Chapter 2. Standing of A Person in Tort

LAW OF TORTS, MV ACCIDENT AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS I
Standing of a Person in Tort

¡ Introduction:
¡ All persons have capacity to sue and be sued in tort. This, however, is a general rule and is
subject to modification in respect of certain categories of persons.
¡ Locus Standi: Traditional Doctrine of Locus Standi in Private Law Litigation-

¡ Locus standi means ‘legal capacity to challenge an act or decision’. This traditional rule of
locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to person who has suffered legal injury.
21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 2

¡ Traditionally it was only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury by a reason of actual
or threatened violations of a legal right or legally protected interest who could bring an action
for judicial redress. However, this is a rule of ancient vintage and it arose during an era
when private law dominated the legal system and public law had not yet been born.
¡ Where an applicant has a legal right or a legally protected interest the violation of which
would result a legal injury to him, there must be corresponding duties owned by other parties
to the applicant.
¡ This rule in regard to locus standi thus postulates the right-duty pattern which is commonly to
be found in private law litigation.

¡ This rule was based on premise that only a person whose own right is threatened, is entitled
to seek a remedy, this rule translate itself into the following proposition of law:
¡ 1. Only he can take recourse to the jurisdiction whose own legal rights of person or property are
directly and substantially injured.
¡ 2. When a person suffers along with other members of the public by administrative action, he
cannot challenge the action in question, unless he can show some special injury to himself over
and above what others have suffered.
¡ 3. Where a person challenging an administrative action is a total stranger (courts call them
meddlesome interloper), the court will not ordinarily entertain his petition.

¡ The Liberalisation of Locus Standi in Public Interest Litigation:
¡ Justice Krishna Iyer in Municipal Council Ratlam v Vardhichand AIR 1980 SC 1622, for
improving the access to justice for the people, stated with assertion the imperative need to
liberalise locus standi to go beyond the blinkered rules of standing of British Indian
Vintage.
¡ A Committee consisting of PN Bhagwati and VR Krishna Iyer JJ submitted the Report on
National Juridicare, Ministry of Law Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India,
1977 and emphasised this need as follows:
¡ “Each one being driven to Court on his separate cause of action is itself a public wrong…The
rule of locus standi requires to be broad based and any organisation (or individual) must be
able to start such legal action…Community proceedings, public interest litigation, class action
and the like before Courts, Tribunals and other authorities must be financed and/or
undertaken by legal aid organisation and public interest lawyers.”

¡ 1. Private Legal Injury to Others
¡ Where a person who has suffered legal wrong or legal injury or whose legal rights or interest
is violated has been unable to approach the court on account of some disability (his socially
or economically disadvantage position) some other person can invoke the assistance of the
court for judicial redress.
¡ S P Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149

¡ It was held that in such a case unless another person is allowed to move the court the legal
wrong or the injury caused to such person would go unredressed.

•  The Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, AIR 2000 SC 988
•  A practicing Advocate of the Calcutta High Court filed a petition under Article.226 of the
Constitution of India against the various railway authorities of the eastern railway claiming
compensation for the victim, Smt. Hanufa Khatoon, a Bangladesh national- who was raped at
the Howrah Station, by the railway security men. The High Court awarded Rs.10 lacs as
compensation.
•  In the Appeal to the Supreme Court, it was asserted by the Court that "Where public
functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of fundamental rights or the
enforcement of public duties, the remedy would be avoidable under public law. It was more so,
when it was not a mere violation of any ordinary right, but the violation of fundamental rights
was involved- as the petitioner was a victim of rape, which a violation of fundamental right of
every person guaranteed under Article.21 of the Constitution."

¡ 2. Injury to Public Interest:
¡ Where the state or a public authority may act in violation of constitutional or statutory
obligations or fail to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury to public interest, who would
have standing to complain against such act or omission of the state or public authority? In
such cases, if no one can maintain an action for redress, it would be disastrous for rule of law.
¡ In S P Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, the Supreme Court viewed that in all such
cases where there has been the public wrong and the public injury, any member of the public
acting bonafide and having sufficient interest can maintain a redress of such public wrong or
public injury.

•  National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1234,
•  Public interest petition, filed by the National Human Rights Commission, it was urged to the
Court to enforce the rights, under Article 21 of the Constitution, of about 65,000 Chakma/
Hajong Tribals, settled mainly in the State of Arunachal Pradesh who were being persecuted by
sections of the citizens of Arunachal Pradesh.
•  The Supreme Court held that ‘the State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human-
being, be he a citizen or otherwise, and it cannot permit any body or group of persons, e.g., the
AAPSU, to threaten the Chakmas to leave the State, failing which they would be forced to do
so. No State Government worth the name can tolerate such threats by one group of persons to
another group of persons; it is duty bound to protect the threatened group from such assaults
and if it fails to do so, it will fail to perform its Constitutional as well as statutory obligations. …
The State Government must act impartially and carry out its legal obligations to safeguard the
life, health and well being of Chakmas residing in the State without being inhibited by local
politics’.

¡ 3. Injury to Public Interest with Specific Injury: Qualified Standing
¡ Where there is public injury by the act or omission of the state or public authority which also
simultaneously causes specific injury to an individual or to a specific class or group of
individuals. In such cases a member of the public having sufficient interest can certainly
maintain an action challenging the legality of such an action.
¡ However, if the person or specific class/group of persons who have primarily injured do not
wish to any claim, the member of public who complains of a secondary public injury can not
maintain the action. (For more details on public interest litigation, please refer to Videh
Upadhyay, “Public Interest Litigation in India: Concepts, Cases and Concerns”,
LexisNexis Butterworth's: 2007)

¡ Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster and Class Action:
¡ A class action is a legal procedure which enables the claims (or part of the claims) of a
number of persons against the same defendant to be determined in the one suit.
¡ In a class action, one or more persons may sue on his or her own behalf and on behalf of a
number of other persons who have a claim to a remedy for the same or a similar alleged
wrong to that alleged by the representative plaintiff, and who have claims that share questions
of law or fact in common with those of the representative plaintiff (‘common issues’).
¡ Only the representative plaintiff is a party to the action. The class members are bound by the
outcome of the litigation on the common issues, whether favourable or adverse to the class,
although they do not, for the most part, take any active part in that litigation.

¡ Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613
¡ The constitutional validity of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act,
1985 was challenged. The Act empowered the Central Government to take over the conduct
of all litigation on behalf of the victims of Bhopal Gas Tragedy. The validity of the Act was
challenged on the ground that the deprivation of the claimants individual rights to legal
remedy against the Union Carbide Company was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
¡ The Court held that the Act is valid as the State in capacity of parents patriae (parent of the
country) for protecting the disabled victims of Bhopal Gas disaster is competent to represent
the victims. It is the duty of the State to protect the rights and privileges of its citizens and
where the citizens are not in a position to assert and secure their rights the State must come
into picture and protect and fight for the rights of the citizens.

Who cannot sue?
¡ Following persons may not sue due to restriction on personality, partially or fully.
¡ Foreign State
¡ Alien Enemy
¡ Convict
¡ Insolvent
¡ Husband and Wife
¡ Corporation

¡ Foreign State:
¡ A foreign state cannot sue in any Court of India unless such State has been recognised by the
Government of India.
¡ As per Section 87A (1) (a), CPC “Foreign State” means any State outside India which has
been recognised by the Central Government.
¡ As per Section 84, CPC a foreign state may sue in any competent court: provided that the
object of the suit is to enforce a private right vested in the ruler or such state or in any officer
of such State in his public capacity. [As per Section 87A (1) (b) CPC “Ruler”, in relation to a
foreign State, means the person who is for the time being recognised by the Central
Government to be the head of that state.]

¡ Private Rights:
¡ The private rights spoken of in this section does not mean individual rights as opposed to
those of the body politic but those private rights of the State which must be enforced in a
Court of Justice as distinguished from its political or territorial rights which must, from
their very nature, be made the subject or arrangement between on e State and another.
¡ Mirza Ali Akbar v. United Arab Republic, AIR 1966 SC 230

¡ It was held by the Supreme Court that ‘private rights’ means rights which may be enforced
by a foreign state against private individuals as distinguished from rights which one State in
its political capacity may have as against another State in it s political capacity.

¡ Alien Enemy :
¡ Alien enemy is a person of enemy nationality or a person residing in or carrying on business
in enemy territory, whatever his nationality. An alien enemy cannot sue in his own right.
¡ Johnstone v. Pedler, (1921) 2 AC 262

¡ It was held that an alien enemy residing within the realm by the express or tacit licence of the
Crown is temporarily free from his enemy character and can invoke jurisdiction of courts.

¡ As per Section 83, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, alien enemies residing in India with the
permission of the Central Government and alien friends, may sue in any court otherwise
competent to try the suit, as if they were citizens of India, but alien enemies residing in India
without such permission, or residing in a foreign country, shall not sue in any such court.
¡ Further, every person residing in a foreign country, the Government of which is at war with
India and carrying on business in that country without a license on that behalf granted by the
Central Government is deemed to be an alien enemy residing in a foreign country.
(Explanation to Section 83, CPC.)

¡ Convict:
¡ A convict can under English Law sue for wrongs to his person and property like any other
citizen.
¡ 1870-1948
¡ Under the Forfeiture Act, 1870, a convict whose sentence was in force and unexpired, and
who was not “lawfully at large under any license” could not sue for an injury to his property,
or for recovery of a debt. This disability was removed by the Criminal Justice Act 1948.
¡ Under English Law, a convicted person, in spite of his imprisonment, retains all civil rights
which are not taken away expressly or by necessary implication.

¡ The Indian Law is the same.
¡ Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675

¡ It was held that “conviction of a person does not draw any iron curtain between him and his
rights and he is not reduced to a non-person”.
¡ Smt. Kewal Pati v. State of UP, (1995) 3 SCC 600

¡ A convict was attacked by another convict in Jail and killed due to failure of Jail authorities to
protect him. In a petition under Article 32 of the constitution by the dependents of the
deceased they were awarded Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation against the State for violation of
the fundamental right of life protected under Article 21.

¡ Insolvent :
¡ Insolvent person may be defined as “one who is unable to satisfy creditors or discharge
liabilities, either because liabilities exceed assets or because of inability to pay debts
as they mature”.
¡ An insolvent person may be sued for a tort committed by him either before or during
insolvency, and if a decree is obtained against him, the amount awarded is a debt provable in
insolvency.

¡ In case of torts committed against an insolvent person, a distinction is to be drawn between
torts to the person and torts to property whereas in case of torts committed to property, the
right of action in respect of insolvent’s property passes to the Official Assignee or Receiver
for the benefit of his creditors whereas in case of torts exclusively to the person, reputation or
feelings of the insolvent remains with the insolvent.
¡ But where a tort causes injury both to the person and property of the insolvent, the right
of action will be split and will pass, so far as it relates to the property, to the Official Assignee
or Receiver, and will remain in the insolvent so far as it relates to his person.

•  Husband and Wife:
¡ England
¡ Prior to 1882, a married woman could not sue for any tort committed by a third person unless
her husband joined with her as plaintiff.
¡ She could also not be sued for a tort committed by her unless her husband was made a
defendant. Further, she could not sue her husband and the husband could not sue her for any
tort committed by one against the other.

¡ These anomalies have been removed by the Married Women’s’ Property Act, 1882 and
the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935.
¡ A married woman can sue for any tort committed by a third person and can also be sued for
any tort committed by her without joining her husband who cannot be made liable or made
party to a suit simply because he is the husband.
¡ Finally, by the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act, 1962, each of the parties to a marriage
has the same right of action in tort against the other as if they were not married but the court
has a discretion to stay the proceedings to prevent them from using it as a forum for trivial
domestic disputes without any chance of substantial benefit to either of them.

¡ India
¡ Marital status of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains and Muslims in India is governed by their
personal laws and not by the common law.
¡ Marriage under these person laws does not affect the capacity of the parties for suing or for
being sued nor does it confer any protection to any of the spouses for any tortious act
committed by one against the other.

¡ Corporation:
¡ A corporation is not a real person but only a juristic or fictitious person and cannot, unlike real
persons, be brought into hatred, ridicule, or contempt by any manner of falsehood.
¡ Thus when a libel had been made against a corporation, in the aggregate capacity, it is in
fact, the individuals composing it and not the corporation in the aggregate capacity whose
reputation has been actually injured. Therefore the law is that a corporation cannot sue for
defamation affecting personal reputation only.
¡ Obviously it is individual member who can have a cause of action and allege loss or personal
reputation.

¡ Mayor of Manchester v. Williams, (1891) 1 QB 94
¡ The plaintiff corporation suit for damages failed in respect of a statement containing charges
of corrupt practices in the administration of municipal affairs, for such statement was held not
to injuriously affect the reputation of the corporation as such.

u  However, a corporation can sue for defamation, when it affects it business and properly even
though the charge may be leveled against the individual members composing it. Two
conditions must be fulfilled:
u  The statement must be of such nature that it would be defamatory, if directed against the
individual;
u  It must be of such a nature that it tends to cause actual damage to the corporation in terms of
its property or business.
¡ South Hilton Coal Co., v. North Eastern News Association, (1894) 1 QB 133
¡ The plaintiff Company’s suit for damages was decreed in respect of statement where in it
was charged with failure to provide decent and sanitary accommodation for it’s workmen and
their families because such a statement was calculated to injure in the way of its business.

¡ Who cannot be sued?
¡ There are nine classes of persons who cannot be sued in tort. They are:
¡ Foreign Sovereigns;
¡ Ambassadors;
¡ Infants;
¡ Lunatics;
¡ Corporations;
¡ Persons having Parental or Quasi-parental authority
¡ Persons having Judicial and Executive Authority
¡ Trade Unions;
¡ Married Women.

¡ Foreign Sovereigns
¡ English Law
¡ Unless a foreign sovereign submits to the jurisdiction of the Court, English courts have no
jurisdiction over an independent foreign sovereign.
¡ No court can entertain an action against a foreign sovereign for anything done or omitted to
be done, by him in his public capacity as representative of the nation of which he is the head.
¡ For this purpose, all sovereigns are equal. It is based on the principle of international comity
which holds that “every sovereign should respect other sovereign”.

¡ Indian Law
¡ The heads of all countries are exempt from the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts.
¡ The real principle on which the exemption of every sovereign from the jurisdiction of
every Court has been deduced is that the exercise of such jurisdiction would be
incompatible with his real dignity i.e. with his absolute independence of every
superior authority.
¡ Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that: “No ruler of a sovereign
State may be sued in any Court otherwise competent to try the suit except with the
consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that
Government.”

¡ United States of America
¡ United States law prohibits most civil lawsuits by an individual against a foreign state under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
¡ The Act includes a number of exceptions that, when satisfied, allow for such lawsuits to be
filed in U.S. Courts. One of these exceptions applies to the victims of state-sponsored
terrorism.

¡ Ambassadors/Diplomatic Agents
¡ The protection of unhampered and free exercise of the diplomatic function was recognised as
one of the fundamental purposes of the law of diplomatic immunity in the Havana
Convention, 1928, the Draft of the Harvard Research Committee, 1932 and the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.
¡ The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197, 207

¡ Brett LJ, asserted that “the immunity of an ambassador from the jurisdiction of the Courts of
the country to which he is accredited is based upon his being the representative of the
independent Sovereign or State, which sends him upon the faith of his being admitted to be
clothed with the same independence of and superiority to all adverse jurisdiction as the
Sovereign authority whom he represents would be”.

¡ Ambassadors cannot be sued for torts either in the Courts of England or in the Courts of India
on principles of international policy. The immunity also extends to the family of such minister
or ambassador.
¡ In India, the provision of Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies in case of
Ambassador also. The remedy against an ambassador is to move one’s own Government to
induce the Government of that country to take an action against the ambassador and his staff,
which they may think to fit to satisfy the Government which complains.

¡ India
¡ To give effect to the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, 1961, India formulated
the Diplomatic Immunities Privileges Act, 1964, which essentially deals with the diplomatic
privileges and immunities as set out in the convention.
¡ Accordingly, diplomatic agents enjoy absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state, and immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction. This immunity of
diplomats extends not merely to their own persons, but to their suite and members of their
family forming part of their household, provided that they are not nationals of the host country.


¡ Minor (Infant)
¡ As per sections 10 and 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 a minor is incompetent to
contract. In Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Cal. 539, it was held that a
minor’s agreement being void ab initio; no action can be brought under the law of contract
against him.
¡ Sections 82 & 83 Indian Penal Code

¡ The law of torts does not make any distinction on the basis of age. Thus a child of seven
years could be sued for trespass like a person of full age. However if the tort is such as
requires a special mental element such as deceit, malicious prosecution, a child cannot be
held liable for the same unless sufficient maturity for committing that tort can be proved in this
case.
¡ Walmsley v. Humenick, (1954) 3 D.L.R. 232

¡ The Supreme Court of British Columbia held that the defendant, a child of five years, could
not be held liable for negligence because he had not reached that stage of mental
development where it could be said that the should be found legally responsible for his
negligent acts.

¡ Sometimes, the same act on the part of a minor may result in such wrongs – a tort and the
breach of contract. The question will arise in such a case are:
¡ I. Can a minor be sued under the law of torts although permitting such an action may mean
indirect enforcement of a void agreement? Or,
¡ II. Will he be exempt from liability in tort, also because his act is also breach of contract for
which he can’t be sued?

¡ Johnson v. Pye, (1665) 1 Sid 258
¡ A minor obtained a loan of pounds 300 falsely representing his age. It was held that he could
not be asked to repay the loan in action for deceit.
¡ Ballet v. Mingay, (1943) K.B. 281

¡ A minor hired a microphone and an amplifier and improperly passed it to a friend. The infant
was held liable for detinue.[1]
[1] When the defendant is wrongfully detaining the goods belonging to the plaintiff and refuses
to deliver the same on lawful demands, the plaintiff can recover the same by bringing an action
for detinue.

§  Liability of parents for children’s torts
§  As a general rule, a parent or a guardian cannot be held liable for the torts of a child. There are
two exceptions to this rule:
§  When the child is father’s servant or agent, the father is vicariously liable. [Not as father but in
the capacity of an employer or principal]
§  When the father himself, by his own negligence, affords his child an opportunity to commit a tort,
he is liable.

¡ Bebee v. Sales, (1916) 32 T.L.R. 413
¡ The father supplied an airgun to his son, aged 15 years. Even after some complaints of
mischief caused by the use of the gun, he allowed the gun to remain with the boy, who,
thereafter, accidentally wounded the plaintiff. The father was held liable.
•  Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Bill 2016 – (Introduced in Lok Sabha in August 2016)
•  The amendment Bill under Section 199A proposes penalties to the guardian/ owner of the
vehicle for offences committed by Juveniles.
•  The guardian or owner of the vehicle shall be guilty with a fine of Rs. 25000/- and/or
imprisonment of up to 3 years, while the Juvenile will be tried under JJ Act. Additionally, the
registration of said motor vehicle will be canceled. The burden of proof shall lie on the
guardian/ owner.

¡ Lunatics
¡ As per section 84 of the Indian Penal code, Insanity is a good defence in the Criminal law
when at the time of commission of the crime, the accused by reason of unsoundness of mind
was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was either wrong or
contrary to law .
¡ Lunacy, like infancy is not a good defence in an action for a tort except in case such as
Malicious Prosecution, Deceit where intention, knowledge, malice, or any other mental
condition is essential to create a tortuous liability, and the lunatic may be found incapable of
having such mental condition or intention or knowledge sufficient to impose liability upon him.
¡ Ranagangulu v. Seaswan, AIR 1947 Ker. 25

¡ The Kerala High Court held that lunacy cannot be regarded as a ground of exemption from
civil wrong as it is ordinarily considered in law of crimes because the object of the law of tort
is compensation and not punishment.

q  Prof. Winfield has quoted three reasons for fixing the liability on the lunatics:
q  where one or two innocent persons must bear loss, the loss must fall on him who did the act;
q  public policy which requires the rule in order to include his relative to keep the lunatic under
restraint and also in order to prevent tort-feasors from feigning insanity;
q  the lunatic must bear the loss occasioned by his torts, as he bears his other misfortunes.

¡ Corporations
¡ Whether Corporation liable for fraud or malice
¡ At one time it was thought that a corporation could not be held liable for wrongs involving
malice or fraud on the ground that to support an action for such a wrong it must be shown that
the wrong doer was actuated by a motive in his mind and that “ corporation has no mind”.
¡ It is now settled that a corporation is liable for wrongs even of malice and fraud. A corporation
may be sued for malicious prosecution or for deceit.
¡ Municipal Board of Ahmedabad v. Panubhai,(1934) 37 Bom. LR 468

¡ Rangnekar, J held that “A corporation cannot be deemed to be actuated by that kind of
malice which essential to the maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution, instituted by
the officer, in the scope of their duty, provided the necessary ingredients of such a
prosecution are made out. A corporation may, in the assertion of its rights render itself liable
for malicious prosecution.”

¡ Whether the corporation is liable for the torts of it’s servants?
¡ A corporation is liable for torts committed by its agents or servants to the same extent as a
principal is liable for torts of his agent or an employer for the torts of his servant, provided the
tort is committed in the course of doing an act which is within the scope of the powers of the
corporation.
¡ It may thus be liable for “assault, false imprisonment, trespass, conversions, libel or
negligence”.
¡ Tiruveriamuthu Pillai v. Municipal Council, AIR 1961 Mad. 230

¡ The plaintiff’s dog was killed by the employee of a Municipal council in the course of the
discharge of their function of killing stray dogs in the municipal town. In an action by the
plaintiff for damages against the Council for the loss of the dog, it was held that the Council is
liable for damages. A corporation cannot be immune form liability in respect of torts brought
about at its instance.

¡ Can a corporation be sued for ‘Ultra-vires’ torts?
¡ A corporation will not be liable if the act of its servant is not authorised by the article of its
incorporation, in other words, which is ultra vires of the corporation.
¡ Poulton v. London and S.W.E. Rly. Co., (1867) LR 2 QB 534

¡ A station master in the employment of the defendant company arrested the plaintiff for
refusing to pay the freight for a horse that had been carried on the defendant’s railway. The
railways company had authority under the Act of Parliament to arrest a person who did not
pay its fare but not to arrest a person for non-payment for the carriage of goods.
¡ It was held that the railway company was not liable as the company having no power in itself
to arrest for such non-payment it could not give the station master any power to do the act.

¡ Persons having Parental or Quasi Parental Authority
¡ Parents and persons in loco parentis have a right to administer punishment on a child to
prevent him from doing mischief to him or others.
¡ Traditionally it is held that parents have the legal right to smack their children as part of
administering of reasonable punishment. However any force used to restrain or punish a
naughty child must always be reasonable or ti will amount to tort. One must remember that
such an authority warrants the use of reasonable and moderate punishment only and
therefore, if there is an excessive use of force, the defendant may be liable for assault,
battery or false imprisonment, as the case may be.

¡ In England, as per Section 1(7), Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, a parent, teacher,
or other person having lawful control or charge of a child or young person is allowed to
administer punishment on him.
¡ The authority of a teacher to correct his students is not limited only to the wrongs which the
student may commit upon the school premises but may also extend to the wrongs done by
him outside the school because there is not much opportunity for boy to exhibit his moral
conduct while in school under the eye of the master the opportunity is while he is at play or
outside the school.
¡ R. v. Newport (Salop) Justices, (1929) 2 K.B. 416

¡ It has been held that if the school rules prohibited smoking, both in the school and in the
public, the school master was justified in caning a student whom he had found smoking
cigarette in a public street.

¡ In United Kingdom, corporal punishments was first banned in state schools in 1987 and has
been banned in all schools since 1998.
¡ A v. United Kingdom, (1998) 2 FLR 959

¡ A 48 year old Scottish teacher who pulled down his eight year old daughters pants and
spanked her at a health centre was convicted of assault and battery. He had exceeded the
bounds of reasonableness.

¡ R (on the application of Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education & Employment,
(2005) UKHL 15
¡ The banning of corporal punishment was challenged as being inconsistent with Christian Faith
(Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
¡ The Court held that abolition of corporeal punishment in schools under s 548 of the Education
Act, 1948 did not infringe parental rights of those parents who believed that such punishment
was consistent with Christian faith (Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
¡ The Court held that the ban did interfere materially with parental rights under Art 9, but that
interference was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of the
vulnerable children.

•  Parents Forum and Meaningful Education v. Union of India AIR 2001 Del 212
•  It challenged the provisions of the Delhi School Education Rules 1973 providing for corporal
punishment to a student. The Government justified the rule as necessary for inculcating
discipline.
•  Justice Anil Dev Singh and Justice Mukundakam Sharma said that ‘it was cruel to subject a
child to physical violence in school in the name of discipline or education’. It was held that
inflicting physical punishment on a child is not in consonance with his or her right of life
guaranteed by Article 21 of Indian Constitution. "Just because child is small he or she cannot
be denied of these rights…. Even animals are protected against cruelty. Our children are surely
cannot be worse off than animals" said the High Court.

¡ Persons having Judicial and Executive Authority
¡ Judicial Officers’ Protection Act, 1850 grants protection to a judicial officer for any act done
or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty. He is protected even though
he exceeds his jurisdiction provided that at that time he honestly believed that he had
jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of.
¡ The Object of the above stated protection is to enable the judicial officers to administer the law
without any fear of unwarranted litigation against them.

¡ Section 1 of the Act reads as follows:
¡ “No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall
be liable to be sued in any civil court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the
discharge of his judicial duty whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction:
¡ Provided that he at the time in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order
the act complained of; and no officer of any court or other person, bound to execute the lawful
warrants or orders of acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil court, for the
execution of any warrant or order which he would be bound to execute, if within the
jurisdiction of the person issuing the same.”

¡ Limits of such protection
¡ 1. No such protection is granted if a magistrate is acting mala fide and outside his
jurisdiction.
¡ Sailajanand Pandey v Suresh Chandra Gupta, AIR 1969 Pat. 194

¡ The magistrate acting mala fide, illegally and outside his jurisdiction, ordered the arrest of the
plaintiff. The Patna High Court held that he was not entitled to the protection given by the
Judicial Officer’s Protection Act, 1850 and was, therefore, liable for the wrong of false
imprisonment.

¡ 2. The protection of judicial privilege applies only to judicial proceedings as contrasted
with administrative or ministerial proceedings and where, a judge acts both judicially
and ministerially or administratively, the protection is not afforded to the act done in
the later capacity.
¡ State of U.P. v. Tulsi Ram, AIR 1971 All. 162

¡ Five persons were prosecuted for certain offences. One of them was acquitted by the
Sessions Court and another by the High Court. The High Court upheld the conviction of only
three of the five persons and authorised the issue of warrants against these three convicted
persons. The judicial magistrate acting negligently signed an order for the arrest of all the five
persons. As a result of this order, the plaintiffs, even though they had been acquitted by the
High Court, were arrested by the police. They filed a suit claiming compensation of Rs. 2,000
from the judicial officer and the State of U.P. stating that their arrest before their relations and
friends on the day of Holi festival had caused much humiliation, disgrace, physical discomfort
and mental suffering to them.

¡ The lower appellate court held that the judicial officer was protected by the Judicial Officer’s
Protection Act, 1850 but the State of U.P. was vicariously liable and passed a decree of Rs.
500 against the state of U.P.
¡ The Allahabad High Court, on an appeal made by the State of U.P. held that the State was not
liable because the act done by its servant was in the discharge of his duties imposed by law.
¡ Further, it held that the judicial officer was liable for the wrongful arrest of the plaintiff-
respondents as the judicial officer was not exercising any judicial function but only an
executive function while issuing warrants and therefore, the protection under the Judicial
Officers’ Protection Act, 1850 could not be available in this case.

¡ Article 361 of the Constitution of India, the President, Governors and Raj-pramukhs of States
and Sardar – i – Riyasat of Jammu & Kashmir are exempted from the jurisdiction of any court
in India.
¡ Under several statutes public servants are protected against prosecution for acts done in
pursuance thereof:
¡ Section 132 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898);
¡ Section 16 of the Glanders and Farcy Act (XIII of 1899);
¡ Section 24 of the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act (VII of 1904);

¡ Section 16 of the Dourine Act (V of 1910);
¡ Section 56 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act (IX of 1910);
¡ Section, 272 of the Cantonments Act (II of 1924);
¡ Section 117 of the Indian Factories Act (LXIII of 1948);
¡ Section 97 of the Indian Lunacy Act (IV of 1912);
¡ Section 11 of the Defence of India (Criminal Law Amendment) Act (IV of 1915);

¡ Section 2 of the Indemnity Act (XXVII of 1919);
¡ Section 293 of the Indian Income Tax Act (XLVIII of 1961);
¡ Section 87 of the Indian Mines Act (XXXV of 1952);
¡ Section 14 of the Indian Naval Armament Act (VII of 1923);
¡ Section 24 of the Bombay Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Registration Act (Bom XIV of
1954)).

¡ Trade Unions
¡ As per section 13 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, every registered Trade Union shall be a
body corporate with all attributes of a legal personality.
¡ Section 18 of the Act enacts that no suit shall lie against a registered trade union, its
members or officers in respect of any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute to which a member of the Trade Union was a party on the ground only
¡ that such act induces some other person to break a contract of employment, or
¡ that it is an interference with the trade, business or employment of some other person or with
the right of some other person to dispute of his capital or labour as he wills.

All the Best!

Chapter 2. Standing of A Person in Tort

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Chapter 2. Standing of A Person in Tort

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LAW OF TORTS, MV ACCIDENT AND CONSUMER

Standing of a Person in Tort

¡ Locus Standi: Traditional Doctrine of Locus Standi in Private Law Litigation-

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 2

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 3

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 4

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 5

¡ S P Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 6

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 7

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 8

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 9

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 10

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 11

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 12

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 13

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 14

¡ Mirza Ali Akbar v. United Arab Republic, AIR 1966 SC 230

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 15

¡ Johnstone v. Pedler, (1921) 2 AC 262

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 16

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 17

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 18

¡ Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675

¡ Smt. Kewal Pati v. State of UP, (1995) 3 SCC 600

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 19

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 20

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 21

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 22

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 23

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 24

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 25

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 26

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 27

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 28

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 29

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 30

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 31

¡ The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197, 207

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 32

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 33

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 34

¡ Sections 82 & 83 Indian Penal Code

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 35

¡ Walmsley v. Humenick, (1954) 3 D.L.R. 232

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 36

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 37

¡ Ballet v. Mingay, (1943) K.B. 281

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 38

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 39

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 40

¡ Ranagangulu v. Seaswan, AIR 1947 Ker. 25

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 41

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 42

¡ Municipal Board of Ahmedabad v. Panubhai,(1934) 37 Bom. LR 468

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 43

¡ Tiruveriamuthu Pillai v. Municipal Council, AIR 1961 Mad. 230

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 44

¡ Poulton v. London and S.W.E. Rly. Co., (1867) LR 2 QB 534

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 45

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 46

¡ R. v. Newport (Salop) Justices, (1929) 2 K.B. 416

21/08/16 Dr C J Rawandale, Associate Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA 47

¡ Locus Standi: Traditional Doctrine of Locus Standi in Private Law Litigation-

¡ S P Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149

¡ Mirza Ali Akbar v. United Arab Republic, AIR 1966 SC 230

¡ Johnstone v. Pedler, (1921) 2 AC 262

¡ Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675

¡ Smt. Kewal Pati v. State of UP, (1995) 3 SCC 600

¡ The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 PD 197, 207

¡ Sections 82 & 83 Indian Penal Code

¡ Walmsley v. Humenick, (1954) 3 D.L.R. 232

¡ Ballet v. Mingay, (1943) K.B. 281

¡ Ranagangulu v. Seaswan, AIR 1947 Ker. 25

¡ Municipal Board of Ahmedabad v. Panubhai,(1934) 37 Bom. LR 468

¡ Tiruveriamuthu Pillai v. Municipal Council, AIR 1961 Mad. 230

¡ Poulton v. London and S.W.E. Rly. Co., (1867) LR 2 QB 534

¡ R. v. Newport (Salop) Justices, (1929) 2 K.B. 416

¡ A v. United Kingdom, (1998) 2 FLR 959

¡ Sailajanand Pandey v Suresh Chandra Gupta, AIR 1969 Pat. 194

¡ State of U.P. v. Tulsi Ram, AIR 1971 All. 162

¡ Section 132 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898);

¡ Section 16 of the Glanders and Farcy Act (XIII of 1899);

¡ Section 24 of the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act (VII of 1904);

¡ Section 56 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act (IX of 1910);

¡ Section, 272 of the Cantonments Act (II of 1924);

¡ Section 117 of the Indian Factories Act (LXIII of 1948);

¡ Section 97 of the Indian Lunacy Act (IV of 1912);

¡ Section 293 of the Indian Income Tax Act (XLVIII of 1961);

¡ Section 87 of the Indian Mines Act (XXXV of 1952);

¡ Section 14 of the Indian Naval Armament Act (VII of 1923);