08_Case Digests
2_Public International Law
United States vs Bowman, 1922
Re: Making it illegal to knowingly present a false claim against the US to any officer of the civil, military or naval
service or to any department thereof
Facts: During the period covered by the indictment -- i.e., between October, 1919, and January, 1920 -- the
steamship Dio belonged to the United States. The United States owned all the stock in the United States Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation. The National Shipping Corporation agreed to operate and manage the Dio
for the Fleet Corporation, which, under the contract, was to pay for fuel, oil, labor, and material used in the
operation. The Dio was on a voyage to Rio de Janeiro under this management. Wry was her master, Bowman
was her engineer, Hawkinson was the agent of the Standard Oil Company at Rio de Janeiro, and Millar was a
merchant and ship repairer and engineer in Rio. Of these four, who were the defendants in the indictment, the
first three were American citizens, and Millar was a British subject. Johnston & Co. were the agents of the
National Shipping Corporation at Rio. The indictment charged that the plot was hatched by Wry and Bowman on
board the Dio before she reached Rio. Their plan was to order, through Johnston & Co., and receipt for, 1,000
tons of fuel oil from the Standard Oil Company, but to take only 600 tons aboard, and to collect cash for a
delivery of 1,000 tons through Johnston & Co. from the Fleet Corporation, and then divide the money paid for
the undelivered 400 tons among the four defendants.
The first count charged a conspiracy by the defendants to defraud the Fleet Corporation, in which the United
States was a stockholder, by obtaining and aiding to obtain the payment and allowance of a false and fraudulent
claim against the Fleet Corporation. It laid the offense on the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular
state and out of the jurisdiction of any district of the United States, but within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States.
Issue: WON the crime was committed without the jurisdiction of the United States or of any state thereof, and
on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of Brazil.
Held: US with jurisdiction. Section 41 of the Judicial Code provides that:
The trial of all offenses committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state or district, shall be in the district where the offender is found, or into which he is first
brought.
The three defendants who were found in New York were citizens of the United States, and were certainly subject
to such laws as it might pass to protect itself and its property. Clearly it is no offense to the dignity or right of
sovereignty of Brazil to hold them for this crime against the government to which they owe allegiance. The other
defendant is a subject of Great Britain. He has never been apprehended, and it will be time enough to consider
what, if any, jurisdiction the district court below has to punish him when he is brought to trial.
GR: Statues apply only to acts performed within US territory, unless Congress manifests an intent to reach acts
performed outside US.
X: Criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Govt’s jurisdiction,
but are enacted because of the right of the Govt to defend itself against the obstruction or fraud wherever
perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or agents.
A criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly injurious to the government and are capable of perpetration
without regard to particular locality, and subjecting all who commit them to punishment, is to be construed as
1 MHH_2.
applicable to citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though there be no express
declaration to that effect.
Section 35 of the Criminal Code, as amended October 23, 1918, c.194, 40 Stat. 1015, is applicable to citizens of
the United States who, on the high seas or in a foreign country, conspired to defraud the United States Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, of which the United States was the stockholder, by obtaining and aiding to
obtain the allowance and payment or a false and fraudulent claim against the Corporation, and who, in a foreign
country, made and caused such claim to be made.
Penal statutes should be fairly construed according to the legislative intent.
Protective principle: Citizens of the United States, while in a foreign country, are subject to penal laws passed by
the United States to protect itself and its property, and for infractions abroad are triable, under Jud.Code § 41, in
the district where they are first brought.
United States vs Romero-Galue – see separate sheet
Issue: Whether Congress, in enacting Section 955(a)(c) (which makes it a crime for all vessels within US waters to
knowingly or intentionally possess marijuana with the intent to distribute it), intended to reach possession of
marijuana by foreigners aboard a foreign vessel on the high seas
Held: The court finds that although the ship is outside US waters per Section 955 (a)(c), if there is a treaty
between the US and the country concerned which allows the US to enforce jurisdiction on a foreign ship, that
treaty will define customs waters rather than Section 955(a)(c).
Thus, whether such a treaty exists between the US and Panama (here, the ship was Panamanian) is a matter for
the lower court
In dicta, the court addresses the protective principle: The US could still exercise jurisdiction over the Panamanian
ship even if there is no treaty because the protective principle would allow the US to prosecute foreign nationals
on foreign vessels on the high seas for possession of narcotics (and in some way inherently harmed the US).
Nothing in international law prohibits two nations from entering into a treaty, which may be amended by other
arrangement, to extend the customs waters and the reach of the domestic law of one of the nations into the
high seas. The defendants cite no authority to the contrary. Even absent a treaty or arrangement, the United
States could, under the "protective principle" of international law, prosecute foreign nationals on foreign vessels
on the high seas for possession of narcotics. The protective principle permits a nation to assert jurisdiction over a
person whose conduct outside the nation's territory threatens the nation's security or could potentially interfere
with the operation of its governmental functions.
The law of nations permits the exercise of [extraterritorial] criminal jurisdiction by a nation under five general
principles. They are the territorial, national, protective, universality and passive personality principles.
Congress grounded section 955a(c) in the protective principle of international law. In passing the provision,
Congress observed that the United States may, consistent with the protective principle, assert jurisdiction over
activity within the customs waters to protect its customs and public health interests.
 08_Case Digests
Eichmann Case (Atty General of Govt of Israel vs Eichmann), 1961
Summary: The crimes perpetrated by the Nazis during Hitler’s reign against Jewish citizens were some of the
worst recorded in history. Although accurate figures may never be known, it is estimated that some 6 million
Jewish individuals died – men, women, and children from all over Europe. They were deported from their homes
in large freight trains in appalling conditions, others starved or froze to death, others still were taken away to
concentration camps where the fit were forced to perform manual labour whilst the weak were shot to death or
later, gassed to death in their thousands.
The Accused, Adolf Eichmann, was an Austrian by birth who volunteered to work for the Security Service (SD) in
Berlin. He rose through the ranks and eventually occupied the position of Head of Section (Referant) for Jewish
Affairs charged with all matters related to the implementation of the Final Solution to the Jewish Question. In
this capacity, he oversaw the transport and deportation of Jewish persons, set up and personally ran an
operations centre in Hungary in order to implement the Final Solution there, organised the transfer of money
from evacuated Jews to the State and was responsible for the administration of the camps at Terezin and
Bergen-Belsen.
He was captured by Israeli Security Forces in Argentina and handed over to the District Court of Jerusalem to
stand trial for war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against the Jewish people. He was convicted of all
15 counts and sentenced to death. He was unsuccessful in contesting the jurisdiction of the Court or defending
his actions by relying on superior orders.
Facts: In May 1960, the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, abducted Eichmann from his hiding place in
Argentina and transferred him to Jerusalem to face an Israeli court.
The trial commenced on 11 April 1961 with the indictment charging Eichmann with 15 counts of crimes against
the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, war crimes and membership in an organisation declared criminal by
the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 15 years earlier.
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Accused was a member of the Austrian SS and later volunteered for a
position with the Head Office of the Security Service (SD) in Berlin. When the SD merged with the State Secret
Police (Gestapo) to form the Head Office for Reich Security (RSHA), the Accused occupied the role of Special
Officer of Zionist Affairs. He was transferred to Vienna in 1938 to administer the Central Office for the Emigration
of Austrian Jews. His success was such that approximately 150,000 Austrian Jews were forced to emigrate and he
was appointed head of the new Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration in October 1939.
From the outbreak of the War to mid-1941, the Accused devised and carried out the mass deportation of Jewish
persons from his role as the Special Referent for Emigration and Evacuation within the RSHA and explored the
possibility of setting up a slave Jewish state in Madagascar.
In early 1942, the Accused was appointed the Referant of the RSHA in matters connected to the Final Solution. In
implementing the Final Solution, the Accused received information as to the number of persons to be expelled,
organised the transfer of money from evacuated Jews for the disposal of the SS, and oversaw the handling of the
transport of Jews, not only in the Reich but also in other countries. In particular, he headed the Eichmann Special
Operations Unit in Hungary and did his utmost to carry out the Final Solution. These Transport Jews» were taken
to concentration camps and those who were unfit for hard labour were exterminated immediately.
2 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
In autumn 1942, a cover up effort was begun as bodies in mass graves were burned in an effort to hide the
slaughter. The concentration camps were evacuated – the Accused in particular was responsible for all
administrative matters connected with the Terezin Ghetto and the camp at Bergen-Belsen.
Issue: Does the District Court of Jerusalem have jurisdiction to try the case in light of the fact that Eichmann is a
foreign national and crimes were committed on foreign territory?
Held: The Court’s jurisdiction is founded upon it by the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-
1950. This law does not violate the principles of international law. Israel’s “right to punish” is founded on two
elements. First, the universal character of the crimes in question, which are grave offences against the law of
nations itself and, in the absence of an international court, grant jurisdiction to any domestic court. Second, the
specific character of the crimes, which was the extermination of the Jewish people, provides the necessary
linking point between the Accused and the newly-founded State of Israel, a State established and recognised as
the State of the Jews. The crimes committed by the Accused concern the vital interests of the State, thus it has a
right to punish the Accused pursuant to the protective principle.
This jurisdiction is not negated by the manner in which the Accused was brought before the Court. It is an
established rule of law that a person standing trial for an offence against the laws of a State may not oppose his
being tried by reason of the illegality of his arrest or the means by which he was brought to the jurisdiction of the
court. This rule applies equally in cases where the accused is relying on violations of international, rather than
domestic, law. Such a violation of international law constitutes an international tort, which may be “cured” by
waiver. In the present instance, the joint decision of the Governments of Argentina and Israel of 3 August 1960
“cured” the international tort committed by Israel when it entered Argentinian territory to abduct the Accused.
Having examined the command structure in place at the SS and the scope of the Accused’s authority, the Court
concluded that the latter acted in accordance with general directives from his superiors but he retained wide
powers of discretion. Under Section 8 of the Punishment Law, the defence of superior orders (contained in
Section 19(b) of the Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936) is not available in case of offences enumerated by the
afore-mentioned Law but may be taken into account as a factor at sentencing.
The Accused was convicted on all fifteen counts and sentenced to death
Crimes against humanity are to be considered as crimes against international law and against the international
community as a whole, and therefore are not restricted to the principle of territorial jurisdiction. Crimes against
humanity, like war crimes, are in principle delicta juris gentium that all States are interested in punishing. UNGA
Resolution 96(I), which states that: " the punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of universal concern",
the limitation of jurisdiction to the State in which territory the crime of genocide was committed is not a true
reflection of customary law.
Ivan the Terrible – The trial of John Demjanjuk
Facts: The first step on Demjanjuk’s legal odyssey was his denaturalization in 1981. After Federal Judge Frank
Battisti stripped him of his citizenship, Judge Robert Angelelli ordered him deported to Ukraine. But before
Demjanjuk was deported, Israel requested his extradition to stand trial for crimes against humanity, the only
crime for which Israel imposes the death penalty. The only time Israel ever imposed the sentence was in 1962,
when Karl Adolf Eichmann, the so-called “architect of the Holocaust” was executed. The United States granted
Israel’s request for extradition. Prosecutors produced abundant evidence that Demjanjuk had “…perpetrated
 08_Case Digests
unspeakable acts of cruelty in conducting victims in the Treblinka concentration camp on the way to their death,
by defendant operating, with his own hands, the engines which pumped the poisonous exhaust fumes into the
gas chambers, thus causing the death of hundreds of thousands of people killed in this manner.” However,
Demjanjuk claimed he was a prisoner of war in Poland for the duration of the war and he is just a victim of
mistaken identity of one Ivan Marchenko (aka Ivan Grozny or Ivan the Terrible).
After new evidence presented and because it indicated that a different ‘Ivan the Terrible’ committed the single
act in the original indictment, and in spite of testimony and other evidence that Demjanjuk tortured and
murdered prisoners at several camps, including Treblinka, the judges reluctantly acquitted Demjanjuk.
Nevertheless, under a provision in Israeli law, Demjanjuk could have been found guilty of multiple murders the
trial showed him to have committed. However, this created its own legal problem because of the doctrine of
specialty (a principle of law prevented Israel from trying Demjanjuk for any crime other than the one for which
he was specifically and exclusively extradited. This principle is spelled out in the extradition treaty between Israel
and the United States, which states that “a person extradited under the present convention shall not be
detained, tried or punished in the territory of the requesting party for any offence other than that for which the
extradition has been granted). As such, the five judge panel concluded that bringing new charges against
Demjanjuk would not be legal without first petitioning the United States for another writ of extradition.
In-depth notes:
Article VI of the Genocide Convention recognizes the jurisdiction of an international penal tribunal, assuming one
has been created and accepted by the relevant states. Most notable is the absence of provisions for universal
jurisdiction whereby any state having the defendant/s in custody could conduct a genocide trial. Universal
jurisdiction made exist in practice as demonstrated by national court cases to punish acts of genocide. Example is
the case of Atty General of Israel vs Eichmann where Eichmann was kidnapped by Israeli operatives from
Argentina and brought to Israel for trial and subsequent execution. In the US, as an alternative to universal
jurisdiction, the response was to deny entry into the country or to remove. As in the case of Demjanjuk, who
became naturalized US citizen after WW II, his citizenship was revoked.
United States vs Osama Bin Laden – see separate sheets
Although Congress has the power to regulate conduct performed outside the US, courts are to presume that
statutes written by Congress apply only to acts performed within US territory unless Congress manifests an
intent to reach act performed outside US territory.
In determining whether a statute is meant to be applied extraterritorially, courts should look to the text,
structure, and legislative history of the statute.
There is a limited exception to this standard approach for “criminal statutes, which are, as a class, not logically
dependent on their locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the
Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially is committed by its
own citizens, officers, or agents.” United States v. Bowman, 260 US 94, 98 (1922). (This principle, called the
Bowman rule, is most directly related to the protective principle of jurisdiction.)
Nexus argument: the Davis court announced that “in order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to
a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the
United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”
3 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
 This court concludes that “where an attempted transaction is aimed at causing criminal acts within the
United States, there is a sufficient basis for the United States to exercise jurisdiction….”
 The court also concludes that if the extraterritorial application of a statute is justified by the protective
principle, such application accords with due process.
The court notes that
 The passive personality principle is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorists and other organized
attacks on a state’s nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a state’s diplomatic
representatives or other officials….”
 “Universal jurisdiction is increasingly accepted for certain acts of terrorism….”
Both universal jurisdiction and the protective principle are bases for jurisdiction by the United States over the
death of foreign citizens.
The case goes through a reasonableness analysis to determine whether it would be unreasonable for the US to
apply a specific law to the deaths of ordinary foreign nationals on foreign soil, and finds that such application is
reasonable.
Wilson vs Girard
Facts: While on duty guarding a machine gun on a firing range, Girard, a Specialist Third Class in the United
States Army, fired from a grenade launcher an empty cartridge case which struck the Japanese woman, causing
her death. American authorities took the position that he was acting at the time "in performance of official
duty," within the meaning of Paragraph 3 of Article XVII of an Administrative Agreement between the United
States and Japan, as amended by a Protocol, and, therefore, the United States had the "primary right" to try him
in a situation of concurrent jurisdiction. Japanese authorities contended that he was acting beyond the scope of
official duty, and that therefore Japan had the "primary right" to exercise jurisdiction. After lengthy negotiations,
and with the approval of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, the United States
yielded to the Japanese position, and agreed, under a provision of the amended Administrative Agreement, to
waive whatever jurisdiction it might have and deliver him to Japanese authorities for trial. Japan then indicted
him for causing death by wounding. He sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, which denied the writ but granted declaratory relief and enjoined his delivery to Japanese
authorities.
Issue: Whether an American soldier should be tried by a Japanese court for causing the death of a Japanese
woman in Japan.
Held: In the light of the Senate's ratification of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan after
consideration of the accompanying Administrative Agreement, and the Senate's subsequent ratification of the
NATO Agreement, with knowledge of the commitment to Japan under the Administrative Agreement to enter
into a similar arrangement, the approval of Article III of the Security Treaty authorized the making of the
Administrative Agreement, and the subsequent Protocol embodying the provisions governing jurisdiction to try
criminal offenses.
 08_Case Digests
As applied here, there is no constitutional or statutory barrier to the provision of the Protocol under which the
United States waived jurisdiction to try the soldier and agreed to deliver him to Japanese authorities for trial.
In the absence of encroachments upon constitutional or statutory limitations, the wisdom of the arrangement
here involved is exclusively for the determination of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government.
United States vs Alvarez-Machain – from the net
Facts: Agents of the DEA abducted Alvarez-Machain (D) from his office in Mexico because he was wanted in the
U.S. (P) for alleged complicity in the torture-murder of a DEA agent. But by contending that his abduction
violated a U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, Alvarez (D) sought to dismiss the indictment. His prayer was granted by
the district court and the indictment was dismissed. The court of appeals affirmed while the U.S. Supreme Court
granted review.
Held: The presence of an extradition treaty between the United States and another country does not necessarily
preclude obtaining a citizen of that nation through abduction. It has been established that abduction, in and of
itself, does not invalidate prosecution against a foreign national. The only question to be answered is whether
the abduction violates any extradition treaty that may be in effect between the U.S. (P) and the nation in which
the abductee was to be found. The international law applies only to situations where no extradition treaty exists,
so it is irrelevant here. Since the extradition treaty does not prohibit an abduction as it occurred in this case, then
it is not illegal. Reversed.
(a) A defendant may not be prosecuted in violation of the terms of an extradition treaty. United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407. However, when a treaty has not been invoked, a court may properly exercise jurisdiction
even though the defendant's presence is procured by means of a forcible abduction. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436.
Thus, if the Extradition Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule of Ker applies and jurisdiction
was proper.
(b) Neither the Treaty's language nor the history of negotiations and practice under it supports the proposition
that it prohibits abductions outside of its terms. The Treaty says nothing about either country refraining from
forcibly abducting people from the other's territory or the consequences if an abduction occurs. In addition,
although the Mexican government was made aware of the Ker doctrine as early as 1906, and language to curtail
Ker was drafted as early as 1935, the Treaty's current version contains no such clause.
(c) General principles of international law provide no basis for interpreting the Treaty to include an implied term
prohibiting international abductions. It would go beyond established precedent and practice to draw such an
inference from the Treaty based on respondent's argument that abductions are so clearly prohibited in
international law that there was no reason to include the prohibition in the Treaty itself. It was the practice of
nations with regard to extradition treaties that formed the basis for this Court's decision in Rauscher, supra, to
imply a term in the extradition treaty between the United States and England. Respondent's argument, however,
would require a much larger inferential leap with only the most general of international law principles to support
it. While respondent may be correct that his abduction was "shocking" and in violation of general international
law principles, the decision whether he should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside the Treaty, is a matter
for the Executive Branch.
PD 1609 (Philippine Extradition Law)
4 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
AUTHORIZING AS AN EMERGENCY MEASURE THE IMPORTATION, FREE OF DUTIES, OF LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM
GAS
WHEREAS, there is a present shortage in the supply of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in the country and this
problem is expected to become even more pressing and burdensome for our people, particularly the consumers,
in the coming months, due to a combination of several factors;
WHEREAS, among the factors cited for the bleak forecast on the situation involving the aforesaid petroleum
product in the domestic market are the fact that the normal production of the refineries has been inadequate to
meet the local requirements for liquefied petroleum gas since 1974 and this deficiency has been exacerbated by
the increased demand for the said product particularly in December last year; the fact that some of the refineries
are scheduled for a temporary shut down in the next few months and such an event would adversely affect the
available supply of LPG in the country; the fact that any importation now of the said product can only be done at
the increased cost resulting from the price adjustments imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries effective January 1, 1979; and the fact that many of the intermediaries engaged in the marketing and
distribution of the said product are likewise encountering difficulties due to the shortage problem;
WHEREAS, to provide for a temporary relief from the pressures generated by the aforesaid problem and in order
to spare the consumers from unnecessary hardships and inconveniences, it is deemed necessary to exempt, for a
limited period, the importation of liquefied petroleum gas from the payment of customs duties;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree the following:
Section 1. Any provision of law, executive or administrative order, rule or regulation to the contrary
notwithstanding, the importation, free from customs duties, of liquefied petroleum gas, by persons or entities
duly authorized by the Board of Energy, shall be allowed for the duration of the critical period until local prices
shall have been adjusted.
Section 2. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Feb 13, 1979.
Govt of Hongkong vs Olalia – from the net
Facts: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,1997.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.
201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven
(7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila
issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr.
issue d an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further
 08_Case Digests 5 MHH_2.2_Public International Law

hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent The trespass of a kidnapper, unauthorized by either of the governments and not professing to act under
judge. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. authority of either, is not a case provided for in the treaty, and the remedy is by a proceeding against him by the
Hence, the instant petition. government whose law he violates or by the party injured.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extradite.
Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee
to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies
in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extradite. Nor is it a full-blown civil
action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused
or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extradite’s rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions,
to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. (Clear and convincing evidence that one is not
a flight risk and will abide by the orders and processes of the extradition court).
Ker vs Illinois
A plea to an indictment in a state court that the defendant has been brought from a foreign country to this
country by proceedings which are a violation of a treaty between that country and the United states, and which
are forbidden by that treaty, raises a question, if the right asserted by the plea is denied, on which this Court can
review, by writ of error, the judgment of the state court.
But where the prisoner has been kidnapped in the foreign country and brought by force against his will within
the jurisdiction of the state whose law he has violated, with no reference to an extradition treaty, though one
existed, and no proceeding or attempt to proceed under the treaty, this Court can give no relief, for these facts
do not establish any right under the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
How far such forcible transfer of the defendant so as to bring him within the jurisdiction of the state where the
offense was committed may be set up against the right to try him is the province of the state court to decide,
and presents no question in which this Court can review its decision.
The plaintiff in error, being convicted of embezzlement in a state court of Illinois, sued out this writ of error. The
federal question which makes the case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Frisbie vs Collins – from the net
Facts: The Respondent, Shirley Collins (the “Respondent”), filed a petition for Habeus Corpus in United States
District Court. The Respondent was in jail for murder. The Respondent alleged that while he was living in
Chicago, police officers from Michigan forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked and brought him to Michigan. The
Respondent argued that this conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Federal
Kidnapping Act. The District Court denied the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue: Whether the Federal Kidnapping Act had changed the rule declared in prior holdings of this Court, that a
state could constitutionally try and convict a defendant after acquiring jurisdiction by force?
Held: The majority observed, “[t]his Court has never departed from the rule announced in [Ker v. Illinois], that
the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the
court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’ ” “There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a
court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his
will.”
The majority observed the Federal Kidnapping Act “prescribes in some detail the severe sanctions Congress
wanted it to have. Persons who have violated it can be imprisoned for a term of years or for life; under some
circumstances violators can be given the death sentence. [The majority] think[s] the Act [however] cannot fairly
be construed so as to add to the list of sanctions barring a state from prosecuting persons wrongfully brought to
it by its officers. It may be that Congress could add such a sanction.”
US vs Alvarez- Machain
In condoning the U.S. action, the Court applied and upheld the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. This doctrine permits a U.S.
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual brought before it, regardless of the method utilized to
acquire jurisdiction. 5 In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court applied the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in its strictest
sense, upholding abduction as a legitimate way of bringing a defendant before a U.S. court.
Ker-Frisbie doctrine: Jurisdiction over a defendant in c criminal case is not affected by the manner in which he or
she has been brought before the court – including kidnapping by govt agents.

The treaties of extradition to which the United States are parties do not guarantee a fugitive from the justice of
one of the countries an asylum in the other. They do not give such person any greater or more sacred right of
asylum than he had before. They only make provision that for certain crimes, he shall be deprived of that asylum
and surrendered to justice, and they prescribe the mode in which this shall be done.