HFSAFETY
Click to add text
Click to add text 1ST SEM
22-23
HFASAFETY Course Objectives:
•Understand the importance and the value of safety
•Know the health hazards and their prevention
•Identify and mitigate or prevent hazards
•Apply the concepts and principles of safety in engineering practice
Overview
“In flying I have learned that carelessness and overconfidence
are usually far more dangerous than deliberately accepted risks”
-Wilbur Wright
•Human factors and evolution of aviation safety management; safety terminology; safety
programs adopted by high risk industries; hazards in the construction, manufacturing, gas
and power plants, and other engineering industries and how to prevent or mitigate them;
techniques in hazard identification and analysis in workplaces; off-the-job safety; disaster
prevention and mitigation; and incident/ accident investigation
What is the difference of
Aviation Quality and Aviation Safety?
Aviation Quality
• is determining gaps based on non compliance with either the regulatory requirements or
organizational requirements.
What is Safety?
• is the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or property damage is reduced
to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard
identification and safety risk management.
CONCEPT OF SAFETY
• Zero accident
• Freedom from danger or risks
• Attitude towards unsafe acts and conditions by employees
• The degree to which the inherent risks in aviation are acceptable
• The process of hazard identification and risk management
• The control of accidental loss of persons , property and damage to the environment
SAFETY PROGRAMME
It is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving
safety.
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
An organized approach to managing safety , including the necessary
organization structures , accountabilities , policies and procedures.
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
(MINIMUMS)
•Identify safety hazards
•Ensure that remedial actions necessary to mitigate the risks/hazards are
implemented
•Provide for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the safety level
achieved
DIFFERENCE OF ICAO AND CAA
ICAO(International Civil Aviation Organization)
– Its role is to provide procedures and guidance for the safe conduct of
international aircraft operation
CAA – CIVIL AVIATION ADMINISTRATIONS
- is the state body responsible for implementing the legislative and regulatory
provisions for aviation safety.
DIFFERENCE OF ACCIDENT AND
INCIDENT
ACCIDENT
- occurrence during the operation of an aircraft which involves a fatality or
serious injury , substantial damage to the aircraft involving structural failure or requiring
major repair and the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible
INCIDENT
- occurrence , other than accident associated with the operation of an aircraft
which affects or could affect the safety of operation.
MANAGEMENT’S SPECIAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFETY
a.) clear direction in the form of credible policies, objectives, goals, standards
b.) adequate resources, including sufficient time, to fulfill assigned tasks
safely and efficiently
c.) expertise in terms of access to experience through saftey literature, trainings, seminars, etc
Terminologies to remember in
HFASAFETY
Slip
• is an action which is not carried out as planned and will therefore always be
observable
Hazard
• A condition, object or activity with the potential of causing:
✓Injuries to personnel;
✓Damage to equipment or structures;
✓Loss of material;
✓Reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function.
Terminologies to remember in
HFASAFETY
Mitigation
• Measures to eliminate the potential hazard or to reduce the risk probability or severity
Probability
• Likelihood that a situation of danger might occur.
Safety Assessment
• The process or action of performing hazard identification and risk analysis.
Severity
• The possible consequences of a situation of danger taking as reference the worse foreseeable
situation.
Risk Index
• The combined value of risk probability and severity.
Risk
• The potential chance of a loss or injury, measured in terms of severity and probability.
Terminologies to remember in
HFASAFETY
ALARP
- As Low As Reasonably Practicable
- means that any further risk reduction is either impracticable or grossly outweighed
by the costs
Human Error
-has been cited as a primary cause contributing factor in disasters and accidents in industries
BIAS
-Tendency to apply a particular response regardless of the situation
Acceptable level of safety performance (ALoSP).
-The minimum level of safety performance of civil aviation in a State, as defined in its State safety
programme, or of a service provider, as defined in its safety management system, expressed in
terms of safety performance targets and safety performance indicators.
Terminologies to remember in
HFASAFETY
Accountable executive.
-A single, identifiable person having responsibility for the effective and efficient performance of the State’s SSP or
of the service provider’s SMS.
Change management.
-A formal process to manage changes within an organization in a systematic manner, so that changes which may
impact identified hazards and risk mitigation strategies are accounted for, before the implementation of such
changes.
Defences.
-Specific mitigating actions, preventive controls or recovery measures put in place to prevent the realization of a
hazard or its escalation into an undesirable consequence.
Errors.
-An action or inaction by an operational person that leads to deviations from organizational or the operational
person’s intentions or expectations.
Terminologies to remember in
HFASAFETY
High-consequence indicators.
-Safety performance indicators pertaining to the monitoring and measurement of high-consequence occurrences, such as
accidents or serious incidents. High-consequence indicators are sometimes referred to as reactive indicators.
Lower-consequence indicators.
-Safety performance indicators pertaining to the monitoring and measurement of lower-consequence occurrences, events or
activities such as incidents, non-conformance findings or deviations. Lower-consequence indicators are sometimes referred to as
proactive/predictive indicators.
Risk mitigation.
-The process of incorporating defences or preventive controls to lower the severity and/or likelihood of a hazard’s projected
consequence.
Safety management system.
-A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and
procedures.
Terminologies to remember in
HFASAFETY
Safety performance.
-A State’s or service provider´s safety achievement as defined by its safety performance targets and
safety performance indicators.
Safety performance indicator.
-A data-based safety parameter used for monitoring and assessing safety performance.
Safety risk.
-The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard.
State safety programme.
-An integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety.
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO HUMAN
ERRORS
a.) Culture
b.) Training
c.) Personal Factors
d.) Other factors
e.) Procedures
f.) Equipment design
g.) Organizational factors
12 common causes of mistakes in the
aviation workplace
“I guess day shift can finish
screwing on the panel”
Lack of Communication
• Failure to transmit, receive, or provide
enough information to complete a task.
Never assume anything.
• Only 30% of verbal communication is
received and understood by either side in
a conversation. Others usually remember
the first and last part of what you say
12 common causes of mistakes in
the aviation workplace
"I've looked back
there 1,000 times
and never found
anything wrong."
Complacency
• Overconfidence from repeated performing a task.
"This is the third one to
bend!
What's going on?"
Lack of Knowledge
• Shortage of the training, information, and/or ability to successfully perform.
12 common causes of mistakes in
the aviation workplace
"Hey, Your wife is on the
phone."
Distractions
• Anything that draws your attention away from the task at hand.
• Distractions are the #1 cause of forgetting things, including what has or has not been done in
a maintenance task.
"I thought you wanted him
to turn
left right here!
Lack of Teamwork
• Failure to work together to complete a shared goal.
12 common causes of mistakes in
the aviation workplace
"I'm glad this double shift is over.“
Fatigue
• Physical or mental exhaustion threatening work performance.
"We have nil stock of left skids so I
guess this will have
to do.“
Lack of Resources
• Not having enough people, equipment, documentation, time, parts, etc., to complete a task.
"Hurry up or we're going to
be late again!"
Pressure
• Real or perceived forces demanding high-level job performance.
12 common causes of mistakes in
the aviation workplace
"Listen, I own the aircraft and
I say it's not a bad leak!"
Lack of Assertiveness
• Failure to speak up or document concerns about instructions, orders, or the actions of
others.
"We lost our best aircraft! How are they going to
pay my wages? What if I'm sued?"
Stress
• A physical, chemical, or emotional factor that causes physical or mental tension.
12 common causes of mistakes in
the aviation workplace
"All the regulation said was, 'Install
Where it is Easily Accessible."
Lack of Awareness
• Failure to recognize a situation, understand what it is, and predict the possible results.
"Never mind the Maintenance Manual.
Its quicker the way we do it here."
Norms
• Expected, yet unwritten, rules of behavior.
HFSAFETY
22-23 1ST SEMESTER
INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The regulation specifies the requirement for service providers to implement
a safety management system (SMS) operating in accordance with Annex
1 — Personnel Licensing; Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft; Annex 8 —
Airworthiness of Aircraft; Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services; and Annex 14 —
Aerodromes, Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations.
INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Within the context of this regulation the term ―service provider‖ would normally refer to approved/
certificated organizations providing aviation services. The term refers to approved training organizations that
are exposed to operational safety risks during the provision of their services, aircraft operators, approved
maintenance organizations, organizations responsible for type design and/or manufacture of aircraft, air traffic
service providers and certified aerodromes, as applicable.
The regulation addresses aviation safety-related processes, procedures and activities of the service provider,
rather than occupational safety, environmental protection or other non-aviation-related activities
The regulation establishes the minimum SMS framework requirements. The service provider can establish
more stringent internal requirements
RELATION OF AVIATION QUALITY TO AVIATION SAFETY
Given the evolution of the aviation safety regulatory framework within the global organization (EU),
the u. s. and other aviation markets, particularly with relevance mandating safety management systems
(SMSs), it's important to reflect on the principles of quality and safety, to grasp what each must offer to
an aviation operator’s bottom line, and to reflect on the longer term of aviation management
systems.Before beginning, it's best to clarify the terms into account.
“
Quality,” as defined by the global organization for Standardization (ISO) standard 9000:2005, is “the
degree to which a group of inherent characteristics fulfils requirements.”
“Safety,” as defined within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Safety Management
Manual, is “the state during which the likelihood of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced
to, and maintained at or below, an appropriate level through a seamless process of hazard identification
and safety risk management.”
INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The very first thing that emerges from the definitions is that quality and safety don't seem to
be the identical. Quality refers to meeting requirements, and safety refers to keeping people and
property from harm. the 2 principles are nevertheless related. Customers and regulators require
certain safety requirements to be met by an air operator; therefore, a high quality product is
additionally necessarily safe.ISO standard 9001:2008 requires the implementation of a high
quality management system (QMS) oriented to meeting customer requirements, thus improving
customer satisfaction. The scope of a QMS PRN by ISO goes well beyond the compliance of an air
operator with regulatory safety requirements.
INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Many areas associated with the customer experience that have little if anything to try and do with
safety comprise the competence of a QMS as needed by ISO.The European Joint Aviation Authorities
(JAA), through its Joint Aviation Requirements, first promoted the compulsory introduction of quality
management in airline operations within the international organisation. Several other countries (for
example, within the Gulf regions) have followed the JAA’s regulatory efforts with relevance quality
management, in many cases adopting the identical regulations by simply changing their names. this
can be a path, however, that several important aviation markets, most notably
the us, haven't followed. the ecu regulation that currently establishes a compulsory QMS is EU
Regulation on Air Operations (EU OPS) 1.035, but it prescribes only basic quality requirements, “to
monitor compliance with, and adequacy of, procedures required to confirm safe operational practices
and airworthy aeroplanes.” In airline operations, QMSs are mandatory with only safety in mind and
with no consideration for other, more strategic, business areas.
SMS QUALITY PRINCIPLES
In the past decade, ICAO has developed the ICAO Safety Management Manual, which accounts for a
key innovation: the promotion of SMSs and therefore the provision of guidance on a way
to implement them. in keeping with ICAO, an SMS shares many commonalities with a QMS, and
specific SMS processes are nurtured by quality principles. QMSs and SMSs both must be planned and
managed; both rely upon measurement and monitoring; both involve every function, process and
person within the organization; and both strive for continuous improvement. within the safety
assurance component of an SMS, the appliance of quality assurance principles helps to make
sure that the requisite system-wide safety measures are taken to support the organization in
achieving its safety objectives.Although QMSs and SMSs share many common features, the
peculiarities of SMSs shouldn't be underestimated.
SMS QUALITY PRINCIPLES
SMSs promote the achievement of high safety standards by encouraging a security culture that
considers the human dimension organization-wide and by promoting a hazard identification/risk
management–based approach to safety management. In a QMS, two parts are
often identified: internal control and quality assurance. internal control is reactive — that “part of
quality management focused on fulfilling requirements.”
Quality assurance is proactive — the “part of quality management focused on providing confidence
that quality requirements are going to be fulfilled.” Just because the scope of QMS goes well beyond
monitoring compliance with safety requirements, its inclusion in SMSs extends the scope of safety
management beyond ensuring the conformance of working practices with safety requirements
toward thoroughly identifying hazards, a number of which are organization-specific.
SMS QUALITY PRINCIPLES
An SMS is therefore considerably more proactive than a QMS; furthermore, the speculation that
supports SMS has been developed with only safety in mind, while the idea supporting QMS has been
developed with customer satisfaction in mind.Quality and safety are both fundamental for a
corporation to achieve its corporate goals. Air operators have disparate goals, but they most try
to transport passengers and/or cargo by air at a profit. the elemental importance of safety in allowing
an air operator to control safely and profitably is unquestionable, because an airline with a poor
safety record may be banned from flying to some countries and isn't likely to draw in many shoppers.
As airlines are increasingly operating in commercially unregulated environments, the flexibility to
satisfy customer requirements and to enhance customer satisfaction is increasingly becoming the
determinant of airline profitability. it's to enhance its business performance that an air operator
can get pleasure from the implementation of a QMS, without necessarily obtaining a certification.
INTEGRATED AVIATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Some countries (e.g., Australia and Canada) have already made SMSs mandatory. Many other
countries, including the United States and those in the EU, will soon require SMS implementation
as mandated by ICAO. Since air operators are or will be mandated to implement another system
— the SMS — it would be more efficient to implement an SMS with the intention of adopting
also a more comprehensive integrated aviation management system (IAMS). An IAMS is the result
of the integration of all management systems within an airline, and “describes the relationship
and operational responsibility of each supporting management system within the overall
enterprise.”Air operators are complex businesses: they require multiple management systems
(including several trans-organizational systems), have dispersed operations, have many technical
functions requiring skilled employees, and are highly regulated and characterized by overlapping
state jurisdictions.
INTEGRATED AVIATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Within this operational complexity, inefficiencies can arise from the overlapping of different
systems. If, with the appropriate approach and the appropriate culture, the numerous
management systems are integrated, airlines will benefit not only from the contribution each
system brings but from a smoother functioning of each system — because of the higher
efficiencies generated by the integration. The systems will support one another in optimally
achieving the air operator’s business objectives.
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Although air operators around the world have succeeded in offering a quality product that is highly
safe and usually affordable (meeting another customer requirement: low fares), the air operators have
not been rewarded for the quality of their services. The airline industry is notorious for never having
paid returns to its shareholders in the aggregate. The problem of the profitability of the industry
needs to be urgently targeted.
For efficiency and profitability, airlines can benefit from an advanced form of quality management,
total quality management (TQM). This tool goes well beyond satisfying the customer or offering
quality products as required by ISO 9000.3 TQM is a management approach in which all members of
an organization participate in improving processes, products, services and the culture in which they
work. Airlines can benefit from TQM because it is widely agreed that the industry needs cost
reduction and control, without losing the focus on product safety.
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT
TQM emphasizes, among other things, eradicating defects and waste from operations, reducing
development cycle times, reducing product and service costs, and challenging quantified goals
and benchmarking. In implementing TQM, airlines could follow the European Foundation for
Quality Management model or the U.S. Malcolm Baldrige model. The latter provides a framework
for business excellence that stresses the importance of financial and marketplace performance.
WHAT IS QUALITY AUDITING
Effective audits should ensure that we deliver “real” audits which identify any gaps in regulatory or
organisational compliance. Which in turn should generate findings leading to corrective and
preventive actions together with relevant follow-up tasks.
A typical issue found with the quality assurance environment is often the lack of detail and
understanding related to the auditees need to address the Root Cause of any finding.
Consideration should be given to developing high-quality reports, meeting professional standards
and clearly communicating the need to oblige the business area owner to deliver corrective
actions.
THE 5 AUDIT ELEMENTS
1/ The finding – What is the problem?
It is important that this is understood and stated in detail often as auditors we see the same group of
findings repeating multiple times which is a typical indicator we are not getting to the root of the
problem.
2/ Why is it a problem – What standard has not been met (is it internal or external)
Often 5 whys of similar can help to raise a detailed understanding of the fundamental exposures?
THE 5 AUDIT ELEMENTS
3/ Why did it happen? – Here we consider Root Cause – Here the auditee needs to have the
competence to assess the root cause of the finding.
4/ What is the consequence – risk or opportunity considered- How will this be moved forward –
Auditee responsibility.
5/ Corrective action disposition – Who, What & When – Final consideration has the root cause been
assessed in the correct way – buy off by the auditor
The outcomes of such activities play a significant role in supporting the organization to achieve its
goals to not just maintain but to exceed regulatory compliance.
AVIATION SAFETY
PREPARED BY: ENGR. MARK ANTHONY A. CHAN
SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
Safety Management System involves reactive and proactive identification of hazards.
Safety reports should not be restricted to incidents but should include hazards.
Data from such report facilitate mitigation process, they help define intervention
strategies and aid in verifying the effectiveness of interventions.
VOLUNTARY REPORTING
Safety report obtained from maintenance related flight incident or accident, is reactive.
A proactive approach is to acquire safety reporting through hazard reporting.
VOLUNTARY REPORTING
Any hazard or near miss that has the potential to cause damage or injury or that threatens the organization‘s
viability should be reported so that timely actions can be taken to improve safety
Confidential incident reporting systems facilitate the disclosure of human errors, hazards without fear of
retribution and enable others to learn.
All hazard reports are directed to Safety Management Department Head.
VOLUNTARY REPORTING
The safety hazard report is reviewed by the Safety Management Department Head. If the report does impact
safety, the Safety Management Department Head will remove the identity of the reporter and submit the report
to the Safety Action Group for analysis. This hazard report will be recorded for future trend analysis.
The Safety Action Group will analyze the safety hazard report and determine the appropriate action, which
includes conducting (HIRA) to mitigate the risk. The outcome of the analysis will be disseminated through
toolbox briefing or through the notice board.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Hazard identification is a process where organizational hazards are identified and managed so that safety is not
compromised.
Hazard maybe identified from company‘s voluntary reporting system, accident/incident reports, audits and surveys,
as well as industry incident/accident reports.
The purpose of this procedure is to provide a systematic and documented method for hazard identification and
risk assessment.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Hazard identification is one of the two core processes of involved in the management of safety.
It is the process of identifying conditions or object(s) with the potential to cause injuries to persons, damage to
equipment and structures, loss of material, reduction of ability to perform the prescribed function, damage to
environment, and damage to company‘s reputation, industrial status, and assets.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The SMS is centered on such a systematic approach to hazard identification and risk assessment in the interest of
minimizing workplace injury, property damage, decline in function or performance, and financial, environmental
and societal losses.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
There is a natural (and erroneous) tendency to describe hazards as an outcome. For example, ―runway
incursion‖ is an outcome, not a hazard. On other hand, ―unclear aerodrome signage‖ is a hazard, not an
outcome. Mistaking hazards as outcomes disguise their nature and interfere with proper identification of actual
outcomes or risks associated with those hazards. A correctly named hazard will enable the tracking of its source
or origin on the one hand and the identification of its potential outcome(s) or risk(s) on the other.
THERE ARE 3 PROCESSES OF IDENTIFYING THE HAZARDS
1. Reactive method responds to the events that already happened, such as incident and accidents.
2. Proactive method looks actively for hazards that pose safety risks through the analysis of the organization‘s
activities like mandatory reports, company‘s voluntary reporting system, safety audits and surveys. That is,
identifying safety risks before it fails.
3. Predictive method is aggressively seeking information from a variety of sources which may be indicative of
emerging risks, such as direct observation of the processes, industry accident reports and forums.
THE FOLLOWING ARE THE EXAMPLES OF AVIATION RELATED
HAZARDS:
1. Fuel vapor from open wing tanks,
2. Discrepant test equipment,
3. Ambiguous work instructions,
4. Improper shift handover procedure,
5. Inadequate training
6. Inadequate resources/capabilities,
7. Improper material / parts
8. Improper equipment handling,
9. Improper packing/seal installation
10. Documentation (record management)
11. Incorrect terminology use during communication between headset man and cockpit
12. Outdated checklist used, etc
SOURCES OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Safety Evaluation
Safety Surveillance
Safety Reporting
Accident/Incident Investigation
SAFETY EVALUATION
process performed by the Safety Management Department to identify safety, health and/or environmental hazards
and the risk involved in a newly proposed or modified processes or facilities.
SAFETY SURVEILLANCE
An observation activity performed usually at random by Safety Management Department to identify unsafe
conditions and practices. High risk areas or operations are inspected more frequently than those with low risk.
The concerned section takes action to address the hazards and the documents such action.
SAFETY REPORTING
reporting process performed by any personnel to report any accidents, incidents, near-miss, maintenance error or
hazardous events.
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
process performed by Safety Management Department to analyse the circumstances and identify the root cause/s
including the contributing factors that led to an accident or incident.
HIRA SHOULD ALSO BE PERFORMED UNDER THESE SPECIFIC
CONDITIONS:
(1). When there is an unexplained increase in safety-related events
(2). When there are abnormal audit or safety indicator trends
(3). When major operational changes are planned
(4). Before a new project, major equipment or facility is set up
(5). During a period of significant organizational change
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
The Safety Action Group is responsible for conducting the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) as
and when the situation calls for it
RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management is the identification, analysis and mitigation of risks associated with the hazards of an
organization's operations.
It aims at a balanced allocation of resources to address all risks and ensure that viable risk control and mitigation
actions are in place.
Risk management is a key component of a SMS. It is a data-driven approach to safety management resource
allocation i.e. priority is accorded to activities based on their risk index.
RISK ASSESSMENT
The next step in the process is to critically assess the hazards and rank risks. Factors to consider are the
likelihood of the occurrence and the severity of the consequences.
Defined as the process of assessing the risks associated with each of the hazards identified so the nature of the
risk can be understood. This includes the nature of the harm that may result from the hazard, the severity of that
harm and the likelihood of this occurring.
For example, an extensive in-flight fire may be an unlikely occurrence which would be catastrophic if it were to
occur. It would rank above a bird strike which, although much more likely to occur, may be less severe.
There are various ways of doing this type of assessments. They range from the subjective to the very analytical
and objective.
RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment is the combination of two components – probability of occurrence and severity of the projected
risk.
Risk assessment is vital because:
a. The level of risk determines the priorities that shall accord to different hazards and the selection of appropriate
control measures and;
b. The level of integrity of corrective/preventive measures will depend on the level of risk.
RISK PROBABILITY
Risk is the likelihood that a situation of danger might occur. Certain questions may be used to guide the
assessment of probability, such as
a. Is there a history of occurrences like the one being assessed, or is the occurrence an isolated event?
b. What other equipment, or similar types of components might have similar defects?
c. What number of operating or maintenance personnel must follow the procedure(s) in question?
d. How frequently is the equipment or procedure under assessment used?
e. Are there organizational, management or regulatory implications that might generate larger threats to
public safety?
RISK SEVERITY
Risk severity measures the possible consequences of a situation of danger, looking at the worst-case scenario.
Severity may be defined in terms of property, health, finance, liability, people, environment, image, or public
confidence. These are the guides to perform the assessment of severity
1. How many lives are at risk (e.g. employees, passengers, bystanders, general public)?
2. What is the environmental impact (e.g. spillage of fuel or other hazardous products?
3. What is the severity of property, financial damage (e.g. direct asset loss; damage to aviation
infrastructure, third party damage, financial impact and economic impact for the State)?
4. What is the damage to the organization's reputation?
RISK INDEX
Values are assigned to numerically weigh the relative importance of each level of severity and probability. The
composite assessment of risk can be derived by multiplying the severity and probability values. This is represented
by the Risk Index Matrix.
HIRA ELIGIBLE OPERATIONS/ PROCESSES
All operations/processes with the potential to harbor or generate hazards/risks to aviation safety should be
eligible for HIRA accountability.
1. Aircraft Maintenance – high risk or complex aircraft maintenance operations/processes such as aircraft
marshalling, aircraft towing, engine ground run, engine change, functional checks involving hydraulic/
pneumatic/ electrical power, fuel tank entry work, etc.
2. Workshop Maintenance – crucial operations/ processes on aircraft/engine parts such as NDT, metal
machining, metal put-on, heat treatment, etc.
3. Other operations/processes deemed by the organization as essential for priority HIRA accountability.
