SPECIAL PENAL LAWS UNDER THE NEW BAR COVERAGE

By Prof. Ramel C. Muria, LL.M.

Indeterminate Sentence Law

1. Offenders who are disqualified from the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
1) Those convicted of offense punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment.
2) Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason.
3) Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage.
4) Those convicted of piracy.
5) Habitual delinquents
6) Persons who escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
7) Those who have been granted pardon but violated the terms thereof.
8) Those convicted by maximum prison term of one year.

2. Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the basic goal is "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness[.]" However, it has
also been held that "penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the
individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order." Hence,
this Court must look at certain factors when imposing penalties: Considering the criminal as
an individual, some of the factors that should be considered are: (1) His age, especially with
reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his
mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of
life (and criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and moral; (6)
his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor during trial
and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in
which the crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No.
4103 excepts certain grave crimes this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum
penalties for analogous crimes). In considering the criminal as a member of society, his
relationship, first, toward his dependents, family and associates and their relationship with
him, and second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are important factors.
The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the
individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law aims to individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not
heretofore known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts
can give full effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature. (Matalam v. People, G.R.
No. G.R. Nos. 221849-50, April 04, 2016, Leonen, J.)

3. How to determine the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence.
Crimes punished under the RPC, the maximum term shall be taken in the penalty that can be
properly imposed under the RPC considering the attending circumstances. The minimum
penalty shall be taken within any period of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed
by law. For offenses punished under special laws, the maximum term shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by
the said law.

4. Application of the Indeterminate Sentence of Law in cases where the prescribed penalty
 imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5)
grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of x x x methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu". Since appellant was found to have been in illegal possession of 5.921 grams of
shabu, appellant should have been meted the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty
(20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from P400,000.00 to
P500,000.00. As such, the penalty of twenty (20) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
thirty (30) years, as maximum, and a fine of P400,000.00, imposed by the trial court and
affirmed by the CA, is proper. As expounded by J. Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, "any
period in excess of twenty [20] years [and one (1) day] is within the range of the penalty."
(People v. Siegfredo Obias, Jr., G.R. No. 222187, March 25, 2019, Del Castillo, J.)

5. What prescribed penalty is. The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general
prescription for the felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This
is what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249 of the RPC,
the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusión temporal which ranges from 12 years
and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying
circumstances which when present in the commission of a felony affects the computation of
the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the
"imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the
RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty,
the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty
actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve (People v. Beth
Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, Ynares-Santiago, En Banc).

(1) Note: For purposes of computing the indeterminate sentence law, the basis for fixing
the minimum term is the prescribed penalty and not the impossable penalty. According
to the Supreme Court: The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two
aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the
minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors and
circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum
penalty within the ascertained limits (People v. Beth Temporada, G.R. No. 173473,
December 17, 2008, Ynares-Santiago, En Banc).

6. Supposed the crime committed is homicide, where the prescribed penalty is reclusion
temporal.

Fixing the indeterminate sentence, will require the fixing of the minimum
sentence which must be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, prision
mayor. The indeterminate sentence shall be:

Prision Mayor in any of its period to Reclusion Temporal in its proper period.

Remember the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are considered only

in the maximum term.

7. Supposed the crime is only frustrated homicide

Lower the penalty for homicide by one degree first in accordance with the rule on
determining the penalty for frustrated crimes. Thus, the prescribed penalty will be
prision mayor.
 Then fix the indeterminate sentence, following the procedure in the first
illustration.

The indeterminate sentence shall be:

Prision Correccional in any of its period to Prision Mayor in its proper period.

8. Supposed the crime is a complex crime of homicide with direct assault

Considering Art. 48 provides that the penalty for complex crime must be the
penalty for the graver offense to be imposed in the maximum, the proper penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which is the penalty for
homicide.

The indeterminate sentence must take into consideration also the prescription of
Article 48 to fix the penalty in its maximum period, thus the indeterminate
sentence shall be:

Prision mayor maximum period in any of its period to Reclusion Temporal

maximum in its proper period.

Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act (Republic Act 9262)

1. Act of violence not required to be as consequence of sexual or dating relationship. It is

immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the
victim when the physical harm was committed (Dabalos v. RTC, Br. 59, Angeles City
(Pampanga), G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.).

2. Section 3(e) above defines dating relationship while Section 3(f) defines sexual relations.
The latter refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a
common child. The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even
without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved (Ang v. CA, G.R. No.
182835, April 20, 2010, Abad, J.). NOTE:
wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a
business or social context is not a dating relationship (Sec. 3,e, RA 9262).

3. Psychological violence as element of Section 5(j) of RA No. 9262. Psychological violence

is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused
on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while
mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such
acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony
of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party (Ricky Dinamling v. People,
G.R. No. 199522, June 22, 2015, 760 SCRA 23, 49, Peralta, J.; According to the Supreme
Court in a later case: Marital infidelity is a form of psychological violence, see Jaime
Araza v. People, G.R. No. 247429, Sept. 8, 2020. Peralta, CJ).

4. Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.

 perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the
damage sustained by the offended party.26 The law does not require proof that the victim
became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather,
the law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish
emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the
victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are personal to this party (Jaime Araza
v. People, G.R. No. 247429, Sept. 8, 2020. Peralta, CJ).

5. Denial of financial support as VAWC. The deprivation or denial of financial support to

the child is considered an act of violence against women and children (Soccoro v. Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014, Peralta, J.). The act
of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed (Soccoro v. Ernst Johan Brinkman
Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014; see Melgar v. People, G.R. No. 223477,
February 14, 2018, and Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019).

6. Taking away household furniture or denying the offended woman their use may be
considered as psychological violence. As defined in law, psychological violence refers to
acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering to the victim.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused upon or the damage sustained by the offended party.
To establish this as an element, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the
acts enumerated in Section 5(i). To establish mental or emotional anguish, the testimony of
the victim must be presented, as these experiences are personal to the party (AAA v. BBB,
G.R. No. 229762, November 28, 2018, Gesmundo, J.).

7. Grant of TPO not violative of due process clause. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be
challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment
which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take
could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same
way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands
of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,
among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security (Tua v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014; see
also Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J., En Banc).

8. There is (likewise) no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or
father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use
of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or
dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, the parents-
in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the
case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically (Jesus C. Garcia v. Drilon,G.R.
 9. A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something
he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women
in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman
may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman (People v. Marivic Genosa,
G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004, Panganiban, J. En Banc).

10. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly
given personality by Section 9(b)1 of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (the Anti-VAWC Law), to file
a civil action petitioning for the issuance of a protection order for her child. In filing such
a petition, she avails of a remedy that is distinct from the criminal action under Section 5
of the same law. The mere filing of such a criminal complaint, without the subsequent filing
of an information in court, does not occasion litis pendentia or res judicata that precludes
the filing of a petition for the issuance of a protection order. (Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R.
No. 181489, April 19, 2017, Leonen, J.)

11. An accused who denied financial support to the offended party or common children may be
convicted of economic abuse if the elements of psychological violence are not proven in court.
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes the act of "causing
mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children."
Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means
employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the
damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of
the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section
5 (i) or similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present
the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party." Thus, in cases of
support, it must be first shown that the accused's denial thereof - which is, by itself,
already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the
woman-victim and/or to their common child. In this case, while the prosecution had
established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was presented
to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish.
Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This
notwithstanding - and taking into consideration the variance doctrine which allows the
conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included
in the crime charged - the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5
(e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional
element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein. (Melgar v.
People, G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018, Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

Anti-Child Abuse Law (RA 7610)

1. Punishable acts: (a) Child prostitution and other abuse (Sec. 5, Article III); (b) Attempt to
commit child prostitution (Sec. 6, Article III); (c) Child Trafficking (Sec. 7, Art. IV); (d)
Attempt to commit child trafficking (Sec. 8, Art. IV); (f) Obscene Publication and Indecent
Shows (Art. 9, Art. V); and (g) Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child s Development.
2. Consented sex is not an admissible defense in the case for violation of Section 5(b) of
Republic Act 7610 for lascivious conduct. For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent
to sexual intercourse with another person. The language of the law is clear: it seeks to
punish [t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. Unlike rape, therefore, consent
is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act
of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited
in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum,
an evil that is proscribed. A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.
This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve
its protection (Michael John Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533
SCRA 643, 651). The foregoing pronouncement was clarified in the case of People v.
Tulagan, (G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, Peralta, J.). According to the Supreme
Court:

While Malto is correct that consent is immaterial in cases under R.A.

No. 7610 where the offended party is below 12 years of age, We clarify
that consent of the child is material and may even be a defense in
criminal cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No.
7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18, or above 18
under special circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the
failure to prove that the said victim engaged in sexual intercourse
either "due to money, profit or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group."

3. Statutory rape is committed to a girl below 12 years old or is demented even if she
consented to the sexual intercourse. Even if the girl who is below twelve (12) years old or
is demented consents to the sexual intercourse, it is always a crime of statutory rape under
the RPC, and the offender should no longer be held liable under R.A. No. 7610. For
example, a nine (9)-year-old girl was sold by a pimp to a customer, the crime committed
by the latter if he commits sexual intercourse with the girl is still statutory rape, because
even if the girl consented or is demented, the law presumes that she is incapable of giving
a rational consent. The same reason holds true with respect to acts of lasciviousness or
lascivious conduct when the offended party is less than 12 years old or is demented. Even
if such party consents to the lascivious conduct, the crime is always statutory acts of
lasciviousness. The offender will be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but the
penalty is provided for under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Therefore, there is no conflict
between rape and acts of lasciviousness under the RPC, and sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 (People v. Tulagan, (G.R. No. 227363, March 12,
2019, Peralta, J.).

4. Accomplices in the crime of statutory rape. If sexual intercourse is committed with a child
under 12 years of age, who is deemed to be "exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse," then those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution under
Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 7610 shall be liable as principal by force or inducement under
Article 17 of the RPC in the crime of statutory rape under Article 266-A of the RPC;
 7610 shall be liable as principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17 of the RPC
(People v. Tulagan, (G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, Peralta, J.).

5. Lascivious conduct under Section 59(b) of Republic Act 7610 and Rape under Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code. If the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed
to be a child "exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" because she agreed to
indulge in sexual intercourse "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," then the crime could not be rape
under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and there
was consent. That is why the offender will now be penalized under Section 5(b), R.A. No.
7610, and not under Article 335 of the RPC [now Article 266-A]. But if the said victim
does not give her consent to sexual intercourse in the sense that the sexual intercourse was
committed through force, threat or intimidation, the crime is rape under paragraph 1, Article
266-A of the RPC. However, if the same victim gave her consent to the sexual intercourse,
and no money, profit, consideration, coercion or influence is involved, then there is no
crime committed, except in those cases where "force, threat or intimidation" as an element
of rape is substituted by "moral ascendancy or moral authority," like in the cases of
incestuous rape, and unless it is punished under the RPC as qualified seduction under
Article 33756 or simple seduction under Article 338 (People v. Tulagan, (G.R. No. 227363,
March 12, 2019, Peralta, J.).

6. A single act of lasciviousness to a minor child is sufficient to convict accused of violation

of Section 3(b), RA 7610. The very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610
does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from
the act complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child.
Thus, a violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual
abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront (Quimvel v.
People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017)

7.
being is not child abuse. With the loss of his self-control, accused lacked that specific intent
to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. It is not trite to remind that under the well-
recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. Thus, the
Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor (Bongalon v. People, G.R.
No. 169533, March 20, 2013).

8. The victim was a Grade 1 pupil of Cawitan Elementary School. He was playing "langit
lupa" during recess with the daughter of the accused and two other classmates. During the
course of their game, he touched the shoulder of the girl which caused her to fall down and
sustained injury on her head. He helped her stand up while one of his classmates called the
accused. When the accused arrived she slapped him on his neck and choked him. The victim
was able to get out of her hold when he removed her hands from his neck. He immediately
ran towards their house some 500 meters away from the school. Is the accused criminally
liable for child abuse under Republic Act 7610? No. The laying of the hands on the victim
was an offshoot of the accused emotional outrage after being informed that her daughter's
head was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. The spontaneity of the acts
of the accused against the victim is just a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to
rescue her own child from harm and danger as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches,
or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries.
Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in
 Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 (Jabalde v. People, G.R. No.195224, June 15, 2016; Bongalon
v. People, G.R. No. 169533; March 20, 2013; see Escolana v. People, G.R. No. 226991,
December 10, 2018, reiterating Bongalon and Jabalde; Talocod v. People, G.R. No.
250671, October 07, 2020).

9. AAA, BBB, and CCC, got three ketchup sachets and threw them at Perlin because she
cussed them the day before. However, Perlin went inside their house so it was accused, her
mother, who was twice hit instead by the sachets. Accused exclaimed, "Putang ina ninyo,
gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-aralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito,
pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko." She was later on charged with
child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act 7610. Is she criminally liable for child
abuse? Held: The record does not show that her act of threatening private complainants
was intended to place the latter in an embarrassing and shameful situation before the public.
There was no indication that she had any specific intent to humiliate AAA, BBB, and CCC;
her threats resulted from the private complainants' vexation. Verily, as the prosecution
failed to specify any intent to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of complainants as
human beings, or that she had intended to humiliate or embarrass AAA, BBB, and CCC;
thus, accused cannot be held criminally liable under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 (Erlinda
Escolano v. People, G.R. No. 226991, December 10, 2018, Gesmundo, J.)

10. Accused was convicted with rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and sexual
abuse, under Section 5(b) of Republic Act 7610. Is there double jeopardy? Rape and sexual
abuse are two (2) separate crimes with distinct elements. The "force, threat, or intimidation"
or deprivation of reason or unconsciousness required in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code is not the same as the "coercion or influence" required in Section 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 7610. Consent is immaterial in the crime of sexual abuse because "the [mere] act
of [having] sexual intercourse ... with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to ...
sexual abuse" is already punishable by law. However, consent exonerates an accused from
a rape charge xxx People v. Abay insofar as it ruled that charging an accused with both
rape, under Article 266-A (l) of the Revised Penal Code, and sexual abuse, under Section
S(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, violates his or her right against double jeopardy-must
therefore be abandoned (People v. Udang, Sr., G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018).

11. Relationship as aggravating circumstance. It is not amiss to stress that the alleged and
proved modifying circumstances that the victim is under 12 years old and the offender is a
relative by affinity within the third (3rd) civil degree, are insufficient in order for the
maximum period to be imposed against the perpetrator pursuant to Section 31, Article XII
of R.A. No. 7610, because the same provision requires that such collateral relative must be
within the second (2nd) civil degree. At any rate, the said relationship of the offender with
the child victim can be considered as an aggravating circumstance for purposes of
increasing the period of imposable penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 (People v. Aycardo, G.R.
No. 218114, June 5, 2017).

12. Age of the victim must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of
qualified rape. In order that the accused is convicted of qualified rape under Article 266-B
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the victim must be
a less than 18 years old; and (2) the offender must either be related to the victim by
consanguinity of by affinity within the third civil degree, or is the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim. These two requisites must be both alleged and proved with absolute
certainty. Otherwise, the accused could only be held guilty of simple rape. The qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority remain to be relevant in the crime of rape despite
 victim's minority must be averred and established "with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself." (People v. Gallano, G.R. No. 184762, February 25, 2015)

Safe Spaces Act (Republic Act 11313)

1. Acts punishable under the Safe Spaces Act:

(a) Acts such as cursing, wolf-whistling, catcalling, leering and intrusive gazing, taunting,
pursing, unwanted invitations, misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic, and sexist
s
personal details such as name, contact and social media details or destination, the use
of words, gestures or actions that ridicule on the basis of sex, gender or sexual
orientation, identity and/or expression including sexist, homophobic, and transphobic
statements and slurs, the persistent telling of sexual jokes, use of sexual names,

ersonal safety (Sec. 11, par. a.);

(b) Acts such as making offensive body gestures at someone, and exposing private parts
for the sexual gratification of the perpetrator with the effect of demeaning, harassing,
threatening or intimidating the offended party including flashing of private parts, public
masturbation, groping, and similar lewd sexual actions (Sec. 11, par. b); and
(c) Acts such as stalking, and any of the acts mentioned in Section 11 paragraphs (a) and
(b), when accompanied by touching, pinching or brushing against the body of the
offended person; or any touching, pinching, or brushing against the genitalia, face,

even when not accompanied by acts mentioned in Section 11 paragraphs (a) and (b)
(Sec. 11, par. c);
(d) Gender-based online sexual harassment which includes acts that use information and
communications technology in terrorizing and intimidating victims through physical,
psychological, and emotional threats, unwanted sexual misogynistic, transphobic,
homophobic and sexist remarks and comments online whether publicly or through

incessant messaging, uploading and sharing without the consent of the victim, any form
of media that contains photos, voice, or video with sexual content, any unauthorized

impersonating identities of victims online or posting lies about victims to harm their
reputation, or filing, false abuse reports to online platforms to silence victims (Sec. 12);
(e) Qualified Gender-Based Streets, Public Spaces and Online Sexual Harassment. -The
penalty next higher in degree will be applied in the following cases: (a) If the act takes
place in a common carrier or PUV, including, but not limited to, jeepneys, taxis,
tricycles, or app-based transport network vehicle services, where the perpetrator is the
driver of the vehicle and the offended party is a passenger; (b) If the offended party is
a minor, a senior citizen, or a person with disability (PWD), or a breastfeeding mother
nursing her child; (c) If the offended party is diagnosed with a mental problem tending
to impair consent; (d) If the perpetrator is a member of the uniformed services, such as
the PNP and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the act was perpetrated
while the perpetrator was in uniform; and (e) If the act takes place in the premises of a
government agency offering frontline services to the public and the perpetrator is a
government employee. (Sec. 15);
(f) Gender-Based Sexual Harassment in the Workplace. -The crime of gender-based sexual
harassment in the workplace includes the following: (a) An act or series of acts
involving any unwelcome sexual advances, requests or demand for sexual favors or
any act of sexual nature, whether done verbally, physically or through the use of
technology such as text messaging or electronic mail or through any other forms of
 opportunities; (b) A conduct of sexual nature and other conduct-based on sex affecting
the dignity of a person, which is unwelcome, unreasonable, and offensive to the
recipient, whether done verbally, physically or through the use of technology such as
text messaging or electronic mail or through any other forms of information and
communication systems; (c) A conduct that is unwelcome and pervasive and creates
an intimidating, hostile or humiliating environment for the recipient: Provided, That
the crime of gender-based sexual harassment may also be committed between peers
and those committed to a superior officer by a subordinate, or to a teacher by a student,
or to a trainer by a trainee; and (d) Information and communication system refers to a
system for generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic
data messages or electronic documents and includes the computer system or other
similar devices by or in which data are recorded or stored and any procedure related to
the recording or storage of electronic data messages or electronic documents. (Sec. 16)

2. Exemptions. Acts that are legitimate expressions of indigenous culture and tradition, as
well as breastfeeding in public shall not be penalized. (Sec. 31)

Data Privacy Act (Republic Act 10173)

1. Acts punishable under the Data Privacy Act: (a) Unauthorized Processing of Personal
Information and Sensitive Personal Information (Sec. 25); (b) Accessing Personal
Information and Sensitive Personal Information Due to Negligence (Sec. 26); (c)
Improper Disposal of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information (Sec. 27);
(d) Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information for
Unauthorized Purposes; (e) Unauthorized Access or Intentional Breach (Sec. 28); (f)
Concealment of Security Breaches Involving Sensitive Personal Information (Sec. 29) (g)
Malicious Disclosure (Sec. 30); (h) Unauthorized Disclosure (Sec. 31); (i) Unauthorized
Disclosure (Sec. 32).

2. Extent of Liability. If the offender is a corporation, partnership or any juridical person,

the penalty shall be imposed upon the responsible officers, as the case may be, who
participated in, or by their gross negligence, allowed the commission of the crime. If the
offender is a juridical person, the court may suspend or revoke any of its rights under this
Act. If the offender is an alien, he or she shall, in addition to the penalties herein
prescribed, be deported without further proceedings after serving the penalties prescribed.
If the offender is a public official or employee and lie or she is found guilty of acts
penalized under Sections 27 and 28 of this Act, he or she shall, in addition to the penalties
prescribed herein, suffer perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification from office, as
the case may be. (Sec. 34).

3. Large-Scale. The maximum penalty in the scale of penalties respectively provided for the
preceding offenses shall be imposed when the personal information of at least one
hundred (100) persons is harmed, affected or involved as the result of the above
mentioned actions. (Sec. 35)

4. Offense Committed by Public Officer. When the offender or the person responsible for
the offense is a public officer as defined in the Administrative Code of the Philippines in
the exercise of his or her duties, an accessory penalty consisting in the disqualification to
occupy public office for a term double the term of criminal penalty imposed shall he
applied. (Sec. 36)

5. Remember: The Data Privacy Act is applicable only if the information involved pertains
 to any of these, then, the Data Privacy Act will not apply to the case. Take note of these
terms:

5.1. Personal information refers to any information whether recorded in a material form or
not, from which the identity of an individual is apparent or can be reasonably and
directly ascertained by the entity holding the information, or when put together with
other information would directly and certainly identify an individual. (Sec. 3,g)
5.2. Personal information controller refers to a person or organization who controls the
collection, holding, processing or use of personal information, including a person or
organization who instructs another person or organization to collect, hold, process, use,
transfer or disclose personal information on his or her behalf. (Sec.3,h)
5.3. Processing refers to any operation or any set of operations performed upon personal
information including, but not limited to, the collection, recording, organization,
storage, updating or modification, retrieval, consultation, use, consolidation, blocking,
erasure or destruction of data. (Sec. 3, i)
5.4. Privileged information refers to any and all forms of data which under the Rides of
Court and other pertinent laws constitute privileged communication. (Sec. 3,j)
5.5. Sensitive personal information refers to personal information:

philosophical or political affiliations;

l life of a person, or to
any proceeding for any offense committed or alleged to have been committed by
such person, the disposal of such proceedings, or the sentence of any court in such
proceedings;
(3) Issued by government agencies peculiar to an individual which includes, but not
limited to, social security numbers, previous or cm-rent health records, licenses or
its denials, suspension or revocation, and tax returns; and
(4) Specifically established by an executive order or an act of Congress to be kept
classified. (Sec.3, l)

6. Data owner rights

1) Right to be informed. Data should never be collected, processed and stored by any
organization without your explicit consent, unless otherwise provided by law. Information
controllers usually solicit your consent through a consent form. Aside from protecting you
against unfair means of personal data collection, this right also requires personal
information controllers (PICs) to notify you if your data have been compromised, in a
timely manner.

2) Right to access. This is your right to find out whether an organization holds any personal

also ask them to provide you with a written description of the kind of information they
have about you as well as their purpose/s for holding them.

3) Right to object. You can exercise your right to object if the personal data processing
involved is based on consent or on legitimate interest. When you object or withhold your
consent, the PIC should no longer process the personal data, unless the processing is
pursuant to a subpoena, for obvious purposes (contract, employer-employee relationship,
etc.) or a result of a legal obligation.

4) Right to erasure or blocking. Under the law, you have the right to suspend, withdraw or
order the blocking, removal or destruction of your personal data.
5) Right to damages. You may claim compensation if you suffered damages due to
inaccurate, incomplete, outdated, false, unlawfully obtained or unauthorized use of
personal data, considering any violation of your rights and freedoms as data subject.

6) Right to file a complaint. If you feel that your personal information has been misused,
maliciously disclosed, or improperly disposed, or that any of your data privacy rights have
been violated, you have a right to file a complaint with the NPC.

7) Right to rectify. You have the right to dispute and have corrected any inaccuracy or error
in the data a personal information controller (PIC) holds about you. The PIC should act on
it immediately and accordingly, unless the request is vexatious or unreasonable. Once
corrected, the PIC should ensure that your access and receipt of both new and retracted
information. PICs should also furnish third parties with said information, should you
request it.

8) Right to data portability. This right assures that YOU remain in full control of YOUR
data. Data portability allows you to obtain and electronically move, copy or transfer your
data in a secure manner, for further use. It enables the free flow of your personal
information across the internet and organizations, according to your preference. This is
important especially now that several organizations and services can reuse the same data.