Hegemony – TDI 2019

Top Level
 Realism
1. The international system is anarchic.
o No actor exists above states, capable of regulating their interactions;
states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than
it being dictated to them by some higher controlling entity.
o The international system exists in a state of constant antagonism
(anarchy).
2. States are the most important actors.
3. All states within the system are unitary, rational actors
o States tend to pursue self-interest.
o Groups strive to attain as many resources as possible (relative gain).
4. The primary concern of all states is survival.
o States build up military to survive, which may lead to a security dilemma.
5. The only way to be safe is to be the hegemon
o Realists argue that there hasn’t been a hegemon but the US with tech
prowess is definitely a regional hegemon and may qualify as the post
powerful civilization of all time.
o Before concerning yourself with the geopolitical disputes away if there are
proximate threats to security, regional heg has to happen first
 Polarity
System polarity: The international distribution of power. A multipolar system is
composed of three or more blocs, a bipolar system is composed of two blocs,
and a unipolar system is dominated by a single power or hegemon. Under
unipolarity realism predicts that states will band together to oppose the
hegemon and restore a balance of power.
 Liberalism
 Rejection of power politics as the only possible outcome of international relations;
it questions security/warfare principles of realism
 It accentuates mutual benefits and international cooperation (NATO is a group of
mutual democracies)
 It implements international organizations and nongovernmental actors for shaping
state preferences and policy choices[1]
This school of thought emphasizes three factors that encourage more cooperation and
less conflict among states:
 International institutions, such as the United Nations, who provide a forum to
resolve disputes in a non-violent way
 International trade because when countries' economies are interconnected
through trade they are less likely to go to war with each other
 Spread of democracy as well-established democracies do not go to war with one
another, so if there are more democracies, interstate war will be less frequent
 Wants to promote democracy, human rights, free trade, reduce conflict,
integration of markets etc (Trump was the only unliberal president)

Liberal international relation with the US is an imperfect utopia since it has it mistakes but no
other country is liberal or powerful enough to fill this role. The idea is that we should use
international institutions to facilitate liberalism, but if these organizations collapse, western
countries should force liberalism with military might.

Argue US revisionism is qualitatively different than Russia’s or China’s

Offensive liberalism is when you attack somewhere to build it and make It more democratic
Responses
 Isolationism/Restraint/Retrenchment
Blinken and Kagan 1/4 [(Anthony, Former Deputy Secretary of State)(Robert, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior
Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy) “‘America First’ is only making the world worse. Here’s a better
approach.” Brookings, 01/04/2019]
Foreign policy was the last thing on voters’ minds in the midterm elections, but as we look
toward 2020, one thing is clear: President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy— or its
progressive cousin, retrenchment —is broadly popular in both parties. Trump’s recent
decision to withdraw all troops from Syria and 7,000 from Afghanistan has been
condemned by Democrats and Republicans alike in Washington. But it is not at all clear
that Americans beyond the Beltway are equally outraged.
The fact is, whatever tolerance most Americans had for the global role the United States
embraced after World War II began to fade with the collapse of the Soviet Union and was
shattered by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2008 financial crisis. Whoever wins
office in 2020 will have a hard time bucking a trend that preceded Trump and will likely
survive him.
 Offshore Balancing
Mearshimer and Walt 16 [(John, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago)(Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School) “The Case
for Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016]

There is a better way. By pursuing a strategy of “offshore balancing,” Washington would forgo
ambitious efforts to remake other societies and concentrate on what really matters:
preserving U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and countering potential hegemons in Europe,
Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Instead of policing the world, the United States would encourage other
countries to take the lead in checking rising powers, intervening itself only when necessary.
This does not mean abandoning the United States’ position as the world’s sole superpower or
retreating to “Fortress America.” Rather, by husbanding U.S. strength, offshore balancing would
preserve U.S. primacy far into the future and safeguard liberty at home.
 Liberal Hegemony/Primacy
Mearshimer and Walt 16 [(John, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago)(Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School) “The Case
for Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016]

The United States does not bear sole responsibility for all these costly debacles, but it has had a hand in most of them. The setbacks
are the natural consequence of the misguided grand strategy of liberal
hegemony that Democrats and Republicans have
pursued for years. This approach holds that the United States must use its power not only to solve

global problems but also to promote a world order based on international institutions ,
representative governments , open markets , and respect for human rights. As “the indispensable
nation,” the logic goes, the United States has the right, responsibility, and wisdom to manage local politics almost everywhere. At its
core, liberal
hegemony is a revisionist grand strategy: instead of calling on the United States to
merely uphold the balance of power in key regions, it commits American might to promoting
democracy everywhere and defending human rights whenever they are threatened.
Offshore Balancing
The Strategy
 In Theory
Mearshimer and Walt 16 [(John, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago)(Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School) “The Case
for Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016]

Under offshore balancing, the United States would calibrate its military posture according to
the distribution of power in the three key regions. If there is no potential hegemon in sight in Europe, Northeast
Asia, or the Gulf, then there is no reason to deploy ground or air forces there and little need for a large military establishment at
home. And because it takes many years for any country to acquire the capacity to dominate its region, Washington would see it
coming and have time to respond. In that event, the
United States should turn to regional forces as the first
line of defense, letting them uphold the balance of power in their own neighborhood. Although
Washington could provide assistance to allies and pledge to support them if they were in danger of being conquered, it should
refrain from deploying large numbers of U.S. forces abroad. It may occasionally make sense to keep certain assets overseas, such as
small military contingents, intelligence-gathering facilities, or prepositioned equipment, but in general, Washington should pass the
buck to regional powers, as they have a far greater interest in preventing any state from dominating them. If
those powers
cannot contain a potential hegemon on their own, however, the United States must help get
the job done, deploying enough firepower to the region to shift the balance in its favor.
Sometimes, that may mean sending in forces before war breaks out. During the Cold War, for example, the United States kept large
numbers of ground and air forces in Europe out of the belief that Western European countries could not contain the Soviet Union on
their own. At other times, the United States might wait to intervene after a war starts, if one side seems likely to emerge as a
regional hegemon. Such was the case during both world wars: the United States came in only after Germany seemed likely to
dominate Europe. In essence, the aim is to remain offshore as long as possible, while recognizing that
it is sometimes necessary to come onshore. If that happens, however, the United States
should make its allies do as much of the heavy lifting as possible and remove its own forces as
soon as it can. Offshore balancing has many virtues. By limiting the areas the U.S. military was committed
to defending and forcing other states to pull their own weight, it would reduce the resources
Washington must devote to defense, allow for greater investment and consumption at home,
and put fewer American lives in harm’s way. Today, allies routinely free-ride on American protection, a problem
that has only grown since the Cold War ended. Within nato, for example, the United States accounts for 46
percent of the alliance’s aggregate gdp yet contributes about 75 percent of its military
spending. As the political scientist Barry Posen has quipped, “This is welfare for the rich.” Offshore balancing would
also reduce the risk of terrorism. Liberal hegemony commits the United States to spreading
democracy in unfamiliar places, which sometimes requires military occupation and always involves
interfering with local political arrangements. Such efforts invariably foster nationalist resentment, and
because the opponents are too weak to confront the United States directly, they sometimes turn to terrorism. (It is
worth remembering that Osama bin Laden was motivated in good part by the presence of U.S. troops in his homeland of Saudi
Arabia.) In addition to inspiring terrorists, liberal
hegemony facilitates their operations: using regime
change to spread American values undermines local institutions and creates ungoverned
spaces where violent extremists can flourish. Offshore balancing would alleviate this problem
by eschewing social engineering and minimizing the United States’ military footprint. U.S.
troops would be stationed on foreign soil only when a country was in a vital region and threatened
by a would-be hegemon. In that case, the potential victim would view the United States as a
savior rather than an occupier. And once the threat had been dealt with, U.S. military forces could go back over the
horizon and not stay behind to meddle in local politics. By respecting the sovereignty of other states, offshore balancing would be
less likely to foster antiAmerican terrorism.
 In Practice
Mearshimer and Walt 16 [(John, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago)(Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School) “The Case
for Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016]

What would offshore balancing look like in today’s world? The good news is that it is hard to foresee
a serious challenge to American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere , and for now, no potential
hegemon lurks in Europe or the Persian Gulf. Now for the bad news : if China continues its
impressive rise, it is likely to seek hegemony in Asia. The United States should undertake a major effort to
prevent it from succeeding. Ideally, Washington would rely on local powers to contain China, but that strategy might not work. Not
only is China likely to be much more powerful than its neighbors, but these states are also
located far from one another, making it harder to form an effective balancing coalition. The
United States will have to coordinate their efforts and may have to throw its considerable
weight behind them. In Asia, the United States may indeed be the indispensable nation. In Europe, the United
States should end its military presence and turn nato over to the Europeans. There is no good reason
to keep U.S. forces in Europe, as no country there has the capability to dominate that region. The top
contenders, Germany and Russia, will both lose relative power as their populations shrink in
size, and no other potential hegemon is in sight. Admittedly, leaving European security to the Europeans could
increase the potential for trouble there. If a conflict did arise, however, it would not threaten vital U.S.

interests. Thus, there is no reason for the United States to spend billions of dollars each year (and pledge its own citizens’ lives)

to prevent one. In
the Gulf, the United States should return to the offshore balancing strategy that
served it so well until the advent of dual containment. No local power is now in a position to
dominate the region, so the United States can move most of its forces back over the horizon. With respect to isis,
the United States should let the regional powers deal with that group and limit its own efforts
to providing arms, intelligence, and military training. Isis represents a serious threat to them but a minor
problem for the United States, and the only long-term solution to it is better local institutions, something Washington cannot
provide. In Syria, the United States should let Russia take the lead. A Syria stabilized under Assad’s control, or divided into competing
ministates, would pose little danger to U.S. interests. Both Democratic and Republican presidents have a rich history of working with
the Assad regime, and a divided and weak Syria would not threaten the regional balance of power. If the civil war continues, it will
be largely Moscow’s problem, although Washington should be willing to help broker a political settlement. For now, the
United
States should pursue better relations with Iran. It is not in Washington’s interest for Tehran to
abandon the nuclear agreement and race for the bomb, an outcome that would become more
likely if it feared a U.S. attack—hence the rationale for mending fences. Moreover, as its ambitions grow,
China will want allies in the Gulf, and Iran will likely top its list. (In a harbinger of things to come, this past
January, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Tehran and signed 17 different agreements.) The United States has an obvious interest
in discouraging Chinese-Iranian security cooperation, and that requires reaching out to Iran. Iran
has a significantly larger
population and greater economic potential than its Arab neighbors, and it may eventually be
in a position to dominate the Gulf. If it begins to move in this direction, the United States
should help the other Gulf states balance against Tehran, calibrating its own efforts and
regional military presence to the magnitude of the danger.
Advantages
 US Interests
Mearshimer and Walt 16 [(John, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago)(Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School) “The Case
for Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016]

Offshore balancing may seem like a radical strategy today, but it provided the guiding logic of U.S.
foreign policy for many decades and served the country well. During the nineteenth century, the United
States was preoccupied with expanding across North America , building a powerful state, and establishing
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. After it completed these tasks at the end of the century, it soon became
interested in preserving the balance of power in Europe and Northeast Asia. Nonetheless, it
let the great powers in those regions check one another, intervening militarily only when the
balance of power broke down, as during both world wars. During the Cold War, the United
States had no choice but to go onshore in Europe and Northeast Asia, as its allies in those
regions could not contain the Soviet Union by themselves. So Washington forged alliances and stationed military
forces in both regions, and it fought the Korean War to contain Soviet influence in Northeast Asia. In
the Persian Gulf,
however, the United States stayed offshore, letting the United Kingdom take the lead in
preventing any state from dominating that oil-rich region. After the British announced their
withdrawal from the Gulf in 1968, the United States turned to the shah of Iran and the Saudi
monarchy to do the job. When the shah fell in 1979, the Carter administration began building the Rapid Deployment
Force, an offshore military capability designed to prevent Iran or the Soviet Union from dominating the region. The Reagan
administration aided Iraq during that country’s 1980–88 war with Iran for similar reasons. The
U.S. military stayed
offshore until 1990, when Saddam Hussein’s seizure of Kuwait threatened to enhance Iraq’s
power and place Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil producers at risk. To restore the regional balance of
power, the George H. W. Bush administration sent an expeditionary force to liberate Kuwait and
smash Saddam’s military machine. For nearly a century, in short, offshore balancing prevented the
emergence of dangerous regional hegemons and preserved a global balance of power that
enhanced American security. Tellingly, when U.S. policymakers deviated from that strategy—as they
did in Vietnam, where the United States had no vital interests— the result was a costly failure. Events since the end of

the Cold War teach the same lesson. In Europe, once the Soviet Union collapsed, the region no longer had a
dominant power. The United States should have steadily reduced its military presence,
cultivated amicable relations with Russia, and turned European security over to the
Europeans. Instead, it expanded nato and ignored Russian interests, helping spark the conflict over
Ukraine and driving Moscow closer to China. In the Middle East, likewise, the United States
should have moved back offshore after the Gulf War and let Iran and Iraq balance each other.
Instead, the Clinton administration adopted the policy of “dual containment,” which required
keeping ground and air forces in Saudi Arabia to check Iran and Iraq simultaneously. The George
W. Bush administration then adopted an even more ambitious strategy, dubbed “regional
transformation,” which produced costly failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Obama
administration repeated the error when it helped topple Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya and when
it exacerbated the chaos in Syria by insisting that Bashar al-Assad “must go” and backing some of his
opponents. Abandoning offshore balancing after the Cold War has been a recipe for failure.
 Regional Instability, Terrorism, and Proliferation
Mearshimer and Walt 16 [(John, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago)(Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School) “The Case
for Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016]

Defenders of liberal hegemony marshal a number of unpersuasive arguments to make their

case. One familiar claim is that only vigorous U.S. leadership can keep order around the globe. But global leadership is not an end
in itself; it is desirable only insofar as it benefits the United States directly. One might further argue that U.S.
leadership is necessary to overcome the collective-action problem of local actors failing to
balance against a potential hegemon. Offshore balancing recognizes this danger , however, and
calls for Washington to step in if needed. Nor does it prohibit Washington from giving friendly
states in the key regions advice or material aid. Other defenders of liberal hegemony argue
that U.S. leadership is necessary to deal with new, transnational threats that arise from failed states,
terrorism, criminal networks, refugee flows, and the like. Not only do the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans offer
inadequate protection against these dangers, they claim, but modern military technology also makes it
easier for the United States to project power around the world and address them. Today’s “global
village,” in short, is more dangerous yet easier to manage. This view exaggerates these threats and overstates
Washington’s ability to eliminate them. Crime, terrorism, and similar problems can be a
nuisance, but they are hardly existential threats and rarely lend themselves to military solutions. Indeed,
constant interference in the affairs of other states —and especially repeated military interventions—
generates local resentment and fosters corruption, thereby making these transnational
dangers worse. The long-term solution to the problems can only be competent local
governance, not heavy-handed U.S. efforts to police the world. Nor is policing the world as cheap as defenders of
liberal hegemony contend, either in dollars spent or in lives lost. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq cost between $4 trillion and $6
trillion and killed nearly 7,000 U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 50,000. Veterans of these conflicts exhibit high rates of
depression and suicide, yet the United States has little to show for their sacrifices. Defenders of the status quo also
fear that offshore balancing would allow other states to replace the United States at the pinnacle of
global power. On the contrary, the strategy would prolong the country’s dominanc e by refocusing its
efforts on core goals. Unlike liberal hegemony, offshore balancing avoids squandering resources on costly
and counterproductive crusades, which would allow the government to invest more in the long-term
ingredients of power and prosperity: education, infrastructure, and research and development. Remember,
the United States became a great power by staying out of foreign wars and building a world-
class economy, which is the same strategy China has pursued over the past three decades.
Meanwhile, the United States has wasted trillions of dollars and put its long-term primacy at risk. Another argument holds
that the U.S. military must garrison the world to keep the peace and preserve an open world economy.
Retrenchment, the logic goes, would renew great-power competition, invite ruinous economic rivalries, and eventually spark a
major war from which the United States could not remain aloof. Better
to keep playing global policeman than
risk a repeat of the 1930s. Such fears are unconvincing. For starters, this argument assumes that deeper U.S.
engagement in Europe would have prevented World War II, a claim hard to square with Adolf Hitler’s unshakable desire for war.
Regional conflicts will sometimes occur no matter what Washington does, but it need not get
involved unless vital U.S. interests are at stake. Indeed, the United States has sometimes stayed out of regional
conflicts—such as the Russo-Japanese War, the Iran-Iraq War, and the current war in Ukraine—belying the claim that it inevitably
gets dragged in. And if
the country is forced to fight another great power, better to arrive late and
let other countries bear the brunt of the costs. As the last major power to enter both world
wars, the United States emerged stronger from each for having waited. Furthermore, recent
history casts doubt on the claim that U.S. leadership preserves peace. Over the past 25 years,
Washington has caused or supported several wars in the Middle East and fueled minor
conflicts elsewhere. If liberal hegemony is supposed to enhance global stability, it has done a poor job. Nor has the strategy
produced much in the way of economic benefits. Given its protected position in the Western Hemisphere, the United States is free
to trade and invest wherever profitable opportunities exist. Because all countries have a shared interest in such activity, Washington
does not need to play global policeman in order to remain economically engaged with others. In fact, the U.S. economy would be in
better shape today if the government were not spending so much money trying to run the world. Proponents of liberal
hegemony also claim that the United States must remain committed all over the world to
prevent nuclear proliferation. If it reduces its role in key regions or withdraws entirely, the argument runs, countries
accustomed to U.S. protection will have no choice but to protect themselves by obtaining nuclear weapons. No grand
strategy is likely to prove wholly successful at preventing proliferation, but offshore balancing
would do a better job than liberal hegemony. After all, that strategy failed to stop India and Pakistan from
ramping up their nuclear capabilities, North Korea from becoming the newest member of the nuclear club, and Iran from making
major progress with its nuclear program. Countries
usually seek the bomb because they fear being
attacked, and U.S. efforts at regime change only heighten such concerns. By eschewing regime change
and reducing the United States’ military footprint, offshore balancing would give potential

proliferators less reason to go nuclear. Moreover, military action cannot prevent a

determined country from eventually obtaining nuclear weapons ; it can only buy time. The recent deal
with Iran serves as a reminder that coordinated multilateral pressure and tough economic sanctions are a better way to discourage
proliferation than preventive war or regime change. To
be sure, if the United States did scale back its security
guarantees, a few vulnerable states might seek their own nuclear deterrents. That outcome is not
desirable, but all-out efforts to prevent it would almost certainly be costly and probably be unsuccessful. Besides, the downsides
may not be as grave as pessimists fear. Getting
the bomb does not transform weak countries into great
powers or enable them to blackmail rival states. Ten states have crossed the nuclear threshold
since 1945, and the world has not turned upside down. Nuclear proliferation will remain a concern no matter
what the United States does, but offshore balancing provides the best strategy for dealing with it.
Liberal Hegemony
The Strategy
 In Theory
Americans have been given a false choice
Blinken and Kagan 1/4 [(Anthony, Former Deputy Secretary of State)(Robert, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior
Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy) “‘America First’ is only making the world worse. Here’s a better
approach.” Brookings, 01/04/2019]
Americans have been given a false choice. Of course, we need to put America first. But what
does that mean? Decades ago, we learned that to advance America’s interests required
building and defending a more peaceful , prosperous and democratic world. Nation-building
at home and promoting the stability and success of others go hand in hand.

the world does not govern itself. If the United States abdicates its leading role
We also learned that

in shaping international rules and institutions—and mobilizing others to defend them—then

one of two things will happen: Some other power or powers will step in and move the world
in ways that advance their interests and values, not ours. Or, more likely, the world will descend
into chaos and conflict, and the jungle will overtake us, as it did in the 1930s.
 In Practice
Preventative Diplomacy and Deterrence
Blinken and Kagan 1/4 [(Anthony, Former Deputy Secretary of State)(Robert, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior
Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy) “‘America First’ is only making the world worse. Here’s a better
approach.” Brookings, 01/04/2019]
Most Americans do not know the role our diplomats have played over the decades in
preventing wars between nuclear-armed nations such as India and Pakistan; between Israel
and the Arab states; and between China and Japan in the East China Sea. U.S. diplomacy helped end the Cold
War, reunify Germany and build peace in the Balkans. The United States led others to begin addressing
climate change, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to fight the Ebola epidemic,
to confront the Islamic State and to level economic playing fields. Properly empowered, U.S. diplomacy
can save trillions of dollars and many thousands of lives that would otherwise be spent responding to crises that explode because we
ignored problems while they were still manageable.

As geopolitical competition intensifies, we must supplement diplomacy with deterrence.

Words alone will not dissuade the Vladimir Putins and Xi Jinpings of this world. Recognizing their
traditional imperial “spheres of interest” will only embolden them to expand farther while
betraying the sovereign nations that fall under their dominion. Because we face real budget constraints,
we have to make tough choices about how best to defend our interests. We’ll have to strike the right balance of modernization,
readiness, asymmetric capabilities and force structure. Whatever formula we choose, we
must convince rivals and
adversaries that trying to achieve their objectives by force will fail and that they have more to
gain through peaceful cooperation and economic development than through aggression.

Trade and Technology

Blinken and Kagan 1/4 [(Anthony, Former Deputy Secretary of State)(Robert, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior
Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy) “‘America First’ is only making the world worse. Here’s a better
approach.” Brookings, 01/04/2019]
Americans have never backed away from the challenges posed by competition and
innovation. Trying to revive the industrial economy of the 1950s is impossible; nor should we embrace the protectionism of the
1930s that helped destroy the global economy and hasten world war. When we pull out of trade agreements, such

as the  T rans- P acific P artnership, we hand a win to countries such as China. If we opt out,
they will shape global trade and innovation to their benefit, not ours. We should insist on
competing in a rules-based system that protects our people from the aggressive state
capitalism of modern autocracies. We should use our market power to set the highest
standards for protecting workers, the environment, intellectual property and middle-class
wages, while insisting on transparency and basic commercial reciprocity. In other words, we’ll treat you
the way you treat us. We also need to stay ahead of the competition in new technologies, especially artificial intelligence, which will
reshape the future global balance of power. We
cannot cede to China or anyone else a technological
sphere of influence. To maintain our edge, we must preserve the free flow of ideas and
international collaboration that spark innovation, but we also need to crack down on
espionage , technology transfer and intellectual property theft. Our tech firms need to take more
responsibility for national security, both in preventing foreign efforts to manipulate our political system, and protecting data and
privacy. If they won’t, government will. Together, government and the private sector must renew investments in our human
resources—through affordable education, training, health care, housing, infrastructure, and research and development—to help our
citizens weather the ups and downs of the global economy and the uneven effects of technological change. We need budget and tax
policies that put a higher priority on these national requirements.
Allies and Institutions
Blinken and Kagan 1/4 [(Anthony, Former Deputy Secretary of State)(Robert, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior
Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy) “‘America First’ is only making the world worse. Here’s a better
approach.” Brookings, 01/04/2019]
The United States doesn’t have to address these challenges or bear these costs alone. After
World War II, we wisely
advanced the security and prosperity of countries that shared our interests, values and fears.
Enlightened self-interest produced a community of democracies with new markets for our
products, new partners to help meet global challenges and new allies to deter aggression.
That strategy produced victory in the Cold War. Turning away from it invites defeat in the
struggles that lie ahead. It’s no coincidence that Russia has launched attacks against two
nations that are not members of NATO—but has yet to strike a member of the alliance. Today, the rise of an
alternative, techno-authoritarian model of governance is the principal threat to the
community of democracies. Autocrats, fearing democracy’s strength and appeal, have weaponized the tools of social

control they use at home to sow division within and among democracies. To rally and protect ourselves, we must adapt. Our
alliances are out of date in one key respect: The United States has European allies and Asian
allies, but no institution links the Asian and European democracies. As China’s Belt and Road
initiative draws Asia, Europe and the Middle East closer together in ways that serve Beijing’s interests, the democracies also need a
global perspective—and new institutions to forge a common strategic, economic and political vision. Why shouldn’t Germany and
France work with India and Japan on strategic issues? Such an organization—call it a league of democracies or a democratic
cooperative network—would not just address military security but also cybersecurity and other threats that democracies face today,
from terrorism to election interference.

Foreign Aid
Blinken and Kagan 1/4 [(Anthony, Former Deputy Secretary of State)(Robert, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior
Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy) “‘America First’ is only making the world worse. Here’s a better
approach.” Brookings, 01/04/2019]
Finally, we have to contend with the most divisive and destabilizing phenomenon in geopolitics:
mass migration. There are more people forcibly on the move around the globe—about 70 million—
than at any time since World War II. Democracies have a right and obligation to control their
borders, humanely. But as conflicts and economic, political and climatic crises drive people from their
homes, we are not going to solve the problem with barbed wire and bayonets. With allied
democracies struggling to cope with greater flows of migrants and refugees, the United States needs to lead, in our
own interest, in addressing the causes and consequences of migration. That means doing
more, not less, to prevent conflict and help others to withstand migratory shocks, and to build
strong and resilient democratic institutions. We must start in our own hemisphere. Today, out
of $50 billion in foreign and military assistance, about $20 billion goes to the Middle East, North Africa and South
Asia. Roughly $12 billion goes to sub-Saharan Africa. Only $2 billion goes to Latin America—and less than half of that

to the Northern Triangle countries—El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. That is not proportionate to our

interests. The answer is not throwing aid at problems; we need to tie our increased investments to
genuine reforms in governance, policing, judicial systems and the economy while combating
corruption. We also need to bolster our neighbors’ economies by trading with them, just as we did in Europe after World War II.
Advantages
 Non-state Actors
Holmes 16 [(James, Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College) “Why Offshore Balancing Won’t Work,” National Interest,
07/18/2016]
Think about it. A
single great naval power has superintended the maritime system for the past five
centuries or so. Before that, local sea powers imposed order in confined sea areas from time to
time. Rome, for instance, kept the peace in mare nostrum—“our sea,” meaning the Mediterranean Sea. Anarchy prevailed
elsewhere. Piracy flourished alongside predatory seagoing states —it was often hard to distinguish
between them—outside pockets of relative tranquility. No single maritime order, let alone a global commons,
prevailed throughout the world’s oceans and seas. Such a nonsystem would be unfriendly to
seaborne trade and commerce, and thus to economic vitality, were it to return today.

That anarchic past could become the world’s future, should Washington embrace offshore
balancing. It beggars the imagination to think freedom of the sea would endure for long once
coastal states—many of them hostile to the idea of a global commons—started imposing
disparate, self-serving visions of nautical order. A dark future would await.
 Great Power War
French 17’ - senior writer for National Review, a senior fellow at the National Review Institute (David, “America Still Is — and
Should Remain — the ‘Indispensable Nation’”, 5/17/17, National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447640/foreign-
policy-indispensable-nation-donald-trump-jeet-heert-mistake//GHS-AK)
What do Americans on both sides of the aisle mean when they call the U.S. the “indispensable nation”? It’s simply this: that without America maintaining its post–World War II
role as the ultimate guarantor of the safety and security of the Free World, the world is more likely than not to revert to the historical mean
of regional and perhaps even global conflict . Acknowledging that the U.S. is “indispensable” does not mean that we’re the world’s hegemon, controlling all the Earth’s peoples from
Washington, D.C. It does not mean that different administrations at different times haven’t chosen to retreat from this or that peripheral commitment. It does depend, however, on the understanding that
American retreat necessarily means — in key strategic areas — the advance of powers hostile to American interests and hostile to
international peace and security more broadly. Writing in The New Republic, Jeet Heer thinks that Donald Trump is well on his way to
destroying America’s status as the world’s indispensable nation — after just four months in office. And Heer is not alone. He cites multiple foreign-policy thinkers who
are not only proclaiming America’s strategic demise ; they’re already anointing international substitutes, such as China and Germany. Even worse, Heer is celebrating
the new international landscape — believing it’s high time that the U.S. take a lesser role in world affairs. He thinks it’s time for other regional powers to fill the vacuum. Heer’s
analysis is fundamentally flawed on both counts. First, it’s simply wrong that Trump has fundamentally changed anything about
America’s strategic approach abroad . For all Trump’s tweets and worrisome campaign rhetoric, since he’s been in office, his administration has reaffirmed its
commitment to NATO, accelerated the fight against ISIS and other Islamic jihadists, enforced Obama’s “red line” against the use of chemical
weapons in Syria, rushed missile-defense batteries to South Korea, and announced its intention to expand and modernize a military that was already the

most powerful in the world. While all these decisions may dismay some of President Trump’s more isolationist supporters, in real-world terms, they mean exerting more American power
abroad, not less. Second, Heer glosses over the Obama administration’s beta test for American withdrawal. Remember “leading from behind”? Remember the Iraq retreat? In many ways, Barack
Obama came into office with a worldview that echoed Heer’s. Obama believed that American power was in many ways responsible for the world’s ills, and that less American influence could well lead to less strife

and conflict. Yet in every strategically important arena where America stepped back , our nation’s rivals stepped forward . From the genocidal
nightmare in Syria and Iraq to China’s aggressive moves in Southeast Asia to Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine and Syria,
American retreat or hesitation emboldened enemies, not friends. By the end of his second term, Obama had become a miniature George W. Bush, launching combat operations in
Libya, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He’d sent troops forward in Poland and Estonia. Obama had finally learned the enduring, eternal lesson of foreign affairs. The operative word in the
phrase “great power” is “power,” and absent that power the greatness or morality of a nation is of little count in international affairs. In reality, Heer and others are engaging little more than a fantasy-land
What happens to international trade and stability if America
intellectual exercise without bothering to realistically explore the alternatives to American engagement.

yanked the U.S. Navy off the high seas — leaving Western democracies with minimal ability to respond to regional instability and
ceding the balance of power to those countries with the largest land armies? No nation can project power like the United States, and even if Britain, France, and

Japan decided to reassert their historic international roles, it would take well over a decade of emergency efforts to design, build, and deploy
naval forces even a fraction of our size. Let’s put this another way. The international order can stand even if any given friendly regional
power fails. It cannot stand if the U.S. abdicates . Germany can fail to meet its defense obligations, yet NATO can still deter Russia. The South Korean military could melt away, yet the

U.S. could defeat North Korea. But if the United States retreats from these key strategic regions , can any allied regional power (or coalition) truly
step up and guarantee stability? The international order can stand even if any given friendly regional power fails. It cannot stand if the U.S. abdicates. What happens to international
stability if America reneged on its commitments to NATO, South Korea, or Japan? What if the U.S. decides to leave the Middle East? Does Heer
legitimately believe that the immediate beneficiaries would be anyone other than Russia, China, Iran, and the barbaric North Korean regime? Yes, Germany has economic power, but it is utterly unable to take
effective action beyond even its immediate borders, and without allied help its own army can’t even protect its own nation. There are certain military realities, and absent resort to their nuclear deterrent, nations
such France and Britain are less equipped to defend, say, Poland than they were in 1939. During the campaign, intelligent critics of Trump’s proposed, more isolationist, foreign policy asked a consistent question:
If America retreats, who advances? There are strategic backwaters (such as post–Cold War Latin America — left more benign after Cuba and the Soviet Union were neutered) where that question is less relevant,
but in every strategically vital region in the world, the answer to that question in the short and medium term is quite simple: Our enemies. They’re the only nations with the will and the power to take advantage of

American weakness. Like it or not, America is indispensable to the preservation of an international order that has not only kept the world broadly at

peace (certainly it has avoided catastrophes such as World War II, World War I, or even devastating conflicts such as the Napoleonic Wars), it actively defeated an aspiring
hegemonic power in the Soviet Union without a military cataclysm. Anyone — whether he be named Donald Trump, Steve Bannon, or Jeet Heer — who
thinks that the United States can meaningfully change its international commitments without incurring an unacceptable level of
risk not just to international peace and stability but to the prosperity and well-being of our own citizens is not living in the real world . It’s true that President Trump
has made statements that have made our allies unnecessarily nervous about American plans and intentions. It’s true that Trump is erratic. But he hasn’t diminished American power, and he certainly hasn’t
changed the reality of international dependency on American power. America is the indispensable power, and not even Donald Trump can change that fundamental strategic fact.
 Alliances/Authoritarian Revisionism
OSB  Nuclear Gambling
Every alternative to heg fails
Brands and Edelman 17’ - Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence at the Philip Merrill Center
for Strategic Studies (Hal and Eric, “The Crisis of American Military Primacy and the Search for Strategic Solvency”, 1/03/17,
ProQuest, https://search-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1879964221?pq-origsite=summon&accountid=14667//GHS-
AK)

If the United States is unwilling to spend significantly more on defense, but does not wish to
invite the geopolitical instability associated with retrenchme nt, a second option is to live with greater risk. Living with
greater risk could take two different, but not mutually exclusive, forms. First, the United
States could accept higher risk with respect to its global commitments by wagering that even
exposed commitments are unlikely to be tested because US adversaries are risk averse and
are unwilling to start a war, even a potentially successful one, that might cause American intervention. In other words, the United States might not be able to defend Taiwan
effectively, but the mere prospect of an invasion provoking a Sino-American war would stay
Beijing's hand. Second, the United States could bridge the capabilities commitments gap through
riskier strategies substituting escalation for additional resources. Most likely, this would entail relying more
heavily on nuclear warfighting and the threat of nuclear retaliation to defend vulnerable allies
in East Asia or Eastern Europe. Because US allies are already covered by the US extended nuclear deterrent, this approach would involve making more explicit nuclear threats and guarantees and integrating

, this approach could entail the use, or the threat of use, of

greater reliance on nuclear weapons into US plans. Similarly

powerful nonnuclear capabilities such as strategic cyberattacks against critical enemy infrastructure for the same purpose-bolstering deterrence on the cheap by raising
the costs an aggressor would expect to pay.35 Lest these approaches sound ridiculous, both have a distinguished pedigree. In the late 1940s, the United States could not credibly defend Western Europe from a
Soviet invasion. But the Truman administration still undertook the security guarantees associated with NATO on the calculated gamble that Moscow was unlikely to risk global war by attacking US allies, particularly
during the period of the US nuclear monopoly.36 And in the 1950s, to control costs and address the continuing deficiency of US and allied conventional forces, the Eisenhower administration relied heavily on
nuclear threats to deter aggression.37 Throughout much of the Cold War, in fact, the United States compensated for conventional inferiority-particularly in Central Europe-by integrating early recourse to nuclear

Yet substituting risk for cost entails

weapons into its war plans. Accepting greater risk would mean updating Cold War-era approaches for today's purposes.

serious liabilities. Simply hoping exposed commitments will not be challenged might work-for a
while. But this strategy carries enormous risk of those guarantees eventually being tested and
found wanting, with devastating effects on America's reputation and credibility. Meanwhile, a strategy of bluff could weaken deterrence and reassurance on the installment plan as allies and adversaries perceive a

shifting balance of power and understand US guarantees are increasingly chimerical. The second variant of this approach, embracing more escalatory approaches,
lacks credibility. Consider threatening to employ strategic cyberattacks against an aggressor in
a conflict over Taiwan or the Baltic states. Such threats are problematic, because as President
Obama acknowledged in 2016, "open societies" such as the United States are "more
vulnerable" to massive cyberattacks than authoritarian rivals such as Russia or China .38 America may
simply lack the escalation dominance needed to make a strategy of cyber-retaliation believable. So too in the nuclear realm. Threats to punish Communist

aggression with nuclear retaliation might have been credible in the 1950s, when China lacked nuclear weapons:
Washington had a massive nuclear advantage over Moscow, and neither adversary could reliably target the US homeland. But today, both rivals possess secure

second-strike capabilities and could inflict horrific damage on America should nuclear
escalation occur . This approach thus risks leading the United States into a trap where, if its
interests are challenged, it faces a choice between pursuing escalatory options carrying
potentially unacceptable costs and acquiescing to aggression. Awareness of this dynamic may,
in turn, make adversaries more likely to probe and push. Trading cost for risk may seem attractive in theory, but in practice the risks may
prove far more dangerous than they initially seem.

Brands and Edelman 17’ - Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence at the Philip Merrill Center
for Strategic Studies (Hal and Eric, “The Crisis of American Military Primacy and the Search for Strategic Solvency”, 1/03/17,
ProQuest, https://search-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1879964221?pq-origsite=summon&accountid=14667//GHS-
AK)
The United States might, for instance, embrace a twenty-first century Nixon Doctrine, by stating that it will protect Middle Eastern partners from conventional, state-based aggression, but that they must defend
themselves against nontraditional threats such as the Islamic State.29 Or, America could simply delegate Persian Gulf security to its Arab allies in the region. Most dramatically, if the United States were really

short, America would reduce

serious about slashing commitments, it could dispense with the obligations most difficult to uphold-to Taiwan and the Baltic states, for instance. In

commitments proactively, rather than having their hollowness exposed by war. There are
historical precedents for this approach. The Nixon Doctrine and US withdrawal from Vietnam
helped Washington retreat to a more defensible strategic perimeter in the 1970s following strategic overstretch in the decade prior. More significantly, beginning in the late-nineteenth century, the United
Kingdom gradually conducted an elegant global retreat by first relying upon rising regional powers such as the United States and Japan to maintain acceptable regional orders, and later encouraging Washington to

shoulder many of London's global burdens after World War II. Graceful retrenchment, then, is not an impossibility.30 It is, however, extremely problematic
today . This approach- particularly the more aggressive variants-would be enormously difficult to
implement . The US commitment to the Baltic states is part of a larger commitment to NATO;
shredding the former guarantee risks undermining the broader alliance. Even in Asia, where the United States has bilateral
alliances, withdrawing the US commitment to Taipei could cause leaders in Manila, Seoul, or Tokyo

to wonder if they might be abandoned next-and to hedge their strategic bets accordingly.
Alliances hinge on the credibility of the patron's promises ; revoking some guarantees without
discrediting others is difficult. 31 This dynamic underscores another liability-the likelihood of profound geopolitical instability. Retrenchment works
best when the overstretched hegemon can hand off excessive responsibilities to some friendly
power. But today, there is no liberal superpower waiting in the wings. Rather, the countries most
sympathetic to America's view of the international order-Japan, the United Kingdom, and key
European allies-confront graver long-term economic and demographic challenges than the
United States. The countries most likely to gain influence following US retrenchment-Russia and
China-have very different global visions. In these circumstances, US retrenchment seems unlikely to
succeed . Rather than simply forcing friendly local actors to do more to defend themselves and check revisionist powers, the outcome might easily be
underbalancing-in which collective action problems, internal political divisions, or resource
limitations prevent timely action against a potential aggressor-or bandwagoning, in which exposed countries
buy a measure of safety by aligning with, rather than against, an aggressive power.32 Meanwhile, although writing off Taiwan or Estonia might produce a near-term improvement of relations with Beijing or
Moscow, the longer-term effect would be to remove a chief constraint on the aggressive behavior these powers have been increasingly manifesting. If Moscow and Beijing seem eager to bring their "near abroads"

to heel now, just wait until the United States retracts its security perimeter.33 If more aggressive variants of retrenchment are thus deeply
flawed, even more limited versions, such as a Middle Eastern Nixon Doctrine, have weaknesses. As Iran's military power
continues to grow, and the recent removal of nuclear-related sanctions makes this seem likely ,
even the wealthy Persian Gulf kingdoms will have great difficulty dealing with Tehran's advanced and

asymmetric capabilities without US assistance. In fact, without US leadership, the long-standing

collection action problems between the Gulf countries are likely to worsen . Moreover, the United
States essentially tried a version of this approach by withdrawing from Iraq i n late 2011. But as soon became clear,
Iraq, a vital state in a key region, could not withstand challenges from nontraditional foes such as the Islamic State on its own. In fact, US retrenchment actually

encouraged developments that left Iraq more vulnerable to collapse, such as the increasingly
sectarian nature of Nürï al-Mâlikï's governance and the hollowing out of the Iraqi Security
Forces. 34 Retrenchment, then, may narrow the gap between capabilities and commitments in
the short run, but only by inviting greater global dangers and instability.
 Is it sustainable?
America has strong bones
Ikenberry 18 [(John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs at Princeton University) reviewing book by Beckley (Michael, Fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy
School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) “Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower,”
Foreign Affairs, November/December 2018]
It has become conventional wisdom that the United States is in decline, the uni-polar
era is ending, and China is on the rise. In this smart and sophisticated book, Beckley
tackles this thesis head-on. He does not dispute that the United States has its problems
or that misguided leaders often squander its advantages. But he points out that the
United States’ deep geographic , demographic , and institutional reserves give the
country unique resilience. The United States is the only great power without regional
rivals. Its companies and universities dominate the world. And most important,
Beckley argues that it has by far the best fundamentals for future economic growth,
thanks to its abundant natural resources , favorable demographics , secure property
rights , and lasting political institutions. China’s growth prospects, in contrast, are
“dismal.” Beckley also thinks the declinists use the wrong measures of power. GDP, for
example, exaggerates the influence of populous but poor countries, such as China,
while overlooking problems that drain those countries’ economic and military
resources. He does not argue that the United States can—or should—try to preserve
the unipolar era, but he does think that it will long remain the world’s leading power. 
 Extra
Brand 18 [(Hal, Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Hopkin’s University’s School of Advanced International Studies and senior
fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) “China’s Master Plan: A Global Military Threat,” Bloomberg Opinion,
06/10/18]
a longstanding assumption of America’s China policy -- that economic
I wrote a column recently about how

integration between the two countries is an unalloyed good -- has now been overtaken by events. But this isn’t the
only area in which China’s rise is forcing a re-evaluation of old beliefs.

Now, as the first in a series of columns on this phenomenon that Bloomberg Opinion will publish in the coming days, I'll delve into another issue with enormous implications for
U.S.-China relations and American interests: the rise of China as a more globally oriented military power.

For years, most experts believed that China’s military challenge to the U.S. was regional in nature -- that it was confined to the Western Pacific. After decades of tacitly free-

Beijing now is seeking the capabilities that will allow it to

riding on America’s global power-projection capabilities, however,

project its own military power well outside its regional neighborhood.
The fact that China is building up its military strength is hardly news, of course. The 1995-96 Taiwan crisis, during which the U.S. responded to Chinese intimidation of Taiwan by
sending two carrier strike groups to the area, underscored to the Chinese leadership that America's military dominance gave it the capability to intervene at will even in China’s
own backyard.

Beijing has been developing the capabilities -- advanced fighter jets, anti-ship ballistic missiles,
Since then,

and stealthy diesel-electric attack submarines among them -- meant not just to give it leverage over
its East and Southeast Asian neighbors, but also to prevent the U.S. from intervening
effectively in their defense.

the U.S. will now face high and continually

This effort to build what are known as “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities has borne fruit, and

growing obstacles to defending Taiwan or other partners and allies in the event of conflict
with China.
Where Great Powers Meet

China’s military modernization effort has provided the first challenge to U.S. might in the
Asia-Pacific region in decades
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies; U.S. Department of Defense

Even as Beijing challenged U.S. dominance in the Western Pacific, however, it was simultaneously one of the greatest beneficiaries of America’s global military superiority.

U.S. power-projection capabilities have underpinned the stability and freedom of the global
commons and ensured the free flow of energy supplies and other key commodities. U.S. military power
has thus fostered the relatively benign global climate in which China has grown rich and powerful.

This is just one of the many paradoxes of the U.S.-China relationship. Washington has underwritten the economic rise of its greatest long-term strategic rival by protecting the
global commercial flows that have made that rival so wealthy. China, for its part, has been a free-rider on America’s provision of global stability even while challenging the U.S.
ever more sharply in the Asia-Pacific.

This situation could not last forever, though, because it represented a vulnerability that a rising China would not tolerate indefinitely. After all, if the U.S. can secure the global
commons, then it can also dominate and even restrict access to them if it so chooses.

as the U.S.-China relationship has become more contentious, China has become less willing
So,

to accept that its economic prosperity requires the forbearance of the U.S. Navy. Chinese strategists have
become acutely aware of the “Malacca Dilemma”-- the prospect that the U.S. could severely constrain China’s imports of oil and other critical commodities by interdicting
shipping at a few crucial maritime chokepoints.

U.S. strategists are also fully aware of this possibility, as proposals for a far-seas blockade meant to starve Beijing of vital resources have figured prominently in the debate on
how to defeat China in a possible war. Any great power would chafe at a situation in which its foremost rival has such enormous power over its own economic well-being, and
China is no exception.
 the growth of Chinese military strength is giving Beijing greater ability to start
At the same time,

redressing this vulnerability. In the mid-1990s, the People’s Liberation Army was still an antiquated force that would have faced enormous difficulty
projecting power anywhere beyond China’s borders. Chinese defense spending amounted to only around 2 percent of the global total.

Now, after decades of rapid economic growth and steadily rising defense spending, China has
the second-largest defense budget in the world, and the PLA is a more sophisticated, modern
force capable of taking on ever-more ambitious missions.

Chinese military officials are looking beyond the Western Pacific and considering how to
As a result,

project power ever farther abroad.

Naval strategists are thinking about how to exert Chinese military influence in the Indian
Ocean, the Horn of Africa and other critical waterways that represent China’s maritime
lifelines to key regions such as Persian Gulf. The Belt and Road Initiative, a vast trade and
infrastructure project meant to link China with countries throughout Asia and Europe, serves a
similar purpose.

And even though China’s force posture is still focused on the country’s maritime and territorial peripheries (as well as on internal security), Beijing is gradually
building a more global military footprint. Chinese forces have carried out counter-piracy missions, crisis evacuations and naval exercises
thousands of miles from China’s coast. They have ventured into the Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea and other faraway waterways. The PLA Navy is developing

capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, that may eventually provide some type of global power-
projection capability.

China is also working to secure the logistical facilities necessary to sustain such operations.
Beijing has opened its first overseas military base in strategically located Djibouti, among
other developments elsewhere along the Indian Ocean littoral, and it is reportedly
using economic leverage and coercive diplomacy to seek access to ports and other facilities in
countries from Vanuatu to Sri Lanka and beyond.
Additionally, Chinese forces have engaged in exercises in Africa, as part of an effort to protect China’s growing overseas presence in that continent. This more global outlook is
even evident in pop culture. A blockbuster movie recently depicted a Chinese battleship rescuing overseas Chinese from the chaos of a civil war in a fictional African country.

It will be decades, at earliest, before China can even come close to equaling the global military reach
of the U.S. But Beijing is moving, clearly and deliberately, in that direction.

this trend is troubling for what it says about China’s long-range ambitions. It
From an American perspective,

shows that, at a time when U.S.-China relations are becoming increasingly antagonistic,
Beijing is already looking ahead to a period when it will compete with America not just
regionally but globally as well.

if China is aspiring to a more global presence now, at a time when the areas just off its coast
And

are still heavily contested, how ambitious might it become if and when it succeeds in
establishing itself as the dominant power in the Western Pacific?

This is just one of several ways in which Beijing is steadily taking on more of the trappings of
an aspiring global power, one whose objectives and interests expand with its capabilities.
Brand 18 [(Hal, Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Hopkin’s University’s School of Advanced International Studies and senior
fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) “China’s Master Plan: Exporting an Ideology,” Bloomberg Opinion,
06/11/18]
The 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2017 is sure to loom large in future accounts of China's relations with
the world. It was then that the party cleared the way for Xi Jinping to rule indefinitely, and when Xi
himself advertised
China’s global ambitions by declaring that Beijing would now  “take center stage” in world
affairs. It was also when Xi threw down the gauntlet in an equally consequential way. 

In his three-hour speech to the assembled delegates, Xi

extolled the virtues of Chinese authoritarian
capitalism, and offered Beijing as a model "for other countries and nations who want to speed
up their development while preserving their independence."

Xi’s speech, then, was not simply an announcement of China’s arrival on the global stage. It was a declaration of
ideological competition -- the starkest we have yet seen from Beijing -- against the U.S. and
the democratic community it leads.

In my last piece, I discussed how China’s expanding global military presence is posing new threats to
U.S. interests. Yet as I argue in this ongoing series, there are multiple ways in which the challenge from a rising China has
evolved in recent years.

Americans are used to thinking about China primarily as a challenge to U.S. global economic superiority and geopolitical primacy in
the Asia-Pacific. What’s become clear, though, is that the ideological challenge an authoritarian China poses
to democratic governance around the world is also quite serious.

Many observers have been slow to recognize that challenge, because any discussion of
ideology is often dismissed as “Cold War thinking,” and because for so many years the free-
market democratic model appeared incontestably dominant. Yet China is contesting that
dominance, through a two-pronged offensive that involves promoting authoritarian
governance while also undermining democratic practices in countries near and far.

China’s ideological assertiveness has been building for years. In the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis, pundits began arguing that the “Beijing Consensus” -- the mix of state-directed capitalism and
authoritarian political control -- was displacing a Washington Consensus that had been badly tarnished
by the near-meltdown of the global economy. A decade later, some projections have China on a path to
dominating global GDP within half a century.

Thus it's little surprise that  China’s political-economic model has long seemed attractive to developing countries where economic
growth is paramount and democratic institutions are often weak.

What has become impossible to ignore more recently is that China is actively working to
fortify authoritarian governments around the world.

This should not be surprising. If

the U.S. has long sought to make the world safe for democracy, China’s
leaders crave a world that is safe for authoritarianism. The best way of achieving that goal is
to ensure that China is not a lone, isolated autocracy in a democratic world. Autocracy-
promotion thus becomes an ever-larger part of Chinese foreign policy.
In recent years, Beijing has lent its expertise on blending economic openness with tight
political control to countries in regions from Southeast Asia to sub-Saharan Africa. It
has exported the techniques and tools of repression -- from riot control gear to tips on how to
use the Internet to monitor and control dissent -- to fellow authoritarian regimes. It has provided
isolated dictatorships and backsliding democracies with crucial economic support and diplomatic cover, a recent example being
Beijing’s backing for Cambodia’s Hun Sen as he has steadily pushed his country deeper into
authoritarianism.

More broadly, China

provides loans, capital and trade to autocracies and semi-autocracies as far
afield as Angola and Venezuela, making them less dependent on Western sources of credit
and commerce -- and thus less susceptible to Western political pressure.
Chinese officials have also helped the autocracies of Central Asia guard againstfeared “color revolutions” that might spark ideological
contagion within China’s own borders. Not least, Beijing has increasingly held up its own experience with authoritarian capitalism as
an example for others.

To be clear, Xi’s China is not a crusading, messianic power in the style of Mao’s revolutionary regime, and China’s leaders would
argue that they are simply conducting no-strings diplomacy in a way meant to be respectful of national sovereignty. But Xi
and
his advisers certainly understand that they will be safer in a world in which authoritarianism
is more widespread , and their policies are working toward just that end.

This would be troubling enough for the U.S., were it not combined with the second prong of
Beijing’s offensive -- efforts to undermine the democratic systems of its geopolitical
competitors.

As a spate of recent reports makes clear, China is waging a concerted campaign to mute international

criticism of its politics and policies, and to render countries from the Asia-Pacific to Europe
more receptive to Chinese influence. Because democratic societies are naturally resistant to
such efforts when undertaken by a brutal, authoritarian regime, Beijing is using an array of
tactics to manipulate open debate in these countries.

These tactics have included efforts to buy influence through political contributions and other
payoffs in Australia and New Zealand , and the use of front organizations, propaganda organs
and other mechanisms to shape public debate in ways that suit Beijing’s interests.

Beijing has also bullied foreign news organizations that report unfavorably on China, and
sought to compromise academic discourse by giving preferential treatment to friendly scholars
and using donations and other forms of economic largesse to shape the agendas of foreign universities and think tanks.

In Europe, the Chinese government has used economic leverage to punish countries that
speak out against Chinese human rights violations and to reward those nations that stay
silent. Even in the U.S., the Chinese government has underwrittennominally independent mouthpieces such as the Confucius
Institutes that are present on many college campuses. There are also reports of Communist Party cells coordinating with Chinese
students to push for curriculum changes that will portray China in a more flattering light.

In some ways, of course, these tactics are all part of the game of great-power politics. Yet
more insidious in this case is
that China is manipulating the open nature of democratic systems to distort public discourse,
whether on human rights or Beijing’s behavior in the South China Sea. And when Beijing
actively seeks to corrupt political actors or undermine the integrity of key social institutions ,
it crosses the line into political warfare against democratic systems.
The good news, from the perspective of the U.S. and other advocates of democracy, is that here as in so many cases Beijing’s
growing assertiveness has engendered a degree of blowback. Support for corrupt dictators may endear Beijing to those rulers, but it
hardly improves China’s image among the people they repress. Revelations of China’s influence operations in democratic societies
have sparked concern and even outrage from Canberra to Washington.

But Beijing’s
activities are nonetheless strengthening authoritarianism at a time when
democracy is sagging around the world, and they are subjecting even established democratic
systems to greater stress by clouding open political debate. China is waging the battle for the
21st century ideologically as well as economically and geopolitically , and the supporters of
open societies around the world had best take note.