The Head and The Heart National Identity and Urban Planning in A Devolved Scotland

International Planning Studies
ISSN: 1356-3475 (Print) 1469-9265 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cips20
The Head and the Heart. National Identity and

Urban Planning in a Devolved Scotland
P. Allmendinger
To cite this article: P. Allmendinger (2001) The Head and the Heart. National Identity and
Urban Planning in a Devolved Scotland, International Planning Studies, 6:1, 33-54, DOI:
10.1080/13563470120026523
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International Planning Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 33–54, 2001
The Head and the Heart. National Identity and Urban

Planning in a Devolved Scotland
P. ALLMENDINGER
Department of Land Economy, St Mary’s, Kings College, Aberdeen AB24 3UF, Scotland
ABSTRACT Questions of identity and how it is changing under the inuences of globalization and
how in turn it is affecting government and policy processes have become increasingly to the fore
in recent years. Despite shifts towards devolution in the UK and the anticipation of such processes
heralding an opportunity for governance to better reect national identity, little interest has been
paid to the role of planning in such issues. An essential component of identity that has inuenced
attitudes towards planning is the role of myths. Two myths that have been signicant for planning
in Scotland are those of egalitarianism and radicalism, both of which have contributed towards the
idea of Scottish planning being distinct from and superior to its English counterpart. These two
myths form part of what Tom Nairn has termed the ‘heart’ of Scottish identity founded upon
romantic, historic imagery of identity. The ‘head’ is formed by the realization of the need to
compete economically in a globalized free-market. This paper explores how both the head and the
heart are driving the future of Scottish planning through the devolved Parliament. It then goes on
to address the institutional and political inuences through the Scottish Parliament and the likely
trajectory for change. It concludes that planning is becoming less a mechanism that reects
national identity and more of a facilitator for economic growth with important symbolic
signicance of distinctiveness.
Introduction
National identity is a powerful structuring force that ‘frames’ state processes as
well as our perception of problem denition, alternative structures and resource
allocation. At the heart of recent interest and re-evaluations of identity are
globalizing processes and their mediation at national, local and individual levels.
Such processes embed global cultures in national and local circumstances while
simultaneously creating reactions against such pressures and fostering the desire
for distinctiveness and the resurgence of national identity (Hall, 1992; Giddens,
1991, 1999). In federal or devolved systems nations such as Scotland they have
the scope for giving expression to such processes across a range of state activities
including planning.
Although the interaction between identity and the state has come to the fore
in recent years, there has been little interest in the relationship between national
identity and land use planning. In one of the few works that addresses these
issues, Macdonald & Thomas (1997) comment on the importance of identity for
1356-347 5 Print/1469-926 5 Online/01/010033-2 2 Ó 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/1356347012002652 3
34 P. Allmendinger
planning in its structuring of individual and group positions and perspectives

and their signicance for collective decision making.
Among the resources which can help bind coalitions are ideologies
which emphasise a sense of belonging, or shared histories, culture and,
perhaps, destiny … nationalist sentiments can be very useful in mobilis-
ing coalitions of interests within their boundaries. (Macdonald &
Thomas, 1997, p. 2)
This lack of interest is surprising given the shift in planning theory towards a
more hermeneutic approach that emphasizes language, culture, communication
and symbolism. For example, Healey recognizes that:
Every eld of endeavour has its history of ideas and practices and its
traditions of debate. These act as a store of experience, of myths,
metaphors and arguments, which those within the eld can draw upon
in developing their own contributions, either through what they do, or
through reecting on the eld. (1997, p. 7)
Notwithstanding such recognitions of cultural and symbolic inuences upon the
practice of planning, attention has tended to focus on a transparency or open-
ness of process that aims to work towards undistorted forms of communication
within planning (e.g. Forester, 1989, 1999; Healey, 1997). The point about
national identity and its subtext of distinctiveness is that it may preclude such
searches through its inherent dynamic of difference rather than consensus at a
national level. The lack of interest is even more signicant given that studies of
the relationship between national identity and state processes have come to the
conclusion that they are of importance in shaping institutions and policy
processes (McCrone, 1992). Planning is of particular signicance in this respect
given its function in relation to the control of space—national identity and space
or territory are closely linked (Macdonald & Thomas, 1997).
Identity is formed from a complex accretion of factors, although an important
element is the role of myths. In Scotland myths have been an important
contributor to the historic development of planning. The ideas of egalitarianism
and radicalism have been of particular signicance and helped promote the idea
of Scottish planning being characterized by, inter alia, being more interventionist
and participatory. Even in the face of the Thatcherite anti-regulatory govern-
ments of the 1980s (arguably a myth itself, see Allmendinger & Thomas, 1998)
Scottish planning was perceived as being more resistant to change than its
English counterpart given the general suspicion of economic liberalism and the
greater acceptance of a regulatory role for the state. The expression of a
distinctive agenda has been limited by the aggregating impact of the English–
Scottish union. Nevertheless, there have long been embers of desire to create a
genuinely ‘Scottish planning’, embers that have been fanned on the back of the
interest and implications of ‘new regionalism’ (Amin, 1999). Devolution of
legislatory powers, including planning to the Scottish Parliament in 1998, could
be seen as providing an opportunity for Scotland to shape a more distinctive
planning system. However, according to some, the impact of globalization in
particular would lead us to believe that such opportunities may also be medi-
ated by other inuences—the desire and need to compete in a more global
market and a growing prevalence and shift towards individualism and con-
sumerism at the individual level (Bauman, 1992). This latter point is reinforced
The Head and the Heart 35
by evidence from the broad agenda of the Scottish Parliament developed in

relation to land use planning and the responses to consultation documents on
the future of Scottish planning (Scottish Executive, 1999). The outcome of the
consultation exercise (which is covered in more detail below) was that while
many still wished for planning to express some kind of innate ‘Scottishness’ they
equally realized that Scotland had to compete in a global economy driven by the
needs of free-trade. Two questions arise, therefore:
· how have processes such as globalization, devolution and mythology been
mediated in the institutions and processes of planning in Scotland, and
· what trajectory should we expect for Scottish planning given the opportunity
for greater national control through the Scottish Parliament?
This paper attempts to address these two questions through an analysis of the
inuences upon national identity of globalization in particular and the relation-
ship between identity and land use planning.
National Identity
From a situation where issues of national identity were not widely discussed
(Beiner, 1999) there has been a growing interest in the relationship between
modernity, modern institutions and the self, particularly as globalization has
focused attention on the:
… increasing inter-connection between the two ‘extremes’ of extension-
ality and intentionality: globalising inuences on the one hand and
personal dispositions on the other. (Giddens, 1991, p. 1)
The practical implications of this interest are felt daily from Quebec to Catalonia,
the Balkans to Israel where people are disputing the “political identities con-
ferred on them by the states to which they belong” (Brown et al., 1998, p. 200).
As Hall points out, in the modern world, national cultures into which we are
born are one of the principal sources of cultural identity (1992, p. 291) and an
important origin of meaning for national and individual identities. This is not
surprising given the desire on the part of the individual to belong to a group or
collective from which they “derive psychological, cultural and social benets”
(Brown et al., 1998, p. 200):
The idea of man without a nation seems to impose a (great) strain on
the modern imagination. A man must have a nationality as he must
have a nose and two ears. All this seems obvious, though, alas, it is not
true. But that it should have come to seem so very obviously true is
indeed an aspect, perhaps the very core, of the problem of nationalism.
Having a nation is not an inherent attitude of humanity, but it has now
come to appear as such. (Gellner, 1983, p. 6)
A symbiotic relationship ensues where the nation state derives loyalty and
obedience from its citizens in exchange for ‘ontological security’ (Giddens, 1990)
or the human need to reduce the anxiety of life (including threats) through
routines and trust. We presume certain things will not happen and act accord-
ingly.
As the idea of national identities has shifted under the impetus of globalizing
challenges so have our conceptions of its constituents. Traditional understand-
ings of national identity have made the assumption that within nation-states are
36 P. Allmendinger
embedded cultures that develop in social and geographical isolation from each
other:
We are led to image each group developing its cultural and social form
in relative isolation, mainly in response to local ecological factors,
through a history of adaptation by intervention and selective borrow-
ing. This history has produced a world of separate peoples, each with
their own culture and each organised in a society which can legiti-
mately be isolated for description as an island to itself. (Barth, 1969,
p. 11)
This concept of fundamentally embedded cultures reduces differences based on
class, gender, ethnicity, age, etc. to the level of individual writ large.
Contemporary understandings of national identity tend to reject this more
reductionist perspective and see identity as far more socially and mutually
derivative:
… national identities are not things that we are born with, but are
formed and transformed within and relation to representation. We only
know what it is to be English because of the way ‘Englishness’ has
come to be represented, as a set of meanings, by English culture. It
follows that a nation is not only a political entity but something which
produces meanings—a system of cultural representation. (Hall, 1992,
p. 292)
According to Anderson (1983) this means that differences between nations lie
not in the evolution of ontological difference but in the different ways in which
they are ‘imagined’. Hall (1992) identies ve ways in which representational
strategies are deployed to construct our common sense views of national
belongings and identity:
· The narrative of the nation. Stories and histories told and retold through media
and popular culture representing shared experiences, sorrows, triumphs, etc.
Such discourses can have a powerful effect, e.g. the image of ‘England’s green
and pleasant land’ and provide meaning to what it is to be part of a nation.
· Origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness. National identity is presented as
inherent and primordial and manifested in, for example, government or
religion, as reecting some core essence.
· The invention of tradition. Rituals or practices that appear to make links to
essential characteristics are sometimes constituted to emphasize distinctive-
ness and inculcate values and norms of behaviour. However, in many cases
such rituals are much more contemporary than they appear.
· Foundational myths. Often stories that seek to provide the foundations of a
nation’s distinctive characteristics are located not in ‘real’ time, but in ‘mythi-
cal’ time. Myths also provide convenient and useful ‘spin’ by seeking to link
events to essential traits, e.g. the ‘Dunkirk spirit’.
· The idea of ‘pure’ peoples. National identity also often draws up the symbolism
of original peoples whose ‘pure’ spirit has in some ways been diluted by the
introduction of ‘foreign’ inuences.
This discursive perspective on the origin, evolution and role of national identity
means that we can “begin to see that it cannot be taken for granted, that it will
reect social power, and that competing identities will emerge and challenge
each other” (Brown et al., 1998, p. 207). It also clearly questions the idea of an
essential basis to national identity and, rather, argues for a social and/or
culturally inuenced origin. What are perceived to be national characteristics are
merely mediated representations reecting powerful interests in society. The
reason why such representations persist is the need for unity:
… culture is now the necessary shared medium, the life-blood, or
perhaps the minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the mem-
bers of society can breath and survive and produce. For a given society
it must be one in which they can all breathe and speak and produce; so
it must be the same culture (Gellner, 1983, pp. 37–38)
However, we should be wary of the idea of national identity representing
cultural homogeneity. As Hall (1992) points out, there are still class, gender,
racial and other differences within a supposed homogeneous culture. Further, it
should also be borne in mind that modern nations (including Scotland) consist
of disparate cultures that were ‘unied’ usually through forced suppression. The
upshot of this is that questions of national identity are informed by a complex
set of relations between individuals and society the mediation of which pro-
duces representations that reect distributions of power within that society.
Complex as it is, national identity has also undergone changes in recent years.
Writers talk of a ‘crisis’ of identity, both at an individual and collective national
level.
Self appears to have become more fragmented, composed of several
competing identities, and the generic process of identication has
become more problematic and contentious. Increasing rates of social
change are destabilising traditional social structures, opening up new
anxieties as well as new possibilities. (Brown et al., 1998, p. 202)
The basis of these new inuences are the dynamics and implications of global-
ization. There is no agreement on the existence or extent of globalization. The
‘sceptics’, as Giddens (1999) terms them, consider that the global economy is
little different from that which existed at previous periods. Other more ‘radical’
perspectives argue that globalization is very real and that converges in all
aspects of society can be felt everywhere. Ohmae (1995), for example, argues that
capital is now so mobile as to make nation-states obsolete. Gray (1998) does not
go this far but does argue that globalizing economic forces have led nation states
to attempt to compete in terms of lower social costs and wages. An analysis
somewhere between the two is provided by Hirst & Thomson (1996). They argue
that there is a difference between the global economy and the international
economy, both of which exist within a specic region or state. Global economic
forces can have signicant impacts on certain kinds of jobs and opportunities
(e.g. branch plants) although in national economies there is still room and
discretion for nation-states to control and inuence economic policy (e.g. public
sector employment).
While both radicals and sceptics can point to evidence to back their arguments
there are also important normative dimensions to the arguments for and against
the existence of globalization. The political left, for example, not only reject any
such shifts on the basis that it questions the ability or possibility of governments
intervening in the market (Atkinson, 1999), they also question the actual extent
of globalization in relation to the free movement of goods, nancial services and
38 P. Allmendinger
capital (e.g. Bhagwarti, 1998). Claim and counter claim also dominate other
elds of debate on the existence and extent of globalization. Webster (1995) and
Kumar (1995) have rejected the technological determinism of Bell (1973), Tofer
(1981) and Naisbitt (1984) who argue the central and increasingly important role
played by information and knowledge in a globalized society. Similarly, Jessop
(1990) has challenged the simplistic portrayal of a shift from Fordist to post-
Fordist modes of production and consumption proffered by the regulation
school (e.g. Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1997; Boyer, 1990) and advocates of exible
specialization (e.g. Sabel, 1982; Piore & Sabel, 1984). Culturally, Jameson (1984)
and Harvey (1989) have questioned the claim to the emergence of postmodern
sensibilities advanced by Lyotard (1984) and Baudrillard (1983) among others
while Giddens (1990) and Eagleton (1996) reject it altogether. From this mire of
claim and counter claim what is generally agreed is the emergence of difference
(Lash & Urry, 1987):
The dynamics of the global nancial system; the tremendous expansion

of transnational corporate activity; the existence of global communica-
tions and media networks; the global production and dissemination of
knowledge, combined with (amongst other factors) the escalating
signicance of transnational religious and ethnic ties; the enormous
ows of peoples across national boundaries; and the emerging auth-
ority of institutions and communities above the nation state: all these
factors provide a powerful case for reassessing the traditional concept
of society (and by association the nation state) as a bounded, ordered
and unied social space—a coherent totality. (McGrew, 1992, p. 63)
However, accepting the existence and signicance of globalization is not enough.

There are important differences of opinion on the causal logic(s) of the changes
behind globalization. Rosenau (1990) and Gilpin (1987) identify and give pri-
macy to individual sources for the dynamic of globalization: technological
progress and power politics respectively. Approaches that emphasize multiple
causes and dimensions of globalization include Giddens (1990, 1999), Robertson
(1991) and McGrew (1992). For Giddens there are four dimensions of globaliza-
tion: capitalism (the system of commodity production), industrialism (the use of
inanimate sources of material power in the production of goods), military power
(the control of the means of violence) and surveillance (control of information and
social supervision) (1990, pp. 55–59). The increasing dominance of globalizing
forces in society plus the lack of any alternative means that globalization is likely
to increasingly dominate the activities of nation-states.
Callinicos (1999) takes Giddens and those who subscribe to such a fatalist
(celebratory?) view of globalization. Resistance has and is forthcoming—Gray
(1999) sees the European Union as a potential force that could manage world
markets for social cohesion. It may be right to claim, as Callinicos (1999) does,
that the fatalist school do not engage questions concerning the viability of the
nation-state in an era of globalization nor the structural limits to the state’s
responsiveness to pressures from below.
Notwithstanding the critics and issues of detail, the general view of globaliza-
tion as:
… the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the

nation-states … which make up the modern world system (where)
events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to
have signicant consequences for individuals and communities in quite
distant parts of the globe. (McGrew, 1992, pp. 65–66)
is broadly agreed as is the central role of the impacts of such processes upon
time and space—an area of globalization that is less contested. Both Giddens
(1990) and Harvey (1989) have provided analyses of globalization in terms of
time and space and both emphasize the profound impact upon both dimensions.
For Harvey: “… we have been experiencing, these last two decades, an intense
phase of time-space compression that has had a disorientating and disruptive
impact upon political-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as
upon cultural and social life” (1989, p. 284). We are now experiencing a distanc-
ing of space from place—in pre-modern societies place usually coincided with
space through localized activities. Through globalization “place becomes in-
creasingly phantasmagoric: that is to say, locales are thoroughly penetrated by
and shaped in terms of social inuences quite distant from them” (Giddens,
1990, p. 19).
Both time and space are profoundly implicated in representation and, conse-
quently, changes in either have profound effects on how identities are located
and represented:
All identities are located in symbolic space and time. They have … the
‘imaginary geographies’: their characteristic ‘landscapes’, their sense of
‘place, ‘home’, or heimat, as well as their placings in time—in invented
traditions which bind past and present, in myths of origin which
project the present back into the past, and in the narratives of the nation
which connect the individual to larger, more signicant national his-
toric events. (Hall, 1992, p. 301)
The impact of time–space compression, however, is not simply at the level of

‘top-down’ processes impacting upon the local or even national. According to
Giddens the relationship between the global and the local is a dialectical process
whose outcome “… is not necessarily, or even usually, a generalised set of
changes acting in a uniform direction, but consists in mutually opposed tenden-
cies” (1990, p. 64). Consequently, local responses and particularities cannot be
‘read off’ from events and dynamics operating at global levels. Instead, we have
the mediation of global and local dynamics that include a number of ‘dualities’
(McGrew, 1992):
· Universalization versus particularization. Globalization encourages the distinc-

tiveness of ‘place’ or distinctiveness particularly as a reaction to globalizing
processes thereby fostering the resurgence of national identities.
· Homogenization versus differentiation. Beyond the clichés of sameness there is
also the local assimilation and re-articulation of the global into local circum-
stances.
· Integration versus fragmentation. In addition to the new global communities and
sensibilities there is also increasing fragmentation of existing social and
economic categories such as class among national and local lines.
· Centralization versus decentralization. Globalization not only leads to greater
centralization of power and decision making but it also generates greater
desires for local control at national and sub-national levels.
40 P. Allmendinger
· Juxtaposition versus syncretization. Through its compression of time and space

globalization leads to the juxtaposition of different cultures and ways of life
simultaneously reinforcing existing cultural boundaries while creating new
ones.
The implications of these contradictory processes for national identity are
complex. There are obviously powerful forces that are impacting upon identity
though not in an even way either spatially or sectorally (e.g. nancial services
and homelessness). Disembedding of identities is undoubtedly occurring though
the actual outcome and direction are uncertain beyond broad processes. A
number of possibilities have been advanced. Hall (1992), for example, argues
that globalization has contested and unsettled contours of national identity
exposing it to pressures of difference and diversity. This has led to the strength-
ening of local identities and a defensive reaction by dominant ethnic groups who
feel threatened. Regardless of this defensiveness there has also been the emerg-
ence of new identities in the ux of globalizing pressures. Giddens (1999) asserts
that globalization is the reason for the revival in local cultural identities in
different parts of the world. The increased pressures for independence in
Scotland, he argues, are not only to be found in their cultural history. Local
nationalism sprang up as a response to globalizing tendencies, as the hold of
older nation states weakens. Brown et al. (1998) also emphasize this ‘openness’
of life and identities but also go on to assert that such a fragmentation has not
just led to a resurgence of national and local identity but also to a reassertion of
individualism. This emphasis on the individual is part of what Rosenau (1990)
has described as post-international politics where the political success of the
neo-liberalism throughout the world during the 1980s and 1990s is a direct
consequence: “after all, saying that there is no such thing as society is to assert
that individuals are free to construct their identities as they please” (Brown et al.,
1998, p. 203). Bauman further reinforces this point with regard to the ascendancy
of power and inuence of the consumer:
… it is the consumer attitude which makes my life into my individual
affair; and it is consumer activity which makes me into the individual.
(1992, p. 203)
Lovering (1999) adds a welcome note of caution to the tendency to ‘read off’
local and regional change as a product of fundamental shifts in economic and
social life that largely derive from globalization. The rise of the ‘new regional-
ism’ as a focus of academic analysis and governmental and economic interest is
based on:
A loose bundle of ideas, an accretion of notions gathered together
because they seem to resonate and point to broadly similar policy
implications somewhere on the horizon. (Lovering, 1999, p. 384)
There is a mismatch between regions in the abstract and the actual regions
where people work and live. What has driven the idea of regions is less a natural
constituency or economic cohesiveness and more the utility of the idea to
powerful state and local elites. Thus, because Scotland has inuential and
powerful groups concerned with creating their own power base it has been
successful in arguing for the existence and legitimation of its identity through
structures such as the Scottish Parliament. Keating (1997) similarly argues that
regional identity and the shift from regional administration to regional govern-
ment is derived from the desire of elites to increase autonomy and local control.
Lovering’s argument tries to highlight what he perceives as a self-serving
conspiracy of individuals and organizations creating a discourse of regionalism
in the face of contrary evidence. However, this is contradicted by the arguments
of some that even if such elites did exist they would not be well served by such
autonomy. According to DeMartino (1999), Harvey (1989), Hall & Jaques (1989)
and Held et al. (1999) these shifts towards global neo-liberalism severely limit the
scope for autonomous national policy options. This might be too crude an
assessment as Berger & Dore (1996) and DeMartino (1999) note the recent rise of
social democratic governments in Europe and North America who seek a broad
rapprochement between the dynamics of globalization and their local manifesta-
tions and mediation. Rather than accepting market-directed ows and outcomes
as the determining factor in national policy governments may wish to place
more restrictions on capital to sustain more social democratic objectives. While
options are limited integration of social democratic approaches across national
boundaries may be possible:
Together (social democratic regimes) might be able to reorientate Eu-
ropean economic integration toward the achievement of regional
protections against the perils of global neo-liberalism. (DeMartino,
1999, p. 349)
This scope for autonomous national politics is arguably questionable in the
Scottish context. Lovering (1999) is perhaps hinting at what Nairn (2000) is more
ready to say, namely, that the existence of a Scottish Parliament is a last ditch
attempt by an essentially unionist polity to halt the inevitable advance of
independence. As such, devolution has various in-built mechanisms to limit the
extent of any expression of national identity that might emerge of facilitate a
shift towards independence. What these mechanisms are is not made clear by
Nairn, although the limits upon the development of a distinctive planning under
the Scottish Parliament are covered later in the paper.
There are obviously complex and fundamental changes that derive from
globalizing processes. Despite the uncertainty and caveats the broad conclusion
from the different perspectives on globalization is that it:
does have the effect of contesting and dislocating the centred and
‘closed’ identities of a national culture. It does have a pluralising impact
on identities, producing a variety of possibilities and new positions and
new positions of identication, and making identities more positional,
more political, more plural and diverse; less xed, unied or trans-his-
torical. (Hall, 1992, p. 309)
National identities, as Brown et al. (1998) point out, are becoming more problem-
atic as conventional state identities are corroded leading to a plethora of
possibilities including a strengthening or weakening of identities depending
upon the local mediation of globalizing processes. Keating (1997, p. 395) argues
that such processes imply that collective identities are continually being reforged
that lead to new forms of both autonomy and dependence at the national and
regional level. It is not a case of regions being able to compete with each other
without the over-arching interests of the nation-state contextualizing relations
between, say, Edinburgh and Brussels as “it is those regions which are best
42 P. Allmendinger
integrated into national circuits of inuence who have most inuence in Brus-
sels. Power resources are cumulative and it is not easy for regions to substitute
one for another” (Keating, 1997, p. 395). In this light, Giddens (1999) maintains
that nation-states have to rethink their identities as older forms of geo-politics
became obsolete, and such debates are underway at national levels (Eriksen,
1993).
While the idea of national identity is accepted it is clear that there are many
inuences upon such an identity including (though not exclusively) global
economic forces. If, as Keating (1997) and Lovering (1999) suggest, regions are
invented for the convenience of elites and governments is there a distinctive
Scottish identity and if so, what are its implications for the trajectory of the state
post devolution and particular state activities such as urban planning?
Scottish Identity and Land Use Planning

It is widely acknowledged that Scotland is in many ways distinct from England
in terms of, inter alia, voting patterns, social and economic characteristics and
government, religious, educational and legal institutions (McCrone, 1992;
McCrone & Bechhofer, 1993; Paterson, 1998). Regardless of these differences and
the claim that “(Scotland) is less ready to call up the ancient ghosts of nation, its
symbols and motifs, in the quest for independence” (McCrone, 1989, p. 161)
Scotland, along with many nations, has undergone signicant shifts in national
identity in recent times. Such shifts are widely linked to the challenge of
globalization to the nation-state and regulatory bodies and are widely felt
throughout Europe (Castells, 1993). One outcome has been a new assertiveness
in urban politics as cities begin to position themselves in the global market place
and a rise in the inuence of sub-national groupings. Cities such as Amsterdam
are drawing on their strong political traditions and forging new political roles
(Newman & Thornley, 1996).
Shifts in national identity as a result of such pressures have been experienced
in ‘imagined’ communities and relate to Hall’s varieties of representational
strategies outlined above. The idea of personal and national identity has been
‘decentred’ for the reasons highlighted earlier questioning and undermining the
over-arching basis of ‘Scottishness’. Nevertheless, consistent surveys show that
people living in Scotland give priority to being Scottish—between six and nine
times more people stress their Scottishness than their Britishness (Brown et al.,
1998, p. 208). This feeling of distinctive identity is backed up by the persistence
of ‘mythic structures’ such as ‘Kailyardism’ (i.e. the bucolic small town orien-
tation of 19th century Scottish literature) and ‘Tartanry’ (i.e. the myth that has
grown up around tartan as an historic national dress). The term myth is not used
as shorthand for ‘false’, but as McCrone (1992, p. 175) rightly points out, as a
way of identifying social and cultural forces which keep such ideas in common
currency. Myths are also inuential in terms of their relation to current state led
policies and processes including planning. Myths also help create identity and,
at the institutional level, provide ‘frames’ that help dene problems and solu-
tions. In this way they work in a similar way to discourses. Two myths that are
of particular relevance to planning are those of egalitarianism and radicalism.
The myth of egalitarianism manifests itself in a number of different forms
including literature (e.g. the works of Walter Scott, Robert Burns and Lewis
Grassic Gibbon) and political theory (e.g. the idea that Scotland is closer to the
socialist ideal than England (Maxwell, 1976; Hobsbawn, 1969)). The egalitarian
myth has a number of dimensions depending upon its use. In its nationalist
version it is used to typify class divisions as an import from England. In its
weaker version it plays on the more meritocratic opportunities in Scotland. In its
political manifestation it is used to explain why Scotland is more radical and
socialist in its voting patterns than England (McCrone, 1992). However used, the
myth of egalitarianism also provides a point of and motivation for distinction:
The belief that Scotland was an open society whose fundamental
egalitarianism was gradually eroded, in part by contact with its more
powerful neighbours is not just a piece of popular nationalism but has
penetrated and been propounded by works of academic scholarship.
(MacLaren, 1976, p. 2)
This more open society is an essential element of ‘Scottishness’ (McCrone, 1992).
The second inuential myth is that of radicalism. Like the egalitarian myth the
idea of the Scottish as more radical in political terms has a long history, calling
upon images such as ‘Red Clydeside’. Like the egalitarian myth, radicalism has
a number of forms and manifestations but can broadly be typied as including
a greater support for state intervention, a more corporate style to government
and a rejection of more individualistic attitudes. Foster & Wolson identify:
State planning (as a) key vehicle for the fullment of (Scottish) national
development. The character of the planning was statist, corporativist
and paternalist. (1986, p. 92)
The myth of radicalism helps explain why Scotland was a less fertile ground for
the neo-liberal emphasis on a reduced state and the authoritarian attack on
egalitarianism that were central tenets of Thatcherism. A further element that
added to myth of radicalism and the growth of nationalism was a reaction
against the Thatcherite penchant to treat her own re-invigorated English
nationalism as applying to Scotland (McCrone, 1992, p. 169).
What is of particular interest is the ways in which myths become “a contem-
porary and an active force providing, in most instances, a reservoir of
legitimation for belief and action” (McCrone, 1992, p. 90). For example, the
egalitarian myth has been highly inuential, not only as a representation of
‘Scottishness’ but also as a basis for institutions and policies such as education
and other areas under the control of the ‘administrative elite’ (McPherson &
Raab, 1988). As McCrone concludes, myth as identity has been “kept alive by the
experiences and beliefs of those who have led that system” (1992, p. 103).
There are obviously tensions between egalitarianism and radicalism in certain
respects. For example, the radical emphasis on corporatism and the egalitarian
emphasis on openness can be in conict. This does not deny the general thrust
of the mythical inuence upon national and individual identity in Scotland as
being less class-conscious, more open, less liberal in an economic sense and more
interventionist. Both myths (and others) have been fused in recent years through
the ascendancy in England and resistance in Scotland of New Right orientated
governments. There has been a reaction against what could be termed ‘high
Englishness’ that was perceived to be characteristic of the policies and attitude
of the Conservative governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Neo-liberal
economic policy, with its emphasis on market mechanisms, challenged the myth
of interventionism and corporatism while the extreme individualism which ran
44 P. Allmendinger
through the authoritarianism of the New Right threatened the collectivist notion
inherent in egalitarianism. The New Right undoubtedly led to a reassessment of
identity in Scotland by challenging existing notions of Scottishness:
Identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something

assumed to be xed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience
of doubt and uncertainty. (Mercer, 1990, p. 43)
The role of myths in the creation and role of national identity and their
institutional and policy manifestations is complicated by a division between the
‘head and the heart’. Tom Nairn has characterized Scottish culture as being
schizophrenic, divided between the heart (the romantic, historic imagery associ-
ated with the myths above) and the head (the present and future and the need
to ‘get by’ in a globalized world) (McCrone, 1989, p. 162). The heart seeks
difference and distinction, an obsession with a unied Scottish culture based on
the idea of tradition, ‘pure’ peoples linked to rituals and practices while the head
seeks rapprochement with economic, political and social realities. The head and
the heart therefore represent two important cleavages in the current formation
of national identity.
Both egalitarianism with its emphasis on meritocracy, openness, cooperation
and pluralism and radicalism with its corresponding focus on intervention in
markets, a distrust of economic liberalism and a more corporate approach to
state-society relations have been inuential in the evolution and application of
land use planning in Scotland (Lyddon, 1980; Hayton, 1996; Rowan-Robinson,
1997). This should not be surprising. If state processes are a reection of
distinctiveness and national identity, planning as a state process should be a
reection of and motivation for identity and distinctiveness (Macdonald &
Thomas, 1997). This has been made easier in the Scottish context because of the
existence of separate governmental, religious, legal and educational arrange-
ments since its incorporation in the Union in 1707 (Paterson, 1998). The Scottish
Development Department and the Scottish Development Agency, for example,
could be seen as institutional manifestations of myths that pervade the Scottish
psyche. According to Lloyd, for example:
… the culture of Scottish planning has differed as a consequence of its

particular administrative and institutional features. (1999, p. 123)
Also:
… the strategic (or cooperative) approach to planning practice and the

management of urban and regional change can be linked to broader
corporatist culture which had prevailed in Scotland and which encour-
aged an acceptance of the need for integrated action to address
Scotland’s specic needs and circumstances. (1999, p. 124)
The relationship between broader national mythical structures and planning is

not simply a top-down process. Scottish planning not only reects myths such
as egalitarianism and radicalism but also creates its own myths of distinctive-
ness. There has always been an element of pride in the differences and a feeling
that “Scottish planning has much to teach the English” (Hague, 1990, p. 287) and
claims that the differences between the two regimes “… go far beyond the
addition of the word ‘Scotland’ to the principal planning act” (Rowan-Robinson,
1997, p. 32). Wannop identied the four distinctive characteristics of the Scottish
planning system 20 years ago as:
· The regional system of local government;
· The comprehensive scale of direct participation in regeneration through
bodies such as the (then) Scottish Development Agency;
· The style of the Scottish Development Department in creating National
Planning Guidelines;
· Regional reports. (1980, p. 64)
These four characteristics have themselves reached mythical status and inuence
impressions and attitudes towards Scottish planning. As we should expect given
the preceding discussions, the justication for this distinctiveness tends to be on
the basis of an essential difference in character between the England and
Scotland. The Scottish planning system needs to “… reect the wishes of the
Scottish, as opposed to British, electorate” (Hayton, 1997, p. 208). These wishes
are represented by some as essential and require a high degree of intervention
to meet, for example, the severe nature of social problems in urban areas in
Scotland (Hague, 1990; Tewdwr-Jones & Lloyd, 1997).
The feeling of land use planning as an expression of identity and difference
has been heightened in recent times by the prospect and then establishment of
the Scottish Parliament. The overall feeling is upbeat about the potential for the
Scottish Parliament to alter further the scope and practice of planning. The
Convenor of the RTPI in Scotland has commented that the planning under a
Scottish Parliament “… represent(s) a genuine opportunity for positive change—
the challenge is to make the most of this opportunity” (Russell, 1999, p. 2) while
Hague believes that “a real tide of imagination and optimism might be released
to plan the development path of this small nation” (1990, p. 296). It is possible
to identify three broad themes that a Scottish Parliament is expected to address
in the future of planning.
Tewdwr-Jones & Lloyd argue that:
Both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly have the ability
to realise a more consistent and coordinated approach to spatial plan-
ning in the future, involving the harmonisation of governmental and
non-governmental public sector interests. (1997, p. 309)
This more coordinated approach is the rst main theme that commentators
believe can be addressed by the Parliament. Like other aspects of state activity
planning has experienced a ‘hollowing out’ of its functions and scope in the past
20 years or so. According to Oatley (1998) throughout the 1990s government has
sought to reorientate traditional regulatory regimes towards the creation of
entrepreneurial cities which have the capacity to compete nationally and interna-
tionally for public resources and private investment. The driving force behind
this shift is the recognition of the global competitive context that dictates a
competitive and anti-regulatory environment to attract inward investment. Ac-
cording to such thinking different localities are driven towards competing with
each other for scarce resources leading to a fragmentation of differing local
regimes of regulation including planning (Peck & Jones, 1995).
This fragmentation of planning into different ‘styles’ has been experienced
throughout the UK (Brindley et al., 1996) although this has been exacerbated by
what Hayton (1997) identies as the breakdown in the coordination of strategies
46 P. Allmendinger
between different public and semi-public or quango bodies. Filipek (1997) and
Hayes (1997) similarly argue that the key issue for a Scottish Parliament to
address is the breakdown between “… the power to plan and the power to act”
(Hayes, 1997, p. 306). The hiatus between statutory land use planning and the
nancial empowerment of local authorities has led to the decline of ‘positive
planning’, that is, the ability to more directly affect change rather than be
dependent upon market forces (Hayes, 1997). What is needed, he argues, is
greater coordination and integration of planning and the plans of other bodies
such as Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) whose functions overlap with land
use regulation. What the Scottish Parliament should do in this view is promote
a form of land use super-plan that ties together the proposals of public and
semi-public bodies to pull in the same direction.
Second, there is a general assumption of a greater democratic input under any
Parliament. As Boyack puts it:
There is a hope that the Parliament will be able to operate in a more
modern way than Westminster, with more of an emphasis on openly
involving people, community, business and civic groups. (1997, p. 308)
The push for a greater degree of community involvement derives from the
severe nature of social problems in urban areas in Scotland that demand
intervention to meet local needs (Hague, 1990). This new level of involvement is
envisaged not only at the more traditional plan preparation stage but also in the
preparation of national guidance.
Third, there is a desire that the Parliament facilitates the development of
different policy agendas north and south of the border. This points to the
desirability of a ‘modied landscape’ for planning that meets distinctive local
needs (Tewdwr-Jones & Lloyd, 1997), although exactly what these needs might
be and how they differ from the present is not really explored. But there is also
a sub-national diversity that a Scottish Parliament should address that means
that rural areas such as the Highlands require a very different approach than the
booming capital of Edinburgh.
These three themes—coordination, participation and differentiation—form an
agenda for the further development of a distinctive Scottish land use planning
that reects issues of national identity. However, the basis of a distinctive
Scottish planning and the desire for an increased distinction (Nairn’s ‘heart’)
have to be mediated and viewed against the shifts outlined in the rst part of
this paper (Nairn’s ‘head’). First, the actual degree of this distinctiveness is open
to question. For example, none of the four characteristics identied by Wannop
now exist or remain distinctive: regional government was effectively abolished
in Scotland in 1996, England and Wales now have equivalent bodies to Scottish
Enterprise, England and Wales have had national guidance for over 10 years and
regional reports are no longer prepared. Scotland, like England, has also been
subject to objectives for planning generated from supra-national concerns such
as sustainability. It has a ‘plan-led’ approach and the same denition of develop-
ment as that south of the border. There are enterprise zones and simplied
planning zones in Scotland and both nations now have a very similar system of
national guidance.
There are also signicant questions concerning the ability of the Scottish
Parliament to diverge further from the English approach to better reect Scot-
land’s priorities and identity. It must be remembered that although environmen-
tal matters including planning have been devolved to the Parliament, Labour is
the dominant party in both Holyrood and Westminster and party discipline and
loyalty will undoubtedly play a role in setting the overall direction of change
(Rose, 1974; Fielding, 1997). With this in mind it is worth noting that policy
documents on planning that have emerged under the Labour government
demonstrate a striking similarity in broad trajectory. Both Modernising Planning
(DETR, 1998) and Land Use Planning Under a Scottish Parliament (Scottish Ofce,
1999a) draw on the Department of Trade and Industry Competitiveness White
Paper (DTI, 1998) concerning the delays and costs of the planning system upon
economic growth. Both make similar noises about the need to improve “… the
speed and efciency of the process while maintaining and enhancing quality in
the decision making process and in the outcomes on the ground” (Scottish
Ofce, 1999a, p. 4).
A further restriction upon the ability of a Scottish Parliament to follow a more
distinctive path comes under the broad heading of ‘fragmented sovereignty’.
Changes in both countries over the past 20 years or so have had the effect of
making government generally more open and accountable including the Citi-
zen’s Charter and latterly the Best Value initiative. Powers have also been
fragmented through the growth in quangos, such as Scottish Enterprise and the
privatized utilities, making direct government inuence far more problematic.
Power and inuence has also ceded to the European Commission and Union
that have led on instruments such as Environmental Assessments and may have
even greater inuence through initiatives such as the European Spatial Develop-
ment Perspective. Foreign treaties such as those at Rio and Kyoto as well as the
Global Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (still the remit of Westminster) also
have an important role in determining the scope of planning regulation.
Identifying and charting the ‘head’ and the ‘heart’ in relation to the identity
of Scottish planning helps uncover the different ‘layers’ of inuence but does not
tell us much about how these are being mediated and what possible trajectories
may emerge as a result. In respect of the impacts upon national and individual
identity discussed earlier we should expect there to be mediation of global
dynamics at the local or national level that correspond to McGrew’s (1992)
dualities. How, for example, are mythic structures and desires for greater
distinction in planning inuencing attitudes and actions in respect of planning?
Are globalizing processes such as time-space compression reinforcing existing
attitudes towards identity and distinctiveness in planning and/or creating new
ones and if so what are the emerging attitudes? How are global sensibilities
being articulated into national circumstances?
Addressing the above questions is problematic because gauging and measur-
ing national identity is notoriously difcult. There have been a number of
surveys that point to what people consider to be elements of national identity
and these provide an indication of changing attitudes over time (e.g. Brown et
al., 1998). In planning, a relatively minor element of national and local govern-
ment activity, the gauging of national identity might also be considered to be
problematic. The overall impression has been touched upon above in the
discussion relating to the distinctiveness of Scottish planning from the English
and could be summed up as a combination of a legacy of greater intervention
and a feeling of clear distinction between the Scottish and English systems. In
terms of ‘more planning is better planning’ the Scottish system is perceived as
being superior to the English through, for example, the use of regional planning
48 P. Allmendinger
mechanisms and the far earlier introduction of national planning guidance. It is

also perceived to be superior in its approach to public involvement in planning
through the onus on applicants for planning permission to undertake neighbour
notication themselves thereby forcing a less confrontational development con-
trol process. These perceptions exist in the popular imagination regardless of
changes that have forced a far greater convergence of the English and Scottish
systems as noted earlier. Planning in Scotland, like other areas of state activity
that reect national identity, seems to be built upon the idea of distinctiveness.
Beyond these general impressions little is known about the relationship between
national identity and planning. However, a recent widespread consultation
exercise on the future of planning in Scotland has provided an opportunity to
test these perceptions and gauge what planners and others actually consider to
be the contribution of planning to national identity. Although partial such
surveys do provide valuable information on how local and global processes are
being mediated in attitudes towards planning.
Land Use Planning Under a Scottish Parliament (Scottish Ofce, 1999a) invited
planners and others to enter a debate “… about the relevance and the shape of
the key mechanisms of the planning system and whether they need to be
adapted at the margin, or more fundamentally” (Scottish Ofce, 1999a, p. 1). The
responses to the questions posed in the paper (Scottish Executive, 1999) demon-
strated clearly that (i) Scottish planning is fast losing its distinctiveness from
England, both in terms of the actual mechanisms and aims but also in terms of
the attitude of those involved; and (ii) that although there was some lingering
idea that Scottish planning was a reection and component of national identity
(the heart) the majority view embraced a much more competitive and liberal
conception (the head) to help ensure competitiveness and economic growth.
The unambiguous message from the respondents was that the current
arrangements for planning were felt to be unacceptable. Nearly twice as many
respondents felt that change was needed than were happy with the status quo.
This gure was even higher in the public sector where more than three times as
many felt the need for change. The direction of this change was even more
emphatic. A small minority of respondents to the consultation paper felt that
land use planning still reected an essential element of distinctive ‘Scottishness’.
Scotland was felt to possess unique problems that required a planning system
tailored to its needs:
For the rst time Scotland has the opportunity to create an efcient land
use planning system that is specically designed for Scotland and its
needs. (Stone, Scottish Executive, 1999, p. 21)
Those who advanced the ‘uniqueness’ argument tended to accompany it with

calls for more planning: more participation, more integration and more direction
from the centre akin to a national plan. Drawing upon emotive language and
phrases such as ‘uniquely Scottish problems’, ‘sensitive and inuential practice
of planning in Scotland’, ‘robust Scottish planning’ and ‘Scottish interests’ the
image of ‘breaking away’ from an homogenous and unsuitable status quo is
clearly conjured up. There is an inference of radicalism in tackling the ‘unique-
ness’ of Scottish problems as well as the overriding message of ‘we’re different!’
Difference is amplied through a feeling of pride: “Planning in Scotland has a
ne track record of achievement to build upon” (RTPI, Scottish Executive, 1999,
p. 3) and “The Scottish planning system has been envied in England and other
countries” (RTPI, Scottish Executive, 1999, p. 18).
Given that the trajectory of planning in England over the past 20 years has
involved greater deregulation, centralization and market orientation (Thornley,
1993; Allmendinger & Thomas, 1998) and that the Scottish electorate has shown
its dislike of such New Right policies through successive general elections, the
expression of a distinctive Scottish planning would presumably be contra this
thrust. There is clear support for a change from the current system in the
responses with 67% of consultees supporting some kind of alteration. However,
rather than a more distinctive approach involving a rolling back of deregulation
38% of respondents actually want more deregulation. This feeling was not
conned to private interests as many local planning authorities also felt the need
for less not more planning. Terms and phrases such as ‘simplication’, ‘stream-
lined’ and ‘bureaucratic constraints’ echoed the criticisms of planning that were
used during the 1980s. Although even at the height of the New Right attacks on
planning during the early 1980s one would not nd a local authority prepared
to portray planning as:
… a system which is more complicated than necessary, difcult to

operate and almost impossible to understand. (East Lothian, Scottish
Executive, 1999, p. 10)
Again there were explicit links to Scotland and Scottishness in the need for
deregulation, e.g. “Current regulatory and bureaucratic restraints impact ad-
versely on the efciency of the Scottish economy” (Civil Engineering Contractors
Association, Scottish Executive, 1999, p. 9).
Rather than a source of pride and expression of distinctiveness and identity
planning may now be perceived in the ‘head’ as nationally homogenized and
typically ‘English’. Further, there seems to be a signicant degree of opinion
across the public and private sectors that wishes to see it less distinctive. For
example, Perth and Kinross Council argued that the current system of public
notication of planning applications should be scrapped in favour of the less
problematic English approach. The scale of the push for far less and more
focused planning is in stark contrast to the image of distinctiveness and
interventionist radicalism generally portrayed as characteristic of Scottish plan-
ning.
Deregulation was not the only important message to appear from the re-
sponses to the consultation paper that challenge the role of land use planning in
Scotland as an expression of national identity although it was by far the most
signicant. Contrary to the image that planners and others in Scotland want to
reinstate ‘more planning’ there is, instead, little in the way of support for this.
There were limited calls for more planning in the form of extensions to the
General Permitted Development Order covering the exemptions currently en-
joyed by agriculture and forestry, although this was only mentioned by 11% of
respondents. The key ‘characteristics’ of Scottish planning including regional
planning, a greater penchant for intervention and national planning guidance
also received little support. Only 7% of respondents mentioned the need for
greater integration of fragmented planning arrangements while 8% called for the
creation of a national plan to provide a consistent framework and 9% mentioned
the need for greater regional planning.
50 P. Allmendinger
Conclusions
The characterization of Scottish identity as comprised the ‘head and the heart’ is
a simplistic representation of what are undoubtedly complex mediations of
global, national and local processes. Such processes are further complicated by
shifting legislative and policy making structures such as devolution which both
reect and enhance the potential for change. What such a characterization does
provide is a useful heuristic with which to begin to dismantle and understand
the competing pressures for change. In response to the rst question set out in
the introduction, it is clear that globalizing pressures, including a growing
economic liberalism, have been impacting upon the institutions and processes of
planning not only in Scotland but also in England and elsewhere. The mediation
of these global processes at a national or regional level is unsettling previously
more stable structures and attitudes leading to a bifurcation of opinion that
broadly corresponds to the dualities identied by McGrew (1992) earlier. The
most signicant impact is a shift in attitudes away from the myths of radical
interventionism and a growth in pressure towards less regulation. As Keating
puts it, “a process of nation building is still at work to adapt historic identities
to the needs of the contemporary world” (1997, p. 391). Territory is continually
being reinvented. The gradual convergence of Scots and English planning
systems, processes and policies regardless of devolution could therefore be seen
as a joint reaction to these processes rather than a conscious political decision to
combine planning regimes.
Another signicant impact in the face of these deregulatory pressures are the
reactions against convergence through, for example, calls for Scots planning to
be more distinctive, to tackle the specic problems of Scotland and to embody
essential characteristics of ‘Scottishness’. However, it appears to be a small and
vocal minority who are reacting in this way. Academics and representative
bodies such as the RTPI seem to be keen to draw upon past and sometimes
mythic images of Scottish planning that reinforce ideas of distinctiveness. For
example, Wannup calls for the possibility of a restoration of “the Scottish
tradition of strategic planning which (has been) considerably weakened over the
past twenty years” (Scottish Executive, 1999, p. 2) while Prior talks of “an
opportunity to put the robust Scottish planning framework into a new inter-
national context” (Scottish Executive, 1999, p. 2). Note again the image of
resistance and distinctiveness used by Wannup that play a crucial role the
creation of identity (Beiner, 1999) while Prior draws upon reproductive imagery
making the link between potency through the use of ‘robust’ and birth in ‘new’.
Equally, those pushing away from these images and towards a more deregu-
lated planning also draw upon powerful imagery and language that appeals to
atavistic as well as more current sentiments concerning bureaucracy and bur-
dens of freedom of the individual. As stated earlier, notwithstanding the calls for
a more distinctive Scottish planning that reects the ideas of Scottishness, the
majority view is for less distinctiveness.
The ‘heart’ undoubtedly reects the egalitarian and radical mythologies of
Scottishness that seek to resist or mediate globalizing pressures through empha-
sizing particularization, differentiation, fragmentation, decentralization and
syncretization. On the other hand the ‘head’ or those pushing for less not more
differentiation stress universaliztion, homogeneity, integration and centraliza-
tion. Why is difference important and why have the myths of distinctiveness
been perpetuated? Part of the reason that there is a continued debate concerning
the existence or not of difference including whether land use planning repre-
sents it or not must be related to deeper debates about whether and to what
extent Scotland exists. Another aspect must surely relate to the idea of difference
as an expression of ethical superiority. In desiring to perpetuate myths of
egalitarianism and radicalism one is also automatically rejecting the values of the
society that is compared. There is an explicit criticism of the values of the
English who are undoubtedly perceived as more class-ridden than meritocractic,
more concerned with individualism than collectivism, more conservative than
radical. The implication is that values such as meritocracy, collectivism and
radicalism are more highly valued and reect the essential nature of Scotland.
These values have been particularly prized in the past two decades with the
ascendancy of the New Right in British politics.
The answer to the second question concerning the trajectory of planning is
also deeply implicated in globalizing processes. As the scope for autonomous
national politics diminishes planning becomes less of a mechanism that ex-
presses or reects national identity at a practical level. What it still does,
however, is express a (diminishing) symbolic role in this respect. Thus the
expressed desire for the development of a more distinctive Scottish planning.
This does not mean that the Scottish Parliament cannot express a distinctive
Scottish planning agenda per se. There are three areas where a more asymmetri-
cal planning might emerge. First, in line with the desire of the planning
establishment in Scotland and the thrust of change generally in the rest of the
UK and beyond there is scope for a change in public participation procedures.
Scotland has always had marginally different arrangements for notifying neigh-
bours and others of planning applications, although recent research has
questioned how effective this has been (Scottish Ofce, 1995). This research
recommended a shift towards a system of consultation that more closely
resembled that in England. However, Land Use Planning under a Scottish Parlia-
ment mentioned the possibility of greater local involvement in the preparation
and content of national policy guidelines which would be a departure from the
English approach. Regardless of this, greater local involvement in local plan
preparation and development control decision making is a relatively uncon-
tentious and easy way that Scottish planning could evolve as it involves
secondary rather than primary legislation. Given the push for greater local
involvement at a UK and EU level any differences that emerge are likely to be
marginal rather than substantive. What is also clear is that, regardless of
pressure to decrease difference and the claim that nation-states have less not
more power as a result of globalization, planners and others still consider that
there is a role for the state in regulating and mediating globalizing inuences at
a local level (see also Dielman & Hamnett, 1994).
Second, as Tewdwr-Jones & Lloyd (1997) point out, there is scope for further
national distinction in policy guidance. National Planning Policy Guidelines in
Scotland are already subtly different from their English equivalents both in
subject area and content. This difference is not signicant enough and neither is
the trajectory of change clearly dissimilar to warrant the claim of a divergence
of approach. Planning Policy Guidance Note 6 (England) and National Planning
Policy Guideline (Scotland) 8 both cover the same topic areas and both seek to
constrain out of town shopping growth through a sequential approach. The
problem of declining town centres in the face of out of town retail competition
52 P. Allmendinger
is one that is ubiquitous. The issue of similar problems north and south of the
border again limits the scope for distinctive policy agendas. Like public involve-
ment, the likelihood for divergence is likely to be one of emphasis rather than
substance.
Finally, there is the issue of policy detail. The Scottish General Permitted
Development Order (GPDO) and the Use Classes Order (UCO) are slightly
different to that in England. Like neighbour notication both these planning
tools are altered through secondary rather than primary legislation. Research
commissioned on the operation of both the GPDO and the UCO recommends
changes that are both marginal and aimed at streamlining the existing proce-
dures (Scottish Ofce, 1998). One area where there could be a divergence is
through the recommended adopted of Local Development Orders which would
allow local authorities to extend permitted development rights to specied sites.
Although this would mark a departure from the approach in England it amounts
to little more than the existing tools of simplied planning zones and Article 4
directions that can be used in England and Scotland. Other changes recom-
mended seem to t in with the general deregulatory push that is also driving
shifts in planning in England. Nevertheless, this area is one with a potential for
distinctive change. Overall though, changes towards a more distinctive planning
that reects national identity is increasingly likely to be cosmetic rather than
substantive.
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The Head and The Heart National Identity and Urban Planning in A Devolved Scotland

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International Planning Studies

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The Head and the Heart. National Identity and Urban

1356-347 5 Print/1469-926 5 Online/01/010033-2 2 Ó 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd

planning in its structuring of individual and group positions and perspectives

by evidence from the broad agenda of the Scottish Parliament developed in

The dynamics of the global nancial system; the tremendous expansion

However, accepting the existence and signicance of globalization is not enough.

… the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the

The impact of time–space compression, however, is not simply at the level of

· Universalization versus particularization. Globalization encourages the distinc-

· Juxtaposition versus syncretization. Through its compression of time and space

Scottish Identity and Land Use Planning

Identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something

… the culture of Scottish planning has differed as a consequence of its

… the strategic (or cooperative) approach to planning practice and the

The relationship between broader national mythical structures and planning is

mechanisms and the far earlier introduction of national planning guidance. It is

Those who advanced the ‘uniqueness’ argument tended to accompany it with

… a system which is more complicated than necessary, difcult to

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