Development Southern Africa

ISSN: 0376-835X (Print) 1470-3637 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdsa20

The political economy of Zimbabwean Urban

informality since 2000 – A contemporary
governance dilemma

Abraham R. Matamanda, Innocent Chirisa, Munyaradzi A. Dzvimbo & Queen

L. Chinozvina

To cite this article: Abraham R. Matamanda, Innocent Chirisa, Munyaradzi A. Dzvimbo

& Queen L. Chinozvina (2019): The political economy of Zimbabwean Urban informality
since 2000 – A contemporary governance dilemma, Development Southern Africa, DOI:
10.1080/0376835X.2019.1698410

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2019.1698410

Published online: 02 Dec 2019.

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DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA
https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2019.1698410

The political economy of Zimbabwean Urban informality since

2000 – A contemporary governance dilemma
Abraham R. Matamandaa, Innocent Chirisaa,b, Munyaradzi A. Dzvimboc and
Queen L. Chinozvinab
a
Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa;
b
Department of Rural and Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe; cDepartment of
Development Studies, Lupane State University, Lupane, Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The article explores the urban informality dilemma in Harare Political economy; urban
through the lens of a political economy theory. It examines the informality; power-based
typologies of urban informality, the influence of political economy model; urbanisation; Harare
on urban informalities, and informs decision-making to address
the urban informality dilemma. A qualitative approach was used
where secondary data were collected through document analysis
and primary data from interviews with 20 purposively selected
key informants. Surveys and in-depth interviews were conducted
with 585 individuals engaged in informal activities. It emerged
that urban informality in Harare takes on different forms and aside
from the economic crisis, politics played a role in the emergence
and proliferation of urban informality. The article provides insight
into, and raises awareness with regard to key areas of concern on
how power influences decision-making relating to urban
informality. Therefore, the article provides a basis for policy
formulation and institutional reforms for effective measures to
curb urban informality.

1. Introduction
Informality is largely characterised as a survival strategy for poor people engaging in
autonomous, unregulated, often illegal, small-scale and low-tech activities (Hart 1973).
Urban informality is a survival strategy for the poor. Lack of understanding of this
sector often leads to it being criminalised and marginalised from the formal economy.
Yet, urban informality has evolved over the years and exists not only as a survival strategy
but also as a stable enterprise for dynamic and growing businesses. It contributes signifi-
cantly to national wealth through the provision of goods and services (Chen 2007). Some
African cities such as Dar es Salaam and Lusaka have up to 90% jobs in the informal sector
(ILO 2009). Furthermore, the informal economy accounts for up to 38% of the gross dom-
estic product in some sub-Saharan African countries (Kamete 2013), albeit its role in sup-
porting the formal economy, urban informality remains an unregulated sector, and
authorities do not realise its potential in urban development (Müller 2017). Cities in

CONTACT Abraham R. Matamanda matamandaa@gmail.com Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Uni-
versity of the Free State, 205 Nelson Mandela Drive, Park West, Bloemfontein 9301, South Africa
© 2019 Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC)
2 A. R. MATAMANDA ET AL.

the Global South acknowledge the importance of urban informality, but fail to embrace it,
because they are entrenched in the legacy of colonial statutes that do not integrate inform-
ality into the formal cityscape (Chigwenya 2019). It becomes a salient sector heavily cri-
ticised by the officials; however, there are instances where the elites benefit from this
informality and actually make efforts to sustain it. Some elements of urban informality
seem to be more functional than the existing formal institutions and systems (Gumbo
& Geyer 2011). Therefore, urban informality is increasingly becoming a ‘contemporary
governance dilemma’ in international development (Benson et al. 2014).
Zimbabwe is not an exception. Over the years, planners and decision-makers have been
grappling with urban informality, especially in Harare, the capital city (Mbiba 2018; Mata-
manda 2019). There are instances where urban informality is ‘tolerated’, while the same
activities are sometimes identified as illegal and sanctioned by the state, for example,
the street vendors in the Central Business District (CBD) of Harare, as well as the backyard
shacks that thrived for some time. In 2005, the government, through Operation Muram-
batsvina, condemned such activities and demolished all informal structures only to create
more informal settlements a few months later (Matamanda 2019). These inconsistencies
and ambiguity in handling the informal sector in urban Zimbabwe raise questions on how
power is used to control informal activities. The proliferation of urban informality in a
context of strict urban planning and land use policy is also mindboggling. Therefore,
this study explored the political economy of urban informality in Harare since 2000
with a view to drawing lessons and implications for urban planning and national develop-
ment policies. The study sought to address the following questions: Which are the typol-
ogies of urban informality in Harare? Who engages in urban informality and how is power
used to stifle or permit urban informality? Who possesses such power? How do they
benefit from the informality? Who is disadvantaged?
The study was structured as follows: The theoretical framework and literature review
focused on concepts and scholarly work relating to political economy in The light of
urbanisation, regulation and informality in African cities, followed by the methodological
approaches and design which guided the study. The three strands of urban informality in
contemporary Harare and the results were discussed next, followed by the conclusion,
policy options, recommendations and the implications for policy and institutional
reforms.

2. Theoretical perspectives
2.1. Urban informality in Africa
Urban informality is a complex phenomenon not easily defined (Chen 2007; Kamete 2013;
Benson et al. 2014). Hart (1973) considers informality as an often illegal, small-scale and
unregulated sector that acts as a survival strategy for the poor. This viewpoint is discre-
dited on the premise that informality is strictly a survival strategy for the poor. Rather,
informality is complementary to, intricately links to, and significantly contributes to the
formal economy (Vanek et al. 2014; Myers 2016). Over the years, urban informality has
evolved and its scale and scope have transformed to include thriving business enterprises
where qualified people are employed and where high technology is used to facilitate pro-
duction (Chen 2007; Nyemb 2017). This link between formal and informal activities
 DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 3

results in some spatial and sectorial bifurcation, which may complicate the understanding
and regulation of urban informality into the mainstream economy. What remains to be
understood is the nexus of the informal and formal sector and activities that may be tol-
erated and regulated from the informality.
Generally, urban informality in Africa exists mainly due to a scarcity of resources. The
increasing rate of urbanisation, characterised by deindustrialisation and economic chal-
lenges, creates an imbalance between urban resources and the population. The urban
formal system thus fails to cater for the needs of this growing urban populace through
the provision of basic services, employment opportunities and infrastructure to support
human well-being. African cities often become areas of poverty and squalor, as the
increasing urban population is not integrated into the formal economic system, leaving
them to seek survival in the informal sector. The levels of informality thus remain high
in African cities, as indicated by the prevalence of informality in sub-Saharan Africa, esti-
mated to represent 66% of the working class (Vanek et al. 2014). To cope with daily urban
life, individuals engage in different forms of informality such as street vending, establish-
ment of informal settlements and informal access to basic services (Nchito 2016; Mucha-
denyika 2018).

2.2. Political economy in urbanisation

The political economy theory in general analyses situations and phenomena by under-
standing the linkages between politics and economics. Politics is mainly concerned with
issues of power and authority in the use and allocation of scarce resources. The decisions
to allocate these scarce resources are usually made by certain individuals or groups who
stand to benefit from the outcome of their decisions. Foucault (1981) has described
these individuals (mostly politicians and the elites) as those who have the power and
ability to define the norm and have the authority to sanction or incentivise the implemen-
tation of certain laws. Social movements, political parties, local authorities, citizens
(especially a particular age group or racial group) and also the state possess the power
to change the norm (Muchadenyika 2018). Andersen et al. (2015) have raised the question
as to who plans the African city.
There are two approaches in political economy theory – an economic approach focus-
ing on the rational choice-based model and the political science perspective through a
power-based model. While economists focus on how institutions make rational choices
in the rational choice-model, the power-based model considers how institutions are per-
sistently created in favour of powerful interests. The power-based model considers how
power and authority affect decision-making and embrace the complex nature of
decision-making to investigate how these influence economic choices in a society (Collin-
son 2003; Serrate 2011). Overall, the question addressed in political economy theory is
who gains and who loses from any particular policies.

2.3. Political economy and power-based model in informality

Castells (1978), Lefebvre (2008) and Harvey (2012) show how power is used by the ruling
class to spearhead urban development. Power is executed in such a way that it results in
struggles and conflicts, which may breed informality when the disadvantaged revolts and
4 A. R. MATAMANDA ET AL.

takes matters into their own hands. It is mainly the ruling class who use power to advance
aspecific agenda that perpetuates their dominance and helps to maintain the status quo
(Lefebvre 2008).
Those that lack power cannot safeguard their basic political, economic and social rights;
hence, they fail to protect themselves from violence or oppose policies that contradict their
interests (Collinson 2003). Le Billon et al. (2000) explain that vulnerability and power play
a critical role in the allocation of economic resources. The rationale is that power enables
one to control resources and means of production, such that one has the ability to exclude
or neglect some individuals from accessing services. This explains the demolition and dis-
placement in informal settlements, the criminalisation of informal traders and the harass-
ment of vendors. Here power is used by certain individuals to influence economic
outcomes based on anticipated economic gains (De Waal 1997).
At times, politicians use their political power to override council bylaws and statutes. In
this way, they end up violating the legal processes and paving the way for informal activi-
ties. For example, in Indian cities the proliferation of informality is attributable to the
water mafia, a group of people responsible for the extraction and delivery of groundwater
to informal residential areas (Ranganathan 2014).
The power-based model also applies to this study in that the African city is often under-
stood in three senses: as a site of control and restriction; as a planned and planning space;
and as a political site of disaffection (Potts 2011). More so, the paranoia with ‘planned,
orderly, “modern” urbanity’ (Magure 2012; Kamete 2013) explains why city authorities
perceive informal trading in the uncomplimentary sense of urban pathology. Its contem-
porary appearance is the authorities’ general hostility to the urban poor who survive in the
informal sector.

3. Context of the study

The British established Harare (then Salisbury) in 1890. The city existed and evolved as a
commercial and administrative hub for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland during
the 1950s and early 1960s. Drawing on the work of Harvey (2012), the production of
excess capital by local governments and the private sector that invested in housing devel-
opment and urban development influenced the planning and growth of Harare. Segre-
gation laws imposed by the colonial governments informed the design and evolution of
Harare (Mlambo 2003). European modernist planning approaches of order, aesthetics
and economic efficiency guided urban development, while urban informality was not tol-
erated under these strict planning regulations (Matamanda 2019). Citizens who had the
ability to pay for services and contribute to the economic growth of the city were
enabled to benefit from the urban system; otherwise, they had no reason to be living in
the city.
Post-independence (1980 onwards) Harare ‘was opened’ to the Africans, resulting in
the soaring of the city’s population. The first years of independence saw the government
adopting a socialist planning ideology, largely top-down, and perpetuating the colonial
planning system (Nyarota 2018). However, power was transferred from the whites to a
few black elites who took over the means of production and decision-making powers.
Since the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in 1990, after
some economic challenges, private players were allowed entry into the economy. At this
 DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 5

stage, urban informality began to take root, as many people were retrenched, while the
establishment of small enterprises was encouraged (Kawewe & Dibie 2000).
Since 2000, the political economy of Harare changed. Following the collapsing of urban
services, mass impoverishment, deindustrialisation and hyperinflation, the city failed to
sustain its growing population (Alexander & McGregor 2013). The emergence of the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which established its dominance in urban
areas, resulted in a change in the governance of Harare. Furthermore, the land reform pro-
grammes launched in the early 2000s also resulted in increased informal settlements in
peri-urban areas. The formation of the Government of National Unity in 2009 with a
view to address the socio-economic and political challenges haunting the country
influenced local governance in urban Zimbabwe (Jonga 2012). Prominent contestations
existed between the central government and urban local authorities, who were in most
instances under MDC leadership. Consequently, power dynamics between local auth-
orities and the central government soared (Ranger 2007). Elite accumulation and politics
of difference were bred, through which patronage became the order of the day. Corruption
and embezzlement of public funds, once shunned, became normalised in state institutions
and among public officials, while informal activities were somehow tolerated to incentivise
party supporters or wherever elites saw an opportunity for political or economic gains
(Alexander & McGregor 2013; McGregor 2013).
It has been shown that power plays a great role in influencing decision making.
Through power, certain individuals can decide what can or cannot be done. Based on
this argument, there has been a need for investigating how political economy relates to
urban informality; hence, this study was based on the methodology presented below.

4. Methodology
The study adopted a qualitative research approach. The multiple case-study design was
used, as urban informality manifests in different shades; hence, the need to draw insights
from urban land management perspectives, the transport sector and street vending. The
CBD has been identified as the case for informality in the transport sector and street
vending, while the Hopley Farm Settlement was identified as case study for informal
land management and allocations.
Secondary data were collected from the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Acts of parliament
and policy documents. The secondary data were then analysed through content analysis.
Primary data1 were collected between January and April 2018 through interviews with 20
purposively selected key informants, and using triangulation to enhance the validity of the
study (see Table 1). In relation to informal land management and allocation, a survey of
450 households was conducted at Hopley Farm in Harare, while 135 informal interviews
were conducted with street vendors and 20 informal transport operators in the CBD. The
respondents were conveniently selected until the data saturation point was reached when
the emerging themes became repetitive.
The data collected through the interviews and informal conversations were recorded
electronically and notes taken during the interview process. Ethical clearance was obtained
from the University of the Free State prior to conducting the fieldworks and the ethical
clearance number in UFS-HSD2017/0808. Informed consent was sought verbally prior
to the recording to inform the respondents on the objective of the study and ensure
6 A. R. MATAMANDA ET AL.

Table 1. Respondents and their characteristics.

Respondent type Code Characteristics
Planners from the CoH CP1 Town planner
CP2 Deputy town planner
TP1, TP2 Transport planning officers from the Department of Transport planning
services
CP1, CP2 Planning officers from the Department of Planning
Ministry of Local PM Director of the Department of Physical Planning
Government
Private planners PP1-5 Five planners practising in the private sector as planning consultants
Developers DPs 1–5 Five developers who have housing projects currently underway in Harare
Planners PL1, PL2, Professional planners working for Urban Development Corporate
PL3

that no harm would befall them for participating in the study. Consequently, the record-
ings were then transcribed, hereafter the data were grouped into themes and categorised
accordingly to find meaning from these themes. Analysis was predominantly deductive by
nature, led by theory and the questions guiding the study. Thematic analysis was used to
analyse the primary data.

5. Results
From the data collection, three broad categories of urban informality emerged, namely
street vending, informal public transport, land management and allocation. These are pre-
sented in this section.

5.1 Street vending

The interviews highlighted that street vending is a complex phenomenon in Harare’s CBD.
Through the Statutory Instrument 159 of 2014, the City of Harare (CoH) attempted to
accommodate the street vendors in the city, as stated in section 4(1) that the council
may set aside land or premises for the establishment of vending sites. The survey
showed that 39% (n = 53) of the vendors in the CBD were male and 61% (n = 82)
female; the majority (74.1%; n = 100) of the vendors were aged between 21 and 40,
showing a domination of youth. The age and gender balance among the street vendors
is an indication that street vending is not only a sector for women; it exists as a provider
of employment opportunities for male and female as well as the youth who are largely
unemployed graduates. It was reported by 83% (n = 112) of the vendors that they had
been engaging in street vending for at least 10 years. Some stated that they managed to
buy assets, which included residential plots and vehicles, and could also send their children
to school. This confirms the findings by Chen (2007) that the informal sector is increas-
ingly becoming an integral part of the urban formal economy. Moreover, street vendors
are not only uneducated and without skills to be employed in the formal sector; they
are predominantly youth who have graduated from tertiary institutions but fail to find
employment prospects (Mazvarirwofa 2016).
The events on the ground in the CBD of Harare raised questions with regard to the
legitimacy of Statutory Instrument 159, as there have been numerous occasions where
blitz actions were undertaken to clear street vendors in the city, even from sites once
 DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 7

designated by the CoH (Bandauko & Mandisvika 2015). One of the key informants high-
lighted that the criminalisation of street vendors is best understood in the context of the
anti-government protests that were undertaken in the country, specifically in Harare, from
June 2016 until November 2017, when Mugabe was forced to resign as President of Zim-
babwe. Chipato (2019) reports that, unlike the previous political protests that were orche-
strated by professionals in the country, this era was characterised by the unemployed, who
included street vendors, bus drivers and street kids. The protests in June 2016 were led by
activists such as a leader of the National Union Vendors Association (NAVUZ) that advo-
cates the rights of informal workers. In this way, the ruling ZANU-PF criminalised the
street vendors as a way to disrupt the protests, as they were always available in the city
and, considering their large numbers, they posed a serious threat. Consequently, in
January 2017, all street vending in Harare was banned on the premise that it was contri-
buting to public health problems such as typhoid (Jakes 2017; Nyemb 2017).
Regardless of the government’s ban on street vendors, street vending continued in the
CBD of Harare. The statistics from CoH show that there are approximately 30,000 regis-
tered vendors in the city; yet, in 2017, there were at least 1,00,000 vendors operating in
Harare, while approximately 20,000 were vending in the CBD. The mismatch between
the number of registered and unregistered vendors is explained by the fact that the
CoH does not have adequate facilities and premises to accommodate the growing
number of vendors (Kadirire 2017). This resulted in most of them operating illegally,
where 87% (n = 117) of the vendors indicated that they were not registered. One street
vendor explained that it was not easy to register and one was on a waiting list; to be allo-
cated a vending site was a long process. Officials from the CoH and the Director of Phys-
ical Planning highlighted that the city was overwhelmed and did not have enough vending
sites to accommodate the large number of vendors. In efforts to accommodate the street
vendors as espoused in section 4(1) of the Statutory Instrument 159 of 2014, the CoH has
thus taken advantage of the desperate street vendors by designating some sites, which
lacked requisite facilities such as ablution facilities.
The designation of vending sites is riddled in power dynamics, as there are different
players who control certain areas. Among these are the CoH, which has the jurisdictional
right to do so, with some youth affiliated with ZANU-PF who claim ‘ownership’ of some
vending sites in the CBD where they collect daily fees from vendors. For example, 65% of
the vendors said that even after being registered and paying to the council, they still had to
pay an additional fee of US$1 to some ZANU-PF youth who claimed that they were the
brainchild of the street vending and therefore owned the projects. Lastly, the police have
reported that the leadership from NAVUZ was collecting subscription fees from the street
vendors so that they would advocate their rights and protect them from victimisation.
Some individuals regulate the vending spaces in Harare and allocate the vendors space
on a partisan basis. In this regard, we observed certain streets in the CBD that were
marked and numbered to serve as vending sites. Interestingly, illegal vending was being
undertaken in front of the Council’s offices in Harare. One private planner highlighted
that there was nothing to be done with the vendors as they had been allocated the
space by ZANU-PF, that collected daily fees from the vendors. A street vendor explained
that street vending in Harare was highly politicised and that at some point in 2017, Amai2
allowed them to vend in the streets as a way of empowering the youth. They had to be a
follower of ZANU-PF to be allocated a stall.
8 A. R. MATAMANDA ET AL.

In in-depth interviews with vendors in the CBD, it was reported that the police received
bribes from the vendors so that they would allow street vendors to operate at the undesig-
nated sites. This is an indication of how the police forces use their policing power to take
advantage of the desperation of the street vendors while receiving bribe money. Instead of
undertaking their designated official duties, as mandated by section 9(1) of the Statutory
Instrument 159 of 2014, to be in charge of the vending sites and collect fees for specific
areas, the officials at times personalised the funds. The result was a reduction in rates col-
lected by the CoH, as reported by the mayor.
The planning officials from the CoH also indicated that the establishment of associ-
ations that support and advocate the street vendors’ rights contribute towards the exist-
ence and survival of these street vendors who had easily been thwarted by the
government in previous years. With such representations, the street vendors have a
voice and have become powerful as they have a legitimate body that support them, as men-
tioned by one private planner. Organisations such as Human Rights Watch and NAVUZ
have also been responsible for advocating the rights of the street vendors.

5.2 Informal public transport

Key informants pointed out that the public transport system in Harare shows remarkable
characteristics of urban informality. First, there are a number of unregistered vehicles
operating in the city. Approximately 60,000 of the 1,00,000 commuter omnibuses
(refers to minibuses used as taxis) that operate in the CoH, are registered, while the rest
are not officially recognised. An official from the CoH stated that in a survey in 2016, it
emerged that the number of registered commuter omnibuses was far less than those oper-
ating in the city.
The transport planners also indicated that there were political elites, senior officers in
the police and army who had fleets of kombis not registered but operating in the city.
Samukange (2014) confirmed this when he reported that over 50% of the commuter omni-
buses in Harare were owned by police officers. A transport planner mentioned in an inter-
view that the implication was that, instead of undertaking their policing duties, they ended
up allowing vehicles that were not registered to operate in the city or on routes they were
not supposed to operate on. They do not have any papers but they pick up and drop people
in undesignated areas.
Secondly, the need to travel the last mile in the CBD and emerging settlements across
Harare have also resulted in the proliferation of an informal public transport system that is
characterised by private cars. These vehicles operate mainly in the CBD of Harare and
serve as a shuttle system for individuals who seek to travel from designated areas in
and around the CBD.
Thirdly, the CoH has been accused of taking advantage of the lucrative business made
by the commuter operators, such that they have been charging fees for the operators to get
route permits (The Herald 2016). In addition, traffic police officers also pounced on
kombis to find a reason for fining them. These fines ranged from US$20 to US$100. All
the drivers interviewed lamented that there was no point in having the kombis registered
because the police would simply find a reason to fine them. Hence, as one driver explained,
it was better to pay the monthly fees directly to the police who operated their routes
instead of paying to the CoH. On the other hand, there are certain individuals who
 DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 9

manage the ranks and certain pick-up points. The Greater Harare Association of Commu-
ter Omnibus Operators (GHACO) has emerged as an advocacy organisation for commu-
ter omnibuses, which at times is recognised and respected more than the council by the
commuter operators. Instead of regulating these areas, the CoH loses potential revenue
to the hawkers who have become as powerful (Muchadenyika 2018).
The thriving informal public transport system in Harare is a result of a number of
issues, which include uncontrolled urbanisation, increased car ownership among citizens,
economic meltdown and increased unemployment rates, corruption, and use of power by
economic and political elites to override the legal systems. An official from the planning
department of the CoH indicated that the rise in transport informality in Harare was a
result of the privatisation of the public transport sector in the 1990s. This privatisation
was a result of the deregulation of state-owned public transport companies and the intro-
duction of commuter taxis called emergence taxis mainly in Harare. This was explained by
the fact that the provision of public transport in the city was left in the hands of the private
sector, with the CoH only licensing the operators. Sixty-five per cent (n = 13) of the com-
muter operators indicated that they had been involved in the transport sector since 2009
when the Zimbabwean economy was dollarized and they managed to export their vehicles,
a lucrative business for them. These respondents also highlighted that they had managed
to make some savings and invested in assets such as residential plots.

5.3 Urban land management and allocation

All the key informants agreed that since 2000, following the Fast Track Land Reform Pro-
gramme (FTLRP), land management in Harare has been greatly informalized. This
confirms the findings by Kadirire (2017) that Harare has over 100 illegal settlements of
organised housing cooperatives established on council land, earmarked for the develop-
ment of schools, clinics, home industries and hospitals. The FTLRP was followed by
land grabbing in urban areas where groups of people used their powers to grab land in
the CoH. War veterans, political elites, and some members of parliament invaded land
at the periphery of Harare and formed housing cooperatives. Considering their
influence in the liberation struggle and their allegiance to ZANU-PF, it was difficult for
the government to turn against these war veterans. The land invasion where they estab-
lished informal settlements was done through political bigwigs, while the cooperatives
were given names that invoked nationalism, for example, Chimurenga Takarwa (We
fought the Liberation War), Zvido Zvemagamba (The needs of the War veterans) and
Patel. An official from the CoH pointed out that the council has lost ‘control’ of some
settlements in Harare due to the politicians. Examples of such land include Harare
South, which has been invaded by political bigwigs such as Philip Chiyangwa (the
nephew of Mugabe). A private planner commented that the situation regarding housing
cooperatives was chaotic and managed by vultures.
The year 2000 also coincided with the political dominance of the MDC party in urban
local governance, as the majority of the urban population were increasingly supporting
this party. Local government issues were thus controlled by the MDC, through the
mayor and councillors, while ZANU-PF retained control of the central government
issues. Muchadenyika (2018) highlighted that the dominance of the MDC in urban politics
posed serious governance issues and threatened the power and legitimacy of the ruling
10 A. R. MATAMANDA ET AL.

ZANU-PF. Instead of allowing urban local authorities to manage the affairs of land allo-
cation in their areas of jurisdiction as espoused in the different pieces of legislation, includ-
ing the Regional Town and Country Planning Act, Urban Councils Act and the
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20 of 2013, the government took over the
function of land allocation in Harare after realising the acute housing shortage in the
city. One of the professional planners indicated that over the past years, the ZANU-PF
government has been ‘rewarding’ its patrons with land and the result has been increasing
proliferation of informal settlements in Harare. The sentiments of the planner confirmed
the results from the survey in Hopley, which showed that 45% (n = 203) of the respondents
got access to their plots through the government.
Interestingly, the beneficiaries of the land from the state are largely the youth, who con-
stitute the greater proportion of the urban population. The dominance of the youth as ben-
eficiaries of government land is evident from the survey at Hopley, which showed that 57%
of the respondents were youth. This shows how the youth emerged as the majority of ben-
eficiaries of the informal land allocated to citizens. The city planner commented that the
ruling ZANU-PF party overrided any formal procedures of land allocation and allocated
land in undesignated sites such as wetlands and open spaces to gain political mileage. It
emerges that informal land management is thus attributed to power struggles rooted in
the dominance of MDC mayors and councillors in Harare since 2000. As mentioned by
one of the professional planners, the result was often some council decisions being disre-
garded by the Ministry of local Governance. Some developments would be undertaken
without the consent of the local authority. For example, settlements such as Hopley
Farm and Caledonia were approved by the Ministry and ZANU-PF; yet, there were
gross infringements of urban planning regulations, as they lacked basic services.

6. Discussion and synthesis

The foregoing sections have provided a situation analysis of the urban informality terrain
and landscape in Harare, together with the socio-economic causes of the proliferation of
this ‘undesired’ sector. The power-based model used helped to explain and understand the
dynamics in Harare’s urban informality over the years. The model highlights how certain
individuals or groups (categorised in different groups) use power and authority to
influence decisions and activities related to urban informality. In this regard, some politi-
cal elites use their political muscle to intimidate officials and citizens and bend rules to
‘legitimise’ certain informal activities, which they benefit from. Evidence is shown in
land management, allocation and informal transport business, where certain high-
profile politicians have been fingered in informal activities through owning unregistered
commuter omnibuses that which operate in the CoH, as well as land grabbing and allocat-
ing it to party supporters without the approval of the CoH. ZANU-PF has also used its
ruling power to manipulate decisions made by CoH through the Ministry of Local Gov-
ernment by disregarding council by-laws, an indication of how power results in the pro-
liferation of informality.
Instead of being a survival strategy for the poor, the power-based model helps to show
that the proliferation of informality in Harare is similar to the Indian water mafias, in that
it emerges as a cartel that is operated by senior government officials who make large sums
of money from this sector that are not taxed, and they find ways to evade regulating to
 DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 11

continue benefiting from the informality. The statistics of the unregistered commuter
omnibuses owned by police officers confirm the involvement of big men in the informal
sector, as opposed to the notion of the informal sector being dominated by the vulnerable
community members.
The large numbers of individuals who engage in street vending, informal transport
operations and those who occupied council or state land informally provides another
dimension to power dynamics in urban informality. The huge numbers of those
engaged in informal activities enable them to have a voice, advance their agenda and
protect their rights. Social movements and organisations such as NAVUZ and GHACO
advocating the rights of individuals in the informal sector have also helped in supporting
the existence of the informal sector in Harare. This observation confirms the argument by
Foucault (1981), explaining how certain individuals define the norm in this regard. There-
fore, players undertaking informal activities end up defining the development trajectory of
the informal sector using their large numbers and representative institutions.
The findings of the study also confirmed the argument brought forth by Chen (2007)
that informality is here to stay and is not emerging as a survival strategy. Evidence from
Harare shows that urban informality is in essence a way of life for many, as shown by the
high proportion of vendors who indicated that they had been engaging in street vending
for the past 11 years, and some indicating that they had managed to acquire assets such as
cars as well as the construction of houses and buying residential stands. Such findings are
critical in informing urban policy and the perception to urban informality as a sector that
has the impact to support livelihoods; hence, it needs to be recognised as an intrinsic com-
ponent of the urban fabric, instead of criminalising it.
The toleration of certain kinds of corruption or informal activities also raises alarm
bells. There are instances when the local authorities shun some activities, but politics
often precede their voices and professionalism, which then results in urban informality
taking root. Moreover, it seems as if urban informality has been tolerated to cover up
for the inefficiencies of the government. This is observed through the existence of the
informal public transport sector that serves the citizens, and the government, knowing
it has no alternative means of public transport, has silently buttressed the sector. The
study recommends institutional reform and the promotion of good governance if the
urban informality in Harare is to be regulated. Furthermore, in order to ensure the formu-
lation of relevant policies and laws governing urban informality, local and central govern-
ment must be committed to change the status quo and allow professionals to execute their
work through human factor development.

7. Conclusion
The study explored the political economy of urban informality in Harare. It concludes that
power can be contested, and the citizens, CoH and resources become objects through
which politicians show their authority and seek to advance their political agendas. This
is evident from the manner in which ZANU-PF has continuously used its power and auth-
ority to sanction or incentivise players in the informal sector. Through patronage and cli-
entism, elites have rewarded its supporters and sympathisers with residential plots, even in
undesignated areas. Individuals operating in the informal economy have also adopted resi-
lient mechanisms and strategies with large numbers to resist intimidation from the
12 A. R. MATAMANDA ET AL.

officials, ensure that the informal sector thrives, and continue to support their livelihoods.
Urban informality takes on different strands, unlike the traditional perception of inform-
ality as a survival strategy; it is rather increasingly becoming an intricate component of the
urban formal economy. Various stakeholders have used power in different ways to sustain
or restrain urban informality in Harare. The ruling ZANU-PF has used its political power
to reward its patrons with land and vending sites in undesignated areas, a situation which
has resulted in the proliferation of informal settlements and street vendors in Harare. Poli-
ticians and some individuals have used their power to override certain laws and statutes
and engage in informal activities for their own self-interests. At times, these individuals
become so powerful that it becomes difficult to regulate what they do. The individuals
operating in the informal economy have found strength through civic organisations
that advocate their rights, thereby making it difficult to criminalise them. Their large
numbers also enable them to thrive the blitz that are organised by government at times.
The CoH has also been collecting revenue from the informal sector through user fees;
hence, they become reluctant to ban informality in Harare. The study concludes that
the stakeholders use power in different spectrums in urban informality, which has
enabled the sector to grow amid the threats from the city officials over the past years.
The authors recognise possible limitations of the study such as the deductive nature,
which somehow stifles the voice of the individuals in the informal sector. Despite this
shortcoming, the study provides critical insights into the relationship between power
and urban informality. Further research may look into the life of individuals in urban
informal sectors where a phenomenological approach may be used to gain insights into
the daily experiences, struggles and opportunities experienced by those engaged in
urban informality.

Notes
1. The data used for this study were only a portion that was extracted from the data set that was
meant for a bigger project. The focus of this data had been on themes related to power
dynamics in urban informality.
2. The former First Lady, Grace Mugabe, affectionately referred to as Amai.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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