AMONOO v CENTRAL REGIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS AND ANOTHER

[2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

Division: SUPREME COURT, ACCRA

Date: 20 July 2005
Before: AKUFFO, WOOD, OCRAN, ANSAH AND ANINAKWA
JJSC

Chieftaincy—Chief—National register of chiefs—Insertion of name in register —Grounds for amendment

of register—Whether National House of Chiefs can refuse to amend register if conditions not met by
applicant—Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), ss 14(4) and 15(1).

State proceedings—Mandamus—Application—Discretionary remedy—Judge to weigh equities before

decision—Application by respondents to compel regional house of chiefs to transmit chieftaincy
declaration forms (CDF) to

[p.578] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

National House of Chiefs (NHC) for inclusion of his name in national register of chiefs—CDF containing
clearly erroneous yet important information—Application nonetheless granted by High Court and
affirmed by Court of Appeal—Failure by appellant to appeal from decision of Court of Appeal—Whether
regional house of chiefs obliged to pass on CDF to NHC—Act 370, s 48(2).

Chieftaincy—Chief—National register of chiefs—Insertion of name in national register—Responsibility of

NHC—Statutory effect of name in national register—Nature of work of research committee of
NHC—Whether rejection of input from research committee vitiating decision of NHC in exercise of
registration of name in national register of chiefs.

Judicial review—Chieftaincy—National register of chiefs—Chief—National House of

Chiefs—Administrative functions—Registration of chiefs—Entry of names of chief in national register of
chiefs administrative and not judicial act—Whether wrongful registration or refusal to register name in
register by NHC challengeable in court of competent jurisdiction.

Chieftaincy—Cause or matter affecting chieftaincy—Meaning of—Existence of justiciable dispute over

eligibility to be chief or participation in decision to appoint chief—Allegation by appellant that
chieftaincy declaration form from regional house of chiefs to NHC containing falsities and
inaccuracies—Whether allegation constituting cause or matter affecting chieftaincy—Act 370, s 66.

Chieftaincy—National House of Chiefs—Original jurisdiction—Conditions for invocation—Allegation by

appellant that regional house of chiefs party to suit—No demonstration by appellant of actual or real
likelihood of bias by regional house of chiefs in dispute—Whether invocation by appellant of original
jurisdiction of NHC in circumstances justified—Whether judicial committee of NHC rightly declining
jurisdiction over appellant’s case—Constitution, 1992, art 273(5)(c).
Chieftaincy—National House of Chiefs—Original jurisdiction—Proper procedure for invocation—CI 27,
r 1 providing invocation of original jurisdiction of NHC be by petition as of right—Whether NHC erred
in holding appellant should have brought action by application—Constitution, 1992, art
273(5)(c)—Chieftaincy (National and Regional House of Chiefs) Procedure Rules, 1972 (CI 27), r 1.
The appellant brought a petition before the Central Regional House of Chiefs against the respondents to
challenge the nomination of the second respondent (JSH) by the other respondents for enstoolment as the
Omanhene of the Oguaa Traditional Area and also a motion for interim injunction to restrain the

[p.579] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

respondents from installing JSH. While that petition and the motion were still pending before the judicial
committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs, JSH who had meanwhile been enstooled, obtained an
order of mandamus from the High Court, Cape Coast compelling the regional house of chiefs to transmit
the chieftaincy declaration forms in respect of his enstoolment to the National House of Chiefs for
insertion of his name in the national register of chiefs in accordance with section 51(1) of the Chieftaincy
Act, 1971 (Act 370). Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant appealed from it to the Court of Appeal on
the ground, inter alia, that since his application for injunction against the respondents was pending before
the judicial committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs and they had brought that fact to the
notice of the High Court, that court in ordering the transmittal of the chieftaincy declaration forms in
respect of JSH to the National House of Chiefs had usurped the jurisdiction of the regional house of
chiefs. That appeal was however dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Subsequently, the appellant brought a
petition under article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 seeking to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
National House of Chief for a declaration that the second respondent’s name be removed from the
national register of chiefs on the grounds that the insertion of his name had been procured by fraud or had
been based on false information contained in the chieftaincy declaration forms sent to the National House
of Chiefs by the Central Regional House of Chiefs. The National House of Chiefs dismissed the petition
on the grounds that (i) the National House of Chiefs lacked jurisdiction over the matter since it was not a
cause or matter affecting chieftaincy; (ii) the appellant’s case was not properly before the National House
of Chiefs because he had brought his case by a petition instead of an application; and (iii) the second
respondent’s name had been inserted in the national register of chiefs in obedience to an order of
mandamus by the High Court which the house could neither impeach nor question under any law. The
appellant appealed from that decision to the Supreme Court on the grounds, inter alia, that the judicial
committee of the National House of Chiefs (a) misapplied the provisions of article 273(5)(c) of the
Constitution, 1992; and (b) erroneously abandoned its jurisdiction. In support of his appeal, he contended
(i) the National House of Chiefs had erred in the interpretation of the procedure to commence an action
before it; and (ii) since the Central Regional House of Chiefs was a party to the proceedings, the National
House of Chiefs was the proper forum to hear the case under its original jurisdiction.
Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) under sections 14(4) and 51(1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370)
the legal opportunities for amendments to the national register of chiefs were enstoolment, destoolment,
abdication

[p.580] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

and death. The provisions assumed that those events had actually occurred. Thus, if an event such as
destoolment was not shown to have occurred, the National House of Chiefs not only had the right but the
duty to refuse registration of another person as chief for the same stool at the same time.
(2) The discretionary nature of a mandamus application demanded that the judge had to weigh the
equities of the case before deciding to grantor refuse the application. Thus, bad faith and tardiness in
making the application would weigh against the applicant. Moreover, an appellate court could set aside a
wrongful grant of mandamus. In the instant case, the courts below had dealt with the second respondent’s
application for mandamus to compel the regional house of chiefs to transmit chieftaincy forms for
registration when the forms contained clearly erroneous or inaccurate, yet important, piece of information,
namely whether there was no case or appeal pending against the second respondent’s enstoolment and
whether the second respondent was in possession of stool properties including the black stool. In the face
of such falsities, the mandamus application was wrongly granted by the High Court and sustained on
appeal. Since however, the appellant had not appealed against the issue of mandamus, that matter
concluded with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. In the result, the Central Regional House of Chiefs
had a legal duty to pass on the chieftaincy forms to the National House of Chiefs to consider them for
registration under section 48(2) of Act 370.
(3) Under section 50(1) of Act 370, entry of a person’s name in the national register of chiefs was
deemed as prima facie evidence of the fact that that person was a chief. Thus, the decision to make an
entry in the register was a legal duty and should not be handled in a sloppy and cavalier fashion.
Furthermore, there was a clear statutory right in section 50(7) of Act 370 for any person aggrieved by a
decision of the National House of Chiefs not to register him or her to lodge an appeal with the Supreme
Court. Accordingly, even though the National House of Chiefs had to endeavor to utilise the work and
insights of the research committees of the house in all registration requests that come before the house,
the input of the research committee was in the nature of recommendations; the decision to register or not
to register was that of the house. Accordingly, the rejection of inputs from the research committees of the
house would not invalidate the act of the National House of Chiefs. Accordingly, the non-utilisation of
the committees in the exercise of registration was a mere irregularity that would not vitiate the decision of
the National House of Chiefs as a matter of law.
(4) When the National House of Chiefs pursuant to sections 48(2) and 50(2) of Act 370 entered the
names of chiefs in the national register of

[p.581] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

chiefs and recorded the relevant particulars of the chiefs, those acts were administrative and not judicial
acts. Thus, the character of the action taken by the National House of Chiefs on receipt of chieftaincy
forms was an administrative act. However, the exercise of that administrative act could be challenged
under section 50(1) of Act 370 in cases of refusal to register and otherwise by an action in a court of
competent jurisdiction to set aside any wrongful registration. Since, in any case, under section 39 of the
Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) as amended by the Courts (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 620), the National
House of Chiefs in its judicial capacity was deemed as a lower court, its wrongful acts were liable to
challenge in the superior courts. Accordingly, the appellant should have framed his case essentially in
terms of a legal challenge to the wrongful exercise of that administrative act and under the appropriate
legal process.
(5) Under section 66 of Act 370 the litmus test for determining whether an issue was a cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy was the existence of a “question” or “dispute”, or contested matter, or cause in the
sense of a justiciable controversy, with respect to an actual challenge to the nomination, election,
appointment, installation of a person as a chief, or his or her destoolment, or the right of participation in
such decision-making or ceremony. In the instant case, even though the appellant’s complaint in respect
of the falsities or inaccuracies in the chieftaincy declaration forms related to a chief and had a bearing
upon the formalities for the public acknowledgment of a chief, it did not constitute a cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy within the meaning of section 66 of Act 370 because it did not raise an actual
challenge to the nomination, election, appointment, installation or destoolment of a person as a chief or
the right of participation in those processes.
(6) Article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 imposed a duty on a party invoking the original
jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs to demonstrate why the cause or matter could not otherwise
be dealt with by the regional house of chiefs. That duty might be satisfied by the demonstration of an
actual or real likelihood of bias. Accordingly, in the instant case, the bare statement of the appellant that
he could not have gone to the Central Regional House of Chiefs because that house was itself a party to
the suit at the time without a demonstration of an actual or real likelihood of bias, did not sufficiently
satisfy that duty. In any case, the Central Regional House of Chiefs only obeyed a mandamus order to
transmit the chieftaincy declaration forms to the National House of Chiefs. In the result, the appellant had
not satisfied the condition laid down in article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 for the invocation of
the original

[p.582] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs. Consequently, the judicial committee of the National House
of Chiefs had not erroneously abandoned its jurisdiction. Fosuhene v Akore II [1992-93] GBR 181, SC
cited. Dictum of Abban CJ in Kwaframoah III v Sakrakyie II [1996-97] SCGLR 199 at 204 applied.
(7) The Chieftaincy (National and Regional Houses of Chiefs) Procedure Rules, 1972 (CI 27), r 1
provided that an action to invoke the original jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs under article
273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 should be commenced by petition as of right to the judicial committee
of the National House of Chiefs in Form 1 as set out in the First Schedule. Accordingly, the National
House of Chiefs erred in holding that the appellant when invoking the original jurisdiction of the National
House of Chiefs under article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 should have brought his action by an
application.

Cases referred to:

(1) Republic v The President, National House of Chiefs; Ex parte Akyeamfour II [1982-83] GLR 10, CA.
(2) Republic v National House of Chefs; Ex parte Faibil III [1984-86] 2 GLR 731, CA.
(3) Republic v Numapau; Ex parte Ameyaw [1999-2000] 1 GLR 283, SC; sub nom Effiduase Stool
Affairs (No 2); In re; Republic v Numapau, President of the National House of Chiefs; Ex parte Ameyaw
(No 2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639.
(4) Kwaframoah III v Sakrakyie II [1995-96] 1 GLR 542, SC; [1996-97] SCGLR 199.
(5) Fosuhene v Akore II [1992-93] 1 GBR 181, SC.
(6) Ansu-Agyei v Fimah [1993-94] 1 GLR 299, SC.
APPEAL by the appellants from the decision of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs
declining to exercise its jurisdiction under article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 to hear the
appellant’s petition for a declaration that the name of the second respondent be removed from the national
register of chiefs. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgments of Ocran and Ansah JJSC.
Ebow Quashie (with him C Kudzedzi) for the appellant.
Ebow Dawson for the second respondent.

[p.583] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

Akuffo JSC. I have been privileged to read beforehand the opinions about to be read by my learned
brothers Ocran and Ansah JJSC, and I fully agree with their conclusions. I have only a few words to add
to their erudite exposition of the law on the matters raised herein.
The crux of the appellant’s complaint is that nananom of the National House of Chiefs were in error when
they declined jurisdiction to hear his petition. As is clear from paragraph (4) of the appellant’s reply to the
second respondent’s statement of case herein, the gravamen of the petition (or as counsel rather
inappropriately expressed it, the “beef of the appellant”) was that “in transmitting the chieftaincy
declaration forms the first, respondent (the Central Region House of Chiefs) merely ‘rubber stamped’ the
forms as presented by the Oguaa Traditional Council.” Consequently, the appellant, as petitioner, sought
from nananom a declaration that the name of the second respondent be removed from the national register
of chiefs because the same had been procured by fraud; the alleged fraud being that some of the responses
entered on the chieftaincy declaration form transmitted by the first respondent to the National House of
Chiefs were false.
The National House of Chiefs is a creature of the law and its functions and powers are governed entirely
by the law that brought it into being, ie the Constitution, 1992 and the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370). It
is clear from articles 272 and 273 of the Constitution, 1992 that the National House Chiefs has multiple
functions, which may be broadly categorised as administrative (including rendering advice, progressively
rationalising customary laws towards unification of the various systems, compiling lines of succession,
modernising traditional customs and usages, regulating the activities of the National House of Chiefs, etc)
and judicial.
Under its judicial function, the National House of Chiefs has appellate jurisdiction in “any cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy”, which has been determined by the regional house of chiefs in a region. It also has
original jurisdiction in any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which lies within the competence of two
or more regional houses of chiefs; or which is not properly within the jurisdiction of a regional house of
chiefs; or which cannot otherwise be dealt with by a regional house of chiefs. It is this original
jurisdiction that the appellant sought to invoke by his petition. By constitutional dicta, the judicial
function, whether appellate or original, is exercised only by a judicial committee of the National

[p.584] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

House of Chiefs. Any function performed by any other committee or grouping within the National House
of Chiefs is not a judicial function. Where a party seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the judicial
committee, his petition must demonstrate that the issues raised therein involve a cause or matter affecting
chieftaincy. Thus, even where a matter otherwise appears to qualify for the invocation of the original
jurisdiction of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs, in that it fits into one or more of
the situations specified in article 273(5) of the Constitution, 1992, the committee would still lack the
authority to entertain it if it does not arise from one of the situations listed in the definition of cause or
matter affecting chieftaincy.
The meaning of “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” is well known and has been clearly defined by
section 117 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) and section 66 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).
These definitions cannot by any stretch of the imagination be extended to include the administrative act of
removing a name from the national register of chiefs. Case law on the issue is also well settled, and it is
clear that the mere fact that a matter concerns a chief, or collaterally concerns his recorded status as a
chief, does not of itself qualify it as a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. In this case, the substantive
cause or matter affecting the second respondent’s status as a chief was, at the time, the petition came
before nananom (and still is) pending for determination by the Central Regional House of Chiefs. Thus,
all that the petition sought was to have the second respondent’s name removed from the register of chiefs
for being based on the alleged falsehoods in the chieftaincy declaration form. This reason does not, in the
circumstances, give rise to a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, such as would justify the judicial
committee assuming jurisdiction. Rather, the petition called upon the judicial committee to exercise an
administrative function (or, at best, supervisory jurisdiction over the research committee of the National
House of Chiefs), and therefore, sought to invoke a power the judicial committee does not possess.
I also wish to add my voice to the concern expressed by my brothers Ocran and Ansah JJSC, in their
respective opinions herein, concerning the processing of the chieftaincy declaration forms for the
registration of chiefs in the national register of chiefs. Earlier case law appears to have taken the view that
since registration is a

[p.585] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

purely administrative act, once a person has been enstooled or enskinned as a chief he has a statutory right
to have his name entered in the national register of chiefs: see Republic v The President, National House
of Chiefs; Ex parte Akyeamfour II [1982-83] GLR 10, CA. It appears that the view still holds sway at the
National House of Chiefs that, once the chieftaincy declaration forms in respect of a chief are received
from a regional house of chiefs, all that the research committee of the National House of Chiefs is
required to do is process them for the registration of the name of the chief, and transmit the information to
the minister for publication in the Local Government Bulletin, in accordance with section 51 of Act 370.
Yet, under paragraph 56 of the National House of Chiefs Standing Orders (Revised), 1991, the functions
of the research committee of the National House of Chiefs (one of the house’s committees established
pursuant to section 2(2) of Act 370), are expressed to include the duty to: “. . . study chieftaincy
declaration forms for enstoolments, destoolments, abdications and death of chiefs . . . for entry in the
National Register of Chiefs.’’ (The emphasis is mine.) Surely, the performance of a duty to study such
forms entails a higher degree of scrutiny and diligence beyond merely reading them and acting thereon.
The chieftaincy declaration forms are questionnaire designed to elicit particular information, which, one
presumes, are essential for safeguarding the sanctity of the institution of chieftaincy. By virtue of section
50(1) of Act 370, the maintenance of a national register of chiefs is a statutory duty imposed on the
National House of Chiefs. In addition, under section 50(8) of Act 370, the contents of the national register
of chiefs serve as prima facie evidence of the existence of any facts or particulars stated therein. Hence,
the processing of the chieftaincy declaration forms is a key activity in the performance of the National
House of Chief’s statutory duty to maintain a national register of chiefs. How efficiently this activity is
conducted is, necessarily, a key factor in assuring the integrity of the contents of the national register of
chiefs. Consequently, it is my respectful view that, upon receiving the chieftaincy declaration forms, the
research committee is expected to perform, at the very least, a basic due-diligence audit to verify the
information provided by the responses, before entering any name on the national register of chiefs.
Otherwise, what would be the point of the whole

[p.586] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

exercise, if the veracity of the responses and particulars were of no consequence? The research committee
was not established to function as a mere rubber-stamp, and it is very unfortunate that it appears to be
performing as such in the maintenance of the national register of chiefs.
Moreover, it is my respectful opinion that, the provisions of paragraph 56 of the 1991 revision of the
standing orders are intended to raise performance standards and direct the research committee on the
manner in which it is to perform its duties in respect of these forms. Chieftaincy is a hallowed institution
in the Ghanaian cultural and national life; it is for this reason that it is guaranteed by the Constitution,
1992. Its sanctity is reflected, in particular, by the terms of article 270 of the Constitution, 1992. It is,
therefore, regrettable that the National House of Chiefs, one of the key components in the structures
established by the Constitution, 1992 for safeguarding the institution, should continue to perform such an
important statutory duty in a lackadaisical manner.
For the foregoing reasons, together with the reasons given by my brothers Ocran and Ansah JJSC, I agree
that the appeal fails and must be and is hereby dismissed.

Ocran JSC. On 20 July 1998 Mr Ekow Garbrah and three others (hereinafter referred to as the
petitioners-appellant, or appellant) filed a petition, before the judicial committee of the Central Region
House of Chiefs opposing the nomination and enstoolment of Mr J S Haizel, the second respondent, as
the Omanhene of the Oguaa Traditional Area. Simultaneously, they filed a motion for the interim
injunction to restrain all the other original respondents from installing the second respondent as the
Omanhene of the Oguaa Traditional Area. Even though the petition and motion for the interim injunction
were filed on 20 July 1998, it appears they were not served on the respondents until after the second
respondent had been installed as the paramount chief. That probably explains why no action for contempt
ever arose in this whole case.
On 25 March 1999, while the appellant’s petition was still pending before the judicial committee of the
Central Regional House of Chiefs, the second respondent applied to the High Court, Cape Coast for an
order of mandamus compelling the Central

[p.587] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

Regional House of Chiefs to transmit information on his enstoolment to the National House of Chiefs to
begin the process of inserting his name in the national register of chiefs, in accordance with section 51(1)
of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370). This information was contained in the chieftaincy declaration
forms. On the basis of his petition before the judicial committee, the petitioner-appellant filed an affidavit
in the High Court, Cape Coast on 27 April 1999 seeking to intervene in the mandamus application,
deposing that since he was a petitioner in a case pending before the judicial committee of the Central
Regional House of Chiefs, he wished to be recognised as a person interested in the outcome of the
application before the High Court. The court ruled against him on this procedural matter on 10 June 1999.
On 15 June counsel for the first respondent, the Central Regional House of Chiefs, informed the court that
they were no longer opposing the mandamus application. Consequently, the court, on 15 June 1999,
granted the second respondent’s application for mandamus against the Central Regional House of Chiefs.
The forms were promptly transmitted to the National House of Chiefs for the name registration process.
The petitioner-appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeal against both the High Court rulings
delivered respectively on 10 and 15 June 1999. In its essentials, the grounds of appeal were that the
rulings were bad in law, and that the High Court judge had usurped the jurisdiction of the Central
Regional House of Chiefs. He pointed out that at the time of the High Court rulings, there was an
application for an injunction against the respondents at the judicial committee, which had not been
determined; and this had been brought to the notice of the judge. In the face of this information, the judge
should not have ordered the transmittal of the papers in respect of the second respondent to the National
House of Chiefs. In so doing, the court had purportedly usurped the jurisdiction of the Central Regional
House of Chiefs. The Court of Appeal upheld the rulings of the High Court, Cape Coast and dismissed
the appeal on 2 May 2002.
Meanwhile, on 3 October 2000, the petitioner-appellant filed a petition before the National House of
Chiefs under its original jurisdiction, pleading for the removal of the second respondent’s name from the
national register of chiefs, on the allegation that the insertion of the name was procured by fraud, or that
the entry of the name was based on false information contained in the Chieftaincy

[p.588] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

Declaration Form 2. An amended petition was substituted on 29 May 2001, but the substance was
basically the same.
The National House of Chiefs dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction since, in their view, the
question placed before them was not a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. It is against this ruling by the
judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs, issued on 11 December 2004, that the petitioner has
filed the present appeal to the Supreme Court. Essentially, he submits that the committee erred in
dismissing his petition, and urge us to reverse that ruling.
The specific grounds of appeal are as follows:
“(1) The judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs misapplied the provisions of article 273(5)(c)
of the Constitution, 1992.
(2) The judicial committee misapplied the principle in Fosuhene v Akore II [1992-93] GBR 181, SC.
(3) The judicial committee misdirected itself as to the issue for consideration before it.
(4) The judicial committee erroneously abandoned its jurisdiction.
(5) Other additional grounds that might be filed upon receipt of the record of proceedings.”

No such grounds have been brought to the notice of this court.

The case for the appellant

The gist of the appellant’s argument is as follows. The registrar of the Central Regional House of Chiefs
did not investigate and approve the information on the chieftaincy declaration forms prior to putting them
before the regional house of chiefs for action. Consequently, the regional house of chiefs could not be
said to have confirmed the information contained in chieftaincy declaration form 2 before it was
despatched to the National House of Chiefs. Moreover, the Central Regional House of Chiefs research
committee had not yet approved the information on the chieftaincy declaration form 1B received from the
Oguaa Traditional Council before their transmittal to the National House of Chiefs. Since a petition was
still pending at the regional house of chiefs against the nomination, election and enstoolment of the
second respondent,

[p.589] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

some of the information contained in chieftaincy declaration form 2 was, to that extent, false.
The appellant’s counsel quotes question No 6 on the said form: “Is there any case/appeal pending against
the enstoolment?” The Oguaa Traditional Council, which filled and transmitted the form to the Central
Regional House of Chiefs, replied “No.” This was false because, at that time the petitioner’s petition was
pending before the judicial committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs. Question No 7 was as
follows: “Is the chief in possession of the stool properties (including the black stool)?” The Oguaa
Traditional Council replied: “Yes.” This again was not true because the Oguaa Gyasehene’s letter of 5
July 1998, addressed to the head of the Mbra family and copied to the President of the Central Regional
House of Chiefs and the acting president of the Oguaa Traditional Council, clearly indicated that the stool
properties were in the hands of various persons—namely one Mr Bart-Addison, the appellant Ekow
Garbrah, and the head of the Mbra family—but certainly not in the hands of the second respondent.
The National House of Chiefs, for its part, had a duty to inquire into the facts laid out in chieftaincy
declaration form 2. Its research committee was not even pressed into action in the registration decision
process. This neglect of duty, according to counsel for the appellant, was “the crux of the matter” before
the National House of Chiefs, “not the qualification of the second respondent.” Thus, its judicial
committee was said to have erroneously abandoned its jurisdiction in dismissing the petition for want of
jurisdiction.
Another main ground of appeal is whether the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs had
original jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s petition. The appellant argues that in going before the
National House of Chiefs, the petitioner-appellant was not invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the
National House of Chiefs under article 273(1) of the Constitution, 1992, but rather its original jurisdiction
under article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992. In his view, it was appropriate to proceed in this fashion
since, in the language of article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992, the case could not “otherwise be dealt
with by a Regional House of Chiefs.” The parties could not have gone to the judicial committee of the
Central Regional House of Chiefs to resolve this matter, because that house was itself a party to the suit as
the first respondent.

[p.590] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

Counsel for the appellant further argues that “questions raised in the chieftaincy declaration forms
constitute a “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy”, which the judicial committee had obvious jurisdiction
to deal with. “If these are not matters or causes affecting chieftaincy,” asks counsel, “then what else are
they...?” Counsel continued: “We wanted to inquire into the propriety of the transmission of the
chieftaincy declaration forms; and this is a matter or cause affecting chieftaincy.”
Counsel questions the opinion of the National House of Chiefs in its ruling that the second respondent’s
name was entered in the national register of chiefs simply by following an order of mandamus directed to
the National House of Chiefs, which was complied with. Thus, the National House of Chiefs cannot be
impeached or questioned. Counsel says the issue was not whether the decision should be impeached, or
whether the ruling of the High Court should be reviewed, but simply whether the information contained in
the chieftaincy declaration forms was true or not.

The case for the respondents

To these submissions counsel for the second respondent has presented equally strong arguments. In the
first place, he argues, all that the Central Regional House of Chiefs did was to obey the dictates of an
order of mandamus from the High Court, Cape Coast. The National House of Chiefs followed up on that
order and simply inserted the name of the second respondent in the national register of chiefs. They
cannot be impeached for doing just that. The High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), Order
59, r 8 (now High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (CI 47), Order 55, r 9) expressly provides that no
action or proceedings can be prosecuted against a person for doing an act in obedience to an order of
mandamus. The appellant’s petition before the National House of Chiefs was simply an indirect attempt
to appeal against or seek a review of the High Court, Cape Coast’s mandamus order, and this was
inappropriate.
Counsel submits that the insertion, reinsertion, and removal of the name of any person into or from the
national register of chiefs is purely an administrative act. Even though the name inserted or removed is
necessarily that of a chief, that simple act is not a “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” within the
meaning of section 66(2)

[p.591] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

of Act 370 and section 117 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459). Moreover, the act of transmittal of the
particulars of such a person from the judicial committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs for
insertion by the National House of Chiefs does not involve a judicial function of the judicial committee of
the Central Region House of Chiefs. At any rate, there is no rule requiring the research committee of the
Central Regional House of Chiefs to vet, investigate and approve the information on the chieftaincy
declaration forms before their transmittal to the National House of Chiefs. Nor does the research
committee of the National House of Chiefs have any such approval role in the final registration of names.
Indeed, it is pointed out, section 51(1) of Act 370 makes no mention of a research committee or its
involvement in this process of transmittal. Since what happened at the regional house of chiefs did not
constitute a judicial act, and it was not a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, the judicial committee of
the National House of Chiefs had no jurisdiction to treat it as such and thus entertain the petition filed at
the National House of Chiefs by the appellants.

Basic issues in the case

The pleadings and submissions of counsel on both sides throw up several issues on aspects of our
chieftaincy law, namely the registration process and the jurisdiction of judicial committees of our houses
of chiefs. These issues are:
(1) Is there a duty on the houses of chiefs to correct wrong or false items of information inserted in
chieftaincy declaration forms and filed by the various traditional councils with the houses of
chiefs? Further, should such information be corrected at the regional house of chiefs before
transmission to the National House of Chiefs, if the former knows or ought to know that they are
wrong or false? And if the information gets to the National House of Chiefs in its uncorrected form,
does it have a duty to correct them if it knows, or ought to know, that they are wrong or false?
(2) If forms with such wrong or false information happen to find its way to the National House of
Chiefs, is there a duty on its part to refuse the registration of the person involved as a chief? If so,
what is the proper legal

[p.592] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

process to invoke in order to rectify any dereliction of such a duty by the National House of
Chiefs?
(3) Will the presence of an order of mandamus neutralise such a general duty to refuse the transmittal
or the registration of a chief’s name?
(4) Does an attempt to challenge such errors or false statements, or to prevent the transmittal of such
information between the regional and national houses of chiefs, or to prevent the insertion of names
of persons in the national register of chiefs on the basis of the alleged wrong information,
necessarily constitute a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy within the meaning of Act 370, so as
to afford the judicial committees of the houses of chiefs the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter?
(5) If the presence of such errors or false statements does not ipso facto constitute a cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy, does it nonetheless give rise to a remedy at law in its own right?
(6) Alternatively, should all challenges to such errors, falsities, and questionable transmittals of these
forms be postponed until after the National House of Chiefs has inserted names in the national
register of chiefs, and then have the aggrieved person challenge the more basic matter of
nomination or enstoolment, in which such errors, falsities and questionable transmissions might be
cited as part of the petitioner’s case?
Legal analysis
I shall now address some of these issues and indicate what I take to be the legal position. I will then
conclude with my holdings and final decision, on the appeal.
As regards the effect of an order of mandamus on an intended transmittal of the chieftaincy declaration
forms to the National House of Chiefs, a case in point is Republic v National House of Chiefs; Ex parte
Faibil III [1984-86] 2 GLR 731, CA. This was an appeal against a High Court mandamus ordering the
removal of the name of Nana Ntsiful Essel IV as the Wassa Fiase Omanhene from the national register of
chiefs and the cancellation of his name as chief from the Local Government Bulletin of 1975. In allowing
the

[p.593] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

appeal, the Court of Appeal, per Edward Wiredu JA (as he then was) reasoned as follows: Where a person
has already been enstooled as a chief, he had a statutory right to have his name registered in the national
register of chiefs, unless there was some demonstrable legal impediment against its non-registration.
While the National House of Chiefs had issued a circular letter admonishing the registrars of all regional
houses of chiefs not to despatch forms indicating disputed enstoolments for registration, such a circular
letter had not been elevated to the status of law. It was little more than an administrative directive. Thus,
the party that seeks to resist registration must still show a legal impediment to justify non-registration.
While there are provisions in Act 370, including section 14(4) and 51(1) pointing to situations that would
legally cause the register to be amended, this was not one of them. The High Court mandamus order was
therefore ill-conceived.
I hasten to add that the legal opportunities for amendments to the register mentioned in section 51 of Act
370—destoolments, abdication, and death—assume that these events have actually occurred. Thus, if an
event such as destoolment is not shown to have occurred, the National House of Chiefs not only has the
right, but in my view, the duty to refuse registration of another person as chief for the same stool at the
same time. But the Ex parte Faibil III case (supra) also makes it clear that a court does not have to issue
an order of mandamus just because an applicant has asked for it. The discretionary nature of the
application demands that the judge has to weigh the equities of the case before deciding to grant or refuse
it. Thus, the court mentioned, for example that bad faith and tardiness in making the application would
weigh against the applicant. Additionally, the very result of the case shows that an appellate court can
indeed set aside a wrongful grant of an order of mandamus. In the case before us, the courts below dealt
with an application for mandamus to transmit chieftaincy forms for registration when they contained
clearly erroneous or inaccurate, yet important, piece of information, namely whether there was no case or
appeal pending against the enstoolment, and whether the chief in question was in possession of stool
properties, including the black stool. In the face of such falsities, the mandamus application was granted
and sustained on appeal. Unfortunately for the appellant, what we have before us right now is not an
appeal against the issue of the mandamus. So the mandamus case died with the judgment

[p.594] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

of the Court of Appeal on 2 May 2002. In the result, I hold that the Central Regional House of Chiefs had
a legal duty to pass on the chieftaincy declaration forms to the National House of Chiefs to consider it for
registration.
However, two important points need to be made at this juncture. First, the High Court order of mandamus
(exhibit A of the record of appeal) was not directed at the National House of Chiefs, but only at the
Central Regional House of Chiefs, which was being compelled to transmit the forms to the National
House of Chiefs, so that the latter could carry out its responsibilities under section 48(2) of Act 370, in
accordance with the proper procedure. In other words, there was no court order to the National House of
Chiefs to do anything in particular. It was not even a party to the mandamus proceedings. Secondly, it is a
logical inference from the judgment in the Ex parte Faibil III case (supra) that, upon the receipt of the
chieftaincy declaration forms, the National House of Chiefs does not have to register the name contained
therein if, in the words of Wiredu JA (as he then was), “there is shown against such registration a legal
impediment to justify non-registration.” If the refusal is wrongful, the aggrieved party is given the right
under section 50(7) of Act 370 to appeal that decision to the Supreme Court. It is from this perspective
that I view the responsibility of the National House of Chiefs in the post-transmittal phase of the
chieftaincy declaration forms.
Short of an unchallenged order of mandamus addressed to the National House of Chiefs, is there indeed a
duty on the house to register a name and particulars forwarded to it under all circumstances, including the
existence of glaring errors? In Republic v The President, National House of Chiefs; Ex parte Akyeamfour
II [1982-83] GLR 10, CA, Francois JA (as he then was) answered the question in terms of “a duty of the
National House of Chiefs to act honestly and fairly.” It is “a moral rather than a legal duty,” wrote
Francois JA (as he then was) at 15. This case, which considered whether an order of certiorari could be
issued to remove the respondent’s name from the register of the national register of chiefs, dwelt more on
the proper legal characterisation of the act of name registration, to which I shall return in a moment. But
as to the responsibility of the National House of Chiefs in the registration process, I consider the duty to
be more than a moral duty and a duty to be fair and nice. Here we

[p.595] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

have to review the perceived role of the research committees of the houses of chiefs, as well as the
significance of section 50 (7) of Act 370.
In In re Effiduase Stool Affairs (No 2); Republic v Numapau, President of the National House of Chiefs;
Ex parte Ameyaw II (No 2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639, the Supreme Court considered the role of the research
committee in the registration process. This was a contempt case brought by one party to a chieftaincy
struggle against his rival and several members of the National House of Chiefs, including its research
committee. Hayfron-Benjamin JSC at 650 cited paragraph 56 of the House of Chiefs Standing Orders
(Revised), 1991 (ie the house’s regulations on the research committee) to the effect that it:
“. . . shall study Chieftaincy Declaration Forms for the enstoolments, destoolments, abdications’ and death of
chiefs submitted from the Regional House of Chiefs…for entry in the National Register of Chiefs and their
transmission to the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs for publication in the Local
Government Bulletin.”

(The emphasis is mine.) One might ask: Why impose this positive duty on the committee and then dismiss
the need for any input from them in the house’s decision to register the name of a chief? Acquah JSC (as
he then was) described the input of the research committee as recommendations, which could be set aside
by aggrieved persons if they turned out to be inconsistent with a binding decision of a court. I must also
point out that under section 50(1) of Act 370, entry of someone’s name in the national register of chiefs is
deemed as prima facie evidence of the fact that that person is a chief. Thus, the decision to make an entry
in the register cannot be handled in a sloppy, cavalier fashion.
Furthermore, there is a clear statutory right in section 50(7) of Act 370 for any person aggrieved by a
National House of Chiefs decision not to register him or her to lodge an appeal with the Supreme Court.
But if the National House of Chiefs deems it fit in some cases to refuse registration, which is appealable
to the Supreme Court, does it not mean that the house has at least an administrative discretion to register
or not to register? As already indicated, Wiredu JA (as he then was) has held in the Ex parte

[p.596] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

Faibil III case (supra) that the house may decide not to register a name if, in his words, “there is a legal
impediment to justify non-registration.” However, the position of Francois JA (as he then was) in Ex
parte Akyeamfour II (supra) is that there is an unflinching legal duty to register; and that because of that
duty, the chief who is a victim of non-registration is given the legal right under section 50(7) of Act 370
to come to the Supreme Court to force registration.
In view of the expected input of the research committee in the registration decision-making, and the
statutory right of appeal in section 50(1) of Act 370 to challenge at least one aspect of the house’s
decision, I am not prepared to accept the view that the august members of our venerable house of chiefs
are mere automatons when it comes to the registration process. The houses must endeavour to utilise the
work and insights of the research committees in all registration requests that come before them. In the
Effiduase case (supra) at 656, Hayfron-Benjamin JSC expressed his dismay at “the revelations of laxity
and, perhaps, even of the recklessness with which the affairs of our National House of Chiefs are
managed”, and called for a strict adherence by nananom to their own rules and procedures. Ultimately,
however, as Acquah JSC (as he then was) said in the Effiduase case (supra), the input of the research
committee was in the nature of recommendations. Thus, it would appear that the decision to register or
not to register remains that of the house. I, therefore, hold that the rejection of inputs from the research
committees does not invalidate the act of the house; and that the non-utilisation of the committees in this
exercise is a mere procedural irregularity that does not vitiate its decision as a matter of law.
The next major issue is the legal characterisation of the act of registration or non-registration of a chief’s
name. When the National House of Chiefs does act pursuant to sections 48(2) and 50(2) of Act 370, ie
entering the names of chiefs in the national register of chiefs, and recording such particulars as it thinks
fit, may those acts be described as judicial acts so as to allow, for example a writ of certiorari to be issued
to quash such a decision, or to trigger the adjudicatory authority of the judicial committees? Here, I agree
with the other important holding in the Ex parte Akyeamfour II case (supra) that such acts are
administrative and not judicial acts. Said Francois JA (as he then was) in that case at 15:

[p.597] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

“These are all functions associated with factual recording and do not extend to adjudicating on the merits.”
Because they are not adjudicatory acts, certiorari will not issue in respect of them. Mensa Boison JA in that
case provides a rule of thumb in deciding whether an act is a judicial act or not. He writes at 22:
“It is somewhat difficult to say what constitutes judicial act in a given situation. I find it to be a good
guide, if the question, ‘Does the statute in issue permit the exercise of judicial discretion?’ could be
answered in the affirmative.”

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed) defines a judicial act as “an act that undertakes to determine a question
of right or obligation or of property as foundation on which it proceeds.” It goes on to define a judicial
action as “action of a court upon a cause, by hearing it, and determining what shall be adjudged or
decreed between the parties, and with which is the right of the case.” When an administrative body rather
than a court carries out such a duty, we would normally refer to it as a quasi-judicial act.
In drawing a distinction between administrative and judicial acts in respect of the functions of the
National House of Chiefs, Francois JA (as he then was) provides a policy justification that I fully share.
He writes at 16:
“The need to keep the two functions, judicial and administrative, separate and distinct, cannot therefore be
 over-emphasised. It would be invidious for the house to assume an investigative and inquisitorial role in the
exercise of purely collating information for the register when it may be called upon in its judicial capacity to
determine the merits of issues affecting the same contesting chiefs.”

Thus, on the character of the action taken by the National House of Chiefs on receipt of chieftaincy
declaration forms for purposes of registration, I hold that the act is an administrative act. But I also hold
that the exercise of that administrative act can be challenged under section 50(1) of Act 370 (for cases of
refusal to register) and otherwise by an action in the appropriate court to set, aside any wrongful
registration. After all under section 39 of Act 459 as amended by the Courts (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act
620), the National House of Chiefs, in its judicial capacity, is deemed as a

[p.598] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

lower court whose wrongful acts are liable to challenge in the superior courts.
If the appellant had framed his case essentially in terms of a legal challenge to the wrongful exercise of
this administrative act, and under an appropriate legal process, his fortunes would probably have been
different. However, he invoked the jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs under article 273 of the
Constitution, 1992, which is brought into play only with respect to a “cause or matter affecting
chieftaincy.” More specifically, the appellant invoked the original jurisdiction of the house under article
273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992. The appellant did this ostensibly in the belief that his grievance
sounded in a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.
I, therefore, wish to consider whether the questions raised in respect of the falsities or inaccuracies on the
chieftaincy declaration forms amounted to a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, and thus called into
play the jurisdiction of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. It appears from the
language of Act 370 that the litmus test for determining whether an issue is a cause or matter affecting
chieftaincy is the existence of a “question” or “dispute”, or contested matter, or a cause in the sense of a
justiciable controversy, with respect to any of the matters listed therein, and not literally in respect of
every matter bearing on chieftaincy. I hold that this complaint, even though relating to a chief and bearing
upon the formalities for the public acknowledgment of a chief, does not constitute a cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy within the meaning of section 66 of Act 370, because it does not raise an actual
challenge to the nomination, election, appointment, installation of a person as chief, or his or her
destoolment, or the right of participation in such decision-making or ceremony.
I now wish to consider the nature of the jurisdiction of the judicial committee of the National House of
Chiefs, specifically under article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992. Here the Supreme Court case of
Kwaframoah III v Sakrakyie II [1996-97] SCGLR 199 is useful. In that case, his lordship Abban CJ
emphasised the point at 204 that:
“...the original jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs cannot be invoked as of right and that anyone
who intends to

[p.599] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

invoke its original jurisdiction has to bring himself within the ambit of the provisions of article 273(5) of the
1992 Constitution.”

However, one significant difference between the Kwaframoah case (supra) and the case before us is that,
whereas in the former case the respondents, in the words of Abban CJ at the same page “... never gave the
slightest indication in his petition as to the reason why he was compelled to invoke the original
jurisdiction of the National House”, in the present case, the appellant has specifically averred that he
could not have gone to the Central Regional House of Chiefs because the latter was itself a party to the
suit at that point in time. The problem, though, is whether a bare statement of this sort sufficiently
satisfies the duty in article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 to demonstrate why the cause or matter
cannot otherwise be dealt with by a regional house of chiefs. Perhaps, the demonstration of an actual or
real likelihood of bias will fill this void. But what, after all, had the Central Regional House of Chiefs
done to indicate such bias? All it did was to obey a mandamus order to transmit the chieftaincy
declaration forms to the National House of Chiefs, while a petition lay before its judicial committee in
respect of the nomination, election and enstoolment of the second respondent. I, therefore, hold that the
condition laid down in article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 for the invocation of the original
jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs has not been satisfied. Consequently, I hold further that the
judicial committee of that house did not erroneously abandon its jurisdiction.
This holding is also consistent with that of Fosuhene v Akore II [1992-93] GBR 181, SC, decided on the
basis of article 179(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1979 as saved by the Provisional National Defence Council
(Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (PNDCL 42),
which held that to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs under the said
article, the applicant had to demonstrate that the case could not be heard in the normal forum of a regional
house of chiefs. Thus, my holding on this point, together with the effect of the mandamus from the High
Court, Cape Coast, also dismisses the appellant’s grounds of appeal No (ii) as inconsequential.
My lords, in the background to this case lies a clear cause or matter affecting chieftaincy as properly
understood in section 66 of

[p.600] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

Act 370—namely the challenge to the second respondent’s status or enstoolment as the Omanhene of the
Oguaa Traditional Area. But that is technically a different matter from what was placed before the
National House of Chiefs, namely a complaint regarding the propriety of the transmittal of chieftaincy
declaration forms by the Central Regional House of Chiefs to the National House of Chiefs for the
insertion of the second defendant’s name in the national register of chiefs. The real cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy is properly before the judicial committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs, in
which the committee is expected to exercise a judicial function, whose outcome is appealable to the
judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. The appellant may therefore wish to return to the
judicial committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs to pursue his old petition on a cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy, that is the petition challenging the purported nomination, election, and/or
confinement of the second respondent as the Omanhene of the Oguaa Traditional Area. If he succeeds in
that action, that will constitute an “occurrence” within the meaning of section 51 of Act 370, which can
then be used to effect any desired changes in the national register of chiefs.
Based on the above reasoning, I dismiss the appeal.

Ansah JSC. This is an appeal from the decision of the chieftaincy tribunal of the National House of
Chiefs dated 11 December 2003. In his amended petition, the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the
appellant), sought to invoke the original jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs under article 273
(5)(c), of the Constitution, 1992 for:
“a declaration that the name of the second respondent be removed from the national register of chiefs
because the entry was based on false information contained in chieftaincy declaration form 2 sent to the
house by the first respondent.”

The brief facts that necessitated the petition were that on 20 July 1998 the appellant in a petition entitled
“Ekow Garbrah & three others v Kwao Abusumpim & two others”, challenged the purported nomination
and election of the second respondent, J S Haizel, also known as Osabarima Kwesi Atta II, at the Central
Regional House of Chiefs, the first respondent herein. Whilst the petition was

[p.601] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

pending before the said house for adjudication, the second respondent successfully brought an application
for an order of mandamus at the High Court, Cape Coast to compel the house to transmit the information
of enstoolment in the chieftaincy declaration form 2, (commonly referred to as CDF 2), to the National
House of Chiefs for registration. The appellant alleged that in complying with the order, the research
committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs did not:
“(i) Vet and approve the information contained in chieftaincy declaration form 1B they had received from
the Oguaa Traditional Council.
(ii) The registrar of the first respondent did not investigate and did not approve the information before he
prepared the chieftaincy declaration form 2 which he laid before the first respondent for them to
confirm and thereby the first respondent did not convene a meeting to confirm the information
contained in chieftaincy declaration form 2 before they dispatched it to the National House of Chiefs.
The information in chieftaincy declaration form 2 was patently false in the sense that there was and
still pending at the Central Regional House of Chiefs a petition against the nomination, election and
enstoolment of the second respondent.
(iii) Again the second respondent is not in possession of the stool regalia including the black stool.”

Upon the granting of the order of mandamus, the appellant appealed against the decision to the Court of
Appeal and lost. Undaunted, the appellant sought a relief from the National House of Chiefs for the relief
aforementioned. The respondents raised an objection that the house lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
petition. The house heard arguments from the parties, at the end of which it upheld the objection and
dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was not properly before it (the house) because the appellant
did not follow the procedure of having to come first by application; a petition was pending before the
Central Regional House of Chiefs; the issues in the petition pointed to a cause other than a cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy. Again, Haizel’s name had been

[p.602] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

inserted in the national register of chiefs in obedience to an order of mandamus by a High Court and
emboldened by Fosuhene v Akore II [1992-93] GBR 181, SC, the house could neither impeach nor
question it under any law.
The petitioner appealed against this dismissal to this court on the grounds that:
“(i) The judicial committee misapplied the provisions of article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992.
(ii) The judicial committee misapplied the principle in Fosuhene v Akore II [1992-93] GBR 181, SC.
(iii) The judicial committee misdirected itself as to the issue for consideration before it.
(iv) The judicial committee erroneously abandoned its jurisdiction.”

There was intimation that additional grounds would be filed upon the receipt of the record of proceedings
but none has been filed as yet.
In his statement of case, the appellant argued grounds (i) and (ii) above together and submitted that: (a)
the National House of Chiefs erred in its interpretation of the procedure to commence an action before it;
(b) as the Central Regional House of Chiefs itself was a party to the proceedings it could not hear the
matter without infringing the “nemo judex in causa sua” rule and so the National House of Chiefs was the
proper forum to hear it in its original jurisdiction; and (c) the conclusion by the said house to dismiss the
petition was in error as it was the duty of the house to question the propriety of the information in the
chieftaincy declaration form 2, but by dismissing it they abandoned their jurisdiction. The submissions by
the appellant on grounds (ii) and (iii) also taken together were that, the National House of Chiefs did state
in its ruling that what was before it was a cause other than a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy
simpliciter, but did not state what it was. It rather erred in supporting their stand with Fosuhene v Akore
III (supra), that it could not re-open the matter by way of an appeal or review.
There was a three-pronged reply by the respondents that under the old Order 59, r 8 of the Civil
Procedure Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), (now Order 55, r 9 of CI 47), there shall be no action against

[p.603] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

anything done in obedience to an order of mandamus. The Central Regional House of Chiefs having done
what the High Court ordered it to do, the appellant was not entitled to any remedy by his petition. Also,
the petition was nothing but an attempt to achieve what he failed to get from the Court of Appeal instead
of appealing against that decision. Thirdly, the insertion or removal of a name from the national register
of chiefs was an administrative act, but not a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy justiciable before a
judicial committee of a house of chiefs; consequently, the National House of Chiefs rightly dismissed the
petition. Lastly, Act 370 did not mention a research committee or its functions in any of its provisions.
Article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 in providing for the original jurisdiction said that:
“(5) A Judicial Committee of the National House of Chiefs shall have original jurisdiction in any cause or
matter affecting chieftaincy—
(c) which cannot otherwise be dealt with by a Regional House of Chiefs.”

(The emphasis is mine.) The procedure to invoke the original jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs
is prescribed by the Chieftaincy (National and Regional Houses of Chiefs) Procedure Rules, 1972 (CI 27).
CI 27, r 1 prescribed that it is an action, which shall be commenced by petition in Form 1 set out in the
First Schedule.
The National House said in its ruling that:
“The procedure is that a petitioner who intends to invoke the original jurisdiction of the National House of
Chiefs under the said article must first come by application. This would undoubtedly enable the committee to
decide whether or not the matter falls within the ambit of the said provision and therefore, clothes it with
jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. In the instant case, it is self evident that the petitioners filed this
case before this house as of right. In the result, we hold that the petition is not properly before us and we
therefore hold that same is incompetent.”

[p.604] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

The National House of Chiefs could not be right in so holding on how to commence proceedings to
invoke the original jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs (to the effect that an application shall
have to be made first for any purpose). It was clear under the rules that the procedure is by petitioning as
of right to the judicial committee of the house in the prescribed form. I must state that the committee erred
in holding as it did on the form of commencing proceedings before the house. Under article 274 (3) of the
Constitution, 1992 a regional house of chiefs shall “(d) have original jurisdiction in all matters relating to
a paramount stool or skin or the occupant of a paramount stool or skin, including a queen mother to a
paramount stool or skin.” See also section 23 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370). I must observe
from the original jurisdiction of both the regional houses of chiefs and the National House of Chiefs as
provided by the laws above that where a regional house of chiefs cannot hear and determine any cause or
matter affecting chieftaincy because the jurisdiction to do so falls outside the scope prescribed by law,
then it is an instance where that matter cannot be otherwise dealt with by a regional house of chiefs, in
which case the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs has jurisdiction to hear it within its
original jurisdiction.
The appellant gave three reasons why the National House of Chiefs has jurisdiction to hear the petition
contrary to the ruling by the National House of Chiefs, namely that:
“(i) the Central Regional House of Chiefs is a party to the petition;
(ii) the information under attack was in a document in the custody of the National House of Chiefs; and
(iii) a petition is pending before the Central Regional House of Chiefs.”

The respondent replied that:

“the insertion or removal of the name of any person from the national register of chiefs or both is purely an
administrative act and certainly not a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy as defined by section 66 of the
Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) and section 117 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459).”

[p.605] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

Whichever of the submissions was right in law, must be determined by looking at one or two cases in our
reports on the point.
Article 273(5)(c) of the Constitution, 1992 was identical in terms with article 179(5)(c) of the
Constitution, 1979 and was therefore not new to our constitutional law. Both dealt with the same subject
matter. Judicial interpretation given by the courts to an earlier enactment will be a useful guide to the
construction of the latter. The principle of interpretation is that: “If two statutes are in pari materia, any
judicial decision as to the construction of one ‘is a sound rule of construction for the other’”: see Odgers
on The Construction of Deeds and Statutes (4th ed), p 241.
In Fosuhene v Akore II (supra), the Supreme Court discussed when to invoke the original jurisdiction of
the National House of Chiefs under article 179 (5) of the Constitution, 1979. In the words of
Bamford-Addo JSC at 186:
“To invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under article 179 it seems to me that an applicant must bring
himself under that provision by demonstrating to the National House that the case cannot be heard in the
normal forum of a Regional House. The National House, if satisfied, would then assume jurisdiction.”

The learned justice of the Supreme Court went on to say at the same page that:
“The Constitution gives exclusive jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters to the chieftaincy tribunals under Act
370 (the Chieftaincy Act then in force), in this case the Regional House of Chiefs. But where the original
jurisdiction of the National House is sought to be invoked it is that House alone which can decide whether to
or not to assume jurisdiction under article 179(5)(c) of the 1979 Constitution after satisfying itself that the
matter cannot be otherwise dealt with at the Regional House.”

Ansu-Agyei v Fimah [1993-94] 1 GLR 299, SC also considered article 179 (5) of the Constitution, 1979
and said; per Ampiah JSC at 306 that:
“This provision presupposes that the matter is one justiciable before a regional house of chiefs. In other
words the matter

[p.606] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

must affect a paramount stool or the occupant of a paramount stool. It is only then that the National House of
Chiefs can exercise original jurisdiction where for the situation set out in the article, no regional house can
entertain the matter.”

To these cases must be added Kwaframoah III v Sakrakyie II [1996-97] SCGLR 199 where it was held, as
stated in headnote (1) that:
“Anyone who intended to invoke it, (that was the original jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs), must
show at least in his petition that the Regional House of Chiefs which under normal circumstances should
assume original jurisdiction, could not do so due to one or more of the reasons spelt out in article 273 (5) of
the 1992 Constitution.”

To circumvent the exclusive jurisdiction constitutionally bestowed on the regional house of chiefs a
person who desired that the National House of Chiefs, should still hear his case in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction must necessarily bring himself within the scope delimited by the Constitution, 1992
as stated above. The matter before the judicial committee of that house must be “a cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy.” That was the issue chronologically to be determined first before any other.
The Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) and Act 370 defined a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, under
sections 66 and 117, respectively and that was an issue the National House of Chiefs must decide for
itself when that issue was raised. It was fair and reasonable to suggest that the facts and circumstances
surrounding a particular case, including the relief sought in the petition must be considered. In this case,
these have been outlined already above. I quote the well-known definition of a cause or matter affecting
chieftaincy in section 117 of Act 459 as:
“117 ... ‘cause or matter affecting chieftaincy’ means any cause, matter, question or dispute relating to any
of the following—
(a) nomination, election, selection, installation or deposition of a person as a chief or the claim of
a person to be nominated, elected, selected, installed as a chief;

[p.607] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

(b) the destoolment or abdication of any Chief;
(c) the right of any person to take part in the nomination, election, selection, appointment or
installation of any person as a Chief or in the deposition of any Chief;
(d) the recovery or delivery of stool property in connection with any such nomination, election,
appointment, installation, deposition or abdication;
(e) the constitutional relations under customary law between Chiefs.”

See also section 66 of Act 370.

The petition to the Central Regional House of Chiefs to challenge the nomination, election and selection J
S Haizel as the Omanhene of the Oguaa Traditional Area, is pending before that house. There has been no
dispute on that. The gist of the petition before the house was that the forms in question, whose particulars
were given were procured by fraud. That was the principal reason why they went to the National and the
Central Regional Houses of Chiefs for the various reliefs, but not to question anything done in obedience
to the order of mandamus by the High Court, thus rendering the rules of court referred to by the
respondents irrelevant and inapplicable.
The other grounds of appeal need not pose any difficulty in resolving. Fosuhene v Akore II (supra)
Ansu-Agyei v Fimah (supra) and Kwafrmoah III v Sakrakyie II (supra) were clear in determining when to
invoke the original jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs, namely when the said house had satisfied
itself that the matter cannot be otherwise heard by the regional house of chiefs. I have also referred to the
original jurisdiction of the regional house of chiefs as well as the identity of the parties, and the reliefs
sought against the respondents. The question that readily comes to mind is whether or not this was a
matter that cannot otherwise be tried by the regional house? If the answer be in the positive then the
appellant was properly before the National House of Chiefs, but if it was in the negative and the regional
house is competent to try the case, then on the authorities of Fosuhene v Akore II (supra) and Ansu-Agyei
v Fimah (supra), the petition was not properly before the National House of Chiefs and the invitation to
invoke its original jurisdiction was properly refused and the appeal should fail.

[p.608] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

In seeking to answer this question, one has to examine the substance of the plaint and not its mere
wording. It was plain that it was the nomination, election and installation of Haizel as the paramount chief
of the Oguaa Traditional Area that provoked the series of actions before the courts till it got to the
National House of Chiefs. Now the crux of the relief sought in both the petition before the National
House of Chiefs and the appeal to this court was the deletion of the respondent’s name from the national
register of chiefs for a stated cause, and that was what must be considered in this appeal.
Although the research committee was not mentioned in name in Act 370, section 2(2) of Act 370
provided that the National House of Chiefs may appoint such committees to assist it in discharging its
functions and also make standing orders for the regulation and orderly conduct of its business under
section 4. The research committee of the National House of Chiefs was one of those committees known to
and recognised by law with specified duties under regulations referred to in In re Effiduase Stool Affairs
(No 2); Republic v Numapau; Ex parte Ameyaw II (No 2) [1998-99] SCGLR 639 to:
“. . . study Chieftaincy Declaration Forms for enstoolments, destoolments, abdications and death of chiefs
submitted from the Regional House of Chiefs under section 51 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370),
for entry in the National House of Chiefs and their transmission to the Commissioner responsible for
Chieftaincy Affairs for publication in the Local Government Bulletin.”

Therefore it was of little or no effect that it was not mentioned by name in Act 370.
In this appeal as well as at the trial, two relevant sections of Act 370 were sections 48 (2) and 51(1),
which I respectfully quote in extenso hereunder:
“48. (2) ... The name of any person who has been installed as Chief shall be entered by the National
House of Chiefs in the National Registrar of Chiefs not later than one month from the date of
the receipt of the notification of such installation.”
“51. (1) All enstoolments, destoolments, abdications and deaths of Chiefs in any Region as well as such
other changes

[p.609] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

in the status of Chiefs as may be prescribed by regulations made under section 62 of this Act
shall as soon as practicable after their occurrences, be reported in writing to the Minister by the
Regional House of Chiefs of the Region through the National House of Chiefs.”

(The emphasis is mine.) The duty of a regional house of chiefs to transmit the report under section 51 (1)
of Act 370 was described in Republic v The President, National House of Chiefs; Ex parte Akyeamfour II
[1982-83] GLR 10, CA as administrative, “pure and simple” per Francois JA (as he then was) at 16.
Mensa Boison JA also called it “clerical or administrative” work. More importantly, the Akyeunfour II
case (supra) at 21 decided that “As forwarding agent, its function does not permit the National House of
Chiefs to question the propriety of such report.” Inserting or removing a name from the national register
of chiefs under either sections 51 (1) or 48 (2) of Act 370, is a normal administrative work and not a
cause or matter affecting chieftaincy so as to be justiciable under the jurisdiction and competence of the
National House of Chiefs. That was the reason why the ruling under appeal must be affirmed. Even
though the ruling by the house did not state what it was, that was not fatal for it was clear it was not a
cause or matter affecting chieftaincy as defined by law.
The fact was patent that the High Court, Cape Coast granted an order of mandamus to compel the
respondent Central Regional House of Chiefs in Republic v Central Regional House of Chiefs & Others,
to comply with section 51 (1) of Act 370 and transmit the information of the enstoolment of the applicant
therein, now the respondent before us, for the National House of Chiefs to comply with section 48 (2) of
Act 370 and insert his name in the national register of chiefs as a chief. The National House of Chiefs
ruled that they were precluded by law from re-opening this matter either by way of appeal or review or
make any pronouncement on the ruling by the High Court, for it bound them. Indeed, Fosuhene v Akore
II (supra) held that the National House of Chiefs, being a lower court established under section 39(c) of
Act 372 was bound by a ruling of the High Court before it and could not re-open the matter either by way
of an appeal or review or make any pronouncement on it. That was how the National House of Chiefs
applied the force in the ruling in that case and dismissed the appeal to it. In the instant case,

[p.610] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

the house followed and applied the directions in the case cited that if the appellant felt aggrieved by the
rulings of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, he should exercise his undoubted right of appeal to the
appropriate forum but not to use the National House of Chiefs as an indirect forum of appeal. The house
could not be far from right in granting the application to dismiss the petition by following and applying
Fosuhene v Akore II (supra). It did not abandon its jurisdiction as the appellant contended. All said and
done, jurisdiction means the power to decide a matter in controversy by a properly constituted court with
control over the subject matter and the parties before it. In this case, the appellant did not mince his words
that the crux of his petition was not the qualification of the second respondent to be a chief, but the false
information in the chieftaincy declaration form 2 on account of which his name should be removed from
the national register of chiefs. That was right. As held above, this did not fall under any of the definitions
of “a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” statutorily defined above.
The appellant having failed to clear the very first hurdle before him, to wit to prove that what was before
the house was a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy (it was rather an administrative act by the Central
Regional House of Chiefs), the National House of Chiefs lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition in its
original jurisdiction, for the petition was one that touched and affected an administrative action.
My concluding observation is that I infer from the petition before the National House of Chiefs and the
submissions by counsel for the appellant that this was a protest against the role of the research committee
of the houses of chiefs described in Ex parte Akyeamfour II (supra) “as a forwarding agent.” Viewed
against their functions as detailed in the Ameyaw case (supra) above, could it be said that in studying the
chieftaincy declaration forms sent to them they should do nothing about supposed errors and falsities in
them but just shove them to the National House of Chiefs to deal with them as it pleased, or to vet,
investigate and possibly correct them? I agree with the sentiments expressed on this issue and the
comments on Republic v National House of Chiefs; Ex parte Faibil III [1984-86] 2 GLR 731, CA by my
brother Ocran JSC in his opinion just read which I had the privilege to read beforehand. Whatever the
research committee could do with the forms or was

[p.611] of [2003-2005] 1 GLR 577

expected to do but was not done was administrative and not “judicial” as stated in my opinion and which
Ocran JSC took time to explain in his. I once again most respectfully agree with him on that.
Consequently, for these reasons, I affirm the decision of the National House of Chiefs to dismiss the
petition and I also dismiss this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.
DRKS