>> POLICY BRIEF

ISSN: 1989-2667

Nº 33 - JANUARY 2010

Yemen:
Make Haste Slowly

Edward Burke

>> The leadership of al-Qaeda has long considered Yemen as a

prime location to establish an Islamic emirate from which to
launch global operations. Al-Qaeda’s leading strategist, Abu Mus’ab
al-Suri, in his highly influential Call for a Global Islamic Resistance
H I G H L I G H TS
noted that Yemen was the ‘fundamental pillar’ of jihad given the ‘reli-
gious and economic factors which exist there’. Al-Qaeda is deeply • Despite the dramatic
aware of the strategic importance of Yemen, its position on the vital attempted Christmas day
Bab al-Mandab straits of the Red Sea and proximity to Saudi Arabia. bombing, a resurgent al-Qaeda
Yemen’s history of violent conflict has also left the country awash with in Yemen must be seen
a cheap and readily available supply of arms. It is important however primarily within its local
to note that al-Qaeda in Yemen takes many forms. There are many context.
diverse jihadi groups who fought with Osama bin Laden and the
mujahidin during the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan • The key external actor in
during the 1980s, but a lack of consensus on whether the Yemeni gov- Yemen is Saudi Arabia: All
ernment is a legitimate target for jihad. Although this debate splits the paths out of Yemen’s current
‘Afghan generation’ of al-Qaeda in Yemen, no such scruples can be
woes go through Riyadh.
attributed to the younger ‘Iraqi generation’ of jihadi volunteers that
trained and fought with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraqi.
• An overtly military
intervention in Yemen would
President Ali Abdullah Saleh has long sought a modus vivendi with the
‘Afghan’ veterans, using them as a militia during the civil war of 1994 and be counterproductive; instead
more recently against the rebellion by Zaydi Shia tribesmen loyal to the the US and Europe would be
Houthi family in the north of the country and showing remarkable better placed to address the
leniency to those Yemenis who fought with al-Qaeda in Iraq. Such toler- long-standing grievances and
ance ultimately resulted in a ‘blowback’ against the Yemeni government. political deadlock which have
Returning veterans from Iraq have denounced their former jihadi allies weakened the state and
who spoke out against attacks upon the government of Ali Abdullah strengthened insurgency.
Saleh as ulama’ al-sultan (the Sultan’s clerics). As distinct from the ‘spec-
taculars’ against the USS Cole in 2001 and the French oil tanker, the MV
 YEMEN:
MAKE HASTE SLOWLY
>>>>>> Limburg, in 2002, there has been a greatly
increased trend of attacks upon the Yemeni state
and its economic lifelines, namely upon energy
infrastructure and tourism.
AL-QAEDA IN YEMEN –
THE SAME BUT DIFFERENT
In addition to linking the Saudi and Yemeni al-Qae-
da elements within one organisation, al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has astutely tapped
into widespread grievance in the south, addressing
the people there directly: ‘What you are demanding
is your right granted to you by your religion […]
injustice, oppression and tyranny should not be
practiced in the name of unity.’ The widespread
sense of ‘occupation’ and exploitation by the ruling
elite of the north has seen former government allies
in the South who fought against the Socialist
regime, such as the tribal leader and ‘Afghan’ veter-
an, Tariq al-Fadhli, ally themselves with the south-
ern secessionist movement led by their former
enemies and with AQAP. American officials have
angrily rejected recent proposals by President Saleh
to negotiate with groups linked to AQAP. However,
President Saleh understands, even if he does not say
so openly, that many of the tribes who accept
AQAP money do so more out of a sense of local
political grievance or economic desperation than a
zealous commitment to global jihad.
It is perhaps not surprising that tribal support for
AQAP has grown at the same time as the Yemeni
economy is in decline. The number of AQAP oper-
atives is likely to be relatively small, well below
1000, but their presence has expanded during the
last year, partly due to an influx of Saudi and oth-
er foreigners who have joined the movement.
Although some observers have called Yemen ‘the
perfect storm’ of political, social and economic
grievance, such a sweeping analysis over-states the
weakness of the central government and ignores
the resilience of the main tribes, of which many
have resolutely resisted infiltration by AQAP.
Nevertheless, the economic situation in Yemen is
dire. Oil exports easily generate the majority of gov-
ernment revenue but these have declined by almost
half in recent years. A lack of revenue and a bloat-
ed, corrupt public sector means that President Ali
Abdullah Saleh is rapidly running out of money
with which to pay government salaries and rein-
force tribal patronage networks. The population has
increased by 600 per cent in the last 40 years and is
set to double in the next 20. Yemen is increasingly
going hungry: according to the UN almost 40 per
cent of the population is suffering from malnour-
ishment. It is currently obliged to import 75–90 per
cent of its food, the shortage of which is com-
pounded by the growing of qat, an extremely pop-
ular mild narcotic and cash crop, which consumes
almost 30 per cent of Yemen’s severely limited water
supplies.
Despite the threat from al-Qaeda, Yemen has been
a remarkably low priority for US development assis-
tance, lagging behind European donors such as the
UK and Germany. The US development agency
USAID allocated just under $15 million to Yemen
in 2005 which fell to $9 million in 2006 as a con-
sequence of a bilateral dispute over the freeing of
suspected al-Qaeda militants by the Yemeni govern-
ment. Western donors have frequently complained
about the Yemeni government’s lack of capacity to
in manage aid or implement development projects,
yet in 2009 USAID terminated a large part of their
governance programmes in Yemen. As the US
begins to inject almost $70 million of security and
development assistance in 2010, the sustainability
of this aid remains in question until there is serious
commitment from the government and interna-
tional donors to improve governance standards. US
proposals for a major increase in military assistance
for the Yemeni security forces overlook the pro-
found rivalry and animosity that exists between cer-
tain commanders and their heavy involvement in
the country’s economy, including in the seizure of
land and other assets in the south following the end
of the civil war in 1994.
SAUDI ARABIA: THE KEY PLAYER
In terms of political influence and delivery of
aid, the most important international donor to
P O L I C Y B R I E F - Nº 33 - JANUARY 2010

3
Yemen is unquestionably Saudi Arabia, which security of the Kingdom’. Although such com-
has made a commitment of $1.25 billion in ments are deeply resented by many Yemeni nation-
development assistance to its southern neigh- alists, they clearly indicate the weight and influence
bour in 2010, dwarfing those made by Western of Riyadh in its neighbour’s affairs.
donors. This is not new: together the six Gulf
Cooperation Council countries have for a long Saudi Arabia’s policy on Yemen has been consis-
time provided the largest share of aid to Yemen. tently reactive, without a clear strategy on how to
Much of this is channelled directly through the reverse the mounting threat to the region from al-
President’s office or through tribal networks in Qaeda. Although Saudi diplomats pay lip-service
order to alleviate the government’s increasing to the prospect of Yemen joining the GCC trad-
shortage of revenue and to fund large infrastruc- ing bloc, in reality there has been very little
ture projects. However, some Gulf diplomats process made towards achieving this goal. The
now complain that an increasing amount of this most striking Saudi policy in recent years has
assistance is embezzled rather than used to alle- been its proposal to build an enormous barrier
viate poverty in the country. along the border with Yemen. Riyadh is also
believed to have deliberately frustrated a Qatari-
Saudi Arabia has for mediated truce in 2008 between the Yemeni gov-
decades funded tribes ernment and the Houthi rebels in the border
‘US proposals in Yemen to act as a province of Saada, suspecting Qatar’s ties with
to increase military political lever against
the government in
Iran and the Houthis own alleged support from
Iran and Iraq. This now appears to have backfired
assistance for Sana’a if necessary. Its following the resumption of hostilities in 2009
rulers have long been which saw rebel incursions into Saudi Arabia and
the Yemeni security fixated with a possible resulted in the death of over 100 Saudi soldiers.
forces have threat emerging from
Yemen and moved to
The Shia faith of the rebels, albeit very different
from the ‘Twelver’ Shia practices of Iran and Iraq,
largely overlooked expel almost one mil- has nevertheless stoked hostility in these countries
lion Yemeni migrant against Saudi Arabia, with both Ayatollah Ali al-
the profound labourers during the Sistani and the Office of Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq
rivalry that exists first Gulf War follow-
ing Yemen’s absten -
calling for support for the rebels. Iranian Presi-
dent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has condemned
between certain tion from a vote in Saudi Arabia for seeking to crush fellow Muslims
the UN Security instead of using their weapons in support of the
commanders’ Council authorising people of Gaza. This increasingly regional conflict
the use of force together with a recent AQAP suicide bomb attack
against Iraq. More recently the extent of Saudi Ara- that narrowly avoided killing the Deputy Minis-
bia’s tribal network was clearly demonstrated in an ter for the Interior, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef,
interview by a Saudi journalist with the two most have shown the limitations of Saudi engagement
powerful tribal leaders in Yemen, widely believed to in Yemen and the need for an urgent reappraisal
be principal beneficiaries of Saudi funds, Sheikh by Riyadh of its relations with its southern neigh-
Naji bin Abdul Aziz al-Shayef and Sheikh Sadiq bin bour.
Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar of the Bakhil and
Hashid tribes respectively, who condemned the
incursions by Yemeni rebels into Saudi Arabia: WHAT TO DO?
‘The Kingdom and Yemen are one country and
one people, and our countries and people’s broth- 2010 threatens to be an even more turbulent
erly relations go back to the eternal depths of his- year for Yemen than 2009. From a position of
tory, and we cannot allow any threats to the doing too little in terms of counter-terrorism >>>>>>
 YEMEN:
MAKE HASTE SLOWLY
>>>>>> efforts in Yemen, the US and Europe now seem
tempted to try and do too much. The interna-
tional community needs to think very carefully
about how a vastly increased programme of mil-
itary assistance will influence the balance of
power in Yemen. Any military assistance should
be linked to a programme of security sector
reform to curb the worst abuses of the Yemeni
security forces. Yemen’s prisons are overcrowd-
ed, brutal and have been where AQAP has done
much of its recruiting. They are also notorious-
ly insecure, with a number of successful escapes
being made by senior AQAP operatives in
recent years. The Yemeni army and police have
frequently shot unarmed protestors when a
non-lethal response to provocation was possible,
with disastrous consequences in terms of alien-
ating the population from the government.
There have also been worrying accounts of sol-
diers selling weapons and ammunition to insur-
gents with impunity.
There has been an obvious lack of will on the
part of the international donor community to
play a role in resolving the deadlock between
the government and the opposition that led to
the postponement of parliamentary elections,
originally scheduled to be held in 2009, to
2011. Confusion surrounding the appointment
of an Electoral Commission and voter registra-
tion has greatly exacerbated mistrust of the gov-
ernment’s commitment to reform. Yet US and
European diplomats in Sana’a admit that, given
the current fixation upon counter-terrorism
cooperation, there has been little or no interest
from their governments to put pressure on the
Yemeni government to hold fair elections. Nei-
ther has any priority been given to easing south-
ern grievances. Donors should insist that the
south receives an appropriate portion of any
increase in aid and that the Yemeni government
draft and implement a strategy for dealing with
southern grievances.
Shelving the reform process in Yemen in favour of
a more ‘realist’ security engagement would be a
self-defeating paradox – much of the frustration
which has fostered the growth of AQAP can be
traced to a lack of accountability and the persecu-
tion of political and civil society activists by the
government, some of whom have been impris-
oned indefinitely under vague anti-terrorism leg-
islation. There is no doubt that an urgent increase
in US and European aid to Yemen is required but
it is imperative that such assistance is sustained
over the coming years.
Yemen also needs to be made a priority of rela-
tions between the West and the Gulf. All paths
out of Yemen’s current crisis go through Riyadh.
Yet, Yemen has for too long been an after-thought
of bilateral and multilateral engagement with
Saudi Arabia, whose government have being
adept at brushing it aside as a matter of local con-
cern. This has to stop. The US and Europe must
be firm and consistent in pushing for a dialogue
with Saudi Arabia on a collective strategy to turn
the tide against AQAP, addressing grievances,
under-cutting AQAP’s tribal support and negoti-
ating an end to the debilitating Houthi insur-
gency. Qatar and the UAE are two obvious
partners in lifting Yemen out of its economic stag-
nation and to fund programmes to reduce alarm-
ingly high illiteracy rates by improving education
standards. These not only provide economic
opportunities for Yemen’s youth but simultane-
ously reduce the likelihood of radicalisation tak-
ing place in the classroom.
MAKE HASTE SLOWLY
Following the attempted Christmas day bomb-
ing aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253, there
has been much sabre rattling in Washington
DC calling for military strikes against AQAP.
Senator Joe Lieberman, the Chairman of the US
Senate’s Homeland Security, stated that
‘Afghanistan is today’s war. If we don’t act pre-
emptively, Yemen will be tomorrow’s war’. This
is highly dangerous rhetoric to follow years of
US complacency and disinterest in Yemen.
If the US military robustly engages ‘pre-emptive-
ly’ and overtly in Yemen, such actions will become
the recruiting sergeant that AQAP have long
P O L I C Y B R I E F - Nº 33 - JANUARY 2010

5
dreamed of and could transform it from being
a movement with fringe support in the Gulf
into a popular insurgency. Comparisons with
Afghanistan are not only simplistic but highly
counter-productive, fuelling Yemeni suspicion of
Western motivations. Many Yemenis do not pri-
marily perceive Afghanistan as a country that was
liberated from the rule of religious extremists, but
rather associate it with a humiliating occupation
imposed upon a Muslim people.

Until recently the US and European presence

on the ground in Yemen has been minimal, con-
stituting only a handful of diplomats, intelli-
gence and military personnel. The internal
dynamics of Yemen are notoriously compli-
cated. With fewer resources and a population
deeply suspicious of any foreign intervention,
the US and Europe would do well to tread very
carefully during the next months. Working
closely with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf coun-
tries to address the political grievances that have
sapped the strength of the Yemeni state would
be a far more deadly blow to AQAP than any
short-term military response. Yemen’s problems
are predominantly local and multi-faceted.
Al Qaeda thrives on all of them.

Edward Burke is researcher

at FRIDE

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