Professional Documents
Culture Documents
without Crisis:
What does it mean today to do critical sociology? Does critical theory have the
monopoly of the notion of critique, and with what prerogatives? Or can one develop a
critical approach using other tools, such as those of systems theory? This article seeks
to contribute to the debate between systems theory and critical theory1 -‐ a debate
that may seem exhausted after a heated discussion in the nineteen seventies and
eighties. Referring to the curious exchange between Habermas and Luhmann
(Luhmann and Habermas 1971), in which each one presented his own arguments
without assuming the perspective of the counterparty, the discussion developed as a
contrast between an idea of social emancipation based on discursive rationality and
the study of self-‐referential complexity of modern society. The two approaches
1
In
reference
to
the
conference
Contemporary
Perspectives
on
Systems
Theory,
University
of
Macau,
1
followed
increasingly
divergent
paths
and
the
opportunities
for
dialogue
decreased,
But now times have changed. Our society is facing challenges that make evident the
need for a social theory capable of reflecting on itself and on its role in the society it
addresses: just think about digital technologies, transformations in the political debate
and in the formation of public opinion, or about the general issue of risk. Resuming
today the debate between systems theory and critical theory can be interesting not so
much to mark the (now obvious) differences, but rather to highlight the problems
which, with different instruments, a reflexive social theory must deal -‐ the discussion
summed up in the idea of critique. What are the sources of the concept of critique?
How did the concept evolve? Can the critical attitude take different forms and refer to
different theories? Luhmann himself presented his sociology of risk as an exercise in
"critical sociology " (1991: 1), but obviously we must clarify what the expression
means.
In this contribution I first distinguish critical attitude from the critical theory of the
Frankfurt school -‐ a necessary step to escape the paradox of the reflexivity of critique
of critique (which we will deal with). I then reconstruct the semantics of the idea and
the practice of critique to show that the interpretation of critical theory is just one
possible implementation. Indeed, it is a quite restrictive interpretation of the critical
2
approach,
which
does
not
radicalize
its
potentialities
and
presents
a
specific
form
of
(not criticized) blindness. An extended idea of critique offers more opportunities, but
Even when presented as critical sociology, systems theory is clearly no critical
theory. Is it possible to distance oneself from critical theory without falling into the
trap of reflexive critique? In other words, can one dissociate from critique without
making a critique of critique? The fascination and the problem of critique relies on a
paradox: critique cannot properly be criticized without confirming critique at the same
time. A critique of critique not only confirms the critical attitude but evidently
criticizes itself2.
2
This,
conversely,
it
is
also
the
reason
why
critical
theory,
strictly
speaking,
cannot
be
formulated
without denying itself. The argument is well known: if it were true that capitalist society suppresses any
genuine expression of originality and dissent, critical theory could not have been formulated. Therefore
Marcuse (1964), who was aware of the difficulty, claims that the "great refusal" will not be achieved by
wage earners of capitalist society, but by excluded people like the "damned" of the third world.
3
The
difficulty
of
criticizing
critique
is
well
known:
the
Romantics
had
already
invented the idea of "metacritique" (Hamann 1783/84; Herder 1799) to oppose the
pervasiveness of critique after Kant. They neutralized the paradox through irony and a
detached relationship with their objects. This, as we will see dealing with second order
observation, is often the most effective way to manage reflexive conditions: instead of
taking a position on one side or the other, you shift to a different level that lets you
observe critique without participating in it. In its relations with critical theory,
however, systems theory does not actually criticize critique itself. It criticizes a specific
understanding of critique and its lack of reflection on itself in particular. Systems
theory does not reject critique but criticizes differently, proposing a notion of critique
of which the understanding of critical theory is only one component. In a way, the
critique of the current use of the idea of critique is achieved not by negating the
notion, but by applying it to itself. Following this approach, here we do not start from
the relationship of critique and affirmation (in favor or against critique) but from
semantic analysis, trying to understand where the concept of critique comes from,
what it relies on, and what its presuppositions (and possible alternatives) are.
Although the term "critique" originated in ancient Greece, the critical approach in
our familiar form is relatively recent. The notion was taken up and reinterpreted in the
4
fifteenth
century,
and
established
in
the
seventeenth
century
(Röttgers
1972
-‐
1997).
It
Previously the observation of reality and texts (which at the time were not clearly
distinguished) was realized as "commentary": a widespread form for millennia, present
in almost all major cultures inside and outside the Western world (Assmann/Gladigow
1995; Smith 1991). What is the difference? The major feature is distance -‐ or lack of
distance -‐ from the commented text or object. While critique requires a complex and
refined form of detachment, commentary assumes a sort of continuum between
object and interpreter. The commentator had no need nor interest to distinguish his
perspective from the commented one. His contribution only had the purpose to make
the content more accessible and articulate. The assumption was that there is one and
only one correct reading of signs and communications, and that the task of the
interpreter (of all interpreters) was to contribute to attaining it -‐ without any distance,
but rather looking for the maximum possible adherence to the original meaning and to
the perspective of any other possible interpreter. Since it was believed that the correct
reading existed and was unique (though perhaps inaccessible to the limited
perspective of men), all commentators, if correct, should agree in their imperfect
attempt to reach it. If there was a disagreement someone had to be in the wrong. One
did not criticize the other's perspective, one looked for errors.
5
The
situation
changed
with
the
introduction
of
printing
and
the
subsequent
dissemination of books. Books became texts, were produced in a multiplicity of
identical items and addressed an anonymous and inaccessible audience that the
author could not imagine, let alone control. The text is the same for everyone, but
everybody reads it in a different way, depending on his interests, his situation, and his
perspective. This specific reading becomes an “interpretation”, and the reader is free
to direct it as he pleases. The reader distances himself from the text and from other
readers, observes their perspectives and compares them with his own, can agree or
dissent. In this distance, the reader becomes an autonomous subject and experiments
Critical capability is an aspect of this freedom. Critique relies on the specificity of
modern individuals and on the irreducibility of their perspectives (Luhmann 1989).
Each reader has his own way of seeing the world, values it, claims his independence,
and grants to other readers the same autonomy. Starting from his perspective, a
reader can observe another’s interpretation and disagree with it, i.e. criticize it.
Moreover, unlike in the world of commentary, two readers can disagree without either
of them necessarily being wrong. Critical ability and individual singularity are two sides
6
Once
"discovered"
on
canonical
texts
(Assmann
1992:
§I.4),
this
critical
attitude
quickly spread to all kinds of texts and gradually to all kinds of objects. The functions of
critique extend from judging the authenticity of texts to explaining texts and objects
(in the ambitious sense of Aufklärung). The range of subjects that formulate critique
are also extended: it broadens from the "savants" to the idea of "republic of the
learned" (Gelehrtenrepublik), and thence to all individuals in general (Habermas
1962). The result is the widespread and pervasive notion of critique familiar since the
18th century (Luhmann 1984: 467), an attitude that any individual can adopt towards
any object.
Some difficulties begin here. Such a widespread notion cannot avoid being circular:
if critique must be exercisable on every possible object, then it also must address the
criticizing agent himself and the critical attitude in general. Critique must be open to
critique, thereby receiving the circular configuration that gave rise to the meta-‐critical
difficulties mentioned above. To criticize critique is difficult because in this modern
extended sense it already criticizes itself -‐ more or less explicitly.
Critics of any orientation are aware of this condition and of its consequences -‐ such
as the fact that every critic and every critique have their inevitable blindness, which
7
only
becomes
visible
to
an
observer3.
Or,
similarly,
that
behind
every
interpretation
a
corresponding "latency" can be found; a residue which remains dark and undetectable
and refers to the specificity of the observer -‐ a sort of social unconscious. Therefore no
In the famous "Positivismusstreit" of the early nineteen seventies, Adorno openly
agreed with Popper on this point, who was supposedly his opponent: there is no pure
science but always and only critical observations -‐ even in the case of critical theory
itself4. Systems theory speaks of second-‐order observation and blind spots5.
Knowledge relies on the observation of observers, of what they see and what they
cannot see.
3
Cf.
for
instance
De
Man
(1971:
106).
4 st
Cfr.
Adorno
(1969:
31),
referring
to
Popper’s
“21
thesis”:
Popper
(1969:
119).
5
Cf.
Luhmann
(1990);
von
Foerster
(1981).
First-‐order
observation
is
that
of
an
observer
who
observes the objects in the world. Second-‐order observation observes observations – it observe how
observers observe. The principle of blind spot generalizes to all forms of observation the discovery of
the studies on ocular vision that there is an area on the retina which corresponds to a blind spot,
without the viewer being aware of it. There is indeed an area where there are no receptor cells and,
therefore, our vision is incomplete. We are not able to see what falls into that zone nor, not being aware
8
This
reflexivity
is
the
root
of
the
critical
attitude,
which
distances
itself
from
any
ontological claim and from the assumption which assumes that there is a given world
on which all observers must agree -‐ the world of commentary and of its "affirmative"
attitude. In front of this claim the critic asks: "who says it?", thereby dissolving the
rigidity of ontology in the contingency of critique. Someone else can always think
otherwise. In this regard there is no disagreement between the representatives of
systems theorists. At this level everybody shares the critical attitude.
Differences emerge in the next step regarding how to practice it. Critical theory
combines critique with the claim of rationality, i.e. with the superiority of critique
towards any “affirmative” approach. In the view of critical theory, critique is critique
and not just observation because it does not only say that from a certain perspective
the world is what it is, It also says what is wrong and how it should be.
But is this move necessary? To perform its task, must the critic know better and
indicate which way to follow? Does the critical attitude necessarily have a normative
component6?
6
As
assumed
in
Amstutz
and
Fischer-‐Lescano
(2014).
9
For
critical
theory
is
it
not
enough
to
describe
the
society
whose
blindness
is
observed, it must be refused. The basic distinction is the opposition of affirmative /
critical whose two sides negate each other. Who is critical is not affirmative, and not
willing to accept the society of which he describes structures and limits. Critical theory
claims the overcoming of a society of which it not only sees blindness and
The idea of critique of critical theory is intrinsically bound to the idea of crisis7. This
requires a diagnosis identifying a pathology, and presents it as a transitory state, which
can be overcome. The notion of crisis comes from the language of medicine and
indicates the stage of the disease in which healing or not healing is decided. As
Habermas explicitly states (Habermas 1973: 4 it.ed.), interpreting an event as crisis
gives it a normative sense. The solution of the crisis involves a release, a healing. For
society, a crisis is the result of an internal contradiction which makes it inherently
7
The
correlation
between
critique
and
crisis
is
famously
the
subject
of
Koselleck
(1959),
who
traces
it back to the origins of modern semantics. He studies the relationship between critical Enlightenment
as observational attitude and the crisis that exploded with the French Revolution. The political crisis
would depend on a way of observing that claims to know the correct state of the world and be able to
plan the course of things. It is interesting that according to Koselleck the critical process that caused the
crisis was not aware of this connection -‐ which contributed to make the crisis particularly acute.
10
irrational.
The
task
of
critique
is
to
identify
these
crises
on
the
basis
of
a
higher
notion
of rationality. Like a doctor, the critic "knows better" (Luhmann 1997: 1115), therefore
can teach those who do not understand how things are and what must be done -‐ how
Identifying the crisis, in this view, is already a step towards overcoming it. You
understand what is going on and have a direction to take action -‐ even if you cannot be
sure of success. The crisis is always informative and allows the observer to gather
more information, to process it, and (if he wants) to act8. This explains the
attractiveness and spread of the idea of crisis, which emerges everywhere: in finance,
in politics, in the ecological debate, in private life -‐ in more and more areas and more
and more frequently. Crisis is always informative. The normativity of crisis enables
critique to overcome the simple affirmativity of description, but is also its blindness.
The critical attitude is the generalization of suspicion, leading to look for what lies
"behind" social phenomena (Luhmann 1993). The blindness is that you find it. In her
recent book about the interpretation of finance, Janet Roitman (2013) claims that
observing
events
in
2007-‐2008
in
the
form
of
crisis
prevented
actors
and
analysts
from
8
Cf.
still
recently
Cordero,
Mascareño
and
Chernilo
(2017):
“in
defining
an
object
or
situation
as
crisis, (actors) not only describe a problematic state of affairs but also give it a normative meaning
which, in turn, may inform, orient and legitimize their claims and concrete actions”.
11
grasping
the
deeper
structures
of
finance
-‐
those
that
do
not
depend
on
a
culprit
(speculators, the banks "too big to fail ") or an error (the "technosystem", the Black-‐
Scholes formula), but on the normal functioning of the system which continued after
2008 and after all subsequent adjustments. The form of the crisis allows to see some
things but doesn’t allow to see others, and most of all does not allow to see one’s own
blindness.
The most serious crisis (for those who adopt the approach of critical theory) would
be a world in which there can be no crisis because there are no crucial revealing
moments and the observer himself is immersed in the world that he tries to describe.
It would be a world in which the observer cannot indicate the "right" course of things
because he cannot see it from outside and has no independent references. This would
require a different way of observing the world and oneself, and the relationship of
The approach of systems theory diverges from that of critical theory, even if the
starting point is similar. Luhmann also recognizes that critique needs to go beyond a
mere account and comment of the world, and that this distinguishes the critical
attitude from a description of the regularities of the world and of society (Luhmann
12
1991:
1).
Such
a
description
can
also
be
complex
and
informative,
and
can
help
to
expand the available knowledge. As the "administrative" science criticized by the
Frankfurt School, the description can reveal previously unknown regularities and even
"latent structures" (Merton 1957: 60 – 69). This disclosure, however, is not enough to
One must go further, however for systems theory the alternative cannot be refusal,
which looks simple and attractive, but is not workable. Where does the observation-‐
refusing society locate itself? From where does it refuse? Sociology is part of the
society it observes and cannot take an external position that would allow to learn
more and to overcome the blindness of the observed society9. The critic who reveals
the blind spot has himself his blind spot that he cannot observe -‐ or can only observe
moving to a different perspective with a different blind spot. One cannot overcome
the blindness but can be aware of it and take it into account in one’s own observation.
Critical theory does not recognize its blindness, thus it can claim to detect crises and
to indicate how to overcome them. But systems theory does, hence it cannot adhere
to critical theory – even and precisely when systemic observation takes a critical
attitude. Critical attitude and critical theory are separate. Towards itself, critical theory
9
Cf.
the
discussion
on
autology
in
Luhmann
(1997:
16ff.).
13
does
not
have
a
critical
attitude
and,
therefore,
a
sociological
theory
with
a
critical
The blindness of critical theory and of its detection of crisis is the blindness of the
external observer who claims to be in a position that allows him to indicate what is
right and what is wrong, and at the same time, prevents him from taking distance from
his position and seeing that he cannot reject his belonging to society. More concretely,
citing Luhmann (1990: 233), “The distinction between affirmative and critical (...)
excludes the possibility that what came about as society gives cause for the worst
fears, but cannot be rejected”. Critical theory, you could say, is not critical enough
because it unrealistically assumes that you can reject society and indicate how it
should be -‐ even if you don’t succeed in achieving it. But even if the observer can
distance himself from a certain observation mode, he cannot distance himself from
society. He is part of the society he criticizes and cannot refuse this condition,
therefore his comments will have consequences that he cannot predict nor control.
The blindness is continuously reproduced, because it is involved in the proceeding of
operations.
The crisis of finance shows this, as Roitman (2013) signals. The critical observation
of finance as crisis obviously had an impact: emergency, alarm, search for causes and
culprits, requests and acceptance of exceptional rulings, political intervention etc.
14
These
measures
can
be
successful
or
not,
but
have
been
accomplished
instead
of
others, which would have had different results. These, however, do not exist and
cannot be observed. The denunciation of crisis has consequences, which also prevent
alternative observations. This holds for every possible perspective, regardless of the
distinction between affirmative and critical. The claim to overcome this blindness
would make no sense, but it may make sense to require an awareness of the blindness,
because this makes a difference. Can the blindness of the distinction
affirmative/critique be critically observed? Is a different kind of critique possible?
According to its origin, and according to all positions referring to it, the concept of
critique requires not only to observe objects as they are, as the “affirmative” attitude
does. In the case of sociology, the critical approach requires to take distance from
what appears normal in society. How can one do this? One possibility, as we have
seen, is that of critical theory, which refuses normality on the basis of the distinction of
refuses the affirmative attitude, negating normality and opting for a form of deviance
15
(or
rebellion)10.
But
this
is
not
the
only
possibility.
An
alternative
is
to
move
up
one
level and not directly refer to normality, but to the distinction between normality and
deviance (or acceptance / refusal), to ask how society manages it. How does society
deal with surprises that are not only deviations from the norm? How are
"unpredictable abnormalities" recognized, what and how do we learn from them, and
Luhmann presents this option as having a “significant critical potential” (1993: 1), if
critique is understood not as “call to refusal” but as a “sharper, not self-‐evident ability
to distinguish” (1993: 2). “'Critical' can also mean, closer to the original meaning of the
word, that sociology must be able to distinguish and to reflect the use of distinctions”
(Luhmann 1997: 1109). In this sense, the critical attitude does not only observe society
and compare it with alternatives, but observes the observation of society itself,
As in the case of romantic metacritique, the critique of critique is achieved not
rejecting
critique
but
moving
to
second
order
observation.
In
this
understanding,
10
On
the
difficulties
related
to
the
fact
that
the
normativity
of
the
approach
paradoxically
makes
of
autological.
16
critique
does
not
refuse
what
is
normal
but
observes
“the
other
side
of
the
normal
form“ (Luhmann 1993: 2), an attitude for which systems theory is especially well
equipped. Its "methodological recipe" in the analysis of social reality is in fact "to look
for theories that succeed in explaining what is normal as improbable " (Luhmann 1984:
161). Critical observation looks for the contingency (improbability) of what evolution
led us to regard as normal and not surprising -‐ be it the possibility to communicate
with persons that are unknown or even dead since centuries (with press and
communication media), the existence of a complex apparatus that guarantees the
possibility of refusing to learn from experience (the law), the commitment of society in
general to grant to individuals the capricious use of resources (private property) or
many others examples. All this is far from obvious, was once different and could have
evolved in a different way. What is familiar to us could not be there or be different,
depending on social conditions that can themselves be observed. Critical observation,
which looks for the conditions that make these improbabilities normal, does not
happen in a vacuum but is properly sociological. It is observation of society within
society. From this perspective, sociological systems theory could be seen somehow
provocatively as the most accomplished form of critical attitude -‐ a reflexive form of
critique.
17
But
what
is
this
attitude12
useful
for?
And
why
do
we
need
it
now?
Going
back
to
the question posed at the beginning of this contribution: why can it be interesting
today to resume the debate on sociological critique and its significance? Perhaps
because it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage normality and contingencies,
and we need appropriate conceptual tools. We need a reflection on normality, its
The discussion on risk deals with this. That our society is defined as “risk society”
(Beck 1986) shows how central this question is becoming: how normal is normality
(Ulrich Beck, quoted in Luhmann 1991: 2)? Our society must make increasingly
frequent decisions involving extremely unlikely events (and damages), which still must
be considered. The established procedures, rules, and "normal" rationality criteria are
in these cases of little help. How should we manage genetic manipulations or nuclear
experiments knowing that we cannot know what damage they may produce, even
when these unknown damages appear very unlikely? How could financial markets
which react to themselves and to regulation, producing "high-‐impact, low-‐probability
events" such as the much discussed "black swans" (Taleb 2007), be regulated? The
12
From
the
point
of
view
of
current
critical
theory,
this
has
the
great
weakness
of
not
offering
18
required
information
can
be
acquired
only
as
a
consequence
of
one’s
decision
(only
when, and if, the experiments will be authorized). In these cases, which are more
frequent and in many different areas, we are confronted with situations in which one
is inclined to expect the improbable (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004), situations in
It is clear that in these cases the refusal of normality is of little value. Refusing risk is
itself risky, and produces other risks for which we are not equipped. Refusing the risk
of genetically manipulated organisms, we run the risk of worsening world hunger or
other unpredictable consequences. Security has become an empty concept (Luhmann
1991: 28ff.) which critical observation certainly cannot go back to. Critical sociology
does not promise any security, but with its observation of distinctions can help to
extricate itself from the opposite traps of denial and fatalism. That risk cannot be
escaped does not mean that any decision is like any other one ("anything goes"),
rather the opposite. Decisions make a difference. That the future cannot be observed
today does not mean that it is arbitrary. What will happen in the future depends on
what we do or do not do today, even and especially if it will come as a surprise. If we
do nothing, or do something different, the future will be otherwise, even if we cannot
know how it will be. "In a broad detour across the present, the future depends on the
19
past
-‐
not
in
the
form
of
continuity,
but
in
the
form
of
discontinuity
"
(Luhmann
1991:
232).
Who can observe more distinctions and can observe them sharper can prepare also
for unexpected events and surprises, and can learn from them when they occur. If we
know it, and paradoxically learn to expect surprises, we will be able to grasp the
connections and learn from unpredicted events -‐ a form of responsibility and distance
that relies on a critical attitude, even if it is not the one of critical theory.
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