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    11 views9 pages

    Aertsen Transcendental Thought in Henry of Ghent

    Uploaded by

    Lisandro Andrés Soria

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    TRANSCENDENTAL THOUGHT IN HENRY OF GHENT JANA. ABRTSEN (KOLN) 1. Introduction: Henry as a “transcendental” philosopher (J. Paulus) “IF i is proper to an idealistic philosophy to take its point of departure i the order of concepts, and not immediately in things, one is obliged to say that Henry of Ghent begins as an idealist.” With this statement Jean Paulus ‘opens the first chapter of his book about Henry of Ghent, a work which appeared more than half a century ago but is still fundamental." Henry must be called an idealist because in the fundamental conflict of two philosophical methods, of which the first goes from being to knowing and the second from knowing to being, he follows the latter way. The first concern of his metaphysics is to discover an idea so general and simple that all other ideas are virtually contained in it. This idea is not, so Paulus emphasizes, the notion of “being,” for this notion does not receive its qualification from our thought but is determined from the outside in the ‘manner of an object. The notion of “being” possesses a duality, for which there is no room in the simplest notion. The notion sought contains not only every conceivable object but also every content of thought, whether ‘oF not an object corresponds to it. This primary concept is for Henry that of “thing’(ves) or “something"(aliquid), a concept which according to Paulus ‘is the mast general index that affects our representations,” “the twanscendental form in the Kantian sense of every product of the intellect Paulus seeks “the point of departure of Henry's metaphysics,” which is the title of the first section of the first chapter of his book. This title eserves attention, as it recalls the principal work of the Belgian philosopher Joseph Maréchal (1878-1944), Le point de départ de la métaphysique, which meant a tum in the interpretation of Thomas 1.1. Pavlas, Hen de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysigue, Pais 1938, p 24 2 tidy. 22. 2 ‘TRANSCENDENTAL THOUGHT IN HENRY OF GENT Aquinas's thought in our century.* Maréchal set out to re-found Thomas's metaphysics by using Kant’s transcendental method, that is, by reducing the objects of thought to the “formal or a priori conditions” of knowledge, Characteristic of “Transcendental Thomism” is the view that underlying the empiricistic explanations of abstraction, there existed in Aquinas “a ‘deeper transcendental conception of it, where "being’ and “something which’ are considered as a prioti conditions of man’s intellect, conditions of the possibility of every human knowledge." Although Paulus does not mention Maréchal’s name in his book, his interpretation is definitely influenced by the “transcendental turn” in Neoselolasticism, and in another study he explicitly refers tg the Belgian Philosopher.* Not that Paulus sees Henry of Ghent as a Thomist; on the contrary, he emphasizes precisely the difference in their points of departure. While for Thomas metaphysical thought immediately grasps the real, its first object for Henry is just the mental, which in most cases also tums out to be real. More than for Thomas, Maréchal’s approach seems to be valid for Henry, since the point of departure of his metaphysics ig “a transcendental form in the Kantian sense.” The central question in this paper is whether this typification and interpretation of Tlenry's way of thought is adequate from a historical and philosophical point of view. 2. The seventh Quodlibet Paulus’ interpretation is based mainly on the seventh Quodliber, since in his judgment this text teaches us the true movement of Henry's thought. Its therefore necessary to start by sketching the outline and structure of this key text. Henry begins his argument by declaring that “the most general {communissimun) of all, that contains everything in an analogous scope fambitus), is “thing” or 'something.”” About this most general concept two observations are made. First, itis only opposed to pure nothing, since this neither is nor is apt to be, either in the outside world or in a concept of the 3. Le point de départ de ta métaphysique, vol. V: Le thomigme devant ta philosophic ‘rtiqu, Louvain 1926: 1949 (2nd ed). 4. J Donceet, “Transcendental Thomism”, in; The Monis 58 (1974), . 76. 5. Cf. J. Paulus, “Henri de Gand. et Pargument ontlogique”, in: Archives d'Wistoire Doctrinale et Linéraire du Moyen-Age \0 (193516, pp. 322-9, 6.4. Paulus, Henri de Gand, p. 25,0. 2. iiss ‘TRANSCENDENTAL THOUGHT IN HENRY OF GENT. 3 intellect. Further, “thing” in this broad sense does not have the feature of a category.” Next the most genera concept is divided into two modes of things, namely, into that which either is or is apt to be in the intellect only, and that which on top of that (cum hoc) either is or is apt to be in reality outside the intetlect, With this division Henry connects a distinction that is clearly dear to him, as he also mentions it at many other places in his work. The first mode of res, a thing according to opinion only. is derived etymologically from reor, reris, which is the sate as “to opine.” This mode contains imaginary or fictitious things, such a5 a golden mountain or the goat-stag (hircocervus) (mentioned by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics I, 7)."The second mode of res, a “true thing,” is called after res, ratitudo, which signifies the internal stability of a thing, its nature or essence. This mode contains things that are a least capable of actually existing? In the continuation of the Quodlibet Henry presents a further division of res, ratitudo. It is divided into that which is being (esse) itself, divine being, and that to which being belongs or is apt to belong, the created thing. No thing can have being in a genus of a category unless itis such ‘that itis not being itself, but that to which being must belong ot is apt to belong. This is in itself the quiddity and essence of every creature.? The remaining part of the text, which we leave outside of consideration here, 7. Henry of Ghent, Quodier Vil. qa. { and #164. G.A. Wilson, im: Henrci de Gandavo Opera Onna, vl. XI, Leuven 191; pp. 26-7) “Sciendum quod omni ‘commanissimom. omnia continens in queda Smbitsanalogo, es res sve aliquid, ‘ie considera ut nil ite oppositum nis rue ei, quod nec est nee natn est esse, neque in re extra intelectam, neque iam in concepts bcos intellects, According to some modern interpreters such as Rolf Schiinberger, there is in Henry a “probably insoluble tension between the primacy of ens and that of res." J, Paulus establishes that in some passages Henry gives the same extension to the term “being” as to the primary notion of “thing,” His explanation of this fact is that it must be attributed to the influence of the traditional terminology, which was designed for realistic conceptions.25 The relation between ens and res turns out to be crucial to understanding Henry's thought, and we must endeavor to gain greater clarity with respect to its point of departure. 21, CELIA. Aectsen, “Truth as Tansoendental in Thomas Aq Review of Philosophy 11 (1992), 159-171 22, Summa 3.1 (fol. 28 B. 3, bid. 1.12 (fo. 22¢ L): “In incomplekis principe primum principium et primus ‘conceptus est concepts ents inguantum est ens; sub quo sunt emnes alt conceptas ‘ncomplexi et ex ipso et post ipsum concipiuntr, Ex concepts enim ents: via

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