or

the other deeply influenced by Western Orientalist writings. To expect Ahmet Kuru, who

teaches in a Western University, to write a book encompassing economics, politics and

sociology being totally detached and free from ideological leanings is to expect the

impossible.

Kuru’s book “Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical

Comparison” can also be classified as belonging to the genre of ‘decline literature’. What one

would have expected Kuru to demonstrate, given his political science background, and the

fact that he did not really belong to the Occident, is a balanced essay on the causes for decline

of the Muslim world which took cognizance of heterogenous factors and multiple actors who

differed from geography to geography and century by century. What, however, emerges is a

narrative that paints the entire Muslim world, starting from the 12th century until modern

times, with a single, albeit, broad, brush.

Interspersed in the book, to be fair to the author, are his brave attempts to exonerate Islam

and early Muslims from the calumnies spread by Orientalists and others who deny Muslims

any major civilizational paradigm changes, and who blame the religion of the Muslims as

being responsible for their decline.

This apart, Kuru claims that the decline of the Muslims, after a bright period starting from the

8th and lasting up to the 11th century, was caused by what he calls the “ulema-state alliance”.

His singular obsession with this claim so overpowers him that he sees no other factors but the

nexus of the ulema and the state for the decline; invariably he tends to see very few bright

spots in the millennium that passed between the 12th and 21st centuries.

Kuru begins by asking questions like, “Why are Muslim-majority countries less peaceful, less

democratic, less developed?” (1) He postulates that, “In early Islamic history, Islamic

scholars generally regarded close entanglements with political authorities as corrupting; they

preferred to be funded by commerce and maintained close relations with merchants”. (3).

Since the 12th century, he claims, Muslim ulema began to depend on rulers for their

sustenance since, in Kuru’s estimation, the merchant-class, the main sponsors of the ulema,

was side-lined. This—the side-lining of the mercantile class and the growing dependency of

the ulema on state-funding— led to, what Kuru alleges, the stifling of intellectualism, which,

in turn, led to the unbridled authoritarianism of the state, abetted by the ulema-class. And

these factors, Kuru wants the reader to believe, did not change for a 1000 years, whereas the

West was able to grow in science and technology and business, overcoming the Muslim

world in all spheres of life, especially form the latter-half of the 18th century.

The absurdity of such a claim, of the ulema-state alliance remaining the singular factor that

led to the continuous decline of Muslim countries, over 10 centuries, and irrespective of the

wide-spread geographies, needs very little effort to prove. Yet, it will be in order to highlight

major deficiencies in the arguments posited by the author. The following list may be

instructive in setting the records straight:

1. Kuru states that early scholars like Imam Abu Hanifa did not depend on state-funding.

However, it is clearly evident that many later-day scholars even up to our own times

have been suffering at the hands of despotic Muslim rulers, not to speak of non-
 Muslim despots who have persecuted their Muslim minorities, especially the ulema

who represented them. These scholars have vigorously refused state funding.

2. No evidence from primary sources is furnished to prove that the agricultural levies

imposed on land-owners, the Iqta, was responsible for the ulema being forced to

depend on the state for their livelihood. (4)

3. In the author’s opinion, if the Nizamiyyah madressahs had not existed, there would

have been a wider flowering of intellectualism. (4). Kuru did not think it necessary to

prove how this would have happened.

4. “From the twelfth to the fourteenth century, the Seljuk model of the ulema–state

alliance spread to other Sunni states in Andalus, Egypt, and Syria, particularly the

Mamluks. The Crusader and Mongol invasions accelerated the spread of this alliance

because Muslim communities sought refuge from the chaos of foreign invasion in

military and religious authorities”. (4). This is but natural. Yet, to extrapolate what

transpired for a century or two as being a permanent feature is unsubstantiated by the

author. Also, while the Mongols ransacked Baghdad in 1258, around the same time,

Islam spread very rapidly in Southeast Asia, with the help of sufis and orthodox

scholars. Local rulers who had converted to Islam also helped in the spread, using the

power of arms when needed. (Khairudin Aljunied). While admitting this spread of

Islam in southeast Asia, the author mentions these states as “small states”. Today, the

Muslim population of these “small states” exceeds that of Turkey, and other populous

Muslim countries.

5. Another observation of Kuru that “these Southeast Asian states did not have an

ulema–state alliance and they were mainly mercantile”, is not accurate. While the

merchants brought Islam to the coastal cities, it was the “Islamic actors”, sufis and
 ulema, who were responsible for the rapid spread of Islam in the hinterland and the

other parts of the Archipelago (Khairudin Aljunied).

6. Another of the sweeping allegations is the following, “Later, around the sixteenth

century, Muslims established three powerful military empires: the Sunni Ottoman, the

Shii Safavid, and the Sunni-run (but non-sectarian) Mughal Empires. These empires

established versions of the ulema–state alliance in territories extending from the

Balkans to Bengal. These empires were militarily very powerful, but they failed to

revive early Muslims’ intellectual and economic dynamism because they virtually

eliminated philosophers and marginalized merchants.” (4-5). Despite making this bold

claim, the author mentions in a footnote, that, “After Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) in history,

Ali Kushji (d. 1474) in astronomy, and Taftazani (d. 1390) and Jurjani (d. 1414) in

theology, the Muslim world very rarely produced scholars in that caliber, with few

exceptions such as Takiyuddin (d. 1585) in astronomy and Mulla Sadra (d. 1640) in

philosophy.” Pg. 5 fn. 9. First, the above proves that all was not lost. Secondly, the

assertion that the “powerful Muslim empires” eliminated philosophers and

marginalized merchants is not substantiated with evidence from primary sources.

7. Certain notes mentioned are also contestable. For instance, ‘According to Anthony

Reid (1993b, 156), “no Islamic texts in Southeast Asian languages which date before

1590 have come to light”.’ Professor Murad Merican, ISTAC-IIUM, denies this. He

mentions that “there were earlier works written around the 1300, which were

translated into Bahasa Melayu from Parsi and Arabic.”

8. The author is at pains to explain how, “starting with Turkey and Iran in the 1920s,

new states that were formed in the Muslim world with few exceptions such as –Saudi

Arabia- did away with the ulema–state alliance and embraced more secular

arrangements of political power. But why, even in these cases of political

 secularization, did independent intellectual and bourgeois classes not emerge in an

influential manner?” (6)

9. The explanation which he provides for the above phenomenon is empirically very

weak. He alleges, “Islamic actors have shared negative attitudes toward the

independent bourgeoisie, given their statist and hierarchical outlook” (6).

10. Another of the reasons provided by Kuru for the decline is, “Shafi developed the

jurisprudential method that prioritized the literal understanding of the Qur’an and

hadiths followed by the consensus of the ulema, limiting the role of reason to mere

analogy. Moreover, with the works of such eminent ulema as Ghazali, Shafii’s

jurisprudential method influenced other fields of Islamic knowledge such as theology

and Sufis. (7). In response to this, Faisal Shah Alam (ISTAC-IIUM) writes, “It is true

that he put analogical reasoning (qiyas) as one of the sources after the Qur’an, the

Sunnah and ijma’. But you have to bear in mind that he incorporated rational

approach (bi’l ra’y) to balance out the more literalist approach that he took from his

teacher Imam Malik. …. Shafi’i was also quite flexible in his approach towards fiqh

as evidenced by the fact that he had two rulings (qaul qadim and qaul jadid) in his

fiqh; the second one was conceived after his move to Egypt. Later in the 11th century

Imam al Haramain al Juwayni made further enhancement in the Shafi’i school by

incorporating the demonstrative method of reasoning (burhan) in his usul al-fiqh.

Kuru’s other accusation that the Shafi’i school dominated the whole Islamic

epistemology including theology and Sufism could not be further from the truth. Ilm

al-kalam, whether the Ash’ari or the Maturidi variant, has always had its own fixed

set of epistemology which are the senses, the intellect and khabar sadiq (true

reports).”
 11. In one breath, Kuru blames Ghazali for stifling intellectualism, and in another breath

he credits him and Al-Shatibi for promoting the Maqasid al Sharia, or the higher

objectives of Islamic law, which, Kuru admits, is a way of making jurisprudence more

flexible”. (8). But, immediately thereafter, he goes on to allege that, “This

epistemology has been a source of the anti-intellectualism among the ulema,

Islamists, and Sufi shaykhs”, without providing any explanation.

The complete list this reviewer has prepared runs into over 25 pages. However, in sum, it can

be said that:

An objective analysis would consider the complexity and multidimensional aspects of the

Muslim states over the centuries, avoiding a tendency to vilify or vindicate any of the Islamic

actors.

Through his overtly simplified analysis in trying to prove why there was a decline in the

Muslim lands, beginning from the 12th century, blaming it squarely on the ulema-state

alliance, by clubbing together different Muslim states and treating them as a homogenous

entity, and by overlooking major achievements of Muslim empires over the long period of a

thousand years, Kuru has, so to speak, thrown almost the entire Muslim civilization under the

bus.

Also, the author does not refer to prominent research works by contemporary Muslim and

non-Muslim authors on the subject. Three such works which are relevant are:

1. Teaching and Learning in the Madrasas of Istanbul During the late Ottoman Period,

by Halil Ibrahim Erbay, a PhD Thesis, SOAS, University of London

2. The Role of The Ottoman Sunni Ulema During the Constitutional Revolution of 1908-

1909/1326-1327 and the Ottoman Constitutional Debates, by Yakoob Ahmed, Thesis

 submitted for the degree of PhD, 2017, Department of the Near and Middle East,

SOAS, University of London.

3. Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology, by Frank Griffel, Oxford University Press.,

2009.

One cannot fail to see a similar pattern as can be found in Kuru’s book, in most decline

literature which, regrettably, is written to cater to a Western or liberal audience.