From The Unconscious Sigmund Freud ‘We have lame from peychoanalyss thet the ensence ofthe proce of = pression ies, notin putting n end to, in anilaing, the idea which rep- resents an instinct, but in preventing i from becoming conselous, When this happens we say ofthe idea that itis ina sate of being ‘unconsciow snd wecan produc good eidence to show that ven when iis unconscious ican produce effects, even incading some which fnly reach conscious ness, Everything thats repressed must remain unconscious but let us tte ax the very oust that the represted does not cover everthing tha ie un- ‘coneciou. The uneonacous has the wider compass the repressed ia part of the unconscious. How arewewarrve ata knowledge of the uncontio? Iris of courte nly as something conscious that we know i afer ithas undergone ans: formation or tanlaion into something conscious, Payho-analyee worl, shows us very day chat ransation ofthis Lindi possible Ln cre ha che should come about, the person under analyse mast overcome eran eis tances—the sre resirances a thoee which, ale, made the terial con- ened int something repressed by rejecting it fom the conscious, 1. Justification for the Concept of the Unconscious (Our sght wo assume che existence of something mental hat is unconscious and to employ thas assumption for che purposes of scenic work dis ‘puted in many quarers. To this we ca reply tha our asurption ofthe un ‘conscous le mcasar a legit, and chat we possess numerous proofs of Teismersary because che dar of consciousness have a very lange num ‘ber of gap in thes both in healthy and in sick people pyehical ats fen oc 2 Frevo + Tee UNconscious 3 ‘ur which can be explained ony by prnspposing ther acs, of which never theless consciousness flords no evidence These nocnlyncade paapraes and deams in heathy peopl and everyting described as a pychicl symp- tomoranobeesion inthe sce our mot personal daly experience acquaint ih des char come nto our ead we donot know fom where and with insllealconclsions arrived a we donot know how Al these conscious ‘cr remain disconnected and unineligible fw insist upon aiming that every metal ae that oecurs in us ust aso neensurly be apeincel by us through consctousnens; on heather hand they Blige demonstrable on- nection if we inepoate Beoween them the unconscions acts which we have Infered. A gainin meanings a perf usable round forgoing beyond the limits of direc experience, When, i addition, i rane out thatthe a+ sumpcion of there being an unconscious enables us to construct a sucesfal procedure by which we can exert an effective nfloence upon the cours of ‘conscious proces, ths ace wl have given an incontroersle prof ofthe existence of what we have asamed. This beng 20, we must adopt che positon char to require hat whatever goes on in the mind mast als be Jinown consciousness isto make an unenable cam. ‘We can go further and arg, in supporof there Being ansncnscious pspeical stat, chat at any given moment consciousness Includes only 2 small content, so that he greater past of what we ell conscious Inowiedge tinny case be for very considenble period of timeinartateoflateny, ‘that st sy of being psychicly unconscious. When all orlaten memno- ea are taken inc consideration i becomes totaly incomprehensible how ‘theeistence ofthe unconscious can be denied. But here we encounter the ‘bjeton shat shes lan realerons can no longer be described a8 pep ‘hia butthat hey comespond co resides of somatic processes fom which ‘whats pajchicl ean once more arise The obvious answer this is that a tent memory is, on the contrary, an unquesionaleresidaum of 3 poh process. Batts more important realize clea thet his objection isbased ‘onthe equston-—no, ite re, xpi tated bu taken ae axomstic—of ‘whats concious with what e mental Thie equation is ee petit prit- ip which bogs the question whether verythingthat i peyehical ilo nex ssa conscious; or ese ie isa mater of convention, of nomenclature. In ‘his lamer eas is, of couse, ike ay her contin, not open refs ‘on, The question remain, however, whether the convention lo expe enetharwe ae bound oadopeit. To this we may ely that the eonvensonal“ cusotes one—Piomsans equation ofthe poyhicl withthe consiou stony inexpedien. fe di apts pychicalcontnsces,phunges us into the insoluble difficulties of paycho- physi parla, is open ro the proach that or no cious rete son iover-eatimates the par played by eonacouaness and that force us prematurely to abandon the fld of paychoogical esearch without bing lero offer us any compensation from other Hl tds clear ang case chat this question whether the latent sats of rental lif, whose existence is undeniable, are o be conceived of ax con- scious mental states or as physical ones~ehreatens to resolve isl inc 2 ‘esha dispute We shall cherefore be beter adved to focus ou tention on svhaewe know with cenainty ofthe nature ofthese debatable wate. Ae fr ss thee phy charcrerstics are concerned, hey are toaly inaccessible to 1:10 physiological concept or chemical process can give ws any notion of, ‘ther narre.On the other hind, we know fr certain that they have abu ‘one another Inthe third place—ane this the moet weighty argument of «ll—we have to ake nto acount the ae that analy invention evesls some ofthese latent process as having characters and pecslirites ‘which sem alien tou, or even neal, and which run dredy counter vo the artibutes of consciousness with which we are fair, Thus we ave rounds for modifying our inference about oases and saying that what t proved ie noe the existence of econd conecouenes ins, ue theexance ‘of pay ats which lack We sal also be sight in eee lng the term ‘subconslousness! ab incorrect and misleading. The well known case of touhle one’ (eplitng of consciousness) prove nothing guna ou view: We ray most aptly deseribthem as cases of spliving of Be mental activities into evo groups, and say thatthe ame consciousness sumsto one othe other of thee groupe alternately In pyeho-analsis there i no choice for us bu to assert thar metal processes arein themselves unconscious and oiken the perception of them lpymeaneofconeousnes othe percepon ofthe een world by means ofthe snse-ongan. We an even hope to gin fesh knowlege from thecom- patton. The paycho-analtieaturpeon of uaconacions mental act ap esretos,on the onehand, ara father expansion ofthe priv animism ‘which used wero secoples of ur own consciousness round wand on the otherband, a an eension ofthe cometions undertaken by Kant of out view on extemal perception Justa Kant warned ue not to veo the fick ‘thatour perceptions ae subjective condoned and muse not beregarded as “Ment with what is perceived though unknowable, so paycho-anayis ‘warn ut not to equate perceptions by means of conciousnest with the une ‘conscious mental processes which are dcr obec Like the physical the y= cis not accu in reality wha i eppears tous tobe, We hal be gad volar, however, tha the correction af internal petespton wil ten ut ot 10 offer sch great difclies a he coretion of enema percepson-—that lnzenal objets are ess unknowable than the ecernal wold 1. Why did james aga that" certain amount of brsn-pysology must ‘be presupposed or dude in Paychology”? Wha id he mean by this? stir seem moro ss cones ety inthe wvensyfist cen? 2. Ima pasage chat presages the cognitive relation in psychology (see the introduction to Chaper 7), James speaks of “fied ends” wich “varying means” Wha points he eying make? >. Fre etal aim is that “ll conscious sets remain disconnected nd unintelligible fe inset yp claiming that very mental ace that ‘osu in ut mst all necessary be experienced by us through con- scousness.” Dawg on this, andthe selection asa whole, explain i Freel vew onthe importance of the unconscious for anderstanding payhology