Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A.1.
In January 2018, Mrs. A, a married woman on her sixth (6) month of pregnancy, was
crossing a street when she was suddenly hit by a car being recklessly driven by Mr. X. As a
result, Mrs. A sustained serious injuries and further, suffered an unintentional abortion.
Mrs. A was hospitalized for two (2) months, during which she incurred P400.000.00 in
medical fees. Her expenses were all duly substantiated by official receipts. During the two
(2)-month period of her confinement, she was unable to report for work and earn any
salary, which was established at the rate of P50,000.00 per month. Mrs. A then filed a civil
case for damages against Mr. X.
(a) Based on the case filed by Mrs. A. what is the source of Mr. X’s obligation to her as a
result of his acts? Explain. (2 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Mr. X’s obligation arose from a quasi-delict, one of the five sources of obligations (Art.
1157, Civil Code). The Code also provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done and such
fault or negligence, is called a quasi-delict (Article 2176 of the Civil Code). Here, Mr. X, in
recklessly driving a car, hit Mrs. A, thereby causing serious injuries and unintentional
abortion to the latter.
(b) May Mrs. A claim actual damages from Mr. X? If so, how much can Mrs. A claim?
Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Mrs. A can claim actual damages amounting to P500,000. Article 2199 of the Civil
Code provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to actual or
compensatory damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
The medical fees totaling P400,000 were duly substantiated by official receipts, Article 2200
of the Civil Code also provides that indemnification for damages shall comprehend not
only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to
obtain. The rate of her salary was established at P50,000 per month; thus, her inability to
report for work and earn salary for two months entitled her to a total of P100,000. Mrs. A,
therefore, can claim her expenses for medical fees and two months’ worth of salary the
total of which is P500.000.
(c) May Mrs. A claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
No, Mrs. A cannot claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Birth determines
personality. The Court has held that an action for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, and if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs (Geluz v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Mrs. A can claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Under Art. Il Sec. 12 of the
1987 Constitution, the State is obliged to protect equally the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception. This provision should be applied in favor of the unborn
child, and therefore modifies the Geluz v. Court of Appeals ruling.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Mrs. A can claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. The Court has held that a
conceived child, although yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Art. 40 of the New Civil Code,
which includes being a recipient of donations under Art. 742 of the New Civil Code, as well
as support. A claim for damages in favor of the unborn child should also
prosper [Quimiguing v. leao, G.R. No. 26795. July 31, 1970].
(d) What must Mrs. A prove if she wants to recover moral damages from Mr. X? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Mrs. A must prove that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or
similar injury. She must also prove that Mr. X’s reckless driving produced the physical
injury in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, without which she would not have suffered the same, that is the reckless
driving is the proximate cause of the injury, Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-
deliets causing physical injuries (Article 2219 of the Civil Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Mrs. A must prove the following: (1) that she suffered physical injuries; (2) that Mr.X
committed a culpable act or omission; (3) that the wrongful act or omission of Mr. X is the
proximate cause of the damages she sustained; and (4) that X’s act or omission is either a
criminal offense resulting to physical injuries or a quasi-delict causing physical injuries
(Mendoza v. Gomez, G.R. No. 160110. June 18, 2014).
(e) Assuming that Mrs. A is awarded actual and moral damages by the trial court, may she also
claim interest if the final and executory judgment award remains unpaid by Mr. X? If so, when
should the interest be reckoned and what is the rate of interest? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Mrs. A may also claim interest. The interest should be 6% per annum from the
finality of judgment until its satisfaction. The Court held in Nacur w. Gallery Frames (G. R.
No. 189871, August 13, 2013), interpreting BSP MB Circular No. 799, that when the
judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be the equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
A.2.
Hand W were married in 1990. 11, being a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), was deployed to a rebel-infested area in 1992. Since then, W has not heard from her
husband, H.
One day, the AFP informed W that H had been declared missing since 1995. in consequence. W
diligently pursued all available means to ascertain her husband’s whereabouts, but to no avail.
Firmly believing that H had already died, W filed a claim before the AFP in 2008 for the death
benefits of the missing serviceman. However, the AFP, despite being cognizant of II’s status,
would not act on the claim, contending that H could not be presumed dead unless a judicial
declaration to this effect is issued by the proper court.
In what instance/s is a judicial declaration of presumptive death necessary? In this case, is the
contention of the AFP correct? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary only for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage. Article 41 of the Family Code provides that for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage contracted by a person who had a well-founded belief
that his/her prior spouse who had been absent for four consecutive years was already dead,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
The contention of the AFP is incorrect.
The Court has declared that the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing
soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the
presumptive death of such soldier and the claimant need only present any “evidence”
which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and/or
under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Article
391 of the Civil Code provides that a person in the armed forces who has taken part in war
and has been missing for four years shall be presumed dead for all purposes. Here, W
informed the AFP that her husband had been declared missing since 1995, 23 years before
the filing of her claim in 2018. There is, thus, no need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death before the AFP can act on the claim of W |Tadeo-Matias y:
Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018).
A.3.
Mr. Reyes is legally married to Mrs. Reyes. During the subsistence of their marriage, Mr. Reyes
cohabited with another woman, Ms. Cruz. Out of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz’s illicit relationship, a
child named C was born. In C’s birth certificate. “Cruz” appears as the child’s surname, although
Mr. Reyes expressly acknowledged Cas his child.
In 2018. Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz ended their relationship. Mr. Reyes thereafter lodged a petition
in court for parental custody and change or correction of C’s surname in the child’s birth
certificate from “Cruz” to “Reyes,” At that time, C was only ten (10) years old.
(a) Should Mr. Reyes be granted custody of C? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mr. Reyes should not be granted custody because C is an illegitimate child, who shall
be under the parental authority of his mother (Article 176, Family Code).
The Family Code provides that children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate (Article 165). In this case, C was conceived and born out of the illicit
relationship of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz who are not married; thus, C is an illegitimate
child of Mr. Reyes. The Court has held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the
father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not eustody of the
child. The Court has further declared that since the law explicitly confers to the mother
sole parental authority over an illegitimate child, it follows that only if she defaults can the
father assume custody and authority over the minor and that only the most compelling of
reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her
deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else (Briones y
Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004). There is no showing that Ms. Cruz, C’s mother
was unfit to exercise sole parental authority over C; therefore, she cannot be deprived of
C’s custody.
(b) Can Mr. Reyes validly compel the change or correction of C’s surname from “Cruz” to
“Reyes”? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mr. Reyes cannot compel the change of surname from “Cruz” to “Reyes”. The Court
has held that Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if
they want to use the surname of their father or not. The Court further declared that it is
not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children; hence, Mr. Reyes cannot validly compel the change or correction of
C’s surname (Grande – Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014).
If they are still minors, however, the decision to use the father’s surname may be exercised
for them by their mother pursuant to the latter’s parental authority over illegitimate
children. In this case, the father cannot compel the mother to register the child under his
surname.
A.4.
F. a Filipina, married J. a Japanese, in the Philippines. After three (3) years, they had a falling out
and thus, separated. Soon after, F initiated a divorce petition in Japan which was not opposed by
because under Japanese law, a grant of divorce will capacitate him to remarry. F’s divorce
petition was then granted by the Japanese court with finality.
May the legal effects of the divorce decree be recognized in the Philippines, and consequently,
capacitate F to remarry here? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the legal effects of the divorce deeree may be recognized in the Philippines, and
consequently, capacitate F to remarry.
In the case of Republic v. Manalo [G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018], the Court held that
under Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Here, F
initiated a divorce petition in Japan and obtained a favorable judgment which capacitated
her Japanese husband to remarry. Applying Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
as interpreted in Republic v. Manalo, the legal effects of the divorce obtained by F may be
recognized in the Philippines which may capacitate F to remarry here.
[Note: The legal effects of the divorce obtained by F may be recognized in the Philippines;
however, it may not capacitate her to remarry as a matter of enforcement of said divorce.
Recognition is different from enforcement, the latter being subject to defenses].
A.5.
X and Y were in a live-in relationship for the longest time, and were already blessed with a child,
Z. They finally decided to get married on March 15, 2020, When X’s parents found about the
news, they were thrilled and thus, donated in favor of Z, the family heirloom, particularly, a gold
ring valued at P250,000.00 which X and Y orally accepted on behalf of their minor child. One
day, X and Y got into a serious quarrel, which resulted in them setting aside their marriage
plans.
(a) Is the donation to Z valid? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it is a void donation. This is an ordinary donation inter vivos, not a donation proper
nuptias. The Civil Code provides that if the value of the personal property donated exceeds
five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing; otherwise,
the donation shall be void. A piece of jewelry like the family heirloom here which is a gold
ring, valued at P250,000.00, is a personal property. Here, the acceptance was made orally;
therefore, the donation is void (Article 748).
(b) Assuming that the donation to Z is valid, may X’s parents revoke the
donation on the ground that the marriage of X with Y did not push through? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because it is an ordinary donation, not a donation propter nuptias. The ground that the
marriage did not push through may only be raised to revoke donations by reason of
marriage which is defined by Article 126 of the Family Code, as those which are made
before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future
spouses (Art. 83, FC). Here, the donation was not made in favor of one or both of the future
spouses, but in favor of their child. X’s parents, therefore, cannot revoke the donation on
the ground that the marriage of X with Y did not push through.
A.6.
Name at least two (2) exclusions from the following property regimes as
enumerated under the Family Code:
(a) Absolute community of property (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(Any 2 of the 3 may be considered):
Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the
fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the
donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However,