Republic of The Philippines Manila Second Division: Supreme Court

Statutory basis of LEASEHOLD: RA 1199;3844;6389;6657
RA 6657 SECTION 12
JURISPRUDENCE ON LEASEHOLD( handwritten case digests shall be submitted on the day of mid term
exams) to be discussed on september 14
Leasehold relation-Tapang vs Robles, 72 Phil 79; Datu et al vs Cabangon et al GR -14590, 25 May 1960;

Genuino vs CAR 22 SCRA 792
Leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease- Gabriel vs Pangilinan 58 SCRA 590
Elements of Agricultural Tenancy-Caballes vs DAR 168 SCRA 254;Teodoro vs Macaraeg 27 SCRA 7;
No tenancy relation when element of personal cultivation does not exist-Castillo vs CA 205 SCRA 529
Landholder-lessor,not the landowner- element of consent; Bernas vs Court of Appeals 225 SCRA 119
Tenacy relation does not exist where a usurper cultivates the land- Hilario vs IAC 148 SCRA 573
Successors-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave consent are bound to
recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the land- Endaya vs CA 215 SCRA 109
Purpose is agricultural production-Caballes vs DAR 168 SCRA 248
Personal cultivation-Oarde vs CA 280 SCRA 235
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Virgilio M. Pablo for defendant-appellant.
Armando M. Laki for movant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
1
Atty. In Progress…… Agri Law…. Alejandra II L. Cueva, LPT
This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified
to this Court by the Court of Appeals for the reason that the jurisdiction of an inferior court is involved.
During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29, 1972, Atty. Virgilio M.
Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, gave notice to this Court that said appellant
died on April 3, 1964, and was survived by his children, who are his legal heirs, namely: Salvador
Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and Pilar Pangilinan de
Avante. For the purposes of this case the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, therefore, is substituted by
his heirs herein named.
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with this Court advising that
appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and was survived by her heirs and successors-in-
interest, namely: Corazon O. Gabriel, married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O. Gabriel; Ester O.
Gabriel, married to Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel and Pablo O.
Gabriel, and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted by her heirs herein named. By
order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer for substitution was granted.
In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the Court of Appeals made the
following findings, which We adopt:
On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga against Eusebio Pangilinan alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond
situated in barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and measuring about 169,507 square
meters; that sometime during the last war she entered into an oral contract of lease
thereof with the defendant on a year to year basis, i.e., from January 1 to December
31, at a rental of P1,200, plus the amount of real estate taxes, payable in advance in
the month of January; that desiring to develop and cultivate the fishpond by herself,
she notified the defendant in a letter dated June 26, 1957 that she was terminating
the contract as of December 31, 1957; that upon request of the defendant, she
extended the lease for another year; that on November 19, 1958 she again wrote the
defendant that he should surrender possession of the fishpond on January 1, 1959,
which demand he however ignored. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that the defendant
be ordered to restore the possession of the fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200,
plus the amount of real estate taxes, a year from 1959, attorney's fees and costs.
The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to the Court of
Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship
between the parties. Upon opposition by the plaintiff, the motion was denied. The
defendant thereafter filed his answer with counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the
land in question was originally leased to him, also verbally, by the plaintiff's father,
Potenciano Gabriel in 1923 for as long as the defendant wanted subject to the
condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and the part which
was already a fishpond be improved at his expense which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease for whatever cause;
that when the plaintiff became the owner of the property through inheritance, she told
the defendant that she would honor her father's contract with the defendant, and
likewise assured him that he could continue leasing the property, whose original
rental of P400.00 a year had been progressively increased to P1,200.00, for as long
as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it personally. As a special
defense, the defendant reiterated the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to
take cognizance of the case.
2
On February 12, 1962 the trial court issued an order herein below quoted in full:
The plaintiff sinks to eject the defendant from the fishpond described in the complaint
which is under lease to the said defendant, who, however, refuses to vacate. Instead,
he has impugned the jurisdiction of this Court contending that the action should have
been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of leasehold tenancy.
After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the allegations of the
complaint, the parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of
determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the defendant, who
originally leased it from the father of the plaintiff. Upon the death of the said father,
the fishpond was inherited by the plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T. No. 1634 and
is registered in her name. It contains an area of 169,507.00 square meters. The
rental is on a yearly basis.
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of
helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 he became ill and incapacitated. His
daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over. She testified that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano
Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and
Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of
the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He
has lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan. who is residing
near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all professions; a lawyer,
an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been
seen working on the fishpond.
The above are the material and pertinent facts upon which we enter this order.
After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions of the Tenancy Law,
Republic Act No. 1199, particularly Sections 4 and 9, as amended. it seems clear
that his case does not fall within the purview of said Act. The lease contract is
manifestly a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. Considering the area of the
fishpond, 16 hectares, more or less, the fact that neither the defendant, who is
physically incapacitated, or his daughter is Personally cultivating the fishpond or
through the employment of mechanical farm implements, and the further fact that the
persons named above are not members of the immediate farm household of the
defendant, the conclusion is that no tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff
and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this Court is vested with jurisdiction
to try and decide this case. After this order has become final, the plaintiff may
request for the setting of the initial trial.
The defendant does not contest the findings of facts therein made by the trial court.
After the parties adduced their respective evidence on the merits, decision was
rendered wherein the trial court Pursuant to Article 1197 of the Civil Code, fixed the
period of the low up to June 30, 1964, the defendant on said date to surrender
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possession of the fishpond to the plaintiff and to pay the rentals due the latter. The
plaintiff, on her part, was required upon surrender of on to her, to pay the defendant
the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of the expenses he incurred in improving
the fishpond, and upon failure by either party to pay the amount due the other, the
same would bear interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he appealed to this Court

and assigned the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as
that of a civil lease, in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines and not a
leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act.
NO. 1199 as amended.
3. The lower court erred in appreciating the evidence of the appellant particularly the
basis for the expenditure for the development of the fishpond in question.
4. The lower court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the appellant in them easily
amount of one thousand pesos for reimbursement and for seven hundred pesos for
the cost of the floodgate.
Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that plaintiff leased the fishpond to the
defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the annual rental payable at the end of the year (Exhibit C,
Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13, 1962, pp. 2 and 3). It is likewise undisputed that the work in the
fishpond consisted in letting out the water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae would not grow,
getting some from the river and putting them in the fishpond, changing the dirty water with fresh
water, repairing leaks in the dikes, and planting of fingerlings and attending to them; that these were
done by defendant, with some help; that he personally attended to the fishpond until 1956 when he
became ill; that thereafter his nephew Bernardo Cayanan, who was living with him, helped in the
work to be done in the fishpond and his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management,
conveying his instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4-8, Magat).
Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship between the parties is an
agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section
35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is therefore within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains in effect that
since defendant has ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his
immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the
parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial court
properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the interpretation of
cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally or with the aid of the members of his
immediate farm household. 1
Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of Appeals which, as a general
rule, bind this Court.
2
4
1. Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First, was the relationship between the
appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or a civil law lease?
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject
matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or
urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally
attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the
law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is
governed by special laws. 3
In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the following requisites
must concur.
1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household;
3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household;
4. That the land belongs to another; and
5. That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both. 4
Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?
There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural
Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the
consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46(c) of said Act provides that "the consideration for
the use of sugar lands, fishponds, salt beds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be
governed by stipulation between the parties". This Court has already ruled that "land in which fish is
produced is classified as agricultural land." The mere fact, however, that a person works an
5
agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above
enumerated are complied with.
Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question has an area of 169,507
square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond. The question of whether such a big parcel of land
is susceptible of being worked by the appellant's family or not has not been raised, and We see no
need of tarrying on this point. So, We pass to the third requisite, to wit, whether the tenant himself
personally or with the aid of his immediate family worked the land.
Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement of leasehold tenancy with
Potenciano Gabriel, appellee's father, such tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he
ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the
members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land in question. Only the members of
the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are
5
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are
included in the term "immediate farm household" The record shows who helped work the land in
6
question, and We quote:
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of
helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 when he became ill and incapacitated.
His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan took over. She testified that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano
Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and
Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of
the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He
has lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing
near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all professionals: a lawyer,
an engineer, and a priest — all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been
seen working on the fishpond. 7
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5
(a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself and with the
aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or
possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the produce with
the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limits
the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land and to the person who
actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm
household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that
the tenant and his immediate farm household work the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy exists
when a person, who either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his
immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of
cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to,
or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in
both.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his
immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land
cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of
8
the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the
meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and
privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the
appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under
Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Agrarian Relations. 9
2. Regarding the second assignment of error, We accordingly rule that the Court of First Instance
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case at bar, this being a case of civil law lease.
3. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and fourth assigned errors as these are issues
involving findings of facts which have been settled by the lower court, and unless there is grave
abuse of discretion, which we do not find in the record of the case, We shall not venture to discuss
the merits of the factual findings of the court a quo.
6
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil
Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
This decision should apply to the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original parties, as named in
this decision. In consonance with the decision of the lower court, the heirs and successors-in-interest
of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should deliver the possession of the fishpond in question to the
heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and said heirs and successors-in-
interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should pay the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee
Trinidad Gabriel the accrued rentals. From January 1, 1960, at the rate of P1,200.00 a year, until the
actual delivery of the possession of the fishpond as herein ordered, with interest at the legal rate
until full payment is made.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78214 December 5, 1988
YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO
ABAJON, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship
between the herein petitioner and the private respondent and certifying the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against
the private respondent as not proper for trial.
The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters (20
meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the
petitioner herein, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea
Alicaba Millenes This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500
square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was
subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the
Millenes family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in favor of
the petitioner.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the
owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land,
agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977,
Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but
continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the lot
occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes.
7
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and
pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon
offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was not
accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they needed the
property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation before the Barangay Captain
of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by the
landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge.
On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately
after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her
knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth
about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed against Abajon and which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of the
banana plants, had been done by Abajon. On September 30, 1982, upon motion of the defense in
open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Regional Office
No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties. As a
result, the Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification dated January 24, 1 983,
1
stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for hearing on the bases of the following
findings:
That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining
witness, which is devoted to bananas;
That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding,
which act is prohibited by law; and
That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.
From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the respondent DAR.
Acting on said appeal, the respondent DAR, through its then Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the
previous certification in its Order of February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case No. 4003 as proper
2
for trial as "the land involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square meters whereon the
house of the accused is constructed and within the industrial zone of the town as evinced from the
Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of Talisay, Cebu."
Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon, the respondent DAR, through its new Minister,
herein respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an Orders dated November 15, 1986, setting aside the
previous Order dated February 3, 1986, and certifying said criminal case as not proper for trial,
3
finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties, and that the case was designed
to harass the accused into vacating his tillage.
In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner, Andrea Millenes,
testified that Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his
cultivation. The grandson of Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the testimony of the
former, stating that he received said share from Abajon. Roger Millenes further testified that the
present owners received in his presence a bunch of bananas from the accused representing ½ or
50% of the two bunches of bananas gathered after Caballes had acquired the property. 4
From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the
former owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as truer
thereof. Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he agricultural
5
8
leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period
in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding"; and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal
possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights
and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled that 'the new owners are
legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was
small, consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60)
square meters." 6
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:
I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power and discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant
even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the
petitioner.
II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003 is not proper for trial and
hearing by the court. 7
We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as amended.
To invest him with the status of a tenant is preposterous.
Section 2 of said law provides:
It is the policy of the State:
(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the
land as tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of
Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to
industrial development;
xxx xxx xxx
RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that permits
efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to
provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and
education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable
reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income." 8
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square
meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of
the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas,
and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a
modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs. The private respondent himself
admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land because it was too small, and that he
took on carpentry jobs on the side. Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the
9
declared policy of the law stated above.
The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land with the former owner,
Andrea Millenes. This led or misled, the public respondents to conclude that a tenancy relationship
existed between the petitioner and the private respondent because, the public respondents continue,
9
by operation of Sec. 10 of R.A. 3844, as amended, the petitioner new owner is subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).
We disagree.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws. 10
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is
not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native
way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and
located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status
arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose
of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's
status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to
live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant
of the said portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the
private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10
of RA of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of
the herein petitioner.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural
tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for
trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.
Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the petitioner, we hold that
the remand of the case to the lower court for the resumption of the criminal proceedings is not in the
interest of justice. Remand to the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve the ends of
justice at all, nor is it necessary, because this High Tribunal is in a position to resolve with finality the
dispute before it. This Court, in the public interest, and towards the expeditious administration of
justice, has decided to act on the merits and dispose of the case with finality. 11
The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent for
allegedly cutting down banana trees worth a measly P50.00 will take up much of the time and
attention of the municipal court to the prejudice of other more pressing cases pending therein.
Furthermore, the private respondent will have to incur unnecessary expenses to finance his legal
10
battle against the petitioner if proceedings in the court below were to resume. Court litigants have
decried the long and unnecessary delay in the resolution of their cases and the consequent costs of
such litigations. The poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial dawdle, Impoverished that
they are they must deal with unjust legal procrastination which they can only interpret as harassment
or intimidation brought about by their poverty, deprivation, and despair. It must be the mission of the
Court to remove the misperceptions aggrieved people have of the nature of the dispensation of
justice. If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from heaven? Thus,
considering that this case involves a mere bagatelle the Court finds it proper and compelling to
decide it here and now, instead of further deferring its final termination.
As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the petitioner's affidavit stating
that after she reprimanded private respondent Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the
property without her knowledge, the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana trees on the property worth
about P50.00.
This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a friend of the petitioner, who likewise executed
an affidavit to the effect that she saw the private respondent indiscriminately cutting the banana
trees.
12
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall deliberately cause to
the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall
be guilty of malicious mischief."
13
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:
1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;

2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.
After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the aforesaid criminal case
against the private respondent be dismissed.
The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana
trees because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana
trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof The private respondent's possession of the land
is not illegal or in bad faith because he was snowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy the
premises. In other words, the private respondent worked the land in dispute with the consent of the
previous and present owners. Consequently, whatever the private respondent planted and cultivated
on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the landowner. Thus, an essential element of
the crime of malicious mischief, which is "damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is
absent because the private respondent merely cut down his own plantings.
WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case No. 4003, is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Municipal
Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for appropriate action. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
11
G.R. No. L-20700 February 27, 1969
FIDEL TEODORO, petitioner,
vs.
FELIX MACARAEG and COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, Second Regional District, Sala
II, respondents.
Jose A. Buendia and Agustin A. Pelmoka for petitioner.

Jesus A. Garcia for respondent Felix Macaraeg.
CASTRO, J.:
Before us for review, upon a petition for certiorari, are the decision of the respondent Court of
Agrarian Relations of September 7, 1962 in CAR case 558-Gba. 68 (Nueva Ecija), ordering the
herein petitioner Fidel Teodoro to reinstate the herein private respondent Felix Macaraeg (the
petitioner in the agrarian court) to his "former landhoding ... and to keep him as the true and lawful
tenant in accordance with law," and the resolution of the same court of November 27, 1962
condemning Teodoro to pay or deliver to Macaraeg as damages "82 cavans of palay or its
equivalent value in the amount of P820.00 computed at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, plus interest at
10% until fully paid."
We turn to the factual milieu.
On June 7, 1961 Macaraeg filed a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations (Second Regional
District, sala II, Guimba, Nueva Ecija) praying, inter alia, that (1) an interlocutory order be issued to
restrain Teodoro and Jose Niegos (the respondents below), from ejecting him from his landholding
pending resolution of his petition; and (2) after due trial, he be maintained as the lawful tenant in the
disputed landholding.
Macaraeg alleged that he is a leasehold tenant of Teodoro cultivating a farmholding situated in the
municipality of Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, of an area of four (4) hectares devoted to rice culture, and that
he has worked said land "as a tenant for the last seven years"; that on March 2, 1961 he received a
letter from Teodoro and his wife advising him that the aforesaid landholding will be given to another
tenant, on the pretext that he (Macaraeg) "is contracting be a tenant of another in said landholding";
that forthwith, Teodoro placed a new tenant, Jose Niegos, in the disputed land; that subsequently,
Niegos repeatedly forbade him from working on said riceland; that in order to avoid trouble, he
refrained from forcibly entering the landholding, but with the advent of the planting season, it became
imperative that the agrarian court order his reinstatement and restrain Teodoro and Niegos from
committing further acts of dispossession.
In his answer with counterclaim dated June 19, 1961, Teodoro categorically denied that Macaraeg
was his tenant, claiming that "ever since he became the owner of around 39 hectares of riceland in
Kalisitan, Talugtug, N. Ecija, he had always leased all of it under civil lease and he had never given
any portion of it under tenancy." He further alleged that after the expiration of his lease contract with
Macaraeg in January, 1961, his wife twice notified Macaraeg to renew his contract for the then
incoming agricultural year 1961-62, but the latter "verbally told Mrs. Teodoro that he was no longer
interested to work on the land and he was giving it up as he had left the place already." Teodoro also
claims that it was only after Macaraeg had abandoned the farmland that he decided to lease it to
Niegos.
On his part, Niegos seasonably answered, disclaming any knowledge that Macaraeg is the tenant of
Teodoro, and averring that he entered the landholding in good faith clothed with the proper authority
12
from the other respondent (Teodoro) and with the consent and confirmity of the petitioner
(Macaraeg) who allowed him to work on the same"; and that Macaraeg "has no more interests in the
cultivation of the landholding as could be gleaned from his actuations, like the failure to clean the
land during the months of March and April, and his failure to prepare his seed bed in the month of
May which is the period for broadcasting seedling in the community".
On February 6, 1962, when the hearing of the present controversy was nearing completion in the
respondent agrarian court but before the case was submitted for decision, Macaraeg filed a
"supplemental petition", claiming damages as a a result of his dispossession. Said petition was given
due course by the court commissioner and the requisite hearing was set for March 9, 1962. Both
Teodoro and Niegos interposed their respective answers, identically asserting that the same was
filed out of time and that the failure of Macaraeg to claim earlier his alleged damages amounted to a
fatal neglect which could no longer be cured at that very late stage of the proceedings. Nonetheless,
hearing on the said petition was disclosed that as "a result of his (Macaraeg's) ejectment, he
became destitute" since he had no "income except from those derived from transplanting and
reaping wherein he earned the amount of P30.00". It was further proved that "for the aqricultural
year 1961-62, Jose Niegos realized a gross harvest of 110 cavans out of which he paid his rental to
Fidel Teodoro in the amount of 42 cavans and 23 kilos."
On September 7, 1962 the decision under review was rendered, with the following dispositive
portion:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of petitioner Felix Macaraeg and against respondents Fidel Teodoro and Jose Niegos
in the tenor and disposition hereinbelow provided, to wit:
1. Jose Niegos is hereby ordered to vacate the landholding in question with an approximate
area of four (4) hectares, situated at Barrio Kalisitan, Talugtug Nueva Ecija, in favor of herein
petitioner and to refrain from molesting or in any manner disturbing his peaceful possession
and cultivation thereof, subject to the condition that said respondent shall have harvested
and threshed his crop which he planted for the current agricultural year;
2. Conformably with the preceding paragraph, Fidel Teodoro is hereby ordered to reinstate
said petitioner to his former landholding aforestated and to keep him as the true and lawful
tenant in accordance with law;
3. Declaring Exhibit A as a leasehold tenancy contract between the parties for the
agricultural year 1960-61 as the term is understood under our tenancy law; as a
consequence hereof, Exhibit 4-Teodoro and Exhibit 5-Niegos, i.e. contract of lease between
Fidel Teodoro and Jose Niegos is hereby declared void and of no legal effect; and
4. Dismissing petitioner's claim for damages as embodied in his supplemental petition.
Teodoro and Niegos filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the respondent
agrarian court in its resolution of November 27, 1962. However, in the same resolution, the court a
quo reconsidered, upon motion of Macaraeg, its ruling denying the latter's prayer for damages, thus:
With respect to petitioner's claim for damages as embodied in his supplemental petition,
wherein evidence was adduced in support thereof, we believe that its admission is in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines, same not being
for the purpose of delaying the proceedings. And, the fact that the Court of Agrarian
Relations shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence but "shall act
13
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case", we believe that the
evidence to support the claim for damages received during the hearings before the court
commissioner is meritorious (Secs. 10 and 11 RA 1267, as amended). Hence, petitioner is
entitled to recover damages claimed by him from his landholder in the amount of 85 cavans
of palay which is equal to the two years rental of his landholding less his earnings during the
same period in the amount of P30.00 only or is equivalent to 3 cavans of palay. In fine, Fidel
Teodoro is liable to pay to petitioner the amount of 82 cavans of palay or its cash value of
P820.00, computed at P10.00 per cavan plus interest at 10% until fully paid.
After Teodoro's motion to reconsider the foregoing resolution was denied, he interposed on January
5, 1963 the present petition, imputing to the court the following errors:
1. In holding that Macaraeg became a tenant of Teodoro by virtue of the "Contract of Lease"
which they executed in April, 1960;
2. Assuming that the foregoing contract was in effect a leasehold tenancy agreement making
Macaraeg a tenant of Teodoro in not finding the former guilty of abandonment, an act which
terminated their tenancy relation; and
3. In condemning Teodoro to pay damages to Macaraeg for the alleged dispossession,

despite the fact that the claim for damages embodied in the abovementioned "Supplemental
Petition" below were about to be terminated.
The pertinent provisions of the disputed "Contract of Lease" between Teodoro and Macaraeg read
as follows:
That the LESSOR is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land situated at Talugtug,
Nueva Ecija, containing an area of THIRTY NINE (39) HECTARES, more or less;
That for and in consideration of the rental of Nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one
agricultural year, the LESSOR hereby lets and leases and the LESSEE hereby accepts an
undivided portion 4 ½ Hectares of the abovementioned property under the following terms
and conditions:
1. That this contract of lease shall only be for the agricultural year 1960-61;
2. That the LESSEE shall give a guaranty to answer for the payment of the lease
consideration of this contract;
3. That the rental of 38.7 cavans of palay per hectare shall be paid unto the LESSOR not
later than January, 1961;
4. That the corresponding rental must be brought to the Poblacion of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, to
be deposited to any bonded Warehouse at the expense of the LESSEE and in the name of
the LESSOR;
5. That the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the LESSEE;
6. That the LESSOR shall pay for the real property taxes corresponding to the property
leased;
14
7. That violation of any of the terms of this contract shall be sufficient ground to terminate the
same with damages against the guilty party;
8. That the property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural enterprise only;
9. That in case of default on the part of the LESSEE to pay the lease consideration when the
same becomes due and payable and the collection for the same reaches the court, the
LESSEE hereby binds himself to pay the cost of the suit including reasonable attorney's
fees. (Emphasis supplied)
I. Teodoro contends that the language and tenor of the aforesaid contract clearly manifest the
intention of the parties to enter into an ordinary civil lease contract, not a leasehold tenancy
agreement as alleged by Macaraeg and sustained by the agrarian court. To start with, Teodoro
stresses, the parties denominated the said covenant as a "Contract of Lease", which assigned title
discloses their mutual intention to execute an ordinary lease contract, for, otherwise, if they had
intended to create a leasehold tenancy relation, they could have accordingly captioned their
agreement "with the word tenancy or some other word of similar import". Moreover, Teodoro points
out that "in the contract of lease in question it is significant to note that the words landlord and tenant
were conspicuous by their complete absence".
The foregoing stance assumed by Teodoro is patently untenable, in the face of the principal features
and stipulations of the contract in controversy and the pertinent provisions of existing law on
leasehold tenancy. It bears emphasis that the title, label or rubric given to a contract cannot be used
to camouflage the real import of an agreement as evinced by its main provisions. Moreover, it is
basic that a contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what it is called by the contracting
parties. 1
As correctly expressed by the respondent court, "viewed from the four corners of Exhibit A, we have
no doubt that the leasehold tenancy contract entered into between petitioner (Macaraeg) and Fidel
Teodoro is a pure and simple leasehold tenancy contract as the term is understood under our
tenancy laws." This observation of the agrarian court finds anchor in the pertinent provision of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act. Thus, section 4 of Rep. Act 1199, as amended by Rep. Act 2263, provides
that
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, undertaken to cultivate a piece of
agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household, belonging to a legally possessed by another in consideration of a
fixed amount in money or in produced or in both.
Furthermore, section 42 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act defines a landlord-lessor as
Any person, natural or judicial, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of
agricultural land, who lets, leases or rents to another said property for purposes of
agricultural production and for a price certain of ascertainable either in amount of money or
produced;
while a tenant-lessee is defined as
15
any person who, with the consent of the former (landlord-lessor), tills, cultivates or operates
said land, susceptible of cultivation by one individual, personally or with the aid of labor
available from among his own immediate farm household.
Gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the following could be synthesized as the principal elements
of a lease-hold tenancy contract or relation:
1. The object of the contract or the relationship is an agricultural land which is leased or

rented for the purpose of agricultural production;
2. The size of the landholding must be such that it is susceptible of personal cultivation by a
single person with assistance from the members of his immediate farm household;
3. The tenant-lessee must actually and personally till, cultivate or operate said land, solely or
with the aid of labor from his immediate farm household; and
4. The landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owner or the legal possessor of the land,
leases the same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in a amount
of money or produce.
Reverting to the controverted "Contract of Lease", we are of the consensus that it indubitably
contains the forgoing essential elements of a leasehold tenancy agreement.
The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural production.

More specifically, the parties stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized for
agricultural enterprise only". (Emphasis supplied). Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the
farmland must be used for rice production as could be inferred from the stipulation that "the rental of
nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one agricultural year ... must be of the same variety (of
palay) as that produced by the LESSEE". (Emphasis supplied)
The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an area of only four and
A half (4-½) hectares. This Court has held 2 that even a bigger area may be cultivated personally by
the tenant, singly or with the help of the members of his immediate farm household.
From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the LESSEE", it
can reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties was that Macaraeg personally work the
land, which he did as found by the Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant
case, petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding belonging to said respondent (Teodoro) for
the agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of a fixed annual rental." (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, there is no evidence that Macaraeg did not personally cultivate the land in dispute.
Neither did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg availed of outside assistance in the
cultivation of the said riceland.
Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the possession thereof
to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in produce. Evidently, there was a valid
leasehold tenancy agreement. Moreover, the provision that the rental be accounted in terms of
produce — 9 cavans per hectare — is an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations,
that the parties did actually enter into a leasehold tenancy relation.
Teodoro further argues, however, that the aforesaid "Contract of Lease" cannot possibly be
construed as establishing a leasehold tenancy relation because the parties themselves ignored and
16
repudiated the very essence of tenancy — security of tenure — when they stipulated that "this
agreement shall only be for the agricultural year 1960-61".
This argument is unacceptable. The mere fact that the parties fixed and limited the duration of their
lease contract to only one agricultural year, does not remove the relationship which they created
from the purview of leasehold tenancy, considering the general import of their agreement which
irreversibly leads to and clearly justifies tenancy coverage. It is fundamental that the tenant-lessee's
security of tenure subsists notwithstanding the termination of the contract which initially established
the tenancy relation. In the language of the law, the "expiration of the period of the contract as fixed
by the parties ... does not of itself extinguish the relationship". 3 This is a "practical consequence of
the distinction between the tenancy contract which is fixed by the parties, and the tenancy
relationship which is maintained and governed by law". 4 Furthermore, section 49 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act provides that
Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the period of future surrender of the
land, in all cases where land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system of
tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the landholder except for
any of the causes hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been proved before
and the dispossession is authorized bye the court." (Emphasis supplied)
The abovecited provision does not permit the parties to stipulate at what future time the tenant shall
leave or surrender the land. Thus, this Court has held 5 that an agreement whereby the tenant was
required to return to the landlord his landholding after one crop year cannot justify the tenant's
dispossession after the said period because such agreement is expressly proscribed by law.
Still vehemently contending that he never intended to enter into any tenancy relation with Macaraeg,
Teodoro finally argues that construing the abovementioned "Contract of Lease" as a leasehold
tenancy agreement would amount to a judicial negation of his freedom to contract.
Needless to stress, this Court frowns upon and rejects any attempt to nullify the legitimate exercise
of the right to contract. We agree with Teodoro that as a landholder he has full liberty to enter into a
civil lease contract covering his property. What we want to indelibly impress, however, is that once a
landowner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production
and said landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with help of labor
coming from his immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold
agreement, and perforce comes under the direct coverage of the tenancy laws. Otherwise, it would
be easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting
the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious
practices of the landed gentry.
II. We now come to the second assignment of error. Teodoro posits that granting the establishment
of a leasehold tenancy relation between him and Macaraeg by virtue of the aforesaid "Contract of
Lease", the agrarian court nevertheless erred in not finding Macaraeg guilty of abandonment, an act
which terminates the tenancy relation and justifies the ejectment of the tenant. In support of his
thesis, Teodoro points out that Macaraeg committed a positive act of abandonment when he offered
to vacate his leasehold in favor of a certain Luciano Claus, and only after "he could not have his own
way of placing Luciano Claus as his successor" did he try to "recover the land holding". Assuming
the veracity of the foregoing allegation, a tenant's offer or intention to surrender his hold on the
condition that the person named by him should be accepted as his successor, does not of itself
constitute abandonment of his farmland.
17
"The word 'abandon', in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly.
The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of 'putting under a ban'. The emphasis is on the
finality and the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the control of another, and
hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never again to resume or claim one's rights or
interests." 6 In other words, the act of abandonment constitutes actual, absolute and irrevocable
desertion of one's right or property. In the case at bar, Macaraeg merely intended to vacate his
leasehold possession on the condition that a certain Claus be taken as his successor. Hence, his act
did not constitute desertion of his leasehold as it was a mere intended surrender of the same. And
as correctly espoused by the counsel for the respondent court, it is "only through the actual
surrender of the land that tenancy relation terminates; no amount of intention to surrender severs the
relationship". Furthermore, the said act of Macaraeg was not an absolute renunciation of his
leasehold possession, as it was in fact clearly conditional.
However, Teodoro also claims, with characteristic certitude that Macaraeg did actually abandon
work on the land in dispute and that even the decision under review contains a finding to this effect.
We find no statement in the agrarian court's decision sustaining Teodoro's view. On the contrary, we
perceive truth in the respondent court's counsel's manifestation that
The only times that the tenant herein did not work the land were (1) during the time it was
undergoing its regular dry season fallow, and, ... (2) after he was prohibited from plowing the
land by a certain Niegos, an agent of petitioner. Failure to cultivate during the dry season
fallow definitely does not amount to abandonment (Cf. De la Cruz vs. Asociacion Zangera
Casilan et al., 83 Phil. 214). Likewise, failure to cultivate the land by reason of the forcible
prohibition to do so by a third party cannot also amount to abandonment, for abandonment
presupposes free will.
Anent the charge of abandonment, it is also pertinent to note that four days after Macaraeg received
a letter from Teodoro and his wife advising him that the landholding in question will be given to
another tenant, he lost no time in inquiring from the Tenancy Mediation Commission at Cabanatuan
City about his rights as a leasehold tenant. It would appear therefore that Macaraeg's immediate
reaction to his landlord's design to dispossess him negates the act of abandonment imputed to him.
Moreover, Teodoro's pretension that Macaraeg had abandoned the disputed landholding was
squarely rejected by the agrarian court, thus:
In the instant case, while petitioner had intentions to surrender his landholding to respondent
after the harvest for the agricultural (year) 1960-61 which led the latter to advise the former
not to give his landholding to Luciano Claus, yet that surrender did not materialize because
said petitioner had apparently changed his mind. For as early as March 6, 1961, petitioner
went to the Office of the Tenancy Mediation Commission, Cabanatuan City for consultation.
As a matter of fact, said Commission wrote a letter to Fidel Teodoro and his wife advising
them to enjoin their overseer, Benito Ismael, from ejecting petitioner.
During the intervening period, Fidel Teodoro and his wife entered into another lease contract
of tenancy with Jose Niegos. For this reason, Mariano Niegos, son of Jose Niegos,
prevented petitioner from plowing his landholding when he found him in the premises on
June 1, 1961. However, notwithstading this incident, Fidel Teodoro opened the door for
negotiations. In fact, as late as June 23, 1961, when petitioner went to the house of Fidel
Teodoro in Manila, a conference was set for that purpose at the house of Benito Ismael
in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija which did not take place because of the absence of petitioner. Under
these circumstances, it appears to our mind that while negotiations for settlement were still
18
pending, yet petitioner has not, in truth and in fact, surrendered his landholding. (Emphasis
supplied)
We are not at liberty to reverse the foregoing finding of fact in the absence of any proof that it is
unfounded or was arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court had failed to consider important evidence to
the contrary. 7 This Court has consistently ruled that the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian
Relations will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial evidence to support them. 8 In the
case at bar, the finding of fact by the by the respondent court anent the issue of abandonment rests
on substantial evidence.
III. Toward the end of the proceedings in the respondent court, Macaraeg interposed a pleading
which he denominated "supplemental petition", wherein he asked for damages as a result of his
dispossession. The said "supplemental petition" was given due course by the hearing commissioner
and Macaraeg was allowed to present evidence in support thereof. On the basis of the evidence
thus adduced, the respondent court awarded damages to Macaraeg as decreed in its
abovementioned resolution of November 27, 1962.
Teodoro maintains that the respondent court erred in admitting the said "supplemental pleading" on
the basis of section 2, Rule 17 (now section 3 of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court) which
exclusively pertains to amendment of pleadings, and has nothing to do with the interposition of
supplemental pleadings which is separately governed by section 5 of Rule 17 (now section 5 of Rule
10). Teodoro avers, moreover, that since Macaraeg filed his claim for damages only when the
hearing below was about to end, his inaction must be considered as a waiver of such claim or that
he should be considered guilty of fatal negligence.
In resolving this last assignment of error, attentions must be centered on the liberal policy which
frees the Court of Agrarian Relations from the fetters of formalistic procedure. As aptly observed in
one case,9
Social justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation like the present, an element of
rigidity would be affixed to procedure precepts and made to cover the matter. Flexibility
should not be ruled out. Precisely, what is sought to be accomplished, by such a
fundamental principle expressly so declared by the Constitution (Art. II, sec. 5) is the
effectiveness of the community's effort to assist the economically underprivileged. For under
existing conditions, without such succor and support, they might not, unaided, be able to
secure justice for themselves....
Moreover, there is equally the obligation on the part of the State to afford protection to labor.
The responsibility is incumbent then, not only on the legislative and executive branches but
also on the judiciary, to translate this pledge into a living reality. The present case is an
appropriate occasion for the discharge of such a trust. To preclude relief under the
circumstances herein disclosed would be to fail to submit to the dictates of a plain
constitutional duty. That we should not allow to happen.
Since the abovementioned "supplemental pleading" was filed without intent to delay the
proceedings, the agrarian court exercised sound discretion in giving it due course in order that "the
real matter in dispute and all matters in the action in dispute between the parties may, as far as
possible, be completely determined in a single proceeding". Moreover Teodoro has no reason to
complain, for he was accorded every opportunity to controvert Macaraeg's claim for damages, but
apparently he did not, as in fact he does not here traverse the substantiality of the award. lawphi1.nêt
19
Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demanding made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute
or of preventing further disputes, provided said matter for determination has been established by
competent evidence during the hearing". 10 In words, the respondent court could have determined
Macaraeg's claim for damages even without his "supplemental petition", provided there was proof to
substantiate such claim (and such requisite evidence was not wanting). Hence if the agrarian court
could, have awarded damages in favor of Macaraeg even in the absence of a specific prayer; then
there is no conceivable reason to bar the respondent court from granting the same with the
interposition of the aforesaid "supplemental petition" which explicitly and unmistakeably prays for
damages resulting from Macaraeg's dispossession.
We hasten to modify however, the award of damages in so far as it deducts from the total amount
recoverable by Macaraeg the sum of P30 or its equivalent of 3 cavans of palay, representing his
earnings during the period of his unlawful ejectment. This part of the award contravenes section
27(1) of the Agricultural Tenancy Act which makes the erring landlord "liable to the tenant for
damages to the extent of the landholder's participation in the harvest in addition to the tenant's right
under Section twenty-two of this Act". And section 22(1) provides that the "tenant shall be free to
work elsewhere whenever the nature of his farm obligations warrants his temporary absence from
his holdings". Consequently, Macaraeg's measly earning of P30 during the period of his
dispossession should not be deducted from the total amount of damages due to him. Interpreting the
abovecited section 27(1) in relation to section 22(1), this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes held that
The earnings of the tenants during the period of unlawful ejectment are not now deductible
from the award of damages. In the case of Potenciano vs. Estefani L-7690, promulgated on
27 July 1955, this Court, on grounds of equity, ruled to deduct such income but said case
was decided under the prior law, Act 4054. The above-quoted Section 27(1) of Republic Act
No. 1199, as amended, which is the one applicable to the present case, not only provides for
a quantum of damages to the tenant, based on the landlord's share in the harvest, but adds
thereto his right under section 22, which states:
(1) the tenant shall be free to work elsewhere whenever the nature of his farm
obligations warrants his temporary absence from his holdings.
This right, although already granted under section 20 of Act 4054, was not then a right
additional to the recovery of damages consequent to unlawful dismissal, but under Republic
Act 1199, as amended, it is to be added to the damages recoverable. 11
ACCORDINGLY, the decision and resolution under review are hereby affirmed, with the sole
modification that the earnings of the herein respondent during the period of his dispossession shall
not be deducted from the award of damages. Cost against the petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
G.R. No. 98028 January 27, 1992
20
GREGORIO CASTILLO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALBERTO IGNACIO, respondents.
Sumulong Law Offices for petitioner.
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision which reversed and set aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 8302-M and declared respondent Alberto
Ignacio as agricultural tenant of the petitioner.
On July 18, 1985, a complaint for injunction was filed by private respondent Alberto Ignacio against
petitioner Gregorio Castillo with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.
It is alleged in the complaint that the respondent is the agricultural tenant of the petitioner in the
latter's parcel of land consisting of 9,920 square meters with fruit-bearing trees situated in Cut-cut,
Pulilan, Bulacan; that sometime in April 1985, the petitioner requested the respondent to allow him to
construct a resthouse in said land, and as a token of goodwill, the respondent agreed, which
agreement is embodied in a "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") between them; that in violation of said
agreement, the petitioner started to cut fruit-bearing trees on the land in question and filled with
adobe stones the area devoted by the private respondent to the planting of vegetables.
The complaint asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
further cutting fruit-bearing trees and from committing further acts of dispossession against the
private respondent. The injunction was granted.
The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the private respondent is not his agricultural tenant;
that respondent Alberto Ignacio is merely a "magsisiga" (smudger) of the landholding in question;
that he did not ask permission from the private respondent to construct a rest house on subject land,
since as owner thereof, he had the right to do so; that he was merely exercising his right of
ownership when he cut certain trees in the subject premises; that when the barangay captain failed
to settle the conflict and the matter was referred to the MAR-BALA (Ministry of Agrarian Reform-
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance) Office in Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Benjamin Yambao of the
MAR (Ministry of Agrarian Reform) prepared the "Kasunduan" attached to the respondent's
complaint, but when he (petitioner) said that he had some misgivings about some words therein,
Atty. Yambao assured him that he need not worry because the respondent could not be a
"kasamang magsasaka" of his mango land because there is nothing to cultivate or till in said land,
but he still corrected the last part of par. 4 of said "Kasunduan" by making it read "sa kanilang
matiwasay na kaugnayan" before signing the same.
On September 28, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring that no tenancy relationship
exists between the petitioner and the private respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
21
a) dismissing the above-entitled case, with costs against the plaintiff;
b) lifting the preliminary injunction issued on September 18, 1985 and declaring the
same legally inefficacious henceforth; and
c) directing the plaintiff no pay unto the defendant the amount of P10,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees.
From the above decision, the private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed
and set aside the decision of the trial court. The respondent appellate court declared that there
exists a tenancy relationship between Alberto Ignacio and Gregorio Castillo and permanently
enjoined the latter from disturbing the respondent's peaceful possession as tenant of said land.
Hence, the instant petition was filed, with the petitioner assigning the following errors as the issues
raised to us:
The Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) committed clear and patent error in reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court which is fully supported not only by
substantial evidence but by overwhelming evidence.
II
The Court of Appeals committed clear and reversible error and grave abuse of
discretion in declaring that "the relationship between plaintiff-appellant and
defendant-appellee over the mango land in question as one of agricultural tenancy"
despite the patent judicial admission of respondent Ignacio that he is merely a
"magsisiga" of the mango land under litigation.
III
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in permanently enjoining

petitioner "from disturbing plaintiff-appellant's peaceful possession as tenant of said
land," although private respondent is not in physical possession of the land,
respondent Ignacio being merely and admittedly a "magsisiga" of the mango land in
question.
IV
The Court of Appeals committed clear and patent error in not ordering the
termination of any and all relationships between petitioner and private respondent,
the latter having failed to perform the work of "magsisiga" on the subject parcel of
land and instead he obstructs the driveway by scattering rubbish, dry leaves, dirt and
other rubbish, preventing the petitioner from proceeding to the premises of the land
by putting up a barb wire fence which are acts of harrassment, disturbing the
peaceful possession of petitioner and which acts are inimical to the continuation of
any kind of relationship between Gregorio Castillo and Alberto Ignacio.
The issue to be resolved in the present petition is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists
between the parties.
22
The Agricultural Tenancy Act defines "agricultural tenancy" as —
. . . the physical possession by a person of a land devoted to agriculture belonging to

or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of
the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of
which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain,
either in produce or in money, or in both. (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 1199; 50 O.G. 4655-56).
As held in the case of Qua v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 236 [1991]), the essential requisites of
tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production; (4) there is consideration which consist of
sharing the harvest; (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the land and (6) there is personal
cultivation by him.
From the foregoing definition, the petitioner insists that for a person to claim tenancy relationship, he
must be an occupant or must be in physical possession of the agricultural land. He alleges that,
Alberto Ignacio, being a mere smudger (magsisiga) of the mango land, no tenancy relationship can
exist between them absent the element of physical possession.
In Gagola v. Court of Agrarian Relations (18 SCRA 992 [1966]), the Court held that a tenant has
possession of the land only through personal cultivation. Thus, in the instant case, the key factor in
ascertaining the existence of a landowner-tenant relationship is whether or not there is personal
cultivation of the land by the private respondent.
The trial court noted that:
Let alone or notwithstanding the use of the phrase "kasamang magsasaka" in the
Kasunduan (Exhibit C) relied upon by the plaintiff, there is no dispute that the actual
role ever played by the plaintiff vis-a-vis the land in litigation was that of a mere
"magsisiga" (smudger). Stated differently, plaintiff has never performed on the
property in question any of the acts of cultivation contemplated by the law as
essential to the creation of an agricultural tenancy relationship. In fine, it is the sense
of the Court that absent the important factor of cultivation, no tenancy relationship
has ever existed between the plaintiff and the defendant over the property involved in
the instant case. At most and at best, the contractual relationship between them was
purely civil nature consisting solely of the seasonal engagement of plaintiff's services
as "magsisiga" or "taga-suob."
On this matter, the appellate court disagreed and noted instead that personal cultivation by
respondent Ignacio of petitioner land is clearly spelled out or admitted in the "Kasunduan" (Exhibit
"C") in view of the aforementioned provision therein that nobody except petitioner and the members
of his family could enter said land without said petitioner's written permission.
We agree with the trial court that the element of personal cultivation is absent. The main thrust of the
petitioner's argument is that the respondent Court of Appeals is mandated by law to affirm the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, acting as an Agrarian Court, if the findings of fact in said
decision are supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions stated therein are not clearly
against the law and jurisprudence. On the other hand, the private respondent contends that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme
Court.
23
After painstakingly going over the records of the petition, we find no strong and cogent reason which
justifies the appellate court's deviation from the findings and conclusions of the trial court. As pointed
out in Hernandez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 [1990]), in agrarian cases, all that
is required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which went
beyond the minimum evidentiary support demanded by law, that is supported by substantial
evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunal.
Moreover, and as significantly held in Qua v. Court of Appeals (supra), the fact that the source of
livelihood of the private respondents is not derived from the lots they are allegedly tenanting is
indicative of non-agricultural tenancy relationship.
Under the facts obtaining in the case, respondent Ignacio is a businessman by occupation and this is
his principal source of income. He manufacturers hollow blocks. He also has a piggery and poultry
farm as well as a hardware store on the land adjoining the subject land. To add to that, the
respondent farms the riceland of one Dr. Luis Santos. It is thus evident that the working hours of the
respondent as a businessman and his other activities do not permit him to undertake the work and
obligations of a real tenant. This is further supported by the undisputed fact that the respondent
cannot even personally perform the work of a smudger because on October 22, 1986, the
respondent hired some 20 people who are not members of his family to cut and burn the grass in the
premises of the subject land.
Anent the element of consent, the petitioner contends that the best evidence and imperishable proof
of the relationship of the parties is that shown in the complaint filed by private respondent with the
barangay captain Tomas Mercado that he is a mere "magsisiga" of the mango trees on the subject
parcel of land. On the other hand, the respondent appellate court said that the best proof of the
existence of tenancy relationship is the "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") and that under Section 7, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court, 'when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,' subject only to certain
exceptions. Inasmuch as substantial evidence does not only require the presence of a mere scintilla
of evidence (Berenguer, Jr. v. CA, 164 SCRA 433 [1988] citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]), we rule that there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to
establish that the element of consent is present. But even assuming arguendo that the element of
consent is present, we declared in De los Reyes v. Espineli (30 SCRA 574 [1969]) that absent the
element of personal cultivation, one cannot be a tenant even if he is so designated in the written
agreement of the parties.
With respect to the requisite of sharing the harvests, the respondent appellate court considered the
receipt (Exhibit "E") signed by the petitioner's son Walderado Castillo as its evidence. On this point,
the petitioner has correctly argued that the receipt is inadmissible on the ground that he did not
participate in its execution.
The maxim "res inter alios acta altere nocere non debet," found in Section 28, Rule 130, Rules of
Court applies, for as stated in Gevero v. Intermediate Appellant Court (189 SCRA 201 [1990]) the
right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Also in pari materia is Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform (168 SCRA 247 [1988]), that the
fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Well-settled is the rule that
all the requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as
contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
24
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. (Qua v. Court of
Appeals, supra citing Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482 [1984]).
However, with respect to the award of attorney's fees by the trial court, the award of P10,000.00 is
unwarranted since the action appears to have been filed in good faith. There should be no penalty
on the right to litigate. (Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989] citing
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 50 [1985]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70736 March 16, 1987
BONIFACIO L. HILARIO and EDUARDA M. BUENCAMINO HILARIO, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SALVADOR
BALTAZAR, respondents.
Bonifacio L. Hilario for petitioners.
Alberto Mala, Jr. for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision declaring Salvador Baltazar
a leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure on a parcel of land consisting of 1,740 square
meters.
On January 13, 1981, Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch VI at Baliuag, Bulacan alleging that since January, 1955 he had been in
continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land with an area of about 2 hectares
situated in San Miguel, Bulacan, which was previously owned by one Socorro Vda. de Balagtas; that
on or about December 27, 1980, and thereafter, the spouses Hilario began to threaten him to desist
from entering and cultivating a portion of the aforesaid land with an area of 4,000 square meters and
otherwise committed acts in violation of his security of tenure; that the Hilarios were contemplating
the putting up of a fence around the said portion of 4,000 square meters and that unless restrained
by the court, they would continue to do so to his great irreparable injury.
Baltazar claims that he became a tenant of Socorro P. Vda. de Balagtas on the latter's two-hectare
landholding located at San Juan, San Miguel, Bulacan by virtue of a "Kasunduan" executed between
them on January 8, 1979, He states that he erected his house and planted "halaman," the produce
of which was divided at 70-30 and 50-50 (sic) in his favor. After the death of Socorro P. Vda. de
Balagtas, he allegedly gave the share pertaining to the landowner to her daughter Corazon
25
Pengzon. It was only in December, 1980 that he came to know that a portion of the 2 hectares or
4,000 square meters is already owned by the Hilarios.
On the other hand, the petitioners aver that they acquired the landholding of 4,000 square meters
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) after it had been foreclosed by virtue of a deed of sale
executed between Bonifacio Hilario and the PNB. The former owner Corazon Pengzon testified that
she owned only two lots-Lot 427-B with an area of 841 square meters and Lot 427-C with an area of
899 square meters with a total area of 1,740 square meters. The other 2 lots were owned by Ruben
Ocampo and Juan Mendoza. She further testified that in 1964 at the time of the partition of the
property, she declared the property for classification purposes as "bakuran" located in the Poblacion
and had no knowledge that there were other things planted in it except bananas and pomelos.
On November 27, 1981, the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in determining whether or not
respondent Baltazar is the tenant of the petitioners ruled that the land in question is not an
agricultural landholding but plain "bakuran," hence, Baltazar is not a tenant on the land.
On January 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals, however, remanded the case to the lower court for
further proceedings on the ground that the findings of the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) were
not supported by substantial evidence.
In compliance with the order of the Court of Appeals, the CAR admitted additional evidence.
On December 19, 1983, the CAR admitted the petitioners' third party complaint filed with leave
against the Philippine National Bank (PNB) which states that in the event that judgment would be
rendered against them under the original complaint, the PNB must contribute, indemnify, and
reimburse the spouses the full amount of the judgment.
On the basis of the parties' and their witnesses' affidavits containing detailed narrations of facts and
documentary exhibits which served as their direct testimonies pursuant to PD 946, the CAR found
that there was no tenancy relationship existing between Baltazar and the former owner, Corazon
Pengzon. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff not to be a tenant on

the landholding described in the complaint and ordering his ejectment therefrom.
The third-party complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 25- 26, Rollo)
Again, respondent Salvador Baltazar appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).
The IAC, however, reversed the decision of the CAR and held that:
... [T]he decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and another one entered
declaring plaintiff-appellant ii leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure on the
land in question consisting of 1,740 square meters. Costs against defendants-
appellees. (p. 31, Rollo)
Consequently, the spouses Hilarios filed this petition for review making the following assignments of
errors:
26
I. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS
AND DECISION OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS (CAR) WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTION (SIC) THE FINDINGS
OF FACTS OF CAR, OF ITS OWN FINDINGS.
III. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
CAR, FINDING THE LOTS IN QUESTION WITH AN AREA OF 1,740 SQUARE METERS AS
RESIDENTIAL LOT AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT NOT TO BE A TENANT.
We agree with the respondent court when it stated that it can affirm on appeal the findings of the
CAR only if there is substantial evidence to support them. However, after a careful consideration of
the records of the case, we find no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the CAR. The
evidence presented by the petitioners is more than sufficient to justify the conclusion that private
respondent Salvador Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding in question.
Salvador Baltazar claims: that he is working on the land in question pursuant to a "kasunduan"
executed between him and Socorro Balagtas. The contract covers a two-hectare parcel of land. The
disputed landholding is only 4,000 square meters more or less, although Baltazar claims that this
area is a portion of the two hectares in the contract. He testified that sometime in 1965, he
relinquished 1.5 hectares of the two hectares subject of the "kasunduan" to Nemesio Ocampo, Juan
Mendoza, Miguel Ocampo and Miguel Viola and what remained under his cultivation was 1/2
hectare owned by Corazon Pengson. He stated that when Socorro Balagtas died, no new contract
was executed. However, he insists that the old contract was continued between Corazon Pengson
and himself. (Rollo, p. 23).
This claim is controverted by the testimony of Corazon Pengson herself which we quote as follows:
Q After the death of your mother in 1965, what step, if any, have you
taken, regarding this subject landholding or after the death of your
mother how did you —
Q ... administer this landholding in 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, etc?
A What I did is to fix the title of ownership, sir.
COURT:
Q What else?
A None other, Your Honor.
Q After the death of your mother in 1962, have you seen Mr.
Salvador Baltazar in this landholding in question?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What was he doing?
WITNESS:
27
A We are neighbors, Your Honor, sometimes he visits and goes to
our place and we used to meet there, Your Honor.
Q What was the purpose of his visit and your meeting in this
landholding?
A Sometimes when he visits our place he tens us that there are some
bananas to be harvested and sometimes there are other fruits, your
Honor.
Q You mean to say he stays in this subject landholding consisting of

7,000 square meters?
A After the survey it turned out-
A . . . that he is occupying another lot which I learned that property

does not belong to us, Your Honor.
Q what was your arrangement regarding his stay in that landholding

which you don't own?
A He said that he had a contract with my late mother which I don't

know; in order not to cause any trouble because I will be bothered in
my business, I told him to continue, Your Honor.
Q What do you mean when you-
COURT:
(continuing)
. . .told him to continue?
A What I mean to say is that he can stay there although I don't

understand the contract with my mother, Your Honor.
Q Was he paying rentals for his stay in that lot?
A No, Your Honor (T.S.N., pp. 15-19, hearing of August 5, 1981).
Corazon Pengson further explained that she did not receive any share from the produce of the land
from 1964 up to the filing of the case and she would not have accepted any share from the produce
of the land because she knew pretty well that she was no longer the owner of the lot since 1974
when it was foreclosed by the bank and later on purchased by the spouses Hilarios.
We note the CAR's finding:
Tenancy relationship is indivisible. The two-hectare land subject of plaintiff's alleged

contract with Socorro Balagtas having been parcelled into seven (7) and possession
thereof relinquished/surrendered in 1965 results in the termination of plaintiff's
28
tenancy relationship with the previous owner/landholder. Such being the case, he
cannot now claim that the landholding in question consisting of 4,000 square meters,
more or less, is being cultivated by him under the old contract. The owner thereof
Corazon Pengson has no tenancy relationship with him (plaintiff). (p. 25, Rollo)
From the foregoing, it is clear that Corazn Pengson did not give her consent to Baltazar to work on
her land consisting of only 1,740 square meters. We agree with the CAR when it said:
The law accords the landholder the right to initially choose his tenant to work on his
land. For this reason, tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of
the true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or
usurpation. So the mere cultivation of the land by usurper cannot confer upon him
any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of
tenure of the law (Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482) (Ibid)
And in the case of Tuazon v. Court of Appeals (118 SCRA 484), this Court had the occasion to
explain:
xxx xxx xxx
... Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and, as in this case, their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even
more important."
The respondent court ruled that the fact that the land in question is located in the poblacion does not
necessarily make it residential.
The conclusion is purely speculative and conjectural, We note that the evidence presented by the
petitioners sufficiently establishes that the land in question is residential and not agricultural.
As we stated in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals (supra) "the key factor in ascertaining whether or not
there is a landowner-tenant relationship in this case is the nature of the disputed property."
The records show that the disputed property, only 1,740 square meters in area, is actually located in
the poblacion of San Miguel, Bulacan not far from the municipal building and the church. It is divided
into two lots-Lot 427-B with an area of 841 square meters and Lot 427-C with an area of 899 square
meters. Two other lots which the respondent claims to cultivate as "tenant" were originally owned by
Ruben Ocampo and Juan Mendoza, not Corazon Pengson, through whom the respondent traces his
alleged tenancy rights.
Respondent Baltazar is a full-time government employee working in the Bureau of Plant Industry.
The disputed lots were acquired at a foreclosure sale from the Philippine National Bank. They were
purchased as residential lots and the deed of sale describes them as "residential." The inspection
and appraisal report of the PNB classified the land as residential. The declaration of real property on
the basis of which taxes are paid and approved by the Acting Provincial Assessor of Bulacan
classifies the land as residential. The tax declarations show that the 841 square meter lot is
assessed for tax purposes at P25,236.00 while the 899 square meter lot is assessed at P26,920.00.
The owner states that the land has only bananas and pomelos on it. But even if the claim of the
29
private respondent that some corn was planted on the lots is true, this does not convert residential
land into agricultural land.
The presumption assumed by the appellate court, that a parcel of land which is located in a
poblacion is not necessary devoted to residential purposes, is wrong. It should be the other way
around. A lot inside the poblacion should be presumed residential or commercial or non-agricultural
unless there is clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural.
The respondent court also failed to note that the alleged tenant pays no rental or share to the
landowners. Baltazar made a vague allegation that he shared 70-30 and 50-50 of the produce in his
favor. The former owner flatly denied that she ever received anything from him,
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) The parties are
the landholder and tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) The purpose is agricultural
production; and (4) There is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.
We held in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, cited above that:
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between

the parties and the absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant
a de facto tenant as contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because
unless a person has established his status as a dejure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government
under existing tenancy laws ... (emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88113 October 23, 1992
SPOUSES TITUS L. ENDAYA and GLENDA TRINIDAD; SPOUSES RICO L. ENDAYA and
NANETTE AQUINO; and SPOUSES JOSEPHINE L. ENDAYA and LEANDRO
BANTUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO FIDELI, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-.G.R.
No. 15724 dated April 26, 1989 reversing the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
1
Batangas (Branch 6) in Civil Case No. T-430 and holding that private respondent is an agricultural
2
lessee in the land of petitioner whose security of tenure must be respected by the latter.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of agricultural land consisting
of 20,200 square meters situated at San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas, devoted to rice and corn. As
30
far back as 1934, private respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses
respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses San Diego under a fifty-
fifty (50-50) sharing agreement. This fact, petitioners do not dispute.
On May 2, 1974, a lease contract was executed between the Spouses San Diego and one Regino
Cassanova for a period of four years from May 1974 up to May 1978. The lease contract obliged 3
Cassanova to pay P400.00 per hectare per annum and gave him the authority to oversee the
planting of crops on the land. Private respondent signed this lease contract as one of two
4
witnesses. 5
The lease contract was subsequently renewed to last until May 1980 but the rental was raised to
P600.00. Again, private respondent signed the contract as witness. 6
During the entire duration of the lease contract between the Spouses San Diego and Cassanova,
private respondent continuously cultivated the land, sharing equally with Cassanova the net produce
of the harvests.
On January 6, 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners for the sum of P26,000.00.
The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas and a Transfer Certificate of Title
was duly issued on January 7, 1981. Private respondent continued to farm the land although
7
petitioners claim that private respondent was told immediately after the sale to vacate the land. 8 In
any case, it is undisputed that private respondent deposited with the Luzon Development Bank an amount of about P8,000.00 as partial
payment of the landowner's share in the harvest for the years 1980 until 1985. 9
Due to petitioners persistent demand for private respondent to vacate the land, private respondent
filed in April 1985 a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas praying that he
10
be declared the agricultural tenant of petitioners.
After trial, the trial court decided in favor of petitioners by holding that private respondent is not an
agricultural lessee of the land now owned by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint to be

declared a tenant of the landholding consisting of 20,200 square meters, located at
San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas, and owned by the defendants; ordering Pedro
Fideli to vacate the landholding deliver possession thereof to the defendants; and
ordering the amount of P8,000.00 deposited under Account No. 2940029826 Civil
Case No. T-430 to be withdrawn and delivered to the defendants, No.
pronouncement as to costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent to be
the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding. Hence, this petition wherein private respondent's
status as an agricultural lessee and his security of tenure as such are being disputed by petitioners.
Petitioners impugn the Court of Appeals' declaration that private respondent is an agricultural lessee
of the subject landholding contending that when the original landowners, the Spouses San Diego,
entered into a lease contract with Regino Cassanova, the agricultural leasehold relationship between
the Spouses San Diego and private respondent, the existence of which petitioners do not dispute,
was thereby terminated. Petitioners argue that a landowner cannot have a civil law lease contract
with one person and at the same time have an agricultural leasehold agreement with another over
the same land. It is further argued that because private respondent consented to the lease contract
between the Spouses San Diego and Cassanova, signing as he did the lease agreement and the
31
renewal contract as witness thereof, private respondent has waived his rights as an agricultural
lessee.
These contentions are without merit.
R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839 (1971), which is the relevant law governing the
events at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971 and established the
agricultural leasehold system by operation of law. Section 7 of the said law gave agricultural
11
lessees security of tenure by providing the following: "The agricultural leasehold relation once
established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding
until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of
tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for
causes herein provided." The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over the
12
subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to oversee the farming of the land, as was
done in this case, is not among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the agricultural
leasehold relation. On the contrary, Section 10 of the law provides:
13
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period,

etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished
by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the
agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists
resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as lease, will not
terminate the right of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such rights
enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor in interest. 14
Illustrative of the legal principles outlined above is Catorce v. Court of Appeals where the person
15
holding a mortgage over the farm land subject of an agricultural leasehold took possession thereof
pursuant to the mortgage and ousted the agricultural lessee. Upon complaint for reinstatement filed
by the agricultural lessee, the then Court of Agrarian Relations ordered the mortgagee to deliver
possession over the land to the agricultural lessee but his decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. In reversing the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstating the Agrarian Court's decision,
the Court, through Justice Melencio-Herrera, noted, among other considerations, that "tenants are
guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment and possession of their
landholding except when their dispossession had been authorized by virtue of a final and executory
judgment, which is not so in the case at bar." Implicit in the decision is the recognition that the
16
transfer of possession to the mortgage did not terminate the agricultural leasehold nor prejudice the
security of tenure of the agricultural lessee.
Closer, to although not identical with the factual setting of the case at bar is Novesteras v. Court of
Appeals. Petitioner in said case was a share tenant of the respondent over two parcels of land.
17
Respondent entered into a contract of civil lease with Rosenda Porculas for a term of three years.
Porculas did not farm the land himself but left it to petitioner to till the land. After the expiration of the
lease between respondent and Porculas, petitioner entered into an agreement denominated as a
contract of civil lease with respondent. On expiration of this lease contract, respondent denied
petitioner possession over the land. Resolving the rights and obligations of the parties, the Court,
through Justice Paras, held that the petitioner therein became an agricultural tenant of respondent
by virtue of R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended by R.A. No 6839 (1971). The lease contract between
32
the respondent and Porculas did not terminate the agricultural leasehold relationship between
petitioner and respondent. If at all, the said lease agreement, coupled by the fact that Porculas
allowed petitioner to continue cultivating in his capacity as tenant of the subject landholding, served
to strengthen petitioner's security of tenure as an agricultural tenant of the farmland in question.
Accordingly, the subsequent contract between petitioner and respondent denominated as a contract
of civil lease was held by the Court to be in fact an agricultural leasehold agreement.
Again, in Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) v. Court of Appeals, it was 18
held that the agricultural leasehold is preserved, notwithstanding the transfer of the legal possession
of the subject landholding, with the transferee, COCOMA in that case, being accountable to the
agricultural lessees for their rights. The Court, through Justice Padilla, summarized the rule as
follows:
There is also no question that, in this case, there was a transfer of the legal
possession of the land from one landholder to another (Fule to petitioner COCOMA).
In connection therewith, Republic Act 3844, Sec. 10 states:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by

Expiration of Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under
this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or
period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of
the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor
sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding,
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Further, in several cases, this Court sustained the preservation of the landholder-
tenant relationship, in cases of transfer of legal possession:
. . . in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the

tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be
preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect
him from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser
of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to
maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the
land or afford them protection against unjustified dismissal from their
holdings. (Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil. 675);
It is our considered judgment, since the return by the lessee of the

leased property to the lessor upon the expiration of the contract
involves also a transfer of legal possession, and taking into account
the manifest intent of the lawmaking body in amending the law, i.e.,
to provide the tenant with security of tenure in all cases of transfer of
legal possession, that the instant case falls within and is governed by
the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended by
Republic Act 2263. (Joya v. Pareja, 106 Phil, 645).
. . . that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of the land to
enforce obligation incurred by the former landholder such
obligation . . . falls upon the assignee or transferee of the land
pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since respondent are in turn
free to proceed against the former landholder for reimbursement, it is
33
not iniquitous to hold them responsible to the tenant for said
obligations. Moreover, it is the purpose of Republic Act 1199,
particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that the right of the tenant to
receive his lawful share of the produce to receive this lawful share of
the produce of the land is unhampered by the transfer of said land
from one landholder to another. (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil.
1154.).
19
In the instant case, private respondent has been cultivating the subject farm landholding with a fifty-
fifty (50-50) sharing arrangement with the Spouses San Diego, petitioners' predecessors-in-interest.
The passage of R.A. 6839 in 1971, amending R.A. 3844 (1963), secured to private respondent all
the rights pertaining to an agricultural lessee. The execution of a lease agreement between the
Spouses San Diego and Regino Cassanova in 1974 did not terminate private respondent's status as
an agricultural lessee. The fact that private respondent knew of, and consented to, the said lease
contract by signing as witness to the agreement may not be construed as a waiver of his rights as an
agricultural lessee. On the contrary, it was his right to know about the lease contract since, as a
result of the agreement, he had to deal with a new person instead of with the owners directly as he
used to. No provision may be found in the lease contract and the renewal contract even intimating
that private respondent has waived his rights as an agricultural lessee. Militating against petitioners'
theory that the agricultural leasehold was terminated or waived upon the execution of the lease
agreement between the San Diegos and Cassanova is the fact the latter desisted from personally
cultivating the land but left it to private respondent to undertake the farming, the produce of the land
being shared between Cassanova and private respondent, while the former paid P400.00 and later
P600.00 per hectare per annum to the San Diegos, as agreed upon in the lease contract.
Petitioners, however, insist that private respondent can no longer be considered the agricultural
lessee of their farm land because after they purchased the land from the Spouses San Diego in
1980, private respondent did not secure their permission to cultivate the land as agricultural lessee.
It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent the true
and lawful owners is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where an untenanted farm
20
land is cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her will or although permission to
work on the farm was given, there was no intention to constitute the worker as the agricultural lessee
of the farm land. The rule finds no application in the case at bar where the petitioners are
21
successors-in-interest to a tenanted land over which an agricultural leasehold has long been
established. The consent given by the original owners to constitute private respondent as the
agricultural lessee of the subject landholding binds private respondents whom as successors-in-
interest of the Spouses San Diego, step into the latter's shows, acquiring not only their rights but
also their obligations.
22
Contradicting their position that no agricultural leasehold exists over the land they acquired from the
Spouses San Diego, petitioners also pray for the termination of the tenancy of private respondent
allegedly due to: (a) non-payment of the agricultural lease rental; and (b) animosity between the
landowners and the agricultural lessee. The Court, however, observes that nowhere in the
petitioners' Answer to private respondent's Complaint or in the other pleadings filed before the trial
court did petitioners allege grounds for the termination of the agricultural leasehold. Well-settled is
the rule that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
23
In fine, the Court, after a painstaking examination of the entire records of the case and taking into
account the applicable law, as well as the relevant jurisprudence, rules that private respondent is the
agricultural lessee over the land owned by petitioners. As such, private respondent's security of
tenure must be respected by petitioners.
34
The Court, however, notes from the records of the case that private respondent has unilaterally
decided to pay only 25% of the net harvests to petitioners. Since the agreement of private
24
respondent with the Spouses San Diego, the original owners, was for a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing of
the net produce of the land, the same sharing agreement should be maintained between petitioners
and private respondents, without prejudice to a renegotiation of the terms of the leasehold
agreement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Private respondent is hereby ordered to pay the back rentals from 1980 until
1992 plus interest at the legal rate. An accounting of the production of the subject landholding is to
be made by private respondent to the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas which shall
determine the amount due to petitioners based on the rate ordered above. So ordered.
G.R. No. 110012 March 28, 2001
ANASTACIO VICTORIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND DOMINADOR FERNANDEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
This case is one of the old ones re-raffled to herein ponente pursuant to the Court's Resolution in
A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001. Sought to be set aside by petitioner is the decision of
the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. SP No. 26680 dated November 27, 1992 affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region (Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan), which held that
the lease contract entered into by and between herein petitioner and private respondent is a civil law
lease agreement and not an agricultural tenancy contract.
The facts of the case are simple. 1âwphi1.nêt
Sometime in 1967, a lease contract over a fishpond located in Brgy. Balangobong, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, was entered into by Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas Fernandez (as lessor), the
fathers of herein petitioner Anastacio Victorio and private respondent Dominador Fernandez,
respectively. The contract was for a period of 10 years. After said contract expired in 1977, the same
was renewed, albeit verbally, for another 10 years or until 1987, adopting the terms and conditions of
the original contract. The original parties to the contract were substituted by their heirs, Anastacio
Victorio and Dominador Fernandez as lessee and lessor, respectively. When the second contract
expired in 1987, private respondent repeatedly asked petitioner to vacate the premises but the latter
adamantly refused. Consequently, private respondent filed a case for ejectment against petitioner,
which was, however, dismissed by the trial court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, the regional trial court reversed, holding that the lease contract is a civil law lease
agreement and ordering petitioner to vacate the fishpond in question, and thereafter, to surrender
peaceful possession and occupation thereof to respondent. The yearly lease rental was set at
P450.00 commencing from June 16, 1987 up to the time the property is vacated (p. 5, RTC
Decision, January 26, 1990).
Petitioner having been rebuked on reconsideration, he elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
on a petition for certiorari. However, the appellate court (Herrera M., Torres (P), and Canizares-Nye)
turned down the appeal, ratiocinating as follows:
35
Contrary to the allegation of the petitioner, the relationship of the petitioner and the private
respondent is one of a civil law lease which has a definite term. Undeniably, the subject
premises was formerly leased by the father of the petitioner for a period of ten (10) years
which lasted from 1967 to 1977. Thereafter, petitioner hired the subject premises for another
ten (10) years or until June 15, 1987. Consequently, upon the expiration of the contract,
petitioner should have surrendered the possession of the subject premises to the private
respondent in the absence of a renewal of the lease contract. The respondent court found
that –
After a painstaking and careful study and analysis of the evidence documentary and
testimonial and the facts obtaining in the case at hand, the court is strongly
convinced and hereby finds and holds that the agreement entered by the parties is a
civil law contract of lease. This finding and observation of the court is anchored on
the following factors:
1. That the written contract of lease (Exhibits 'A' and 'I') the terms and stipulations of
which were adopted by the parties in their verbal agreement is titled and styled
contract of lease and not agricultural leasehold system as expressly termed under
R.A. 3844 as amended;
2. That the parties in the contract are designated as 'lessor' and 'lessee' and not
agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee as the Code of Agrarian Reform used in
agricultural leasehold contract.
That the mode of payment of the lease rental as stipulated in the agreement is, that
the rentals for the first three years be paid in advance within the first fifteen days of
June of every year. This mode of payment is one of the essential characteristics of a
contract of civil law lease. In agricultural leasehold system, the rental is generally
paid on the date it falls due as provided for under Section 26, paragraph 6 of
Republic Act 3844. It is likewise stated in Section 33 of the same Code, that in no
case shall the agricultural lessor require the agricultural lessee to pay the lease
rental in advance, in money or in kind or in both.
The owner of an agricultural land is given the option to choose the mode of managing or
administering his property, thus: (1) he works on it himself; (2) he may secure the services of
an agricultural tenant; or (3) he may enter into a lease contract with another under the
provisions of the Civil Code. In the instant case, the private respondent opted for civil law
lease and hence, the contract had a fixed term. When the lessee's right ceases because the
term has expired, all other rights created by the exercise of that right must also cease.
(pp. 6-7, CA Decision, November 27, 1992)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
The lone issue presented is whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act
No. 3844 and thus entitled to security of tenure over the fishpond in question, or a mere civil lessee
whose right over the subject premises ceased upon the expiration of the contract of lease.
We affirm.
36
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties (Chico vs. Court
of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 [1998]; Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Odsique vs.
Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also Sintos vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 223
[1995]).1âwphi1.nêt
In the case under review, the first, third, and fourth requisites were absent in the agreement, leading
to the conclusion that no tenancy relationship existed between petitioner and private respondent.
The record is bereft of any evidence showing that Dominador Femandez consented to having
petitioner Anastacio Victorio as his tenant in the fishpond subject of the controversy. Later, what was
agreed upon was for petitioner Victorio to continue leasing the subject premises under the terms and
conditions of the original lease. Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract
between his father and private respondent's father wherein petitioner's father was designated as a
"lessee" and not as a "tenant". Petitioner can not, therefore, be more than a lessee like his father
because "the spring cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was no stipulation regarding
the sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One of the essential requisites for the
existence of a tenancy relationship is sharing by the landowner and tenant of the produce, and no
proof of this fact has been shown in this case. What the parties agreed upon, as established by the
evidence, was for petitioner to pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an advance
payment of 3 years' rental. This is not the case obtaining in a tenancy relationship where the parties
share in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as it becomes available, during harvest time. It is
also significant to note that, as shown by the evidentiary record, private respondent and his father,
as lessor, bore all the expenses for the repair and improvement of the dikes whenever the fishpond
was destroyed due to floods and other natural calamities.
All of the above are hallmarks of a civil law lease contract and, as correctly found by both the
appellate court and the regional trial court, they belie the existence of a tenancy relationship
between petitioner and private respondent. We find no reason to deviate from these findings, correct
and founded as they are on the law and evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
regional trial court affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
37

Republic of The Philippines Manila Second Division: Supreme Court

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Statutory basis of LEASEHOLD: RA 1199;3844;6389;6657

Leasehold relation-Tapang vs Robles, 72 Phil 79; Datu et al vs Cabangon et al GR -14590, 25 May 1960;

Elements of Agricultural Tenancy-Caballes vs DAR 168 SCRA 254;Teodoro vs Macaraeg 27 SCRA 7;

Purpose is agricultural production-Caballes vs DAR 168 SCRA 248

Personal cultivation-Oarde vs CA 280 SCRA 235

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974

Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.

Virgilio M. Pablo for defendant-appellant.

Armando M. Laki for movant.

A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he appealed to this Court

1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

4. That the land belongs to another; and

Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?

question, and We quote:

G.R. No. 78214 December 5, 1988

The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:

That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.

Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:

Section 2 of said law provides:

It is the policy of the State:

xxx xxx xxx

declared policy of the law stated above.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:

1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;

Jose A. Buendia and Agustin A. Pelmoka for petitioner.

We turn to the factual milieu.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in

4. Dismissing petitioner's claim for damages as embodied in his supplemental petition.

3. In condemning Teodoro to pay damages to Macaraeg for the alleged dispossession,

Furthermore, section 42 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act defines a landlord-lessor as

while a tenant-lessee is defined as

1. The object of the contract or the relationship is an agricultural land which is leased or

The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural production.

G.R. No. 98028 January 27, 1992

Sumulong Law Offices for petitioner.

Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for private respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in permanently enjoining

. . . the physical possession by a person of a land devoted to agriculture belonging to

The trial court noted that:

G.R. No. 70736 March 16, 1987

BONIFACIO L. HILARIO and EDUARDA M. BUENCAMINO HILARIO, petitioners,

Bonifacio L. Hilario for petitioners.

Alberto Mala, Jr. for private respondent.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff not to be a tenant on

Q ... administer this landholding in 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, etc?

A What I did is to fix the title of ownership, sir.

A None other, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What was he doing?

Q You mean to say he stays in this subject landholding consisting of

A After the survey it turned out-

A . . . that he is occupying another lot which I learned that property

Q what was your arrangement regarding his stay in that landholding

A He said that he had a contract with my late mother which I don't

Q What do you mean when you-

. . .told him to continue?

A What I mean to say is that he can stay there although I don't

Q Was he paying rentals for his stay in that lot?

A No, Your Honor (T.S.N., pp. 15-19, hearing of August 5, 1981).