Climate Change and Renewable Energy How-To End The Climate Crisis 1st Ed

Climate Change and
Renewable Energy
How to End the
Climate Crisis
Martin J. Bush
Climate Change and Renewable Energy
Martin J. Bush
Climate Change
and Renewable
Energy
How to End the Climate Crisis
Martin J. Bush
Markham, ON, Canada
ISBN 978-3-030-15423-3 ISBN 978-3-030-15424-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020

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This book is dedicated to all the young people of the world who have found
themselves to be living on a planet in serious existential trouble. Never before
in the history of planet Earth has a single species, in this case homo sapiens,
been so dangerously and mindlessly destructive to the point where its selfish
actions threaten to trigger a sixth extinction. There is still time to save most of
humanity—but only if there is forceful and rapid international action to curb
global heating and slowly and eventually reverse the worsening impacts of the
changing climate. For Michael, Corry, Sonny, Zaina, Johnny and Aida, growing
up in the thick of the worsening climate crisis, their future welfare and
well-being is uncertain and fraught with danger. My hope is that this book
will make a small contribution to the groundswell of global action as a younger
generation of vocal activists force moribund politicians to finally take stronger
and more effective measures to bring the climate crisis to an end.
Preface
Many excellent books have been written about global heating and climate
change. Even more about renewable sources of energy; but far fewer about
how these inexhaustible sources of clean energy are the key to slowing and
eventually halting the emissions of the carbon gases that are driving the
planet towards a dangerously warmer state.
In this book I show how these climate change-related dimensions are
linked and interrelated. I explain how inexhaustible supplies of renewable
energy can replace coal, oil and natural gas; how the transport sector will
become electrified; and how all new buildings will soon be super energy-
efficient and powered by electricity from renewable sources of energy. The
fly in the ointment—and it’s a very big fly—are the fossil fuel and petro-
chemical companies and their allies in government agencies who are work-
ing night and day to try and block the transition to clean renewable energy.
It’s obvious to most people that the planet is in serious trouble. Although
the climate deniers and contrarians are trying hard to convince us that
global heating is not happening and that the climate is not changing (or if it
is, it’s not because of what we humans are doing), the scientific evidence for
a warming planet caused by the emissions of greenhouse gases from human
industry and energy use is now indisputable. Anyone who reads up on the
subject and consults the mainstream scientific journals can easily separate
fact from fiction.
From north pole to south, the planet has entered an era of unprece-
dented disruption and deterioration—at least since homo sapiens first walked
the Earth. The most visible and obvious signs are the stronger and more
destructive hurricanes and cyclones, the insufferable heatwaves, the increased
vii
viii Preface
frequency of floods that displace thousands sometimes millions of people,

the melting glaciers, and the massively destructive wildfires. But behind the
scenes, in the undergrowth of the forests and deep in the oceans, the natural
world is struggling to survive. While many urban communities, at least in
the wealthy industrialised countries, can mostly handle the extreme weather
and the wildfires, the loss of biodiversity and the extinction of numerous
species of all types of animals, especially insects, is inevitably going to cause
widespread disruption of agriculture, fisheries, and the services provided by
natural ecosystems everywhere around the world. There is no technical fix
for extinction.
People will flee from lands parched by continuous drought and so
scorched by heat that agriculture is almost impossible. The first signs of a
regional migration out of the areas of the world most afflicted by drought,
floods, and heatwaves are already becoming clear. The links between cli-
mate change, migration, and conflict are increasingly being examined and
confirmed.
In order to understand why global heating is happening and how it causes
the climate to change, it is necessary to grasp some of the basics of climate
science. This book explains them in terms that everyone can understand.
Then we look more closely at the fossil fuel industries. We count the min-
ers dying from black lung disease, the tailings pond disasters, the mercury
emissions, and the coal train fatal accidents. The roll call of disasters for the
oil industry is worse: the offshore oil rig explosions and marine pollution;
the tanker collisions and oil spills; the pipeline fractures and fires; and the
oil train accidents and explosions, are a continual litany of catastrophic dis-
asters. Then there’s fracking and the biggest environmental mess of all: the
Canadian tar sands.
Huge solar photovoltaic arrays and megawatt scale wind farms are now
generating electricity at the same scale as fossil fuel power plants, and at a
fraction of the cost. The levelized cost of electricity from solar energy and
wind power is now below that of electricity generated by conventional coal,
oil and natural gas. Market forces and investor self-interest will eventually
side-line the fossil fuels—except where politicians in the pocket of the oil
companies and petrochemical conglomerates try to block this inevitable
transition. This book takes an eye-opening look into the shadowy, dark-
money world of regulatory capture, SLAPP suits, ad hominem attacks on cli-
mate scientists, and how the oil companies are prepping your children for a
fossil fuel future.
Most of the 190-plus countries that signed up to the 2015 Paris
Agreement are gradually reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases—or
Preface ix
say they plan to. But three major scientific reports published in late 2018
and early 2019 documented the dangers of moving forward so slowly. Those
studies showed that we are not on course to keep global warming to below
2 ℃ above pre-industrial era levels. Not even close.
Is it possible to limit global warming to less than 2 ℃ and keep the
extreme weather and the impacts of climate change-driven disasters within
manageable bounds? That’s the wrong question. Of course it’s possible.
But is it likely? It all depends how rapidly and forcefully governments take
action to drive the transition to clean and inexhaustible sources of renewable
energy that have zero emissions of greenhouse gases. This book shows how
this transition can be accomplished.
Climate scientists are highly trained specialists: meteorologists, atmos-
pheric physicists and chemists, cryosphere experts, glaciologists, biol-
ogists, ecologists, foresters, and agronomists. Not to mention all the
mathematicians modelling the climate and the statisticians analysing the
data. I was trained as a chemical engineer, but never worked in the petro-
chemical industry. Instead, I used my engineering training to work first on
renewable energy technologies and then, after working in several developing
countries, to shift to natural resources management, and then finally to cli-
mate change adaptation and management. I also have done something that
very few climate scientists have experienced. I have actually lived in many of
the countries that will suffer the most from climate change: Haiti, Trinidad
and Tobago, Mali, Guinea, Madagascar, Egypt, Sudan and Djibouti. I have
worked for years at a time in these countries, and seen how vulnerable the
populations are to drought, floods, and extreme weather. I have also worked
for shorter periods in Ethiopia, Uganda and Bangladesh. But the most
exposed and vulnerable countries are the small island developing states: the
SIDS. Many of the low-lying islands like Tuvalu, the Maldives, Kiribati, and
the Marshall Islands will gradually become uninhabitable as sea levels rise
and hurricanes and cyclones drive storm-surge waves hundreds of metres
inland, polluting ground water resources, destroying crops, and sweeping
away homes and livestock. There is little hope that all of these beautiful
islands will survive. In the Caribbean, the islands will be increasingly devas-
tated by stronger more destructive hurricanes, like Hurricane Dorian which
smashed into the Bahamas in September 2019.
The focus in this book is on the big picture. The climate scientists and
other specialists are doing a brilliant job documenting and reporting how
the world’s ecosystems, its biodiversity, and the global environment are
changing and deteriorating. But sometimes the specialists can’t see the wood
x Preface
for the trees. To employ another analogy, climate scientists are providing
us with carefully measured pieces of a huge global jigsaw puzzle. This book
explains how these pieces all fit together and shows that what comes into
focus is the stark reality of life-threatening climate change on a global scale.
In 2019, it was generally accepted that global climate change was now a
global climate crisis. Several countries, including the UK, have declared a cli-
mate emergency.
The book concludes with an analysis that shows how we can all individ-
ually take action and pressure politicians and policymakers to make real
changes that will reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, accelerate the tran-
sition to renewable sources of energy, electrify the transport sector, capture
carbon from industrial pollution, and gradually curtail global heating and
lessen the destructive impacts of the changing climate. The climate crisis can
be brought to an end—but only if strong and game-changing action is taken
by governments around the globe. We have the tools: the renewable energy
technologies that will shut down the emissions of greenhouse gases, drive
out the smog from urban air, and improve the health of millions of urban
families are well known, less costly, and easily available. What is lacking is
forceful action by the people we have elected to represent us and to govern
in our best interests. This has to change.
Markham, ON, Canada Martin J. Bush

Contents
1 A Planet in Peril 1
Introduction 1
Heat Waves 2
Natural Disasters 6
Trends in Climate-Related Disasters 8
A World on Fire 11
The Big Melt 16
Sea Ice 16
Glaciers 18
Ice Sheets 19
Permafrost 22
Coral Reefs and Oceans 22
Acidification 25
Deoxygenation 26
Plastic Pollution 27
Air Pollution 32
Outdoor Air Pollution 32
Household Air Pollution 36
Air Pollution and Children 37
Water Pollution 39
In Sickness and in Health 40
Pesticides 42
Biodiversity 43
xi
xii Contents
The Sixth Extinction? 45

The Big Picture 48
Conclusion 50
2 The Overheated Earth 59

Introduction 59
In the Greenhouse 60
In the Beginning 62
The Greenhouse Gases 64
Black Carbon 67
Drought and Floods 68
East Africa—The Drought Years 70
Ethiopia 71
California 72
South Africa 73
Floods 73
Food Insecurity 76
Availability 77
Access 77
Utilization 78
Stability 78
Locusts 79
The Warming Soils 80
Permafrost Soils 81
The Rising Seas 82
Storm Surge 83
Species on the Move 90
Climate Change and Conflict 92
Climate Change and Poverty 95
Climate-Driven Migration 96
Too Hot to Handle 99
The IPCC 100
Conclusion 102
3 The Carbon Cycle 109

Introduction 109
Fast Carbon 110
The Temperature Connection 112
Land Use Change 114
Contents xiii
Methane 116
Enlarging the Sinks 118
In the Ocean 118
On the Land 119
Dialling It Down 122
Two Degrees of Heat 122
An Agreement in Paris 125
Mind the Gap 126
Negative Emission Technologies 128
Keep It in the Ground 134
Conclusion 137
4 Carbon Chaos 143

Introduction 143
Coal 144
The Miners and the Mines 145
Preparing the Coal 147
Generating Electricity 150
Mercury 153
The Minamata Convention 155
Petroleum 156
Offshore Disasters 159
The Macondo Well Disaster 162
Oil Refineries 163
Oil Sands 166
Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage 168
Cyclic Steam Stimulation 168
Petcoke 170
Hydraulic Fracturing 171
Water Usage 173
Methane Emissions 176
Gathering the Gas 179
Railway Carbon 182
The Pipeline Wars 187
Standing Rock 188
Canada’s Pipelines 189
Take the Train 195
Climate Justice 195
The Cost of Carbon 199
Conclusion 202
xiv Contents
5 Coming Clean 213

Introduction 213
Wind and Water 214
Leading the Way 215
Global Energy Production 217
The Key Sectors 219
The Power Sector 220
Can Coal Come Clean? 222
Transport 224
Public Transport 228
Marine and Aviation 229
Shipping 230
Case Study: Sweden 232
Aviation 233
Residential and Tertiary 233
Going Electric 234
Solar Thermal 236
Geothermal Heating 238
Industry 239
Carbon Capture and Storage 239
Rural Electrification 241
Minigrids 242
Tanzania 244
Haiti 247
Solar Home Systems 249
The Economics of Minigrids 251
Energy Efficiency 254
Industry 255
Buildings 257
Transport 259
Strategies for Improving Energy Efficiency 261
Conclusion 262
6 Getting Technical 271

Introduction 271
Wind Power 272
The Twenty-First Century 274
How It Works 274
Capacity Factor 276
Contents xv
Windspeed Distribution 277

Wind Resources 280
Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) 282
Environmental Impacts 285
Solar Photovoltaic Energy 287
Photovoltaic Technology 291
Distributed Solar Energy 294
Levelized Cost of PV Electricity 299
Concentrating Solar Power 300
Hydropower 303
Regional Trends 303
Pumped Storage 304
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 305
Environmental Impacts 306
Biomass Energy 308
Biofuels 310
Advanced biofuels 311
Biogas 312
Geothermal Energy 313
How It Works 315
Geothermal Direct Use 316
Nuclear Power 317
Energy Storage 319
Behind the Meter 321
Comparing the Costs 322
Conclusion 324
7 Pricing Down Carbon 333

Introduction 333
Dialling It Down 334
Carbon Pricing 334
Tax, Cap or Trade? 336
The Global Overview 338
Carbon Revenues 340
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 343
Quebec Cap-and-Trade System for Emission Allowances 350
Carbon Revenues 352
British Columbia 353
California 356
xvi Contents
Fossil Fuel Subsidies 359

One Hundred Percent Clean? 362
Petrochemicals 364
Metallurgical Coal 366
Cement Production 367
Conclusion 367
8 Denial and Deception 373

Introduction 373
Manufacturing Doubt 374
Detection and Concern 375
Research, and More Research 377
The Decades of Denial 380
ExxonMobil’s Denial Campaign 383
Mixing the Message 385
Getting Personal 387
The Thomas Karl Affair 390
The Balancing Act 393
SLAPPing Them Around 395
Prepping the Kids 398
Regulatory Capture 401
Expunging the Record 405
Big Oil, Big Pockets 406
Sunblock 407
Fuelling US Forward 410
Denying the Science 412
Conclusion 414
9 How to End the Climate Crisis 421

Introduction 421
The IPCC Special Report 422
The Carbon Budget 423
Small Island Developing States 423
Business as Usual 424
On the Wrong Track 425
Can We Trust the IPCC Reports? 428
Risky Business 429
The Fat Tail Problem 430
Permafrost Carbon Emissions 431
Contents xvii
Arctic Sea Ice 433

The Greenland Ice Sheet 434
Antarctic Ice Sheet 434
Sea Level Rise 435
Settling the Argument 437
Action Not Words 438
A Framework for Climate Action 440
Strategic Objectives 441
Non-state Actors 454
Divestment 455
In the Streets 457
Extinction Rebellion 458
Greta Thunberg 460
L’union Fait La Force 460
Make Your Vote Count 465
Conclusion 466
Annex 468
Glossary 477
Index 505
Abbreviations and Symbols
AIMS Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea: A group
of the SIDS
ALEC American Legislative Exchange Council
AR5 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC
bbl Barrel, equal to 42 US gallons (about 159 liters)
BECCS Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage
CC Climate change
CCS Carbon capture and storage
CDC Centers for Disease Control (USA)
CDR Carbon dioxide removal
CH4 Methane
CO2 Carbon dioxide
COP Conference of the Parties (to the UNFCCC)
CSA Climate smart agriculture
DA Designated authority
DAC Direct air capture
EBA Ecosystem-based adaptation
EEI Edison Electric Institute
EEZ Economic exclusion zone
ENSO El nino southern oscillation
EPA Environmental Protection Agency (US)
ESM Earth system models
EVI Economic vulnerability index
GCC Global Climate Coalition
GCF Green Climate Fund
GDP Gross domestic product
GHG Greenhouse gases (principally CO2, methane, and nitrous oxide)
xix
xx Abbreviations and Symbols
GIS Geographic information system

GMST Global mean surface temperature
Gt Gigatonne (1 billion tonnes)
GtC Gigaton of carbon
GtCO2 Gigatonne of carbon dioxide
GtCO2e Gigatonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (includes other greenhouse
gases)
GW Gigawatt (1 billion watts)
GWh Gigawatthour (1 billion watthours)
G$ Billion dollars (USD)
ha Hectare. 10,000 square metres, equal to 4048 acres
HDR Human development report
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
INDC Intended nationally determined contribution
IPCC Intergovernmental panel on climate change
IPP Independent power producer
IUCN International union for the conservation of nature
kWp Kilowatt peak
LDC Least developed country
LED Light emitting diode
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MPA Marine protected area
MSL Mean sea level
MtCO2 Million tonnes of CO2
MtCO2e Million tonnes of eqivalent CO2
MUD Manufacturing uncertainty and doubt
MW Megawatt (1 million watts)
MWh Megawatthour (1 million watthours)
MWp Peak megawatt (of a PV array)
NAS National Academy of Science
NASA National Aeronautical and Space Agency (USA)
NDC Nationally determined contribution (to the Paris Agreement Targets)
NEB National Energy Board (Canada)
NET Negative emission technology
NHC National Hurricane Centre (USA)
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (USA)
pH A measure of acidity. A pH of 7 is neutral. A lower value is more
acidic
PNG Papua New Guinea
PPA Power purchase agreement
ppb Parts per billion
ppm Parts per million
Abbreviations and Symbols xxi
PV Photovoltaic solar energy

RCP Representative concentration pathway
RET Renewable energy technology
RF Radiative forcing
SIDS Small Island Developing State
SLAPP Strategic lawsuit against public participation
SST Sea surface temperature
t/yr Tonnes per year
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WHO World Health Organisation
WMO World Meteorological Organisation
XR Extinction Rebellion
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Ratio of record highs to record lows in the USA

(Source US Global Change Research Program 2017) 5
Fig. 1.2 Number of deaths per disaster type (Source Centre for Research
on the Epidemiology of Disasters: Poverty & death:
Disaster mortality 1996–2015 ) 7
Fig. 1.3 Number of climate-related disasters occurring each year since
1960 (Emergency events database, EM-DAT. Universite
Catholique de Louvain. Accessed at: http://emdat.be/database
in July 2017) (Source Emergency events database. Université
Catholique de Louvain) 10
Fig. 1.4 Calls for assistance to the US Federal Emergency Management
Agency 1997–2016 (Source US Environmental Defense Fund) 12
Fig. 1.5 Cars racing to escape the flames engulfing Fort McMurray
in May 2016 13
Fig. 1.6 Wildfires blazing in Portugal in October 2017 14
Fig. 1.7 Human and lightning-ignited annual large forest fires (a);
and shrub and grassland fires (b) on lands in the western US.
The horizontal lines indicate 10-year averages
(Source Westerling, A.L.R.: “Increasing western US forest
wildfire activity: Sensitivity to changes in the timing of spring.”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 371 [2016]:
20150178) 15
Fig. 1.8 Average monthly Arctic sea ice extent. August 1979–2017
(see the US National Snow and Ice Data Center website.
Accessed at: https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2017/09/
the-end-of-summer-nears/) (Source US National Snow
and Ice Data Center) 17
xxiii
xxiv List of Figures
Fig. 1.9 Antarctic November sea-ice extent 1978–2018

(Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center) 18
Fig. 1.10 Glacier Bay National Park and Reserve’s White Thunder
ridge—Then and now (Source US National Snow and Ice
Data Center, state of the cryosphere) 19
Fig. 1.11 Annual mass balance of reference glaciers (see the WMO
Report No. 1233. Statement on the State of the Global
Climate in 2018 ) (Source World Meteorological Organisation,
Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018 ) 20
Fig. 1.12 Mass balance trends for four major ice sheets
(Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center) 21
Fig. 1.13 A ‘drunken forest’ in Alaska—caused by thawing
permafrost (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center) 23
Fig. 1.14 Coral bleaching (left) and coral dying (right) at Lizard
Island (Source The Ocean Agency) 24
Fig. 1.15 Coral reef in Haiti destroyed by overfishing (A typical
former coral reef at La Gonave in Haiti overfished
to the point where it has become an algal dominated
reef with a few stubs of coral surviving but no fish)
(Source Reef Check) 25
Fig. 1.16 Impact of dissolved oxygen (DO) levels on marine
organisms (see Dead zones and climate zones. Accessed at:
http://www.vims.edu/research/topics/dead_zones/impacts/
index.php) (Source Virginia Institute of Marine Science) 28
Fig. 1.17 Plastic waste inputs into the ocean in 2010
(Source Jambeck Research Group) 29
Fig. 1.18 Remains of an albatross that had ingested plastic waste
(Source Science Magazine) 30
Fig. 1.19 Mean concentrations of particulate matter (PM10) in 40 cities
for the period 2011–2015 (Source World Health Organisation) 33
Fig. 1.20 Comparison of growth areas and declining emissions in the
USA, 1980–2017 (Our nation’s air: https://gispub.epa.gov/
air/trendsreport/2017/#home) (Source US Environmental
Protection Agency) 35
Fig. 1.21 Charcoal market in Haiti—Just outside Port-au Prince
in 2013 (Source Author’s collection) 37
Fig. 1.22 Prevalence of undernourishment in the world and absolute
numbers in millions (Source FAO, State of Food Security
and Nutrition in the World 2018 ) 42
Fig. 2.1 Global temperature anomalies over land and over ocean
(Source NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies) 61
Fig. 2.2 Global ocean heat content (0–2000 m) (Source National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) 62
List of Figures xxv
Fig. 2.3 Global mean energy budget of the Earth under present day
conditions (Source Institute for Atmospheric and Climate
Science ETH Zurich) 63
Fig. 2.4 The Keeling curve—Atmospheric concentrations of CO2
measured at Mauna Loa observatory (Source Scripps Institution
of Oceanography) 65
Fig. 2.5 Global atmospheric levels of methane (left) and nitrous oxide
(right) (Source WMO Statement on the State of the Global
Climate in 2018) 66
Fig. 2.6 Number of people affected by drought since 1990
(Graph from the EM-DAT database) (Source Centre of
Research for the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université
Fig. 2.7 Number of people affected by floods between 1900–2015
(The graph is from the EM-DAT database) (Source Centre
of Research for the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université
Fig. 2.8 Storm surge and storm tide (Source US National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration) 84
Fig. 2.9 The price of food and social unrest in 40 countries
(Source FAO. The State of Food Security and Nutrition
in the World 2017 ) 93
Fig. 2.10 Annual mean growth rates of CO2 at Mauna Loa Observatory
(Source US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration) 99
Fig. 3.1 Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions 2008–2017
(see the Global Carbon Budget 2018 Report. Accessed at:
http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/17/files/
GCP_CarbonBudget_2018.pdf ) (Source Global Carbon Project) 111
Fig. 3.2 The sources and sinks of anthropogenic carbon dioxide
emissions (see the Global Carbon Budget 2018 Report.
http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/17/files/
GCP_CarbonBudget_2018.pdf ) (Source Global Carbon Project) 112
Fig. 3.3 Global emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel use (see the Global
Carbon Budget 2018 Report. http://www.globalcarbonproject.
org/carbonbudget/17/files/GCP_CarbonBudget_2018.pdf )
(Source Global Carbon Project) 113
Fig. 3.4 The correlation between global temperature and atmospheric
CO2 (Source Climate Central) 113
Fig. 3.5 Global annual emissions from fossil carbon and land-use
change (Source Global Carbon Project) 115
xxvi List of Figures
Fig. 3.6 Global emissions of CO2 by country 1960–2017

Fig. 3.7 Estimated global anthropogenic methane emissions by source
(Source Global Methane Initiative) 117
Fig. 3.8 Trends lines for ocean and terrestrial sinks since 1960
Fig. 3.9 Emissions gaps in meeting the Paris Agreement’s goals
(Source Carbon Action Tracker) 127
Fig. 3.10 Potential sectoral emission reductions by 2030 (see The
Emissions Gap Report 2017. United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP). Available at: https://www.unenviron-
ment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report) (Source United
Nations Environment Program) 128
Fig. 4.1 The village of Aberfan just after the 1966 disaster
(Source Public domain) 149
Fig. 4.2 The mercury cycle (Source Physicians for Social Responsibility
[USA]) 155
Fig. 4.3 Number of pipeline incidents from 1999 to 2018
(Source US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration [See the US Pipeline and hazardous materials
safety administration website: https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/
analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages]) 159
Fig. 4.4 Number of incidents reported to the NEB in Canada
(Source National Energy Board, Canada) 160
Fig. 4.5 The Deepwater Horizon oil rig on fire in the Gulf of Mexico
(Source US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board) 163
Fig. 4.6 Emissions of CO2 from the extraction and processing of crude
oil (Source Pembina Institute, Canada) 169
Fig. 4.7 Schematic of shale gas well (Source Canadian Society
for Unconventional Resources) 172
Fig. 4.8 Greenhouse gas emissions from shale gas compared
to other fuels (Source Robert Howarth, Cornell University) 179
Fig. 4.9 Canada’s pipeline infrastructure in 2014 (Source Natural
Resources Canada) 181
Fig. 4.10 Oil train derailment and fire in Mosier, Oregon, USA
(Source Paloma Ayala) 185
Fig. 4.11 The Lac Megantic scene after the July 2013 accident
(Source Transportation Safety Board of Canada) 186
Fig. 4.12 External costs per technology for electricity technologies,
US¢/kWh (Source European Commission) 201
Fig. 5.1 Estimated renewable energy share of total final energy
consumption in 2016 (REN21. Renewables 2018 Global
Status Report) (Source REN21) 217
List of Figures xxvii
Fig. 5.2 European greenhouse gas emission reductions projected

through to 2050 (Source European Commission) 219
Fig. 5.3 Estimated renewable energy share of global electricity
production end-2017 (Source REN21 Global Status Report) 221
Fig. 5.4 Global Passenger Electric Vehicle Market (including PHEVs),
2012–2017 (Source REN21 Global Status Report) 225
Fig. 5.5 Tonnes of black carbon emissions per ship per year in 2015
(Source International Council on Clean Transportation) 231
Fig. 5.6 Small distributed capacity investments by country in 2016
and growth on 2015 (Source Frankfurt School) 235
Fig. 5.7 Drake Landing Solar Community heating system (see the
Drake Landing website at https://dlsc.ca/how.htm)
(Source Drake Landing Solar Community) 238
Fig. 5.8 Distribution of mini-grids in Tanzania by installed capacity
and energy, source, 2016 (Source World Resources Institute) 245
Fig. 5.9 Average additional monthly income generated by the solar
home systems (Source Off-Grid Solar Energy Industry) 251
Fig. 6.1 Wind power global capacity and annual additions from 2007
to 2017, gigawatts (Source REN21 Renewables 2018 Global
Status Report) 275
Fig. 6.2 Principal elements of a large wind turbine (Source U.S.
Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy) 275
Fig. 6.3 Power curve for a Vestas V80 2 MW turbine (Source Wind
Power Program) 276
Fig. 6.4 Histogram of hourly windspeeds at Plymouth, UK (Source
Wind Power Program) 278
Fig. 6.5 Global weighted average capacity factors for new onshore
and offshore wind turbines (Source International Renewable
Energy Agency) 279
Fig. 6.6 Wind energy resources map of North America and Europe
(Source Wind Atlas) 281
Fig. 6.7 World’s largest offshore windfarms in 2018 (see the September
2018 Guardian article: World’s largest offshore windfarm opens
off Cumbrian coast. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2018/sep/06/worlds-largest-offshore-
windfarm-opens-cumbrian-coast-walney-extension-brexit)
(Source Wikipedia) 283
Fig. 6.8 Global weighted average levelized cost of electricity for onshore
wind projects 1983–2017 (Source International Renewable
Energy Agency) 284
xxviii List of Figures
Fig. 6.9 Solar PV global capacity and annual additions from 2007

to 2017 (Source REN21 Renewables 2018 Global Status Report) 288
Fig. 6.10 Energy output from the PVGIS model for a 6kWp
photovoltaic system in Miami, Florida (Source Photovoltaic
Geographic Information System) 293
Fig. 6.11 Output data for a 30 MWp photovoltaic system in Djibouti,
East Africa (Source Photovoltaic Geographic Information System) 293
Fig. 6.12 Three models of community and shared solar energy
(Source US Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency
and Renewable Energy) 296
Fig. 6.13 Basic components of a PV + energy storage system
(Source Florida Solar Energy Center) 298
Fig. 6.14 SunShot targets for levelized costs of PV electricity in US cents/
kWh (Source US Department of Energy, Sunshot Initiative) 300
Fig. 6.15 The two main solar concentrating power concepts
(Source US Department of Energy) 301
Fig. 6.16 Geothermal power capacity and additions, top ten countries
and rest of the world in 2017 (see Renewables 2018 Global
Status Report) (Source REN21 Global Status Report) 314
Fig. 7.1 How a carbon tax reduces emissions (Source Ecofiscal, Canada) 337
Fig. 7.2 How a cap and trade system reduces emissions
(Source Ecofiscal Canada) 337
Fig. 7.3 Carbon prices below $25tCO2e (State and trends of carbon
emissions 2018 ) (Source World Bank Group) 339
Fig. 7.4 Disbursement of carbon revenues by the RGGI states
(Source Inside Climate News) 347
Fig. 7.5 How Quebec’s cap-and-trade system works (Source Le Quebec
en action verte) 351
Fig. 7.6 Disbursements budgeted for Quebec’s carbon revenues,
2013–2020 (Source Le Quebec en action verte) 353
Fig. 7.7 Trends in California’s GDP, population, and GHG emissions
since 2000 (Source California Air Resources Board) 357
Fig. 7.8 Trends in California GHG emissions by sector 2000–2016
(Source California Air Resources Board) 358
Fig. 7.9 Fossil fuel consumption subsidies, 2017 (billion dollars)
(International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook: Fossil-
fuel subsidies. Accessed at: https://www.iea.org/weo/energysub-
sidies/) (Source International Energy Agency) 360
Fig. 7.10 Energy sources in the 100% clean energy scenario for the USA
(Source Energy and Environmental Sciences) 363
Fig. 8.1 Average temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere over the last
1000 years (Source Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 388
List of Figures xxix
Fig. 8.2 Global mean surface temperature anomalies relative

to the 1961–1990 mean (see Climate Change 2013.
The IPCC 5th Assessment Report WG1. Available at:
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_
all_final.pdf ) (Source Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change) 390
Fig. 9.1 Average annual global primary energy demand growth
by fuel, 2011–2018 (Source International Energy Agency) 425
Fig. 9.2 Comparison of countries’ commitment to meeting
the Paris Agreement targets (Source Climate Action Tracker) 428
Fig. 9.3 Probability of global warming for atmospheric CO2 equivalent
concentrations of 700 ppm (Source Climate Shock) 432
Fig. 9.4 Emission gaps and 1990 emission level as 2030 target
(Source Carbon Action Tracker) 439
Fig. 9.5 Logical framework for a transition to a net zero greenhouse
gas economy by 2050 (The seven strategic objectives and much
of the text is based on the EU publication: A clean planet for all ) 441
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Occurrence and mortality of the five top types of disaster

over the last two decades 9
Table 1.2 Top ten countries ranked by quantity of mismanaged plastic
waste in 2010, million tons 29
Table 2.1 Storm surges recorded in the USA and the Caribbean
this century 85
Table 2.2 Number of people living at less than 1 m above sea level 87
Table 2.3 Percentage of populations living less than 1 m above sea level 88
Table 2.4 Conflict, climate-related shocks, and food insecurity in 2016 94
Table 3.1 Emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion in the USA
in 2017 114
Table 3.2 The top ten emitters of carbon dioxide in 2018 116
Table 3.3 US methane emissions in 2017 118
Table 3.4 Cost, global potential, and limiting factors for a range
of negative emissions technologies 133
Table 3.5 CO2 produced by combustion of total world fossil fuel reserves 137
Table 4.1 Health effects of air pollutants from coal-fired power plants 151
Table 4.2 The worst oil tanker accidents since 1967 158
Table 4.3 The worst offshore oil rig disasters 160
Table 4.4 Major Canadian pipeline initiatives during the last decade 190
Table 5.1 Renewable energy indicators 2014–2017 218
Table 5.2 Relative performance of coal-fired generation technologies
in South East Asia 223
Table 5.3 The competitiveness of electrification options 252
Table 5.4 Cost of electricity from electrification options 253
Table 6.1 Annual energy output for a 2 MW Vestas offshore wind turbine 279
Table 6.2 Largest operational onshore windfarms 282
xxxi
xxxii List of Tables
Table 6.3 Common human-caused threats to birds in North America 287

Table 6.4 The largest solar photovoltaic power plants (300 MW or greater) 290
Table 6.5 Top 10 countries for installed hydropower capacity 304
Table 6.6 Median life-cycle carbon emissions 306
Table 7.1 Disbursement of carbon revenues 2013/2014 341
Table 7.2 Key issues and enabling measures supporting carbon pricing 342
Table 7.3 Allocation of carbon revenues among RGGI states, 2015–2017 346
Table 7.4 Energy-related emissions of CO2 in the RGGI states, MtCO2 348
Table 7.5 Total caps of emissions units granted 352
Table 7.6 Quebec’s actual emissions of greenhouse gases 352
Table 7.7 Emissions per capita for Canada, British Columbia, Quebec,
and Ontario 1990–2017 355
Table 7.8 Global fossil fuel subsidies, million USD (2017) 361
Table 7.9 Hydrocarbon gas liquids, uses and products 365
Table 8.1 Contributions to the defeat of Initiative 1631 406
Table 9.1 Top ten CO2 emitting countries in 2018, MtCO2 426
1
A Planet in Peril
Introduction
The news in the summer of 2017 was all about the hurricanes in the
Caribbean (three of which ripped into the US causing extensive damage),
the earthquakes in Iran, Iraq, and Mexico, and disastrous, flooding in India,
Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh that drowned over a thousand people and
displaced millions more.
In 2018, the roll call of natural disasters continued: stifling heatwaves in
Australia, numerous destructive wildfires along the west coast of America
and Canada, and more devastating hurricanes tearing into the Caribbean
islands and the USA. Then in early 2019, the monster cyclone Idai barrelled
into Mozambique killing at least 1000 people and leaving almost half a mil-
lion homeless.
Are these disasters becoming more frequent, and are they somehow
related to climate change? Or do they always happen every 10 or 20 years,
and so the disasters of the last few years are just a normal run of horrible
weather: storms, heatwaves, and floods. And earthquakes? They have been
devastating cities and destroying lives since the beginning of recorded time.
But then most people have read that scientists and meteorologists are say-
ing that global temperatures are now increasing year after year. After 2015,
which was a record-breaking year, 2016 was hotter still and then so was
2017. The five hottest years on record have all occurred since 2010. Is this
just part of a normal cycle of temperature variations that sometimes go up
© The Author(s) 2020 1

M. J. Bush, Climate Change and Renewable Energy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_1
2
M. J. Bush
and then eventually come down? Maybe this has all happened before and we
will all soon be back to normal?
In this chapter we want to examine the evidence that the climate appears
to be permanently changing. We will look at all the signs that the Earth is
suffering from a multitude of stresses and forces that are making life dan-
gerous and miserable not just for people in almost all countries around
the world, but for most of the ecosystems and animal species on the
planet. Something is seriously wrong. That’s why the title of this chapter is
‘A planet in peril’: because something out there is having a malign influence
on what was once a beautiful and healthy planet.
Heat Waves
Although there is no standard definition of a heat wave, it’s a phenomenon
that everyone understands. We all have a general sense of what the term
means. It’s not just that it’s hotter than normal for the time of year: the heat
keeps going for several days, the temperature hardly falls overnight, and for
most people, the hot weather is close to unbearable. When some people
actually die of heatstroke and exhaustion during this period, there is no dis-
puting the term. It’s a heatwave.1
Heatwaves have been around for a long time: they are not events that
have suddenly appeared since scientists started worrying about climate
change and global heating. The first well-documented case may be the
extreme heat that settled over London in 1858. The River Thames at the
time was little more than a massive and foul sewer carrying the human waste
of more than two million people slowly out to sea. Since the river is tidal in
central London—most of the filth came back in again. The smell was bad
enough in the winter, but in the summer heat of 1858 the stench was intol-
erable. Since drinking water came from ground water sources outside the
city but also contaminated by human waste, cholera was a constant threat.
The abominable stench from the River Thames in the mid-nineteenth
century finally resulted in government action to build a sewerage system that
still operates today.
There is a lesson to be learned from this event in Britain (which is not the
obvious one that seemingly only catastrophic events lead to any real govern-
ment action); it is that heat waves make all the other environmental prob-
lems and health issues that are present at the time much, much worse.
Heat waves occurred regularly throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Among the most well-documented heat waves in the
1 A Planet in Peril
3
United States are those that occurred in 1980 (St. Louis and Kansas
City, Missouri), 1995 (Chicago, Illinois), and 1999 (Cincinnati, Ohio;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Chicago, Illinois). The highest death rates in
these heat waves occurred in people over 65 years of age.2
But since the year 2000, there have been some extreme events. In 2003,
a record heat wave over western Europe resulted in the deaths of as many
as 70,000 people, mostly in Italy and France. The young, the sick, and the
elderly were most affected. Some estimates run as high as 80,000 deaths. For
the period 2000–2106, at least 136,000 fatalities were recorded in Europe
due to heat-related health complications, which represents more than 87%
of all disaster-related deaths in that region.3
In July 2006, heat waves again suffocated Europe and North America—
where over 200 people died in the US. Temperatures in South Dakota
reached 54 °C; in California the heat rose to 50 °C. A year later, Europe
again experienced sustained temperatures over 45 °C. This pattern has con-
tinued every year since.
The most extreme recent event is reckoned to be the Russian heat wave of
July 2010—when thousands of people died: the exact number is unknown.
Scores of people reportedly drowned while swimming drunk.4
In the summer of 2011, a heatwave in Texas produced temperatures over
45 °C. The associated drought and record wildfires cost an estimated $12
billion.5
2015 was an extreme year for heatwaves. In Egypt temperatures reached
45 °C—over 60 people died. This was followed by extreme temperatures
in Iran which were reported as a heat index of 73 °C! Then Pakistan was
scorched in June by 49 °C heat that left 1200 dead; almost 2000 were hos-
pitalized for dehydration and heat stroke. The month before in India, over
2500 people succumbed to the overpowering heat.
In 2016, the hot weather continued its assault. In southern Africa at
the beginning of the year an extreme heatwave set in—exacerbated by the
continuing drought. Many places broke records in early January—records
that had been set only weeks earlier in late 2015. The first week of January
2016, the temperature reached 42 °C in Pretoria and almost 39 °C in
Johannesburg, both of which were 3 °C or more above previous records.
Extreme heat also suffocated South and South-East Asia in April and May
2016 prior to the start of the summer monsoon. The extreme heat was cen-
tred on Thailand, where a national record of 44.6 °C was set at Mae Hong
Son in April. Several records were broken in Malaysia in March and April,
and in May temperatures rose to 51 °C in Phalodi—the highest temperature
ever recorded for India.
4
M. J. Bush
In the Middle East and northern Africa, temperatures were at record

highs. The highest temperature was recorded at Mitribah in Kuwait in July
2016 where the mercury hit 54 °C which, if confirmed, would be the high-
est temperature on record for Asia. The same month, temperatures rose to
54 °C in Basra, Iraq and 53 °C in Dehloran, Iran.6
In early August 2016, a heat wave in Europe dubbed ‘Lucifer’ caused sev-
eral deaths. As sweltering heat settled across western Europe, temperatures
rose to 38 °C in Italy, 40 °C in France, and 44 °C in Spain.7
In the same year, several countries, including Mexico and India, reported
record high temperatures while many other countries observed near record
highs. A weeklong heat waves at the end of April over the northern and east-
ern Indian peninsular, with temperatures over 44 °C, contributed to a water
crisis for 330 million people and caused 300 fatalities.8
The intense heat continued into 2018. Although many countries have
taken steps to better protect vulnerable people against extreme temperatures,
70 people died in Quebec, Canada, and more than 80 died in Japan. There
were prolonged periods of high temperatures in the UK, France, Alaska,
mainland USA, Scandinavia, Morocco, and the Arabian Peninsula.9 In
January 2019, as this book was being finished, Australia was in the grip of
yet another ferocious heatwave—once again breaking all records.
So are heatwaves getting hotter? Are they becoming more frequent? The
answer to both questions appears to be, Yes.
Over the last several decades, there has been an increasing number of
high-humidity heat waves—characterized by the persistence of extremely
high night-time temperatures. The combination of high humidity and high
temperatures at night can have fatal consequences for the elderly. Extreme
heat events are now responsible for more deaths annually than hurricanes,
tornadoes, floods and earthquakes combined.10
Across the globe, extremely warm nights that used to come once in
20 years now occur every ten years. And extremely hot summers (those
substantially above the historical average) are now occurring across a larger
swathe of the planet’s land area—as much as ten times larger than the period
1951–1980.11 One indication of the changing climate can be deduced by
comparing the number of record lows with the number of record highs. In
the US about 60 years ago, the number of new record high temperatures
recorded across the country was roughly equal to the number of record lows:
a sign of the natural variability of weather patterns but nothing to suggest
that the climate was changing. But since the beginning of this century, the
number of new record highs recorded each year has been twice the number
of new record lows. The number of new highs has surpassed the number
1 A Planet in Peril
5
of new lows in 15 of the last 20 years, with 2012 and 2016 being particu-
larly extreme (ratios of seven and five, respectively). Figure 1.1 illustrates the
observed trend in the US since the 1930s.12
So heat waves are becoming hotter. And although Fig. 1.1 shows the
trend for the USA, there is no reason not to suppose that these data signal a
global trend.
Extreme temperatures have killed at over 165,000 people in the last
20 years. In India alone, more than 22,000 people died in heatwaves
between 1992 and 2005.13 During the last 10 years, heatwaves have over-
taken flooding to become the third highest cause of global disaster mortality.
The incidence of extreme temperature also increased: rising to 219 events
over the period 2006–2015, up from 177 the previous decade.14
In spite of the recent record-breaking temperatures, the number of
deaths from heat waves has fallen since 2005, mainly due to lower mor-
tality in Western Europe—where health impact-based weather forecast-
ing was introduced following the 2003 heatwave, an example followed by
several countries including India. However, the global numbers for deaths
due to heatwaves are considered to be substantially under-reported. While
in Western Europe, public awareness may have increased and there is now
much better medical support, middle-income and developing countries in
the tropics for the most part have not adopted these measures.
In North America, increasing access to air-conditioned spaces and greater
awareness of the risks, has tended to reduce the number of fatalities result-
ing from heat waves over the last few years. But this form of adaptation,
which depends on access to reliable electrical power, cannot be replicated
Fig. 1.1 Ratio of record highs to record lows in the USA (Source US Global Change
Research Program 2017)
6
M. J. Bush
everywhere. Across Asia, in the developing world, and everywhere fami-

lies cannot afford air-conditioning, the impact of heat waves is deadly. In
African and Asian villages without electricity there is no respite: the young,
the elderly and those who because of illness are unable to cope with the heat,
will die in greater numbers.
In the Middle East: across Iraq and Iran and over the Persian Gulf, sum-
mer temperatures are now regularly hitting 50 °C or higher. The wealthy
take refuge in the air-conditioned malls, cooled to less than half that temper-
ature by electrical power generated by natural gas. But the region is home to
a third of the world’s refugees, hundreds of thousands of whom live in tent
cities. For these unfortunates, there is no escape from the insufferable heat.
Natural Disasters
Earthquakes, floods and drought are scourges the world has known since
biblical times. They are still called ‘natural’ disasters—suggesting that they
are simply part and parcel of life on planet Earth. But times are changing,
and what was perhaps ‘natural’ a century ago no longer seems quite so natu-
ral now.
The 20-year period from 1996 to 2015 saw just over 7000 disasters
recorded by the database maintained by the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), based at the Catholic University of
Louvain in Brussels, Belgium.15 While the frequency of geophysical disasters
such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions, remained about the
same, there was a sustained increase in climate- and weather-related events:
floods, storms, and particularly heatwaves.
In total, the number of weather- and climate-related disasters has more
than doubled over the past forty years, accounting for over 6000 events in
the 20-year period 1996–2015, up from just over 3000 in the period 1976-
1995. The average mortality for all types of natural disasters increased to
69,800 per year in the decade 2006–2015, up from 64,900 between 1996
and 2005.
These numbers reflect the impacts of two ‘mega disasters’ during the last
decade: cyclone Nargis in 2008 and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The pre-
vious decade saw just one mega disaster: the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.16
Figure 1.2 shows the number of deaths registered for the six most deadly
types of disaster.17
In terms of disaster mortality, the CRED data recorded almost 750,000
deaths from earthquakes in the past 20 years, with 357,000 lives lost
1 A Planet in Peril
7
Fig. 1.2 Number of deaths per disaster type (Source Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters: Poverty & death: Disaster mortality 1996–2015 )
between 2006 and 2015—the majority in the horrific earthquake that dev-
astated Port-au-Prince, Haiti in 2010.
In the previous decade (1996–2005), earthquakes claimed almost
392,000 lives—a period which included the fatalities caused by the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami. In fact, tsunamis are 16 times more deadly than ter-
restrial earthquakes in terms of the proportion of victims killed. This makes
tsunamis the most deadly hazard on the planet.
What is also striking is that storm-related deaths more than doubled
during the 10-year periods shown in Fig. 1.2—even though the number of
storms decreased.
Although relatively small in number, the number of deaths due to
drought increased by a factor of almost 10. This is significant because
drought is a disaster where the number of victims greatly exceeds the num-
ber of deaths. So a 10-fold increase in deaths implies an enormous increase
in the number of people affected by drought—people that are often forced
to move away from drought-stricken regions and effectively become climate
refugees.
Although the number and intensity of heatwaves increased, heatwave
mortality has declined—due primarily to better preparedness and heat-stress
8
M. J. Bush
management. However, it is generally accepted that heat-related deaths in

developing countries are substantially under-reported.
Trends in Climate-Related Disasters
The number of storms resulting in fatalities has slightly declined on a dec-

adal basis over the past 20 years—a decline that may be explained by the El
Nino of 2014–2015 which reduced the occurrence of Atlantic hurricanes.
By contrast, the number of fatalities has increased significantly. Storms
appear to be getting stronger: fatalities jumped from an average of 64 deaths
per event in 1996–2005 to 180 in 2006–2015.
In the period 2006–2015, heatwaves overtook flooding to become the
third highest cause of global disaster mortality. The number of extreme tem-
perature events also increased, rising to 219 events in 2006–2015 up from
177 the previous decade.
The occurrence of floods increased from 1368 to 1672 over the decadal
periods. However, there were fewer fatalities per event suggesting that bet-
ter disaster risk management for floods is having an impact. In contrast, the
number of droughts decreased slightly, but mortality increased massively.
Table 1.1 shows the numbers as reported by the CRED.18
Discounting the earthquake mortalities, climate-related mortalities have
increased by a third over the two decades shown in Table 1.1.
Figure 1.3 shows time series data for the occurrence of storms, floods and
droughts taken from the EM-DAT database—which unfortunately does
not show data for the annual incidence of heatwaves. However, what is clear
is that the number of climate-related disasters, excluding heatwaves, has
increased enormously over the last 60 years. Although the long-term inci-
dence of drought is approximately constant, the mortality associated with
each event has increased substantially—as shown in Table 1.1. This suggests
that droughts are becoming longer, more intense, or covering a larger area
(or all of the above)—characteristics that are not captured by just counting a
drought as a single event.
Have climate-related disasters levelled out over the last ten years? The
apparent flatline trend in Fig. 1.3 is created by the large spike in flood and
storm events during the years 2005–2007—which then drops back to the
long-term trend line for the previous decades producing a short period dur-
ing which the trend line is flat. It is always a mistake to judge a trend based
on a short period of time when the event being assessed is inherently varia-
ble over a period just as long.
Table 1.1 Occurrence and mortality of the five top types of disaster over the last two decades
Disaster 1996–2005 2006–2015 Change (%)
Occurrence Mortality Occurrence Mortality Occurrence Mortality
Earthquakes 299 391,529 248 357,092 −17 −9
Storms 1019 65,430 966 173,695 −5 +165
Heatwaves 177 87,082 219 78,787 24 −10
Floods 1368 93,113 1672 56,948 22 −39
Droughts 186 2118 164 20,177 −12 +853
Total mortalities 639,272 686,699 +7
Climate-related mortalities 247,743 329,607 +33
Source Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. Poverty & death: Disaster mortality 1996–2015
9
1 A Planet in Peril
10
M. J. Bush
Fig. 1.3 Number of climate-related disasters occurring each year since 1960

(Emergency events database, EM-DAT. Universite Catholique de Louvain. Accessed at:
http://emdat.be/database in July 2017) (Source Emergency events database. Université
Catholique de Louvain)
In 2017, there were 318 natural disasters resulting in 9500 deaths and
over 96 million people displaced or otherwise affected. The human impact
was much lower than the last 10-year average, where events with extremely
high mortality occurred: such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (over
225,000 deaths) and the 2008 Nargis cyclone in Myanmar which killed over
138,000 people. Nearly 60% of people affected by disasters in 2017 were
affected by floods, while 85% of economic damage was due to storms.
India was hit hardest with almost 2300 deaths and 22.5 million people
affected mostly by floods and storms. Sierra Leone experienced a disastrous
mudslide that killed 502 people and left 600 more missing. Hurricanes Irma
and Maria caused extensive damage to small islands in the Caribbean, par-
ticularly Puerto Rico where the death toll, originally estimated at less than
100, was later raised to nearly 3000. In Mauritania, 88% of population was
affected by drought.19
In terms of economic losses, 2017 was the second costliest year with losses
estimated at $314 billion—mainly due to the three hurricanes (Harvey,
Irma, and Maria) that devastated the Caribbean islands and caused extensive
damage in the US.20
In 2018, there were 315 recorded disasters—almost the same number
as the year before, but they were more destructive, killing 11,800 people.
Overall, floods have affected more people than any other type of disaster in
the twenty-first century and 2018 was no exception. In Somalia, 700,000
people were affected by flooding, while in Nigeria nearly 2 million people
1 A Planet in Peril
11
were displaced. The August flash flood in India’s Kerala’s state affected over
23 million people.
Two destructive hurricanes tore into the US, while in Asia, China, India,
Japan, and the Philippines were all hit hard by multiple storms. Three east
and central pacific hurricanes reached category 5 intensity in 2018: Lane,
Walaka and Willa. Lane dumped 1312 mm of rain on Hawaii during a 96 h
period—the highest storm rainfall on record for a Hawaiian tropical cyclone
and second for the US after Harvey in 2017. Storms were the most costly
type of disaster in 2018, primarily due to hurricanes Florence and Michael,
and typhoon Jebi.
Drought impacted 3 million people in Kenya and almost the same num-
ber in Afghanistan. In Central America, drought affect 2.5 million people
in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua—driving increased
migration from those countries.
Across the world, the trend of devastating wildfires continued from 2017
into 2018. The Attica fire in Greece killed 100 people, making it the dead-
liest wildfire in Europe since records began in 1900, while in the US, the
Camp Fire killed 88 people and was the costliest on record.21
The numbers suggest an emerging trend: that although the mortality due
to natural disasters may be declining, but the economic impact is escalat-
ing. This might be because some types of disasters—particularly storms and
wildfires, are becomes more intense and destructive, but at the same time,
people are becoming better able to escape the danger or withstand the force
of the event.
In the USA, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) had the good idea
of checking in with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
They took a look at how many calls for help FEMA had to respond to over
the last few years. The results are shown in Fig. 1.4.22
The trend is clear. Even though the period 2012-2016 suggests a down-
ward trend, the longer term trend is upwards. And when the graph is
updated to include the data from 2017—when four hurricanes tore into the
US (including Puerto Rico), the number of counties calling FEMA for help
is sure to increase dramatically.
A World on Fire
The Canadian wildfire season in 2015 began early and ended late. In that
year, almost 5000 fires burned through 3.25 million hectares of woodland—
four times the 25-year average. In British Colombia, the months of May
12
M. J. Bush
Fig. 1.4 Calls for assistance to the US Federal Emergency Management Agency 1997–
2016 (Source US Environmental Defense Fund)
and June were close to being the driest months on record, and this weather
was clearly amplifying the rampant fires. The thick and pungent smoke
from the flames left thousands of residents gasping for air through surgical
masks. Further east across the prairies in Saskatchewan, uncontrollable fires
prompted what was, up until that time, the largest evacuation in Canada’s
history—more than 13,000 people fled the flames.23
But 2015 was merely a prelude to the 2016 fire the Canadians called the
Beast.
The spring of 2016 was the driest ever recorded at Fort McMurray,
Alberta, and the second warmest on record. Weeks of warm dry weather
created a bone-dry forest floor—the perfect conditions for a firestorm.
On May 1 the fire ignited, and blustery winds quickly blew it out of con-
trol. Within two days the fire had doubled in size, jumped highways and
the Athabasca River and was burning its way towards downtown Fort
McMurray. The town’s 88,000 residents scrambled to leave—a mass exo-
dus of unprecedented scale for Canada. By May 4, the wildfire was so large
it could be seen from space. It burned through an area the size of Prince
Edward Island, destroyed 2400 homes and other buildings, scorched
18,600 vehicles and left the town a smouldering ash-covered ruin. It was
the costliest catastrophe in Canadian history: total damages reached $4 bil-
lion in insured losses and billions more in lost business, infrastructure and
uninsured losses.24
What made the wildfire so dramatic was the speed with which it spread
into the town of Fort McMurray. Many residents were caught by sur-
prise and had to flee the city driving through a wall of flame. The photo
1 A Planet in Peril
13
Fig. 1.5 Cars racing to escape the flames engulfing Fort McMurray in May 2016
in Fig. 1.5, taken from inside a car approaching what looks like a raging
inferno, captures the terrifying experience many residents endured as they
fled the city to escape the encircling flames.
If anything the year 2017 was worse. By the month of August, the prov-
ince of British Columbia was in a state of emergency as 138 wildfires burned
across the province, and metro Vancouver was covered in a thick layer of
smoke. This was British Columbia’s worst fire season in history.25
At the same time in California, wildfires burned across thousands of hec-
tares of land fuelled by scorching temperatures that were breaking heat and
fire records across the region. At least 15 cities registered record-breaking
heat and the state experienced its hottest summer on record. San Francisco
hit 41 °C the first week of September 2017, breaking its previous record by
1.7 °C. At one point, over 80 large fires were blazing across 600,000 hectares
from Colorado to California and north to Washington state. Seattle and
Vancouver were shrouded in a smoky fog.26 Then in early December 2017,
yet another fire ignited—60 miles northwest of Los Angeles. Dubbed the
Thomas Fire and whipped up by Santa Ana winds, it burned for a month
and became the largest fire in California history—scorching over 114,000
hectares and destroying 1063 structures. Fifty thousand people were evacu-
ated from in and around Ventura county.
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M. J. Bush
Fig. 1.6 Wildfires blazing in Portugal in October 2017
In October 2017, huge wildfires burned across Portugal. At least 37 peo-

ple died in the fires—fuelled by temperatures of 34 °C and strong winds.
Figure 1.6 gives an idea of the scale of the fires.
In 2018, California was once again in flames. In August, the Mendocino
Complex fire became the largest in California history.27 Then in
November, the Camp Fire broke out and incinerated an area of more than
62,000 hectares, destroying 18,800 structures in its path and killing 88 peo-
ple. The wildfire almost completely destroyed the town of Paradise.
The years 2015–2017 were some of the hottest years on record, and the
extremely hot summers were certainly a factor in fuelling these huge wild-
fires. But in the forests along the western US, fires have been increasing in
intensity since the mid-1980s.
Figure 1.7 shows that the frequency of large forest wildfires has continued
to increase with each decade since the 1970s. The area burned in these fires
has also continued to increase—so the fires are getting larger. Most of the
increase is due to wildfires ignited by lightning. Less than 12% of the trend
in large forest fires is due to fires ignited by humans.28
There are two things to note about the numbers shown in Fig. 1.7: first,
although there is a large degree of variability, the ten-year averages show a
steady and unmistakable upward trend. Second, lightning is becoming the
dominant source of ignition for these wildfire in western USA. This was not
1 A Planet in Peril
15
Fig. 1.7 Human and lightning-ignited annual large forest fires (a); and shrub and
grassland fires (b) on lands in the western US. The horizontal lines indicate 10-year
averages (Source Westerling, A.L.R.: “Increasing western US forest wildfire activity:
Sensitivity to changes in the timing of spring.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B 371 [2016]: 20150178)
the case in the 1970s, but lightning-ignited wildfires have become increas-
ingly predominant over the last 30 years. This is an alarming trend: there is
evidence that the frequency of lightning strikes increases as the climate gets
warmer.29
Lightning-caused fires have risen between 2 and 5% per year for the last
four decades. As thunderstorms intensify and become more frequent, fires
are increasingly occurring in the boreal forests and even on the permafrost
tundra. Warmer temperatures generate more thunderstorms which in turn
bring more lightning and greater fire risk.30
In August 2017, a large wildfire was burning in Greenland only 40 miles
from the ice sheet, and in a place so remote that no-one noticed it until
satellites spotted the smoke at the end of July. Small fires are not unknown
in Greenland during the summer, but for such a large blaze to burn for so
long was unusual. Scientists at the University of Technology in Delft in
the Netherlands said that 2017 was by far the worst year for wildfires in
Greenland since records began in 2000.31 It is not known what caused the
fire in the tundra of western Greenland, but the summer of 2017 was a par-
ticularly dry summer.
Are wildfires growing in number and intensity across the world? The data
are mixed, but for most regions the trend is actually downward. A 2017
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M. J. Bush
research article that examined multiple satellite data sets found that global
burned area has declined by about 24% over the last 18 years. But these data
cover all fires, not just wildfires, including those deliberately set by farmers
to burn crop residues or to clear away forests to open up the land for agri-
culture. The global trend for wildfires, as opposed to fires deliberately set, is
unclear.32 But in North America, the trend is unmistakably upwards.
The Big Melt

What’s called the cryosphere includes sea ice, ice sheets, ice shelves, glaciers,
and permafrost—frozen ground. These frigid formations hold an enormous
amount of frozen water. If they were all to melt away, the resulting global sea
level rise would be catastrophic. The good news is that even if melting is tak-
ing place—it’s slow. But is there any evidence that this is, in fact, happening?
Sea Ice
Sea ice is frozen seawater that floats on the ocean surface. Covering millions
of square kilometres at both ends of the planet, sea ice freezes over and then
melts away with the polar seasons, choreographing the seasonal rhythms of
human activity and ecosystem habitats. In the Arctic, some sea ice persists
year after year, whereas in the Southern Ocean or Antarctic, sea ice is more
seasonal—melting completely away and reforming annually. While both
Arctic and Antarctic ice are vitally important for the habitats of land and
marine mammals, sea ice in the Arctic appears to play a more crucial role in
influencing the climate.33
The Arctic and the Antarctic are quite different. Up north, the Arctic
is pretty much all sea ice—meaning that most of it is floating on water.
There is very little land. When this ice melts, sea level is unaffected. The
Antarctic on the other hand is a huge land mass that is covered by ice
formed from snowfall—an ice sheet. There is some floating sea ice around
the perimeter of the land, but the vast majority of Antarctic ice is on land.
Sea ice thickness, its spatial extent, and the fraction of open water within
the ice pack can vary rapidly in response to changing weather and climate.
Sea ice typically covers about 14–16 million km2 in late winter in the Arctic
and 17–20 million km2 in the Antarctic Southern Ocean. On average, the
seasonal decrease is much larger in the Antarctic, with only about 2–4 mil-
lion km2 remaining at the end of summer, compared to about 7 million km2
remaining in the Arctic.
1 A Planet in Peril
17
In the Arctic, the extent of sea ice has been declining. Since 1979, winter
Arctic ice extent has decreased by about 3% per decade.34
In 2016, the extent of sea ice was well below average and was at record
low levels for many months of the year. The maximum extent of the ice—
which usually occurs in the first few months of the year in the Northern
hemisphere, was the lowest ever recorded in the satellite record (which goes
back almost 40 years). Figure 1.8 shows August levels of sea ice extent in the
Arctic from 1979 to 2017.
The trend in the Arctic is unmistakable.
While Arctic sea ice was setting record lows, Antarctic sea ice was setting
record highs. In September 2014, Antarctic sea ice expanded to over 20 mil-
lion km2—the highest sea ice extent in the satellite record.
Still in the Antarctic, in 2016 the sea-ice extent was close to the long-term
average for the first eight months of the year, reaching a seasonal maximum
of just over 18 million km2 at the end of August. This was the earliest sea-
sonal maximum on record. This was then followed by an exceptionally rapid
spring melt, resulting in a November mean extent of 14.5 million km2—by
far the lowest on record. The reasons for the rapid collapse of the Antarctic
sea ice in late 2016 are not completely understood. Clearly much more
research is needed—if only because the Antarctic ice sheets hold truly mas-
sive, almost incomprehensible amounts of water.
Fig. 1.8 Average monthly Arctic sea ice extent. August 1979–2017 (see the US
National Snow and Ice Data Center website. Accessed at: https://nsidc.org/arcticseai-
cenews/2017/09/the-end-of-summer-nears/) (Source US National Snow and Ice Data
Center)
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M. J. Bush
Fig. 1.9 Antarctic November sea-ice extent 1978–2018 (Source US National Snow and
Ice Data Center)
Figure 1.9 shows the percentage change in the extent of Antarctic

November sea ice from 1978 to 2018.35
The long term trendline is flat—although the last five years are showing a
downward trend.
However, in November 2016, sea ice extent was at record lows at both
ends of the planet. After having been 1–2 million km2 below the long term
average for most of the year, global sea-ice extent dropped more than 4 mil-
lion km2 below average in that month—an event unprecedented in the sat-
ellite record.36 The hydrodynamics and thermodynamics of the Antarctic
cryosphere are complex, and scientists are working to understand why the
sea ice trend at the south pole is relatively flat when, at the north pole, sea
ice extent continues to decline.37
Glaciers
While the extent of sea ice at the poles shows contrasting trends, this is not
the case for the thousands of glaciers that are found across all the continents
except Australia. Glaciers interest scientists because they are constantly on
the move.
Continuous mass balance records have been kept for about 40 glaciers
since the early 1960s. These data show that in most regions of the world,
glaciers are shrinking in size. From 1961 to 2005, the thickness of many
small glaciers decreased by about 12 meters or the equivalent of 9000 cubic
kilometres of water.38
A study of observational data sets from the World Glacier Monitoring
Service (WGMS) concluded that “rates of early 21st century mass loss are
without precedent on a global scale, at least for the time period observed and
probably also for recorded history. ”
1 A Planet in Peril
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Fig. 1.10 Glacier Bay National Park and Reserve’s White Thunder ridge—Then and
now (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center, state of the cryosphere)
Because glaciers are shrinking so quickly, there are many really striking
‘before and after’ photos in the public record. When it comes to melting gla-
ciers: a picture really is worth a thousand words.
Figure 1.10 shows the Glacier Bay National Park and Reserve’s White
Thunder Ridge as seen on August 13, 1941 (left) and August 31, 2004
(right). The Muir Glacier has retreated out of the field of view, while the
Riggs Glacier has thinned and retreated significantly, and dense new veg-
etation has appeared. The Muir Glacier was more than 2000 feet thick in
1941.39
Glaciers gain mass from snowfall and lose mass as ice melts from its lead-
ing edge. If this mass balance is positive, the glacier gains mass, if the bal-
ance is negative the glacier is losing mass and retreating. Figure 1.11 shows
this balance for 41 reference glaciers tracked by scientists since 1980. The
overall balance since 1989 is clearly negative—meaning the glaciers are
retreating. The rate at which these glaciers are retreating also appears to be
increasing.
This is a global phenomenon. Almost everywhere around the world, gla-
ciers are melting.40
Ice Sheets
Just like glaciers, an ice sheet forms through the accumulation of snowfall—
when snowfall exceeds the annual snow melt. Over thousands of years, the
layers of snow build up, become compacted, and can form a sheet of ice sev-
eral thousand meters thick, and hundreds of kilometres wide.
If the ice field covers more than 50,000 km2, it is defined as an ice sheet.
Although ice sheets covered much of the northern hemisphere during the
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M. J. Bush
Fig. 1.11 Annual mass balance of reference glaciers (see the WMO Report No. 1233.
Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018 ) (Source World Meteorological
Organisation, Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018 )
last ice ages, the planet now has just two major ice sheets: one on Greenland,
the other on Antarctica. The Greenland ice sheet is the smaller of the two:
covering about 1.7 million km2. In contrast, the area of the Antarctic ice
sheet is enormous—almost 14 million km2. That is more than one and a half
times the area of the continental USA.
As the ice sheet gets thicker from snowfall, its weight increases—to the
point where the ice sheet begins to deform and to flow slowly outwards. Ice
sheets flow outward from their centres, where they are generally thickest,
and push outwards until they encounter ocean water, or where the climate is
warm enough to melt the ice faster than its rate of flow.
Together the two formations on Greenland and Antarctica hold 99% of
the world’s freshwater. If the Greenland ice sheet melted away completely,
global sea levels would rise about 7 meters. If the Antarctic ice sheet were to
melt, sea levels would rise at least another 50 meters.41
Because ice sheets hold so much ice and have the potential to raise global
sea levels so dramatically, measuring the mass balance of the ice sheets and
tracking these changes is an area of intense scientific study. Particularly for
the Antarctic where, as noted above, the geophysics and hydrodynamics of
ice sheet behaviour are not yet fully understood.
The science is complex and sophisticated: satellite radar, altimetry map-
ping, and gravimetric sensing using NASA’s GRACE satellites have been
1 A Planet in Peril
21
employed together with more conventional land-based mass balance calcu-

lations. The data, while not perfectly aligned, clearly agree on the long term
trends. A study in 2012 combined satellite altimetry, interferometry, and
gravimetric data to examine ice sheet mass balances. The study found rea-
sonable agreement between the different satellite methods and estimated the
mass balance changes between 1992 and 2011 as shown in Fig. 1.12.42
So except for the East Antarctica ice sheet, which appears relatively stable
and has gained a small amount of mass over the last few years, the other ice
sheets are losing mass. The overall mass balance for Antarctica is still nega-
tive because the West Antarctica sheet and the Antarctic peninsula are both
losing mass. But the Greenland ice sheet is melting at an unprecedented
Fig. 1.12 Mass balance trends for four major ice sheets (Source US National Snow
and Ice Data Center)
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M. J. Bush
rate. In early 2018, NASA reported that the ice sheet was melting at a rate of
286 billion tonnes a year.43
Permafrost
Permafrost, or permanently frozen ground, is soil, sediment, or rock that

remains at 0 °C for at least two years. Despite its name, permafrost is char-
acterized more by its instability than by its permanence. What’s called the
‘active layer thickness’ or ALT, is the layer that thaws and freezes over the
seasonal cycle—and it gets larger in warmer conditions. Permafrost has
warmed over the past 2–3 decades and is continuing to warm across the
circumpolar north.44 Field observations indicate that permafrost warmed
by up to 6 °C during the twentieth century. Observations on Svalbard
(a Norwegian island close to the Arctic circle) detected record permafrost
warming during the winter of 2005–2006—apparently resulting from
spring temperatures as much as 12 °C above the 1961–1990 average.45
Approximately 55% of northern hemisphere’s land surface is covered
by seasonally frozen ground—which can stay frozen for several months at
high latitudes and high elevations. But when warming permafrost thaws
for longer periods, the effects can be startling. Trees that have fallen over
because of permafrost melting are sometimes referred to as ‘drunken forests’
(Fig. 1.13). Where large-scale thawing of ground ice has occurred, the land-
scape can be transformed through mudslides and the formation of flat-bot-
tomed valleys and melt ponds, which can dramatically alter the landscape.46
Coral Reefs and Oceans

Coral reefs are one of the most productive and biologically rich ecosystems
that exist anywhere on Earth. They are the essential habitat for roughly a
quarter of all known marine species: including fish, sponges, urchins, crus-
taceans, and molluscs. They also provide essential ecosystem services for sev-
eral hundred million people living in coastal communities across the world.
The livelihoods of many coastal communities in developing countries
depend on the fish that congregate and thrive among coral reefs. These live-
lihoods are now threatened by the deteriorating status of the world’s reefs.
In 2011, the World Resources Institute revisited their work conducted
in 2005 surveying the status of, and threats to, the world’s coral reefs. The
Institute reported their key findings as follows.47
1 A Planet in Peril
23
Fig. 1.13 A ‘drunken forest’ in Alaska—caused by thawing permafrost (Source US

National Snow and Ice Data Center)
• More than 60% of the world’s reefs are under immediate and direct threat
from one or more local sources—such as overfishing and destructive fish-
ing, coastal development, watershed-based pollution, or marine-based
pollution and damage.
• Of local pressures on coral reefs, overfishing—including destructive fish-
ing is the most pervasive immediate threat, affecting more than 55% of
the world’s reefs. Coastal development and watershed-based pollution
each threaten about 25% of reefs. Marine-based pollution and damage
from ships is widespread—threatening about 10% of reefs.
• Approximately 75% of the world’s coral reefs are rated as threatened
when local threats are combined with thermal stress, which reflects the
recent impacts of rising ocean temperatures, linked to the widespread
weakening and mortality of corals due to mass coral bleaching.
Warmer waters frequently result in coral bleaching. When seawater is too

warm, corals will expel the algae (zooxanthellae) living in their tissues—
causing the coral to turn completely white. When a coral bleaches it is not
dead, and coral can survive a bleaching event if temperatures moderate. But
24
M. J. Bush
if temperatures remain elevated and if other stresses continue to impact the

reef, the coral will eventually die.
Coral bleaching is one of the clearest indicators of thermal stress on a
reef ecosystem. In 1998, a huge spike in sea surface temperatures killed
16% of the corals on reefs around the world. Triggered by the El Nino of
that year, it was declared the first major global bleaching event. The second
global bleaching event in 2010 was once again caused by an El Nino event.
The third global bleaching event struck in October 2015 and became the
longest and the most destructive on record up to that point in time. The El
Nino of 2015 was once again the principal agent of the damage caused to
the coral.
Figure 1.14 shows a before and after photo of coral bleaching (left) and
coral dying (right) at Lizard Island on the Great Barrier Reef off the coast of
Australia in May 2016.48
The bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef continued into 2017—the first
time that bleaching had occurred in consecutive years. Since it takes corals
at least a decade to recover, mass bleaching events that occur every couple of
years are likely to eventually kill the coral.49
Overfishing can also fatally damage a coral reef. When overfishing is com-
bined with higher seawater temperatures, corals have little chance of recover-
ing (Fig. 1.15).
Fig. 1.14 Coral bleaching (left) and coral dying (right) at Lizard Island (Source The
Ocean Agency)
1 A Planet in Peril
25
Fig. 1.15 Coral reef in Haiti destroyed by overfishing (A typical former coral reef at
La Gonave in Haiti overfished to the point where it has become an algal dominated
reef with a few stubs of coral surviving but no fish) (Source Reef Check)
Haiti is an extreme example of the impact of overfishing on the marine

environment. For instance, Reef Check surveys conducted in 2014 showed
that the reefs of Haiti are the most overfished and destabilized in the world.
Many reefs in Haiti resemble marine ghost towns—with algal dominated
reefs and only a few tiny fish.50
Acidification
The chemistry of ocean water is changing—in ways that may have a fatal
impact on many marine species of crustaceans.
Ocean acidification causes a variety of chemical changes in seawater.
Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere dissolves in water to form carbonic acid.
Over the last 150 years, ocean surface waters have become 30% more acidic
as they have absorbed large amounts of CO2 from the atmosphere. Since
the preindustrial period, the oceans have absorbed most of the CO2 emitted
into the atmosphere—absorption that is still continuing.
26
M. J. Bush
When carbon dioxide is absorbed by seawater, chemical reactions occur

that reduce the saturation state of biologically important calcium carbonate
minerals which are the building blocks of the skeletons and shells of many
marine organisms. In areas where shellfish thrive, the water is supersatu-
rated with respect to calcium carbonate minerals. This allows the shellfish to
develop and grow.
Ocean acidification can have a dramatic effect on some calcifying spe-
cies including oysters, clams, sea urchins, corals, and calcareous plankton.
In recent years, there have been near total failures of developing oysters in
both aquaculture facilities and natural ecosystems on the west coast of the
US. These larval oyster failures appear to be correlated with naturally occur-
ring upwelling events that bring low-pH (i.e. acidic) waters undersaturated
in aragonite (a carbonate mineral) to nearshore environments.51
Deoxygenation
Oxygen is essential for nearly all life in the ocean: from microbes to whales.
But what has become increasingly evident over the last several years is that
climate-induced oxygen loss (deoxygenation) associated with ocean warm-
ing is occurring in all regions around the globe. Where dissolved oxygen lev-
els drop to almost zero (hypoxia) marine species cannot survive. The area
affected is called a ‘dead zone’.
Global ocean deoxygenation is a direct effect of increasing ocean tempera-
tures. Ocean warming reduces the solubility of oxygen (warmer water holds
less oxygen) and changes the physical mixing by upwelling and circulation
of oxygen in the oceans. Warmer waters also increase the metabolism of
marine creatures—increasing their need for oxygen.
The increased temperature of the oceans is estimated to account for about
15% of global oxygen loss, although changes in temperature and oxygen are
not uniform throughout the oceans. Warming also directly influences ther-
mal and salinity stratification, the melting of ice, and changes in precipita-
tion. More pronounced stratification also leads to reduced mixing of oxygen
into the ocean interior.52
Coastal zones can be strongly impacted due to agricultural runoff and the
nutrients, primarily nitrogen and phosphorus, that enter coastal waters and
fertilize blooms of algae. When the algae die, they sink to the bottom and
decompose—a process that consumes dissolved oxygen from the surround-
ing waters. If stratification of the water column prevents mixing or dissolu-
tion of atmospheric oxygen into these waters, they will remain deficient in
oxygen.
1 A Planet in Peril
27
Studies by the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences show that the num-
ber of dead zones has approximately doubled each decade since the 1960s.
Many ecosystems experience a progression in which periodic hypoxic events
becomes seasonal and then, if nutrients continue to increase, persistent. The
planet’s largest dead zone, which is in the Baltic Sea, experiences hypoxia
all year long. Chesapeake Bay, in the US, experiences seasonal summertime
hypoxia through much of its main channel.
Compared to land animals, marine organisms have much more diffi-
culty extracting oxygen from water. Depending on its temperature and
salinity, water contains 20–40 times less oxygen by volume than air.
The gas diffuses much more slowly through water than air, so even small
decreases in dissolved oxygen can have a serious negative impact on marine
animals.53
The concentration of dissolved oxygen in ocean water is typically between
7 and 8 milligrams per litre (mg/l), if concentrations fall below 4 mg/l,
organisms will begin to react to the stress. If they are able, they will move
out of the area, migrating to zones with higher levels of oxygen. Waters with
less than 0.2 mg/l are called anoxic and are unable to support any forms of
life that respire oxygen. Waters with no measurable dissolved oxygen are
hypoxic. Figure 1.16 illustrates how low levels of oxygen have a significant
impact on marine organisms.
Studies show that hypoxic waters have expanded by 4.5 million km2 at a
depth of 200 meters, with widespread loss of oxygen in the Southern Ocean,
Western Pacific, and North Atlantic. Overall, oxygen declines have been
greater in coastal ocean than in the open ocean and are often greater inshore
than offshore.54
In the many areas where dissolved oxygen is declining, high natural varia-
bility makes it difficult to identify causes, impacts and trends. What is clear
though, is that the increasing deoxygenation of the oceans is yet another,
potentially serious, environmental problem.
Plastic Pollution
The amount of plastic waste produced by the world’s more than 6 billion
people is enormous—around 300 million tons a year. If most of this
plastic was recycled the environmental impact would perhaps be managea-
ble. But it’s not. A small but significant portion of this plastic debris finishes
up in the oceans where it increasingly has a fatal impact on both marine spe-
cies and seabirds.
28
M. J. Bush
Fig. 1.16 Impact of dissolved oxygen (DO) levels on marine organisms (see Dead
zones and climate zones. Accessed at: http://www.vims.edu/research/topics/dead_
zones/impacts/index.php) (Source Virginia Institute of Marine Science)
A study reported in Science magazine estimated that in 2010, 275 mil-

lion tonnes (Mt) of plastic waste was produced by 192 coastal countries.
Of this amount, somewhere between 4.8 to 12.7 Mt entered the oceans.55
Figure 1.17 shows the estimated amount of plastic waste washing from the
land into the ocean in 2010.56
Estimated quantities of mismanaged plastic waste (meaning plastic waste
that would probably end up in the sea) are shown for the countries which
are the worst offenders in Table 1.2.
1 A Planet in Peril
29
Fig. 1.17 Plastic waste inputs into the ocean in 2010 (Source Jambeck Research
Group)
Table 1.2 Top ten countries ranked by quantity of mismanaged plastic waste in

2010, million tons
Rank Country Mismanaged plastic waste Mt/year
1 China 8.82
2 Indonesia 3.22
3 Philippines 1.88
4 Vietnam 1.83
5 Sri Lanka 1.59
6 Thailand 1.03
7 Egypt 0.97
8 Malaysia 0.94
9 Nigeria 0.84
10 Bangladesh 0.79
Source Jambeck Research Group
China tops the list and is the worst offender by far. Followed by Indonesia
and several other Asian countries. Egypt and Nigeria also make the top 10.
The table shows absolute amounts in million tons, so coastal countries with
large populations will tend to show up at the top of the list. The US is out-
side the top 10, but just makes the top 20. Canada and the European coun-
tries are not in the top twenty.
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M. J. Bush
There is now so much plastic floating in some parts of the ocean, espe-
cially in the five large ocean gyres known as ‘garbage patches’, that each
square kilometre of surface water holds almost 600,000 pieces of plastic and
other debris. Not all trash floats, plastic bags hang around just below the
surface, and much of the trash, including microplastic debris, slowly sinks to
the bottom where it eventually settles into deep-sea sediments.57
The largest garbage patch is the Great Pacific Garbage Patch which is
floating off the coast of California. It covers about 1.6 million km2—three
times the size of France. Containing about 1.8 trillion pieces of plastic, the
weight of the trash is estimated at about 80,000 tonnes—roughly the weight
of 500 jumbo jets.58
Plastic pollution in the oceans is now a major and global concern. The
plastic eventually breaks down into smaller pieces that may be ingested by
both marine species and seabirds. The internet is full of images of dead fish
and seabirds cut open to show all the pieces of plastic in their stomachs.
Figure 1.18 shows the remains of an albatross that had ingested an extraor-
dinary assortment of pieces of plastic waste.59 In early 2018, a 6-ton juve-
nile Sperm Whale washed up on the beach near Cabo de Palos in Southern
Spain. In its digestive tract were plastic bags, raffia sacks, ropes, pieces of
nets and even a plastic jerry can. The experts who examined the whale said it
Fig. 1.18 Remains of an albatross that had ingested plastic waste (Source Science
Magazine)
1 A Planet in Peril
31
was likely that the whale was unable to expel the trash causing it to die from
peritonitis—an infection of the abdomen.60
In October 2018, the New York Times reported on an effort to save a
young hawksbill turtle rescued from being tangled up in fishing gear off
the east coast of Kenya, near Watamu. The hawksbill turtle is a critically
endangered species. This one weighed only 3 kg—much less than normal.
An X-ray exam showed the turtle’s intestines were clogged with plastic.
Although cared for by an NGO called Local Ocean, the turtle died after a
few months. A post-mortem exam revealed shards of pink, white and blue
plastic, and tangles of blue and grey string in its stomach.61
A few weeks later in November 2018, a dead whale washed ashore in
Eastern Indonesia. In its stomach conservation officials found almost 6 kg
of plastic waste including 115 plastic cups, four plastic bottles, 25 plastic
bags, 2 flip-flops, a nylon sac and more than 10,000 other assorted pieces of
plastic.62
The risk to marine species and seabirds is increasing because the amount
of plastic debris being dumped into the oceans is rising almost exponentially
each year.63 To make matters worse, research conducted in 2017, seemed to
indicate that some fish mistake plastic debris for food.64
This may be because plastic debris is getting smaller. Microplastic par-
ticles now pollute most of the oceans. They have been found in some of
the most remote and uncharted areas. Samples taken from the middle of
the South Indian Ocean—one of the most remote regions on the planet—
showed microplastic particles at a relatively high volume. The highest lev-
els of microplastic were around Europe’s north Atlantic and Mediterranean
coasts. High levels were also recorded off the coast of Cape Town and
Australia.65
A 2016 study on just a single catchment area in northern England
revealed shocking results. The highest levels of microplastic pollution were
found in rivers near Manchester. The River Tame had more than 500,000
microplastic particles per square meter in the top 10 cm of riverbed—the
highest levels ever recorded world-wide.66
Moreover, plastic waste is stifling coral reefs. In 2017, scientists assessed
the influence of disease on 124,000 reef-building corals from 159 reefs in
the Asia-Pacific region. The likelihood of disease increases from 4 to 89%
when corals are in contact with plastic. It was estimated that 11.1 billion
plastic items are entangled on coral reefs across the Asia-Pacific region, and
that this number is increasing every year.67
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M. J. Bush
Air Pollution
Pollution is the greatest environmental cause of disease and premature death.
Diseases caused by pollution were responsible for an estimated 9 million
premature deaths in 2105—that’s 16% of all deaths worldwide. A number
that is three times more than deaths from AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria
combined. In the most severely affected countries, pollution is responsible
for more than one death in four.68 Globally, with smoking on the decline,
air pollution now causes more deaths annually than tobacco.69
Pollution is now a substantial global problem that endangers the health of
millions, degrades the Earth’s ecosystems, undermines the economic security
of nations, and is responsible for an enormous global burden of disease, dis-
ability, and premature death. It is associated with a much wider range of dis-
eases than was previously recognized. Air pollution is now understood to be
an important causative agent of many non-communicable diseases including
asthma, cancer, neurodevelopmental disorders, and birth defects in children;
and heart disease, stroke, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and cancer
in adults.70
Pollution is directly linked to the combustion of carbon fuels: fossil fuel
combustion in high-income and middle-income countries and the burning
of biomass in low-income countries accounts for 85% of airborne particu-
late pollution and for almost all pollution related to sulphur emissions and
nitrogen oxides.
In many part of the world pollution is getting worse. Household air and
water pollution, the forms of pollution associated with poverty and tradi-
tional lifestyles in many developing countries, are slowly declining as cleaner
technologies for cooking and lighting are adopted. However, ambient air
pollution, chemical pollution, and soil pollution—the forms of pollution
produced by industry, mining, power generation, mechanized agriculture
and vehicles—are all on the rise with the most marked increases in rapidly
developing and industrializing low-income and middle-income countries.71
Outdoor Air Pollution
In 2016 the World Health Organisation published a comprehensive report

that assessed the level of exposure and the burden of disease resulting from
outside (ambient) air pollution—meaning the quality of the air we breathe
outside the home and moving around in towns and cities around the
globe.72 Data was collected from almost 3000 cities and towns with a mean
1 A Planet in Peril
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size of about 540,000 people. This represents about 1.6 billion people or
43% of the global urban population.
The survey looked at levels of only one type of pollution, particulate
matter (PM), which is generally a good indicator of overall air quality.
Particulate matter is a noxious pollutant which is responsible for a wide
variety of medical conditions that may result in premature death. There is
in fact no safe level of particulate matter—no threshold has been identi-
fied below which no damage to health is observed. The WHO Air Quality
Guidelines therefore recommend achieving the lowest concentrations of
PM possible.
For the most dangerous type of particulate matter: the very fine particles
referred to as PM2.5, the guideline values recommended by World Health
Organisation are as follows:
• Annual mean: 10 micrograms per cubic meter of air (10 µg/m3)

• 24-hour mean: 25 µg/m3
For PM10 particulate matter, slightly less dangerous, the guidelines value for
the annual mean is 20 µg/m3. Figure 1.19 shows annual mean concentra-
tions of PM10 measured in 40 cities around the world.73
Toronto, Madrid, Sydney and Auckland look like they just about meet
the recommended limit of 20 µg/m3). None of the other cities are in com-
pliance, and several cities in the eastern Mediterranean region and south east
Asia are way over the limit by a factor of 10 or more.
Fig. 1.19 Mean concentrations of particulate matter (PM10) in 40 cities for the period
2011–2015 (Source World Health Organisation)
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M. J. Bush
In terms of population numbers, fully 84% of the assessed populations

exposed to PM10 or PM2.5 are breathing in air that fails to meet the Air
Quality Guideline values cited above. That is roughly 1.3 billion people.
The number of deaths caused by ambient air, chemical, and soil pollu-
tion—the forms of pollution associated with modern industrial and urban
development—are increasing. Deaths attributable to PM2.5 air pollution is
estimated to have risen from 3.5 million in 1990 to 4.2 million in 2015—a
20% increase. Among the world’s 10 most populous countries in 2015,
the largest increases in numbers of pollution-related deaths were recorded
in India and Bangladesh.74 The worst cities for air pollution are in India.
In 2018, nine of the world’s top ten cities for PM2.5 pollution were in
that country. Kanpur was the worst: recording PM2.5 levels at a whopping
173 µg per cubic metre.75
The WHO air pollution assessment only looked at particulate matter.
But in densely populated urban areas with lots of diesel cars moving around
(in many European cities for example), levels of a pollutant called nitrogen
dioxide, are increasingly becoming a serious concern. In London and Paris,
the average daytime nitrogen dioxide hourly concentrations are routinely
higher than WHO guidelines.76
In the USA, the Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection
Agency to set national ambient air quality standards for six specific
pollutants:
• Carbon monoxide
• Lead
• Nitrogen dioxide
• Ozone
• Particulate matter
• Sulphur dioxide
The US has made significant progress in reducing the emissions of the

most hazardous atmospheric pollutants. And this in spite of solid economic
growth over the last 45 year period: as shown in Fig. 1.20.
But aggregate annual national statistics smooth out the data and mask the
large local and day-to-day variations. A 2019 report by the American Lung
Association paints a far less rosy picture than the one perhaps airbrushed by
the EPA. According to the ALA:
• Many cities across the US experienced an increased number of days with

when particle pollution (often called ‘soot’) rose to record-breaking levels.
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Fig. 1.20 Comparison of growth areas and declining emissions in the USA, 1980–
2017 (Our nation’s air: https://gispub.epa.gov/air/trendsreport/2017/#home) (Source
US Environmental Protection Agency)
More cities suffered from a greater number of days when ground-level

ozone (aka ‘smog’) reached unhealthy levels.
• The number of people exposed to unhealthy air in 2017 increased to 141
million, up from 134 million in 2016 and 125 million in 2015. However,
these numbers are down from those measured in 2014—when an esti-
mated 166 million people were exposed to unhealthy air.
• More than 20 million people live in 12 US counties with unhealthy levels
of ozone, short-term and year-round particle pollution.77
Meanwhile, over in London, England, a report issued in October 2017 by

Transport for London (TFL) shocked many people living in the city. The
TFL agency measured levels of PM2.5—the most dangerous of the particu-
late matter pollutants, across the metropolis. It found that “all Londoners are
exposed to concentrations higher than WHO air quality guidelines”.
On the outskirts of London, where about 6% of the population live,
PM2.5 levels were just slightly more than the guideline limit (which is that
the annual mean concentration should not exceed 10 micrograms per cubic
meter). More centrally, almost 8 million Londoners—nearly 95% of the
capital’s population—live in areas of London that exceed the guideline limit
by 50% or more.78 In fact, across the UK, most urban areas have illegal
levels of air pollution.
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M. J. Bush
Household Air Pollution
A third of the world’s population uses solid fuel derived from plant mate-
rial (biomass) or coal for cooking, heating or lighting. These fuels are often
burned in an open fire or a simple stove, often inside the home. The stoves
are inefficient and the incomplete combustion results in large amounts of
smoke and noxious gases that have a serious health impact.
Cooking consumes most solid fuel worldwide. The sources of fuel vary
considerably: with coal used predominantly in China, but wood and char-
coal are more common in Africa and India. Animal dung is used in pas-
toralist communities, particularly those at high altitudes (e.g. Nepal and
Afghanistan) or in savannahs where wood is rare (e.g. Kenya and Ethiopia).
Fuel deprived communities often burn domestic rubbish and plant residues
such as straw and maize husks, whereas urban communities more commonly
burn charcoal or kerosene.
Lighting can also result in substantial pollution inside the home. Smoky
unvented wicks in simple lamps that burn kerosene and ordinary candles
can result in substantial black carbon smoke. Heating needs are highly vari-
able by latitude, altitude and season. In cold climates (e.g. Nepal and North
India) ventilation may be deliberately minimized to conserve energy, result-
ing in extremely toxic levels of household air pollution for a substantial part
of the year. Poor urban people in Africa often bring a simple cooking stove
indoors to keep their sleeping area warm at night.
In most cultures, women have a leading role in domestic cooking, with
men perhaps cooking when at work or away from home. In the typical
domestic context, women experience several periods of intense exposure to
cooking smoke each day. Young children and infants often carried on the
woman’s back or placed nearby to sleep are also exposed to these short very
high levels of smoke. There is particular concern when young children are
exposed to smoke because data suggest that smoke exposure during this
development phase is particularly detrimental to their health.
Socioeconomic status is a major predictor of exposure to household
air pollution. Poverty, disease, and the use of solid fuel are inextricably
linked because poverty is a risk factor for disease in all communities across
the globe. Poorer people use easily available fuels and inefficient stoves
because these are generally less expensive. Propane and liquid petroleum
gas (LPG) burn much more cleanly with almost no smoke but are too
expensive for many households in developing countries. But cheaper fuels
such as charcoal, wood, dung, and crop residues, produce highly toxic
emissions.
1 A Planet in Peril
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Fig. 1.21 Charcoal market in Haiti—Just outside Port-au Prince in 2013 (Source

Author’s collection)
Globally, indoor air pollution is declining—thanks to huge efforts by sev-

eral international donors to improve the efficiency of charcoal stoves and
to promote a shift to cleaner fuels—such as liquified petroleum gas (LPG).
Figure 1.21 shows a charcoal market just outside Port-au-Prince in 2013.
The simple charcoal stoves used in Haiti are also sold in this market (you can
see them stacked up just above the red Digicel umbrellas). It’s not hard to
understand how cooking with charcoal on simple but very inefficient stoves
leads to high levels of smoke and airborne particulates in the kitchens and
homes of poor Haitian families.
Air Pollution and Children
Air pollution is directly linked with diseases and infections that kill about
650,000 children under the age of five every year. Almost one million chil-
dren die from pneumonia each year, and more than half of these deaths are
directly related to air pollution—which is strongly correlated with respira-
tory conditions such as pneumonia, bronchitis and asthma.
38
M. J. Bush
As countries industrialize and urbanize, energy use tends to increase. If

that energy comes from coal and carbon fuels then outside air pollution can
substantially worsen.
Children are especially sensitive to air-borne pollutants. The cell layer on
the inside of the respiratory tract is more permeable in children, and their
respiratory airways are smaller than an adult’s. Infections are more likely to
cause blockages. Children also breathe twice as fast, inhaling more air per
unit of body weight compared to adults. The lung capacity of children living
in a polluted environment can be reduced by 20%—similar to growing up
in a house with second-hand cigarette smoke.
Air pollution can also exacerbate underlying health issues that prevent
children for going to school, and there is emerging evidence that air pollu-
tion can disrupt physical and cognitive development. Left untreated some
health complications related to air pollution can endure for a lifetime.
Studies have also shown that people who were exposed to chronic air pollu-
tion as children tend to have respiratory problems later in life.79
It should come as no surprise that poor children are most at risk, and that
globally, air pollution affects children in low- and middle income countries
more severely. Asia currently accounts for most of the deaths attributable to
air pollution. However, in Africa, increasing industrial production, urbaniza-
tion and traffic is driving a rapid rise in outside air pollution.
Lower-income areas are often highly exposed to environmental pollut-
ants such as waste and air pollution. Factories and industrial activity are
often more common near low-income areas, and there is often less capacity
to manage household and industrial waste. This can result in burning trash
including plastics, rubber and electronics, creating toxic air-borne chemicals
which are highly detrimental to children. And poor families are much less
likely to have the resources to provide effective ventilation, or air condition-
ing to protect themselves from harmful air.
World-wide over 1 billion children live in homes where solid fuels are
used for cooking and heating. While outdoor air pollution tends to be worse
in poor urban communities, indoor air pollution is worse in rural com-
munities where biomass fuels (wood, charcoal, peat, and dung) are more
frequently used in cooking and heating. For instance, about 80% of rural
families in India use biomass fuels simply because they are less expensive
and readily available. The poorer the family, the more likely it is to use less
expensive but more polluting biomass fuels.
Being poor also means that access to health care is much more limited.
When a child lacks good nutrition or does not have access to clean water,
adequate sanitation and hygiene, respiratory infections such as pneumonia are
1 A Planet in Peril
39
much more common and potentially more deadly. A body’s defences require
good overall health. A lack of access to healthcare not only prevents treatment
but can also mean that conditions go undiagnosed in the first place.80
Water Pollution
The level of pollution in the world’s rivers and lakes varies considerably. In
the majority of developed countries, the quality of the water has improved
significantly. There are localized exceptions to this rule (think Flint,
Michigan). However, in the developing world, the situation is still deeply
concerning.
According to 2016 report by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP),
water pollution has worsened since the 1990s in the majority of rivers in
Latin America, Africa and Asia.81
Severe pathogen pollution is estimated to affect about a quarter of river
stretches in Latin America, somewhere between 10 and 25% of African riv-
ers, and about a third of Asian river stretches. Factoring in the fraction of
rural population that is likely to come into contact with these water courses,
it is estimated that between 8 and 25 million people are at risk in Latin
America, 32–164 million in Africa, and 31–134 million in Asia. The num-
bers are evidently approximate—reflecting the lack of data on the extent of
water pollution in developing countries. But the scale is alarming: the num-
ber of people exposed to this form of pollution is in the millions.
Concentrations of faecal coliform bacteria (FCB) have increased between
1990 and 2010 in almost two thirds of all rivers in Latin America, Africa
and Asia, and along about a quarter of their length.
A large part of the increase in FCB pollution is thought to be due to the
expansion of sewer systems that discharge untreated wastewater into surface
waters. While improved sanitation in urban areas brings huge health ben-
efits, discharging the sewage and wastewater into the nearest river simply
shifts the environmental problem elsewhere, and relocates the risk factor of
unimproved sanitation from urban to downstream rural communities. What
is needed are wastewater treatment facilities that can treat the sewage, sta-
bilize it, render it non-toxic, and ideally recycle the wastewater as water for
irrigation and agricultural production.
Women and children are at higher risk than men from this form of water
pollution because women in riverine communities often wash clothes in the
river and collect water for cooking and drinking. Children play in the river
and are often tasked (particularly girls) with bringing water to the house.
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M. J. Bush
Organic pollution is caused by the release of large quantities of organic

waste materials into surface waters—rivers and lakes. The decomposition of
these wastes often leads to a reduction in the dissolved oxygen level in the
water which, like a dead zone in the ocean, may kill fish and other aquatic
fauna.
Inland capture fisheries are an important source of protein for rural
communities in developing countries—providing employment for over 20
million fishers. Almost all of these livelihoods depend on small-scale fish-
eries exploited by relatively poor people with over half the workforce being
women. In 2010, severe organic pollution was estimated to affect up to one
in ten of river stretches in Latin America, one in seven in Africa and one
in six in Asia. Organic pollution is getting worse: between 1990 and 2010
pollution increased in almost two-thirds of all rivers in Latin America, Africa
and Asia.82
The UNEP report ends on a positive note, stressing that although water
pollution is serious and getting worse in Africa, Latin America and Asia, the
majority of rivers on these three continents are still in good shape, and that
there are clear opportunities for reducing further pollution and restoring the
rivers that are of concern.83
But serious and concerted action will be required to reverse the present
downward trend.
In Sickness and in Health

Although this chapter is primarily focused on the ailing health of planet
Earth, it would be obtuse not to take a quick look at the health of the dom-
inant species in the Anthropocene Age. Are people living longer? Are they in
robust health? What about the children?
Globally, life expectancy has been improving at a rate of more than
3 years per decade since 1950s, with the exception of the 1990s—when
progress stalled in Africa because of the rising HIV epidemic and faltered
in Europe because of increased mortality in many ex-Soviet countries fol-
lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union. Life expectancy improved rapidly
in most regions from 2000 onwards, and overall there was a global increase
of 5.9 years in life expectancy between 2000 and 2015, with an even larger
increase of 9.4 years recorded in WHO’s Africa region. Improvements in
outcomes for all major causes of deaths have contributed to these substantial
gains. The gap between African life expectancy and European LE has nar-
rowed by 4.9 years since the year 2000.84
1 A Planet in Peril
41
This impressive increase in life expectancy across the globe and particu-
larly in low and middle income countries is the result of a sustained pro-
gramme of investment and support for health programs by United Nations
agencies and by large non-governmental organizations that have often
received substantial financial support from wealthy donors and philan-
thropic organizations. It is one of the outstanding technology success stories
of the last century.
But a 2018 report issued by several UN agencies casts a sombre shadow
over these numbers. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World is
an annual report. Since about 2010, the number of undernourished people
in the world had been decreasing—from about 900 million in 2000 to 784
million in 2015. That trend now appears to have been reversed. In 2016 the
number of chronically undernourished people rose to 804 million and the
figure for 2017 is estimated to be as high as 821 million.
The food security situation has worsened in parts of Africa, and in South-
East and Western Asia. The worst deteriorations have been observed most
often, perhaps unsurprisingly, in situations of conflict—but conflict that is
often compounded by droughts or floods.
Over the past ten years the number of violent conflicts around the world
has increased significantly—and rural communities are generally the hard-
est hit. Conflict drives greater food insecurity—fuelling violence leading to
more conflict.
Figure 1.22 shows that the number of undernourished people has been on
the rise since 2015—reaching an estimated 821 million in 2017. The preva-
lence (i.e. the percentage) of undernourished people has also risen.85 Recent
estimate show that despite significant population growth the share of under-
nourished people in the world decreased from 14.7% in 2000 to 10.6%
in 2015. However, the rate of decline has slowed significantly—coming to
a virtual halt between 2014 and 2016, and rising in 2017 to an estimated
10.9%, almost the level it was in 2013.
Globally, the prevalence of anaemia in women and obesity in adults
is increasing. More than one in eight adults in the world is obese and one
in three women of reproductive age is anaemic—a statistic that the FAO
describes as shameful.86
What about children? Can they look forward to a long and healthy life?
According to the latest estimates for 2017, 151 million children under
five years of age across the world suffer from unnaturally slow growth.
Called stunting, children are too short for their age, a condition which is a
reflection of a chronic state of undernutrition. When children are stunted
before the age of two, they are at a higher risk of illness and more likely
42
M. J. Bush
Fig. 1.22 Prevalence of undernourishment in the world and absolute numbers in

millions (Source FAO, State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018 )
than well-nourished children to develop poor cognitive skills and learning

disabilities in later childhood and adolescence. If widespread, stunting can
undermine the economic development of entire communities. The preva-
lence of stunting is highest in Africa, Southern Asia and Oceania (excluding
Australia and New Zealand) where more than 30% of children under five
are too short for their age.
As a percentage, stunting has been slowly declining. But in Africa, the
decline has not kept pace with the increase in population so the number
of stunted children has actually increased—although the vast majority of
stunted children are found in Asia.
Childhood wasting: being too thin for one’s height is another scourge. It is
generally caused by low birth weight, inadequate diet, poor care practices, and
infections. In 2017, wasting affected 50 million children under five with two
regions, Asia and Oceania, seeing almost 1 in 10 affected compared to just one in
a hundred in Latin America and the Caribbean. Most of the burden is concen-
trated in Asia, with seven out of ten afflicted children living in this region.87
Pesticides
A UN report in 2017 looked at the use of pesticides in the context of

the right to food. The report states that pesticides are responsible for an
1 A Planet in Peril
43
estimated 200,000 acute poisoning deaths a year, 99% of which occur in

developing countries—even though these countries account for only about a
quarter of worldwide pesticide usage.88 In some countries, pesticide poison-
ing exceeds fatalities from infectious diseases—a shocking situation.89
Tragic accidents involving poisoning include an accident in Peru in 1999,
where 24 schoolchildren died following the consumption of the highly toxic
pesticide parathion—which had been packaged so that it was mistaken for
milk powder. Other cases include the deaths of 23 children in India in 2013
after consuming a meal contaminated with the highly toxic pesticide mono-
crotophos; the poisoning of 39 preschool children in China in 2014 from
the consumption of food containing residues of pesticide; and the death
of 11 children in Bangladesh in 2015 after eating fruit laced with pesticide
chemicals.90 All these deaths from pesticide poisoning involved children.
Biodiversity
Finally we look at biodiversity—because all of the factors described above
in this chapter are having a dangerously harmful impact on the Earth’s
biodiversity.
We share this planet with a huge assortment of wonderful and amaz-
ing creatures. For the most part, we have treated them appallingly badly:
destroying their habitat, polluting their waters, poisoning them with indus-
trial effluents, pesticides and toxic chemicals; and hunting and killing the
larger animals—often to the point of extinction. This callous brutality still
continues: the killing of elephants for their tusks, and rhinos for their horns
has never stopped.
A report in 2016 found over 300 mammal species are threatened by hunt-
ing including primates, ungulates, bats, marsupials, rodents, and carnivores.
The primary reason for hunting and trapping these animals is to acquire
meat for human consumption, and this occurs almost entirely in develop-
ing countries across Africa, South America and particularly Southeast Asia.
Animals are also hunted for their body parts for traditional medicine, live
animals for the pet trade, and the ornamental use of body parts.91
Bush meat is now traded internationally and can even be found in New
York.92
The threats to global biodiversity are not only due to the changing cli-
mate: in fact climate change, a much more recent phenomenon, is at least
for the moment less severe than the other pressures driving many species
towards extinction.93 These include:
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M. J. Bush
Habitat loss and degradation: Caused by unsustainable agriculture, logging,

roads, residential and commercial development, energy production and
mining, the fragmentation, degradation, and despoliation of a species
habitat (including water courses for fish) has an immediate detrimental
impact. The clearing of forests for palm oil plantations in Asia, and for
beef production in South America continues to have a major impact on
biodiversity in those regions.
Overexploitation: Unsustainable hunting, fishing, poaching and harvest-
ing can drive species to the point of no-return. Indirect overexploitation
occurs when non-target species are killed unintentionally (as bycatch for
instance).
Pollution: Predominantly a threat in the marine environment: oil spills, agri-
cultural runoff, and the huge amounts of plastic trash in the oceans have
a noxious and often fatal impact on fish and marine mammals. Pesticides
continue to have a severe impact on essential pollinator species such as
bees.
Invasive species and disease: Invasive species compete for food and habitat and
can both prey on native species and bring diseases not previously in the
environment that decimate indigenous populations.
But climate change is an emerging and potentially existential threat for huge
numbers of species already exposed to the risks described above. Rising
temperatures will induce many species to shift their range and to move to
areas where the climate is more suitable. Butterflies, for instance, appear
to be moving towards the poles in several countries. But for many species
this form of adaptation will not be possible. Species that inhabit the polar
regions for instance, like the polar bear in the Arctic, have nowhere else to
go. The future is bleak for this iconic species.
Changes in sea level are an obvious threat to species that live on low-lying
islands or which inhabit low-elevation coastal zones. In what is believed to
be the first instance of an extinction caused solely by human-induced cli-
mate change, a small rodent called the Bramble Cay melomys—an animal
that lived on a small island in the eastern Torres Strait of the Great Barrier
Reef, disappeared from the island in 2016. The melomys was already hugely
vulnerable: it had the most isolated and restricted range of any Australian
mammal. It is estimated that the area of the cay above high tide decreased
from 4 ha in 1998 to 2.5 ha in 2014. In addition, over the last ten years,
97% of the rodents’ habitat was destroyed by severe weather compounded
by sea level rise.94
1 A Planet in Peril
45
The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) publishes an annual report called the
Living Planet Report. The 2016 edition paints a very sombre picture of life
on Earth and its prospects.95
The Sixth Extinction?
Palaeontologists define mass extinctions as events characterized by the loss

of the majority of species in a relatively short geological time period. Mass
extinctions have occurred five times in the past 4–500 million years. The
continual loss of biodiversity, diminution of species’ populations, and the
number of actual extinctions of species now underway in the twenty-first
century has been called the sixth extinction. In the past, extinctions took
place over long geological periods of time—often millions of years. What
is astonishing about the present era is that the continuing process of incre-
mental extinctions is taking place within an extremely short period of time.
And the driving force behind this transition is exceptional: never before has
a single species, Homo sapiens, had such a destructive impact on the planet.
In fact, the previous extinctions were all caused by the planet’s chang-
ing climate. The difference is that the changes were caused by events over
which the species present at the time had no control. A massive hit from a
large meteor ended the reign of the dinosaurs. The planet’s natural long-term
climate variability produced ice-ages so severe that few animals and plants
could survive.
In the past few years, scientists have tried to compare current rates of
species extinctions with the rate at which species became extinct over the
preceding millennia—referred to as the ‘background rate’. The background
rate is conservatively estimated to be somewhere between 0.1 and 1 extinc-
tions per 10,000 species per 100 years.96 Modern extinction rates have
increased sharply over the last 200 years, and the rates now are much higher
than the background rate. Moreover, the pace of extinctions appears to be
increasing.97
As an example, only nine vertebrate extinctions would have been expected
since 1900 if the background rate had continued for all vertebrates; however,
the data show that 477 species became extinct—53 times higher than the
number expected. These species include 69 mammal species, 80 bird species,
24 reptiles, 146 amphibians, and 158 species of fish.98
Further research has examined not just the rate of species’ extinctions,
but the disappearance of populations of individual species—since clearly the
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M. J. Bush
disappearance of species populations is a precursor to the extinction of the

entire species.
In 2016, a paper published in the proceedings of the American National
Academy of Sciences sounded the alarm in stark terms. Based on a sample
of 27,600 terrestrial vertebrate species, and a more detailed analysis of 177
mammal species, the authors highlight the extremely high degree of pop-
ulation decay in vertebrates, even in species not considered to be of any
concern.99 Their conclusion is that “Earth is experiencing a huge episode
of population decline and extirpation which will have negative cascad-
ing consequences on ecosystem functioning and services vital to sustaining
civilization.”
They go on to state:
Dwindling population sizes and range shrinkages amount to a massive anthro-

pogenic erosion of biodiversity and of the ecosystem services essential to civi-
lization. This “biological annihilation” underlines the seriousness for humanity
of Earth’s ongoing sixth mass extinction event.
It’s not just vertebrate species that are threatened with extinction. In
October 2017, data gathered by amateur entomologists in 63 nature reserves
across Germany revealed a huge decline in the number of insects present
in these protected environments. The annual average fell by 76% over the
27 year period, and the summer peak—normally when insects are most
numerous—showed a reduction of 82%.
Working tirelessly behind the scenes, insects are an essential part of the
Earth’s complex of ecosystems. A decline of this magnitude is a sign of seri-
ous problems. The cause of the decline is unclear—although the destruction
of wild areas and the widespread use of pesticides are considered to be the
most likely contributing factors.100
More evidence for the decline in arthropod populations was published in
2018 by scientists checking on the health of a rainforest ecosystem in Puerto
Rico. Arthropods include insects, spiders, and centipedes, and the abun-
dance of all these small invertebrate animals was found to have substantially
declined in the Luquillo rainforest, part of the El Yunque National Forest in
the north-eastern part of the island. Arthropods comprise more than two-
thirds of all terrestrial species and are critically important for the health and
well-being of the Earth’s ecosystems. Scientists speculate that tropical spe-
cies that have evolved in regions where there are no pronounced seasonal
variations in temperature, like the tropics, are more sensitive to increasing
global temperatures. Consequently, even small increments in temperature,
1 A Planet in Peril
47
particularly maximum temperature, can precipitate sharp decreases in abun-

dance. These predictions have been verified in a variety of tropical reptiles,
amphibians and invertebrates.
Between 1978 (when the area was first studied) and 2015, maximum
temperatures as recorded in the field station have risen by 2 °C. The impact
on the population of arthropods has been severe. Samples collected from the
ground and from the canopy of the forest were said to be “indicative of a
collapse in forest arthropods.”101 This sharp fall in arthropod abundance has
had a knock-on effect on the food chain, with insectivore lizards, frogs, and
birds all showing a decline in numbers—in what the authors call “a classic
bottom-up cascade.”102
The collapse in the abundance of arthropods was not found to be related
to extreme climate events—like hurricanes. While the initial damage from
hurricane Hugo in 1989 was devastating, the Luquillo forest vegetation
recovered quickly with 70% of trees producing new leaves after only seven
weeks, and after hurricane George in 1998, insect populations recovered
in less than a year. Checking on damage after hurricane Maria in 2017,
researchers found many locations well on the way to recovery after just two
months. However, as global warming continues to intensify, the frequency
and intensity of hurricanes impacting Puerto Rico are expected to increase,
along with the intensity of droughts, and increases in maximum tempera-
ture—conditions that collectively may well overwhelm the resilience of the
rainforest ecosystem.103
In 2019, another shocking report made headlines around the world.
Published by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), the report on global biodiversity presented
the work of more than 400 experts who had laboured for 3 years to bring
together the latest assessment of the deteriorating condition of the planet’s
natural environment and its biodiversity.104
The report charts the accelerating impacts of global heating, climate
change, and mankind’s destructive impact on the natural environment. It
foresees a grim future for over a million of the planet’s species. This warning
follows hot on the heels of a Canadian government assessment that forecasts
that Canada will warm twice as fast as the global average, and the sombre
2018 IPCC report that meticulously laid out the evidence that even keep-
ing global warming to 1.5 °C will result in widespread social and economic
disruption as climate-driven natural disasters increasingly bludgeon the
planet.105
The stark conclusion of the scientists is that human actions threaten more
species with global extinction than ever before. An average of about 25% of
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M. J. Bush
animal and plant species are threatened, suggesting that around 1 million
species face extinction within a matter of decades unless action is taken to
reduce the intensity of the main drivers of biodiversity loss.
The problem is not only climate change—which is judged to be the
third most destructive influence on the biosphere. The main culprit is the
way mankind has radically changed and destroyed the natural landscape.
Seventy-five percent of the land surface has been significantly altered, 66%
of the of the oceans are experiencing increasing cumulative impacts, and
over 85% of wetlands have been lost. Across much of the tropics, 32 million
hectares of primary or recovering forests were cut down between 2010 and
2015—an area half the size of France.
In the oceans, half of coral cover on coral reefs has been lost. The aver-
age abundance of terrestrial species in most major biomes has fallen by at
least 20 per cent—a decline that appears to be accelerating. Population sizes
of wild vertebrate species have tended to decline over the last 50 years on
land, in freshwater and in the sea. Global trends in insect population are
not known accurately but rapid declines have been well documented in cer-
tain regions. Researchers in 2017, warned of an “ecological Armageddon”
after measuring a dramatic plunge in insect numbers across Germany. Using
malaise traps to capture flying insects in 63 nature reserves, and measuring
the weight of the captured insects, the data showed a decrease of 76% over
a 27 year period, and a startling drop of 82% in the summer—when insect
abundance would normally reach its peak.
The rate of global change during the last 50 years is unprecedented in
human history. The most destructive drivers of these global changes are in
land and sea use, direct exploitation of organisms, climate change, pollution,
and the invasion of alien species. All are caused directly and indirectly by the
way we mine the planet’s natural resources without a second thought, pump
polluting chemicals into the air, and dump our trash onto the land and into
the oceans.106
The Big Picture

This chapter has covered a lot of ground. Let’s just take a step back and
recap what we now know:
• Heatwaves are becoming more intense. They are not killing more
people—because government agencies have got better at warning com-
munities and providing assistance to those who are most vulnerable. But
1 A Planet in Peril
49
the trend is upward, and the forecast is for hotter and more frequent
heatwave events;
• Natural disasters are more frequent and more damaging: floods are more
frequent, hurricanes and cyclones more intense, and both are more
destructive;
• Wildfires are becoming more frequent. They are larger and more wide-
spread. Higher average temperatures and more intense heatwaves are
likely to produce more fires. So the prediction is for larger and more
destructive wildfires;
• Glaciers are melting; Arctic sea ice is declining; and the Greenland and
Antarctic ice sheets are melting faster than previously predicted;
• The oceans are in bad shape. They are becoming more acidic; dead zones
are multiplying; enormous garbage patches filled with trash are now
found in all the oceans. Plastic waste is killing fish and seabirds;
• Coral reefs are bleaching out because of rising seawater temperatures.
Many are unlikely to survive. Millions of rural fishers in developing coun-
tries will lose one of their principal livelihoods.
• Air pollution kills several million people every year including over half a
million children. Air quality does not appear to be getting any worse. But
there is little evidence that it is getting any better. And the death toll is
already huge.
• There are close to half a billion undernourished people in the world and
the situation appears to be worsening. Childhood wasting and stunting
affects over a 100 million children worldwide.
• The pollution of rivers in Latin America, Africa and Asia is worsening—
threatening the health of millions of rural communities that rely on rivers
and lakes for drinking water;
• Across the planet, biodiversity is showing signs of alarming stress. Many
species have become extinct; more will follow. Many experts believe that a
6th extinction is already underway.
The majority of scientists that study the global climate are certain that most
of the problems that are afflicting the planet can be explained by the changes
that have been observed in the Earth’s climate. The warning signs have been
there for some time: the first alarms were sounded back in the 1960s. But
at that time the evidence that the climate was changing was unconvincing.
Scientists knew that levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere were increas-
ing every year, and many of them believed that this spelled trouble. But not
all scientists agreed. After all, carbon dioxide is a natural part of the envi-
ronment and, moreover, is essential for photosynthesis and for the growth
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M. J. Bush
of plants. How could the slowly increasing concentrations of this essential

life-giving gas possibly cause a problem? It seemed highly unlikely, impossi-
ble even.
But since the turn of the century, the signs of an increasingly disturbed
climate have become impossible to ignore.
Conclusion
What the majority of climate scientists now believe is that most of the prob-
lems written about in this chapter are either directly caused, or indirectly
accelerated, by the fact that the planet is getting warmer.
Not the trash in the oceans and the polluted air and rivers—that’s just
humankind in the Anthropocene Age continuing to treat the natural envi-
ronment as a huge trash can of unlimited capacity. But the violent weather,
droughts and floods, wildfires, heatwaves, bleached-out coral, acidic seawa-
ter, food insecurity, and melting glaciers and ice sheets, are all driven, either
totally or in part, by the fact that the Earth is warming.
It’s not an illusion; it’s not a hypothesis. It’s a scientific fact based on solid
incontrovertible evidence.
So how did we get in this much trouble? Who’s to blame?
The Climate Science Special Report published by the US Global Change
Research Program in 2017 states unequivocally107:
It is extremely likely that human activities, especially emissions of green-

house gases, are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the
mid-20th century. For the warming over the last century, there is no con-
vincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational
evidence.
The words ‘extremely likely’ are code. They mean that the probability
that human activities have been the dominant cause of global warming is
between 95 and 100%.
In Chapter 2 we will examine in more detail this global warming trend
and look more closely at the greenhouse gases which are believed to be the
dominant cause of global heating. And then, in subsequent chapters, we
will look for solutions to this global problem.
1 A Planet in Peril
51
Notes
1. One definition of a heatwave is: A marked unusual period of hot weather
(Max, Min and daily average) over a region persisting for at least two con-
secutive days during the hot period of the year based on local climatological
conditions, with thermal conditions recorded above given thresholds. But
there are other definitions that are more statistical.
2. See Analyses of the effects of global change on human health and welfare
and human systems. US Climate Change Science Program: Synthesis and
Assessment Product 4.6. Washington, DC. September 2008.
3. See Heatwaves and health. CRED Crunch. Issue No. 46. Centre
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université
catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. December 2016.
4. See Worst heatwaves in history: Timeline. Accessed at: http://www.tel-
egraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8653974/Worst-
heatwaves-in-history-timeline.html.
5. See Heat waves and climate change: A science update from climate commu-
nication. Accessed at: https://www.climatecommunication.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2012/06/Heat_Waves_and_Climate_Change.pdf.
6. WMO statement on the state of the global climate in 2016. WMO-No.
1189. World Meteorological Organisation. Geneva, Switzerland.
7. See Deadly heat wave, nicknamed ‘Lucifer’ engulfs Europe. Accessed at:
https://thinkprogress.org/europe-a-heat-wave-named-lucifer/?
8. See State of the climate in 2016, a 2017 report by the American
Meteorological Society.
9. See This summer’s heat waves could be the strongest climate signal yet.
Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/27072018/summer-
2018-hear-wave-wildfires-climate-change-evidence-crops-flooding-
deaths-records-broken.
10. See the article by Lugber, G., and McGeehin, M.: “Climate change
and extreme heat.” The American Journal of Preventive Medicine 35 (5)
(2008): 429–435.
11. See Heat waves and climate change: A science update from climate commu-
nication. Accessed at: https://www.climatecommunication.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2012/06/Heat_Waves_and_Climate_Change.pdf.
12. See the report of the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP):
Climate Science Special Report—Fourth National Climate Assessment,
470 pp, Volume I [eds. D.J. Wuebbles, D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard,
D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock]. U.S. Global Change
Research Program, Washington, DC, USA. 2017. Available at: https://
www.globalchange.gov/nca4.
52
M. J. Bush
13. See Death toll climbs in Karachi heatwave. Accessed at: https://www.
thheguardian.com/world/2018/may/22/death-toll-climbs-in-karachi-
heatwave.
14. See the 2016 report from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology
of Disasters (CRED): Poverty & death: Disaster mortality 1996–2015.
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université
catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. Available at: https://www.
cred.be/poverty-death-disaster-mortality-0.
15. Ibid.
16. A megadisaster is defined as a single event which kills more than
100,000 people.
17. See the Poverty & death report from CRED cited above.
18. See the report Poverty & death, Op. cit.
19. See CRED Crunch No. 50. Accessed at: https://www.preventionweb.
net/publications/view/57791.
20. Ibid.
21. CRED Crunch No. 54. Accessed at: https://www.glunis.com/BE/
Brussels/982611265115548/CRED.
22. See New data shows changing disaster trends—And why Congress should
take note. Accessed at: https://www.edf.org/blog/2017/09/13/new-da-
ta-shows-changing-disaster-trends-and-why-congress-should-take-note#
comment-2507.
23. See the website of the Canadian Meteorological and Oceanographic
Society. Accessed at: http://www.cmos.ca/site/top_ten?a=2015#Forest.
24. See the Canadian Meteorological and Oceanographic Society (CMOS)
website for the year 2016.
25. See the article: “B.C. wildfires map 2017: Current location of wildfires
around the province.” Accessed at: http://globalnews.ca/news/3585284/
b-c-wildfires-map-2017-current-location-of-wildfires-around-the-prov-
ince/.
26. See the article: “Potent mix of record heat and dryness fuels wild-
fires across the West.” Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/05092017/west-wildfires-california-canada-forests-record-heat-
climate-change.
27. See Mendocino Complex fire now largest in California history. Accessed at:
http://latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-california-wildfire-danger-lev-
el-20180806-story.html.
28. The figure is from the article by Leroy Westerling. Cited as: Westerling,
A.L.R.: “Increasing western US forest wildfire activity: Sensitivity to
changes in the timing of spring.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B Biological Sciences 371 (2016): 20150178.
29. One study asserts that for every degree Celsius of warming, lightning
strikes are estimated to increase 12% according to research published
1 A Planet in Peril
53
in the journal Science in 2014. See Lightning-caused fire rise in

Arctic as the region warms. The trend could worsen significantly in
the future if tree cover spreads northward. Accessed at: https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/lightning-caused-fires-rise-in-arctic-as-
the-region-warms/.
30. See the article in Science: “Fires rise in Arctic as ‘lightning follows the
warming’.” Accessed at: https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060056631.
31. See the article: “Ice and fire: Large blaze burns in Greenland for two
weeks.” Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/20/
ice-and-fire-large-blaze-burns-in-greenland-for-two-weeks/.
32. See the article published in Science cited as: Andela, N., Morton, D.C.,
Giglio, L., Chen, Y. et al. “A human-driven decline in global burned
area.” Science 356 (2017): 1356–1362.
33. National Snow and Ice Data Center: State of the cryosphere. SOTC:
Sea ice. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/sotc/sea_ice.html.
October 2017.
34. World Meteorological Organisation: WMO statement on the state of the
global climate in 2016.
35. Ibid.
36. WMO: Statement on the state of the global climate in 2016.
37. See Global warming is melting Antarctic ice from below. Accessed at:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-
cent/2018/may/09/global-warming-is-melting-antarctic-ice-from-below.
Mountain glaciers. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/sotc/gla-
cier_balance.html. October 2017.
Mountain glaciers. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/sotc/
glacier_balance.html. 2004 USGS photo by B.F. Molnia; 1941 photo
by W.O. Field. See Repeat Photography of Glaciers in the Glacier
Photograph Collection.
40. Ibid.
41. National Snow and Ice Data Center: State of the cryosphere. SOTC: Ice
sheets. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/sotc/ice_sheets.html.
October 2017.
42. See the National Snow and Ice Data Center Report at: www.nsidc.org/
cryosphere/sotc/ice_sheets.html.
43. See the NASA website. Sea level change: Observations from space.
Accessed at: https://sealevel.nasa.gov
44. “State of the climate in 2015.” Bulletin of the American Meteorological
Society 97 (8).
54
M. J. Bush
Permafrost and frozen ground. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/
sotc/ice_sheets.html. October 2017.
46. The photo is from the NSIDC Report: The state of the cryosphere. SOTC:
Permafrost and frozen ground. Cited above.
47. See the book: Burke, L., Reytar, K., Spalding, M., Perry A. Reefs at risk
revisited. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. 2011.
48. Images reprinted from: http://www.globalcoralbleaching.org/#images. See
also In the Seychelles, coral reefs face change threat. Accessed at: https://www.
apnews.com/94c7b0e2d2b84473b306a665c73bd207/In-the-Seychelles,-
coral-reefs-face-climate-change-threatmate.
49. See Great Barrier Reef hit by bleaching for the second year in a row. Accessed
at: http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/10/523254085/
great-barrier-reef-hit-by-bleaching-for-the-second-year-in-a-row.
50. See the website for Reef Check International and their international
programs
51. See http://emdat.be/emdat_db/. Access to the database must be requested
and approved.
52. See Ocean changes—Warming, stratification, circulation, acidification and
deoxygenation, in Climate Science Special Report: A Sustained Assessment
Activity of the US Global Change Research Program (eds. D.J. Wuebbles,
D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, et al.). US Global Change
Research Program, Washington, DC, USA. 2017.
53. See Dead zones and climate zones. Accessed at: http://www.vims.edu/
research/topics/dead_zones/impacts/index.php.
54. Ibid.
55. Jambeck, J.R., Geyer, R., Wilcox, C., Siegler, T.R., et al. “Plastic waste
inputs from land into the ocean.” Science 347 (6223) (2015): 768–771.
56. The graphic is from the Jambeck Research Group, see https://jambeck.
engr.uga.edu/landplasticinput.
57. Woodall, L.C., Sanchez-Vidal, A., Canals, M., Paterson, G.I.j, et al. The
deep sea is a major sink for microplastic debris, see http://rsos.royalsociety-
publishing.org/content/1/4/140317.
58. See Great Pacific garbage patch is now twice the size of Texas. Accessed at:
https://www.ecowatch.com/great-pacific-garbage-patch-texas-2551330463.
html?
59. See these two articles “Nearly every seabird may be eating plastic by 2025.”
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/08/nearly-every-seabird-may-be-
eating-plastic-2050, and “Fish mistaking plastic debris in ocean for food
study finds.” https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/aug/16/
fish-confusing-plastic-debris-in-ocean-for-food-study-finds. See also Plastic
threatens to swamp the planet. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/plas-
tic-pollution-oceans-2538009649.html.
1 A Planet in Peril
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60. See Death by plastic: 64 lb of trash in whale’s digestive system. Accessed at:
https://www.ecowatch.com/sperm-whale-plastic-death-2558644554.html.
61. New York Times. “Rescuing sea turtles from the fishing net.” The New York
Times International, Weekend 27–28 October 2018.
62. See Dead whale had 115 plastic cups, 2 flip-flops in its stomach. Accessed
at: https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/11/20/news/dead-whale-had-
115-plastic-cups-2-flip-flops-its-stomach/.
63. See this article: Wilcox, C., Van Sebille, E., Hardesty, B.D.: “Threat of
plastic pollution to seabirds is global, pervasive and increasing.” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (38) (2015): 11,899–11,904. 22
September 2015. Also this website piece: Nearly every seabird may be eating
plastic by 2025. Accessed at: http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/08/
nearly-every-seabird-may-be-eating-plastic-2050.
64. Savoca, M.S., Tyson, C.W., McGill, M., and Slager, C.J.: “Odours from
marine plastic debris induce food search behaviours in a forage fish.”
Proceedings of the Royal Society. 16 August 2017.
65. See Microplastics pollute most remote and uncharted areas of the oceans.
Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/12/
microplastics-pollute-most-remote-and-uncharted-areas-of-the-ocean. See
also Mountains and mountains of plastic: Life on Cambodias’ polluted coast.
Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/25/mountains-
and-mountains-of-plastic-life-on-cambodias-polluted-coast?CMP=
twt_a-environment_b-gdneco.
66. See Microplastic pollution in oceans is far worse than feared, say scientists.
Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/mar/12/
microplastic-pollution-in-oceans-is-far-greater-than-thought-say-scientists.
67. Lamb, J.B., Willis, B.L., Firoenza, E.A., Couch, C.S., et al. “Plastic
waste associated with disease on coral reefs.” Science 359 (6374) (2018):
460–462.
68. The Lancet Commission on pollution and health.
69. See Air pollution is the ‘new tobacco’ warns WHO head. Accessed at: https://
www.theguardian.com/environemnt/2018/oct/27/air-pollution-is-the-
new-tobacco-warns-who-head/.
70. Lancet Commission on pollution and health. Op. cit.
72. Ambient air pollution: A global assessment of exposure and burden of disease.
World Health Organisation. Geneva, Switzerland. 2016.
73. Graph is from the 2016 WHO report cited above: Ambient air pollution: A
global assessment of exposure and burden of disease.
75. See Air pollution is the ‘new tobacco’ warns WHO head. Accessed at: https://
www.theguardian.com/environemnt/2018/oct/27/air-pollution-is-
the-new-tobacco-warns-who-head/.
56
M. J. Bush
76. Breathtaking: Air quality indices make pollution seem less bad than it is.
Accessed at: https://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/
21702743-air-quality-indices-make-pollution-seem-less-bad-it-breathtak-
ing.
77. See the report: State of the air 2019. American Lung Association, Chicago,
Illinois, USA. Accessed at: www.stateoftheair.org.
78. See PM2.5 concentrations and exposure in London, a report issued by
Transport for London. See also Revealed: every Londoner breathing dan-
gerous levels of toxic air particle. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2017/oct/04/revealed-every-londoner-breathing-danger-
ous-levels-of-toxic-air-particle.
79. See “Air pollution is the ‘new tobacco’, warns WHO head.” The Guardian.
Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/27/air-
pollution-is-the-new-tobacco-warns-who-head.
80. The data and information discussed in this section on air pollution and
children are taken from the 2016 UNICEF report: Clear the air for chil-
dren: The impact of air pollution on children, which is available online.
81. UNEP 2016. A snapshot of the world’s water quality: Towards a global assess-
ment. United Nations Environment Program, Nairobi, Kenya.
82. Data is from the UNEP report #49.
83. UNEP 2016. Op. cit.
84. World Health Statistics 2016: Monitoring health for the SDGs: Sustainable
Development Goals. World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
85. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018: Building
Resilience for Peace and Food Security. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and
WHO. 2018.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. UN General assembly. Human Rights Council. Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the right to food. Report A/HRC/34/48. 24 January 2017.
89. See the article in the The Lancet: Michael Eddleston, “Pesticide poison-
ing in the developing world—A minimum pesticide list.” The Lancet 360
(9340) (2002): 1163–1167. Referenced in the UN report—Note 55.
90. The information is reported in the UN document: Note 55.
91. Ripple, W.J, Abernethy, K., Betts, M.G., Chapron, G., et al. “Bushmeat
hunting and extinction risk to the world’s mammals.” Royal Society Open
Science 3: 160498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.160498.
92. Smuggled bushmeat is Ebola’s backdoor to America. Accessed at:
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/29/smuggled-bushmeat-ebo-
las-back-door-america-265668.html.
93. WWW 2016. Living Planet report 2016—Risk and resilience in a new era.
WWF International, Gland, Switzerland.
1 A Planet in Peril
57
94. First mammal species goes extinct due to climate change. Accessed at:
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/06/first-mammal-extinct-
climate-change-bramble-cay-melomys/. See also A national disgrace’:
Australia’s extinction crisis is unfolding in plain sight. Accessed at: https://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/13/a-national-disgrace-aus-
tralias-extinction-crisis-is-unfolding-in-plain-sight?
96. Ceballos, G., Ehrlich, P.R., Barnosky, A.D., Garcia, A., et al. “Accelerated
modern human-induced species losses: Entering the sixth mass extinction.”
Science Advances. 19 June 2015.
98. Ceballos G., Ehrlich P.R., Barnosky A.D., Garcia A., et al.: “Accelerated
modern human-induced species losses: Entering the sixth mass extinction.”
Science Advances. 19 June 2015.
99. Ceballos, G., Ehrlich, P.R., and Dizzo, R.: “Biological annihilation via the
ongoing sixth mass extinction signaled by vertebrate population losses and
declines.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114 (30). 25 July
2017. Washington, DC, USA.
100. See the article: More than 75 percent decline over 27 years in total fly-
ing insect biomass in protected areas. Accessed at: http://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0185809.
101. Lister, B.C., and Garcia, A.: Climate-driven declines in arthropod abun-
dance restructure a rainforest food web. Accessed at: www.pnas.org/cgi/
doi/10.1073/pnas.1722477115.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. The summary for policymakers of the IPBES report can be found here.
Accessed at: https://www.eaere.org/policy/ecosystems-biodiversity/
ipbes-2019-global-assessment-report-on-biodiversity-and-ecosystem-ser-
vices/
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. See the US Global Change Research Program: Climate Science Special
Report. Fourth National Climate Assessment | Volume I. Op. cit. Page 10.
2
The Overheated Earth
Introduction
Not all the problems discussed in Chapter 1 can be attributed to the fact
that the Earth is warming. But worsening heatwaves, storms, droughts,
floods, and wildfires; melting glaciers; and bleaching coral are all directly
accelerated by higher global temperatures. Other problems are impacted less
directly: air pollution, for instance, is much more deadly during a heatwave.
Biodiversity, while predominantly threatened by a multitude of human-
driven activities including the loss of habitat for thousands of species, is fur-
ther stressed by the warming climate.
The pollution of rivers and lakes, and the trash-filled oceans have little to do
with the changing climate. But to be scaled back and reduced to a minimum,
these problems require the same forceful intervention by environmentally
aware communities, intelligent and knowledgeable governance, and strong
leadership that is needed to tackle the inexorable rise in global temperatures.
In Chapter 1, we have deliberately avoided talking too much about
climate change—preferring the facts to speak for themselves. But in this
chapter we look at why the evidence for a warming planet is irrefutable and
the impact inescapable. We are living in a warmer world. One that is already
dangerously overheated.
In 2019, scientists and environmentalists were increasingly talking about
a climate crisis, rather than just climate change. And the occurrence of global
warming was more frequently being described as global heating. Clearly, the
climate situation is getting worse, not better.

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M. J. Bush
In the Greenhouse
First a question: Are we absolutely certain that the Earth is getting warmer?
Are we sure that it’s not just due to sunspots or solar flares, or a wobble in
the Earth’s orbit around the sun? What about the Milankovitch cycle? And
what if all these variables that could potentially warm up the planet just hap-
pen to be taking place at the same time?
It certainly seems as if the Earth is getting warmer. Every year since 2015
the meteorologists have been telling us that the year just over was the hottest
ever recorded, and that the present year is on track to be hotter still.
The World Meteorological Organisation’s report on the state of the global
climate in 2018 was clear: The year 2018 was the fourth warmest on record
and the four years, 2015–2018 were the top four warmest years in the global
temperature record. Over the Arctic, annual average temperature anomalies
(meaning deviations from the long term average) exceeded 2 °C and even
3 °C in several places. This was slightly lower than 2016, but still exception-
ally high compared to the long-term average.1
For Europe as a whole, 2018 was one of the three warmest years on
record. Other areas of notable warmth included the south-western US, east-
ern parts of Australia, and New Zealand, where it was the second warmest
year on record.2
It was 2016 that was actually the warmest year during this period—
including in several high-latitude locations, particularly along the Russian
Federation coast, in Alaska, and far north Canada. In the high Arctic, tem-
peratures were significantly above average values—with Svalbard airport in
Norway (right up against the Arctic circle) recording average temperatures a
huge 6.5 °C above the baseline value.3
Figure 2.1 is from NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS)
and shows the global trend in land surface air temperatures and sea surface
water temperatures since 1880.4 Although there are periods when warming
slows, the trend since about 1970 is inexorably upwards. More alarmingly,
the rate of increase in the warming trend since 2010 has increased substan-
tially. You can see a definite uptick in the curves after about 2010.
The global sea surface temperature trend so far for the twenty-first cen-
tury is estimate at 0.16 °C per decade—a significantly higher figure than the
longer term 1950–2016 trend of 0.10 °C per decade.5
The rate of energy increase in the climate system is the most fundamen-
tal metric that defines the rate of global climate change. More than 90% of
2 The Overheated Earth
61
>ĂŶĚƐƵƌĨĂĐĞĂŝƌ
ƚĞŵƉĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƐ;ƌĞĚͿ
^ĞĂƐƵƌĨĂĐĞǁĂƚĞƌ
ƚĞŵƉĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ;ďůƵĞͿ
Fig. 2.1 Global temperature anomalies over land and over ocean (Source NASA
Goddard Institute for Space Studies)
the Earth’s energy imbalance goes into heating the oceans. So tracking ocean
temperatures and calculating the changes in ocean heat content (OHC) is
where you look first if you want to understand more about global warming.
The temperature of a substance is an indication of its energy content, and
the energy absorbed and held in the oceans is orders of magnitude greater
than the energy content of the atmosphere.
Water is about a thousand times heavier than air, and it takes almost four
times as much energy to raise the temperature of a kilogram of water by
1 °C than it does to raise the temperature of a kilogram of air by the same
amount.
How much water is in the oceans? About 1.35 billion billion tons. So
raising the temperature of this mass of ocean water by just 0.6 °C requires a
truly phenomenal amount of energy. Only when you consider the increasing
heat content of the oceans, do you start to get an idea of the massive amount
of energy that is being absorbed by the planet.
Figure 2.2 from NOAA shows global ocean heat content data since 1957.
For the last 50 years, the long-term trend has been strongly positive.6 The
year 2018 set new records for ocean heat content in the upper 700 metres,
exceeding previous records set in 2017.7
So what’s causing this seemingly inexorable rise in global temperatures?
62
M. J. Bush
Fig. 2.2 Global ocean heat content (0–2000 m) (Source National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration)
As we noted in Chapter 1, the Climate Science Special Report, published

in 2017 by the US Global Change Research Program, is very clear on this
question. It states:
This assessment concludes, based on extensive evidence, that it is extremely

likely that human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse gases, are
the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.
For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative expla-
nation supported by the extent of the observational evidence.8
The boldface text is in the original text—which suggests that the scientists
who authored the report wanted to make it absolutely clear that they believe
that human activities, especially the emissions of greenhouse gases, are causing
global warming.
In the Beginning
The discovery of global warming is a fascinating tale of scientific endeav-

our, insight, and perseverance that starts way back in the early nineteenth
century. Curiously, the aim at that time in the scientific community was to
understand more about the ice ages. Could another one occur again?
63
Beginning with work by Joseph Fourier in the 1820s, scientists had

speculated that gases in the atmosphere might trap the heat received from
the sun. An amateur English scientist, David Tyndall, working out of his
makeshift laboratory, identified several gases that absorbed radiant heat.
He discovered that the most important of these were water vapour and car-
bon dioxide.9 Fast forward a century and a half and scientists with much
more accurate and sensitive equipment, and a new understanding of the
chemical isotopes of carbon, were gradually unravelling the complexity of
the carbon cycle. They understood the role of atmospheric carbon dioxide
(CO2) in absorbing the radiation of heat from the planet—which is keeping
the planet comfortably warmer than it would be if the atmosphere was
completely transparent to this outgoing radiation. This is the so-called
greenhouse effect.
Figure 2.3 shows how it all works.10
It looks complicated—and it is.
But the numbers are not as important as the concept. On the left-hand
side, in yellow, is the incoming solar energy striking the top of the atmos-
phere (TOA) with an intensity of 340 Watts per square meter. This level
of solar energy is pretty much constant. A bit less than half of this energy
Fig. 2.3 Global mean energy budget of the Earth under present day conditions
(Source Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science ETH Zurich)
64
M. J. Bush
reaches the surface of the Earth (where it is shown as ‘solar absorbed sur-
face’). This energy warms the surface. But the Earth, since it is a warm body,
emits its own thermal radiation (on the right in orange) but at a much
longer wavelength than the incoming radiation from the sun. A fraction
of this longwave radiation is absorbed by the greenhouse gases (includ-
ing water vapour and carbon dioxide)—which warms the atmosphere and
which, in turn, radiates part of this energy back down to the surface. This
radiative energy is shown on the right as ‘thermal down surface’. The net
result of these energy flows is tucked away in the bottom left corner. There
is an imbalance: more energy is coming into the surface of the Earth than is
leaving.
Result? The Earth is warming up. It has to—there is more energy coming
in than going out.
And let’s not confuse a warming climate with only warmer weather. It still
gets cold in the winter in the northern hemisphere. There’s plenty of snow.
At the same time, in the southern hemisphere summer, it is hot. Very hot. In
January 2018, while it was freezing in North America, South Africa was in
the grip of an intense drought; Cape Town was running out of water; New
Zealand was sweltering under a heat wave and in Australia, temperatures
of 46 °C killed thousands of flying foxes and volunteers were hosing down
heat-stressed koalas.11
The Greenhouse Gases
So what are the gases in this greenhouse? Although water vapour is a sig-
nificant absorber of infrared radiation, research has shown that it is carbon
dioxide which has a much stronger influence on the global energy budget.
It’s been called the control knob: turn it up and the Earth gets warmer; dial it
down and the planet cools.12
In 1953, a post-doctoral student called Charles Keeling began working at
Caltech in California on the chemistry of carbonates in surface waters, and
their equilibria with limestone and CO2 in the air. To investigate the chem-
istry of these compounds and their interactions with CO2, Keeling had to
measure CO2 extracted from the air as well as in acidified samples of water.
What he found was intriguing. The air contained more CO2 at night than
during the day—a consistent diurnal variation. In the afternoon, concentra-
tions were relatively stable at about 310 parts per million (ppm).
The early results of this research led to a larger research program intended
to measure concentrations of atmospheric CO2 more widely around
65
Fig. 2.4 The Keeling curve—Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 measured at Mauna

Loa observatory (Source Scripps Institution of Oceanography)
the globe. Four monitoring points around the world were proposed but
only one, at Mauna Loa in Hawaii, was able to measure CO2 concentra-
tions almost without interruption. In March 1958, CO2 was measured at
313 ppm. More surprising still, as the daily measurements were carefully
recorded over the course of the year, was a marked seasonal variation in CO2
concentrations as the gas was absorbed for plant growth during the spring
and summer months and returned to the atmosphere during the winter that
followed. As Keeling continued to monitor CO2 concentrations and report
his results, the now famous saw-tooth graph of increasing atmospheric
CO2 concentrations began to take shape.13 Its current version is shown in
Fig. 2.4.14
What is immediately obvious is that the concentrations of CO2 in the
atmosphere are increasing and have been increasing continuously since
measurements began in 1958. Although it is a little hard to detect, the rate
of increase is also higher now than it was a few years ago. So there is no sign
yet that the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has started to level
off. Concentrations of CO2 are still climbing—just the way they have done,
year after year, for the past 60 years. The graph shows concentrations of CO2
were at about 415 ppm in May 2019—100 ppm more than when Keeling
first started his measurements in 1958.
So why are atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide rising and
where is this carbon dioxide coming from?
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M. J. Bush
It’s being produced by the burning of fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural
gas. And scientists can prove it.
An isotope of carbon, carbon-14, is created by cosmic rays in the upper
atmosphere. More of the isotope was created by nuclear weapons tests in the
1950s. The isotope decays very slowly—over thousands of years. However,
the carbon in coal and oil is so old that it completely lacks the radioactive
isotope. Therefore the emissions of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels
adds only plain old carbon to the atmosphere. In 1955, the chemist Hans
Seuss conducted an analysis of wood from trees grown over the last century,
reporting that the newer the wood, the greater the ratio of plain carbon to
carbon-14—meaning that the amount of plain carbon in the atmosphere
was increasing. The only plausible source of this carbon was the burning of
fossil fuels: coal and oil.15
Although carbon dioxide is the principal actor, he is by no means alone
on the stage. There are two other actors of note: methane and nitrous oxide.
And three with minor roles: HFCs, PFCs, and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).16
Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide together account for more than
80% of the warming effect of the greenhouse gases—so in this book we are
going to focus on these three gases.17
Methane is emitted from a variety of sources: both natural sources such
as wetlands, volcanoes, permafrost soils and wildfires; and anthropogenic
sources: principally enteric fermentation by livestock (cows), the oil and gas
industry, and landfills. Methane is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
Like carbon dioxide, levels of both methane and nitrous oxide are increas-
ing in the atmosphere (Fig. 2.5). Although the concentrations are very low
Fig. 2.5 Global atmospheric levels of methane (left) and nitrous oxide (right) (Source
WMO Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018)
67
(measured in parts per billion ), these are powerful greenhouse gases. The
Global Warming Potential (GWP) of methane and nitrous oxide is respec-
tively 2518 and 298 times the value of carbon dioxide.19
Carbon dioxide concentrations have increased by almost 50% from
278 ppm in about 1750, to about 415 ppm in 2019. During the same
period the concentration of nitrous oxide increased more slowly—but the
levels of methane in the atmosphere more than tripled.
The current concentrations of these three gases exceed any levels measured
in the last 800,000 years—the period covered by the ice cores. The rate of
increase of the three gases during the last century is also unprecedented.20
Black Carbon
It sounds like a character out of a horror movie—and in some respects

it is.
Black carbon (BC) is a form of carbon that is formed primarily in open
flames and in engines burning diesel fuel. When emitted into the atmos-
phere it has several unusual properties. It strongly absorbs visible light—
warming in the process, and it is extremely stable with very low chemical
reactivity in the air.
It is not a gas: rather like the general term soot, it exists as an aggregate of
very small particles—often visible in the black exhaust fumes of large die-
sel trucks. Black carbon is therefore not included among the greenhouse
gases—even though it has a significant effect on global warming. The strong
absorption of light at all visible wavelengths is the distinguishing character-
istic that has raised interest in studies of atmospheric physics and chemis-
try. No other substance with such strong light absorption is present in the
atmosphere in significant quantities.
Black carbon is emitted in a variety of combustion processes and is widely
present in the atmosphere. It has a unique and important role in the Earth’s
climate system because it absorbs solar radiation, influences cloud processes,
and alters the melting of snow and ice cover.
The material is removed within days from the atmosphere by deposition–
either directly deposited or washed out by rainfall or snow. But while it is
in the atmosphere, black carbon has a strong influence on atmospheric pro-
cesses: recent studies now rank black carbon in second place behind carbon
dioxide, and ahead of methane, in terms of global warming.21
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M. J. Bush
Sources whose emissions are rich in black carbon can be grouped into a
small number of categories—diesel engines, industry, residential solid fuel,
and open burning. The largest global source is the open burning of forests
and savannas. The amount of carbon emitted varies according to the geo-
graphic region. Residential solid fuels, for example: coal, wood and charcoal,
contribute 60–80% of Asian and African emissions; while diesel engines
contribute about 70% of emissions in Europe, North America and Latin
America. Residential coal is a significant source of black carbon in China,
the former USSR and a few Eastern European countries. These categories
represent about 90% of black carbon emissions. Other black-carbon-rich
sources include emissions from aviation, shipping, and the flaring of hydro-
carbon gases, which together account for about 9%, the remaining 1% is
from sources with low emission levels.22
Fossil-fuel fired power plants are not major sources of black carbon
because the combustion of the carbon fuels is better controlled, and there
is normally adequate amounts of air to ensure complete combustion. Power
plants produce carbon dioxide rather than black carbon.
Drought and Floods
It’s perhaps no surprise that a warming planet will lead to more intense
and more frequent drought. Drought affects Africa more than any
other continent, with the record showing 136 droughts across Africa
between 1995 and 2015. Of this number, more than half were in East Africa
alone.
Drought exacts a high human toll in terms of hunger, poverty, and the
perpetuation of under-development. It causes widespread damage to crops,
loss of livestock, water shortages and outbreaks of epidemic diseases.
Some droughts last for years, causing extensive and long-lasting economic
decline as well as displacing large sections of the population. Consecutive
failures of seasonal rains in east Africa in 2005, for example, led to food
insecurity for at least 11 million people.
In total the CRED database recorded more than one billion peo-
ple affected by drought in the period 1995–2015. That is more than a
quarter of all people affected by all types of weather-related disasters world-
wide—even though drought accounted for less than 5% of all natural
hazards.23
69
Fig. 2.6 Number of people affected by drought since 1990 (Graph from the EM-DAT
database) (Source Centre of Research for the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université
Catholique de Louvain)
Drought is a disaster that has huge human impact—but few deaths are
directly attributed to drought. People die later—from malnutrition, disease,
displacement and conflict.
The number of droughts occurring each year hasn’t changed much over
the last couple of decades—but the impact, in terms of the number of peo-
ple affected, has been increasing dramatically, as Fig. 2.6.
This graph shown in Fig. 2.6 peaks at around 380,000 people affected
in 2014–2015, and clearly shows that droughts have become much more
intense—or much longer. More probably it is the latter, because short
droughts can often be tolerated and coped with by farmers and pastoralists.
But when drought continues for more than a year the impact is generally
catastrophic.
The total area affected by drought in 2016 was among the largest in the
post-1950 record. For each month, at least 12% of global land surface expe-
rienced severe drought conditions, the longest such stretch in the record. In
north-eastern Brazil, drought conditions occurred for the 5th consecutive
year, making this the longest drought on record for this region.24 Excessive
heat and drought continued into 2018. Temperatures were well above aver-
age and rainfall well below average from April onward in much of north-
ern and western Europe. Denmark had its hottest summer and driest May
to July on record, and Norway and Finland their hottest July months. This
culminated in a prolonged heatwave in late July and early August, which
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M. J. Bush
included numerous record high temperatures north of the Arctic circle, and
record long runs of warm temperatures.
In eastern Australia there was significant drought in 2018. Over the
Murray–Darling Basin, the rainfall for January was the lowest since 1902.
Central Australia was even drier than usual, with Alice Springs going a
record 160 days without rain.25
East Africa—The Drought Years
Over the past decade East Africa has experienced a number of particularly
severe droughts—occurring almost every year since 2005. Along with the
increased frequency, the severity of the droughts and the impact on human
populations have also intensified. The drought that lasted from mid-2011 to
mid-2012 was the region’s worst for 60 years. But while that crisis affected
over 12 million people, the most recent drought that began in 2016 has
greatly increased the number of people suffering from food insecurity and
malnutrition. In August 2016, 24 million people—twice as many as in
2015—were facing critical food insecurity. According to UNICEF, in 2017
more than 1 million children were acutely malnourished and over 5 million
children were in danger. The drought contributed to outbreaks of yellow
fever, malaria, cholera and measles.
Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia have been hardest hit by extensive crop fail-
ures and livestock deaths but other countries in the wider region have also
been badly affected. In South Sudan, the drought, coupled with an ongoing
armed conflict, has pushed the country close to disaster. In February 2017,
the UN declared famine in parts of South Sudan where 100,000 people face
starvation and around 1 million people are classified as being on the brink
of famine, one in seven people have been forced to flee their homes through
the combined impacts of conflict and drought.26
Exacerbated by a brutal conflict, the drought, food scarcity and spiralling
food prices have led to massive migration across borders as well as internal
displacement. According to the UN there were 4.4 million refugees and asy-
lum seekers and an additional 3 million internally displaced people across
East Africa in July 2017.
The forecasts are grim. A 2017 UN assessment predicted that the drought
will intensify, that food prices will continue to rise, that there is a risk of
escalating violence in South Sudan, and that the humanitarian situation in
many East African countries will deteriorate. Across the Horn of Africa and
71
further south, the region faces the likelihood of below-normal to near-nor-

mal rainfall leading to poor harvests and shortages of water.27
Ethiopia
Between 2000 and 2017, six drought episodes have been registered in
Ethiopia, with the latest two—in 2011 and 2016/17 devastating pastoral
and agropastoral livelihoods. Herders’ continued reliance on natural rainfed
pasture in the face of a host of factors that are accelerating the scarcity of
these resources has meant that livelihoods are less and less able to cope with
shocks like drought.
Droughts are happening at shorter intervals with no time for the recov-
ery of pasture in the rangelands. Flash floods—that usually happen at the
end of drought episodes—then wash away the natural seed reserve in the
soil, denuding vast areas of rangeland. The extent of invasive species is esti-
mated to extend over 1 million hectares in the four major pastoral ecosys-
tems of Ethiopia, implying that this expanse of land is no longer available
for grazing. Added to this is the loss of prime dry-season grazing reserves
close to major river systems due to various state and private investments and
projects.28
In 2016, the October rains failed in southern and south-eastern Ethiopia.
In the most affected areas, the cumulative rainfall totals during the season
were less that 25% of the average. This followed the already erratic per-
formance of the main 2016 rains and continued into 2017. The ongoing
drought has been dubbed “the most severe drought ever” owing to its inten-
sity, duration, and extent. In the three pastoral ecosystems covering four
regions of Somali, Borena in Oromia, SNNPR29 and Afar regions, nine con-
tinuous dry months have been recorded up to mid-2017, and the amount of
rain received in the preceding months was insufficient to make any mean-
ingful impact.30
The failed rains have caused abnormal migrations, deteriorating livestock
body conditions and weakened immune systems among livestock, result-
ing in increasing cases of opportunistic diseases and internal and external
parasites among animals and further pushing up mortality rates. Milk pro-
duction in cattle declined by as much as 80%, while significant losses were
recorded in camels and goats raising serious concerns over already high mal-
nutrition rates—given the close link between milk availability and human
nutrition in pastoral communities.
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M. J. Bush
It is estimated that between November 2016 and April 2017, more than
1.5 million livestock perished in southern and south-eastern areas, represent-
ing an economic loss of over $350 million. Extreme coping mechanisms—
such as reducing the number and size of meals, selling remaining productive
assets, and in an increasing number of cases—destitution and displacement
owing to the complete loss of livestock assets—have been observed through-
out the affected areas.31
As Ethiopia continued to struggle with the effects of drought in the pas-
toral lowlands, a formidable enemy has appeared on the scene. An exotic
and invasive pest called the Fall Army worm, is spreading through the region
at an alarming rate. The worm, which is known to affect over 80 species of
plants, prefers maize—Ethiopia’s leading cereal in terms of production. The
worm has affected over 50,000 hectares in 144 districts in three of the major
maize-growing regional states: Gambella, Oromia and SNNPR.32
California
Meanwhile, over on the other side of the world, a different scenario was
playing out. California’s drought which started in 2012 and continued for
about five years was successfully managed by the State. A well-organized
media campaign persuaded people to reduce their water use, and all non-
essential use was prohibited. Such a vigorous and intense media campaign
requires a lot of money and other resources, but California is the wealthiest
State in the US with a GDP which, if it were a country, would place the
State among the top 10 countries ranked by this metric.
So almost everyone in California managed to survive the drought—
including the huge mechanized agricultural industry.
The drought was made worse by prolonged and unusually high tempera-
tures along the west coast of the US. The California drought didn’t cause a
huge amount of damage in terms of lives lost or people displaced. But the
constant summer heat waves created conditions that sparked hundreds of
intense and deadly wildfires.
In 2017, more than 11,000 wildfires flared up along the coast of
California making that year the worst year for fires since 2015—another
record year.
The fires raced through the coastal forests driven by fierce Diablo winds—
hot and dry. The fires moved so fast they caught many residents by sur-
prise—particularly at night; many families escaping only in the nick of time.
Over 30 people were killed by the fires.
73
Ironically, good rainfall during the previous winter encouraged the strong
growth of vegetation over the cooler winter season—which then dried
out in the fierce summer heat and provided the fuel for the rampant fires.
The wildfires also brought unprecedented levels of air pollution—a poten-
tially deadly hazard for many older residents and children suffering from
asthma.33
South Africa
In February 2018, Africa’s top tourist destination was in the grip of the
worst drought on record. Water levels in its six main supply dams had plum-
meted to less than one third normal levels—down from more than 90%
four years earlier. The Theewaterskloof Dam, one of Cape Town’s six main
dams had dwindled to 10% of its capacity.
Restrictions on water consumption were unprecedented. High-income
families slashed their consumption by 80%; lower income families by 40%.
After city resident were limited to just over 13 gallons a day, any household
that exceeded the limit had a water restriction device attached to its pipes by
the authorities. Showers are quick—with a bucket in the tub to catch some
of the water: for flushing the toilet.
Airport washrooms offered hand sanitizers instead of tap water—which
cannot be used for any purpose outside the house. Builders use recycled or
bore water for cement. Some restaurants abandoned pasta and boiled vegeta-
bles, while others switched to paper tablecloths and napkins, and reused ice
bucket water for mopping floors.
A drought this severe has never occurred before in the 100 year record.
Scientists at the University of Cape Town estimated it at a 1 in 400-year
event.34
The city is building three small temporary desalination plants but is also
drilling hundreds of bore holes. That’s an understandable response, but
groundwater resources need to be replenished by rainfall. Eventually the
water level in the boreholes drops and the wells run dry.35
Floods
Since 1995, floods have accounted for almost half of all weather-related dis-
asters. They also have a huge impact—displacing hundreds of thousands
of people and resulting in many deaths. Even so, twice as many people are
affected by drought than floods. Over the period 1995–2015, the CRED
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M. J. Bush
Fig. 2.7 Number of people affected by floods between 1900–2015 (The graph

is from the EM-DAT database) (Source Centre of Research for the Epidemiology of
Disasters, Université Catholique de Louvain)
database recorded 2.3 billion people affected by drought; 1.1 billion affected
by floods.
Both the number of floods and their impact has been rising, increasing to
an average of 171 floods annually over the period 2005–2014 compared to
an average of 127 floods per year in the previous decade.36 The number of
people affected is shown in Fig. 2.7.
Comparing Figs. 2.6 and 2.7, the coincidence of the impacts of floods
and droughts is striking.
Can droughts cause floods, or might floods cause droughts? That seems
odd.
More likely it is evidence of the extreme variability of local weather pat-
terns caused by the changing climate. The predictable pattern of dry seasons
and rainy seasons—on which rainfed agriculture has depended on for several
thousand years, has been largely disrupted in many countries. Now, a year-
long drought is likely to be followed by devastating floods—which in turn
may be followed by another drought. For example, on 20 February 2017,
after a 5-year drought, some parts of California received nearly twice as
much rain in a single deluge as normally falls in the preceding five months.
In 2018, flooding affected Kenya and Somalia which had previously been
suffering from severe drought, as well as Ethiopia and parts of Tanzania.37
Just like droughts, floods strike Africa and Asia more than other conti-
nents, but pose an increasing danger elsewhere. In South America, over half
a million people were affected by floods on average each year between 1995
75
and 2004. By the following decade, that number had risen to an average of
2.2 million annually: four times as many.
The death toll from flooding has also been rising in many parts of the
world. In 2007, floods killed 3000 people in India and Bangladesh. Then in
2010, flooding killed 2100 people in Pakistan and another 1900 in China,
while in 2013 close to 6500 people died because of flooding in India.
In 2017 the disasters continued. As the western media focused on the
flooding in Texas after hurricane Harvey, a far worse tragedy was unfold-
ing in Asia. After weeks of unusually strong monsoon rains pounded India,
Bangladesh and Nepal, the death toll was already close to 1200. The Red
Cross estimated that as many as 14 million people were displaced in India;
seven million in Bangladesh and 1.5 million in Nepal. Half the state of
Uttar Pradesh, home to over 200 million people, was under water. The
floodwaters in Mumbai (with a population six times greater than Houston’s)
was five feet deep.38
The following year in August, the Indian state of Kerala suffered major
flooding as a result of persistent heavy monsoon rains. Rainfall that month
was almost twice the long term average. Over a million people were dis-
placed and five times than number affected in some way. There was disas-
trous flooding in Japan in June and July; in Nigeria in September; and in
parts of the middle East in October and November.
Although many of the most disastrous floods have been in Asia, Europe is
not immune to the risk. A 2018 study found that the British Isles have some
of the worst flood projections, with half of UK cities likely experiencing a
50% increase in peak river flows. Elsewhere in Europe, the capitals worst hit
by flooding will be Dublin, Helsinki, Riga, Vilnius and Zagreb.39
The nature of disastrous flooding has also changed: with flash floods, and
riverine and coastal flooding increasingly frequent. In addition, urbanization
has significantly increased flood runoff, while recurrent flooding of agricul-
tural land in Asia has exacted a heavy toll in terms of lost production, food
insecurity and rural under-nutrition. In rural India, children in households
exposed to recurrent flooding are more likely to be stunted and underweight
compared to children in non-flooded villages. Children exposed to floods in
their first year of life also suffered the highest levels of chronic malnutrition
due to lost agricultural production and interrupted food supplies.
Many of the impacts of floods are preventable—since flooding can be
reduced through simple technologies such as dams and dykes. But these
measure are hugely expensive if they are built to withstand the force of
intense hurricanes and cyclones.
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M. J. Bush
Food Insecurity
In Chapter 1 we noted that the number of undernourished people in the
world has been rising since 2014—reversing a downward trend that had
been observed during the previous decade. Is this reversal related in any way
to how the climate is changing?
Many scientists believe that it is.
Climate change is profoundly impacting the conditions in which agri-
cultural activities are conducted. When climatic conditions change, even
slightly and even in a direction that might seem favourable to growth, plants
will be affected: some will become less productive or even disappear.
Global food production is vulnerable to many climate-related threats:
Reduced yields: The productivity of crops and livestock including milk
yields generally declines at higher temperatures and drought-related stress.
Agriculture may shift to higher latitudes where soil and nutrients may be less
suitable for producing crops, leaving lower latitude areas less productive.
Planting and Harvesting: Changing seasonal rainfall patterns and more
severe precipitation events—and related flooding—may delay planting,
interrupt harvesting, and decimate production.
More Pests: Insect and plant pests may thrive in greater numbers if cold
winters no longer keep them in check. New pests may invade as tempera-
tures and levels of humidity change.
Risks to Fisheries: Higher ocean temperatures will cause changes in the
abundance and range of fish and other commercial marine species. Coral
reefs, the breeding ground and refuge for many species of fish, are threat-
ened by higher water temperatures.
Extreme Weather: Storms, floods, and wildfires can lead to huge losses of
crops and livestock, and the destruction of buildings and infrastructure that
are essential for the commerce of agricultural produce.40
Food insecurity is less likely to be problematic if four criteria are satisfied:
• Food is available and in sufficient quantity, appropriate quality, and sup-

plied though domestic production or imports
• Individuals have access to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate
foods for a nutritious diet
• The utilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation
and healthcare enables individuals to reach a state of nutritional
well-being where all physiological needs are met
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• Stability—where households have access to adequate food at affordable

prices at all times.
Each of these dimensions of food security is threatened by the changing

climate.
Availability
Yields are expected to be negatively impacted more in tropical regions than

in higher latitudes and impacts are more severe with increased warming—
and many of the regions where crop yields are expected to decrease are also
areas that are already experiencing food insecurity.
With global consumption projected at over 730 million tonnes in
2017/18, wheat is by far the most significant single crop in terms of human
consumption. Declining production will have far-reaching impacts in
countries where it is the foundation of food security, and where options to
import the cereal are limited. The increase in global temperatures between
1980 and 2008 resulted in an average reduction in global wheat yields of
5.5%.41 A 2016 study that employed three different modelling techniques
found that a global increase in warming of 1 °C would lead to a worldwide
decline in wheat yields of between 4 and 6%.42 The same study found that
yields would decline in the US, China, India and France, and that warmer
regions would experience the largest losses.
Rice is especially sensitive to higher temperatures: yields could decline by
as much as 90% if temperatures increase from 27 to 32 °C, and yields in
rain-fed but drought-prone areas have been reduced by 17–40% in severe
drought years. In Africa, recurring drought affects about 80% of lowland
rainfed rice production. The International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) has forecast that by 2050, yield losses could reach between 10 and
15%, and that rice prices may increase by between 32 and 37% as a result of
climate change.43
Access
According to the World Bank, in 2015 at least 800 million people in the
world lived in extreme poverty, and of those at least 70% live in rural areas,
most of them depending wholly or in part on agriculture for their liveli-
hoods. Roughly 500 million smallholder farms in the developing world are
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M. J. Bush
supporting almost 2 billion people, and in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa these
small farms produce about 80% of the food consumed.
In regions with high food insecurity and inequality, the increased fre-
quency of droughts will severely impact poorer households, and may dis-
proportionately affect women, given their vulnerability and restricted access
to resources. Climate change is a huge risk for indigenous peoples who
depend on the environment and its biodiversity for their food security and
nutrition—especially those living in areas where significant climate change
impacts are expected to occur in mountain regions, the Pacific islands,
coastal and other low-lying areas, and in the Arctic.
Utilization
Climate change will impact the livelihoods and income of small-scale food
producers—and through price increases and volatility, the livelihoods of
poorer families who are net food buyers. These families are likely to respond
by reducing their food consumption in terms of both quantity and quality.
They are also likely to reduce expenditures on healthcare—which also has
potential impacts on nutrition.
Climate change has an impact on food safety—particularly on the inci-
dence and prevalence of food-borne diseases. Rising temperatures will
encourage the spread of the organism responsible for producing the toxin
that causes ciguatera fish poisoning—which occurs in tropical regions and
is the most common non-bacterial food-borne illness associated with the
consumption of fish. Increasing rates of Ciguatera have been observed in
the lesser Antilles, and on islands in the Pacific: Tuvalu, Kiribati, the Cook
Islands, and Vanuatu.44
Stability
The variability of the climate and the increased incidence and intensity of
extreme weather will directly affect the other three dimensions of food secu-
rity: availability, access, and utilization. The irregularity of income of people
depending on agriculture for their livelihoods as well as food price increases
and their volatility, will reduce peoples’ access to food.
Droughts and heatwaves are estimated to have decreased the global har-
vest of cereals—including rice, wheat, and maize—by up to 10% between
1964 and 2007. Drought is one of the key factors for agricultural failure
and the increase in intensity, frequency and duration of droughts caused by
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climate change will cause devastating losses in crop yields in many areas of
the world. In recent years, nearly a quarter of the total damage and loss from
climate-related disasters in developing countries has been in the agricultural
sector.
Higher temperatures, drought, and extreme weather are not the only
threats to agriculture. Climate change will intensify the impact of pests—
as they arrive earlier in the season, spread to new geographic regions, and
survive longer into winter months.
One of these pests, known since biblical times, is infamous for its
devastating impact on local agriculture.
Locusts
The changes in temperature, rainfall, and wind patterns associated with cli-
mate change are expected to have a dramatic effect on the Desert Locust
in Africa—the most dangerous and destructive of all migratory pests. The
greatest impacts will be caused by warmer temperatures and increased rain-
fall in desert areas extending from West Africa to the Horn of Africa, the
Arabian Peninsular and southwest Asia. Warmer temperatures will cause the
insect to mature sooner, leading to an overall shorter lifecycle—allowing sea-
sonal breeding during the winter along the Red Sea coastal plains and in the
Horn of Africa. Coupled with a general increase in precipitation or more
frequent extreme high rainfall events, locust numbers could increase much
more rapidly than at present, leading to a greater risk of outbreaks that if
uncontrolled could develop into devastating plagues.
Increased frequency of El Nino et La Nina events will allow the breeding
of locusts during the winter in the Horn of Africa and during the summer in
the Sahel of West Africa. Any changes in wind circulation could allow locust
adults and swarms to reach previously unaffected areas to the north, south
and east of their present habitat—which stretches from West Africa to India
and includes the Sahara and the deserts of the Near East and Southwest
Asia.45
Overall, climate change is expected to have a negative impact on food
security and nutrition. Through its effects on agro-ecosystems, it impacts
agricultural production, the people depending on this production, and ulti-
mately consumers through increased price volatility. The worst affected are
the poorest populations, whose livelihoods depend on agriculture, and who
are therefore the people most exposed and vulnerable to the impacts of the
changing climate.
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M. J. Bush
The Warming Soils

Very large quantities of carbon are locked away in soils: somewhere between
3000 and 4000 billion tonnes (Gt)—about the same order of magnitude as
fossil fuel reserves. So this is a source of carbon that needs to be kept firmly
in its place—in the ground.
Scientists are still unsure how global warming will affect the stability
of this huge carbon reservoir. But a landmark study being conducted at
Harvard University in Massachusetts may offer a clue.
Soil scientists have been studying artificially heated plots of soil in a for-
est near Harvard for over 25 years. Since 1991, scientists at the 1200 ha
site near Petersham, Massachusetts have been tracking CO2 emissions from
18 test plots of forest soil heated to 5 °C above ambient temperatures. The
results were published in the journal Science in October 2017.
The emissions of carbon dioxide increased—but not as expected. There
were four phases of soil organic matter decay and carbon dioxide emission to
the atmosphere, with periods of substantial soil carbon loss alternating with
periods of no detectable change.
During the first ten years there was a significant increase in carbon
released from the plots, then a period of about seven years when nothing
much seemed to be happening. Then the emissions of carbon resumed
once again. The explanation is thought to be the way soil microorgan-
isms adapt to the changes in the form of carbon accessible to the microbial
community.
Since the experiments began in 1991, the upper 60 cm of soil lost about
17% of its carbon.
While the loss of carbon from warming soils is slow, the scientists writing
in Science concluded by stating: Our results support projections of a long-term,
self-reinforcing carbon feedback from mid-latitude forests to the climate system as
the world warms.46
The concern is that the world is facing a classic and potentially cat-
astrophic positive feedback mechanism: as the temperature of the soils
slowly increases, additional carbon is released to the atmosphere by
microbial decomposition of soil organic matter. This raises atmospheric con-
centrations of carbon dioxide—which has the effect of raising temperature still
higher. The circular process reinforces itself and atmospheric temperatures
continue to climb. Once started, there is no way to stop it: a nightmare
scenario.
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Permafrost Soils
Very large amounts of carbon are stored at higher latitudes in permafrost

soils and methane-containing ice called methane hydrates or clathrates, espe-
cially offshore in ocean sediments. Because of their sheer size, these carbon
stocks have the potential to strongly affect the planet’s climate should they
ever be released to the atmosphere.
More than 1500 billion tonnes of carbon are thought to be stored in the
permafrost soils beneath the Arctic tundra. Permafrost on land, and in ocean
shelves, contain large amounts of organic carbon—which must be thawed
and decomposed by microbes before it can be released as carbon dioxide. In
waterlogged soils, where oxygen is limited, microbial action will also pro-
duce methane.
On land permafrost is overlain by a surface active layer which thaws dur-
ing summer and forms part of the tundra ecosystem. If spring and summer
temperatures are warmer than average, the active layer (called the active layer
thickness or ALT) will increase making more carbon available for microbial
decomposition.
However, warmer summers would also result in greater uptake of carbon
dioxide by Arctic vegetation through photosynthesis. That means that the
net carbon balance in the Arctic is unpredictable: it could be either a net
source or a net sink of carbon, and this balance could vary both regionally
and over short periods of time.
Hydrological conditions during the summer thaw are also important. The
melting of ground ice may create pools of water and lakes where the lack
of oxygen will induce the production of methane. The complexity of Arctic
landscapes under climate change means that the effects of warming tempera-
tures are uncertain, but the release of methane in lakes in Alaska has already
be observed.47
Given enough oxygen, the decomposition of organic matter in soil is
accompanied by heat produced by microbes which, during summer, might
stimulate further thawing of the permafrost. Depending on the carbon and
ice content of the permafrost and the hydrology, this mechanism could
trigger relatively fast local permafrost degradation.48
Methane hydrates are another form of frozen carbon, occurring in deep
permafrost soils, ocean shelves, shelf slopes and deeper ocean bottom
sediments. They consist of methane and water molecule clusters which are
only stable under specific conditions of temperature and pressure.
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M. J. Bush
Any warming of permafrost soils ocean waters and sediments and/or

changes in pressure could destabilize the hydrates, releasing methane to the
ocean. During larger more sporadic releases, a fraction of the methane might
be outgassed to the atmosphere.
Air temperatures in the Arctic have risen faster than anywhere else on the
planet. Average temperatures in the permafrost have increased by over 5 °C
since the 1980s.49
In 2016, permafrost temperatures were the highest on record at the
majority of Arctic observation sites.50 In some places this has pushed the
temperature above freezing, meaning that soils that may have been frozen
for thousands of years begin to decompose and release their carbon.
A study in 2017 published data from NOAA’s Barrow station in Alaska
that found that tundra ecosystems were a net source of carbon dioxide to the
atmosphere annually, with especially high rates of respiration during early
winter (October through December). Long term records from the station
suggest that CO2 emission rates from North Slope tundra have increased
during the October to December period by 73% since 1975. The rates of
emission correlate with higher summer temperatures—supporting the view
that that rising temperatures have made Arctic ecosystems a net source of
CO2.51
More alarming is the fact that Arctic permafrost holds in place substantial
amounts of old, geologic methane in subsurface reservoirs. As the permafrost
thaws, it may open up pathways for the methane to migrate to the surface.
A study conducted in the Mackenzie Delta in 2016 found that where the per-
mafrost was discontinuous, emissions of methane were 13 times greater than
the emissions typically measured from methanogenic bacteria in the soil.52
The Rising Seas

Sea levels are increasing in all the oceans. Slowly but surely, global mean sea
levels are rising each year.
Globally, sea level has risen by about 20 cm since the start of the
twentieth century—due mostly to the expansion of the warming ocean
water, and the melting of glaciers and the ice sheets—which add more water
to the mix. Some regions are experiencing greater sea level rise than others.
The tropical western Pacific has seen some of the highest rising sea-level rates
over the period 1993–2015—which was a significant factor in the enormous
devastation in parts of the Philippines when typhoon Haiyan drove forward
a massive storm surge in November 2013.53
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So how high will the oceans rise, and when does this all happen?
It depends.
This is the way the US Climate Science Special Report sees it:
Human caused climate change has made a substantial contribution to global

mean sea level rise (GMSL) since 1900, contributing to a rate of rise that is
greater than during any preceding century in at least 2800 years. Relative to
the year 2000, GMSL is very likely to rise by 9-18 cm by 2030, 15-38 cm by
2050, and 30 – 130 cm by 2100.
The range of values is due both to the inherent uncertainty of the climate
models used to make these forecasts, and to the fact that a lot depends on
by how much we can reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases, primarily
carbon dioxide, that are causing the warming that is creating the problem.54
A 2017 report by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) looked at the latest sea level rise projections and
came up with some updated numbers—much larger than the forecasts made
in the Climate Science Special Report.
Factoring in the latest information concerning the melting of the
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, NOAA found that there is evidence to
support a physically plausible GMSL rise for the year 2100 in the range of
2.0–2.7 m—double previous estimates. NOAA recommended that agencies
use an upper bound of 2.5 m and a lower bound of 0.3 m as the basis for
local and regional planning.55
But there are significant local differences. Along regions of the NE
Atlantic coast of the US (from Virginia northward into Canada), relative sea
level rise is projected to be 0.3–0.5 m greater that the global average under
all the scenarios evaluated by the study.
While the uncertainty is confusing and annoying, the more logical reac-
tion should be alarm. Because the upper limits of the numerous estimates
that are being generated by the climate models and the satellite data are all
entirely possible outcomes. Not only that, recent satellite data seems to show
that the rate of sea level rise is actually increasing.56
Storm Surge
If the oceans remained calm and tranquil, sea level rise, being just 1–2 cm
a year, would not pose much of an immediate threat to coastal zones or
small islands. There would be time to take the necessary measures to protect
coastal communities and infrastructure. But that’s not the way it works.
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M. J. Bush
The oceans are in constant motion: pushed and pulled by the lunar-driven
tides and constantly stirred by shifting winds. When powerful storms drive
waves to heights of several meters above normal levels, and when this coin-
cides with high tides, storms cause massive damage.
Storm surge is an abnormal rise of water generated by a storm, over and
above the normal height of the regular tides. The term ‘storm tide’ is defined
as the sea water level rise due to the combination of storm surge and normal
tide, as depicted in Fig. 2.8.
This rise in storm-driven sea level can cause extensive flooding in coastal
areas. The storm surge can travel several miles inland, especially along bays,
rivers, and estuaries, resulting in substantial loss of life and widespread
destruction. Flooding is historically the leading cause of hurricane related
deaths in the USA.
Storm surges can easily reach 5 meters. Table 2.1 shows some of the more
destructive hurricanes and storm surges recorded in the USA during the last
10 years.
For small low-lying islands, just one large wave that comes ashore and
inundates the coastal interior is enough to kill crops and contaminate drink-
ing water. Even though the storm surge of hurricane Maria at Puerto Rico
was recorded as just 1–2 meters, a measuring buoy out to sea off Fajardo on
the east coast of the island registered a wave of 7 meters.57
Fig. 2.8 Storm surge and storm tide (Source US National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration)
Table 2.1 Storm surges recorded in the USA and the Caribbean this century
Storm (Year) Details Storm surge
Michael (2018) Hurricane Michael made landfall as an unprecedented high-end Category 4 hurricane on the Florida Panhandle 3–5 metres
region with maximum sustained wind speeds of 155 mph. The storm caused catastrophic damage to coastal
towns from wind and storm surge. The widespread damage spread well inland as Hurricane Michael remained
at hurricane strength into southwest Georgia. One of the hardest hit locations was from Mexico Beach to Indian
Pass where 3–5 metres of peak storm surge inundation was observed. In addition, wave action caused even
higher surges and this resulted in waves destroying the second story of multiple buildings in Mexico Beach
Florence (2018) Hurricane Florence caused severe damage in the Carolinas in September, primarily as a result of freshwater flood- Minimal
ing. Florence dropped almost a metre of rain in Elizabethtown, North Carolina, becoming the wettest tropical
cyclone recorded in the Carolinas. The storm originated from a strong tropical wave that emerged off the west
coast of Africa in late August. On September 14, Florence made landfall in the US just south of Wrightsville
Beach, North Carolina, and slowly moved inland. The widespread flooding badly affected North Carolina’s agri-
cultural industry. An estimated 3.4 million chickens and turkeys, and 5500 hogs died in flooded farms. Dozens of
farms remained isolated with animals unable to be fed. Piles of manure stored at these farms were swept into
swollen rivers, and about a dozen pits holding animal waste were damaged by the flooding and debris. Almost
19,000 m3 of partially treated wastewater spilled into the Cape Fear River after a treatment plant lost power;
and over 1500 m3 of coal ash from the closed Sutton Power Station near Wilmington was also swept into the
river. The H. F. Lee power plant in Goldsboro flooded to the point where their three ponds were completely
underwater and began releasing coal ash into the Neuse River
Maria (2017) Hurricane Maria formed from an African easterly wave that moved across the tropical Atlantic Ocean in mid-Sep- About 1–2 meters at
tember 2017. The hurricane gradually intensified and became the 8th hurricane of the 2017 Atlantic hurricane Puerto Rico
season with 75 mph maximum sustained winds. Maria continued to gain strength—going from a category 1 to
a dangerous category 5 hurricane. Maria first made landfall in Dominica, savaging that island, and then ripped
into the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. The storm produced extremely heavy rainfall that led to catastrophic
flooding and flash flooding, especially across the northern half of Puerto Rico. Even though hurricane force
winds started to diminish once the system moved offshore, tropical storm force winds continued well into the
evening and overnight hours across mainland Puerto Ricoa
Irma (2017) Hurricane Irma began as a tropical wave off the coast of Africa. The wave became a tropical storm on August 30, 3–4 meters
and then rapidly intensified—reaching major hurricane status, Category 3, on August 31. Heading west, Irma
ploughed through several islands in the Caribbean, devastating Barbuda. The hurricane then made two landfall
in Florida on September 10, one in the Keys and another one near Marco Island. Irma is one of only five hurri-
canes that have reached maximum sustained wind speeds of 185 mph or greater, and then maintained those
winds for 37 hours, the longest on record. Irma also tied the Cuba Hurricane of 1932 for the longest lifetime as a
Category 5 in the Atlantic Basin
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Storm (Year) Details Storm surge
Harvey (2017) Harvey started as a typical weak August tropical storm that affected the Lesser Antilles and dissipated over the 2–4 meters
central Caribbean Sea. However, after re-forming over the Bay of Campeche, Harvey rapidly intensified into
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a category 4 hurricane (on the Saffir Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale) before making landfall along the middle
Texas coast. The storm then stalled, with its centre over or near the Texas coast for four days, dropping historic
amounts of rainfall of more than 60 inches over south-eastern Texas—the largest rainfall ever recorded for a
M. J. Bush
single event in the mainland US. The rains caused catastrophic flooding, and Harvey is the second-most costly
hurricane in U.S. history behind Katrina (2005). At least 68 people died from the direct effects of the storm in
Texas, the largest number of direct deaths from a tropical cyclone in that state since 1919b
Matthew (2016) Hurricane Matthew, which pummelled Jamaica, Haiti, Cuba and the Bahamas in October 2016 generated a storm 3–5 meters
surge of between 3 and 5 meters approaching the Bahamas. It passed along the Florida east coast without mak-
ing landfall but caused substantial flooding in many areas along the eastern shoreline
Alex (2016) In January 2016, a hurricane named Alex formed in the northern Atlantic—an unusual event for that time of the 18 meters
year. Although not an especially fierce storm, it reportedly produced a storm surge of 18 meters. A red alert was
issued for five of the Azores’ nine islands. It was noted at the time that sea water temperatures were about 2 °C
higher than normal
Sandy (2012) Second only to Hurricane Katrina in terms of the damage wrought in the US, ‘Superstorm Sandy’ ripped into 4–5 meters
Jamaica where it caused J$9.7 billion or 0.8% of 2011 GDP in direct and indirect damage. In Cuba, there was
extensive coastal flooding and destruction inland, destroying some 15,000 homes, killing 11, and causing $2 bil-
lion (2012 USD) in damages. Sandy also caused two deaths and damage estimated at $700 million (2012 USD) in
the Bahamas
Ike (2008) The Category 2 hurricane made landfall near Galveston, Texas, leaving a trail of death and destruction. It is esti- 5–7 meters
mated that flooding and mud slides killed 74 people in Haiti and two in the Dominican Republic, compounding
the problems caused by Fay, Gustav, and Hanna. The Turks and Caicos Islands and the south-eastern Bahamas
sustained widespread damage to property. Seven deaths were reported in Cuba
aSeewww.weather.gov/sju/maria2017
bSeeThe National Hurricane Center website. Accessed at: https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092017_Harvey.pdf
Source US National Hurricane Center, Miami
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Table 2.2 Number of people living at less than 1 m above sea level
Country Population at LECZ < 1 m Percentage of total population
China 20,291,056 1.5
Egypt 7,719,685 9.4
Netherlands 6,794,846 40.8
India 4,613,225 0.4
Vietnam 4,560,734 5.1
Japan 4,164,277 3.3
Bangladesh 2,199,494 1.5
Indonesia 2,150,300 0.9
Germany 1,860,133 2.3
USA 1,797,420 0.6
Italy 1,504,973 2.5
Source Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CESIN), Columbia
University
These storm surge levels were recorded for Atlantic hurricanes. Reports on
tropical cyclones do not always mention the height of the storm surge, but
the extensive coastal and inland flooding caused by many of these cyclones is
testimony to the high storm surges generated by these extreme events.
Recent advances in satellite imagery have enabled scientists to more accu-
rately estimate the number of people, and the extent of the coastal area, at
different elevations above mean sea level. People that live only a few meters
above sea level in areas of the world where cyclones and hurricanes are fre-
quent obviously face a heightened risk of being hurt or killed by storm
surges associated with these extreme events.
Data registered at the Center for International Earth Science Information
Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University show which countries are most
at risk from the rising seas.58 The data show the number of people living on
Low Elevation Coastal Zones (LECZ) at different elevations: less than 1 m
and up to 10 meters above mean sea level. Communities living at less than
1 m above sea level are obviously hugely vulnerable.
The countries with more than a million people essentially living at
sea level are shown in Table 2.2. The data are from 2010, so a bit out of
date59—populations will have increased substantially. But the ranking and
the percentages will have stayed about the same.
China dominates the list—over twenty million people live in coastal areas
less than 1 m above mean sea levels. Egypt in the number 2 position is per-
haps surprising: but most of this population is resident on the Nile delta
which is only just above sea level. Then comes the Netherlands with more
than 40% of its population living at sea level—or even below sea level in
that country.
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M. J. Bush
Table 2.3 Percentage of populations living less than 1 m above sea level
Country Percentage of population at Percentage of land area at risk
LECZ < 1 m
Greenland 42.3 8.67
Netherlands 40.8 43.82
Macau 22.7 21.02
Monaco 20.6 20.62
Tuvalu 20.3 16.29
Maldives 18.8 20.88
Tokelau 14.7 16.22
Marshall Islands 14.4 23.28
Gibraltar 13.7 13.77
Source Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CESIN), Columbia
University
The Netherlands has been fighting back the sea for centuries and has
invested huge amounts of money to keep the North Sea at bay. Fighting the
force of the oceans is massively expensive—not just the initial investment,
but also the constant upkeep and maintenance of the dikes, digues, levees,
floodgates, and machinery that must be kept in working order at all times.
If we look at countries that have the largest percentage of their population
living close to sea level, the most vulnerable countries—those with more
than 10% of their population living at sea level—are shown in Table 2.3.
Greenland and the Netherlands (once again) top the list—with over 40%
of their populations living at or close to sea level.
Large islands like Greenland, and mainland countries like the
Netherlands generally have space into which coastal communities can move.
Small islands do not. And small island states that are less developed do
not have many options. Tuvalu, the Maldives, Tokelau,60 and the Marshall
Islands face an existential threat.
These country-level data do not capture the threat to several of the
world’s major cities, some of which, like New York and Miami are hugely
vulnerable.
At least 275 million city people live in areas vulnerable to storm surges
caused by sea level rise and extreme weather—most of them in Asian coastal
megacities and industrial centres such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, Bangkok and
Tokyo.
The largest city, Shanghai, is home to over 17 million people. Now one
of the world’s biggest ports, the city is bordered by the Yangtse river in the
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north and divided by the Huangpu river. The municipality includes several
islands, two long coastlines, shipping ports and long stretches of canals, riv-
ers and waterways. Shanghai is thought to be the most vulnerable city in the
world to sea level rise and flooding caused by extreme weather.
The Chinese government has not wasted time. Since 2012, it has con-
structed China’s largest deep-water drainage system beneath the Suzhou
Creek waterway—made up of 15 km of pipes to drain rainwater across a 58
km2 area. It has also started an $8 billion River Flood Discharge project that
will stretch for 120 km between Lake Taihu and the Huangpu river in an
attempt to reduce the risk of the upstream lake flooding.61
Japan’s second biggest city, Osaka, is projected to lose its business and
entertainment districts of Umeda and Namba unless additional flood
defences are constructed. Like much of Japan, the city already has a net-
work of seawalls and other defences to protect against tsunamis. But these
defences are not considered sufficient.
Egypt is particularly vulnerable. Alexandria, a city of 3 million people, is
threatened, and several million poor farmers working across the Nile delta
are likely to be displaced—creating social and political turmoil.
Rio de Janeiro is also vulnerable. The famous beaches and the domestic
waterfront airport will be swamped, and inland areas such as the Barra de
Tijuca neighbourhood, where the 2016 Olympic games were held, are likely
to be flooded.
In Miami—which is going to be inundated even if global warming is
limited to 2 °C—there is finally a sense of urgency: as journals post photo-
shopped images of the city mostly underwater.
All the cities along the east coast of the US are threatened. Boston is con-
sidering building a giant seawall across its harbour—like the huge barriers
that protect New Orleans. Boston’s planning is set out in an excellent pub-
lication Climate Ready Boston published in December 2016.62 The plan out-
lines the options to protect the city against storm surge, sea level rise and
intense rainfall—like the deluge that swamped Houston during Hurricane
Harvey. Options include rezoning waterfront land as green space, installing
specialized protections for key infrastructure, and constructing berms, dikes,
dams, temporary flood barriers and buildings that can withstand flooding.
Many new buildings are already preparing for the worst: the Spaulding
Rehabilitation Hospital which opened in 2013 has its backup generators
placed on the roof, barriers and berms to protect against floods—and even a
roof over the entrance that can serve as a dock if floodwater gets that high.63
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M. J. Bush
New York City is looking into the construction of a two-wall barrier that
would close both the entrance to New York Harbour and the East River. The
main sea wall would be 8 km long and 9 meters high and run from Sandy
Hook in New Jersey to Queens in New York City.64
Species on the Move

The warming climate is creating turmoil among the planet’s multitude of
animal and plant species as temperatures rise and patterns of rainfall change
in timing, intensity and location.
As the majority of species—both terrestrial and marine—shift their range
and seek a cooler or less challenging environment, many will move towards
the poles: either northwards or towards the south depending on the hemi-
sphere of their habitat. Or move to a higher elevation—if one exists.
Many fish species are already migrating towards the poles resulting in
the rapid ‘tropicalization’ of mid- and high-latitude systems. Models based
on predicted changes in environmental conditions, habitat types and phy-
toplankton production, project a large-scale redistribution of global marine
fish catch potential, with an average 30–70% increase in high-latitude
regions and a drop of 40% in the tropics. In the coastal waters of the US,
fish species are moving north. In the Gulf of Maine, for instance, one of
the fastest warming ocean areas, temperatures are predicted to become less
suitable almost everywhere for cod, flounder and pollock—three traditional
mainstays of the regional fishing industry.65
Small-scale fisheries in less developed tropical regions are particularly
vulnerable to climate change impacts. In the Mediterranean, it has been
observed that invasive species from lower latitude regions have arrived in
recent years at the rate of one every four weeks. Species have been observed
migrating north by an average of 300 km since the 1980s: trying to find the
biochemical and physical conditions of their natural habitat.66
Some species move quickly: birds, fish, and marine mammals; other spe-
cies, like terrestrial mammals, move more slowly. Trees, shrubs, and plant
species are also changing—both in their range and phenology. Hybrid spe-
cies are emerging as the range of sub-species overlap and intersect. Toads,
sharks, butterflies, bears, and trout are among the hybrids that have been
observed and documented.67
91
This widespread shift in the range of most if not all of the planet’s
species—driven by changes to the global climate wrought by a single domi-
nant species, is unprecedented. One expert is quoted as saying: We’re talking
about a redistribution of the entire planet’s species.68
Maybe not the entirety. A recent study that looked at 4000 species from
around the world found that about half were on the move. Species on land
were averaging more than 10 miles a decade, while marine species were mov-
ing four times faster. But insects seem to be among the first to pack up and
move out. The European purple Emperor butterfly reportedly moved more
than 125 miles in a single decade.69
If species on the move meant just mammals and birds migrating towards
cooler climes, and fish swimming into cooler waters, perhaps the impact on
people, communities, and livelihoods, would be minimal. But that is far
from being the case.
This widespread rearrangement and redistribution of the planet’s spe-
cies brings with it a multitude of threats. Parasites, crop pests, and dis-
ease-bearing insects are expanding their range. Insects that were previously
geographically constrained by cold winters are moving into new territory.
Vector-borne diseases that were previously limited to well-defined regions
are expanding into areas that used to be risk-free.
For instance, even modest temperature increases may significantly affect
the extent and incidence of malaria. Global warming of just 2 °C could
increase the number of people at risk from the disease by up to 5% or more
than 150 million people. Climate change will bring new areas into risk from
the disease—areas where mosquito control programs are not yet in place and
where people’s natural immunity is weak.70 The disease now appears at high
elevations in Colombia and Ethiopia as rising temperatures push isotherms
higher. Leishmaniasis, once primarily a tropical disease, has moved into
northern Texas as the sand flies that host the disease-causing parasite move
north.
Insects that ravage agricultural crops are increasing their range.
Diamondback moths, which destroys cabbages, kale, and cauliflower grown
by poor urban farmers, are spreading in South Africa. In Latin America, cof-
fee plant fungi and pests are appearing in new areas, threatening this key
industry.71
Insects that attack trees are on the increase in North America. Ticks and
other insects that carry diseases are certain to increase their range as the
planet warms.
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M. J. Bush
Competition among species will intensify. Invasive species are likely

to become more of a problem. Classic examples include cheatgrass which
has established itself in all 50 states in the US and is highly invasive in arid
western regions. Zebra mussels have invaded the Great Lakes and other
freshwater systems in North America and have devastated native aquatic
communities.72
Climate Change and Conflict

In their 2017 report on the humanitarian crisis on the Horn of Africa, the
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)
identified the drivers of humanitarian need as: conflict, climate and natural
disasters, and economic shocks.
How are these factors related? Do they usually occur independently and it
is therefore just an unfortunate coincidence when a region experiences them
all together? Or are there subtle linkages among these factors that are only
recently being identified and evaluated?
In east Africa in 2017, UNOCHA reported that 26.5 million people
needed food assistance and that the number of refugees who had sought
protection in the Horn of Africa region had increased to 4.4 million peo-
ple. Drought is a recurring theme. Here’s a direct quote from one of their
reports:
More than 3 million people have become internally displaced in the region
as a result of conflict and drought. Conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo has displaced more than 1.6 million people since August 2016 in
the Kasai and Tanganyika provinces. Almost a million people have been dis-
placed by drought conditions predominantly internally. Over 739,000 people
have been displaced in Somalia as a result of drought since November 2016,
while nearly 200,000 have been displaced in Ethiopia due to drought since the
beginning of the year.73
Extreme weather and natural disasters—particularly droughts—severely dis-

rupt livelihoods that depend on agriculture and pastoralism. As we have seen
in East Africa, these events can force hundreds of thousands of families into
poverty and induce millions of people to move—both within their coun-
try and across borders to neighbouring countries that may offer relief and
respite. As drought takes hold and agriculture fails, the price of food can
increase dramatically. In many cases, the hardship caused by the rising price
of food staples can lead to protests and riots.
93
In 2015, over 800 million people in the world lived in extreme poverty.
As most poor people spend more than 50% of their income on food, even a
small increase in prices can seriously affect their welfare. There is a growing
body of evidence that points to food price hikes as an important contrib-
uting trigger of social unrest such as protests, riots, violence and even war.
Most evidence stems from studies of these conditions in Africa, including
studies that identified international food price shocks as one of the factors
that may have contributed to the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings of 2010–2011.
Figure 2.9 charts the possible linkages between the food prices and
protests and riots in 40 countries since 2004. In this chart, the red dotted
vertical lines correspond to the onset of ‘food riots’ and protest associated
with the social unrest witnessed during this period in North Africa and the
Near East. The death toll is shown in parentheses.74
Long droughts are one of the most forceful drivers of social unrest in agri-
culturally dependent countries—meaning most of sub-Saharan Africa, the
Middle east and south east Asia. By dramatically increasing food insecurity
and the price of food staples, droughts may induce groups and communities
to violently protest and, in many cases, to move out of their usual location.
This in itself can produce conflicts between groups competing for grazing
lands, food and water. Prolonged drought kills livestock, drastically reduces
agricultural productivity, and destroys livelihoods. It aggravates existing
humanitarian conditions which in turn can exacerbate grievances, imagined
or real, and create a breeding ground for confrontation and conflict.
Fig. 2.9 The price of food and social unrest in 40 countries (Source FAO. The State of
Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017 )
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M. J. Bush
Table 2.4 Conflict, climate-related shocks, and food insecurity in 2016

Country Climate impact on food Number of food insecure
security people (millions)
Afghanistan Floods, landslides in winter, 8.5
drought in Ghar province
Burundi El Nino phenomenon 2.3
Central African Localized floods 2.0
Republic
Democratic Republic of El Nino phenomenon 5.9
the Congo
Iraq Drought 1.5
Somalia Il Nino related drought 2.9
South Sudan Drought and floods 4.9
Sudan El Nino phenomenon 4.4
Syrian Arab Republic Drought in Aleppo, Idlib 7.0
and Homs
Yemen Flooding, heavy rains and 14.1
tropical cyclones
Total 53.5
Source FAO. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017
In most circumstances, the impact of drought on conflict is limited.

However, for segments of the population that are particularly vulnerable to
climate change because of their dependence on agriculture, drought signifi-
cantly increases the likelihood of sustained conflict, especially among groups
in least developed states.75
Although prolonged drought may obviously cause food insecurity among
agriculturally dependent groups, if it also exacerbates conflict, the situation
quickly degenerates to the point where groups may be displaced by both the
violence and the developing conditions of famine.
Problems of acute food insecurity and malnutrition tend to be mag-
nified where natural hazards such as droughts and floods compound the
consequences of conflicts. The concurrence of conflict and climate-related
natural disasters such as floods and droughts is likely to increase with climate
change, as it not only magnifies problems of food insecurity and nutrition
but can contribute to a downward spiral into conflict and chronic humani-
tarian crisis.
Table 2.4 shows conflict and climate-related shocks associated with food
crisis situations in 2016.
The civil war in the Syrian Arab Republic and the rise of rebel groups
provides an example of the way drought may exacerbate social tensions and
unrest and, in some cases, lead to violent conflict.
95
A severe drought across the region in 2006–2007 led to the collapse of

the country’s agricultural system, with most small- and medium-scale farm-
ers and herders losing most if not all agricultural production and livestock
herds in 2008. No government support was provided for these farmers so
the majority moved to urban areas in order to survive.
An estimated 1.5 million Syrians joined the swelling Iraqi refugee pop-
ulation in the Arab Republic’s largest cities including Damascus, Aleppo,
Homs, and Latakia—comprising as much as 20% of the population in these
urban areas. The refugees and migrants lived in substandard and makeshift
housing, faced almost total unemployment, and received little if any govern-
ment support, sparking rebellion in several of these communities.
Although political factors were predominant in this scenario, hunger,
poverty and hopelessness was the context which perhaps motivated men to
join rebel groups that offered an alternative livelihood and a way to protect
household food security through incentives and the promise of improved
conditions.76
Climate Change and Poverty
Climate change is a serious obstacle to the sustained eradication of poverty.

Climate related shocks and stresses, already a major impediment to the
reduction of poverty, will worsen with climate change.
Climate is involved in most of the shocks that bring or keep households
in poverty: natural disasters such as floods or landslides that destroy assets
and livelihoods, health shocks such as malaria or waterborne diseases and
pests that become more prevalent during heat waves, floods, or droughts;
crop failure from reduced rainfall; and spikes in food prices that follow
extreme weather events.
Poor people are disproportionately affected—not only because they
are often more exposed and invariably more vulnerable to climate-related
shocks, but also because they have fewer resources and receive less support
from family, community, the financial system, and even social safety nets,
which might permit them to cope, recover and adapt. Climate change will
worsen these shocks and stresses, contributing to a decoupling of economic
growth and poverty reduction, and making it that much harder to eradicate
poverty in a sustainable manner.
Climate related shocks also affect those who are not poor but remain vul-
nerable and these shocks can drag them down into poverty—for instance
when a flood destroys a small business, a drought decimates livestock, or
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M. J. Bush
contaminated water makes a family member sick. Such events can erase
years of hard work and asset accumulation and leave people with irreversible
health consequences.77
Climate-Driven Migration
If violent conflict, climate-driven disasters, food insecurity, and famine

are all somehow related and in many instances self-reinforcing, it is hardly
surprising that hundreds of thousands of desperate people seek to move
to countries where they hope to find a better life for themselves and their
children.
Migrants attempting to enter Europe illegally from North Africa
is already a huge problem for the European countries bordering the
Mediterranean. As the planet continues to warm and climate related disas-
ters—hurricanes, cyclones, floods and droughts—become more intense,
more frequent and more catastrophic, it is an absolute certainty that more
and more people from the affected regions in the tropical and sub-tropical
latitudes are going to attempt to migrate to countries they see as providing a
refuge from the problems that threaten to overwhelm them.
In 2016 extreme weather related disasters displaced around 23.5 million
people. Since 2008, an average of 21.7 million people were displaced each
year by such hazards. This does not include the people forced to move as a
consequence of slow-onset events such as prolonged droughts.
It is not only poor people from the least developed countries that being
forced to move by climate-related disasters. The hurricanes that devastated
the Caribbean islands and Puerto Rico in 2017 forced thousands of people
to move to other islands or across to mainland USA.
Low-lying river deltas, which are often among the most agriculturally
productive areas, are especially vulnerable to sea level rise. Over a million
people have migrated out from the Mekong delta provinces in recent years.
Saltwater intrusion has ruined agriculture in many areas of the delta. In
2015 there was a serious drought that allowed salt water to intrude 80 km
inland destroying 160,000 ha of crops.78
In 2018, the World Bank issued a report warning about the possible scale
of internal migration due to the impacts of the changing climate. Focusing
on three regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, the
study found that climate change will push tens of millions of people to
migrate within their countries by 2050. The study forecast that without sub-
stantial climate and development action, over 140 million people could be
97
forced to move within their own countries to escape the slow-onset impacts
of climate change. They will migrate from less viable areas with lower water
availability and crop productivity, and from coastal areas affected by rising
sea levels and storm surges. The report determined that climate migration
will rise through 2050 and then accelerate unless there are significant cuts
in greenhouse gas emissions and what the report called “robust development
action”.79
One hundred and forty million is a conservative estimate. The study
focused only on what are called slow onset events: like water stress, crop
failure, and sea level rise—rather than rapid onset events such as floods and
extreme weather. This leads to a lower-bound estimate of the likely overall
impact of climate change on migration across the three regions. In reality,
the number of people migrating in search of a more secure environment is
likely to be much greater.
A case in point is the dire situation in Guatemala.
The country is consistently listed among the world’s 10 most v ulnerable
nations to the effects of climate change. Increasingly erratic climate patterns
have produced years of failed harvests and dwindling work opportunities
across the country, forcing increasing numbers of people to consider
migration in a last-ditch effort to escape rising levels of food insecurity and
poverty.
Families that are displaced frequently seek to relocate in other coun-
tries as “climate change refugees,” but there’s a problem: the 1951 Refugee
Convention, which defines the rights of displaced people, provides a list of
situations people must be fleeing from in order to be granted asylum or ref-
uge. Climate change isn’t one of them.
2018 data from the US Customs and Border Patrol show a huge increase
in the number of Guatemalan migrants, particularly families and unaccom-
panied minors, intercepted at the US border starting in 2014. It’s not a coin-
cidence that the spike coincides with the onset of severe El Nino- related
drought conditions in Central America’s Dry Corridor, which stretches
through Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
The UN World Food Programme (WFP) interviewed families from key
districts in the Dry Corridor about the pressures that are forcing them to
leave. The main “push factor” identified was not violence, but drought and
its consequences: no food, no money, and no work.
Their findings suggest a clear relation between climate variability, food
insecurity, and migration. Adverse climate conditions in Guatemala affect
food security by reducing agricultural production in both commercial as
well as subsistence farming, limiting the agricultural work opportunities that
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M. J. Bush
make up a significant portion of the national economy. Rising poverty rates

and plunging social indicators paint a bleak outlook for the country, which
has the fourth-highest level of chronic malnutrition in the world, and the
highest in Latin America. According to the WFP, nearly 50% of children
under five years old are considered chronically malnourished in Guatemala,
a metric that jumps to 90% or higher in many rural areas.
Scientists attribute the unusually severe droughts starting in 2014
that have prompted the exodus of families heading north to the effects of
El Nino, part of a natural climate cycle known as the El Nino-Southern
Oscillation (ENSO), which causes swings between cooler and wetter, and
hotter and drier periods around the globe.
In previous years, families affected by a bad year’s harvest would seek
work as day laborers on commercial farms, making enough money to pur-
chase staples like corn and beans. But even well-established commercial agri-
culture ventures have been affected by drought, foreshadowing the bigger
problems that will arise as the climate-sensitive crops that make up the bulk
of Guatemala’s key agricultural exports suffer the effects of rising tempera-
tures and increasingly frequent climate-related disasters.
Years of erratic weather, failed harvests, and a chronic lack of employ-
ment opportunities have slowly chipped away at the strategies Guatemalan
families have used successfully to cope with one or two years of successive
droughts and crop failures. But now, entire villages seem to be collapsing as
more and more communities become stranded, hours away from the nearest
town, with no food, no work, and no way to seek help.
Villagers are reduced to foraging the countryside for wild malanga roots
in attempts to stave off starvation. Without a reliable source of potable
water, outbreaks of diarrhoea and skin rashes have become increasingly com-
mon, especially among children.
When subsistence farmers lose their harvests, they’re forced to purchase
the staples they typically grow, usually at highly inflated prices, to feed their
families. Without a source of income, this additional expense leaves many
without the economic resources for other basic necessities such as medica-
tions or transportation to doctors. As hunger pushes desperate parents to
resort to extreme measures in order to feed their families, robberies and vio-
lent assaults have escalated.
Many consider migration to be their last option, one that comes with tre-
mendous risks to their personal security and dire consequences if they are
unable to complete the journey.
Those with homes or small plots of land use them as collateral to pay
human smugglers known as “coyotes” between $10,000 and $15,000
99
in exchange for three chances to cross the border into the U.S. But fami-
lies from the poorest regions of the country are often forced to choose the
option with the least guarantees and the highest risks—going alone, often
with small children in tow.80
Too Hot to Handle

At the end of 2018, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide had risen
over to 410 ppm. In fact, 2017 was the first year when CO2 readings never
dropped below that level—even after the regular spring decline that occurs
every year (and which produces the characteristic sawtooth profile of the
graph). In mid-2019, CO2 concentrations have reached 415 ppm and show
no signs of slowing.
Figure 2.10 shows the annual mean growth rates for CO2 measured at the
Mauna Loa Observatory over the last several decades. The average growth
rate for each decade are shown by the horizontal lines. For the decade 2000–
2010, the average growth rate is close to 2 ppm per year or 20 ppm per
decade.
If we use this chart to estimate CO2 concentrations at the end of the
century, assuming emissions continue at the present rate, atmospheric
concentrations of CO2 will be about 180 ppm higher, or around 580 ppm.
Climate scientists believe that if this scenario plays out global tempera-
tures in 2100 will be 4–5 °C higher than they were in 2018. In this pro-
jection, often called ‘business as usual’, the climate will change in a way
Fig. 2.10 Annual mean growth rates of CO2 at Mauna Loa Observatory (Source US
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration)
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M. J. Bush
that will bring frequent, catastrophic, extreme weather to most of the coun-
tries on the planet. In addition, the melting ice sheets and glaciers will have
raised sea levels by at least a meter—maybe two or three meters—no-one
is quite sure. All the cities around the world that are on the coast, and the
hundreds of millions of people that live in them, will be swamped and inun-
dated by the oceans. Literally hundreds of millions of people will be driven
inland from coastal cities and onto higher ground. This is a nightmare
scenario.
The IPCC
So who is keeping watch? The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change, the IPCC, was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) to assess in a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent
manner, the scientific, technical, and socio-economic information relevant
to understanding human-induced climate change, its potential impacts,
and adaptation and mitigation options. The IPCC secretariat is located in
Geneva, Switzerland, and is hosted by the WMO.
The IPCC is an intergovernmental and scientific body with 195 m ember
countries. It does not undertake new research or monitor climate-related
data: instead it conducts assessments of the state of climate change knowl-
edge on the basis of published and peer-reviewed scientific and technical
literature. This means that IPCC reports are fundamental to policy
making—but are not intended to guide or direct policy. Climate change
policy is the responsibility of national governments acting individually or in
concertation as agreed and coordinated through an international agreement
or protocol.
The IPCC has three working groups—referred to as the WGs:
• WG I addresses the physical science basis of climate change

• WG II addresses climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability,
and
• WG III addresses options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and mit-
igating climate change.
Since its inception, the IPCC, has prepared a series of comprehensive

assessment reports, special reports, and technical papers that provide

scientific information on climate change for the international community.
101
By 2018, the IPCC had completed five assessment reports—each one

sounding alarm bells that grew louder each time.
• In 1990, the first assessment report (AR1) showed that climate changes
partly due to natural variability, but that greenhouse gases from human
activity play a role. The assessment report predicted temperature rises of
0.3 °C per decade during the twenty-first century—higher than seen in
10,000 years, and sea level rises of 60 cm by 2100.
• In 1995, the second assessment report (AR2) showed that carbon diox-
ide is the greenhouse gas mainly responsible for global warming, and that
human actions that increase carbon concentrations in the atmosphere
could alter the climate irreversibly.
• The third assessment report in 2001 showed that the world had warmed
by 0.6 °C compared with pre-industrial levels, and in the last 50 years this
was mainly due to human activity. The report predicted temperature rises
of between 1.4 and 5.8 °C by 2100, and sea level rises of 0.1–0.9 meters.
• The fourth assessment report (AR4) was published in 2007. It concluded
that warming is ‘unequivocal’, with more than 90% certainty that the ris-
ing temperatures are due to human activity. The report confirmed that
beyond a certain level of warming, the effects on global climate become
irreversible and in many cases catastrophic, and outlined scenarios for
a range of estimates of future warming. The mid-range estimate of
human-induced warming of about 2 °C above pre-industrial levels was
adopted as the threshold of safety in political decisions on curbing green-
house gas emissions.
In 2013 and 2014, the IPCC published its 5th assessment report in stages.
AR5 showed that the 2 °C threshold will likely be breached within 30 years
without urgent action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The urgency of
the warnings outlined in AR5 increased pressure on governments to take
action to tackle climate change—culminating in the landmark climate
agreement forged in Paris in 2015.81
The sixth assessment cycle will report in 2022. Over the last 20 years,
several special reports have been prepared by the IPCC including:
• Land use, land use change and forestry (2000)

• Carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (2005)
• Climate change and water (2008)
• Renewable energy sources and climate change mitigation (2011)
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M. J. Bush
• Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate

change adaptation (2011)
• Global warming of 1.5 °C (2018)
The special report on global warming of 1.5 °C was released in October

2018 and was particularly important because it assessed and summarized the
latest information and data on the global climate in the years following the
2015 Paris Agreement. The report is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.
Conclusion
In this chapter we took a tour inside the warming greenhouse in which we
now find planet Earth. It’s hot; it’s uncomfortable, and it’s not a pretty sight.
There are heatwaves, wildfires, droughts, floods and storms. We’ve seen
millions of poor farmers across the tropics and sub-tropics being dragged
down into deepening poverty by prolonged droughts and extreme weather.
Everywhere we look, biodiversity is on the move trying to escape the heat.
Millions of people are moving away from their ancestral lands—seeking
shelter in countries that may offer a refuge from the floods, droughts, and
extreme weather of the changing climate. In 2017–2018, violent conflict
continued to destroy lives in many regions of the world—often driven by
ethnic, religious and geopolitical tensions, but frequently exacerbated by
crop failure, drought, and killer heatwaves.
Can we turn down the heat?
What scientists know is that greenhouse gases—mainly carbon dioxide
but also methane—are the principal cause of the planet’s warming trend. We
also know that most of these gases are emitted by the combustion of coal,
oil, and natural gas for the generation of electricity, and by the consumption
of diesel fuel and gasoline in the transport sector.
So turning down the heat requires that emissions of greenhouse gases are
dramatically reduced—to a level close to zero.
Is this possible?
It is. But it won’t be easy. And we need to have started yesterday. But first
we need learn more about carbon—where it comes from, how it gets into
the atmosphere, and how it moves through the natural environment. This is
the subject of the next chapter.
103
Notes
1. WMO statement on the state of the global climate in 2018. World
Meteorological Organisation WMO-No.1233. Geneva, Switzerland.
2019.
2. Ibid.
3. The values are from the WMO report for 2016.
4. From the NASA GISS website: https://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/
graphs/. Accessed 23 September 2017.
5. See the 2017 report from the American meteorological Society: State of
the Climate in 2016.
6. See the NOAA website at: https://www.nodc.noaa.gov/OC5/3M_
HEAT_CONTENT/.
7. WMO Report No. 1233. Op. cit.
8. See the Climate Science Special Report. USGCRP: Climate Science
Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, 470 pp, Volume
I. US Global change research program. Washington DC, USA. 2017.
Available online at: https://science2017.globalchange.gov.
9. An excellent and fascinating essay on the history of global warming is
available from the American Institute of Physics (AIP) website: https://
history.aip.org/history/climate/co2.htm.
10. See Wild, M. et al.: “The energy balance over land and oceans: An
assessment based on direct observations and CMIP5 climate models.”
11. See https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/10/weather/flying-foxes-heat-wave-
australia-trnd/index.html.
12. Lacis, A.A, Hansen, J.E., Russell, G.L., Oinas, V, et al.: “The role of
long-lived greenhouse gases as principal LW control knob that gov-
erns the global surface temperature for past and future climate change.”
Tellus B: Chemical and Physical Meteorology 65 (1) (2013).
13. See The history of the Keeling curve, by Bob Monroe. Accessed on 22
September 2107. https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/2013/
04/03/the-history-of-the-keeling-curve/.
14. From https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/wp-content/
plugins/sio-bluemoon/graphs/mlo_full_record.png. Accessed on 23
September 2017.
15. From the American Institute of Physics article: “The discovery of global
warming: The carbon dioxide greenhouse effect.” Cited above.
16. HFCs are hydrofluorocarbons and PFCs are perfluorocarbons. Sulfur
hexafluoride is a potent greenhouse gas, produced by the chemical
industry and used as an electrical insulator in power distribution equip-
ment. Chlorofluorocarbons together with other halogenated gases con-
tribute about 12% to radiative forcing by long-lived greenhouse gases.
104
M. J. Bush
Some hydrochlorofluorocarbons and HFCs are increasing at a rela-

tive rapid rate, although they are still low in abundance. See World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) Greenhouse Gas Bulletin No. 12.
24 October 2016.
17.
For readers who really want to get into the weeds on the Global
Warming Potential of the other greenhouse gases, there are several
excellent reports available on the internet. See for instance: Inventory of
US Greenhouse gas emissions and sinks 1990–2015, US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA 430-P-17-001) 2017, for a good review of the
science.
18. The Global Warming Potential for methane of 25 is the value of the
warming potential of methane over a 100-year period. Since a molecule
of methane only stays in the atmosphere for about 12 years, employing
this value is disputable. Many scientists now prefer to calculate meth-
ane’s warming potential over a 20-year period in which case its GWP
is closer to 86. More importantly, methane is always in the atmosphere
since it is constantly replaced by emissions.
19. US Environmental Protection Agency: Inventory of US greenhouse gas
emissions and sinks 1990–2015. EPA 430-P-17-001. 2017.
20. See the IPCC 5th Assessment Report Chapter 6: Carbon and other bio-
geochemical cycles.
21. See the comprehensive scientific assessment in the paper published in
2013: “Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A sci-
entific assessment.” Available at https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/pdf/10.1002/jgrd.50171.
22. Ibid.
23. CRED is the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters,
based at the Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
24. See the 2017 Report by the American Meteorological Society: State of
the Climate in 2016.
5.
2 WMO Report No. 1233. Op. cit.
26. Beyond Borders, p. 26. Op. cit.
27. See Regional outlook for the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region:
April–June 2017. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs Accessed at: http://reliefweb.int/report/world/regional-outlook-
horn-africa-and-great-lakes-region-april-june-2017.
28. FAO: Ethiopia—Drought response plan and priorities in 2017. Revised
version. Food and Agricultural Organization 2017.
29. Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region. A large region in
southwest Ethiopia with a population of about 15 million people. Food
insecurity is a constant threat.
0.
3 FAO 2017, ibid.
31. Ibid.
105
32. Regional outlook for the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region: April–June
2017.
33. California Wildfires: Death Toll Rises to 23, ‘Worst Air Quality Ever
Recorded’ in Bay Area. See https://www.ecowatch.com/california-wild-
fires-air-2495879541.html.
34. See How Cape Town found water savings California never dreamed of.
Accessed at: http://wwwlatimes.com/world/la-fg-south-africa-drought-
20180401-story.html.
35. See As Cape town water crisis deepens, scientists prepare for ‘Day Zero’.
Accessed at: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-01134-x.
36. The human cost of weather-related disasters 1995–2015. Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters CRED.
3 7. See the WMO Report No. 1233. Op. cit.
38. See 1,200 Dead, 41 million affected by flooding in India, Bangladesh and
Nepal. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/flooding-asia-bangla-
desh-2479927370.html.
39. See Climate change will push European cities towards breaking point.
climate-change-will-push-european-cities-towards-breaking-point.
40. See Beyond Borders: Our changing climate—Its role in conflict and dis-
placement. Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), London, UK.
2017.
41. See Beyond Borders. Op.cit., p. 20.
2.
4 See the article by Liu et al.: “Similar estimates of temperature impacts
on global wheat yield by three independent methods.” Nature Climate
Change 6 (2016): 1130–1136.
43. See Boosting rice production in the face of climate change. Accessed at:
http://news.irri.org/2017/12/boosting-rice-production-in-face-of.html.
4 4. Ibid., p. 33.
45. Ibid., p. 12.
46.
See the article in Science Magazine: “Long-term pattern and mag-
nitude of soil carbon feedback to the climate system in a warming
world”, Science 358 (6359): 101–105, by Jerry Melillo et al. See also:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/oct/05/carbon-emis-
sions-warming-soils-higher-than-estimated-signalling-tipping-points.
47.
See “21st-century modeled permafrost carbon emissions accelerated
by abrupt thaw beneath lakes.” Nature Communications. https://doi.
org/10.1038/s41467-018-05738-9
48. See the IPCC 5th Assessment Report Chapter 6: Carbon and other bio-
geochemical cycles, p. 530.
49. See Permafrost ‘carbon bomb’ may be more of a slow burn, say scientists.
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/apr/09/arctic-carbon-
bomb-may-never-happen-say-scientists.
106
M. J. Bush
50. See the article on terrestrial permafrost by Romanovsky et al. in the

Arctic Report Card 2017 at: www.arctic.noaa.gov/Report-Card.
51. See “Carbon dioxide sources from Alaska driven by increasing early
winter respiration from Arctic tundra.” Proceedings of National Academy
of Sciences 114(21) (2017): 5361–5366.
52. See Methane seeps out as the Arctic permafrost starts to resemble Swiss
cheese. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/18072017/
arctic-permafrost-melting-methane-emissions-geologic-sources-study.
This article summarizes the findings of the report in Nature by Katrin
Kohnert et al.: “Strong geologic methane emissions from discontin-
uous terrestrial permafrost in the Mackenzie Delta, Canada.” Nature
Scientific Reports 7, Article number: 5828 (2017).
5 3. WMO statement on the State of the global climate in 2016. Op. cit.
54. See the Climate Science Special Report. USGCRP: Climate Science
Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, 470 pp, Volume
I. US Global change research program, Washington, DC, USA. 2017.
Available online at: https://science2017.globalchange.gov.
55. Global and regional sea rise scenarios for the United States. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Technical Report NOS
CO-OPS 083. Maryland, USA. 2017,
56. See Sea level rise is accelerating: 4 inches per decade (or more) by 2100.
Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/11022018/sea-level-
rise-accelerating-satellite-study-coastal-flood-risk-antarctica-oceans.
7.
5 See www.weather.gov/sju/maria2017.
58.
Center for International Earth Science Information Network
(CIESIN)/Columbia University. 2013. Urban-Rural Population and
Land Area Estimates Version 2. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic
Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.
edu/data/set/lecz-urban-rural-population-land-area-estimates-v2.
5 9. In 2018, CIESIN was in the process of updating the LECZ database.
60. Strictly speaking, tiny Tokelau is not a State: it is a dependent territory
of New Zealand with a population of about 1500 people.
61. See The three-degree world: the cities that will be drowned by global warm-
ing. Accessed at: https://www.thegardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/
2017/nov/03/three-degree-world-cities-drowned-global-warming/.
62. See Climate Ready Boston—Executive summary. Accessed at: https://
www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/02_20161206_executivesummary_
digital.pdf.
63. See With storms intensifying and oceans on the rise, Boston weighs
strategies for staying dry. Accessed at: https://ensia.com/features/
boston-adaptation/
64. Op. cit.: https://ensia.com/features/boston-adaptation/.
107
65. See Fish species forecast to migrate hundreds of miles northward as

US waters warm. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
16052018/fish-species-climate-change-migration-pacific-northwest-
alaska-atlantic-gulf-maine-cod-pollock.
66. See Climate change and food security: Risks and responses. FAO 2016.
67. See Half of all species are on the move—And we’re feeling it. Go to:
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/04/climate-change-species-
migration-disease/.
68. Quoted in the National Geographic article: Half of all species are on
the move—And we’re feeling it. Accessed at: https://news.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/2017/04/climate-change-species-migration-disease/. The
article in National geographic references the article in Science Magazine:
“Biodiversity redistribution under climate change: Impacts on ecosys-
tems and human well-being”. Science 355 (6332) (2017), by Gretta Pecl
et al.
69. Reported in: Half of all species are on the move—and we’re feeling
it. See https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/04/climate-change-
species-migration-disease/.
70. See the World Bank Report: Shock waves: Managing the impacts of cli-
mate change on poverty. Climate change and poverty series. World Bank,
Washington, DC.
71. See Half of all species are on the move—And we’re feeling it. Accessed at:
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/04/climate-change-species-
migration-disease/.
72. See Climate change and invasive species. Accessed at: https://www.wil-
derness.net/toolboxes/documents/climate/Summary-Climate%20
Change%20and%20Invasive%20Species.pdf.
73.
Regional outlook for the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region:
April–June 2017. UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs. 2017. Accessed at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/regional-
outlook-horn-africa-and-great-lakes-region-april-june-2017.
74. The chart is copied from the 2017 FAO Report: The state of food secu-
rity and nutrition in the world. Op. cit., and adapted from Logi, M.,
Bertrand, K.Z., and Bar-Yam, Y. The food crises and political instability
in North Africa and the Middle East. New England Complex Systems
Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA. 2011.
75. Von Uexkull, N., Croicu M., Fjelde H., and Buhaug H.: “Civil con-
flict sensitivity to growing-season drought.” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 113 (64) (2016): 12391–12396.
7 6. Ibid., p. 57.
77. See the report by Hallegatte, S., Bangalore, M., Bonzaniga, L., Fay,
M., et al.: Shock waves: Managing the impacts of climate change on
108
M. J. Bush
poverty. Climate change and development series. World Bank Group,

Washington, DC.
78. See Climate change is driving migration from Vietnam’s Mekong delta.
Accessed at: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2018/01/11/climate-
change-driving-migration-vietnams-mekong-delta/.
79. Groundswell: Preparing for internal climate migration. Accessed at: http://
www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2018/03/19/groundswell---
preparing-for-internal-climate-migration.
80. This narrative about the situation in Guatemala is from a 2018 Report
by National Geographic. Changing climate forces desperate Guatemalans
to migrate. Accessed here: https://www.nationalgeographic.com/envi-
ronment/2018/10/drought-climate-change-force-guatemalans-migrate-
to-us/.
81. See the Earth Negotiations Bulletin IPCC-48 Final, produced by the
International Institute for Sustainable Development. Available at:
http://enb.iisd.org/climate/ipcc48/. Also the Guardian article: “How
the UN climate panel got to 1.5C threshold-timeline.” Accessed at:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/how-the-un-
climate-panel-ipcc-got-to-15c-threshold-timeline/.
3
The Carbon Cycle
Introduction
This chapter looks at the carbon cycle—because we need to know what
happens to all the carbon dioxide and methane we are pumping into the
air. If it dissipates rapidly and doesn’t stay around too long, maybe global
warming will eventually taper off? Unfortunately, that’s not the way it works.
Carbon is found in all living creatures and plants. It has been called the
backbone of life on Earth. Most of the Earth’s carbon—about 65 billion
tonnes—is stored in rocks. The rest is in the oceans, the atmosphere, trees
and plants, soil, and of course: fossil fuels.
Carbon flows both ways between these reservoirs in what is called the
carbon cycle—which has a slow and a fast component. The slow carbon
cycle is the movement of carbon between rocks, soil, ocean and the atmos-
phere. On average, between 10 and 100 million tonnes of carbon moves
around this cycle every year. Part of this slow cycle involves the emission
of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere by volcanoes, which return geologic
carbon to the atmosphere at a rate of around 130 to 380 million tonnes a
year—but this is less than 1% of the carbon dioxide the world pumps out by
burning fossil fuels.
By contrast, the fast carbon cycle moves carbon relatively quickly through
the atmosphere and biosphere, where it supports most of the life on Earth.
Several billion tonnes of carbon may move around this cycle each year—
much more than circulates through the slow cycle. Plants and phytoplank-
ton are the main components of the fast carbon cycle. They absorb and

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_3
110
M. J. Bush
consume atmospheric carbon dioxide through photosynthesis, which is then

returned to the atmosphere when the plant or organism eventually dies and
decays—or is destroyed by fire if it consumes the biomass.
But the largest flux in the fast carbon cycle is that produced by the
combustion of fossil fuels—which produces copious amounts of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases which are all expelled into the atmos-
phere. Much of this carbon finds its way back to the land and into the
oceans, but a significant fraction remains in the atmosphere where the con-
centration of carbon dioxide and methane continues to increase—directly
contributing to global warming.1
In this chapter we will look at how the global sources and sinks of carbon
interact, and how we might reduce emissions to the point where the global
warming trend slows and stops.
Fast Carbon
Every year the Global Carbon Project publishes the latest ‘Global carbon
budget’, a budget that focuses primarily on carbon dioxide—the most
important of the greenhouse gases. Figure 3.1 shows the budget published
in 2017. The numbers show the movement of carbon dioxide in gigatonnes
(1 Gt = 1 billion tonnes) averaged over the decade 2007 to 2016. There
are five major components in this simplified schematic of the carbon cycle:
emissions from two sources—fossil fuels and industry, and from changes in
land use; and absorption by two sinks—on the land and in the oceans.
The fifth component is the atmosphere where—as we can see from
Fig. 2.4 in the previous chapter—carbon dioxide is accumulating, and where
the concentration of carbon dioxide in the air has risen by about 45% since
the beginning of the industrial era in 1750.
The emissions of carbon dioxide from land use change are mainly driven by
the destruction of forests and woodlands—either deliberately for logging or
by clear-cutting forests for agriculture, plantations, or pasture; or by wildfires
that worldwide may be increasing in frequency. Changing land-use patterns:
between agriculture and pasture, or between different cropping systems, can
also change emissions of CO2—and methane, which is generated in signifi-
cant amounts by grazing livestock and the production of wetland rice.
The absorption of carbon dioxide by plants as they photosynthesize energy-
producing carbohydrates from sunlight and carbon dioxide is a major sink for
atmospheric CO2. The other sink is the ocean—which continually absorbs
CO2 from the air. This process works both ways: carbon dioxide moves across
3 The Carbon Cycle
111
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ϭϭ͘ϲ
ϯϰ͘ϰ ϭϳ͘ϯ
ϱ͘ϯ
ϴ͘ϵ
Fig. 3.1 Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions 2008–2017 (see the Global Carbon
Budget 2018 Report. Accessed at: http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/
17/files/GCP_CarbonBudget_2018.pdf) (Source Global Carbon Project)
the gas–liquid interface in both directions depending on the boundary layer

concentrations in the air and in the water. The net effect is that the oceans
absorbs more CO2 than they lose by desorption into the air. Figure 3.1 shows
the principal flows of carbon dioxide between the sources and the sinks—
with a substantial fraction of the emissions accumulating in the atmosphere.
The schematic shown in Fig. 3.1, although labelled a ‘budget’ is in effect
what a chemical engineer would call a ‘mass balance. Figure 3.2 shows how
the sources and the sinks balance each other out. Except that the numbers
don’t quite add up.
The total of the sources is 39.7 Gt/yr whereas the total of the sinks is 37.8
Gt/yr. The missing 1.9 Gt/yr is an indication of the uncertainties inherent in
the calculation of the fluxes. It may also be a result of the fact that this mass
balance is calculated over a ten-year period—during which time emissions
have been constantly rising, and each of the sinks is continually adjusting to
the increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations—but at different rates. It’s
not surprising that the numbers don’t exactly balance.
112
M. J. Bush
Fig. 3.2 The sources and sinks of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions (see the
Global Carbon Budget 2018 Report. http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbon-
budget/17/files/GCP_CarbonBudget_2018.pdf) (Source Global Carbon Project)
The Temperature Connection

Except for a couple of temporary pauses, and a brief hiccup in 2008 when
the global economy suffered a short recession, global emissions of carbon
dioxide have increased almost every year for the last 50 years. Figure 3.3
charts the rising emissions since 1960.
Emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels and industry were almost
flat at about 36 Gt/yr over the period 2014 to 2016—prompting optimism
that CO2 emissions were peaking. But emissions in 2017 were once again on
the rise and this trend has continued through 2018.
As more and more carbon dioxide is pumped into the air from fossil fuel
power plants and automobiles, the level of CO2 in the atmosphere rises
almost in tandem. So also do global temperatures—as Fig. 3.4 indicates.2
As a rough rule of thumb, we may note from this graph that an increase
of 100 ppm in atmospheric CO2 concentrations correlates with a global
temperature rise of approximately 1 degree Centigrade.
So if atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide are being driven by emissions
from fossil fuels, industry and land use changes; and if there’s a clear
correlation between climbing atmospheric CO2 levels and rising global

temperatures, the inference is obvious: if global temperatures are to be

reduced, then emissions of carbon dioxide from these sectors need to be
sharply curtailed.
3 The Carbon Cycle
113
Fig. 3.3 Global emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel use (see the Global Carbon Budget
2018 Report. http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/17/files/GCP_Carbon
Budget_2018.pdf) (Source Global Carbon Project)
Fig. 3.4 The correlation between global temperature and atmospheric CO2 (Source
Climate Central)
We now need to look more carefully at which industries are involved and
to break out the transport sub-sector—which is often rolled in with emis-
sions from the generation of electricity.
In almost every country worldwide, the combustion of fossil fuels
(including motor vehicles), is responsible for most of the emissions of car-
bon dioxide. In the USA, fossil fuel combustion accounts for 93% of total
CO2 emission—where industries such as the non-energy use of fuels; iron
114
M. J. Bush
Table 3.1 Emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion in the USA in 2017a
Sub-sector Billion tonnes CO2 %
Electricity generation 1.732 35.6
Transportation 1.801 36.9
Industrial 0.811 16.6
Residential 0.295 6.1
Commercial 0.233 4.8
Total fossil fuel combustion 4.872 100
aSee the EPA Report. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/01/vehicles-
climate-change-emissions-trump-administration/
Source US Environmental Protection Agency
and steel production; natural gas systems; and cement, petrochemical and
lime production are factored in.3
Within that 93.3%, we need to identify the contribution of the transport
sub-sector. In the USA for instance, emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel com-
bustion (without industry) in 2015 are shown in Table 3.1.4
What should be noted is that electricity generation and transportation—
subsectors that could potentially be 100% powered by renewable energy—
accounted for 72.5% of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, and
67.0% of total CO2 emissions in the USA in 2017.5
Land Use Change
Clearing forests and woodlands removes biomass that holds large quantities
of carbon—biomass that was absorbing carbon from the air as the plants
and trees grew. If forests and woodlands are cleared and replaced with crops
or pasture, the amount of carbon absorbed and stored is less. Exposed soil,
now warmer, will vent carbon into the atmosphere from decaying biomass
and bacterial action.
Wildfires also generate huge amounts of carbon dioxide, and wildfires are
increasing in intensity and frequency—particularly in the tropics.
Land-use emissions are inherently variable, uncertain, and difficult to
measure or calculate accurately. Figure 3.5 shows annual emissions for land-
use change compared to the fossil fuel and industry trend line from 1960 to
2017.
Land-use change emissions have stayed roughly constant at around 4 to
5 GtCO2/yr over the last decade. The noticeable spike in 1998 was due to
widespread wildfires in Indonesia.6
Which countries are producing most of the carbon dioxide that gets into
the atmosphere? Figure 3.6 shows the largest emitters.
3 The Carbon Cycle
115
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Fig. 3.5 Global annual emissions from fossil carbon and land-use change (Source Global
Carbon Project)
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:ĂƉĂŶ
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h^
Fig. 3.6 Global emissions of CO2 by country 1960–2017 (Source Global Carbon

Project)
Back in 1960, emissions of CO2 were dominated by the USA and OECD
Europe. India hardly shows up, and China is only a minor player behind
Russia.
Fast forward to 2018 and things have changed dramatically. Emissions
now are dominated by China; and India’s emissions are substantial—
larger than Japan and the Russian Federation. US emissions have gradu-
ally declined over the last ten years, as have the emissions in Europe. You
can see on Fig. 3.6 that total emissions just about levelled out from 2014
to 2016 but, as Fig. 3.3 shows, they were once again on the rise in 2017
and 2018.
116
M. J. Bush
Table 3.2 The top ten emitters of carbon dioxide in 2018a

Country/region Total CO2 emissions 2018 % change
Emissions GtCO2 % of global total 2017–2018
1 China 9.420 28.0 2.2

2 USA 5.018 14.9 2.6
3 India 2.481 7.4 7.0
4 Russian Federation 1.551 4.6 4.2
5 Japan 1.150 3.4 −2.0
6 Germany 0.717 2.1 −4.8
7 South Korea 0.696 2.1 2.8
8 Iran 0.656 1.9 5.5
9 Saudi Arabia 0.571 1.7 −3.4
10 Canada 0.555 1.6 0.1
aThe data are from BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 68th edition 2019
Source BP Statistical Review of World Energy
Figure 3.6 shows how CO2 emissions are now dominated by China,

Europe and the US, but it leaves out several big-hitters. Table 3.2 shows the
CO2 top ten in 2018.
Only three countries reduced their emissions over the period 2017–2018:
Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia. Seven countries increased their emis-
sions over the same period, led by India and Iran. India’s strong growth in
emissions reflects the government’s policy to provide power to the millions
of people with no access to electricity. Rural electrification is a top priority
for many countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa—although the provision
of electricity should always be based on minigrids powered by photovoltaic
energy, not grid-connected electricity powered by fossil fuels.
Methane
Methane may play second fiddle to its heavier big brother: carbon dioxide,
but the gas punches above its weight when it comes to raising atmospheric
temperatures. Over a 20-year period, methane is over 85 times as powerful as
carbon dioxide in contributing to global warming. That means a little goes a
long way. Globally, the principal sources of methane are enteric fermentation
(mostly from cattle), the oil and gas sector, municipal solid waste landfills,
coal mining, rice cultivation, and wastewater treatment. Figure 3.7 shows
the relative amounts of the major categories of anthropogenic methane emis-
sions. The other sources in this mix includes methane from biomass, mobile
sources, manure management, and other agricultural sources.7
3 The Carbon Cycle
117
KƚŚĞƌƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŶƚĞƌŝĐ
&ĞƌŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ
tĂƐƚĞǁĂƚĞƌ
ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ
ZŝĐĞĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĂůŵŝŶŝŶŐ
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Fig. 3.7 Estimated global anthropogenic methane emissions by source (Source

Global Methane Initiative)
There are also significant natural sources of methane: particularly from

wetlands and warming permafrost soils; smaller sources include termites,
oceans, sediments, volcanoes, and wildfires.
Globally, emissions of methane are running at roughly 800 million tonnes
a year—a much smaller quantity than emissions of carbon dioxide. But
because methane is a much stronger greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, in
terms of global warming this amount of methane is equivalent to approxi-
mately 16% of the total global warming effect.
Anthropogenic emissions of methane from the US in 2016 totalled
about 657 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent. The main sectors are shown in
Table 3.3.8
One point to note is that if natural gas systems are combined with petro-
leum systems, the oil and gas industry in the US is the largest source of
emissions of methane. Adding in the emissions from abandoned oil and gas
wells and abandoned coal mines would raise the total from the fossil fuels
industries by an additional 13.3 MtCO2e. On the other hand, if enteric fer-
mentation is combined with manure management, the agricultural sector
would be in first place.
Once in the atmosphere, methane reacts with air-borne molecules
(particularly the hydroxyl radical) and is eventually converted to other com-
pounds (including water vapour—which is also a strong greenhouse gas).
The atmosphere is therefore the primary sink for the gas, although a small
fraction of atmospheric methane is absorbed by the soil.
Methane concentrations in the air began to increase rapidly around 2007
and are now growing much more strongly (see Fig. 2.5). During the period
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M. J. Bush
Table 3.3 US methane emissions in 2017

Methane source MtCO2e
Enteric fermentation (livestock) 175.4
Natural gas systems 165.6
Landfills (municipal solid waste) 107.7
Manure management 61.7
Coal mining 55.7
Petroleum systems 37.7
Wastewater treatment 14.2
Rice cultivation 11.3
Stationary combustion 7.8
Abandoned oil and gas wells 6.9
Abandoned underground coal mines 6.4
Mobile combustion 3.2
Composting 2.2
Petrochemical production 0.3
Field burning of agricultural residues 0.2
Total 656.3
Source US Environmental Protection Agency
2014–2017, CH4 levels increased by about 9 ppb annually—almost 20

times faster than the rate of increase at the turn of the century.9
What prompted this surge in emissions of the gas is not yet well under-
stood. The production of fossil fuels: natural gas and coal may have played
a part; but more likely, according to some researchers is agriculture—where
the FAO estimates that global livestock operations expanded from 1.3 bil-
lion head of cattle in 1994 to 1.5 billion in 2014. The cultivation of wetland
rice, another important source of methane, also increased over the period.10
Enlarging the Sinks
Another way to bring down levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and
thus global temperatures is to ramp up the absorptive capacity of the terres-
trial and ocean sinks. Is this possible?
In the Ocean
The oceans are an enormous reservoir of carbon. But the physical and chem-
ical processes that drive the absorption and desorption of carbon dioxide
across the gas–liquid interface of the atmosphere and the sea are impossible
to regulate. As atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have increased, the rate
3 The Carbon Cycle
119
of absorption of the gas by surface water has also increased—as one would
expect. But the rate of absorption is far less than the rate at which CO2 is
being released into the atmosphere by fossil fuel powered electricity genera-
tion and industry. In addition, the ocean is far from being the ideal sink for
CO2. It’s becoming more acidic, and this poses serious problems for many
marine shellfish species and ocean biodiversity.
There are some novel ideas about how we might increase the ability of
the oceans to absorb more carbon without increasing acidity. One proposal
would add iron to some of the world’s oceans—particularly the Southern
Ocean and the equatorial Pacific, that currently have relatively low levels of
the element. The idea is that this would fertilize the growth of algae which
would then in principle absorb huge amount of carbon dioxide through
photosynthesis. But messing with ocean biochemistry on a large scale is
always high-risk—and it’s far from being the best option, particularly when
there are much better and safer alternatives.
On the Land
The terrestrial sink for carbon dioxide relies primarily on the world’s forests.
In 1990 the world had 4128 million hectares (Mha) of forest. By 2015 this
area had decreased to 4000 Mha—an annual rate of loss of 0.13% over the
period.11
Forest area has increased in temperate regions in recent years, and there
has been relatively little change in the boreal and subtropical climatic
regions. The largest loss of forest area has occurred in the tropics, particularly
in South America and Africa.
The expansion of agriculture is the cause of about 80% of deforesta-
tion worldwide, However, there are major differences between geographic
regions, and important distinctions between large-scale commercial agricul-
ture and subsistence agriculture as drivers of deforestation.
A 2012 analysis of data from 46 tropical and sub-tropical countries rep-
resenting about 78% of forest area in those regions revealed that large-scale
commercial agriculture was the most prevalent driver of deforestation—
accounting for 40% of the loss. Local subsistence agriculture accounted for
33% of the loss, urban expansion for 10% and mining for 7%.12
In South-east Asia, palm oil plantations supplying the food industry have
replaced substantial areas of natural forest. In Malaysia, palm oil planta-
tions increased from 2.4 to 4.2 million hectares (Mha) from 1990 to 2005,
destroying at least 1 Mha of natural forest over this period. In Indonesia,
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M. J. Bush
the area of palm oil plantations more than tripled in 10 years: increasing
from 1.7 to 6.1 Mha between 1990 and 2000, resulting in the clearing of an
estimated 1.7 to 3.0 Mha of forest.13
Small-scale agriculture is the main cause of deforestation in Africa—
where many poor households particularly in sub-Saharan Africa have cleared
forest lands to grow food. Large-scale commercial agriculture on the other
hand, accounts for only one third of deforestation in Africa.
A study of deforestation in seven South American countries showed how
deforestation has been mainly driven by the expansion of pasture for cattle
ranching. Over 70% of deforestation in these countries between 1990 and
2005 was the result of an increased demand for pasture. A further 14% of
the loss was due to increased demand for cropland. Pasture expansion caused
at least one-third of forest loss in all countries except Peru—where small-
holder cropland expansion was a more dominant driver.
In Argentina, the expansion of pasture was responsible for nearly 45% of
forest loss, although deforestation for agriculture destroyed almost as much.
In Brazil, more than 80% of deforestation during the same period was
associated with the conversion of forest to pasture land.14
However, an article published in Geophysical Research Letters in 2015
contended that deforestation in the tropics was much worse that the numbers
the FAO was reporting. The researchers found accelerated deforestation in
34 tropical countries that covered most the world’s tropical forests. They esti-
mated there was a 63% acceleration in net deforestation in the humid tropics
from the 1990s to the 2000s with the loss of forest cover peaking in 2005.15
In Australia, deforestation looks even worse: a report in early 2018 char-
acterized the situation as a ‘full-blown land-clearing crisis’—as 3 million hec-
tares of untouched forest were slated for destruction driven by the booming
livestock industry.16
Although the area of forests worldwide continues to decline, the increas-
ing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the air has a positive effect on
growth. In North America, the warming temperatures have extended the
growing season by several days, and the fertilization effect of higher CO2
levels improves the efficiency of water utilization by trees and plants. There
are constraints however on this potential advantage, as increased plant
growth also requires water and nitrogen—both of which may be limited.
Higher temperatures also stress plants. They need water to survive and
water-stressed plants are more susceptible to fire and insects.
Rising temperatures are lengthening the growing season in many
northern and mid-latitude forests. In the US, trees in the eastern half of the
country are leafing out earlier in the spring and dropping their leaves later.
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121
Fig. 3.8 Trends lines for ocean and terrestrial sinks since 1960 (Source Global Carbon
Project)
The increased carbon uptake has outpaced a simultaneous increase in CO2

released into the atmosphere by respiration. Overall, eastern forests in the
US are acting as sinks.
However, in the northern boreal forests of the US and Canada, which
are primarily evergreen species, studies found an overall decrease in carbon
uptake, despite an extended growing season.17
The Global Carbon Budget report’s estimate of the terrestrial carbon sink
shows large annual variations around the most recent decadal mean of 11.6
Gt/yr of CO2. In contrast with the ocean sink, which is relatively invariant
and slowly increasing, the terrestrial sink’s large annual variations reflect the
influence of a multitude of climate- and weather-related factors that strongly
influence regional and annual patterns of plant growth. Figure 3.8 shows the
contrasting trends.
So are the world’s forests still a sink for atmospheric CO2? An article in
Science in September 2017 asserted that tropical forests were a net carbon
source (not a sink) based on above-ground measurements of gain and loss.
Examining 12 years of satellite data that directly measured net annual
changes in the above-ground carbon density of tropical vegetation, the sci-
entists calculated that the world’s tropical forests are now a net carbon
source—emitting 0.425 Gt of carbon a year. The net release of carbon is
due to deforestation and from reductions in carbon density within standing
forests due to degradation and other forms of disturbance.18
The study found that in Africa and the Americas, most of the carbon loss
was due to small-scale degradation and disturbance from selective logging
and fires; while in Asia—where there is widespread deforestation for palm
oil production—less than half was a result of degradation and disturbance.19
The sustainable management of the world’s forest resources is an absolute
global priority. There is little hope of bringing down atmospheric CO2 con-
centrations from their present levels if the planet’s forests are slowly becom-
ing a source of carbon.
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Dialling It Down
In order to reduce atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and reduce
global warming either we reduce emissions or we enhance the sinks—or
ideally both at the same time.
We have no realistic way of increasing the ability of the oceans to absorb
more CO2—there is some outside-the-box thinking, but most scientists
believe that all these ideas—like ocean iron fertilization (many of which are
illegal under international law), carry substantial risks.20
Reducing emissions from land-use change and forestry is certainly, at least
in principle, a feasible option. But the frequency of wildfires is on the rise
and given the warming temperatures and increasing frequency of drought,
it’s not a safe bet that emissions from land use change can be substantially
reduced. In addition, these emissions are much smaller than the emissions
from fossil fuels and industry, so even reducing them to zero doesn’t solve
the problem.
That leaves us with three options:
– dramatically reducing emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels and

from industry,
– substantially increasing the area of sustainably managed forests,
– directly removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
We will look at this last option, called Negative Emission Technologies

(NETs), a little later in this chapter.
We now have two key questions: by how much should emissions of car-
bon dioxide and the other greenhouse gases be reduced? And how urgent is
this action—meaning when do these steps need to be taken?
These questions are all linked to projections about the future temperature
of the planet. How hot can the Earth get before it gets too hot to handle?
Two Degrees of Heat
How hot is too hot? It’s not an easy question to answer—particularly when
you don’t know exactly what impact the temperature increase will have on
the Earth’s ecosystems, biodiversity and humanity. One way to approach an
answer is to go back in time and to look how hot the planet has been in the
past—and to try and figure out whether the climate at that time would have
been even remotely supportable.
3 The Carbon Cycle
123
In the 1970s, William Nordhaus, a professor of economics at Yale

University, proposed a tentative answer to this question: observing that
if temperatures rose more than 2 °C or 3 °C above the average global tem-
perature at that time, the Earth’s climate would exceed the range which was
estimated to have occurred over the last several thousand years.
In 1998, James Hansen, one of the early pioneers of climate change
analysis working at NASA in the US, warned in his testimony to the US
Congress that the Earth was warmer than ever before, that emissions of
carbon dioxide were responsible, and that rising temperatures would very
probably lead to extreme weather and a changing climate. However, Hansen
did not propose a limit to global temperature increases—arguing more on
the need to control emissions.
The Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) was the first agency to define
a limit—citing two “absolute temperature targets”: the lower one of 1 °C
was already close to being exceeded; the upper limit of 2 °C was proposed as
an attainable target.21
The question of global warming was very much on the agenda at the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (the ‘Earth’ summit), held
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. One of the principal outcomes of that confer-
ence: the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UNFCCC, is
now the principal legal instrument that regulates and coordinates global
action aimed at reducing the increasingly damaging impacts of global warm-
ing and climate change.
The objective of the Convention was stated as:
…to achieve…stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmos-

phere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system.
The Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994. There are 197 parties
to the convention—all independent countries, except for the European
Union.22
The UNFCCC forged an impressive consensus around a global objective
but did not set out any limits or targets for global warming.
However, in 1996, the European Council of Environment Ministers
issued a declaration that global average temperatures should not exceed 2 °C
above pre-industrial level—the first time that a firm temperature limit was
agreed upon and announced by an international agency.
The Kyoto protocol, which was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, in December
1997, and which entered into force in 2005, set internationally binding
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M. J. Bush
emission reduction targets for the parties to the UNFCCC agreement but
did not offer an opinion on the 2 °C limit.
The rules for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at the
7th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2001 (called the
Marrakesh Accords). Its first commitment period started in 2008 and ended
in 2012. During this period, 37 industrialized countries and the European
Community committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by an
average of 5% below 1990 levels.
The Doha amendment to the Protocol further strengthened the terms of
the agreement. The amendment defined a second commitment period from
2013 to 2020, during which parties to the convention committed to reduc-
ing GHG emission by at least 18% below 1990 levels. However, the USA,
which signed the treaty in 1998, never ratified the agreement—the only sig-
natory to the Protocol which failed to ratify it.
In 2011, Canada, Japan and Russia stated that they would not commit to
the amended Kyoto targets, and Canada finally withdrew from the protocol
in December 2012.23
The reality is that despite strong initial support from the international
community, the Kyoto Protocol ultimately failed to generate significant
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions on a global scale. The protocol failed
to obtain emission reduction commitments from some of the world’s largest
GHG emitters—including the US, China, Brazil, and India.24
At the 17th Conference of Parties (COP17) in 2011, the parties to the
UNFCCC created the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action (known as the ADP). The ADP was charged with develop-
ing a new UNFCCC protocol or instrument with legal force which would
be applicable to all the parties.
Rather than relying on a top-down approach, as the Kyoto protocol
had done, the ADP asked all member Parties to create voluntary emission
reduction targets that were not only achievable, but which reflected the
party’s own policies and priorities. These targets, called Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDCs), were not legally binding—which per-
haps made their formulation by governments easier to initiate and fi nalize.
Moreover, there was no standard definition of what was to be included
in the INDCs, a feature that allowed Parties to formulate mitigation and
adaptation strategies that were more closely aligned with their national

development plans and priorities.
Parties were asked to submit their INDCs well in advance of the proposed
21st Conference of Parties planned for Paris in December 2015. By the time
of the meeting of COP21, 197 countries had submitted their INDCs.
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125
An Agreement in Paris
The Paris Agreement was adopted in December 2015. The aim of the agree-
ment is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change “in
the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty”, by
a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would
significantly reduce the risk and impact of climate change;
b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change
and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions develop-
ment, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and
c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse
gas emissions and climate resilient development.25
The Agreement also offered some advice about how this objective might be
achieved. Article 4 states:
In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal… Parties aim to reach

global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible…and to under-
take rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as
to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals
by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of the century…
So net zero emissions of greenhouse gases are to be achieved sometime

between 2050 and 2100—which is not a very precise directive; but the
intention is clear: peaking of emissions is to occur as soon as possible, and
rapid reductions are to follow.
The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, thirty days
after the date on which more than 55 Parties to the Convention, account-
ing in total for at least an estimated 55% of the total global greenhouse
gas emissions, had submitted their instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession.
In ratifying the agreement, countries that are parties to the Agreement
commit to implementing their INDCs. The INDCs then become NDCs:
Nationally Determined Contributions—which are legally binding under the
terms of the Agreement. The NDCs for each country are recorded in a regis-
try managed by the Climate Change secretariat.
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M. J. Bush
As of April 1, 2018, 195 Parties had signed the agreement and 175—
representing 87% of global GHG emissions—had deposited their instru-
ments of ratification. The Paris Agreement requires all ratifying Parties to
communicate an NDC. Most Parties’ first NDC are their original submit-
ted INDCs, with only 11 Parties having an NDC which differs from their
INDC. In most cases modifications were minor, although some countries
raised the level of their intended reductions. It is noteworthy that 88 Parties
mention carbon pricing in their NDCs representing 56% of global GHG
emissions.26
Mind the Gap
The Paris Agreement stipulated that participating countries should aim
to reach the peak of their emissions ‘as soon as possible’. And although
several countries have managed this: most notably the countries of the
European Union and the USA (see Fig. 3.6), globally, emissions have con-
tinued to rise.
The reality is that in 2018, two years after the Agreement entered into
force, emissions of CO2 and the other greenhouses gases are still increas-
ing. Worse, when analysts model the aggregate impact of all the countries’
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, it falls way short of what is required if the Paris Agreement tem-
perature targets are not to be exceeded.
An annual publication by the United Nations Environment
Programme examines what action needs to be taken in order to bring
emissions of greenhouse gases down in line with the Paris targets. Called
the Emissions Gap Report, the document focuses attention on the ‘gap’
between present projections of greenhouse gas emissions, and the reduc-
tions required if the UNFCCC targets of 1.5 °C and 2 °C of global
warming are to be met.27
Figure 3.9 shows the size of the ‘gap’ for the two temperature targets:
1.5 °C and 2 °C. The range of the gap results from the inherent uncertainties
associated with countries’ NDCs.28
The emissions gap forecast for 2030, even if all the NDCs are fully
implemented (which is highly unlikely), is estimated at between 15 and 18
GtCO2e if the world is to stay within the 2 °C limit, and between 26 and 29
GtCO2e in order to stay within the 1.5 °C limit.29
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127
'ůŽďĂůŐƌĞĞŶŚŽƵƐĞŐĂƐĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ͕'ƚKϮĞͬǇĞĂƌ
Fig. 3.9 Emissions gaps in meeting the Paris Agreement’s goals (Source Carbon
Action Tracker)
So between now (in 2019) and 2030, much stronger action must be taken
to dramatically curtail the emission of greenhouse gases.
Can these gaps be closed between now and 2030?
The 2017 UNEP Emissions Gap Report examined a wide range of
technological changes and improvements that would lead to reductions in
emissions of greenhouse gases. The focus was on the energy sector—where
a transition to electrical power generation based on renewable sources of
energy is essential. Without this transition, there is almost no chance of
global temperature increases being held under 2 °C.
In association with this transition to renewable energy, there must be
substantial gains in energy efficiency—in industry, transport, and the built
environment. In the transport sector, gains in efficiency together with the
transition to electric vehicles, already underway in 2018, will make a huge
contribution to reducing emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.
In principle, reforestation, afforestation, and changes in agricultural
practice, could also play an important role. But changes to these sectors
are much more difficult to initiate and sustain. So the four key sectors
where forceful action needs to be taken are energy, industry, transport, and
buildings.
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M. J. Bush
Fig. 3.10 Potential sectoral emission reductions by 2030 (see The Emissions Gap
Report 2017. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available at: https://
www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report) (Source United Nations
Environment Program)
Figure 3.10, taken from the Emissions Gap 2017 report, shows the
potential emission reductions that could be achieved from the four key sec-
tors, together with forestry and agriculture.
These projections to 2030 come with substantial uncertainties. But
once again, the precision of the estimation is not as important as the
embedded information it carries in terms of policy. The message is clear: if
global warming is to be kept under 2 °C, there needs to be substantial and
immediate reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases from these four
key sectors: energy, industry, transport and buildings. If progress can also
be made in sustainably managing the world’s forests, and in accelerating the
more widespread adoption of conservation agriculture, the increase in car-
bon naturally sequestered by biomass, and the reduction in emissions from
the soil, will be an additional and potential significant co-benefit.
Negative Emission Technologies

Assuming that global emissions of CO2 level off around 2020 and then start
to decline, it still seems unlikely, given present trends and most countries’
only modest programs to curtail their emissions under the Paris Agreement,
that atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases are going to fall fast enough to
keep global warming under 2 °C.30
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129
Is there a way to remove carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere?

We already know of two natural sinks: the land sink (biomass and soil), and
the oceans, which together are absorbing about 20 Gt of CO2 each year—as
shown by the global carbon budget of Fig. 3.1.
Scientists and engineers have been looking into the possibility of directly
removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere for at least a decade. Called
Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs), six of them are currently under
investigation31; they are:
• Afforestation and reforestation

• Land management to increase soil organic carbon
• Bioenergy production with carbon capture and storage/sequestration
(BECCS)
• Enhanced weathering
• Direct air capture and carbon storage (DACCS)
• Ocean iron fertilization
This is an area of study replete with acronyms: in addition to BECCS and

DACCS, we are also going to run into:
– CDR Carbon dioxide removal

– CCS Carbon capture and storage (or sequestration—both are used)
– CCUS Carbon capture, utilisation, and storage
– OIF Ocean iron fertilization
Afforestation and reforestation: All living plants and trees absorb carbon
dioxide from the air as they grow. In trees, the carbon is locked into the
wood and roots. Protecting the world’s forests and increasing their area
would result in significant amounts of carbon being taken out of the atmos-
phere. Estimates range from 1.1 to 1.3 Gt of carbon per year. But very
large areas of land would be required—creating potential conflicts with agri-
culture—and as we have seen earlier, in the global conflict between forest
lands and the expansion of agriculture (both commercial and subsistence),
the forests are on the losing side.
The changing climate is also a threat for forests. Rising global tempera-
tures and frequent drought conditions increase the risk of wildfires—which
are becoming more likely in many areas of the world. Hurricanes and
cyclones also cause immense damage to forests. Hurricane Maria devastated
the El Yunque National Forest in Puerto Rico,32 and Hurricane Katrina
caused massive damage to forests on the US Gulf Coast.33 Trees that are
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M. J. Bush
blown over by hurricane-force winds will die, decay, and release carbon back
to the atmosphere—negating the positive impact of their previous absorp-
tion of carbon dioxide from the air.
The world’s forests absolutely need to be better protected and managed—
not just because they are repositories of large quantities of carbon, but also
because they are the natural habitat of millions of creatures that are strug-
gling to survive. The protection of biodiversity is the most compelling
argument for the protection of the world’s forests. But as a mechanism to
counteract and possibly negate rising carbon emissions, they will play a lim-
ited, but still important role.
Land management to increase soil organic carbon: The amount of
organic carbon sequestered in the soil could potentially be significantly
increased by conservation agriculture techniques. However, conservation
agriculture is not yet extensively practiced worldwide, and the amount of
organic carbon that could potentially be sequestered and locked away in the
soil is probably limited—given the difficulty of managing and sustaining
conservation agriculture on a global scale.
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS): There is a
great deal of interest in the BECCS concept. The idea is to manage either
fast-growing energy crops (perennial grasses, for instance), or increased
forest biomass production, and to use this biomass as a source of fuel to gen-
erate electricity in conventional power plants. The carbon in the biomass
would be released as carbon dioxide during combustion, but the gas would
be extracted from the flue gas of the power plant and stored—either under-
ground or in deep water deposits.
The technology consists of two separate components: the production of large
quantities of biomass feedstock, and viable and reliable carbon storage technol-
ogies. The intermediate step—the extraction of carbon dioxide from the power
plant flue gas stream is proven technology and straightforward to deploy.
The widespread deployment of BECCS power production will require
large areas of land to grow the biomass fuel—which must also be cut, gath-
ered, transported, and processed before being delivered to the power plant.
Bioenergy production at the required scale may therefore have significant
environmental and social impacts.34 Chapter 6 looks into this question in
more detail.
Enhanced weathering: The idea is that geochemical processes that
naturally absorb carbon dioxide at slow rates can be brought into play at
an enhanced rate of absorption. One technique involves spreading finely
ground mineral silicate rock over large areas of land, as is already done in
some instances to reduce soil acidity for agriculture.
3 The Carbon Cycle
131
The concept seems unrealistic: it would require the mining, processing,

transport, and deployment of large quantities of minerals, and the land
area required for the spreading or burying the necessary amount of crushed
rock would be enormous. Not to mention the cost. In addition, all mining
operations have major environmental impacts—including the tailings from
the mining operation.
Direct air capture and carbon storage: DACCS technology would
rely on the same carbon storage CCS technology employed by BECCS—a
technology that has promising potential. But extracting the carbon dioxide
directly from the atmosphere—where its concentration is a tiny 0.04%—
takes a lot of energy and is likely to be expensive.
Removing CO2 from a flue gas is a well-established chemical process
technology. The first commercial DACCS installation started up in
Switzerland in 2017.35 It employed a solid adsorption technology and
removed 900 tonnes of CO2 a year from the atmosphere. Smaller more
experimental systems are in operation in Canada, the US, and Europe.
Ocean iron fertilization: Planktonic algae and other microscopic plants
absorb CO2 and by photosynthesis build organic matter. A fraction of this
organic material eventually sinks and is sequestered in deep ocean deposits.
The idea is to enhance this process by adding iron as a nutrient to the
water. The concept has actually been tested—illegally—off the west coast of
Canada in 2012.
An American businessman dumped around 100 tons of iron sulphate
into the Pacific Ocean as part of a geoengineering scheme in July 2012—
creating, as predicted, an artificial plankton bloom as large as 10,000 km2.
The release of the iron compound took place about 200 nautical miles west
of the islands of Haida Gwaii, one of the world’s richest ecosystems, where
one of the villages was apparently persuaded to agree to the experiment after
being told that it was a ‘salmon enhancement project’.36
However, the ocean fertilization concept carries substantial risks to the
marine environment: for example, ecological impacts on the marine food
chain and fisheries, and downstream effects on nutrient supply and dynam-
ics are very difficult to predict and potentially damaging.
Although the CDR technologies are all unproven at anything like the
scale required to substantially reduce global levels of atmospheric car-
bon dioxide, NETs are assumed by the IPCC scenarios to be operational
by about 2030—if the 2 °C limit is not to be exceeded. The crucial role of
NETs can be seen in the IPCC scenario database where of the 400 scenarios
that have a 50% chance or better of achieving no more than 2 °C warming,
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M. J. Bush
more than three quarters of them assume the large-scale deployment of some
form of NETs.
In October 2018, the US National Academies of Science weighed in on
this question with a report that reviewed the status of NETs and proposed
a research agenda that aims to expedite their development and implemen-
tation. The report looked at five of the six NETs discussed above (not ocean
fertilisation) and added one more: ‘coastal blue carbon’. This is the develop-
ment of land use and management practices that increase the carbon stored
in living plants or sediments in mangroves, tidal marshes, seagrass beds, and
other tidal or salt-water wetlands. These concepts are sometimes called “blue
carbon” even though they refer to coastal ecosystems instead of the open
ocean.37
The NAS report drew several interesting conclusions about the potential
of NETs. The most salient of which are summarised below:
• If the goals for climate and economic growth are to be achieved, NETs
will likely need to play a large role in mitigating climate change by
removing approximately 10 GtCO2 per year by 2050 and about 20
GtCO2/yr by 2100.
• Four NETs are ready for large-scale deployment: afforestation/
reforestation, changes in forests management, uptake and storage by agri-
cultural soils, and biomass energy with carbon capture and storage.
• Current NETs with direct costs that do not exceed $100/tCO2 can be
safely scaled up to capture and store substantial amounts of carbon, but
significantly less than 10 GtCO2.
In other words, several NETs could in principle be scaled up and deployed

at the present time but, with current technology, their contribution to cap-
turing and sequestering atmospheric CO2 will not be enough to limit global
warming to less than 2 °C.
Table 3.4 summarizes the NAS assessment of the current status of NETs
and their potential impact, and current limiting factors.
The technology with the greatest potential is biomass energy with carbon
capture and storage. The big question though is how to reserve and manage
the very large areas of land required for the growth and harvesting of the
biomass feedstock. The NAS report estimates that between 30 million and
43 million hectares of land are required per GtCO2/yr of negative emissions.
So for a removal rate of 10 GtCO2/yr—the order of magnitude necessary if
global warming is to be kept below 2 °C, the land area required would be
somewhere between 300 million and 430 million hectares. This area is 40%
of global cropland.38
Table 3.4 Cost, global potential, and limiting factors for a range of negative emissions technologiesa
Negative emissions technology Estimated cost Global potential Primary current limiting factors
($/tCO2) rate of CO2 removal
(GtCO2/yr)
Coastal blue carbon Low: $0–$20 0.13 • Available land given coastal development and land
use
• Understanding of future rates with sea level rise and
coastal management
Afforestation and reforestation Low: $0–$20 1 • Available land—given needs for food and fibre pro-
duction and for biodiversity
• Inability to fully implement forestry management
practices
Forest management Low: $0–$20 1.5 • Demand for wood limits feasible reduction in har-
vest rate, though some forest management activities
would not impact fibre supplies
Agricultural practices to enhance Low to medium: 3 • Limited per hectare rates of carbon uptake by exist-
soil carbon storage <$100 ing agricultural practices
• Inability to fully implement soil conservation
practices
Biomass energy with carbon cap- Medium: $20–$100 3.5–5.2 • Cost
ture and storage (BECCS) • Availability of biomass, given needs for food and
fibre production and for biodiversity
• Inability to fully capture waste biomass
• Fundamental understanding
Direct air capture (DAC) High: >$100 ? • Cost is greater than economic demand
• Practical barriers to pace of scale up
Carbon mineralization Medium to high Unknown • Fundamental understanding, especially of feedbacks
between carbon mineralization and permeability for
in situ methods
aTableadapted from NAS report on negative emissions technologies and reliable sequestration: a research agenda. Washington DC, 2018
3 The Carbon Cycle
Source US National Academy of Sciences

133
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M. J. Bush
In reality, there is no silver bullet. It is more likely that some combination

of the NETs described above will be developed and implemented. This is
one area of technology development where more research is clearly needed.
Keep It in the Ground

The model of the fast carbon cycle shown in Fig. 3.1 and the fact that the
carbon sinks are approximately constant over decade-scale periods, means
that there is an almost linear relationship between cumulative emissions of
carbon dioxide and increasing global temperatures.
So when proposing a maximum allowable global temperature increase of
1.5 °C or 2 °C over pre-industrial levels, it’s possible to estimate how much
more carbon dioxide can be emitted into the atmosphere before these tem-
perature limits are reached. It’s called the carbon budget.
The carbon budget is the amount of carbon dioxide the world can emit
while still having a reasonably good chance of limiting global temperature
rise to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.39
Figuring out the carbon budget from now until the end of the century
has required running several thousand computer simulations of the global
climate system and comparing the results from dozens of computer models
developed by agencies specializing in climate science. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ran the numbers a few years ago and
reported their results in the 5th Assessment Report published in 2014.
This is the way the IPCC summarized their findings:
Multi-model results show that limiting total human-induced warming …to

less than 2°C relative to the period 1861-1880 with a probability of > 66%
would require total CO2 emission from all anthropogenic sources since 1870
to be limited to about 2900 GtCO2…. About 1900 GtCO2 were emitted by
2011, leaving about 1000 GtCO2 to be consistent with this temperature goal.
Estimated total fossil carbon reserves exceed this remaining amount by a factor
of 4 to 7 with resources much larger still.40
It’s this last sentence that should get our attention.

We need to also note that the budget of about 1000 GtCO2 was for the
period starting in 2011. Since emissions since then have averaged about 33
GtCO2 a year, the available carbon budget at the end of 2018 was closer to
770 GtCO2.
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135
More recent data was presented in the IPCC Special Report: Global
Warming of 1.5 °C. The report reiterated once again that constraining
global warming requires limiting cumulative emissions of CO2 in order to
stay within the carbon budget. By the end of 2017, anthropogenic CO2
emissions since the preindustrial period were estimated to have reduced
the total carbon budget for 1.5 °C by approximately 2200 GtCO2. The
report estimated the remaining carbon budget to be about 570 GtCO2 for
a 66% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C. Since the associ-
ated remaining budget was being depleted by emissions of about 34 GtCO2
per year in 2018, these more recent estimates imply that if emissions are
not reduced, global warming could rise to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels
within 16 years—sometime around 2033 or just after.
When methane and black carbon are factored in, the carbon budget could
be substantially reduced. In addition, methane from permafrost thawing and
methane release from wetlands could reduce the budget even further.
Every year British Petroleum publishes a report called the BP Statistical
Review of World Energy. It is one of the principal sources of information for
scientists and policymakers who want to know more about the production
and consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas in individual countries and
worldwide. The report also provides detailed information on fossil fuels
reserves that are being exploited, or which could be, by the fossil fuel com-
panies that have access to them.
In the 2018 edition of the review, global totals of proved fossil fuel
reserves were estimated as follows:
Fossil fuel Total proved reserves at end 2018a

Oil 1729.7 billion barrels
Natural gas 6951.8 trillion cubic feet
Anthracite and bituminous coal 734.9 billion tonnes
Sub-bituminous and lignite 319.9 billion tonnes
aSeethe BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019
Total proved reserves are defined in the BP publication as the quantities

that geological and engineering information indicate with reasonable
certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under
existing economic and operating conditions. Reserves are much smaller
than ‘resources’—which are the quantities of fossil fuels that are known
to exist, but which are not necessarily recoverable under present economic
conditions.
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M. J. Bush
Burning these fossil fuel reserves to produce energy—either by generating

electrical power or used in internal combustion engines to power vehicles—
will obviously produce considerable amounts of carbon dioxide. Given the
aim of the global community to limit global warming to ‘well below 2 °C
above pre-industrial levels’, as specified in the 2015 Paris Agreement, and
knowing that this objective requires limiting the emissions of carbon d ioxide
from 2018 onward to between 600 and 700 GtCO2, the fundamental ques-
tion is: Can all this oil, natural gas, and coal be burned without driving
global temperatures a lot higher than they are now, and way above the 2 °C
limit set under the Paris Agreement?
The short answer is no. They can’t.
The amount of carbon dioxide which would be produced if all global
fossil fuel reserves were used as fuel, based on the fossil fuel reserves listed
above, is shown in Table 3.5.
Clearly, given the limit of 600–700 GtCO2 if the 2 °C target is going to
be achieved, not all the world’s reserves of fossil fuels can be burned as fuel.
This stark reality has given rise to the movement ‘Keep it in the ground!’—
which lobbies governments and fossil fuel companies to prevent companies
from exploring for additional reserves of fossil fuels: What’s the point when
the world already has too much of them?
But there are a couple of things to note:
1. It is the reserves of coal, not so much oil and natural gas, that are exces-
sive. Only a small fraction of the world’s reserves of coal can be used as
fuel if global warming is to be constrained to 2 °C. Most coal reserves
should stay in the ground. Coal is also the dirtiest fuel with the most cor-
rosive and health-damaging emissions. There are compelling arguments
for completely phasing out coal as a source of energy and closing most of
the mines.
2. There are already sufficient reserves of oil and natural gas available for
the production of electricity and for fuelling the transport sector. If oil
companies continue to explore for additional reserves, they are delib-
erately ignoring the global temperature limits imposed by the Paris
Agreement. It makes no sense for national governments to sign up to the
Paris Agreement while at the same time, state-owned and investor-owned
companies under their jurisdiction continue to explore for additional
reserves of oil and gas.
The oil companies continue to invest very substantial amounts of money in

their exploration programs—and there are few indications that this obsessive
3 The Carbon Cycle
137
Table 3.5 CO2 produced by combustion of total world fossil fuel reserves

Fossil fuels—global reserves Emission factors CO2 per unita GtCO2
Oil 371.4 kg CO2/bbl 642
Natural gas 53.4 kg CO2/thousand cu ft 371
Anthracite and bituminous coal 2530.5 kg CO2/tonne 1860
Sub-bituminous coal and lignite 1509.0 kg CO2/tonne 483
Total CO2 produced by the total combustion of global reserves 3356 GtCO2
aThe emission factors in this table are taken from the paper by Heede, Richard and
Oreskes, Naomi: “Potential emissions of CO2 and methane from proved reserves of
fossil fuels: An alternative analysis”. Global Environmental Change 36 (2016): 12–20
Source Oreskes and Heede
search for more oil and gas reserves has ceased or diminished since the Paris
Agreement came into force in 2016. The blatant disregard of climate science
and the goals of the Paris Agreement by many oil companies and associated
industries has led to a worldwide campaign to persuade academic, religious,
and financial institutions to withdraw any investments they may have in
these industries. This is discussed further in Chapter 9.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the structure of the carbon cycle: the sources and
the sinks and examined the way in which emissions of carbon dioxide are
driving up the concentrations of the gas in the atmosphere. The principal
source of carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels, mainly coal but
also natural gas, for the generation of electricity. Emissions from industry,
and the combustion of gasoline and diesel fuel in automobiles also produce
significant quantities of CO2.
The 2015 Paris Agreement, forged under the auspices of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), aims to keep
global warming below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, and ideally below
1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. However, the emission reduction commit-
ments made by countries as part of their proposed committments submitted
to the Paris Agreement secretariat are insufficient, and much stronger inter-
national action is required if these targets are to be achieved.
Negative Emission Technologies may help to achieve the Paris Agreement
targets but the most interesting of them—bioenergy production with carbon
capture and storage (BECCS), requires that very substantial areas of land
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M. J. Bush
be allocated for this sole objective. This may not be a realistic proposition.
However, carbon capture and storage is a developing technology that holds
significant promise for reducing carbon emissions from industry.
The remaining carbon budget: the amount of carbon dioxide that can be
emitted into the atmosphere if global warming is to be kept within 1.5 °C,
is now only about 570 billion tonnes. At present emission rates, the budget
will be used up within about 16 years.
The proven reserves of oil, natural gas, and coal cannot all be exploited
if the Paris Agreement target of no more than 2 °C of global warming is to
be achieved. The continued exploration by the oil companies for even more
petroleum resources is incompatible with the global community’s determi-
nation to reduce global warming and to find a way to end the climate crisis.
The key to reducing the world’s reliance on fossil fuels is to strongly and
rapidly facilitate a global transition to clean sources of energy. Photovoltaic
energy, hydropower, and wind power unlock the inexhaustible resources of
zero-emission energy. Nuclear power is also a clean source of energy and is
likely to play an important role in generating electricity for at least another
decade. But before we look at these renewable sources of energy in more
detail, we should examine a little more closely the fossil fuels upon which
the world has relied for so long. The truth is that while these fuels have pro-
vided essential power to industrial nations, developing countries, and emerg-
ing economies, they have also had a massively destructive impact on the
natural environment. The next chapter shines a light on the huge environ-
mental and human costs of the world’s addiction to fossil fuels.
Notes
1. See the NASA website: The carbon cycle. Accessed at: https://www.earthob-
servatory.nasa.gov/features/CarbonCycle.
2. See Climate central. Accessed at: http://www.climatecentral.org/gallery/
graphics/co2-and-rising-global-temperatures.
3. See Table ES-2 in the EPA Report Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse gas emis-
sions and sinks 1990–2017. Environmental Protection Agency Report
EPA 430-R-19-001. Accessed at: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2019-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf.
4. Emissions from US territories, shown in Table ES-2 of the EPA Report as
0.041 Gt/yr, are not included in Table 3.1
5. At the end of 2017 it was reported that vehicle emissions in the USA had
overtaken emissions from power generation for the first time. See Vehicles
are now America’s biggest CO2 source but EPA is tearing up regulations.
3 The Carbon Cycle
139
Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/01/

vehicles-climate-change-emissions-trump-administration/.
6. See Global carbon budget 2017, Op. cit.
7. Global Methane Initiative. Global methane emissions and mitigation oppor-
tunities. Accessed at: https://www.globalmethane.org/documents/analysis_
fs_en.pdf.
8. Table ES-2 in the EPA Report Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse gas emissions
and sinks 1990–2015. Environmental Protection Agency Report EPA
430-P-17-001.
9. See Surge in methane emissions threatens efforts to slow climate change.
Accessed at: https://phys.org/news/2016-12-surge-methane-emissions-
threatens-efforts.html. Also see Very strong atmospheric methane growth in
the 4 years 2014–2017: Implications for the Paris Agreement. Accessed at:
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2018GB006009.
10. Ibid.
11. See the FAO Report: Global forest resources assessment 2015, 2nd edition.
FAO 2016.
12. See The state of the world’s forests: Forests and agriculture: Land-use challenges
and opportunities. FAO 2016.
13. Idem.
14. Idem.
15. See Kim, D.H., Sexton, J.O., and Townshend, J.R.: “Accelerated deforest-
ation in the humid tropics from the 1990s to the 2000s”. Geophysical
Research Letters 42 (9) (16 May 2015): 3495–3501.
16. See Global deforestation hotspot: 3m hectares of Australian forest to be lost in
15 years. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/
mar/05/global-deforestation-hotspot-3m-hectares-of-australian-forest-to-
be-lost-in-15-years.
17. See the article on the NOAA website: In response to warming, eastern forests
inhaling more carbon dioxide than they’re exhaling. Accessed at: https://www.
climate.gov/print/261731.
18. See the article in Science: Tropical forests are a net carbon source based on
aboveground measurements of gain and loss, authored by A. Baccini and
others in Science, 28 September 2017. The net loss was given precisely as
425.2 ± 92.0 Tg C/yr—which converts to 0.4252 Gt C/yr.
19. See Death by 1000 cuts: Why the forest carbon sink is disappearing. Accessed
at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/28092017/tropical-forest-logging-
fires-carbon-sink-climate-change-study.
20. See World’s biggest geoengineering experiment ‘violates’ UN rules. Accessed at:
https://www.theguardian.com/envronment/2012/oct/15/pacific-iron-fer-
tilisation-geoengineering and Canadian government knew of plans to
dump iron into the Pacific. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2012/oct/17/canada-geoengineering-pacific.
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M. J. Bush
21. See Limiting warming to no more than two degrees has become the de facto
target for global climate policy. Accessed at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/
two-degrees-the-history-of-climate-changes-speed-limit.
22. See https://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php.
23. See the Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_
Protocol#Non-ratification_by_the_US.
24. See From Kyoto to Paris: How bottom-up regulation could revitalize
the UNFCC. Accessed at: https://jelpblog.wordpress.com/2015/11/28/
from-kyoto-to-paris/.
25. The text of the agreement is available at: http://unfccc.int/files/essential_
background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf.
26. See State and trends of carbon pricing 2018. World Bank and Ecofys 2018.
Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29687.
27. See the report from Climate Action Tracker. Accessed at: https://climateac-
tiontracker.org/global/cat-emissions-gap/.
28. Note that the graph in Fig. 3.9 shows emissions in units of carbon dioxide
equivalent—meaning that the global warming effects of methane and the
other greenhouse gases have been factored in.
29. Note that the latest Emissions Gap Report 2018 published by UNEP has
slightly different estimates for the extent of the gaps. The gap is a little
smaller for the 2 °C limit (between 13 and 15 GtCO2e), but slightly larger
for the 1.5 °C limit (between 29 and 32 GtCO2e). This means that the
lower limit of 1.5 °C of warming will be harder to achieve, and most ana-
lysts believe that keeping global warming below 1.5 °C is now impossible.
30. See The Climate Action Tracker 2017. Accessed at: http://climateac-
tiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing_papers/CAT_2017-11-15_
Improvement-in-warming-outlook.pdf.
31. See Negative emission technologies: What role in meeting Paris Agreement
targets? European Academies Science Advisory Council, EASAC Policy
Report 35. 2018.
32. See Forests protect the climate: A future with more storms would mean trouble.
Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/climate/forests-storms-
climate-chnage.html.
33. See Chambers, J.Q., Fisher, J.I., Zeng, H., Chapman, E.L., et al.:
“Hurricane Katrina’s carbon footprint on US Gulf coast forests”. Science
318 (16 November 2017): 1107. Accessed at: http://science.science-
mag.org/content/318/5853/1107?sid=a159ca86-a564-41b7-af3b-
8177de549eff.
34. See Negative emission technologies: What role in meeting Paris Agreement tar-
gets? Op. cit.
35. See Negative emission technologies. Op. cit.
3 The Carbon Cycle
141
36. See World’s biggest geoengineering experiment ‘violates’ UN rules. Accessed at:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/oct/15/pacific-iron-fer-
tilisation-geoengineering. Also Canadian government ‘new of plans to
dump iron into the Pacific’. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2012/oct/17/canada-geoengineering-pacific.
37. National Academies of Science: Negative emissions technologies and reliable
sequestration: a research agenda. Washington, DC. 2018.
38. Table adapted from NAS report on negative emissions technologies.
Op. cit.
39. ‘Reasonably good’ means better than a 66% chance. Two out of three. And
a one in three chance of failure.
40. IPCC 5th Assessment Report. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report,
p. 63.
4
Carbon Chaos
Introduction
There is no question that the harnessing of carbon-based fossil fuels has
enabled the Earth’s dominant species, homo sapiens, not just to inherit the
Earth, but to dominate it in ways unimaginable even a century ago. Without
plentiful supplies of coal, oil, and natural gas, there is no way the planet
could have managed to support the almost 8 billion people who now call it
home.
Not that all of them are in great shape. But up until a few decades ago,
economic prospects for the populations of most countries, at least those not
involved in armed conflict, were pretty good. Harnessing the world’s plenti-
ful sources of fossil fuel energy has made that happen. In developing coun-
tries, access to modern forms of energy has helped lift millions of people out
of poverty.
When fossil fuels are burned—either to generate electricity or to power
all the forms of transport that keep the global economy moving—we are
essentially burning trees, plants, and other forms of biomass that died and
decayed hundreds of millions of years ago.
Compressed and compacted into coal or transformed by heat and pres-
sure into carbon-rich petroleum, all the carbon in those trees and plants, and
all the other chemical elements naturally found in biomass, like sulphur, are
released into the atmosphere as gases when the fuel is burned. Carbon diox-
ide is the principal pollutant from this combustion, but other gases like sul-
phur dioxide, and volatile compounds (such as benzene), are also driven into

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_4
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M. J. Bush
the air by the heat of combustion. Since combustion requires air, which is
mostly nitrogen, nitrogen oxide gases are also present in the exhaust fumes
of vehicles and the smokestacks of power plants. But combustion is never
perfect. There is always smoke.
Composed of minute particles of carbon, ash, and traces of other elements
found in the carbon fuel, what is called particulate matter or just plain partic-
ulates is dangerous stuff. When breathed in, it gets into the lungs and causes
a host of respiratory problems—particularly for children. We looked at this
problem in general terms in Chapter 1. In this chapter we will examine the
pollution and the environmental impacts caused by the combustion of fossil
fuels in more detail, as well as documenting the other environmental impacts
that are unavoidable when fossil fuels are the main source of energy.
We will also look at the external costs associated with fossil fuels. These
are the costs that the polluter never pays. And along the way we will doc-
ument all the horrendous accidents and catastrophes caused by the need
to constantly move enormous quantities of highly flammable hydrocarbon
liquids and gases across North America and around the world in pipelines,
tank cars, coal trains, and super-tankers.
Coal
The use of coal as a fuel is often associated with the industrial revolution of
18th century Britain, but coal was an important source of energy even in
Roman times.
A century before the industrial revolution, many cities in England were
dependent on coal for heating and for artisanal manufacturing. Air pollu-
tion was already a huge problem in the capital. In 1656, the English poet Sir
William Davenport published a tract that complained about the ‘canopy of
smoke’ that covered the city of London. He even wrote a song that included
the lines1:
London is smother’d with sulph’rous fumes

Still she wears a black-hood and cloak
Of sea-coal smoak…
The problem of air pollution in the capital was not really tackled until
the mid-twentieth century—after the ‘Great Smog’ of 1952 killed several
thousand people. So for at least 300 years, the air pollution caused by the
burning of coal in London was atrocious.
4 Carbon Chaos
145
Coal is still a major source of primary energy—it was only knocked into
2nd place by oil in the mid-twentieth century. Although its use as a fuel
is declining in North America and Europe, it is increasing in Asia, and the
production of coal is not expected to peak until after well after 2020. In
2017, about 30% of global primary energy production was being supplied
by coal.
All mining operations are inherently dangerous. The list of catastrophic
coal mine disasters that have occurred over the last 200 years is long and
horrendous—but coal mining today is a lot safer. Even so, coal mining leads
US industries in fatal injuries: the 2007 fatality rate in coal mining was
almost 25 per 100,000 workers—more than six times greater than all private
industry. In the US, employees in coal mining are more likely to be killed or
to incur a non-fatal injury or illness, and their injuries are more likely to be
severe, than workers in private industry as a whole.2 But the situation has
improved since then: in 2017, fatalities among US coal miners had dropped
to 18 per 100,000 workers. But it’s still a dangerous job.3
The Miners and the Mines
Progressive massive fibrosis (PMF) is an advanced, debilitating, and lethal

form of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. It is known as black lung disease,
which gives you an idea of what it does to a miner’s lungs. Breathing in coal
mine dust is the sole cause of PMF in working coal miners. There is no cure.
One would think that, at least in the US with all the awareness of envi-
ronmental issues and worker’s safety, that an occupational hazard of this type
would have been eradicated by now. In fact, the disease was almost elimi-
nated 20 years ago with a reported prevalence of just 0.33% among active
underground workers with at least 25 years of mining tenure. Since that
time, the incidence of the disease has risen substantially. For example, the
Coal Workers Health Surveillance Program (CWHSP) reported in 2012
that the incidence of the disease in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia
had increased by a factor of ten.4
The disease seems to be becoming more prevalent and more serious in the
US. A report released in February 2018, presented the results of surveys con-
ducted at three clinics serving coal miners in Virginia, Kentucky, and West
Virginia. A total of 416 cases of black lung disease were identified. Scientists
have speculated that the increased incidence of the disease could be linked
to the shift towards mining thinner coal seams that require cutting into the
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M. J. Bush
surrounding rock. Silica dust from pulverized rock may damage lungs faster
that coal dust alone.5 A few months later in July 2018, the US National
Institute for Occupational safety and Health (NIOSH) reported that as
many as one in five miners in central Appalachia suffer black lung disease,
the highest rate in 25 years. Nationwide the condition now afflicts one in
ten of miners, an increase of 3% since 2012.6
Black lung disease is found everywhere that coal is mined. There are
reports from Australia and the UK that document the same condition. The
disease cannot be eradicated. As long as miners go underground and breathe
in coal dust-laden air they will be exposed to the disease. In countries where
mining is poorly regulated the prevalence of the disease can rise to astro-
nomical levels. In China in 2013, the government’s National Health and
Family Planning Commission reported that there were 750,000 people suf-
fering from black lung disease.7
It’s not just the miners who suffer. China, for example, has the largest
number of premature deaths attributable to outdoor air pollution related to
particulate matter—more than 1 million; followed by India with 620,000.
In both cases, particulate emissions from coal combustion are reportedly a
key underlying factor.8
The mining of coal has a massive and often irreversible impact on the
environment. A form of surface mining called mountaintop removal, or
MTR, involves stripping all trees from a mountaintop and blasting away
the top of the mountain with explosives. The resulting thousands of tons
of debris is generally dumped into adjacent valleys, burying watercourses,
totally disrupting watersheds, and often permanently changing the biodiver-
sity of the area. In the US, in Appalachia alone, coalfields cover 48,000 km2
of mountaintops and valleys, displacing forests and polluting or burying
more than 5% of the region’s streams.9
Drainage from coal mines is acidic, laced with heavy metals, and an envi-
ronmental nightmare. In the US, it has been described as one of the worst
environmental problems facing the mining industry.10 Acid mine drainage
(AMD) is the acidic water produced when rock containing sulphide min-
erals, particularly iron pyrites, comes into contact with water and oxygen.
The chemistry is complex, but the result is that downstream watercourses
are turned red, orange and yellow by the accumulating concentrations of fer-
rous compounds. The acidity of the water also dissolves other minerals from
the rock: zinc, copper, arsenic, cadmium and lead. Left untreated the prob-
lem can last for centuries: some Roman mines in Britain still produce acidic
drainage.11
4 Carbon Chaos
147
Preparing the Coal
Before it is transported to power plants, coal is generally cleaned up to

remove soil and other rock fragments. The preparation includes crushing
the coal and removing extraneous non-coal materials. If the coal is high
in sulphur or other impurities, it is washed with a water or immersed in a
chemical bath to remove inorganic sulphur in the coal.
The process requires the application of complex chemicals, large quan-
tities of water, and produces a thick slurry waste that may contain arsenic
and mercury—which are both common in mined rock. This liquid waste
is generally stored in huge surface impoundments, sometimes called tailing
ponds, to prevent the pollution of local rivers and streams. While generally
safe, they occasionally fail. Catastrophically.
In Inez, Kentucky, three coal mines owned by Martin County Coal
Corporation fed coal into a preparation plant on conveyor belts through
underground mine workings. Waste coal slurry from the plant was pumped
into a 29 hectare tailing pond called the Big Branch impoundment. The
dam held back over 2 billion gallons of slurry.
In October 2000, the dam failed, releasing about 300 million gallons
of coal waste slurry into local streams, flooding stream banks to a depth of
five feet. About 120 km of rivers and streams turned black, killing fish, and
polluting the river water along the Tug Fork of the Big Sandy River, and
some of its tributaries. Like all coal mine tailing ponds, the slurry contained
detectable levels of arsenic, mercury, lead, copper and chromium. Martin
County Coal eventually paid out over $6 million in penalties and damages.12
In 1972, the most destructive flood in West Virginia’s history occurred
when a coal waste impounding structure collapsed on the Buffalo Creek
tributary of Middle Fork. The failure released 132 million gallons of water.
As a result of the flood, 125 people were killed, 1100 were injured and more
than 4000 were left homeless.13
While the regulations in the US and Canada are now much stricter,
accidents still happen. In January 2018, it was reported that Duke Energy,
one of the largest electricity companies in the US will pay an $84,000 pen-
alty and work to stop potentially toxic waste from three North Carolina
coal-burning plants from leaking into groundwater and nearby rivers. Two
dozen leaky spots were detected at coal ash pits before 2015. Duke Energy
acknowledged that the leaks into the Catawba and Broad rivers were from
unlined earthen holding basins at the power plants. Groundwater in the
vicinity may have been polluted, and Duke Energy has been providing
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M. J. Bush
hundreds of homes using wells within a half-mile of its coal plants with bot-
tled water as a precaution. In January 2018, it was reported that some fami-
lies had been using bottled water for over two and a half years.14
Canada has experienced similar dam failures at coal mines. On the
night of Halloween 2013, an estimated 264 million gallons of waste coal
slurry spilled out of a broken earth berm at the Obed Mountain mine near
Hinton, Alberta. The burst contaminated 25 km of the Athabasca river. Ten
municipalities were warned not to withdraw water from the river and to
keep livestock away from the tainted water.15
But these impoundment and tailing pond failures pale in comparison
to the disaster at the Mount Polley mine in the remote Caribou region of
British Columbia in western Canada. When the dam failed in August 2014,
it released 3.9 billion gallons of thick toxic slurry containing lead, copper,
and mercury, into nearby Hazeltine Creek, Polley Lake, and Quesnel Lake.
The environmental impact was catastrophic.
The Mount Polley mine was not a coal mine. Imperial Metals was min-
ing for gold and silver. But the approach is exactly the same for the mining
of coal: the toxic slurry waste resulting from the processing and washing of
coal or rock cannot be released into the environment—it has to be held in
impoundments and tailing ponds. Even though dam and dike failures are
infrequent, they still happen.16 It is worth noting that a report on the cause
of the breach by an expert review panel found that the “dominant contribu-
tion to the failure resides in the design.” The construction of the dam did
not follow the proposed design.17
Design problems have also been a frequent problem in the US. In 2013,
the Washington Post reported that several tailing ponds at coal mines in West
Virginia had been found to have defective walls because of poor construc-
tion. Tests of the density of these impoundment walls showed flaws in all
seven sites surveyed, with only 16 field tests meeting the required standards
out of 73 conducted. That report noted that there were as many as 596 coal
slurry impoundments in 21 states, of which 114 were in West Virginia.18
Apart from the slurry waste from the preparation process, solid wastes are
generated in coal mines in substantial quantities. The piles of waste can be
huge and since they contain coal dust and fragments of coal, they are prone
to combust spontaneously. In the UK they are called coal slag heaps and
were a dominant feature of the mining towns in Wales and the North of
England when coal was a major industry in the last century.
The Aberfan tragedy is still remembered. The Welsh mining village lies
at the bottom of a small valley. The Merthyr Vale coal mine, the mainstay
4 Carbon Chaos
149
Fig. 4.1 The village of Aberfan just after the 1966 disaster (Source Public domain)
of the local economy, was higher up the hill—where the colossal slag heaps
dominated the skyline (Fig. 4.1).
Mining in Aberfan started in 1869. Initially the waste was dumped in
tips on the slope adjacent to the colliery. But as the volume of waste mate-
rial increased, new tips were created on the slopes higher up the hillside. By
1966, seven tips had been constructed. Tip number 7, the one that failed,
held about 230,000 cubic metres of mine waste and had reached a height of
40 meters.
Just after 9 a.m., on October 21, 1966, after several days of rain, about
half of the slag heap slid away, and over 100,000 m3 of mud and coal
mine waste cascaded down onto the village below. The mud and rubble
roared down the valley, crashed through a row of small houses, and
crushed the Pantglas junior school—where about 120 young children had
just come into their classrooms. The slag heap slide killed 144 people: 116
children aged 7 to 10; six adults in the school including 5 teachers, and 22
people who were in the houses that were destroyed.19 It was an appalling
tragedy.
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M. J. Bush
Generating Electricity
In 2017, the world production of coal was about 7.3 billion tonnes—over
40% of which was mined in China (which imported even more). India and
the USA each produced about 10% of the total. Not all coal goes into power
production. A substantial fraction is used for the manufacture of steel and
cement and other industrial and residential applications. In 2017, Canada
produced 61 million tonnes of coal, of which 56% was metallurgical coal
used for steel-making, and 44% was thermal coal used for generating
electricity.20
When coal is burned in a power plant to generate the steam that powers
the turbines, the resulting mix of flue gases is a toxic cocktail of gas-phase
chemical compounds and particulates.
The main constituent is carbon dioxide—a gas which has little direct
impact on human health, although it is the chief culprit when it comes to
global heating.
But the other constituent gases have a noxious impact. Table 4.1, adapted
from a report published by Physicians for Social Responsibility, summarizes
the health effects of the major power plant pollutants.21
The PSR report lists coal’s contribution to major health impacts as
follows22:
Asthma. Nitrogen oxides, ozone, and particulate matter are all implicated in
the prevalence of the disease. The most vulnerable are children and adults.
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). Emphysema with
chronic obstructive bronchitis permanently narrows airways. In the US,
COPD is the 4th leading cause of death. Smokers are most vulnerable.
NOx and particulate matter are implicated.
Infant mortality. NOx and particulates are implicated in the deaths of
infants less than 1 year old. Almost a quarter may have had respiratory
causes.
Lung cancer. Leading cause of cancer mortality in US among both men and
women. The disease is exacerbated by air pollution caused by particulate
matter.
Acute myocardial infarction. Particulate matter is implicated in the disease
Coronary heart disease. CHD is a leading cause of death in the US and air
pollution is known to negatively impact cardiovascular health.
Ischemic stroke. NOx, particulate matter and sulphur dioxide are all impli-
cated in the prevalence of ischemic stroke.
Table 4.1 Health effects of air pollutants from coal-fired power plants
Name Description Health impact Most vulnerable population
Sulphur dioxide SO2 is a corrosive invisible gas Coughing, wheezing, shortness Children and adults with asthma
formed from the sulphur in coal. of breath, nasal congestion and or other respiratory disease
It reacts with water vapor in the inflammation. Worsens asthma.
air to form sulphuric acid—acid The gas can destabilize heart
rain rhythms. It may cause low birth
weight and an increased risk of
infant death
Particulate matter (PM) A mixture of tiny solid parti- PM crosses the lung into the Elderly, children, people with
cles (soot) and sulphuric acid bloodstream resulting in inflam- asthma
droplets. PM is a complex mix of mation of the cardiac system—a
carbon and other toxic elements root cause of cardiac disease
including heart attack and stroke
leading to premature death. PM
exposure is linked to low birth
weight, premature birth, chronic
airway obstruction and sudden
infant death
Nitrogen oxides A mix of nitrogen oxides, NOx, is NOx decreases lung function and Elderly, children, people with
produced by high combustion is associated with respiratory asthma
temperatures. The gases react in disease in children. Converts to
the presence of sunlight to form ozone and acidic PM particles in
ozone smog the atmosphere
Ozone Invisible and highly corrosive, Rapid shallow breathing, airway Children, elderly people with
ozone is produced when nitro- irritation, coughing, wheezing, asthma or other respiratory
gen oxides react with other shortness of breath. Worsens disease
pollutants in the presence of asthma. May be related to
sunlight premature birth, cardiac birth
defects, low birth weight, and
stunted lung growth
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Source Physicians for Social Responsibility (USA)

152
M. J. Bush
The problem is not confined to North America. Analysis of coal-fired power

plants in Europe found that their 2013 emissions caused almost 23,000
deaths, tens of thousands of illnesses from heart disease to bronchitis and
over 60 billion euros in health costs. This is the cost of pollution that the
polluter never pays. The worst offender is Poland, followed by Germany,
Romania, Bulgaria and the UK.23 A report in 2017 confirmed that coal-fired
power plants in Europe were responsible for the largest releases of carbon
dioxide, sulphur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides to the environment.24
Apart from the air pollution, there’s the ash. You can’t burn coal without
producing ash.
Coal ash is the waste that is left behind after coal is combusted in a coal-
fired power plant. It includes fly ash, captured from smokestack effluents,
and coarser ash from the furnaces. The ash typically contains a slew of heavy
metals including arsenic, lead, mercury, cadmium, chromium and sele-
nium—all metals that are extremely toxic.
Coal ash from power plants is generally dumped either into dry landfills
or into wet surface impoundments. In the US, there are approximately 2000
coal ash dump sites across the country.
In 2007, roughly 140 million tons of coal ash was generated annually
from power plants. Coal ash is the second largest industrial waste stream in
the US—second only to mine wastes.25
Wet ash ponds are just as liable to fail as the impoundments and tailing
ponds at the coal mines themselves. The most notorious incident occurred
in December 2008 when an earthen wall holding back a large coal ash dis-
posal pond at the coal-fired power plant in Kingston, Tennessee, failed cata-
strophically. The 16 hectare pond spilled more than 1 billion gallons of coal
ash slurry into the adjacent river valley, covering about 1200 hectares of land
with a thick, viscous, toxic sludge. The spill destroyed three homes, damaged
several others, and contaminated the Emory and Clinch rivers.
When the EPA tested water samples after the spill, they found toxic heavy
metals including arsenic—which they measured at 149 times the allow-
able standard for drinking water. The water also contained lead, thallium,
barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury and nickel.26
It took workers a year to clean up the mess—during which time they
could not avoid breathing in the toxic coal ash dust. Coal ash dust is highly
toxic—many of those workers subsequently became ill. The contaminated
area was finally designated a Superfund site by the US Environmental
Protection Agency.27
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Under a 2015 US EPA coal ash rule, all US electric generating utilities
were required to analyse groundwater pollution at each of their operating
coal ash dumps by the end of January 2018 and publish their results one
month later. Initial results show that a majority of the coal ash pits are leak-
ing polluted water into groundwater.28
But there’s one other dangerous pollutant that is widespread in the envi-
ronment, present in the human tissue of practically every man and woman
on the planet, and whose toxic neurological effects are mainly due to the
burning of coal.
Mercury
Elemental mercury and mercury compounds occur naturally in geologic

hydrocarbons including coal, natural gas, gas condensates, and crude oil.
Coal contains trace amounts of mercury in the form of mercuric sulphate
(HgS—known as cinnabar29). When the coal is burned, it is released into
the environment as mercury vapor.30
Mercury is extremely toxic. It is considered by the World Health
Organisation as one of the top ten chemicals or groups of chemicals of
major public health concern.
Mercury moves around the world in three key ways. First, it is actively
traded as a global commodity, often for uses like artisanal and small-scale
gold mining—where substantial mercury releases into the environment are
routine. Second, airborne mercury, carried in the air pollution caused by the
combustion of coal, is dissipated over very wide areas before being deposited
on land and on water. Third, once mercury enters a river or ocean, natural
bacteria can absorb it and convert it to a more toxic form: methylmercury.
Methylmercury accumulates in fish and shellfish. Large predatory fish are
more likely to have high levels of mercury as a result of eating smaller fish
that have acquired mercury through the ingestion of plankton. Predatory
fish at the top of the aquatic food chain may accumulate levels of methyl-
mercury as high as 1 part per million. The mercury ‘bio-accumulates’ as it
moves up the food chain. It also gets more concentrated—so larger preda-
tory fish have higher concentrations of mercury in their tissue than smaller
fish further down the food chain.
Global emissions are running at somewhere between 5000 and 8000
tonnes a year—the exact figure seems to be unclear. Although emissions
from coal fired power plants have declined in North America and many
154
M. J. Bush
western European countries due to much-improved emission control tech-

nologies, globally, emission are on the rise. In 2018, UN agencies reported
that global emissions had risen 20% between 2010 and 2015.31
In the US, mercury emissions in 2014 were about 55 tons, with coal-fired
units responsible for about 42% of the total.32 That figure may be declin-
ing as coal fired power plants are gradually shut down—but the story is dif-
ferent in Poland. A Polish newspaper reported in June 2018 that emissions
of mercury from coal power plants had jumped a whopping 87% in just
one year. European data showed that that mercury pollution from the giant
Belchatow power plant in central Poland was 18 times higher in 2016 than
in the previous year.33
Airborne mercury is a global traveller. Once in the air it can remain for
up to a year and travel long distances. In Canada, 97% of mercury deposited
on Canadian landscapes, roughly 47 tonnes a year, comes from other coun-
tries—mainly from Asia. The highest rate of deposition is in the Canadian
Arctic—where almost 9 tonnes/year of airborne mercury settles each year—
where it is gradually absorbed into natural ecosystems, marine environ-
ments—and fish.34
Two groups of people are more sensitive to the effects of mercury.
Foetuses are most susceptible to the adverse developmental effects of the ele-
ment. Methylmercury exposure in the womb can result from the mother’s
consumption of fish and shellfish. It can adversely affect a baby’s growing
brain and nervous system. The primary health effect of methylmercury is
impaired neurological development. Cognitive thinking, memory, attention,
language, and fine motor and visual spatial skills may be affected in children
who were exposed to methylmercury as foetuses.35
The second group is people who are regularly exposed to high levels of
mercury—such as populations that rely on subsistence fishing. According
to the World Health Organisation, among selected subsistence fishing pop-
ulations, between 1.5 and 17 in 1000 children showed cognitive impair-
ment and mild mental retardation caused by the consumption of fish
containing mercury. These children were in populations in Brazil, Canada,
China, Columbia, and Greenland.36 Figure 4.2 shows how mercury moves
through the environment and eventually into the human body.37
In the US, a nationwide study of blood samples in 1999–2000 showed
that more than 15% of women of childbearing age had blood mercury
levels that would cause them to give birth to children with mercury levels
exceeding the EPA’s maximum acceptable dose for the element. This dose
was established to limit the number of children with mercury-related neuro-
logical and developmental impairments. Researchers have estimated that as
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155
Fig. 4.2 The mercury cycle (Source Physicians for Social Responsibility [USA])
many as 630,000 children are born in the US each year with blood mercury
levels high enough to impair performance on neurodevelopmental tests and
cause lifelong loss of intelligence.38
The Minamata Convention
The Minamata Convention on Mercury entered in force in 2017. Signed by

128 countries and ratified by 100 countries and the European Union, the
Convention takes its name from the most severe mercury poisoning disas-
ter in history, which came to light in Minamata, Japan, in May 1956, after
sustained dumping of industrial wastewaters into Minamata Bay, beginning
in the 1930s. Local villagers who ate fish and shellfish from the bay started
suffering convulsions, psychosis, loss of consciousness and coma. In all,
thousands of people were certified as having directly suffered from mercury
poisoning, now known as Minamata disease. Both Canada and the US are
signatories to the convention.
156
M. J. Bush
The convention requires parties to apply best available technology to

curb mercury emissions from new fossil-fuel power plants. Coal-fired power
plants are the worst offenders in terms of mercury emissions.
However, the convention does not apply to existing coal-fired power
plants, which are likely to have older equipment and higher pollution lev-
els. And in spite of the rapid penetration of utility-scale solar power and
wind energy, globally, coal is still the predominant fuel for power generation.
Moreover, the Minamata convention does not set any limit on the number
of new coal-fired power plant that a party can construct. Even with best
available technology, mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants are not
completely eliminated, which means that emissions of mercury are likely to
rise even when control technology is installed—as long as coal continues to
be used to generate electricity.
In November 2018, as the second meeting of the Conference of Parties
was getting underway in Geneva, it was reported that global emissions of
mercury had risen by 20% from 2010 to 2015. An estimated 15 million
miners are exposed to mercury through its use in artisanal and small-scale
gold mining in over 70 countries.39
Mercury vapour can be removed from coal fired power plants using a
variety of pollution control technologies—but not completely. The mercury
that is removed is then deposited in the solid waste products from the power
plant. Impoundments, slag heaps, tailing ponds, and tips are never perma-
nent repositories of toxic pollutants. Once coal is mined and burned, one
way or another, the mercury will find its way into the environment—and
eventually into the food chain.
Petroleum
Coal may have fuelled the industrial revolution, but the steam engine was a
heavy and inefficient machine that mostly powered stationary engines. Only
very large forms of transport: railway locomotives and ships could support
the heavy boilers and the reciprocating machinery on a platform that could
actually move and carry passengers. And you had to bring your own coal.
Passengers arriving at Paddington railway station in London in the
mid-nineteenth century would exit the station and hail a cab pulled by a
horse. Or maybe an omnibus—a horse-drawn carriage that seated about 20
passengers. In 1900, there were over 11,000 hansom cabs on the streets of
London, and several thousand horse-drawn omnibuses each needing the
services of 12 horses a day. About 50,000 horses were transporting people
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around the city. New York had even more horses than London—100,000
of them, producing over 1000 tons of manure a day.40 This was the age of
horsepower.
But all that changed with the invention of the internal combustion
engine. Its adoption was swift, and the subsequent growth of the a utomobile
industry was phenomenal. In America, registrations for automobiles
rose from 8000 in 1900 to 902,000 in 1912.41 By 1918 half of all cars in
America were Ford Model Ts. And they all ran on gasoline.
Oil was also powering ships—led in part by the British Navy, which
famously converted their warships from coal to oil in 1912 under Winston
Churchill when he was First Lord of the Admiralty. The age of petroleum
was well and truly underway.
But fossil fuels all have one enormous and damaging drawback. They have
to be conveyed from where they are found and brought to the surface, to
where they are processed and then distributed for sale and use. This is espe-
cially true in the case of oil and natural gas where a huge seemingly chaotic
network of pipes and pipelines moves oil, petroleum products, and natural
gas across countries and continents around the globe.
This is in stark contrast to renewable energy where, if it’s not on your
rooftop like solar photovoltaic energy, it’s generating electricity in a place
where that power is brought to you by a distribution network linked to
high-voltage electrical transmission lines. These transmission lines can be
very long and extensive, but unlike oil and gas pipelines, oil trains, and
supertankers, they don’t leak, spill, crash, sink, or explode. Electricity is cer-
tainly dangerous—but its transmission doesn’t foul and pollute the envi-
ronment, and if it’s generated from renewable sources of energy, its use for
power has the game-changing advantage that it doesn’t produce greenhouses
gases.
Moving large quantities of oil, natural gas, and petroleum products across
countries and around the globe is inherently risky. It is simply impossible to
avoid accidents. Some accidents are minor—small quantities of petroleum
products or natural gas that leak slowly from a pipeline; others are large,
spectacular, and often catastrophic.
Petroleum also has more moving parts than coal. There is first the pro-
duction of crude oil, which if offshore is dangerous work and where there
have been a number of horrific accidents and monumental spills. The
Deepwater Horizon drilling platform explosion in 2010 that allowed
210 million gallons of crude oil to pour into the Gulf of Mexico 66 km
from the Louisiana coast being the largest of them.
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M. J. Bush
Table 4.2 The worst oil tanker accidents since 1967

Tanker name Year of accident Location Quantity oil spilled
(tonnes)
Atlantic Empress 1979 Trinidad, Caribbean 287,000
ABT Summer 1991 Angola 260,000
Castillo de Bellver 1983 South Africa 252,000
Amoco Cadiz 1978 France, Brittany 227,000
Haven 1991 Mediterranean 144,000
Sanchi 2018 East China Sea 136,000
Odyssey 1988 Atlantic Canada 132,000
Torrey Canyon 1967 British Isles 119,000
Sea Star 1972 Iran, Gul of Oman 115,000
Exxon Valdez 1989 Prince William 104,000
Sound, Alaska
Irenes Serenade 1980 Greece, Pylos 100,000
Source Wikipedia
Then there is the conveyance of the crude oil to a refinery where, if an oil
train is employed, there have been several horrendous accidents—the cat-
astrophic derailment and explosion in 2015 at Lac Megantic in Quebec in
which 47 people were killed, being by far the worst.
If the oil is transported by sea in oil tankers, the risks are low, but the
impact of an accident is usually catastrophic. The worst disasters of tankers
that broke apart and discharged over 100,000 tonnes of oil and petroleum
products into the sea are shown in Table 4.2.
These are just the big ones. During the last 60 years there have been at
least 83 serious tanker accidents and shipwrecks that have spilled around
2.26 million tonnes of oil and petroleum liquids into the oceans.42
On the north American mainland, Canada and the US are crisscrossed
with an extensive network of pipelines that carry large quantities of liquid
petroleum products including crude oil and refined products such as gas-
oline, diesel fuel, and natural gas liquids. The US has the world’s largest
pipeline network: more than 320,000 km of pipelines carrying liquids, over
480,000 km of gas transmission lines, and more than 3.3 million km of gas
distribution pipelines.
Pipelines ought to be a lot safer than tankers and trains, but accidents
still happen—it’s inherent in a fossil fuel supply system that needs to con-
stantly move large quantities of flammable liquids and gases under pressure
and over long distances. Figure 4.3 shows the number of pipeline incidents
that occurred in the US from 1997 to 2016. Since 2002, when for some rea-
son the number of accidents almost doubled, pipeline incidents have been
running at almost 600 a year.
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Fig. 4.3 Number of pipeline incidents from 1999 to 2018 (Source US Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [See the US Pipeline and hazardous mate-
rials safety administration website: https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/analyticsSOAP/saw.
dll?Portalpages])
Tucked away in the data for the year 2010 is the largest inland oil spill in
US history. The spill occurred when a pipeline managed by the Canadian
energy firm Enbridge carrying diluted bitumen from the Alberta tar sands
ruptured, sending over 800,000 gallons of ‘dilbit’ into the Kalamazoo River
near the town of Marshall, Indiana. The heavy oil spill flowed for 17 hours
before Enbridge finally shut down the pipeline. The diluted bitumen con-
taminated 40 miles of the river, fouling over 4000 acres of riverside land. In
2016, the cost of the clean-up of the contaminated stretch of the Kalamazoo
river was estimated at $1.21 billion.43
Canadian pipelines appear to be somewhat safer than US pipelines
(although the network is smaller). Figure 4.4 shows the number of incidents
reported to Canada’s National Energy Board (NEB). The 10-year average is
108 incidents a year.44
Some major Canadian pipelines seem particularly prone to spills. For
instance, from 1961 to 2013, 81 oil spills from the Trans Mountain Pipeline
were reported to the NEB.
Data obtained in 2013 on the number of pipeline incidents regulated by
the province of Alberta (and so not reported to the NEB) found that there
were over 28,000 crude oil spills from 1975 to 2012—roughly two spills a
day over 37 years.45
Offshore Disasters
The Deepwater Horizon explosion, catastrophic fire, and subsequent leak

of millions of gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico 80 km from the
160
M. J. Bush
Louisiana coast was just the most spectacular and disastrous of recent off-
shore oil rig accidents. There have been many more. Table 4.3 lists some of
the more recent accidents.46
Fig. 4.4 Number of incidents reported to the NEB in Canada (Source National Energy
Board, Canada)
Table 4.3 The worst offshore oil rig disasters
1969 In January 1969, Union Oil began drilling a fifth well on their Platform A
about five miles off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. On January 28,
the well blew, leaking oil and gas. Then a second blowout occurred on
February 24. Clean up efforts were rudimentary at the time, and the pollu-
tion of California’s coastline was severe
1979 Mexico’s Pemex was working on the Ixtox I, an exploratory well 62 miles off
the coast of Campeche when on June 3 the well blew spewing 30,000 bar-
rels of oil into the gulf each day. The spill was not contained until March
1980
1979 The Bohai 2 oil rig was being towed in the Gulf of Bohai off the coast of
China in November when a storm damaged the rig and it capsized and
sank. Of the 76 crewmembers, 72 died in the accident
1980 In March 1980, a severe storm and high seas capsized the Alexander L.
Kiellend semi-submersible drilling rig in the North Sea. One hundred and
twenty three of the 212 men on board were killed
1982 Mobil Oil’s Ocean Ranger semi-submersible drilling rig was drilling 166 miles
off the coast of Newfoundland when it was hit by a violent storm early on
February 15. The crew abandoned the rig, but several lifeboats malfunc-
tioned. The rig finally sank, and 84 crewmembers drowned
(continued)
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1983 In October, the Glomar Java Sea drilling ship operating in the South China
Sea was capsized and wrecked by tropical storm Lex. Among the 81 crew,
there were no survivors
1984 Petrobas’ Enchova drilling platform operating in the Campos basin near Rio
de Janeiro experienced a blowout followed by an explosion on August 16.
During the evacuation of the platform, 42 workers died
1988 In April, the same platform suffered a gas blowout. The gas ignited, and the
resulting fire burned for 31 days. This time there were no casualties
1988 Piper Alpha was one of the largest offshore platforms in the UK—at one time
producing 300,000 barrels a day of crude oil and gas. On July 6, a gas leak
from one of the condensate pipes ignited causing several explosions on the
rig. The entire platform was destroyed in the resulting fire—which took
three weeks to control; 167 people lost their lives. In terms of fatalities, the
loss of the Piper Alpha was the worst offshore oil rig disaster in history
1989 In November 1989, typhoon Gay battered the Seacrest drilling ship operat-
ing in the Gulf of Thailand. The ship capsized and eventually sank killing
91 of the 97 crewmembers
2001 Petrobas’ P-36 oil drilling platform experienced back-to-back explosions that
killed 11 of the 175 workers. The platform started to list and then eventu-
ally sank five days later
2005 In July of that year, a support vessel crashed into the Mumbai High North
platform causing an explosion and huge fire. The platform was destroyed
and 22 of the 384 workers on board were killed
2007 On October 23, the Usumacinta Jack-up was positioned alongside the Kab-
101 platform when a storm caused damage that leaked oil and gas which
soon ignited. Twenty-two workers were killed
2009 Seadrill’s West Atlas rig in the Timor Sea began leaking oil in August of that
year. All the workers were evacuated but the oil slick spread over 2300
square miles of ocean. The leak was not plugged for months
2010 In April, a blowout occurred on BPs huge rig, the Deepwater Horizon, oper-
ating off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. The platform burned
for 36 h before sinking. Eleven crewmembers died and many more were seri-
ously injured. Over the next three months, about 4 million barrels of crude
oil spewed into the sea. Environmental damage was massive, widespread,
and long lasting. BP eventually paid damages of close to 20 billion dollars
2010 Also in the Gulf of Mexico and just a few months later, Mariner Energy’s
Vermillion Oil Rig 380 exploded and burned. All the crewmembers were
rescued
2012 Operating just six miles off the coast Nigeria, Chevron Nigeria’s rig experi-
enced an explosion and fire in January 2012. Several crewmembers were
killed. The environmental impact was never fully investigated or reported
2015 Another Petrobas oil rig exploded off the Brazilian coast—killing five work-
ers and injuring more than 25 others
2015 A fire broke out in a subsea pipeline of the Gunashli oil field in Azerbaijan
that quickly spread to multiple wells. Ten workers were killed, 20 were
missing, and nine were seriously injured
Source Offshore Technology

162
M. J. Bush
The Macondo Well Disaster

On April 20, 2010, operations were underway on the Deepwater Horizon
drilling rig which was stationed about 80 km from the coast of Louisiana in
the Gulf of Mexico. BP was the main operator and lease holder responsible
for the design of the well; Transocean was the drilling contractor that owned
and operated the platform. On the day of the accident, the crew was com-
pleting temporary abandonment of the well so it could be left in a safe con-
dition until a production unit could return later to extract the oil and gas.
The abandonment work was supposed to plug the well. But a cement bar-
rier intended to seal the oil and gas had not been correctly installed at the
bottom of the well. Personnel misinterpreted the results of a test to assess the
integrity of the cement plug, leading them to believe that the well had been
properly sealed. It was not.
The crew started to remove drilling mud from the well in preparation for
the installation of an additional cement barrier. At the base of the well on
the seabed was a blowout preventer, called the BOP. The BOP was designed
to shut and close the well automatically in the event of a blowout.
Removing the drilling mud after the pressure test allowed oil and gas to
flow past the failed cement barrier up to the rig. This flow continued for
almost an hour and was not immediately detected by the crew. The BOP
did not activate. Eventually, the oil and gas blew out onto the rig. The crew
acted immediately to manually close the blowout preventer. But oil and gas
had already flowed past the BOP and continued to gush onto the rig, finally
igniting and then exploding. An automatic emergency response system
designed to shear drill pipe passing through the BOP and seal the well did
not activate successfully.
Eleven crewmembers were killed by the explosions and 17 more were
seriously injured. The fire was catastrophic, and after burning fiercely for
36 hours the drilling rig toppled over and sank. Figure 4.5 captures the cata-
strophic scale of the explosion and fire.47
The oil spill was the largest offshore spill in US history. Unconstrained by
the blowout protector, crude oil continued to flow from the well for 87 days
before the well was finally closed. Over 130 million gallons of crude oil
spewed into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico fouling 1300 miles of shore-
line along five states.48
The northern Gulf coast is home to 22 species of marine mammals,
including manatees in coastal seagrasses, and dolphins and whales in estu-
arine, nearshore, and offshore habitats—all of which were contaminated
with oil. The disaster contributed to the largest and longest marine mammal
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163
Fig. 4.5 The Deepwater Horizon oil rig on fire in the Gulf of Mexico (Source US
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board)
mortality event ever recorded in the Gulf of Mexico. For instance,

bottlenose dolphins exhibited reduced survival and reproductive success in
the years following the spill, leading to a 50% decline in the population.49
Oil Refineries
One part of the petroleum supply system that doesn’t always get looked at
closely is the oil refinery itself—which is a complex petrochemical plant pro-
cessing large quantities of crude oil. Accidents are infrequent in large pet-
rochemical plants, but oil refineries produce considerable amounts of air
pollution and toxic waste.
Large petrochemical plants and oil refineries process liquid and gas-phase
hydrocarbons at high temperatures and pressures. Leaks are inevitable—and
frequent. In the US, Canada, and Europe, oil refineries are strictly regulated,
but it is technically impossible to reduce emissions to zero. In the USA, in
2015 the petroleum industry, primarily the refineries, released more toxic
emissions than the electric utilities sector.50
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M. J. Bush
A typical refinery generates approximately 10–15 gallons of wastewater

for every barrel of oil processed. This wastewater is treated on site so that the
final effluent meets regulatory standards. But removing the solids and sus-
pended material from wastewater produces a secondary solid waste stream.
Slurry waste from refineries include tank bottoms, slop oil, spent cata-
lysts, filter cake from water treatment, and numerous other solid or sludge
wastes.51 There is no other place to put them but in a holding pond on site.
But it’s the air pollution that most affects communities close to the
refineries. In 2015, there were reportedly 142 large refineries in the US
and about 6 million people living within 3 miles of them.52 The main
compounds released to the air from refineries are called Volatile Organic
Compounds (VOCs)—consisting mostly of benzene, toluene, ethylben-
zene, and xylene—all of which are considered to be carcinogenic to some
degree, particularly benzene. Then there is particulate matter, nitrogen
oxides, carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulphide, and sulphur dioxide—all
of which are noxious air pollutants with a significant impact on human
health.
Every refinery has a different emissions profile so precise data on
individual refinery emissions are hard to come by. In Canada, the 17
refineries operating in 2013 reportedly emitted on average 430 tonnes of
VOCs. But one refinery, the 130,000 bbl./day Co-op refinery in Regina
released 4229 tonnes of VOCs in the same year—almost 10 times more
than the average.53
In recent years there has been an increasing focus on environmental jus-
tice—the recognition that the health impacts of the pollution produced by
chemical and petrochemical plants fall disproportionately on poor commu-
nities—which, in the USA, are very often communities of colour.
As an example, take the case of the city of Port Arthur in Texas. The city
is home to two large oil refineries: the Motiva refinery in the northeast (the
largest oil refinery in America), and the Valero refinery to the west, with a
combined throughput capacity of more than 900,000 bbl./day. The Valero
refinery borders west Port Arthur, a predominantly Afro-American commu-
nity with several complexes of low-income public housing that are located
right on the refinery fence. Like all oil refineries, the petrochemical plant
pollutes the air with emissions of carcinogenic VOCs such as benzene; as
well as carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide. The EPA ranks Jefferson
county among the worst nationally for emissions known to cause cancer,
birth defects, and reproductive disorders—and Port Arthur is near the top of
the list of offending cities.54 The Manchester neighbourhood adjacent to the
4 Carbon Chaos
165
Valero refinery has been called the most polluted community in the entire
US.55
It is notoriously hard to prove cause (pollution) and effect (health
impacts) in these circumstances. But anyone who has been in the vicinity
of an oil refinery knows the smell. There’s no mistaking it. The smell comes
from the vaporous organic chemicals tinged with a dash of sulphur; the
burning sensation in the nose and throat comes from the sulphur dioxide;
and the asthma attack is triggered by the ozone.
Although oil refinery fires and explosions are infrequent, when they
occur, they are often catastrophic. In June 2019, a fire broke out in the
Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refining Complex, a large crude oil refin-
ery on the east coast of the US. The resulting explosions sent a fireball high
into the night sky and rocked buildings for miles around. Four people were
injured but all survived. This was reportedly the second fire in the refinery
that year.56 Refinery fires always produce large emissions of a toxic slew of
hydrocarbon vapours, black carbon, and VOCs. These emissions may be of
short duration, but nearby communities are hugely exposed to the health
impacts of these chemicals. In the case of the Philadelphia explosions, an
alkylation unit using hydrofluoric acid was destroyed. This chemical is
extremely toxic and corrosive and was almost certainly released as hydrogen
fluoride gas during and after the explosion.
It’s not just the combustion of coal that releases mercury into the atmos-
phere and into the food chain. Although petroleum contains less mercury
than coal, it is still a fossil fuel, and all fossil fuels contain mercury.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, petrochemical plants like oil refineries may have
serious technical difficulties when disrupted by extreme weather. In August
2017, Hurricane Harvey flooded several chemical plants and oil refineries
in the Houston area, and as the refineries shut down or went to a standby
status, one result was the emergency release of excess amounts of gaseous
hydrocarbons as engineers struggled to cope with the situation. As the oper-
ation switched to a circulation mode, the Motiva refinery was forced to flare
hydrocarbon gases that could not be stored.57
At about the same time, the Arkema chemical plant in Crosby lost power
and could not continue to refrigerate highly flammable chemicals that even-
tually exploded and caused a fire that burned for days. The town of Crosby
was evacuated because of the risk of further explosions, and because the
smoke from the fire was extremely toxic—as it always is from any fire in a
chemical plant or oil refinery.
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M. J. Bush
During the same storm, the ExxonMobil refinery in Baytown was dam-
aged and reportedly released pollutants, and two storage tanks holding
crude oil burst into flames outside of Port Arthur after lightning struck the
Karbuhn Oil Company facility.58 Over in Manchester, the Valero refinery
leaked benzene and other volatile hydrocarbons into the air when a stor-
age tank’s roof failed. According to one report, the power was out and the
weather was sweltering hot, so many residents kept their windows and doors
open increasing their exposure to the carcinogenic vapours.59
In Galena Park, a tank farm run by Magellan Midstream Partners was ini-
tially reported to the Coast Guard as having leaked 42,000 gallons of gaso-
line. Eleven days later, Magellan reported that the leak was 10 times larger:
the amount of gasoline spilled was closer to 460,000 gallons.60
None of these incidents in the Houston area was considered by the
authorities to be particularly severe, and all were finally brought under con-
trol. But these events highlight the fact that large chemical plants and oil
refineries are highly vulnerable to extreme weather. Everyone knew that
Hurricane Harvey was coming. Torrential rain had been forecast and prepa-
rations made. But shutting down an oil refinery is complicated. It was una-
voidable that some hydrocarbon liquids and gases would need to be released
into the environment.
But by far the worst damage to petrochemical plants and oil refineries was
caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This hurricane was the most destruc-
tive natural disaster in US history.
The hurricane caused at least ten oil spills from refineries and other pet-
rochemical plants, releasing the same quantity of oil as some of the worst oil
spills in US history. In total, more than 7.4 million gallons of oil and petro-
leum poured into local waterways.61
Oil Sands
Canada’s oil sands resources exist in three major deposits in Alberta:
Athabasca, Cold Lake, and Peace River. The oil sands are the third largest oil
reserves in the world after Venezuela and Saudi Arabia: in 2016 the remain-
ing proven reserves were estimated at 165.4 billion barrels. That’s more than
three times the total proven oil reserves located in the USA.
The oil sands underlie about 142,000 km2 of land, but only about 3% of
this area, roughly 4800 km2 can be mined—the remaining oil sands are too
4 Carbon Chaos
167
deep. Production in 2016 was running at about 2.5 million barrels a day,62
and expected to rise to 3 million barrels a day before the end of 2018.63
The oil sands are a naturally occurring mixture of sand, clay or other
minerals, water and bitumen—a heavy and extremely viscous oil which is
more like tar. The Athabasca deposit, the largest, is mined from the sur-
face. Most other bitumen is produced in situ—meaning drilling down to
the bitumen, treating it to reduce its viscosity, and then pumping it up to
the surface.
Surface mining results in very substantial amounts of tailings. In a real
sense, this form of oil sands extraction is more like a coal mine that an oil
drilling platform.
The mammoth size of the oil sands tailing ponds exceeds the size of any
other tailing ponds or impoundments anywhere on the planet. The largest
impoundment—the Mildred Lake settling basin, is reportedly the world’s
largest dam in terms of the volume of material used for its construction.
In 2017, there were 20 oil sands tailing ponds in northern Alberta holding
approximately 340 billion gallons of toxic wastewater.64 The total area of
tailing ponds in 2017 was estimated as 220 square kilometres.65
The ponds hold water, clay, sand and residual bitumen. The sand slowly
settles and the surface water evaporates, but the layer in between, called the
Mature Fine Tailings (MTF), is like a gel. It stays put and resists drying—for
decades. It can take more than 30 years for the MTF layer to solidify suffi-
ciently for the land to be restored.66
Every year, an estimated 200,000 birds land in the vicinity of the oil sands
mining areas including the tailing ponds. In 2009, 1600 ducks died after
landing on a Syncrude tailing pond—leading to a record fine of $3 million.
So to scare away the birds, the companies deck out the tailing ponds with
bird cannons, equipment that produces radar-activated shrieks that mimic
attacking falcons, and scarecrows perched above the surface.
The oil sands companies are required by law to restore the land after they
move out—a requirement that is estimated to cost as much as $130 billion.
The companies are now trying out a least-cost clean-up approach called
water capping.
The tailings slurry is pumped into a mined-out pit and covered with fresh
water from a nearby river or reservoir. The idea is that the toxic tailings settle
to the bottom of the newly created lake, and over time it becomes a healthy
ecosystem capable of supporting fish, aquatic plants and wildlife. That’s the
plan.
168
M. J. Bush
Water capping is relatively cheap—which is why it is favoured by the oil

sands companies. Since 2016 four companies have informed the Alberta
Energy Regulator (AER) that they intend to use water capping—despite the
fact that the AER has not yet approved the technology. Eight water-capped
lakes storing tailings have been proposed.
Some scientists regard the concept as a fantasy, while others say that water
capping may at least stabilise the tailing and make them less hazardous to
birds and other wildlife—but this may take years, and no-one is really sure if
the technique is going to work.67
None of these lakes is going to be leak proof. Seepage is slow but contin-
uous and will eventually contaminate groundwater. Findings from a 2014
study by Environment Canada scientists indicated that oilsands-tainted
groundwater was likely reaching the Athabasca river.
The impact on the livelihoods of local indigenous communities has been
severe. A member of the Fort McMurray First Nation is quoted as saying
“We used to eat fish all the time, but nobody does that anymore”. Trappers
are afraid to eat the animals they catch, fearing that the wildlife may have
drunk contaminated water.68
Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage
The in situ SAGD process was developed in the 1980s at a time when direc-
tional drilling technology was becoming employed in north America. In an
SAGD installation, two horizontal wells are drilled in the oil sands, one very
near the bottom of the formation and the other about five meters above it.
These wells are typically drilled in groups from a central pad and can
extend horizontally for up 1000 meters in any direction. In each well pair,
steam is injected into the upper well and the heated bitumen will start to
drain downwards to the lower well where it is pumped to the surface. SAGD
has high production rates and recovers more than 60% of the oil in place.
Most major Canadian companies now have SAGD projects in production or
under development.
Cyclic Steam Stimulation
This cyclic procedure, often called “huff-and-puff” has been employed by

Imperial Oil at Cold Lake since the 1980s. The well is put through cycles
of steam injection, soak, and production. First steam is injected into a well
at a temperature of about 340 °C for a period of months. Then the well
4 Carbon Chaos
169
is allowed to sit to permit the heat to ‘soak’ into the formation. After this
phase, the hot oil is pumped out of the well for a period of months. Once
the production rate falls off, the well is put through another cycle of injec-
tion soak and production. The CSS method is capable of achieving recovery
rates of around 20 to 25%.69
There is also a solvent process—where hydrocarbon solvents are injected
into the upper well to dilute the bitumen and allow it to flow down to the
lower well.
In situ production has the significant advantage that the waste tailings stream
is smaller than with surface mining. But in 2016, fully half of the oil sands pro-
duction was from surface mining—which requires huge tailing ponds.
Apart from the solvent process, the in situ production processes that
allows deeper deposits of oil to be pumped to the surface require steam—
which is generated by burning natural gas. The amount of greenhouse gases
produced during the extraction and processing of the bitumen is therefore
substantially greater than emissions from more conventional oil production.
Figure 4.6 shows the CO2 emissions associated with the extraction and pro-
cessing of several types of crude oil produced in North America.70
But it’s not only greenhouse gases are emitted from the oil sands sites. A
2016 study led by Environment Canada found that the: “evaporation and
atmospheric oxidation of low-volatility organic vapours from the mined oil sands
material is directly responsible for the majority of the observed secondary organic
aerosol mass. The resultant production rates of 45–84 tonnes per day make the
oil sands one of the largest sources of anthropogenic secondary organic aerosols in
North America.”71
ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ͕ŬŐKϮͬďĂƌƌĞů
ĂŶĂĚĂŽŝůƐĂŶĚƐ
h^ůĂƐŬĂEŽƌƚŚ^ůŽƉĞ
h^ĂŬŬĞŶ;ǁŝƚŚŇĂƌŝŶŐͿ
DĞǆŝĐŽĂŶƚĂƌĞůů
hƐdĞǆĂƐĂŐůĞ&ŽƌĚůĂĐŬK/>ŽŶĞ
h^ĂŬŬĞŶ;ŶŽŇĂƌŝŶŐͿ
Ϭ ϱϬ ϭϬϬ ϭϱϬ ϮϬϬ
Fig. 4.6 Emissions of CO2 from the extraction and processing of crude oil (Source
Pembina Institute, Canada)
170
M. J. Bush
Oil sands are of course a fossil fuel, and where there’s fossil fuels there’s
always mercury. A study in 2014 measured mercury in the spring-time
snowpack in the region of the oil sands. The authors concluded:
Total mercury loads were predominantly particulate-bound… and increased

with proximity to major developments. Methylmercury loads increased in a
similar fashion…suggesting that oil sands developments are a direct source of
methylmercury to local landscapes and water bodies.72
Petcoke
In May 2013, media outlets around Detroit, Michigan, began publishing

articles about large piles of petroleum coke stored along the Detroit river-
front. Called petcoke, it is a black solid composed mainly of carbon with
traces of sulphur, metals, and non-volatile organic compounds.
The coke piled up in Detroit was a by-product of the nearby Marathon
refinery—which was processing heavy crude oils derived in part from
Canadian oil sands. The large piles of black coke, which were clearly visible
from across the river in Windsor, Ontario, triggered local concerns over the
potential impact of the material on human health.
Petcoke is a by-product of the refining of heavy oils and bitumen. High
in carbon but low in hydrogen, it is the final product of thermal decomposi-
tion in the condensation process in hydrocarbon cracking. It has commercial
value because, being mainly carbon, it has a higher heating value than coal,
and is marketed as a fuel or as catalyst coke. Many US oil refineries have
installed coking equipment in order to take advantage of increased supplies
of heavy crude oil from the Athabasca oil sands.73 Petcoke is priced at a dis-
count with respect to coal on commercial markets, and so replaces coal in
many industrial applications.
However, petcoke produces more carbon dioxide than coal when burned.
In terms of CO2 emissions, it’s a dirtier fuel than coal.
So to recap. The exploitation of the Alberta oil sands:
– requires huge tailing ponds, including the largest in North America

– generates the highest greenhouse gas emissions per barrel of oil
– is responsible for one of the largest sources of organic aerosols in North
America
– leads to widespread local methylmercury pollution—a well-known
neurotoxin.
4 Carbon Chaos
171
The massive environmental impact caused by the exploitation and develop-

ment of the Alberta oil sands is quite unlike anything else on the planet.
Hydraulic Fracturing
Natural gas is increasingly being produced by a technology called hydrau-
lic fracturing, or fracking. The technology is particularly widespread in the
USA and Canada where very large quantities of natural gas from shale for-
mations are now produced using this technology.
Approximately 1 million wells have been hydraulically fractured since the
technique was first developed in the late 1940s.74
In 2016, roughly three-quarters of a million wells were producing natural
gas in Canada and the USA—about 200,000 in Canada and 550,000 in the
USA. Not all these wells would have been fracked. But increasingly, natural
gas is being produced from shale and ‘tight’ reservoirs that require hydraulic
fracking to release the gas.75
Shale gas has been produced for decades from geological formations
with natural fractures that allowed economic recovery from shallow vertical
wells producing at low rates over a long period of time. But improvements
in technology and higher gas prices have enabled the large-scale produc-
tion of much deeper shale gas reservoirs. Fracking in shale formations was
pioneered in the Texas Barnett Shale in the late 1990s when two different
technologies: horizontal drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing were
combined. The gas well is drilled vertically from the surface and is then bent
or kicked at a certain depth to penetrate the shale gas layer horizontally.
This allows the wellbore to intersect a much greater part of the reservoir as
well as a greater number of existing natural fractures. The horizontal part of
the well varies in length but may extend out to as much as 3 km from the
wellhead.
Multi-stage fracturing involves injecting a fluid: usually water plus chem-
icals and proppants (which ‘prop open’ the fractures) at extremely high pres-
sure into a shale formation in a number of places (stages) along the wellbore.
This fractures the rock and creates a network of open fractures through
which the gas can flow and be collected.
Figure 4.7 shows a schematic of a shale gas well, illustrating the various
geological strata through which a well is drilled, and the relative depth at
which hydraulic fracturing occurs. Lateral sections (the horizontal part of
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M. J. Bush
Fig. 4.7 Schematic of shale gas well (Source Canadian Society for Unconventional
Resources)
the well) are generally much longer than shown. The inset shows the casings
(the steel tubing) that are inserted into the well and cemented into place.76
Horizontal drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing are not new
or unique to shale gas development. Horizontal drilling has been used in
Canada since the 1980s, primarily to increase heavy oil production, and
hydraulic fracturing has been used extensively since the 1950s.
What is new is the combination of these technologies: the use of greater
amounts of water, sand and chemicals; and the higher injection rates and
pressures employed to fracture a much larger volume of rock.
4 Carbon Chaos
173
The scale of the development is also what differentiates shale gas devel-
opment from conventional gas production. Although both conventional
and shale gas development require the construction of well pads, work
camps, roads, and pipelines—shale gas development requires more of these
activities. Even with multi-well pads, shale gas development will generally
lead to more pads being built and more wells being drilled than would be
needed to produce the same volume of gas from conventional gas reserves in
high-permeability reservoirs.77
Natural gas burns more cleanly than coal or fuel oil. But hydraulic frac-
turing, like all fossil fuel exploration, mining, and production systems, has a
very substantial environmental impact.
First, there is the environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing on surface
and groundwater resources due to pollution by wastewater, the chemicals
used in the injection process, and gas leakage from the wells.
Secondly, there are significant emissions of methane from the wellhead
and gas processing sites; and thirdly, the localized collection and pumping
of the gas to its processing site (the ‘gathering’ pipeline network) carries sub-
stantial risks.
Water Usage
The hydraulic fracturing water cycle can be broken out into five distinct
stages78:
• Water acquisition: the withdrawal of groundwater or surface water to

make hydraulic fracturing fluids;
• Chemical mixing: the mixing of the base fluid (generally water), prop-
pant, and chemicals at the well site to create the fracking fluids;
• Well injection: the high-pressure injection of fracking fluids into the
gas-bearing targeted rock formation;
• Produced water handling: the on-site collection and handling of water
that returns to surface after fracking, and the transportation of produced
water for disposal or reuse;
• Wastewater disposal and reuse: the disposal and reuse of the liquid waste
streams from the well site.
Hydraulic fracturing requires large quantities of water. Some wells in the

US use as much as 7 million gallons per fracture. In British Columbia, frac-
turing can reportedly require as much as 25 million gallons.79 Providing
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M. J. Bush
this amount of water to a wellsite requires hundreds of trips by diesel-engine

tanker trucks transporting water to the site. In the US, each day more than
two billion gallons of water and fracking fluids are injected under high pres-
sure into the ground to facilitate the extraction of oil and gas via fracking or,
after the fracking is finished, to flush the extracted wastewater down more
than 187,500 disposal wells across the US that accept oil and gas waste.80
In principle, a lot of this water could be reused, but the proportion of
water used in fracking that comes from reused wastewater appears to be
low. The EPA report states that the median percentage of the injected fluid
volume that comes from reused wastewater was only 5% between 2008 and
2014.
The impact on local water resources of this level of withdrawal for frack-
ing purposes obviously depends on the local situation. The EPA report iden-
tifies one area in the US: Mountrail County in North Dakota, where the
annual average water use by over 500 wells was about 36% of the total water
use in 2010. The withdrawal of water for hydraulic fracturing is a consump-
tive use of water since some if it will remain in the shale gas formation and
not flow back to the surface. Water use is large compared to conventional
gas production but small relative to the production of conventional oil and
to the production of oil from the oil sands.81
However, the absolute quantities of water withdrawn are often less impor-
tant than the times and rates at which water is extracted. Fracking uses a
lot of water over a short period of time—several days. If several fracking
operations take place sequentially, as they would in a multi-well pad, or con-
currently on different pads, the demand could exceed the local unallocated
supply for that period. Based on the US average of 5 million gallons per
well, a well pad with eight wells could use some 40 million gallons of water
within two to three months.82 A 2018 study of high-volume water with-
drawals for fracking in Arkansas, found that the permitted 12-hour with-
drawal volumes exceeded median streamflow at half of the sites monitored
in June 2017 when stream flows were low.83
But it is the mix of chemicals that are an essential part of the hydraulic
fracturing process that is most alarming. The US Environmental Protection
Agency identified over 1000 chemicals that were reported to have been used
in fracking fluids between 2005 and 2013. A single well will use anywhere
from 4 to 28 chemical additives in a fracking operation. Three chemicals:
methanol, hydrotreated light petroleum distillates, and hydrochloric acid
were used in 65% of the wells reporting to the Fracfocus database.
These chemicals are transported to the well site and stored on site until
they are mixed with the base fluid and proppant and pumped down the
4 Carbon Chaos
175
production well. While the quantities added to the fracking fluid are small,
the amounts stored at the well site are not. Thousands of gallons of chemical
additives can be stored on site for use during the fracking process.84
The chemicals are stored in multiple closed containers and pumped
around the site in hoses and tubing. Spills and leaks are inevitable. The EPA
reported 151 spills of fracking fluid or additives in 11 states between 2006
and 2012. The mean quantity of fluid released was only 420 gallons, but the
largest spill was over 19,000 gallons. Thirteen of these spills polluted local
surface waters. In Pennsylvania, between 2008 and 2013, 10 spills of over
400 gallons that polluted surface waters were documented. The spills ranged
from 3400 gallons to one which was over 224,000 gallons.85
During fracking, a well is subjected to very high pressures. The fracking
fluid is pumped into the well until the targeted rock formation fractures—
the pressure then decreases. Pressures can range from 2000 psi to 12,000 psi.
The well casing, cement, and other well components must be able to with-
stand these pressures so that the fracking fluid can flow to the targeted rock
formation without leaking.
Older wells that are fracked may not be able to withstand the fluid pres-
sure. Older wells may also be fracked at shallower depths, where cement
around the casing may be inadequate or missing. There have been several
documented failures of this type. In one case, the fracking of an inade-
quately cemented well in Bainbridge Township, Ohio, contributed to the
flow of methane into local drinking water resources. In another case, an
inner string of casing burst during fracking of an oil well near Killdeer,
North Dakota, resulting in a release of fracking fluids and formation fluids
that polluted a groundwater resource.86
In rural areas where homes rely on private wells for water, fracking oper-
ations pose a particularly high risk. Pennsylvania regulators have confirmed
at least 260 instances of private well contamination from fracking opera-
tions since 2005. Independent journalists exploring the issue have docu-
mented over 2300 complaints of pollution of private wells in 17 of the 40
Pennsylvania counties where fracking has taken place.87
The integrity of the well is paramount. Mechanical integrity failures
have allowed gases or liquids to move to underground drinking water
resources. Fracking has even occurred within underground drinking water
resources—which obviously rapidly contaminates drinking water wells in
the vicinity.88
After hydraulic fracturing, the injection pressure applied to the well is
released and the direction of flow reverses, causing fluid to flow out of the
well. The fluid that initially returns to the surface after fracking is mostly
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M. J. Bush
fracking fluid and is sometimes called ‘flowback’. The fluid that returns to the
surface during gas production is similar in composition to the fluid naturally
occurring in the targeted rock formation and is typically called ‘produced
water’. Produced water is extremely toxic. It has been found to contain:
• Naturally-occurring organic compounds including benzene, toluene,

ethylbenzene, xylenes, oil and grease;
• Naturally occurring radioactive materials including radium;
• Metals including barium, manganese, iron and strontium;
• Sodium, magnesium and calcium salts (chlorides, bromides, and sulphates);
• Hydraulic fracturing chemicals, additives, and their derivatives.89
Produced water is usually stored in lined surface ponds or tanks before

being either treated, used to fracture another well, or reinjected into a deep
saline formation or, in the US, reinjected into a Class II disposal well. Lined
ponds, even when built with double liners, are rarely free from flaws and can
be expected to eventually leak.90
Spills of produced water have been reported right across the US—ranging
from 1300 to 3800 litres (the median values of several datasets). However,
much larger spills have occurred. In North Dakota there were 12 spills
greater than 21,000 gallons and, in 2015, one huge spill of almost 3 million
gallons. Many of the reported produced water spills contaminated surface
water resources: the EPA reported that 13 of 225 spills polluted local creeks,
ponds, or wetlands. One spill contaminated ground water. A report from
California showed that between 2009 and 2014, 18% of spills impacted
waterways. In yet another incident, pits holding flowback fluids overflowed
in Kentucky in 2007, contaminating the Acorn Fork Creek.91
Produced water cannot be treated in typical municipal wastewater treat-
ment plants because the high salinity disrupts the activated sludge process.
In addition, the naturally occurring radioactive elements brought to the sur-
face in the produced water may be absorbed by the sludge or simply flow
through the treatment plant and be discharged into the receiving waters.
Hence, deep-well injection is generally the industry’s preferred option when
the geology allows for this method of disposal.
Methane Emissions
Shale gas is mainly methane—which is a powerful greenhouse gas; much

more powerful than carbon dioxide in contributing to climate change and a
warming planet.
4 Carbon Chaos
177
In contrast to CO2, which can linger in the atmosphere for decades,

methane breaks down fairly quickly—within 9 to 10 years. However,
the impact of CO2 on climate change has generally been measured over a
period of a 100 years. This is the convention which has been adopted by the
IPCC—and which has been followed by many climate scientists.
If the same timeframe of 100 years is used for estimating the impact of
methane, the gas would be considered to be about 25 times stronger than
CO2 in inducing global warming.
However, if a more realistic timeframe is used for methane—a shorter
period which reflects its actual lifetime in the atmosphere, the impact of
methane on global warming would be calculated as being much stronger:
about 86 times as strong as CO2. This is important because the climate
impact of methane as a greenhouse gas is measured in units of CO2 equiva-
lent—written as CO2e or CO2eq.
The smaller emission factor tends to minimize the impact of methane
as a greenhouse gas. Moreover, methane is constantly accumulating in the
atmosphere as Fig. 2.5 shows. The global warming potential (GWP) of
methane should be set at the upper level—a level that recognizes its substan-
tial contribution to the global warming effects of atmospheric greenhouse
gases.92
Natural gas is being touted as a clean fuel—and it is certainly cleaner
than coal in terms of its emissions of carbon dioxide when fuelling a power
plant to generate electricity. Natural gas also produces much less particulate
air pollution, lower levels of nitrogen oxides (which can lead to the ground
level ozone), and less sulphur dioxide than coal. Emissions of vapor-phase
mercury are also insignificant—if the mercury is removed during up-stream
processing. In other words, natural gas burns relatively cleanly.
But petroleum and gas processing systems can release substantial quantities
of methane into the atmosphere. If hydraulic fracturing and the production
and processing of shale gas release significant quantities of methane, the
advantages of natural gas over coal quickly disappear.
Both methane and carbon dioxide are potentially released during fracking
when:
• Emissions of methane and carbon dioxide occur during drilling and well
completion, mostly due to venting and flaring;
• Emissions occur from plays where the gas contains significant amounts of
carbon dioxide that has to be removed before the gas can be brought to
market;
178
M. J. Bush
• Fugitive emissions occur during production, processing, gathering, and

transport to market;
• Emissions occur from well seeps after abandonment of the well.
These are the emissions from an operational fracking well. But just setting
up the well pad and installing all the heavy equipment is an energy inten-
sive undertaking. Most of the drilling, pumping, and hydraulic fracturing is
driven by diesel engines. The carbon dioxide and other pollutants produced
by these diesel engines are seldom counted.93
There have been many attempts to accurately measure methane emissions
from hydraulically fractured shale gas sites. The results are variable, incon-
sistent, and often contradictory. This may be because methane leaks from
frack sites are likely to be sporadic, intermittent, and to some extent unpre-
dictable. Surveys conducted at different times of the year and at different
stages of the fracking process cycle will give different results. In addition,
airborne releases are difficult to attribute to a specific site.
There is, however, absolutely no doubt that the hydraulic fracking of shale
produces significant emissions of methane—a powerful greenhouse gas.
Both satellite and ground measurements have shown that methane emis-
sions from the US are responsible for between 30 and 60% of the upsurge
in global atmospheric methane concentrations. Most of this excess meth-
ane represents fugitive emissions from American oil and gas operations.
Moreover, the widely touted claim that the US fracking boom has con-
tributed to declines in carbon dioxide emissions in the US has been con-
tradicted by research showing that almost all of the reductions in CO2
emissions between 2007 and 2009 were the result of economic recession
rather than coal-to-gas fuel switching.94
The situation is no better in Canada. In October 2017, a team of
researchers measured regional airborne methane and ethane emissions from
the Alberta oil and gas fields in Canada. They compared their results to
emissions report by the industries themselves and found large discrepancies.
Much more methane was being released than reported—mostly from fugi-
tive leaks that were not being measured at all or from episodes of unreported
venting.95
A detailed peer-reviewed study in 2015 by Robert Howarth at Cornell
University concluded that when methane emissions from shale gas pro-
duction were accounted for, shale gas is not quite the clean fuel many
proponents claim. Yes it burns cleaner. But the upstream production pro-
cesses—starting with drilling the well—leak a powerful greenhouse gas into
the atmosphere: methane.
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179
Fig. 4.8 Greenhouse gas emissions from shale gas compared to other fuels (Source
Robert Howarth, Cornell University)
Figure 4.8 shows the greenhouse gas emissions of shale gas, conventional

natural gas, oil and coal in units of grams per unit of heat produced. The
darker section indicates direct and indirect emission of carbon dioxide. The
lighter section shows methane emissions in equivalent amounts of CO2
using a GWP of 86.96
Figure 4.8 clearly shows that greenhouse gas emissions for shale gas pro-
duction and combustion are higher than for conventional natural gas, diesel
fuel, and even coal. The difference is due to the release of methane during
the production, gathering, and processing of the shale gas.
Gathering the Gas
There is an additional source of fugitive methane that is not counted in the

analysis of the emissions from the fracking well site.
Raw natural gas commonly exists in mixtures with other hydrocarbons—
ethane, propane, butane, and pentanes. It may also contain water vapor,
hydrogen sulphide, carbon dioxide, helium, nitrogen, and other com-
pounds. These compounds must be removed by processing the raw gas in
order to produce the higher-quality gas provided to the consumer.
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M. J. Bush
While some of the needed processing can be accomplished at or near the

well head, the final processing of natural gas generally takes places at a pro-
cessing plant. The extracted natural gas is transported to these processing
plants through a network of gathering pipelines, which are small diameter,
lower pressure pipes. A complex gathering system can consist of thousands
of miles of pipes. In 2017, there were reportedly over 380,000 km of
onshore gathering pipelines in the US.97 In Canada, the gathering pipeline
network consisted of about 250,000 km of lines in 2014.98
Who regulates this system of gathering pipelines? In the US, apparently
no-one.
However, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
is said to be working on it. In their 2017 brochure “Gathering Pipelines
FAQs”, the PHMSA writes:
PHMSA is currently considering regulating these gathering pipelines. The

lines being put into service in the various shale plays like Marcellus, Utica,
Barnett and Bakken are generally of much larger diameter and operating at
a higher pressure than traditional rural gas gathering pipelines, increasing the
concern for safety of the environment and the people near operations.99
In Canada, where the gathering, feeder, and transmission pipeline infra-

structure stretches to more than 375,000 km, the NEB regulated only about
73,000 km of pipelines in 2014. And most if not all of those regulated
pipelines would have been the large-diameter transmission lines—not the
smaller-diameter but more extensive gathering pipelines.
Figure 4.9 shows the different components of Canada’s pipeline
infrastructure.100
Apart from the inevitable small leaks of fugitive methane from the pipes,
flanges and valves, gas pipelines accidents, when they occur, are often cat-
astrophic—because the gas is so explosive. When a poorly maintained nat-
ural gas distribution pipeline exploded in San Bruno, California in 2010,
eight people died and 38 homes were destroyed. In 2012, a 10-inch natu-
ral gas gathering pipeline exploded near Alice, Texas. Luckily, there were no
injuries.101
Perhaps the most spectacular disaster occurred in Massachusetts in 2018
when over-pressurized natural gas lines caused multiple explosions and fires
in 70 homes in the towns of Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover, on
the evening of September 13. One resident was killed and 10 others injured.
Local news dispatches from the scene show homes bursting into flames with
little warning.102
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Fig. 4.9 Canada’s pipeline infrastructure in 2014 (Source Natural Resources Canada)
With the rapid expansion of shale gas fracking sites in the US and
Canada, the network of unregulated gathering pipelines spreading out from
the frack sites can be expected to increase just as rapidly. It’s also worth not-
ing that because the natural gas has not yet been fully processed, the gas in
the gathering pipelines is odourless—the odorizing agent that are obligatory
in household gas so that leaks can be more easily detected has not yet been
added. If there is a leak, the invisible and odourless gas cannot be detected
unless the hissing leak can be heard—or until it explodes.
The largest methane leak in US history occurred in 2015 when the Aliso
Canyon storage facility in southern California released more than 100,000
metric tons of methane into the air of the San Fernando valley over a four-
month period in October 2015. The plume of gas was visible from space. More
than 8000 families in the vicinity were evacuated and relocated; thousands
were sickened, and two public schools were closed. The cause of the blowout
was determined to be a cracked well casing and the lack of a shut-off valve.103
The most detailed study of the health and environmental impacts of
hydraulic fracking is the 2018 report by the Concerned Health Professionals
of New York and Physicians for Social Responsibility—a hugely detailed
study of all the problems associated with fracking, the conclusions of the
physicians are damning:
Altogether, findings to date from scientific, medical, and journalistic investi-

gations combine to demonstrate that fracking poses significant threats to air,
water, health, public safety, climate stability, seismic stability, community
cohesion and long-term economic vitality.104
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M. J. Bush
A technology potentially this harmful would only be acceptable if substan-

tial and over-riding socio-economic benefits were to be derived from its
deployment—and if this technology was the only way to achieve them. But
that is most definitely not the case.
Railway Carbon
Pipelines are costly to build, and their approval and construction nearly
always creates conflict with communities that are frequently fiercely opposed
to pipelines running across land and waterways that would be catastrophi-
cally affected by spills of oil or the release of natural gas.
The technical and legal difficulties involved in constructing pipelines, the
length of time involved, and the huge cost, has induced many fossil fuel
companies to move fossil fuels by train. The tracks are already laid—only the
coal cars and the tanker cars have to be procured, coupled up, and readied
for operation.
Coal in North America is conveyed in uncovered rail cars. It’s hardly
surprising that during transport substantial amounts of coal dust and frag-
ments are swept off the surface of the coal. Each car in a coal train may lose
between 250 and 800 kg of coal dust over the course of its journey, accord-
ing to a study by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway. This means
a typical 125-car coal train could release over 100 tonnes of dust in a sin-
gle trip. And coal dust, just like coal, contains traces of heavy metals and of
course the ubiquitous neurotoxin: mercury.
Chemical surfactants sprayed onto the coal reduce the amount of coal
dust lost from the cars—but they are also potentially a contaminant of sur-
face water and soil.
Coal dust has an unusual characteristic as it settles on the rail ballast—
the crushed rock that anchors the crossties and the steel rails themselves.
The coal dust clogs the spaces in the rail ballast and turns it into a solid
tar-like substance when wet. This effect apparently decreases the stability of
the track, and this has led to some spectacular derailments. In 2012, there
were seven coal train derailments in the US. In July 2012, three coal trains
derailed in the same week.105 On the July 4, 2012, 31 rail cars laden with
coal derailed in the Chicago suburb of Northwood. The cars toppled onto
a road bridge that collapsed—killing two people traveling in a car passing
underneath.106
Just a few weeks later, on 21 August 2012, an eastbound CSX coal train
derailed the first 21 cars while crossing the railroad bridge over Main Street
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in Ellicott City, Maryland. The train consisted of two locomotives and 80

loaded coal cars weighing almost 10,000 tons. Seven of the derailed cars
fell into a public parking area that was below and north of the tracks. The
remainder of the derailed cars overturned and spilled coal along the north
side of the tracks. Two women who just happened to be walking under the
bridge at the time were killed.107
More recently in 2014, four coal train derailments were reported by the
US Safety Transportation Board. On January 17, a CSX coal train derailed
in Dunnellon, Florida; two days later a Union Pacific coal train derailed
near Caledonia, Wisconsin; on January 31, a Norfolk Southern coal train
derailed near Jewell Ridge, Virginia; and on May 1, a CSX coal train
derailed in Bowie, Maryland.108
Canada’s rail network is the third largest worldwide and transports the
fourth largest volume of goods. Canadian railways move about 70% of the
country’s surface goods (including 40% of its exports) and carry over 70
million people.
In 2015, 1200 rail accidents were reported to the Canadian Transport
Safety Board, a 3% decrease from the 2014 total of 1238 but an 8% increase
from the 2010 to 2014 average of 1115.
Approximately one third of the trains involved in rail accidents in
2015 were freight trains. Not all these freight train accidents were coal
trains—the statistics do not break out the details. But it’s a reasonable
assumption, given the huge amount of coal that moves by rail in Canada,
that many of these approximately 400 freight train accidents involved coal
trains.109
Apart from the accidents, moving coal by train always spreads coal dust
that pollutes the air, and which has a health impact on communities living
near the tracks. You can’t move coal around without creating coal dust.
Coal trains also produce emissions from the diesel locomotives—some-
times 2 or 3 coupled in a single train—that are a significant source of air
pollution.
But the worst-case scenarios are reserved for the oil trains.
The transport of oil by train developed around 2010 as a way of avoiding
congested pipelines and moving crude oil from the Bakken field to refineries
on the US Gulf coast. Since then the practice has taken off—both in the US
and in Canada.
Oil trains have several advantages over pipelines: flexibility, relatively low
investment and permitting costs, and a relatively short lead time.
North American rail shipments of crude oil and petroleum products have
been increasing rapidly. US crude oil carloads went from less than 10,000
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M. J. Bush
in 2008 to about 400,000 in 2013. The volume of crude oil shipped by rail
that year was estimated at about 680,000 bbl./day—which was about 10%
of US crude oil production.
Canadian crude and petroleum products rail shipments also increased
strongly—up 150% from 2009 to 2012. Rail shipments of crude and petro-
leum represented 5% and 9% of total rail shipments in the US and Canada
respectively in 2012.110
Increasing volumes of crude oil transported by rail raises serious concerns
about safety. A review conducted by the International Energy Agency found
that there are more accidents with rail cars than pipelines—but that the
quantities of oil spilled are smaller.
In other words, in terms of barrel-miles of oil transported, trains have
more accidents but pipelines spills are larger. In fact, the risk of a train acci-
dent is six times higher than that of a pipeline—but pipelines spill three
times as much oil.111
What these numbers don’t tell you though, is that oil train accidents are
not about the spills.
They are about the fires and catastrophic explosions.
In June 2016 a unit train carrying crude oil on the Union Pacific line
derailed near Mosier, Oregon, USA. Fourteen cars of the 96-car train
derailed; four caught fire and burned explosively. The train was carry-
ing crude oil from the Bakken field from Eastport, Idaho to Tacoma,
Washington through the Columbia River Gorge. Crude oil from the Bakken
field is more volatile than most crudes and is therefore more likely to explo-
sively ignite in the case of an accident.
Figure 4.10 shows the scene just after the accident. The extraordinary
length of the train is evident—as is the proximity of the railway to nearby
houses.112 No-one was injured; but given how close the accident was to the
town’s residences and to a road bridge—this was a lucky escape.
Crude oil from the Bakken field was also the cargo in an oil train acci-
dent and conflagration in November 2013, when a 90-car train carrying 2.9
million gallons of Bakken crude from Amory, Mississippi, to a refinery in
Walnut Hill, Florida derailed and exploded in Aliceville, Alabama. Twenty
cars full of oil and two of the three locomotives jumped the tracks. At least
11 of the railcars at one point were aflame.113
Just a couple of weeks before this accident, in October, a Canadian
National oil train derailed in Alberta, Canada. Thirteen of the cars carry-
ing crude oil and liquified petroleum gas jumped the tracks. One LPG car
exploded and three others burst in flame. Residents were evacuated from the
nearby town of Gainford. It was reportedly the third CN derailment in as
many weeks.114
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Fig. 4.10 Oil train derailment and fire in Mosier, Oregon, USA (Source Paloma Ayala)
Just a few weeks later, on December 30, 2013, a train collision in

Casselton, North Dakota, 20 miles outside of Fargo, forced the evacuation
of half the town’s residents after 400,000 gallons of oil spilled and 18 oil cars
exploded into flame.115
In Canada the same year, by far the most catastrophic oil train accident
occurred in Lac Megantic, Quebec.
On the evening of July 5, 2013, at about 11 p.m., a Montreal, Maine &
Atlantic (MMA) train arrived at Nantes, Quebec, carrying 2 million gal-
lons of crude oil in 72 tank cars. The oil had come from the Bakken field in
North Dakota and was bound for Saint John, New Brunswick.
After arriving in Nantes, the locomotive engineer parked the train on a
descending gradient on the main track—a replacement engineer was sched-
uled to take over the train the next morning.
The engineer had applied hand brakes on all five locomotives and two
other cars and shut down all but the lead locomotive. Railway rules require
that hand brakes alone, without the action of air brakes, be capable of hold-
ing a train stationary. That night, however, the locomotive air brakes were
left on, meaning that the train was being held by a combination of hand
brakes and air brakes.
This error would not have proved disastrous—except that the lead
locomotive had mechanical problems which led to a small fire igniting in the
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M. J. Bush
turbocharger of the diesel engine. This fire was quickly extinguished, but the
electric circuits of the lead locomotive were shut down as a precaution by
the local firefighters called to the scene.
Without electricity, the compressor powering the air brakes stopped.
The air brakes were on—but with the compressor turned off, the air
brakes slowly lost their braking power. The hand brakes could not hold the
train on the inclined track. At about 1 am, the train slowly began to move.
It picked up speed as it rolled downhill towards Lac Megantic, seven
miles away—reaching a top speed of 65 mph. Fifteen minutes later, the train
derailed near the centre of the town
Almost all of the 63 derailed tank cars were damaged, and many were
ripped apart. About 6 million litres of oil were spilled, and almost imme-
diately many of the damaged cars exploded. Much of the downtown core
of the town was destroyed. Forty-seven people were killed, and 2000 peo-
ple were forced from their homes.116 Figure 4.11 shows the accident scene a
short while after the fire was extinguished.
As a result of the accident, the MMA railroad company went bankrupt—
unable to pay the estimated $180 million in damages and penalties likely to
be imposed. Canadian regulators subsequently discovered that that the com-
pany carried only $25 million in liability insurance.117
In 2018, it was reported that new rail tracks would be laid bypassing
the town. The construction will cost $133 million. Several other towns in
Fig. 4.11 The Lac Megantic scene after the July 2013 accident (Source Transportation
Safety Board of Canada)
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Canada are pressing to have freight trains rerouted around their centres.
But laying new train tracks is expensive. In Saskatoon, where the
government wants to relocate Canadian Pacific tracks, the cost could reach
almost $600 million.118
In Canada, the oil-train accidents continued—although not as cata-
strophically as the disaster in Lac Megantic.
Trains operated by Canadian National derailed along main lines 57 times
in 2014—up 73% from 2013. At least 27 of the domestic derailments were
caused by track problems.119
On March 7, 2015, a CN oil train loaded with crude oil was heading
east near Gogama, Ontario. It was equipped with two locomotives hauling
94 tank cars—over 6000 feet long and weighing 14,355 tons. At 2.42 in
the morning while traveling at 43 mph, the automatic braking system was
activated. The crew looked back to see a fireball about 700 feet behind the
locomotives. Thirty-nine of the 94 cars had derailed. The engineers detached
the locomotives and the first five cars still on the rails and pulled clear.
The fire burned for 3 days and destroyed 700 feet of track. No-one was
injured.120
On 22 June 2018, a train carrying Canadian crude oil derailed in Iowa
releasing an estimate 230,000 gallons of oil into a flooded river. About
30 of the tank cars ended up in the water; about half of them leaked even
though they were the new stronger DOT-117R tank cars.121 Again no-one
was injured and the oil did not ignite. But the risk of catastrophic accidents
when oil is conveyed by train is clearly significant.122
The Pipeline Wars

There are essentially two reasons why new pipelines are opposed by many
communities and environmental groups. The first reason, and the most
common one, is the simple fact that pipelines, particularly oil pipelines and
those carrying diluted bitumen, pose a real threat to the environment and to
the communities whose livelihoods depend on local and regional ecosystems
and the services those ecosystems provide. Although accidents are not fre-
quent, they are certainly not rare. We have seen that the number of pipeline
incidents in the US and Canada is shockingly high, so clearly this means
of transporting hydrocarbon liquids and gases under pressure and over long
distances carries significant risks—both to the environment and to the com-
munities who live close to the pipelines.
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M. J. Bush
The second reason is linked to the concern about climate change and
the international agreement forged in Paris in 2015 to try and limit global
warming to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.123 In order for
this target to be achieved, the consumption of fossil fuels has to be sub-
stantially reduced, and the deployment of inexhaustible renewable energy
technologies dramatically increased. Ramping up the capacity of the oil
and natural gas supply and distribution system by building new pipelines
or expanding existing ones therefore runs counter to international efforts to
achieve the Paris Agreement targets and curb global warming. Effectively, it
just intensifies the global climate crisis.
Standing Rock
The fiercest conflict occurred in North Dakota in 2016 where the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe strongly opposed the construction of the Dakota Access
Pipeline (DAPL)—a pipeline that carries oil from the Bakken oil fields in
western North Dakota to southern Illinois. One curious aspect is that
the pipeline was rerouted near the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation after
the original route close to the state capital Bismarck was rejected due to it
reportedly being deemed too risky for the city’s water supplies.124 However,
this report is disputed, and the more likely reason that the route was
changed appears to be that the Bismarck route would have been 17 km
longer with more road crossings, and waterbody and wetland crossings.
The Bismarck route also would have crossed an area considered by federal
pipeline regulators as a “high consequence area,” which is an area deemed
to have the most significant adverse consequences in the event of a pipeline
spill.125
The pipeline now runs beneath the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers
as well as under part of Lake Oahe near the Standing Rock Indian
Reservation—presumably an area of lower “consequence” in the event of a
spill. Many of the Standing Rock tribe believe that the pipeline poses a seri-
ous threat to the region’s clean water and to sacred ancient burial grounds.
In April 2016, Standing Rock Sioux elder LaDonna Brave Bull Allard and
several grandchildren established a camp as a centre for spiritual resistance to
the pipeline. Over the summer of 2016, the camp grew to thousands of peo-
ple and drew widespread national and international attention.
The conflict between protesters, police and construction workers grew
increasingly confrontational and violent. In September 2016, construc-
tion workers bulldozed a section of land the tribe had identified as sacred
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ground, and when protesters entered the area security workers brought in
dogs which attacked several protesters and a horse. The incident was filmed
and viewed by several million people on YouTube and other social media.
The following month, armed soldiers and police with riot gear and military
equipment cleared an encampment that was directly in the pipeline’s path,
and in November 2016, police used water cannon on protesters in freezing
weather—an aggressive response that drew widespread condemnation.126
In December 2016, under the Obama administration, the US Army
Corps of Engineers was denied an easement for the construction of the
pipeline under the Missouri river pending an environmental impact assess-
ment of this part of the route. However, a few months later, newly-elected
President Trump issued an executive order which authorised the Army
Corps of Engineers to proceed, and which cancelled the call for an environ-
mental impact assessment. The pipeline was finally completed in April 2017
and oil was flowing a month later. During the year-long protest, almost 300
people were injured and over 480 arrested.
Canada’s Pipelines
It should come as no surprise that the Canadian Association of Petroleum

Producers (CAPP), an industry association, is convinced that connecting
western Canada’s crude oil supplies to global markets is an absolute priority
and firmly in the national interest. Over the last decade, several pipelines
across Canada have been proposed by the petroleum industry. The status of
the largest of them is shown in Table 4.4.127
Enbridge Northern Gateway. The proposal submitted by Canadian
company Enbridge was for a twin pipeline: one carrying imported natural
gas condensate from the BC coast east to the oil sands area in Alberta; the
other carrying diluted bitumen west towards the BC coast at Kitimat. Many
First Nations groups, several BC municipalities, and environmental groups
opposed the project because of the environmental risks associated with the
transport of diluted bitumen. In December 2010, 66 First Nations bands
in British Columbia signed the Save the Fraser Declaration opposing the
project, and 40 more groups signed on later. Local communities and First
Nations groups in British Columbia were certainly aware of the major spill
of diluted bitumen from an Enbridge pipeline into the Kalamazoo River in
2010—a spill that proved extremely difficult and costly to clean up.
The proposal was approved by the Canadian federal government in 2014
subject to 209 conditions. However, upon taking office in 2015, Prime
Table 4.4 Major Canadian pipeline initiatives during the last decade
Proposed pipeline Length and Route Additional capacity Potential markets Status (2018)
Enbridge Northern 1177 km from 525,000 bbl./day (dilbit) Asia and California Application dismissed
Gateway Bruderheim, Alberta by the Federal
190
to Kitimat, British Government in 2016

Columbia
Trans Mountain 1150 km from Edmonton, 590,000 bbl./day Asia and California Approved with 157
M. J. Bush
Expansion Project Alberta to the BC coast conditions by federal

at Burnaby government but denied
by courts pending
more consultation with
First Nations peoples.
Approved once again
in early 2019 with 156
conditions
TransCanada Energy East 4600 km from Alberta 1,100,000 bbl./day Eastern Canada, US East Application to the
to New Brunswick in Coast, Europe, Africa NEB withdrawn by
eastern Canada and Asia TransCanada in 2017
Enbridge Line 3 1660 km from Hardisty, 370,000 bbl./day Central and eastern The Canadian part of the
Replacement Alberta to Superior, Canada, US Midwest pipeline was approved
Wisconsin and Gulf coast by federal govern-
ment in 2016 with 89
conditions. In June 2019
there were continuing
legal problems in the
US courtsa
(continued)
Proposed pipeline Length and Route Additional capacity Potential markets Status (2018)
TransCanada Keystone XL 1897 km from Hardisty, 830,000 bbl./day Heavy oil refineries along Executive order to
Alberta to Steele City, Gulf Coast allow construction
Nebraska to proceed signed by
President Trump in
March 2017 but vacated
by a federal judge in
November 2018. A
revised environmental
impact assessment was
submitted but legal
problems in the US con-
tinue. Construction on
the Canadian section is
planned for mid 2019
aSee Inside Climate News. 2 more tar sands oil pipelines run into trouble in the Midwest. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/06062019/tar-sands-oil-pipeline-court-ruling-spill-risk-minnesota-michigan-enbridge-canada-climate-change
Source Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
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192
M. J. Bush
Minister Justin Trudeau imposed a ban on tanker traffic along the northeast
coast of British Columbia effectively halting the project. In November 2016,
the Federal Government directed Canada’s NEB to dismiss the Northern
Gateway application.128
Trans Mountain Expansion Project. The original Trans Mountain
Pipeline was built in 1953 and is still operational. It runs for 1150 km
from Strathcona County near Edmonton, Alberta, to the coastal town of
Burnaby in British Columbia. The expansion project is essentially a twin-
ning of the original pipeline—which will almost triple its capacity from
its present level of 300,000 bbl./day to 890,000 bbl./day. The proposal
was approved by the Government of Canada in November 2016 after
a 29-month review by the NEB. On January 2017, the British Columbia
Environmental Office issued an environmental assessment certificate
approving the pipeline.
However, the expansion of the pipeline has faced fierce opposition from
Indigenous groups and environmentalists—particularly in British Columbia.
The conflicting views have also incited a bad-tempered spat between the pro-
vincial governments of Alberta and British Columbia—which disagree over
the risks involved and the necessity of the expansion.
In May 2018, the Government of Canada agreed to purchase the pipe-
line from Kinder Morgan in order to ensure that the project moves ahead.
Canada’s Finance Minister is quoted as saying at the time: “It must be built;
it will be built. ”129
However, in August 2018, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal issued a
decision cancelling the approval of the project. According to the Court, the
NEB unjustifiably defined the scope of the project not to include project-
related tanker traffic—the increased level of which is likely to have an
adverse impact on the endangered Southern resident killer whales that fre-
quent the coastal environment. The Federal Court of Appeal also judged
that the Government of Canada failed in its duty to adequately consult
Indigenous peoples.130
In February 2019, the Canadian NEB completed the reconsideration
process and, in spite of the risks involved, found the project to be “in the
public interest”.131 The number of protests declined pending the result of
these consultative procedures, but when construction eventually resumes, it
is certain that opposition to the pipeline will flare up once again.
TransCanada Energy East. The Energy East pipeline was to deliver
diluted bitumen from Western Canada and Northwest US to delivery points
and refineries in New Brunswick and potentially Quebec. The project was
announced in 2013. About 3000 km of existing natural gas line was to be
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converted to carrying diluted bitumen, and an additional 1600 km of line

was to be constructed—making this pipeline the longest in Canada when
completed.
The proposed route crossed the territory of 180 Indigenous groups most
of which were opposed to the pipeline.
In August 2017, Canada’s NEB announced it would consider upstream
and downstream greenhouse gas emissions in determining whether the
Energy East pipeline was in the national interest. TransCanada then asked
the NEB to put its regulatory review hearings on hold while it reviewed the
decision to include an assessment of the pipeline’s impact on greenhouse
gases. TransCanada subsequently withdrew its application to the NEB to
construct the pipeline.132
Enbridge Line 3 replacement. Enbridge’s aging Line 3 pipeline runs
for 1660 km across Canada from Hardisty, Alberta to Gretna, Manitoba,
and then in the US from the Minnesota border to Superior, Wisconsin.
Enbridge has stated that the pipeline is deteriorating and needs to be
replaced. Current capacity is 390,000 bbl./day, but the new 36-inch
pipeline will restore the pipeline to its former capacity of 760,000 bbl./day.
Construction began in 2017. The original 34-inch pipeline will be deacti-
vated and left in place, which Enbridge says causes less damage than remov-
ing it.133
There were only limited protests against the replacement pipeline in
Canada. However, in the US, opposition has been more intense. Minnesota
regulators approved their part of the pipeline in June 2018, sparking
an angry reaction from Ojibwe band members present at the hearing.
Opponents to the pipeline argue that the pipeline risks spills in fragile areas
in northern Minnesota, including where American Indians harvest wild
rice. Ojibwe Indians, or Anishinaabe, consider wild rice sacred and central
to their culture. Winona LaDuke, founder of Honour the Earth, said at the
time that opponents would use every regulatory means possible to stop the
project, including mass protests if necessary.134
TransCanada Keystone XL. The Keystone pipeline system has been
operating in Canada and the US since 2010. It was constructed in several
phases: the first part of the line ran 3456 km south east from Hardisty,
Alberta, to Steele City, Nebraska, then east across Missouri to the Wood
River refinery and the Patoka Oil Terminal in Illinois. It has a capacity of
590,000 bbl./day. The second phase runs for 468 km south from Steele City
to Cushing, Oklahoma, and has a capacity of 700,000 bbl./day. Finally, the
third phase of 784 km extended the southern line from Cushing to refineries
in Port Arthur in Texas. It has a capacity of 700,000 bbl./day.
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M. J. Bush
The Keystone XL (meaning export limited) is a proposed new line from

Hardisty, Alberta, to Steele City, Illinois, that runs more directly between
the two cities and has a higher capacity: 830,000 bbl./day pumped through
a larger diameter, 36-inch, pipe. It will carry crude oil from western Canada
and pick up lighter oil from the Bakken field in Montana along the route.
The application by TransCanada was filed in September 2008.
The route of the pipeline on the US side runs through Montana, South
Dakota, and Nebraska. The KXL has been controversial from the start: both
because of its original route through fragile landscapes like the Sandhills in
Nebraska and its passage over the Ogallala aquifer, and also because it was
viewed as being contrary to efforts to reduce global warming. In 2010, the
No Tar Sands Oil campaign was launched in the US, sponsored by a variety
of the most active and well-known US environmental organisations.
Protests against Keystone XL have been widespread. In August 2011, over
1000 protesters were arrested outside the White House in Washington, DC.
In November that year, several thousand protesters formed a human chain
around the White House in an effort to convince President Obama to block
the project. The largest protest took place in February 2013 when 35,000
to 50,000 protesters attended a rally in Washington DC organised by The
Sierra Club and 350.org. Simultaneous protests were organised in other
cities across the US, Canada, and Europe. Then in 2014, about 1000 pro-
testers marched from Georgetown University to the White House to protest
the pipeline. Almost 400 people were arrested after tying themselves to the
White House fence.135
Apart from the continuing protests in the streets and around the White
House, legal challenges to the pipeline and to President Trump’s approval
have continued to stall the completion of the line. In 2017, the Indigenous
Environment Network sued the Trump Administration claiming that it had
erred by relying on an outdated analysis of the pipeline’s environmental
impacts. In November 2018 a federal judge ruled in favour of the plaintiffs
on several issues, vacated the 2017 approval decision, and ordered the State
Department to revise the 2014 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The
additional analysis is to include a supposedly “hard look” at the effects of
current oil prices, potential increases in greenhouse gas emissions, possible
damage to cultural resources and new data on oil spills—which were under-
estimated in the 2014 EIS.136
The construction of new petroleum pipelines has become a battleground
where the different sides in the global warming controversy increasingly
meet head on and clash. Increased pipeline capacity inevitably leads to more
production of oil, gas and petroleum products. That, after all, is the purpose
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195
of building new pipelines: getting greater quantities of the product to mar-

kets. But the increased production and processing inevitably leads to greater
emissions of carbon dioxide and methane from the upstream drilling, gath-
ering, processing operations, and refineries.
Take the Train
As the construction of new pipelines is stalled and delayed by protests and

legal challenges, the oil industry has started to move more oil by train. This
mode of conveyance has a higher risk of accidents, so the stakes involved in
ramping up the supply of oil and petroleum products are becoming higher.
We noted in this chapter that oil trains have more accidents than pipelines,
but that pipeline spills are larger. But whereas the environmental impacts of
a pipeline rupture and spill are predominantly on surface water resources,
ecosystems, and the livelihoods of local communities (which is bad
enough!), an oil train accident can result in a catastrophic fire and explosions
that can potentially kill and injure dozens if not hundreds of people—as
the oil train accidents at Lac Megantic, Quebec, and Mosier, Oregon, have
clearly shown.137
Undaunted by the risks involved, the premier of Alberta announced in
November 2018, that the provincial government planned to purchase as
many as 7000 rail cars in order to meet its goal of moving 120,000 bbl. a
day of diluted bitumen to the west coast of Canada. The province will also
purchase 80 locomotives with each train pulling 100–120 tank cars.138
Climate Justice
Global heating raises important questions concerning justice and human
rights. Although climate change affects everyone, it disproportionately
impacts those who have contributed least to it and who are very often the
least able to counteract its harmful effects. By contrast, the main contribu-
tors to climate change—those with the largest carbon footprint, living and
working in the world’s wealthiest regions—are most able to cope with and
withstand its most extreme impacts. This fundamental justice concern is
exacerbated by the fact that climate change will strain the ability of many
states, especially the poorest ones, to uphold their human rights obligations.
Climate change therefore poses a substantial obstacle to the continued pro-
gress in improving human rights, which translates directly into a worsening
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of the existing inequities that afflict a world already riven with inequalities,
poverty and conflict.139
Climate change justice has been defined as:
To ensure communities, individuals and governments have substantive legal

and procedural rights relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and
sustainable environment, and the means to take measures within their national
legislative and judicial systems and, where necessary, at international levels to
mitigate sources of climate change and provide for adaptation to its effects in a
manner that respects human rights.140
Environmental law is necessarily central to the goal of achieving climate

change justice. On the domestic front, a growing number of countries have
integrated carbon pricing mechanisms into their national climate policies.
Regional arrangements have also been established to combat climate change
with the leading example being the programme of regulations and pol-
icy targets set within the European Union including its Emissions Trading
Scheme.
Concerning international law, in addition to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto protocol, there
are a number of other treaties and several widely-held principles that are of
relevance to climate change. In addition to the principle of ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’ (embedded throughout the UNFCCC text
and the 2015 Paris Agreement), there is the ‘no-harm’ principle, the ‘pre-
cautionary principle’ and the principle of sustainable development. The
progressive acceptance of these principles marks a long-term trend in inter-
national law. However, there is little evidence that international law, on its
own, has developed to the point where it might provide a firm basis for lim-
iting the degree to which states may release harmful greenhouse gases into
the environment.141
International human rights law may provide an avenue for individual and
communities to seek redress for harms caused by global warming and cli-
mate change. There is little doubt that climate change affects people’s human
rights directly. Rights to life, health, food, shelter and water are all adversely
affected by the harmful impacts of climate change. These effects can be char-
acterised as ‘rights violations’ because climate change is a preventable man-
made phenomenon. Nevertheless it is not easy as a matter of law to make
a direct causal connection between those emitting excessive greenhouse
gases and those suffering the consequences. The law is not designed for this
purpose and challenging questions related to causality and standing arise.
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197
Possible opportunities for redress may include class actions, targeting major
groups of emitters, or holding public officials responsible for failures of due
diligence. Another possible approach may be the development of ‘environ-
mental rights’ now recognised in a number of national constitutions.142
In a similar vein, the suit brought against the US federal government by
21 young plaintiffs in the US District Court in Oregon in 2015 alleges that
the US Government’s actions helped to cause climate change, violating the
youngest generations’ constitutional right to life, liberty, and property, and
failed to protect essential public trust resources—including the atmosphere,
which is regarded as an asset in that trust because of its importance in the
viability of every natural system. The concept of Atmospheric Trust Litigation
argues that a government elected by the people has a duty to protect the nat-
ural systems required for those peoples’ survival.143
At the time of writing in late 2018, the defendant (the US government)
had asked for a stay of the case—which had been granted by US Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Roberts. The Oregon District Court then vacated
the case pending a decision from the high court.
Where a jurisdiction has enacted legislation mandating a reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions or other measures to mitigate global warming,
if those measures are not subsequently fulfilled by state agencies, a law-
suit may be an effective strategy in holding policymakers to account. In a
case brought by four plaintiffs in the US state of Massachusetts, that state’s
Supreme Judicial Court found in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The court
found that the DEP was not complying with its legal obligations to reduce
the State’s greenhouse gas emissions and ordered the agency to “promulgate
regulations that address…greenhouse gas emissions, impose a limit on emissions
that may be released…and set limits that decline on an annual basis.”
The legal obligation in question is defined in Massachusetts’s Global
Warming Solutions Act (GWSA) which was signed into law in 2008, and
which created the framework for reducing the state’s GHG emissions by
25% compared to 1990 levels by 2020, and by 80% by 2050.144
This suggests an approach in jurisdictions where opposition political
parties in favour of climate change action outnumber an incumbent party
which is doing little to curb emissions. Once legislation mandating emission
cuts or other regulatory measure has been passed, it offers the opportunity
for individuals and environmental groups to sue the government if action on
climate change continues to be stalled.
In Canada, the courts have generally been unsympathetic to this form of
legal action. In 2007, Friends of the Earth Canada sought a declaration that
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M. J. Bush
the government’s climate change plan failed to comply with a federal law:
the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act (KPIA). The KPIA was passed in
June 2007 by a coalition of opposition parties. It required the government
to file a climate change plan with a view to meeting Canada’s obligation as
a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. The government, which had opposed the
legislation, filed a plan that effectively admitted that it could not and would
not comply with these obligations. Friends of the Earth sued.
In dismissing the case, the court held that the provisions of the KPIA,
taken together, “were so policy-laden, permissive and subject to parliamentary
consultation and review, that they did not evince a legislative intention to impose
absolute, justiciable compliance obligations upon the government.”145 The court
ruled that the legislation itself was not justiciable—meaning that it is not a
question the courts can settle or resolve. The decision was upheld on appeal,
with the effect of removing any domestic legal requirement for Canada to
adhere to the Kyoto protocol.146
In 2005, Imperial Oil applied to the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board
for approval to develop and mine the Kearl Oil Sands—a large deposit of
bitumen located about 70 km north of Fort McMurray in Alberta. Because
the KOS project would potentially cause harm to fish, an environmental
assessment under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act was obliga-
tory. Given the magnitude of the potential impacts, the federal government
referred the environmental assessment to a joint environment assessment
panel consisting of three members.
The Joint Panel issued its 116-page report in February 2007. The report
concluded that: “the KOS project is not likely to result in significant adverse
environmental effects, provided that the recommendations and mitigation meas-
ures proposed by the Joint Panel are implemented.”
In March 2007, four environmental groups filed a Notice of Application
of judicial review of the Joint Panel’s report. Several alleged flaws were cited
in the Notice of Application but the essential concern was that the mitiga-
tion measures were insufficient, and that the panel should have reasonably
concluded that the project would cause significant adverse environmen-
tal effects. This would leave the government to make the final decision of
whether to approve the decision regardless of its environmental impacts.
The Kearl Oil Sands development was projected to produce around 4.6
million tonnes a year of carbon dioxide. Both the province of Alberta and
the Joint Panel found these emissions reasonable and that human health
impacts for the application were negligible.147
What these lawsuits demonstrate is that the courts in Canada tend to go
along with accepted practice and the status quo. Since the mining of the oil
4 Carbon Chaos
199
sands has been continuing for decades, the review panel saw no reason to
block a development which was essentially business as usual. Since account-
ing for the external costs associated with the emissions of greenhouse gases
has never been part of the calculus, it was not taken into account this time
either.
Environmental assessment in Canada is weak and flawed because it is so
subjective. It may involve a great deal of talk and consultation, but the result
essentially reflects the mindset of the people engaged to conduct the assess-
ment. These are generally engineers and scientists who are working in the
industry. They are not going to seriously question whether another oil sands
mining project is necessary when the oil and gas industry is loudly forecast-
ing huge demand for oil and natural gas in China, India and south-east Asia
for the foreseeable future. And of course mining the oil sands can make lots
of money. For the people working in the oil and gas industry, that’s really
the only bottom line.
The Cost of Carbon

The cost of cleaning up after all the pipeline, coal train, oil train, and tanker
accidents is enormous—often running into hundreds of millions of dollars.
But these numbers are relatively small compared to the estimated costs of
providing health care for people impacted by the air pollution caused by
coal-fired power plants, the gas processing and oil refining industries, and
the urban smog caused by millions of automobiles burning gasoline and die-
sel fuels.
The health costs associated with the production and consumption of fossil
fuels are almost never borne by the companies and industries that cause the
problem. For the most part, these costs are paid by national governments
using funds raised by taxation. It’s not the polluter who pays.
Economists are increasingly looking at the aggregate environmental costs
of using fossil fuels over the complete life-cycle of the fuel.
For instance, in the case of coal, each stage of the life-cycle of the fuel—
extraction, transport, processing, and combustion—generates waste that cre-
ates multiple hazards for human health and the environment. The cost of
the damage caused by these hazards are not paid by the coal industry. They
are referred to as ‘externalities’ or external costs.
The classic example is that of a private owner of a coal power plant pay-
ing for coal, labour, and other inputs and charging for the energy sold, but
not bearing a cost for the damages to health and nature caused by the air
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M. J. Bush
pollution the power plant emits. These costs are borne by society as a whole,
so that the outcomes for private and social welfare differ.148
A study of the US coal industry in 2011 estimated the external cost of the
fuel cycle as somewhere between a third to over one-half of a trillion dollars
each year. In that report, accounting for the damages associated with the use
of coal conservatively doubles or even triples the price of electricity gener-
ated from coal.149
A more detailed study of the external costs of energy was conducted by
the European Commission in 2014. Eighteen impact categories were identi-
fied and quantified. The top five were:
• Climate change
• Particulate matter
• Human toxicity
• Agricultural land occupation
• Depletion of energy resources
Other categories included ozone depletion, terrestrial acidification, marine

eutrophication, ecotoxicity (3 types), water depletion, metal depletion,
photochemical oxidant formation, ionizing radiation (from nuclear power
plants), and natural land transformation. The impact of the life cycle of
13 types of energy production were quantified and monetized. Figure 4.12
shows the external costs associated with the production of electricity for sev-
eral different technologies.150
What is immediately clear from the data shown in Fig. 4.12 is that the
external costs of the four fossil fuel-powered electricity power plants (the
first four bars on the left), are higher than nuclear power, and substantially
more than the eight types of renewable energy shown on the graph. This is
because the emissions of greenhouse gases from fossil fuel production and
combustion contribute substantially to global warming and hugely costly
climate change impacts. The cost to society of these emission can be quanti-
fied—at least approximately.
If the external costs of coal fired power generation were fully internalized
the cost of electricity generated from coal would approximately double. This
is the same value as the external cost estimated by the US study cited ear-
lier—although at the lower end of that estimate. And the fact that the US
study calculated a higher external cost for coal fired plants seems plausible
given that European regulatory controls are generally stricter and that a car-
bon tax is already in force—which has the result of internalizing a fraction
of the external cost.
4 Carbon Chaos
201
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Fig. 4.12 External costs per technology for electricity technologies, US¢/kWh (Source
European Commission)
Figure 4.12 shows that wind energy and hydropower have the lowest
external costs. Solar photovoltaic energy has external costs of about
2¢/kWh—much higher than wind energy, which seems surprising—but
the authors of this report caution that this maybe an overestimate because
of the ‘high rate of technological development’ at the time the survey was
conducted.151
This evaluation of the external costs of energy production only substanti-
ates what we already know. Fossil fuels have a huge environmental impact,
a massive carbon footprint, and harm people’s health everywhere they are
produced and burned as fuel.
One final point concerns the methodology employed to evaluate these
external costs.
It does not account for all the accidents that occur every year due to
the mining, drilling, processing, transport, and combustion of fossil fuels.
None of the pipeline spills, natural gas explosions, oil rig disasters, oil tanker
fires, tailing pond failures, oil refinery accidents, and coal train and oil train
derailments are included in the analysis.
So when you consider the sheer magnitude and extent of the damage
caused by the use fossil fuels, you have to ask yourself the question:
Surely there’s a better way of providing energy and power to the world?
202
M. J. Bush
Conclusion
In this chapter we have documented the substantial environmental impacts
caused by the exploitation of fossil fuels for the production of electricity, and
for producing the fuels that power the transport sector and provide energy
to industry and the built environment.
Coal is the fuel that has the greatest environmental and health impacts.
For the miners, black lung disease comes with the job. The mining, clean-
ing and processing of coal requires huge tailing ponds that have polluted
ground water and which sometimes have failed catastrophically. Moving coal
by train generates substantial quantities of harmful coal dust, and there have
been frequent accidents. Coal-fired power plants produce large emissions
of greenhouse gases, particulate matter, and mercury—a potent neurotoxin
that finds its way into the food chain and raises blood concentrations in
communities that consume relatively large amounts of fish. This is particu-
larly a problem for the Indigenous communities of Northern Canada.
Oil, petroleum products, and natural gas are conveyed around North
America in a sprawling network of pipelines that frequently break, leak, and
spill, often contaminating major rivers and watercourses. Oil trains have
derailed, caught fire and exploded. Oil tankers sink, and oil rigs have leaked
millions of gallons of oil into the oceans, fouling coastlines and killing wild-
life on numerous occasions.
This chapter has also shown that the exploitation of the oil sands in
Alberta, Canada, is one of the most polluting industries found anywhere on
Earth—producing significant emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and
volatile chemicals, and requiring some of the largest tailing ponds in North
America.
Finally, if the external costs associated with fossil fuels are fully accounted
for, it is clear that all the sources of renewable energy: solar, wind, hydro-
power, biomass, and geothermal energy generate electricity at substantially
lower cost.
We ended this chapter with a question. Surely there’s a better way of pro-
viding energy and power? And of course there is. In the next chapter we look
at the renewable sources of energy. Solar energy and wind power are availa-
ble everywhere and are inexhaustible sources of power. Hydropower can be
affected by fluctuating rainfall and drought conditions which may reduce its
output, but for the moment it remains the renewable energy technology that
globally delivers the greatest amount of dependable power.
4 Carbon Chaos
203
Notes
1. See the brilliant book by Parker, Geoffrey: Global crisis: War, climate
change, & catastrophe in the seventeenth century. Yale University Press, New
Haven, CT. 2013.
2. See the US Bureau of Labor Statistics Fact sheet | coal mining | April 2010.
Injuries, illnesses and fatalities in the coal mining industry. Accessed at:
https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/osar0012.htm.
3. See statistics from the US Mine Safety and Health Administration.
Accessed at: https://arlweb.msha.gov/stats/centurystats/coalstats.asp.
4. See the article in the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care
Medicine: “Resurgence of debilitating and entirely preventable respiratory
disease among working coal miners”. AJRCCM 190 (6) (15 September
2014).
5. See New black lung epidemic emerging in coal country. Accessed at: https://
www.ecowatch.com/black-lung-epidemic-2538494787.html. Also Black
lung study finds biggest cluster ever of fatal coal miners’ disease. Accessed at:
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/06/583456129/black-lung-biggest-cluster-
ever-of-fatal-coal-miners-disease.
6. See Congress is giving the coal industry a break, and sick miners may pay the
price. Accessed at: https://nymag.com/intelligence/2018/12/coal-congress-
black-lung-fund.html.
7. See Coal miners suffering from black lung disease fight for compensation.
Accessed at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/907788.shtml.
8. See the Report: Energy and Air Pollution. World Energy Outlook special
Report. International Energy Agency 2016, p. 35.
9. See the article by the Union of Concerned Scientists: How coal works.
Accessed at: https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/all-about-coal/how-coal-
works#.WlecoKinHIU.
10. See Technical document: Acid mine drainage prediction. US Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, Washington, DC. 1994.
11. See Acid mine drainage—A legacy of an industrial past. Accessed at:
https://eic.rsc.org/feature/acid-mine-drainage-a-legacy-of-an-industrial-
past/2020087.article.
12. See The Inez coal tailing dam failure (Kentucky, USA). Accessed at: http://
wise-uranium.org/mdafin.html.
13. Coal waste impoundments: Risks, responses and alternatives. National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.
14. See This is a first: Duke Energy agrees to pay $84K penalty for coal ash
leaks. Accessed at: http://www.greensboro.com/news/local_news/this-is-
a-first-duke-energy-agrees-to-pay-k/article_e5feb62d-618b-5fb0-a284-
57b9f6c5ccdf.html.
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M. J. Bush
15. See Did Canada just have the largest coal slurry spill in its history? Accessed
at: https://www.ecowatch.com/did-canada-just-have-thelargest-coal-slurry-
spill-in-its-history-1881814153.html.
16. See Ponds are the biggest environmental disaster you’ve never heard of.
Accessed at: https://news.vice.com/article/tailing-ponds-are-the-biggest-en-
vironmental-disaster-youve-never-heard-ofTailing and Tailing pond spill:
What happens to effluent over time. Accessed at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/british-columbia/tailing-pond-spill-what-happens-to-effluent-
over-time-1.2729751.
17. See Report on Mount Polley tailing storage facility breach. Accessed
at: https://www.mountpolleyreviewpanel/default/files/report/Reporton
MountPolleyTailingStorageFacilityBreach.pdf. The breach was avoida-
ble. The report stated bluntly: “Had the downstream slope in recent years
been flattened to 2.0 horizontal to 1.0 vertical, as proposed in the original
design, failure would have been avoided” (emphasis added).
18. See Many coal sludge impoundments have weak walls, federal study says.
Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
many-coal-sludge-impoundments-have-weak-walls-federal-study-
says/2013/04/24/76c5be2a-acf9-11e2-a8b9-2a63d75b5459_story.html?
utm_term=.0ffb1d75a7a3.
19. See Remembering Aberfan. Institute of Hazard, Risk and Resilience blog,
Durham University UK. http://ihrrblog.org/2011/10/21/remembering-
aberfan/.
20. See Natural Resources Canada: Coal facts. Accessed at: https://www.nrcan.
gc.ca/energy/facts/coal/20071.
21. See Coal’s assault on human health. A Report from Physicians for Social
Responsibility. 2009. Accessed at: http://www.psr.org/resources/coals-as-
sault-on-human-health.html.
22. See Coal’s assault on human health, pp. x, xi. Op. cit.
23. See Report: Germany Suffers More Coal-Linked Deaths Than Rest of EU.
Accessed at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/health-consumers/news/
report-germany-suffers-more-coal-linked-deaths-than-rest-of-eu/.
24. See Coal-fired power plants remain top industrial polluters in Europe.
Accessed at: https://www.eea.europa.eu/highlights/coal-fired-power-plants-
remain.
25. See Coal ash: The toxic threat to our health and environment. Physicians for
Social Responsibility and Earth Justice. 2010. http://www.psr.org/environ-
ment-and-health/code-black/coal-ash-toxic-and-leaking.html.
26. Ibid.
27. See https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/07/20/19962/former-cleanup-
workers-blame-illnesses-toxic-coal-ash-exposures/.
4 Carbon Chaos
205
28. See New industry data confirms toxics are polluting groundwater at coal ash
sites. Accessed at: https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2018/new-industry-
data-confirms-toxics-are-polluting-groundwater-at-coal-ash-dumps.
29. Hg is the chemical symbol for mercury. The symbol comes from the Latin
name Hydrargyrum—meaning liquid silver.
30. See Mercury in petroleum and natural gas: estimation of emissions from pro-
duction, processing and combustion. EPA Report EPA-600/R-01-066.
September 2001.
31. See Countries meet to address mercury as global emissions rise by 20%. Accessed
at: https://www.thegef.org/news/countries-meet-address-mercury-global-
emissions-rise-20.
32. See the EPA website: https://www.epa.gov/mercury/basic-information-
about-mercury#airemissions.
33. See Poland’s coal-related mercury emissions revised upwards, significantly.
Accessed at: https://ieefa.org/plands-coal-related-mercury-emissions-
revised-upward-significantly/.
34. See the report on mercury from the Canadian Council of Ministers of the
Environment (CCME). Accessed at: https://www.ccme.ca/en/resources/
air/mercury.html.
35. See the World Health Organisation fact sheet: Mercury and health.
Updated March 2017. Accessed at: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs361/en/.
36. See the WHO Fact sheet: Mercury and health. Ibid.
37. The chart is from Physicians for Social Responsibility Report. Op. cit.
38. The data are from the Physicians for Social Responsibility Report. Op. cit.
39. See Countries meet to address mercury as global emissions rise by 20%.
Accessed at: https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/press-
release/countries-meet-address-mercury-global-emissions-rise.
40. See http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/Great-Horse-
Manure-Crisis-of-1894/.
41. See The Prize by Daniel Yergin. Free Press. 1991, p. 64.
42. See the Wikipedia entry at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_oil_
spills/.
43. See New price tag for Kalamazoo River oil spill cleanup: Enbridge says
$1.21 billion. Accessed at: http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/
index.ssf/2014/11/2010_oil_spill_cost_enbridge_1.html.
44. See National Energy Board. Accessed at: https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/sftn-
vrnmnt/sft/dshbrd/dshbrd-eng.html.
45. See The biggest oil pipeline spills in Canadian history. Accessed at: https://
activehistory.ca/2015/07/the-biggest-oil-pipeline-spills-in-canadian-
history/.
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M. J. Bush
46. See The world’s worst offshore oil rig disasters. Accessed at: https://www.
offshore-technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-deadliest-offshore-
oil-rig-disasters-4149812/ and Major offshore accidents of the 20th and
21st century. Accessed at: https://www.arnolditkin.com/practice-areas/
oil-rig-explosions/major-oil-rig-diasassters.
47. The description of the incident and the image in Fig. 4.5 are taken from
the Investigation report and executive summary of the incident issued by
the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. Available at:
http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/Overview_-_Final.pdf.
48. See the National Ocean Service Report: Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Accessed at: https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/apr17/dwh-protected-spe-
cies.html.
49. See the National Ocean Report, ibid.
50. See the EPA toxic release Inventory (TRI) website: https://www.epa.gov/
trinationalanalysis/comparing-industry-sector-2015-tri-national-analysis.
51. EPA-600/R-01-066. Op. cit., p. 17.
52. See EPA cracks down on oil refinery pollution. Accessed at: http://thehill.
com/policy/energy-environment/255299-epa-cracks-down-on-oil-refinery-
pollution.
53. See Co-op refinery VOC emissions 10x higher than average of other refineries.
Accessed at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/coo-op-refin-
ery-voc-emissions-10x-higher-than-average-of-other-refineies-1.3122876.
54. See Fumes across the fence-line: The health impacts of air pollution from oil
& gas facilities on African American communities, a report by the Clean Air
Task Force. November 2017.
55. See City in a swamp: Houston’s flood problems are only getting worse.
Accessed at: https://inisideclimatenews.org/news/22012018/houston-
flood-plain-development-hurricane-harvey-reservoirs-overflow.
56. See Massive fire breaks out at Philadelphia oil refinery. Accessed at: https://
washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/21/philadelphia-oil-refinery-fire/.
57. See Motiva shuts Port Arthur Texas refinery due to flooding. Accessed at:
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/30/motiva-shuts-port-arthur-texas-refin-
ery-due-to-flooding.html/.
58. See Harvey shines a spotlight on a high-risk area of chemical plants in
Texas. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/01/
harvey-shines-a-spotlight-on-a-high-risk-area-of-chemical-plants-in-texas.
59. See City in a swamp: Houston’s flood problems are only getting worse.
Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/22012018/houston-flood-
plain-development-hurricane-harvey-reservoirs-overflow and https://pro-
jets.propublica.org/graphics/harvey-manchester.
60. See Hurricane Harvey’s toxic impact deeper than public told. Accessed at:
https://apnews.com/e0ceae76d5894734b0041210a902218d/Hurricane-
Harvey’s-toxic-impact-deeper-than-public-told.
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61. See the report on hurricane Katrina issued by the White House. Accessed
at: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-
learned/chapterr1.html.
62. See Alberta energy: Facts and statistics. Accessed at: http://www.energy.
alberta.ca/OilSands/791.asp.
63. See Alberta Oil Sands Industry Quarterly Report. Winter 2017. Available
at: www.albertacanada.com/business/statistics/oil-sands-quarterly.aspx.
64. See the report by the Pembina Institute: Tailing ponds: The worst is yet to
come. Accessed at: http://www.pembina.org/blog/real-ghg-trend-oilsands.
65. See Environmental impacts of oil sands development in Alberta. Accessed at:
http://www.resilience.org/stories/2009-09-22/environmental-impacts-
oil-sands-development-alberta. Also http://calgaryherald.com/business/
energy/tailing-ponds-a-critical-part-of-albertas-oilsands-legacy, which gives
the area of the tailing ponds as 220 km2.
66. See the book by the former CEO of Suncor, Rick George: Sun rise: Suncor,
the oil sands and the future of energy. HarperCollins. 2012.
67. See the INSIGHT article in the Toronto Star on 24 November 2018.
Penny wise and pound foolish.
68. Ibid.
69. See Oil sands technology. https://sunshineoilsands.com/?page=oil-
sands-technology. Accessed 26 January 2018.
70. The graph is taken from: The real GHG trend: Oilsands among the most car-
bon intensive crudes in North America. Accessed at: http://www.pembina.
org/blog/real-ghg-trend-oilsands.
71. See Oil sands operations as a large source of secondary organic aerosols.
Accessed at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303509842_Oil_
sands_operations_as_a_large_source_of_secondary_organic_aerosols, and
also: Alberta’s oilsands industry is a huge source of harmful air pollution,
study says. Accessed at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/oilsands-
soas-1.3599074.
72. Kirk, J.L., Muir, D., Gleason, A., Wang, X. et al.: “Atmospheric deposi-
tion of mercury and methylmercury to landscapes and waterbodies of the
Athabasca oil sands region”. Environmental Science and Technology 48 (13)
(2014): 7374–7383. Available at: https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/
es500986r.
73. See Andrews, A., and Lattanzio, R.K.: Petroleum coke: Industry and environ-
mental issues. Congressional Research Service. October 2013.
74. See the EPA Report: Hydraulic fracturing for oil and gas: Impacts from the
hydraulic fracturing water cycle on drinking water resources in the United
States. US Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-600-R-16-236ES.
December 2016.
208
M. J. Bush
75. For Canada, see What you need to know about fracking in Canada.
Accessed at: https://www.desmog.ca/2017/04/06/what-is-fracking-in-can-
ada. For USA see https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_wells_s1_a.htm.
76. The diagram is from the factsheet Hydraulic Fracturing issued by the
Canadian Society for Unconventional Resources (CSUR). Available at:
http://www.csur.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/HydFrac_v3.pdf.
77. Ibid., p. 39.
78. See the EPA Report. Op. cit., p. 7.
79. See what you need to know about fracking in Canada. Accessed at: https://
www.desmog.ca/2017/04/06/what-is-fracking-in-Canada.
80. See the report by Concerned Health Professionals of New York &
Physicians for Social Responsibility. Compendium of scientific, medical, and
media findings demonstrating risks and harms of fracking (unconventional
gas and oil extraction), 5th edition. March 2018. Available at: http://con-
cernedhealthny.org/compendium/.
81. See the CCA Report: Environmental impacts of shale gas extraction in
Canada. Council of Canadian Academies, Ottawa, Canada, 2014, p. 90.
82. Ibid., p. 92.
83. Entrekin, S., Trainor, A., Saiers, J., Patterson, L., et al.: Water stress from
high-volume hydraulic fracturing potentially threatens aquatic biodiversity and
ecosystem services in Arkansas, United States. Environmental Science and
Technology. 31 January 2018.
86. See the EAP Report. Op. cit., p. 26.
87. See Fracking by the numbers: The damage to our water, land and climate from
a decade of dirty drilling. Environment America and the Frontier Group.
88. See the EPA Report, p. 29.
89. EPA Report, p. 29.
90. CCA Report, p. 93.
91. These data are from the EPA Report, p. 31.
92. See Science News. EPA underestimates methane emissions. Accessed at:
https://www.sciencenews.org/article/epa-underestimates-methane-emis-
sions. This issue is also discussed in the CHPNY&PSR compendium
report on pp. 178 and 181. Op. cit.
93. See Fracking the future: How unconventional gas threatens our water, health
and climate. DeSmogBlog Society of British Columbia. 2010.
94. See the Compendium report by CHPNY&PSR. Op. cit. Accessed at:
http://concernedhealthny.org/compendium/.
95. See “Comparison of airborne measurements and inventory estimates
of methane emissions in the Alberta upstream oil and gas sector”.
Environmental Science and Technology 51 (21) (2017): 13008–13017.
4 Carbon Chaos
209
96. Howarth, R.: “Methane emissions and climatic warming risk from hydrau-
lic fracturing and shale gas development: implications for policy”. Energy
and Emission Control Technologies 3 (2015): 45–54.
97. See Gathering pipelines FAQs. Accessed at: https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/
faqs/gathering-pipelines-faqs. Updated 8 May 2017.
98. See Natural Resources Canada brochure: Pipelines across Canada. Accessed
at: https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/files/pdf/
14-0277-%20PS_pipelines_across_canada_e.pdf.
99. See the PHMSA brochure: Gathering pipelines FAQs (updated 8 May
2017).
100. See Pipelines across Canada. Op. cit.
101. See Boom in unregulated natural gas pipelines posing new risks. Accessed at:
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20130926/boom-unregulated-natural-
gas-pipelines-posing-new-risks.
102. See Explosions from gas utility lines kill 1, injure 10 in Massachusetts.
Accessed at: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/explosions-from-gas-utility-
lines-kill-1-injure-10-in-massachusetts/532397/.
103. Reported in the Compendium Report by CHPNY&PSR. Op. cit.
Accessed at: http://concernedhealthny.org/compendium/.
104. See the conclusion of the Compendium Report by CHPNY&PSR. Op.
cit. Accessed at: http://concernedhealthny.org/compendium/
105. See Coal derailments lead to tragedy. Accessed at: https://blog.nwf.
org/201207/going-off-the-rails-on-a-crazy-coal-train.
106. See Coal derailments lead to tragedy. Op. cit.
107. See the NTSB Accident Report. Accessed at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investi-
gations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1407.pdf.
108. See Railway accidents in the United States 2011 through June 2014.
Accessed at: https://www.stb.gov/Ect1/ecorrespondence.nsf/UNID/
0FB2B0AFB471952285257DB3001F22F3/$file/Railway+Accidents+
in+the+United+States.pdf.
109. See the Canadian Transportation Safety Board website: http://tsb.gc.ca/
eng/rail/index.asp.
110. See the International Energy Report: Medium-Term Oil Market Report
2013.
111. See the IEA Report, p. 134.
112. See Oil train derails in Columbia River Gorge, rally calls for ban on ‘Bomb
trains’. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/oil-train-derails-in-colum-
bia-river-gorge-rally-calls-for-ban-on-bomb–1891163987.html.
113. See Train carrying crude oil derails in Pickens County causing explo-
sions and fire, no injuries reported. Accessed at: http://blog.al.com/tusca-
loosa/2013/11/train_carrying_crude_oil_derai.html.
210
M. J. Bush
114. See Train carrying oil, liquid petroleum gas derails in Alberta. Accessed
at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cnrailway-derailment/train-carry-
ing-oil-liquid-petroleum-gas-derails-in-alberta-idUSBRE99I04820131019.
115. See 2013 was a record year for oil-train accidents, and insurers are wary.
Accessed at: https://www.alternet.org/environment/2013-was-record-year-
oil-train-accidents-and-insurers-are-wary.
116. See Lac-Megantic runaway train and derailment investigation summary.
Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Accessed at: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/
eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054-r-es.asp.
117. See 2013 was a record year for oil-train accidents, and insurers are wary.
Accessed at: https://www.alternet.org/environment/2013-was-record-year-
oil-train-accidents-and-insurers-are-wary.
118. See Toronto Star. Lac Megantic relocating railway line. 11 May 2018.
119. See Canadian National Railways derailment numbers soared 73% before
recent crashes. Accessed at: http://business.financialpost.com/transporta-
tion/canadian-national-railways-derailment-numbers-soared-73-before-re-
cent-crashes.
120. See the Transportation Safety Board of Canada News release: Derailment
and fire of second Canadian national crude oil train near Gogama, Ontario.
Accessed at: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/mediass-media/communiques/rail/2015/
r15h0021-20150317.asp.
121. DeSmogBlog. Derailed oil train spills 230,000 gallons of tar sands
in flooded Iowa river. Accessed at: https://www.desmogblog.
com/2018/06/25/oil-train-derailment-doon-iowa-bnsf-230000-gallons-oil-
flooded-river.
121. DeSmogBlog. Oil-by-rail rises once again as safety rules disappear.
Accessed at: https://www.desmogblog.com/2018/10/17/safety-rules-rollback-
second-oil-train-boom-rail-industry?
122. At the time of writing in late 2018, most climate scientists believe that
the stricter target of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C above pre-indus-
trial levels can no longer be achieved. Global emissions of greenhouse gases
increased in 2017 and look certain to rise again in 2018. Even achiev-
ing the 2 °C target without overshoot looks unlikely, and technologies to
remove CO2 from the atmosphere are still in their infancy.
123. See Bismarck residents got the Dakota Access Pipeline moved without a
fight. Accessed at: https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-12-01/bismarck-
residents-got-dakota-access-pipeline-moved-without-fight.
124. See DAPL routed through standing rock after Bismark residents said no?
Accessed at: https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/dapl-routed-through-
standing-rock-after-bismarck-residents-said-no/.
125. See the Wikipedia article: Dakota Access Pipeline Protests. Accessed at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dakota_Access_Pipeline_protests/.
4 Carbon Chaos
211
127. CAPP. Crude oil forecast, markets and transportation. Accessed at: https://
www.capp.ca/pub;ication-and-statistics/publications/303440.
128. See Line 3 Replacement Program and Northern Gateway Decisions Statement.
Accessed at: http://www.enbridge.com/media-center/media-statements/
government-of-canada-pipelinedecisions/.
129. See Kinder Morgan pipeline: Canadian government to buy project for
$4.5bn. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/29/
canada-kinder-morgan-pipeline-trans-mountain.
130. See the Federal Court of Appeals decision. Available at: https://decisions.
fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/343511/index.do.
131. See the Trans Mountain Corporation website: https://www.transmountain.
com/project-overview.
132. See TransCanada cancels Energy East Oilsands pipeline. Accessed at:
https://www.desmogblog.com/2017/10/05/transcanada-cancels-energy-
east-oilsands-pipeline.
133. See the Enbridge news release at: http://www.enbridge.com/
projects-and-infrastructure/projects/line-3-replacement-program-canada.
134. See Minnesota regulators approve Enbridge Line 3 project. Accessed at:
https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/enbridge-minnesota-line-3-1.4726894.
135. See the excellent Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Keystone_Pipeline, from which most of the information on the Keystome
XL pipeline is taken.
136. See the article in High Country News: A judge just dealt a potentially
fatal blow to KeystoneXL. Accessed at: https://www.hcn.org/articles/
oil-a-judge-just-dealt-a-potentially-fatal-blow-to-keystone-xl/.
137. See the text and photos in Chapter 3.
138. See Alberta plans to buy 7000 rail cars to ease ‘crisi’ in oil price differen-
tials. Accessed at: https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/
alberta-plans-to-buy-7000-railcars-to-ease-crisis-in-oil-price-differentials.
139. This perspective is taken directly from the excellent report by the
International Bar Association: Achieving justice and human rights in
an era of climate disruption. Available at: https://www.ibanet.org/
PresidentialTaskForceClimateChangeJustice2014Report.aspx.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. See The US supreme court slows children’s climate lawsuit—For now. Accessed at:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2018/10/22/the-us-supreme-court-
slows-childrens-climate-lawsuit-for-now/#6bd4e5aa297e. Also The supreme
court is about to decide if the children’s climate lawsuit can proceed. Accessed
at: https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/10/23/18010582/
childrens-climate-lawsuit-supreme-court.
212
M. J. Bush
144. See Children win another climate change legal case in Mass supreme
court. Accessed at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/05/19/
children-win-another-climate-change-legal-case-in-mass-supreme-
court/#1b14c5e75822.
145. Quoted in the report by the International Bar Association. Op. cit.
146. See Canada wriggles off the hook for violating Kyoto law. Accessed at:
https://foecanada.org/en/2008/10/canada-wriggles-off-the-hook-for-
violating-kyoto-law/.
147. Joint Panel Report. EUB Decision 2007-013. Accessed at: https://www.
aer.ca/documents/decisions/2007/2007-013.pdf.
148. This explanation is given in the report: Subsidies and costs of EU energy.
Final Report.
149. See Coal’s hidden costs top $345 billion in U.S.-study. Accessed at: https://
www.reuters.com/article/usa-coal-study/coals-hidden-costs-top-345-bil-
lion-in-u-s-study-idUSN1628366220110216.
150. See the European Commission Report: Subsidies and costs of EU energy.
Final Report. European Commission. November 2014.
151. See the EU Report. Ibid., p. 37, Figure 3–8 and notes. Accessed at:
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/obed-mountain-mine-
fine-athabasca-spill-1.4154792.
5
Coming Clean
Introduction
At the end of Chapter 4 we asked the question: Surely there’s a better way of
providing energy and power to the world? In this chapter, we answer that ques-
tion with a resounding: Yes there is!
Solar energy, wind power, geothermal heat, and hydraulic energy have
been used in one form or another since the beginning of recorded history.
England’s Domes Day book dates from the eleventh Century and recorded
the number of mills powered by water in towns across the country. But
you can go back to the Romans, and before that to the Egyptians and the
Chinese to find examples of ways in which the power of water and the wind
was used to drive simple machines.
Hot springs were popular in Roman times. Now, geothermal energy is
used to generate electricity at utility-scale in the US and Iceland, and on
a smaller scale in many other countries. District heating using geothermal
hot water has found wide application across Europe. Huge megawatt-scale
solar photovoltaic installations, and enormous wind turbines now generate
enough power to light hundreds of thousands of homes. An energy revolu-
tion is underway.
In this chapter we look at these technologies and discover how these
sources of inexhaustible renewable energy, none of which produce emis-
sions of greenhouse gases, can provide nearly all of the global demand for
energy—and at less cost.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_5
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M. J. Bush
Wind and Water
Wind and water at first powered mechanical machines made mainly from
wood. But with the invention of electricity and its rapid evolution into a
source of power for industrial machinery in the nineteenth century, it wasn’t
long before the flow of water was channelled and harnessed to generate
electricity.
The first recorded hydroelectric machine was built was in England in
1878—when a small turbine and generator produced electricity to light
a single electric bulb. But the idea rapidly caught on. Just three years later
there were hydroelectric plants installed in Grand Rapids, New York and
Niagara Falls in the US, and in Ottawa, Canada. Then in 1895, the world’s
largest hydroelectric plant at that time: the Edward Dean Adams power
plant, started operating at Niagara Falls.1
At about the same time, the first electricity-generating wind turbine was
erected in Scotland by James Blyth and used to light his home. In 1887, a
large wind turbine was built in Cleveland, Ohio, by Charles Brush. It drove
a 12 kilowatt generator.
Electricity generated from solar energy and wind power didn’t really take
off until the twentieth century. In rural America and Canada in the 1930s,
kilowatt-scale wind electric turbines were commonplace—until electrifica-
tion programs brought centrally-generated electricity to rural farms in the
1960s.2
Experimentally, wind turbines got bigger. The first megawatt-scale turbine
was the Smith-Putnam machine erected on Grandpa’s Knob in Vermont
in 1941. The first wind farm, albeit with smaller turbines, was erected in
Altamont Pass in California in the early 1980s.
Solar photovoltaic electricity was a late starter compared to wind and
water—but is now one of the most widely deployed forms of renewable
energy.
After years of steady cost decline, renewable power technologies are now
an increasingly competitive way to meet global energy needs. In particular,
the decline in electricity costs for utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) pro-
jects has been huge. Solar PV technology is now competing head-to head
with conventional power sources—and doing so without financial support.
Three main cost reduction drivers have emerged for renewable energy:
improvements in technology, competitive procurement, and a large base of
experienced international project developers.
Electricity from renewable sources of energy will soon be consistently
cheaper than energy from fossil fuels. Well before 2020, all the renewable
5 Coming Clean
215
power generation technologies that are now in commercial use will fall
within fossil-fuel cost range, with most at the lower end and undercutting all
fossil fuels. The outlook for solar and wind electricity costs to 2020, based
on the latest auction and project-level cost data, projects the lowest costs yet
seen for these modular technologies.
Decreasing electricity costs from renewables as a whole, and the low costs
from the best solar PV and onshore wind projects represents a real paradigm
shift in the competitiveness of different power generation options.3
Leading the Way
A number of countries have moved strongly forward to facilitate a transition
to a low-carbon and even a zero-carbon economy.
A first and absolutely essential step is to phase out coal-fired power plants.
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Finland, France, Italy, and Portugal
all have committed to closing their coal plants in the coming decade. The
movement called Europe Beyond Coal is working hard to facilitate this transi-
tion—in association with the Sierra Club’s Beyond Coal campaign.4
In November 2017, a group of 27 national, provincial, state, and city
governments launched the Powering Past Coal Alliance, committing to phas-
ing out coal power by 2030. By early 2018, over 60 government organiza-
tions had signed up.5
Across the USA, over 50 cities, five counties and one state have adopted
100% clean energy goals. Five cities have already met this target: Aspen,
Burlington, Greensburg KS, Rock Port MO, and Kodiak Island AK. These
five cities generate 100% of their energy from renewable energy sources.
Numerous other US cities have made commitments to cut carbon and
address the threat of climate change through initiatives like the ‘Compact of
Mayors’, ‘We Are Still In’, or by establishing their own Climate Action Plan.6
Universities and schools are powering up on solar energy. In 2019, the
University of Hawaii, Maui College will be one of the first campuses in the
US to generate all of its energy from on-site photovoltaic electricity coupled
with battery storage. The entire university network will be 100% renewable
by 2035 and the state has committed to be 100% on renewables by 2045.
The Ready for 100 association, initiated by the US Sierra Club, has
issued guidelines for this transition: climate action plans and energy action
plans.7 Another initiative being promoted by the Sierra Club is Mayors for
100% clean energy—190 mayors have signed up to a future of 100% clean
and renewable energy.8
216
M. J. Bush
Then there’s RE 100—a collaborative, global initiative uniting more than

120 influential businesses committed to consuming 100% renewable elec-
tricity and working to increase the demand and delivery of renewable energy.
At the COP 22 meeting in Marrakesh in 2016, representatives from 47 of
the world’s most disadvantaged nations pledged to generate all their future
energy needs from renewable energy. Members of the Climate Vulnerable
Forum (CVF) issued a statement on the last day of the Marrakesh meeting.
Dubbed the Marrakesh Vision, the nations pledged that they will “strive to
meet 100% domestic renewable energy production as rapidly as possible, while
working to end energy poverty and protect water and food security. ”9
In 2018, the Balearic Islands’ government launched a plan to eliminate
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. New diesel cars are to be taken off the
road in Ibiza, Majorca, Menorca and Formenta from 2025, a year in which
all street lights are to be replaced by LEDs. Solar panels are to be installed
on all buildings with roofs larger than 1000 square metres—which includes
car parks, hospitals, supermarkets and sports stadiums. Gasoline and diesel
vehicles are to be totally eliminated, and all car hire fleets on the islands will
be electric.10
Over the course of 2016, 117 countries submitted their first Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, and 55 of
these countries featured renewable energy targets.11
During the same year, the Australian Capital Territory added a new com-
mitment and several other large cities—such as Calgary, Tokyo, Cape Town
and New York set significant targets for the transition to renewable energy.12
Copenhagen went one step further. As part of the city’s aim to become car-
bon-neutral by 2025, Copenhagen requires that all flat roofs be planted with
vegetation.13 Many cities plan to simply ban gasoline and diesel vehicles
from the city centre.
Building on international agreement to phase out fossil fuel subsidies—
such as the 2009 commitments by the Group of Twenty (G20) and by Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)—by the end of 2016 more than 50
countries had committed to stop subsidising fossil fuels. Subsidy reforms
were instituted in Angola, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gabon,
India, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sudan,
Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisian, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Zambia.
However, fossil fuel subsidies are still substantially higher than the subsidies
for renewable sources of energy.14
So there is a high-profile groundswell of initiatives aimed at reducing
countries’ and cities’ dependence on fossil fuels and transitioning towards a
low carbon economy.
But the pace of change has to pick up substantially.
5 Coming Clean
217
Global Energy Production

The year 2017 saw a continuing fall in the price of photovoltaic energy and
wind power, and a continued interest in energy storage—one of the keys to
the more rapid adoption of renewable power technologies.
Globally, primary energy demand has grown by an annual average of
around 1.8% since 2011, although the rate of growth has slowed in the last
few years. Growth has been more rapid in developing countries and emerg-
ing economies—whereas in many developed countries demand has slowed
or even declined.
In North America and western Europe, coal production is declining as
many countries commit to phasing out coal for electricity generation. But
several countries—most notably China and India, continue to increase coal
production for generating electricity.15 Figure 5.1 shows the share of renewa-
ble energy in global final energy consumption in 2016.
Figure 5.1 shows that renewable sources of energy provides a significant
fraction, more than 18%, of the energy consumed worldwide. If we look
at only modern renewables—excluding the wood and charcoal traditionally
used for cooking in many developing countries, the fraction falls to just over
10%. But this is still more than four times larger than the contribution of
nuclear power. However, the share of fossil fuels in final energy consumption
has actually been increasing since 2014 when it was 78.3%.
Table 5.1 shows the increase in the deployment of renewable energy over
the period 2014–2017. Solar photovoltaic and wind power are the technolo-
gies leading the rapid penetration of renewable sources of energy into global
electrical power production.
Fig. 5.1 Estimated renewable energy share of total final energy consumption in

2016 (REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report) (Source REN21)
218
M. J. Bush
Table 5.1 Renewable energy indicators 2014–2017

Renewable energy technology 2014 2015 2016 2017 % change
2014–2017
Power capacity GW
Renewable power (including hydro) 1701 1856 2017 2195 29.0
Renewable energy (not including 665 785 921 1081 62.6
hydro)
Hydropowera 1036 1071 1095 1114 7.5
Bio-power 101 106 112 122 20.8
Geothermal 12.9 13 12.1 12.8 −0.8
Solar photovoltaic 177 228 303 402 127.1
Concentrating solar thermal 4.3 4.7 4.8 4.9 14.0
Wind power 370 433 487 539 45.7
Heat GW thermal
Solar hot water 409 436 456 472 15.4
Transport—billion litres
Ethanol production 94.5 98.3 103 106 12.2
Biodiesel production 30.4 30.1 30.8 31 2.0
The data are from the Renewables Global Status Report for 2016, 2017 and 2018.
There are some slight differences in the data reported in the different reports
aThis figure does not include pumped storage facilities. The figure for installed capac-
ity reported by the International Hydropower Association for 2017 is 1267 GW—
including pumped storage capacity. See Chapter 6
Source REN21 Global Status Report
Hydropower continues to dominate the renewable energy technolo-

gies in terms of installed capacity, but this source of energy is growing only
slowly. In contrast, solar photovoltaic and wind power are catching up rap-
idly. Concentrating solar thermal power (the ‘power tower’ concept), is still
a developing technology—but one with considerable potential—particularly
when combined with thermal storage.
Geothermal is a technology with enormous potential at megawatt scale—
but is hampered by high upfront costs and investment risks. Nevertheless, there
are installations operating successfully—notably in the US, Philippines, and
Indonesia, and development work is continuing elsewhere. But as Table 5.1
shows, installed capacity has not changed materially over the last four years.
New investment in renewable power and fuels (not counting large hydro
over 50 MW) exceeded $200 billion annually for the eighth year running.
Investments in renewable power capacity including hydropower, was three
times the investment in fossil fuel generating capacity and more than double
the investment in fossil fuel and nuclear power generation combined. The
principal focus was solar photovoltaic energy, which increased its lead over
wind power in 2017. Moreover, investment in small-scale solar PV registered
significant growth—rising 15% to $49 billion.16
5 Coming Clean
219
The Key Sectors

The European Commission has set out a roadmap that charts how the
European Union plans to transition towards a low-carbon economy. The
Commission estimates that by 2050, emissions of greenhouse gases will have
to be reduced by 80% compared to 1990 values if the Paris Agreement lim-
its of 1.5–2 °C are to be achieved. The milestones along the way are set as:
• A 40% reduction by 2030

• A 60% reduction by 2040.
Can this unprecedented reduction in greenhouse gas emissions be achieved

by transitioning to renewable energy? Figure 5.2 shows how this substantial
reduction in European emissions is to be achieved.17
What this roadmap projects is that the power sector should be almost
fully decarbonized by 2050—by mandating and incentivizing an almost
total transition to renewable energy.
The power sector has the greatest potential for cutting emissions. It can
virtually eliminate CO2 emissions by 2050. In parallel, electricity is expected
to replace fossil fuels both in transport and heating. Electricity will come
from renewable resources: wind, solar, hydropower and biomass, or other
clean energy sources like nuclear power. Carbon capture and storage (CCS)
is also expected to play a role in reducing emissions.
Fig. 5.2 European greenhouse gas emission reductions projected through to 2050

(Source European Commission)
220
M. J. Bush
By 2050, emissions from transport are forecast to be reduced by 60%

below 1990 levels. In the short-term, greater fuel efficiency for gasoline and
diesel engines is an essential part of transport policy. But over the mid- to
longer-term, plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles will produce steeper emis-
sion reductions. Both policies can be pursued in tandem as the transition
to electrified vehicles gradually becomes the dominant mode of transport.
Biofuels are expected to be increasingly used in aviation and in long-distance
haulage where electric powertrains may not be practical or economic.
In this European scenario, emissions from residences and office buildings
are substantially reduced—by about 90% in 2050. This is to be achieved
by incorporating energy-efficient heating and cooling technology in new
buildings, refurbishing older buildings to improve energy efficiency, and
substituting electricity and renewables for fossil fuels in heating, cooling and
cooking.
In the industrial sector, energy intensive industries are expected to cut
emissions by more than 80% by 2050—by using more efficient technolo-
gies and also by more widespread employment of CCS in industries where
reductions are more difficult for technical reasons—such as steel-making and
cement production.
Emissions from agriculture are forecast to decrease more modestly—and
the share of agriculture in EU’s total emissions is expected to rise to about a
third by 2050.18
The Power Sector

In 2017, renewable power generating capacity recorded its largest ever
annual increase—rising almost 9% above 2016 levels. Overall, renewable
energy accounted for an estimated 70% of net additions to global power
capacity in 2017, due in large part to the increasing cost-competitiveness of
photovoltaic energy and wind power.
Solar PV led the way—accounting for nearly 55% of newly installed
renewable power capacity in 2017. More new solar PV was installed
than net additions of fossil fuels and nuclear power combined.19 The
International Energy Agency (IEA) proclaimed that it was the start of “a
new era for solar power”.20
Figure 5.3 breaks out the types of renewable energy that contributed to
this electrical power production at the end of 2017.
Globally, most electrical power continues to be generated in coal-fired
power plants, but as noted earlier in this chapter, several countries have
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Fig. 5.3 Estimated renewable energy share of global electricity production end-2017

(Source REN21 Global Status Report)
committed to phasing out coal—although not always right away; 2030 is

often cited as the deadline for the collective shutdown.
Hydropower remains the predominant renewable power technology—
out-muscling the other renewables because of the numerous large-scale
hydropower plants operating around the world. But there is mounting con-
cern that this technology is vulnerable to the fluctuating precipitation and
increased variability that the changing climate will have on rainfall patterns
and river flows. Compared to wind and solar, hydropower capacity has
increased only modestly over the last couple of years.
At the end of 2017, the top five countries for total installed renewable
electric power capacity were China, the USA, Brazil, Germany and India. If
large hydropower is set aside, the top five countries would be China, the US,
Germany, India and Japan—all countries with significant solar and wind
power capacity.
China alone is responsible for over 40% of global renewable energy capac-
ity growth—a policy which is driven in part by serious concerns about air
pollution. The country is ahead of schedule—exceeding its 2020 solar PV
target in 2016 and expecting to surpass its wind target in 2019. In 2018,
China represented half of global solar PV demand, while Chinese companies
account for about 60% of total annual PV cell manufacturing capacity.
The spectacular growth in wind and PV power is being driven by record-
low auction prices for electricity production—as low as $30/MWh (equivalent
to 3 US cents per kilowatthour) on the international market. These contract
prices, structured as power purchase agreements (PPAs), are increasingly below
the cost of power from new gas and high-efficiency coal power plants.
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M. J. Bush
A case in point are the offers made by several international consor-

tia bidding in February 2018 to construct a 300 MW photovoltaic power
plant in Sakaka, Saudi Arabia. At least five of the offers were below 3 cents/
kWh—those made by French energy group Engie, Japanese companies JGC
Corporation and Mitsubishi, Total (France) and the Saudi energy group
ACWA. Saudi Arabia’s Renewable Energy Project Development Office
(REPCO) awarded the contract to ACWA—which signed a 25-year Power
Purchase Agreement in March 2017.21
In 2018, the USA was the second-largest growth market for renewables—
in spite of the uncertainties created by tax reforms, NAFTA negotiations,
and import duties imposed by the Trump administration. The main eco-
nomic drivers remained strong for new onshore wind and solar installations
such as multi-year federal tax incentives combined with renewable portfolio
standards as well as state-level policies for distributed solar PV systems.22
The third major player on the global renewable energy stage is India. By
2022, the country is expected to more double its current renewable electric-
ity capacity, and the rate of growth of renewable energy will be greater than
the European Union. Recent auctions for solar energy have yielded prices
lower than coal tariffs—for the moment by far the predominant fuel source
for electricity generation in India.
Can Coal Come Clean?
Coal-fired electrical power generation technology has definitely improved.

High-efficiency low-emission (HELE) coal-fired power plants are being pro-
posed as a climate-friendly technology that can substantially reduce emis-
sions of carbon dioxide.
The greater efficiency is achieved because the power plants operate
at much higher temperatures—at above 700 °C where steam becomes
super-critical and has quite different physical and thermodynamic proper-
ties compared to steam at lower temperatures. The higher thermal efficiency
means that the power plant uses less coal—which leads to lower emissions of
carbon dioxide and the other pollutants found in the flue gases of coal-fired
power plants.
Table 5.2 from a coal industry publication shows the relative performance
of a proposed 1 GW HELE coal power plant in South East Asia.
Table 5.2 shows that a supercritical HELE power plant could reduce CO2
emissions by about 22%—which is a significant improvement. But this ben-
efit comes at a substantial price: capital costs increase by 40%, from $1.05 to
$1.47 billion per megawatt of installed capacity.
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Table 5.2 Relative performance of coal-fired generation technologies in South East

Asia
Technology Capital Net thermal Emission Capital cost Annual emis-
cost (M$/ efficiency rate (tCO2/ for 1 GW plant sions at 85%
MW) (%) MWh) ($million) load factor
(MtCO2)
Conventional 1.05 32 1.04 1047 7.73
Subcritical
Supercritical 1.26 36 0.88 1256 6.54
Ultra 1.47 39 0.81 1465 6.06
supercritical
See the report from World Coal: The case for coal: The power of high efficiency coal
reducing emissions while delivering economic development and reliable energy.
https://www.worldcoal.org/sites/default/files/resources_files/The%20Power%20of%20
high%20efficiency%20coal%20-%20WCA%20-%200316.pdf
Source World Coal
The coal industry argues that CCS technology could further reduce emis-
sions by removing CO2 directly from the flue gases—which is true. But all
this advanced technology gets to be expensive, and CCS technology has yet
to be proven at large scale.
In addition, this analysis ignores the rest of the coal fuel cycle: the mining
operations, the tailings ponds, the coal trains, the coal ash retention ponds,
and the emissions of mercury and other pollutants—all the parts of coal’s
life cycle that have serious negative and costly impacts on the environment
and on human health.
The truth is that natural gas—a cleaner fuel, and renewable energy
(cleaner still), have a substantial economic advantage over coal-fired power
plants. But politics often plays a dominate role in governments’ energy pol-
icy decision-making. Take the case of Poland.
In 2018, Poland was Europe’s largest coal producer, and the fossil fuel
continues to dominate the energy mix in Poland—accounting for a huge
80% of electricity production. The country is investing in new mines
including those producing lignite—the lowest quality coal.
The Polish government’s strong commitment to coal has little to do with
economics.
The coal industry has a long and proud tradition in Poland. Miners
parade in traditional uniforms at state events. They enjoy salaries and
pensions higher than the national average. They are also highly organ-
ized, politically influential, and mobilize rapidly and effectively to ensure
that the mines are kept open and that coal is the principal fuel for power
generation.
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M. J. Bush
The government is also keenly aware of issues around energy security. The
country does not want to be dependent on Russian supplies of natural gas,
and domestic supplies of coal are abundant, predictable and secure. Supplies
of liquified natural gas are increasing: Poland is diversifying its suppliers, but
the fuel is intended to reduce the country’s reliance on Russia rather than to
substitute for coal.
This situation evidently creates a political problem for the European
Union—which is strongly committed to phasing out coal and transitioning
to renewable energy.23
Transport
Worldwide, the transportation of goods and people by road, rail, ships and
airplanes, accounts for roughly a quarter of greenhouse gas emissions—
about the same as the electrical power sector. If vehicles could be powered
by electricity generated by renewable energy or nuclear power, and if other
technologies like fuel cells or hydrogen could also power zero-emission vehi-
cles (ZEVs), the global reduction in greenhouse gases could potentially be
huge.
Electric vehicles have been around for decades. But it is only with
the increasing concern about the global warming effects of carbon diox-
ide emitted from internal combustion engines that the call for a global
transition towards ZEVs has grown louder and (literally) gained more
traction.
At the Paris Conference of Parties meeting in December 2015, a decla-
ration was issued specifically focusing on the electrification of the transport
sector. Titled the Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility and Climate Change
& Call to Action, the declaration stressed the link between ZEVs and the
“low-carbon production of electricity and hydrogen, implemented in conjunction
with broader sustainable transport principles.”24
Citing modeling work undertaken by the IEA, the Declaration called for
the electrification of rail transport, and for at least 20% of all road transport
vehicles to be electrically powered by 2030—if global warming is to be lim-
ited to 2 °C or less.
This scenario foresees more than 100 million electric vehicles on the roads
in 2030, and more than 400 million two- and three-wheelers (up from
about 250 million operating today—mainly in China).25
Considering that there are only about 3 million electric vehicles on the
roads at the present time (2018) this scenario envisaged by the IEA and
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225
endorsed by the UNFCCC at the 2015 COP meeting in Paris implies

an almost explosive growth in the sale of electric vehicles. Is it a realistic
scenario?
In 2015, for the first time in history, there were more than 1 million elec-
tric vehicles on the road. In early 2018, the number of electric and plug-in
hybrids had already soared to 3 million.26
Figure 5.4 shows the trend in EVs sold worldwide at the end of 2017.
The rapid growth in the number of electric vehicles in operation since
2010 has been phenomenal.
The market is dominated by China and the US, followed by Japan and
the Netherlands. However, in the Nordic region—Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway and Sweden, the stock of EVs has been expanding stead-
ily since 2010 and by the end of 2017 it had reached almost 250,000 cars,
about 8% of the global total of electric vehicles. Per capita, the Nordic
region has one of the highest levels of EV penetration in the world.27
Norway is leading the way—in 2015 electric vehicles had an impressive
23% of market share. Three years later more than half of new car sales were
for battery electric or hybrid cars, and all-electric cars made up 31% of the
market.28
In Germany by the end of 2017, Deutche Post DHL had 5000
StreetScooter electric vehicles operating entirely on renewable electricity for
the company’s urban postal delivery service. According to DHL, the EV’s
Fig. 5.4 Global Passenger Electric Vehicle Market (including PHEVs), 2012–2017

(Source REN21 Global Status Report)
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M. J. Bush
maintenance costs are 60–80% less than similar conventional vehicles, and
the use of renewable electricity reduces the company’s CO2 emissions by
16,000 tonnes a year, contributing to DHL’s commitment to achieve net-
zero emissions by 2050.29
In Latin America there is strong interest in electric vehicles. Cities in
Columbia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Costa Rica have all commit-
ted to increasing EV’s market share and electrifying public transport. The
region has some of the cleanest electricity in the world. In 2016, over 50%
of electricity was generated by renewable sources of energy, so switching to
electric vehicles brings immediate benefits in terms of cutting back emissions
of carbon and improving air quality in urban areas.30
China overtook the USA in 2015 and is now the largest market for elec-
tric vehicles (EVs). China is also home to the highest global deployment
of electric scooters and electric buses. The country has seen a phenome-
nal growth in the production and use of electric scooters and motorcycles
largely because of restrictions on conventional 2-wheelers in towns and cities
in order to reduce air pollution. In 2017, the country had over 250 million
electric 2-wheelers on the road, and more than 300,000 electric buses.31
The rapid growth in the deployment of electric vehicles is certain to
continue. The Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI), a multi-government policy
forum established in 2009 under the Clean Energy Ministerial, has a goal
of a global deployment of 20 million zero emission vehicles on the road by
2020.32 The state of California alone is aiming for 5 million zero emission
vehicles operating by 2030.33
Although less bullish than these projections, a 2018 forecast by
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) projected sales of electric vehicles
increasing from 1.1 million in 2017 to around 11 million in 2025, reaching
30 million in 2030. China is expected to lead this transition with almost
50% of the global EV market in 2025. The market penetration of electric
buses will be even more dramatic as their cost drops below conventional
municipal buses.34
In China, the numbers are going through the roof. In July 2018, it was
reported that for the five-month period from January to May, the produc-
tion and sales of electric vehicles reached 328,000 units—increases of 123%
and 142% respectively compared to the previous year. China expects to
achieve more than 1 million units in both production and sales of EVs in
2018.35
In 2017, a coalition of global corporations, including Unilever, IKEA,
and DHL launched a global campaign to accelerate the transition to electric
vehicles and away from gasoline and diesel-powered transportation. Since
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227
more than half of the cars on the road belong to companies, the new coa-
lition, called EV100, could potentially have a major impact on the pace at
which the change to electric vehicles takes place. Germany’s Deutche Post
DHL Group, a global delivery company, purchased EV startup StreetScooter
to build its own electric delivery can service. European power plant operator
Vattenfall plans to replace its 3500 strong car fleet with plug-in EVs over the
next five years. New York City plans to convert all 5700 of its public buses
to an all-electric fleet by 2040.36
The projections keep climbing exponentially. In May 2019, the IEA was
predicting 250 million electric vehicles on the road by 2030!37
Other companies involved in EV100 include Chinese webservice giant
Baidu, retailer Metro AG, Heathrow Airport and Hewlett Packard.38
Governments have used a wide variety of financial incentives to encourage
the shift from gasoline and diesel vehicles to ZEVs—mainly battery electric
vehicles and plug-in hybrids. These incentives include:
EV purchase incentives
• Rebates at registration and sale
• Sales tax and VAT exemptions
• Tax credits
EV use and circulation incentives

• Circulation tax exemptions
• Waivers on fees: toll roads, congestion charges, parking, ferries
• Electricity supply reductions and exemptions
• Tax credits for company cars
Waivers on access restrictions

• Access to bus lanes
• Access to HOV lanes
• Access to restricted traffic zones.
These incentives are often coupled with dissuasive measures aimed at reduc-
ing the emissions of conventional vehicles: regulations limiting tailpipe
emissions and stricter fuel efficiency standards. In addition, a number of
European cities plan to completely ban gasoline and diesel vehicles because
of concerns about air pollution. In 2018, Paris, the English city of Oxford,
as well as the whole of the Netherlands announced separate proposals to
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M. J. Bush
phase out gasoline and diesel vehicles.39 Britain intends to ban all new gas-
oline and diesel vehicles by 2040.40 But the lack of charging points in the
UK has been cited as a barrier to the rapid uptake of electric vehicles.41
These financial and fiscal incentives are having a positive impact on the
global market penetration of electric vehicles. But as the cost of batteries fall
and economies of scale kick in, electric vehicles will increasing become com-
petitive with conventional vehicles even without the subsidies. A 2017 study
found that battery EVs were already the cheapest option in the UK, the US
and Japan.
Studies show that the lower cost of maintenance and fuel brings down
the annual cost of battery electric vehicles to below that of diesel- and gaso-
line-engine cars in the UK. Battery electric vehicles are also less expensive to
own and operate compared to hybrids and plug-in hybrids in Japan, Texas
and California.42
One of the keys to the rapid deployment of electric vehicles, apart from
the numerous incentives, is the rapidly declining cost of the batteries—
which are a major cost component of all electric vehicles. Battery packs
(often called the ESS or Energy Storage System), have been dropping rapidly
in price—falling nearly 80% since 2010.43
By displacing the internal combustion engine (ICE), electric and other
zero emission vehicles deliver immediate benefits in terms of urban air qual-
ity—a hazard that is becoming increasingly dangerous in cities in China,
India and even in Europe. But substantial greenhouse gas reductions can
only be realised if the power plants generating the electricity are powered by
renewable energy or nuclear power—not fossil fuels.
There is therefore a powerful synergy between renewable energy power
plants and electric vehicles. Acting in tandem, the potential for substantial
game-changing reductions in global emissions of greenhouse gases is huge.
Public Transport
One attractive option that is available to cities that have serious air pollu-
tion problems caused by gasoline and diesel vehicles is to strongly promote
the deployment of electric buses. Converting city transit buses to electric
is a definite win-win situation if the source of electricity is predominantly
renewable energy. Diesel exhaust from buses pose a serious health risk. The
vehicles mainly run in areas where there are lots of people, including in the
more densely crowded areas of cities, on the busiest roads and often close to
schools. Buses circulate almost continuously and make several trips each day.
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229
The message is getting out. In April 2018, New York City announced
it will convert its public bus system to an all-electric fleet by 2040. Not
to be outdone, Los Angeles has committed to transitioning its entire bus
fleet to electricity by 2030. Other US cities are piloting electric buses:
Seattle, Washington DC, Chicago, Portland, Albuquerque, to name a few.
In Canada, Edmonton has committed to electric buses and Montreal is
expected to follow suit.44 Toronto has committed to purchasing 30 electric
buses by 2019, and the whole fleet is to go electric by 2040.45
The range anxiety issue can more easily be allayed in larger vehicles—like
trucks and buses—that can carry much larger energy storage systems. A case
in point is a Proterra 40-foot bus that broke records in 2018 by running
over 1600 km in the US on a single charge.
Other manufacturers are taking a stake in what is rapidly becoming a sub-
stantial global market. Chinese automaker BYD will manufacture electric
buses and trucks in its Lancaster, California, facility. Volvo has a new 7900
series battery electric bus (BEB) on the market. In 2017, Hyundai unveiled
a BEB with a range of 180 miles. Volkswagen in Europe and Tata in India
are also manufacturing BEBs.
A good place to start is with school buses. These buses in the US and
Canada carry millions of children to school and back every weekday.
Replacing all of America’s school buses with electric buses would avoid more
that 5 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions. This reduction is twice
as much as would be saved by converting all the US transit buses to elec-
tric power.46 There are serious health risks associated with diesel school buses
running in and of schools and with children standing in proximity to the
exhaust gases.
Although electric buses cost more to purchase, their lifetime costs are less.
The operating costs of electric buses are less than half the cost of conven-
tional diesel buses. Each electric school bus in service is estimated to save
districts nearly $2000 a year in fuel and $4400 in reduced maintenance
costs compared to diesel school buses.47
Marine and Aviation
Marine shipping and aviation are also significant producers of carbon diox-
ide. Many ships burn heavy fuel oil—one of the worst fuels imaginable in
terms of carbon emissions.
Aircraft produce significant amount of CO2 emissions, and as interna-
tional travel and tourism continues to rise, so too do the emissions produced
by international aviation.
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M. J. Bush
The substitution of alternative fuels in ships and aircraft is technically

possible, but little progress has been made so far—mainly because of a lack
of regulatory oversight, but also because alternate fuels are more expensive
and there is therefore little incentive for commercial operators of ships and
aircraft to switch to fuels with a lower carbon footprint.
Shipping
In 2018, international shipping was responsible for about 900 million

tonnes a year of carbon dioxide—which puts shipping right up there with
Germany in terms of emissions of greenhouse gases. If international ship-
ping were a country it would be in 8th place in the world’s top ten of high-
est emitters of carbon dioxide.
Essentially unregulated at the present time,48 emissions from shipping
are projected to rise to 1090 Mt of CO2 by 2035 and to roughly dou-
ble again by 2050 unless shipping is regulated and controlled much more
effectively.49
In addition to the greenhouse gases, the heavy fuel oil burned by the
majority of oceangoing vessels in their low-speed diesel engines produce a
slew of other pollutants—including black carbon.
This pollutant, which is not covered by the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris
Agreement, is now recognized as having a strong influence on global warm-
ing and climate change.
Technically black carbon is not a gas, and so it is not classified as a green-
house gas. But its greenhouse warming effect is substantial—even perhaps
exceeding the global warming impact of methane. There is more about the
global warming potential of black carbon in Chapter 2.
The widespread use of residual fuels in international shipping exacerbates
the problem because ships using residual fuel oil emit more black carbon
than if they operated on cleaner distillate fuels.
Shipping emitted about 67,000 tonnes of black carbon in 2015. Larger
ships are responsible for most of these emissions. Container ships, bulk car-
riers and oil tankers together emitted 60% of BC emissions. But cruise ships
are the worst offender—each ship emitting three times more than container
ships and about six times more than oil tankers. However, container ships
emit more black carbon than any other class of ship simply because there are
more of them.50
Figure 5.5 graphically depicts the relative emissions of black carbon
among the different types of shipping.51
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231
Fig. 5.5 Tonnes of black carbon emissions per ship per year in 2015 (Source
International Council on Clean Transportation)
On average, one cruise ship emits as much black carbon as over 4000
heavy duty trucks clocking 100,000 km a year.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) which regulates inter-
national shipping, has been discussing how to control greenhouse gas emis-
sions from oceangoing vessels for more than 20 years. Under the UNFCCC
Kyoto protocol, the IMO was assigned responsibility to limit GHG emis-
sions from international shipping, which fall outside of national borders.
But it wasn’t until 2011 with the passage of the Energy Efficiency Design
Index that the IMO adopted its first mandatory requirements for GHG
emissions from oceangoing vessels.
However, in 2015, reduction targets for international shipping and inter-
national aviation were not included in the Paris Agreement.
In April 2018, the IMO held the 72nd meeting of the Marine
Environment Protection Committee—which adopted a resolution codify-
ing an initial greenhouse gas strategy for international shipping. This was the
first global climate framework for shipping that included quantitative GHG
reduction targets through to 2050, and a list of candidate policy measures to
help achieve these targets.
The GHG reduction targets set by the IMO include:
• At least a 40% reduction in carbon intensity (defined as CO2 emissions

per unit of transport work) by 2030, and pursuing efforts towards a 70%
reduction by 2050, both compared to 2008 levels.
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M. J. Bush
• To peak GHG emissions from international shipping as soon as possi-

ble and to reduce total annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050
compared to 2008 levels while pursuing efforts towards phasing them out
consistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goals.
• A new phase of the Energy Efficiency Design Index to be reviewed within
the Marine Environment Protection Committee.52
According to the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT),

achieving these targets will “require near-term policies to significantly improve
the fuel efficiency of the global fleet, and to promote the development and deploy-
ment of low-and zero-carbon fuels and propulsion technologies.”53
But what is lacking in these proposals is any reference to black carbon emis-
sions. Since BC technically is not a greenhouse gas, it is not specifically covered
by proposals to reduce GHGs. Moreover, the metric carbon intensity is defined
only in terms of emissions of CO2 related to transport work (ton-mile of travel
or a similar metric). So emissions of black carbon may not actually change.
Just before the IMO meeting in April 2018, the International Transport
Forum published a report examining how maritime transport might transi-
tion to zero-carbon shipping by 2035.54
Several alternative fuels for shipping were evaluated including advanced bio-
fuels, liquified natural gas, hydrogen, ammonia, methanol, wind power, fuel
cells, electric-hybrid propulsion, solar photovoltaic, and nuclear propulsion.
Wind power and photovoltaics are not at present technically viable for
oceangoing shipping. But powering smaller coastal vessels and ferries with
low-carbon fuels and electricity is feasible.
For examples of how this might be achieved, we take a look at Sweden—
which has taken the global lead on decarbonizing maritime transport.
Case Study: Sweden
The Swedish Shipowners Association is aiming for zero CO2 emissions by

2050—an ambitious but feasible target. The Scandinavian country is among
the first with a significant number of LNG-powered ships, ship-to-ship
LNG supply ships, electric ships, and methanol-powered vessels.
• The company Erik Thun AB operates an LNG-powered ocean-going dry

cargo vessel.
• Viking Lines operates the world’s largest LNG-powered passenger ferry
between Stockholm and Turku in Finland.
• Green City Ferries operates an electric ferry between Stockholm and
Movitz.
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233
• HH Ferries operates two electric ferries between Helsingborg in Sweden

ad Helsingor in Denmark—a 4 km route. The ferries are the largest
100% electric-powered car and passenger ferries in the world. Both are
hybrid diesel-electric ships with the diesel as a back up to the electric
motors. The lithium batteries can be charged in under 10 minutes.
• Stena Line is the first shipping company to use methanol as fuel—con-
verting a large passenger and car ferry operating between Gothenburg and
Kiel in Germany.
None of these ships are directly powered by solar or wind. The electric ships
are powered by electricity from batteries that are charged at the end of their
journey. But if the national grid is running mostly on hydropower—which
is the case in Sweden, effectively this is zero- or low-emission shipping pow-
ered for the most part by renewable energy.55
Not just the ships, but the ports are also going electric. In the US, the
port of San Diego is switching to electric powered forklifts and other dock-
yard vehicles. Ships in port turn off their auxiliary engines and plug into the
power system to reduce pollution.56
Aviation
Electric planes transporting large numbers of passengers over long distances are
not impossible—but seem highly unlikely with today’s technology—or even
tomorrow’s. But we already have drones capable of carrying a passenger or two
over short distances, so maybe the future of electric aviation isn’t so far off.
In the meantime, airplane engines can be converted to run on biofuels, and
while this is not a zero emission option, it is certainly a better alternative in terms
of net carbon emissions compared to today’s petroleum distillate jet fuels.57
Residential and Tertiary
The principal use of fossil fuels in residences and in commercial buildings is
for heating and cooling—services which can both be provided by electric-
ity. To take advantage of electricity generated from renewable resources of
energy, the residential and tertiary sectors should be electrified—just like the
road-based transportation sector.
So the first step in reducing the emission of greenhouse gases from the
residential sector is to phase out the fossil fuels used for space heating: natu-
ral gas, heating oil, and wood, and to switch everything over to electricity—
from renewable sources of energy, of course.
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M. J. Bush
Going Electric
In the developed world and in the cities of developing countries, just about
all functional buildings that accommodate people for at least part of the day
are connected to an electrical power supply of some kind. Most of that elec-
tricity is supplied by an electrical distribution system connected to a large
and extensive power grid. But this model of generating and distributing
electricity is slowly changing.
In North America and Europe, increasing numbers of homes and resi-
dences have installed solar photovoltaic systems to provide part or all of the
electricity consumed in the home. The majority of these homes are still con-
nected to the grid. At night, and when the solar system is not generating
enough power, electricity is supplied by the grid.
In the USA, there are now more than a million homes and residences that
generate part or all of their electricity from solar (PV) panels.58 In Germany,
the number of distributed (meaning small) PV systems was estimated at 1.6
million at the end of 2017.59 In Japan and Italy, the installation of residen-
tial PV systems has also shown strong growth over recent years.
In 2016, almost $40 billion was invested into predominantly rooftop
and small ground-mounted solar PV systems of less than 1 MW. This was a
decline of 28% on the previous year’s outlay of $55.5 billion and well below
the peak of the German and Italian PV boom years of 2011 and 2012.60
Although investment in small distributed PV was down in 2016 com-
pared to the year before, the amount of residential and commercial capac-
ity was about the same—at approximately 20 GW. The drop in investment
was partly due to lower PV system costs in certain key markets—which ena-
bled developers to install more capacity for the same amount of money. For
instance, American PV installers SolarCity, SunRun and Vivint all dropped
their prices in 2016, while in Australia and Germany prices remained largely
constant.61
Although PV investments in China are larger than all other countries, the
US leads the field in terms of small distributed capacity—which are PV sys-
tems installed on homes, offices and small businesses. Figure 5.6 shows the
investments in billion dollars for small distributed PV systems for the top
ten countries over the period 2015 to 2016.62
The slowing down of investment in Japan and the UK is noticeable, as is the
striking acceleration of investment in India—albeit from a much smaller base.
The cost of residential PV systems is falling due to the continuing
decline in the price of solar photovoltaic panels. If this trend continues as
expected, then the transition to 100% solar powered homes and businesses
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235
Fig. 5.6 Small distributed capacity investments by country in 2016 and growth on

2015 (Source Frankfurt School)
is certain to accelerate—as long as there is an enabling financial and policy

environment.
In this context it is interesting to note the legislation passed in California
in 2018. This state will become the first to require solar PV panels on most
new homes. The mandate applies to all new homes, condos, and apartment
buildings up to three floors tall that obtain building permits in 2020. The
plan will not require the homes to reach net zero energy status, but home-
owners who install a battery, like a Tesla Powerwall, will get an exemption
that allows them to further reduce the size of the solar array.63
In promulgating the new building standards, the California Energy
Commission (CEC) also recognized the importance of energy storage (i.e.
batteries) in reducing a residence’s energy demand so that the residence has
almost no impact on the grid. Roof top solar without storage can cause sta-
bility problems when excessive amounts of distributed power are being fed
to the grid.64
Open for Business
Several high profile businesses and commercial operations in the US and
Europe are now running entirely on solar energy. These showcase installa-
tions play an important role in raising public awareness about photovoltaic
electricity, because they visibly demonstrate the ability of photovoltaic sys-
tems to power large business operations that are household names.
Top companies are investing in PV power in record numbers. 2017
was the 3rd largest year for installations by America’s companies—with
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M. J. Bush
325 MW of installed capacity. Installations are also getting larger—as prices

fall or perhaps as companies are motivated by seeing competitors go solar.
The average system size for business installations since 2008 has risen from
250 kW to over 440 kW in 2017, while installed system prices have fallen
by a whopping 73% since 2010. Supermarket chains Target and Walmart
lead the field: in 2017 Target had 422 PV installations across the country,
while Walmart was not far behind with 371 systems in operation.65
Schools Follow Suit
Schools are ideal buildings to be powered by solar photovoltaic electricity.
Their energy demand peaks during the day when photovoltaic power output
is highest, and they usually have lots of available roof space, and parking areas
where PV canopies can provide useful shade and protection. Any vacant adja-
cent land can also be used to add more capacity. On the weekends, this excess
power can be supplied to the grid and generate revenue for the school.
In the US, there are several thousand photovoltaic systems installed on
K-12 schools across the country. A 2014 report documented that 3752 K-12
schools in the US had installed PV systems—meaning that almost 3 million
students were attending schools powered in part by solar energy. PV systems
also make economic sense: the report found that the electricity generated in
one year by these schools saved a combined $77.8 million per year in utility
bills—an average of almost $21,000 per year per school.
California leads with 963 schools powered by solar energy in 2014—with
a total installed capacity of 217 MW. In second place is New Jersey with 379
schools generating a total of 91 MW.66
The province of Ontario, Canada, has also taken advantage of generous
feed-in-tariffs offered by the provincial government. In the Toronto area,
301 schools had installed PV systems in mid-2018.67
Photovoltaic systems powering schools offer a unique opportunity to
involve school children in the science of solar energy. It’s a solar energy labo-
ratory right there in the school.
Solar Thermal
Although electricity can power space heating through heat pump systems,
providing hot water is an essential service not just for residences and offices
but also for industry. Solar thermal energy can be a cost-effective option.
The amount of direct heat provided by solar energy worldwide is sub-
stantial. There were approximately 108 million solar thermal systems in
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operation across the globe at the end of 2015—mostly domestic hot water
systems (63%), but also larger systems attached to multiple-unit housing,
hotels, hospitals, and schools (28%). The remaining applications were for
swimming pool heating (6%) and a few much larger systems for district
heating, industrial applications, and solar cooling.
The trend in the application of solar thermal technology is interesting.
The data show that the smaller domestic systems are losing market share;
conversely the number of larger solar thermal systems is increasing—even
though it is only about 3% of the market.
In several European countries, large-scale solar thermal plants connected
to local or district heating grids have been in use since the early 1980s. In
recent years, China has installed a number of large scale systems for district
heating.
By the end of 2016, there were about 300 solar thermal systems larger
than 300 kWth68 (which implies about 500 m2 of solar collectors) con-
nected to heating networks, and 18 systems connected to cooling networks.
In 2016, 37 large systems were constructed—up from 21 the year before.
Of these, 31 were all in one country: Denmark—primarily for district heat-
ing, including the world’s largest solar thermal installation in Silkeborg.
This system has a large array of flat plate solar panels with a total area of
over 156,000 m2 and can produce 100 MW of thermal power. The system
works in parallel with an efficient combined-cycle gas plant and a system
of heat pumps. So the system is not 100% renewable energy, but it is defi-
nitely low-carbon compared to a conventional fossil-fuel system. Moreover,
the electricity supply comes from wind power.69
Denmark is also home to the 2nd largest solar thermal system in the
city of Vojens. This is about half the size of the Silkeborg system, but it still
delivers about 60% of the thermal energy demand of 2000 households in
the city.
In Canada, the Drake Landing Solar Community uses a 1.5 MWth cen-
tralized solar thermal plant connected to a seasonal borehole thermal storage
to supply more than 90% of the energy needs for space heating of 52 energy
efficient single family homes. Figure 5.7 shows the configuration of the solar
collectors—800 of which are on the detached community garage.
The Drake Landing solar installation uses an underground borehole system
to store summer heat. In summer, the heated water is pumped through the
borehole thermal energy storage system. The BTES consists of 144 boreholes
that run 37 metres below the ground and cover an area of 35 metres in diame-
ter. The heat is transferred to the surrounding earth which can reach 80 °C by
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M. J. Bush
Fig. 5.7 Drake Landing Solar Community heating system (see the Drake Landing
website at https://dlsc.ca/how.htm) (Source Drake Landing Solar Community)
the end of the summer. To retain the heat, the energy storage is covered with
sand, thermal insulation, a waterproof membrane, clay, and landscaping mate-
rials. Backup heating, if it’s needed, is provided by a natural gas system.
Geothermal Heating
A renewable energy technology that can be directly tapped for residen-

tial and district heating is geothermal energy. Since the amount of thermal
energy that can be extracted is often substantial, heating a district using geo-
thermal energy is often the most efficient and cost-effective option. There
are more than 250 geothermal district heating (geoDH) systems operating
in Europe. Measured by thermal power output, Iceland is by far the most
important country. But in terms of the number of operating systems, France
and Germany are the leading countries.70
Where geothermal resources are insufficient, heat pumps can be employed
in tandem to raise water temperatures. Geothermal energy can also be used
to provide cooling—using absorption chillers, which require a source of heat
to power the absorption cycle.
Geothermal district heating and cooling requires electricity to power the
pumps and compressors that are part of the equipment, and for the control-
lers that operate them. So as we have noted before, geothermal technology
only is only carbon free if the electricity that keeps it running is generated
from renewable resources.
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239
Industry
Industry is a major source of greenhouse gases. In the US, about 15% of
CO2 emissions is produced by the combustion of fossil fuels in this sector.
But heavy industries such iron and steel, and the production of cement, pet-
rochemicals, lime, and ammonia, and the incineration of waste produce sig-
nificant amounts of CO2.
Electrical power to industry can be provided from renewable sources,
but where natural gas is burned for steam generation and process heat, the
options for using renewable sources of energy may be limited. In these cir-
cumstances, CCS technologies may be the only way to reduce emissions of
carbon dioxide.
Industrial societies will always produce emissions of greenhouse gases. It
is impossible to eliminate them entirely. The challenge is to manage these
emissions so that they are as low as possible. There are natural sinks—the
forests and the oceans—that absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
But emissions of methane will always be a serious problem.
As the production and consumption of fossil fuels powers down and is
reduced to applications where solar energy cannot cost-effectively provide
the service, fiscal instruments like carbon pricing that penalize the emis-
sion of carbon dioxide and methane will be essential. This policy, if strictly
enforced, will lead to improvements in efficiency and innovations that keep
emissions to a minimum.
Lighter manufacturing industries that use only electricity (with perhaps
some natural gas for heating) can switch entirely to solar photovoltaic power.
A number of high profile manufacturing companies have made the transi-
tion over the last few years: Apple, Google, and Tesla—to name some of the
most well-known members of the group.
Carbon Capture and Storage
Carbon capture and storage technologies are developing rapidly. Their major
advantage is that they can be used to capture and permanently store carbon
dioxide produced by heavy industry. These are high-temperature, process
heat applications where solar energy is not technically feasible and where
electrical heating would probably not be cost-effective.
When combined with biomass energy, CCS has been proposed as a way
of absorbing carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere and storing it
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M. J. Bush
safely underground. But this concept, known as BECCS, has several serious
drawbacks—as noted in Chapter 3.
There are several small-scale CCS projects operating in North America
and Europe. One of the first was the Boundary Dam 3 project in
Saskatchewan, Canada. Carbon dioxide is absorbed from the flue gases of
Unit 3 of the power plant and pumped 66 km to the Weyburn Enhanced
Oil Recovery Project where the CO2 is primarily used for enhanced oil
recovery (EOR)—although a part of the output is pumped underground
and stored.71
Using CO2 for EOR is a well-known technology that has been used at
many oil production sites in North America. As a mechanism to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases it obviously has serious flaws—since the
additional oil produced will generate more carbon dioxide when burned as
fuel—thus negating the reduced emissions of the capture process. Carbon
dioxide also dissolves in crude oil and so a fraction of the gas will be brought
to the surface with the oil and released into the atmosphere when the pres-
sure is reduced.
The net effect of the carbon capture with EOR is unlikely to be close to
zero. Moreover, it is not evident that CO2 used in EOR situations remains
underground—since it is not being pumped into reservoirs specifically
selected because of their ability to permanently contain the gas.
In Canada, the Quest CCS project near Fort Saskatchewan in Alberta
is designed to capture and store 1 million tonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide a
year. The CO2 is taken from Shells’ Scotford Upgrader which was opened
in 2003 to process bitumen from the oil sands mines of the Athabasca Oil
Sands Project (AOSP). The CCS project began operation in 2015 and cuts
emissions from the bitumen upgrader by one third. The upgrader processes
the bitumen to Syncrude by reacting the bitumen with hydrogen produced
from methane. Carbon dioxide is a waste stream from this chemical process
and was generally vented to the atmosphere.72
The captured CO2 is dehydrated and compressed into liquid form before
being transported 60 km to a storage site in Fort Saskatchewan. The liquid
CO2 is injected down three injection wells into the porous rock formation
called the Basal Cambrian Sands for permanent storage 2 km underground.
The most ambitious CCS project, and a possible blueprint for use of the
CCS technology in removing large quantities of CO2 from the emissions of
heavy industry, is the Teesside Collective project in the UK.
The Tees Valley Process Industry cluster is one of the largest industrial
areas in England, consisting of a diverse group of chemicals, petrochemicals,
steel and energy companies. Teesside is one of the most carbon-intensive
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areas in the UK. Four industries are planned for the first phase of the
CCS network: a blast furnace and steel works at Redcar; GrowHow’s
Teesside operations at Haverton Hill—which include the production of
ammonia, nitric acid, carbon dioxide and fertilizer plants; BOC Linde’s
steam reformer operation producing hydrogen; and Latte Chemical UK’s
plant producing PET resin pellets. The total CO2 production from the four
plants is about 3 million tonnes of CO2 a year.
Two locations in the North Sea are being considered as permanent storage
sites for the captured carbon dioxide. The first is the Captain Aquifer which
is situated about 430 km northeast of Teesside; the second is the Bunter
Aquifer which lies about 150 km south east of the Tees. At the time of writ-
ing the UK government had not yet made a decision which of these aquifers
will be used.73
Rural Electrification
Over a billion people around the world live without access to clean forms
of energy. Providing electricity to these families and households has been
a priority for the international development agencies for decades. In some
regions, there has been good progress—particularly now that one of the
UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (#7) is to provide access to affordable,
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all people.
In 2016, the number of people without access to electricity had fallen to
just over a billion—down from over 1.6 billion in 2000. Substantial progress
has been made in Asia, where the number of people lacking electricity fell
by more than half from 2000 to 2016. However, in sub-Saharan Africa, pro-
gress has been much more uneven, and there are still more people without
electricity in 2016 (588 million) than there were in 2000 (518 million).74
However, since 2012, the pace of rural electrification in sub-Saharan
Africa has nearly tripled compared to the previous periods. East Africa in
particular has made significant progress: the number of people without
access has decreased by 14% since 2012. In spite of this effort, more than
half of the population remain without access to electricity, making the
region the largest concentration of people in the world without electricity.
Of the 35 countries where more than half the population do not have
electricity, 32 are African (the other three are Haiti, North Korea and the
Solomon Islands).75 And yet the solution is literally staring us in the face:
solar energy can easily provide electricity to all the countries where that
energy is lacking.
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M. J. Bush
The communities that have no access to electricity are nearly always

located in rural villages that are far from the country’s national grid.
Extending the national grid out to rural villages is expensive. In most devel-
oping countries, villagers use very little electricity, at least at first, and so
from the perspective of the national electricity company or service provider,
building out the grid and connecting rural households is not an economic
proposition—especially if the village is small and households are dispersed.
Among all the options to provide electricity for rural communities, this
option is the most expensive for national or regional governments—which is
why so many rural communities remain without electricity.
Nevertheless, as a matter of national policy, some governments have com-
mitted to providing electricity to all their population and have provided the
necessary funds to extend the main power grid out to rural communities.
In this case, substantial government subsidies will generally be necessary in
order to keep the power transmission and distribution system up and run-
ning. However, access to electricity brings substantial economic benefit to
rural communities and significant regional economic development will
almost certainly follow when villages are connected to a reliable source of
electricity.
Aside from extending the national transmission system, there are two
principal options when providing electricity to households in a village
located far from the grid. The first is to build a local electricity distribution
system where electricity which is generated on-site is distributed locally to
several hundred customers. In effect, the system is set up like a small-scale
grid, and so is generally referred to as a ‘mini-grid’. The second option is to
install a small photovoltaic panel on each home and connect it directly to
lights, a cell phone charger, and a couple of appliances. Each home has its
own PV panel and there is no interconnection or distribution of electricity.
These small individual systems are called Solar Home Systems (SHS).
Minigrids
Minigrids are localized power networks usually without the infrastructure to

transmit electricity outside of their service area. In the past, minigrids were
nearly always powered by diesel generators or, less frequently, by small-scale
hydropower. But increasingly mini-grids are being powered by solar photo-
voltaic electricity or wind turbines. If the main source of power is renewable
energy, the minigrid will usually have a diesel generator or a bank of batter-
ies to provide backup power. Some minigrids have both—allowing the diesel
generator to run less often and saving on fuel.
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The economics of minigrids improve considerably if there are one or more

‘anchor’ loads on the system. These could be be public service institutions (for
example: hospitals, clinics, schools, a police station or army post), or indus-
trial and commercial facilities like a cell phone tower or an artisanal business.
Mini-grids can be scaled up to meet rising demand, and they should always
be designed so as to be technically compatible with the main grid—which in
many cases will eventually be extended out into more rural areas.76
Since 2010, dozens of minigrid startups have appeared on the scene in
Africa and India to take advantage of declining photovoltaic and energy
storage costs. Manufacturers producing smart meters, software, and innova-
tive payment technology have also made rapid progress. Minigrids are now
seen as a key part of the energy access solution. For instance, the African
Development Bank’s $60 million Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa
(SEFA) is primarily focused on the promotion of minigrids; the Scaling-Up
Renewable Energy Program (SREP) has dedicated tens of millions of dollars
to minigrids in Africa; and the UK’s DFID agency has allocated £75 million
to its Green Mini-Grids Africa Program.77
Minigrids have several significant advantages compared to solar home
systems:
• Minigrids can deliver more power and so can support larger commercial
and light-industry loads.
• They have lower costs per unit of electricity delivered compared to solar
home systems.
• They deliver standard alternating current (AC) electricity, and so house-
holds and businesses can operate regular appliances such as televisions,
refrigerators, water pumps, and small electrical machinery like mills,
grinders, circular saws, electric drills, and welding equipment.
On the other hand, minigrids are more complex and more difficult to man-
age. Although smart meters and pay-as-you-go systems ensure much better
financial management and less risk, the inverters, charge controller, power
lines, and batteries require regular supervision and maintenance. At least one
full-time technician needs to be onsite. The upfront capital cost of a mini-
grid system is substantial.
The batteries in particular are often a problem in tropical climates because
in a hot environment their lifetime can be reduced to just a few years—and
they are expensive to replace.
We will look at two case studies which provide contrasting business mod-
els: Tanzania and Haiti.
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M. J. Bush
Tanzania
Over 60% of the population of Tanzania, about 37 million people, have no

access to electricity. In rural areas, the percentage is even higher: over 90% of
the rural population has no access to electrical power.
The electrification of the country began with the installation of die-
sel powered mini-grids in the capital Dar es Salaam, and in the towns of
Dodoma, Tabora, and Kingoma over a century ago. Hydropower was
increasingly harnessed: a hydroelectric minigrid was constructed in Loliondo
in 1928, and in the 1950s, the Pangani Falls hydropower project brought
electricity to a small number of local townships.78
In the 1970s, minigrids were extended to Dar es Salaam and other towns
to form the first national grid—which now connects about three-quarters
of regional townships. However, in 2015, only 3000 of 15,000 villages had
been connected.79
After independence in 1961, the government built diesel-powered minigrids
in many rural areas as part of a policy to electrify isolated regional and district
townships and to promote industrialization. Industries like mining (diamonds,
gold, and lead), and agricultural processing (cotton, coconuts, and tea) often
distributed electricity to nearby communities by installing minigrids.
In 2016, Tanzania had more than 109 minigrids providing electricity to
about 184,000 customers. Sixteen of these mini-grids were connected to the
national grid; the remaining 93 systems were operating as isolated systems
with no link to the grid. Not all the power is delivered to local customers—
some is sold to the national utility: the Tanzania Electric Supply Company
(TANESCO).80
Hydropower is the most common source of the electricity delivered by
the minigrids: 49 minigrids derive their energy from hydropower. Nineteen
systems are powered by fossil fuels and these minigrids are larger systems
generating more power and connected to more customers than the hydro-
power minigrids. The country also has 25 biomass powered minigrids, and
13 solar photovoltaic mini-grids—the latter being mostly small donor-
funded community-owned demonstration projects. The larger mini-grids
with a capacity between 1 and 10 MW are powered by fossil fuels, biomass
or hydropower. The solar photovoltaics systems are all under 100 kWp.
Figure 5.8 shows how the energy source varies according to the size of the
mini-grid for 109 systems installed in the country.81
In terms of power, fossil fuels (mainly diesel, but also gasoline and natu-
ral gas) dominate with an installed capacity of 72.7 MW; biomass generates
51.7 MW; and hydropower 32.9 MW. Solar photovoltaic systems generate
only 2.3 MW—less than 1% of the total installed capacity.
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Fig. 5.8 Distribution of mini-grids in Tanzania by installed capacity and energy,

source, 2016 (Source World Resources Institute)
Diesel mini-rids are often preferred because they are less expensive to pro-
cure, have short lead times, are modular, easy to site and to relocate. Local
vendors can be found throughout the country, and there is an ample inven-
tory of spare parts in large cities. Many technicians know how to operate
and maintain diesel engines because they are used in grain mills and vegeta-
ble oil mills. However, diesel generators are expensive to run, require regular
maintenance, and have shorter lifetimes than hydropower and solar photo-
voltaic minigrids.
Minigrids running on biomass have existed in Tanzania since colonial
times—typically in industries like sugar refining (burning the bagasse), and
in wood-based industries like the Tanganyika Wattle Company. These indus-
tries generate MW-scale power often as combined heat and power plants.
The smaller biomass minigrids include gasifiers, biogas plants, and engines
running on Jatropha oil.
In 2008, the government of Tanzania introduced the small power pro-
ducers (SPP) framework. An SPP was defined as a generating facility under
10 MW producing power from renewable or fossil sources, cogeneration, or
a hybrid system. The SPP established feed-in-tariffs for minigrids injecting
electricity into the national grid—an initiative which has encouraged sev-
eral dozen private companies to build and commission minigrids over the
last decade. Since the SPP legislation was enacted, 52 minigrids were com-
missioned between 2008 and 2016 with a nameplate capacity of 67 MW.
Only seven of these minigrids systems were powered by diesel fuel, so
there has been a definite shift towards renewable energy: hydropower
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M. J. Bush
(9 mini-grids), biomass (20), and solar photovoltaic (13). Three minigrids

were hybrid systems—combining a renewable energy technology with a die-
sel generator backup.82
Comparing the different mini-grid technologies, the experience in
Tanzania can be summarized as follows:
• Hydropower minigrids are most common, but fossil fuel and biomass
systems dominate in terms of installed capacity. Hydropower minigrids
are smaller and most of them are run-of-the-river installations. They are
expensive to build but long-lived and relatively inexpensive to operate.
• Diesel and natural gas plants are large and relatively inexpensive to install,
but they need frequent maintenance and spare parts that are not readily
available in rural areas.
• Most biomass plants are commercially owned units powering wood or
sugar mills and supplying other users close by. They are moderately inex-
pensive to build and maintain, but fuel supply and preparation can be
challenging.
• Solar minigrids remain mostly at the demonstration stage.83
In 2015, the national utility regulator, EWURA, revised the SPP frame-
work allowing for two forms of contracts: a renewable energy feed-in tariff
(REFITs) for small hydro and biomass projects, and a competitive bidding
procedure for wind and solar projects. The same tariff structure applies to
all minigrids, whether or not they are injecting power into the main grid.
Payments by TANESCO are now made in hard currency—an advantage for
minigrid developers.84
The institutional, policy, and regulatory framework for the energy sector
in Tanzania has been reformed since the passing of the 2008 Electricity Act.
Specific initiatives encourage private participation in small power produc-
tion and distribution. As a result, the number and installed capacity of mini-
grids in the country has doubled since 2008.
Minigrid owners and operators in Tanzania include the national util-
ity, private commercial entities, faith-based organisations and commu-
nities. Fossil fuel mini-grids owned and operated by the national utility,
TANESCO, all operate on the utility model where the same tariffs apply
to all customers. Private entities sell power to both TANESCO and to retail
customers. Community-based models have experienced mixed success with
management, service delivery, and revenue collection. Community owner-
ship and participation in project development and operations appears to be
a key factor for sustainability.
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Larger privately-owned minigrids that are grid-connected experience

difficulties with delayed payments for bulk sales to the national utility.
Household customes pay on time, but retail tarrifs need to be high to cover
long-term costs. Operation and maintenance costs of rural minigrids run by
TANESCO are high, but the utility is allowed to charge only a low ‘lifeline’
tarrif to rural customeres. The lifeline tarrif is cross-subsidized by tarrifs to
larger users but they too fail to fully reflect costs. Lastly, mini-grids owned
by faith-based organizations have operated for many years but are usually
not financially self-sufficient.85
There are fundamental weaknesses in all minigrid projects. They stem
from the fact that minigrids are capital intensive projects with substantial
initial costs providing a service to mostly low-income customers. They are
therefore inherently risky. This characteristic means that it is often difficult
for a developer to obtain financing from commercial sources. If the minigrid
project is eventually financed, it is by no means certain that a developer will
be able to cover his investment and recurrent costs from revenue generated
by his customers who are paying for the service.
Commercial sources of funding consider rural electrification risky because
of a variety of factors: including unproven technology, and the low and var-
iable incomes of many rural consumers. Energy access companies that have
raised significant finance are typically foreign owned or managed, and have
the connections and the resources to raise capital on the global market.
Banks are often unwilling to lend to developers that cannot provide a strong
track record of capacity, collateral, and other commercial requirements for
rural electrification.
Financial support to small power providers (SPPs) though the Tanzania
Energy Development and Access Project (TEDAP) and the Rural Energy
Fund (REF) has financed the completion or initiation of 17 minigrid projets
since 2008. Using financing facilities outside the SPP framework, donors
have funded another 35 minigrids. Nonetheless, public and private sector
funding for rural electrification in Tanzania remains inadequate, but finan-
cial mechanisms have stimulated investor activity and led to further com-
mitments of funds from development partners.
Haiti
Haiti has one of the lowest electricity connection rates in the world, with
less than 40% of the population connected. Many of the households
that have access to electricity are tapping into the distribution system
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M. J. Bush
illegally—which means that the national power company, Electricité d’Haiti,

never covers its costs and requires substantial support from the Government
of Haiti in order to keep the country’s inadequate and overloaded distribu-
tion system functioning for at least part of the time. Few areas in Haiti, even
in the capital Port-au-Prince, have reliable electrical power. Families that
can afford it will install a bank of 4 or 8 deep-cycle 6-volt batteries that are
charged by an inverter whenever electricity is available, and which provide
power to the house when the grid goes down. But since an inverter-battery
system is often insufficient—if the grid power goes off for several days for
instance, a backup diesel generator is also required. This level of investment
is impossible for the majority of Haitian families—and also for many small
businesses, so the lack of a reliable electricity supply system has a huge neg-
ative impact on commerce, the provision of government services, and eco-
nomic development in general.
Many rural areas in Haiti are far from any electricity distribution system
and so families have no choice but to rely on kerosene lamps for lighting.
Kerosene is not cheap in rural areas, and so poor families are paying out a
significant fraction of their income on inadequate and poor quality light-
ing. Kerosene lighting is also a major health hazard: the sooty, carbon-rich,
vapours given off by the lamps are noxious and harmful for the lungs—
particularly those of young children.
In the town of Les Anglais in south-west Haiti, a PV-hybrid system
provides power to homes and businesses. Set up in 2012 by EarthSpark
International, a US-based non-profit organization, it is in many respects a
conventional PV-hybrid system—but with several innovative features.
The Les Anglais minigrid serves over 2000 customers—both house-
holds and local businesses. A 93-kilowatt PV array generates electricity that
is distributed by the minigrid installed by EarthSpark. A bank of batteries
provides 400 kWh of electrical storage, and a small 30 kW diesel genera-
tor provides backup power if the solar energy is inadequate. The system is
designed to reliably provide electricity 24/7 to its customers. The backup
generator is only used occasionally: over the 6-month period September
2015 to March 2016, it ran for a total of only 90 hours.86
One of the problems of managing a minigrid system in a rural area is that
families newly-connected to the electricity service may have difficulty man-
aging the amount of electricity they consume, and then have to pay for. If
they are unfamiliar with how electricity is used and charged, they may be
presented with a bill they cannot pay. Disconnecting customers from the
service because they cannot afford to pay for their electricity is not a solu-
tion over the longer term because the economics of the service improves as
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249
more paying customers connect to the grid. The smart meters installed by
EarthSpark help solve this problem by requiring households to prepay their
power consumption. This approach is familiar to Haitian families accus-
tomed to buying kerosene for lighting, charcoal for cooking, and top-up
cards for their cell phone service. In effect, you pay in advance for what you
need.
EarthSpark’s smart electricity meters were developed to meet the special
needs of minigrid operators in expanding access to electricity to new cus-
tomers. Other innovative features include time-of-use pricing: which enables
EarthSpark to charge a lower price for electricity during the middle of the
day when energy costs are lower because power is drawn from the PV sys-
tem. Moreover, the consumption of power across the minigrid can be mon-
itord remotely at the household level. The data can be used to manage the
load, to educate the community on energy efficiency, and to detect and eval-
uate technical problems immediately they arise. EarthSpark plans to install
80 more minigrid PV-diesel hybrid systems in Haiti before 2020.
The Les Anglais system in Haiti is a good example of applying modern
technology to a vexing development problem: how to bring electrical power
to the rural areas of poor countries. Because of the development of increas-
ingly affordable and reliable renewable energy technologies coupled with
smart meters and control systems, it is no longer necessary to think in terms
of extending transmission and distribution systems. PV-hybrid minigrids
offer a practical and cost-effective alternative.
Unfortunately, hurricane Matthew, a category-5 cyclone, ripped into
southwest Haiti in early October 2016 and badly damaged the photovol-
taic array. It is a lesson that needs to be learned as storms in the Caribbean
become more intense: PV systems and wind power installations need to be
able to withstand hurricane force winds. But building stronger PV array
mountings and support structures does not solve the larger problem: many
of the homes connected to the minigrid were destroyed by the storm.87
Solar Home Systems
A major challenge with rural electrification is that the majority of house-

holds are low-income families. Finding a business model that enables the
service provider to cover its costs is a major concern.
An innovative approach is to employ a pay-as-you-go arrangement where
payments are made via a mobile phone. If payments are not made on time,
the solar home system can be shut down by an offsite manager connected
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M. J. Bush
remotely to the system. One innovative company promoting this approach

is M-Kopa Solar.
Based in Nairobi, M-Kopa Solar has connected more than 600,000 homes
in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania since the company launched in 2012. These
are small photovoltaic systems—but providing electric lighting to households
that were using kerosene lamps is a huge step forward for families that had
no access to electricity. Kerosene lamps provide only poor quality lighting;
moreover they cause hazardous indoor air pollution and are a fire hazard—
yet hundreds of thousands of low-income families in Africa and Asia have
no alternative but to use them. Kerosene is also expensive. According to a
2014 survey, an average off-grid household in Kenya spends about 75¢ a day
on energy, or $272 a year—$164 on kerosene, $36 on charging their mobile
phone, and $72 on batteries. M-Kopa estimates a customer saves about
$750 over the first four years by installing to its basic solar kit.88
The basic package is the M-KOPA 5 solar home system.89 It consists of:
• 1 8-W solar panel

• 1 Rechargeable FM/USB radio
• 1 M-KOPA 5 control unit with lithium battery
• 4 bright 1.2 Watt LED bulbs
• 1 5-in-1 phone charge cable
• 1 Custom charge cable
• 1 Rechargeable LED torch.
Customers pay a deposit of about $35 to obtain the system. They then pay
the equivalent of about $0.50 a day for a year—which is when they own
the system. These payments are made through M-Pesa—the mobile phone-
based money transfer system. A more expensive package is available that
includes a flat screen digital TV and a TV antenna.
Although these SHS are small—it’s their small size that makes them
affordable for poor families. There is ample evidence that households that
have just a few watts of power from a solar home system soon start a small
business or find other ways to generate an income using the electricity.
In early 2018, a study of 2300 pay-as-you-go solar energy users in five
East African countries clearly showed the positive economic impacts on
low-income families that SHS can produce.90 These small solar energy
systems open up a wide range of small-scale business opportunities that
bring substantial benefits to rural households. In addition, the positive
health effects of no longer using kerosene lamps is a substantial co-benefit.
The study outlined its 10 key findings as follows:
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Fig. 5.9 Average additional monthly income generated by the solar home systems
(Source Off-Grid Solar Energy Industry)
• 58% of households undertake more economic activities thanks to their

solar home system
• 36% of households generate additional income once they purchase an SHS
• Households on average create an additional income of $35 per month
• 44% of customers can spend more time at work
• 11% of customers started a new business
• In 7% of households, owning an SHS enabled someone to get a new job
• 89% of customers report that they use their phone more since using their
SHS
• 91% of customers report they feel safer with off-grid solar
• 915 report their health has improved since buying the SHS
• 84% of customers say children have more time to do their homework.
Figure 5.9 shows the average additional monthly income generated by the

economic activities unlocked by the installation of a solar home system.
Customers combining two or more of these economic activities created the
largest increase in income: on average $53 per month.91
The most popular new businesses were reported as: charging mobile
phones for a fee; opening a small shop or stall, and opening a bar-restaurant.
The Economics of Minigrids
The competitiveness of a minigrid depends on its cost relative to the cost of

alternative ways of providing electricity to rural households: extending the
national grid and installing SHS. Table 5.3 summarizes the relative advan-
tages and disadvantages of the three alternative electrification options.92
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M. J. Bush
Table 5.3 The competitiveness of electrification options

Option Advantage Disadvantage
Grid • L ow cost per unit of energy due to •G rid extension is very expen-
connection large economies of scale sive as distance increases
•O ften the central power
generation is unreliable
with frequent outages
Minigrid • Compared to solar home systems, •C ompared to solar home
system the cost of electricity is lower systems, the capital cost is
• More power is available for larger much higher
loads •T he operation and main-
• More productive use of the energy tenance of the minigrid
is possible requires at least one fulltime
• High reliability staff
Solar home • No interconnection lines • Only powers very low loads
system • High reliability • Cannot support productive
• No operation or maintenance costs loads
Source Rocky Mountain Institute
The principal advantage of connecting to the main power grid is that elec-
tricity is much less expensive for the customer. But the power utility faces sub-
stantial costs for extending the transmission line to villages that may be widely
spaced, and installing distribution cables and connections to customers many
of which may be low-income families consuming small amounts of energy.
Solar home systems have high generation costs per unit of electricity
(typically several dollars per kWh) but avoid the cost of distribution lines,
metering, and theft. Between these two approaches are minigrids, the com-
petitiveness of which depends on a wide array of interelated factors. In con-
trast to the costs associated with grid extension and SHS, minigrids are more
complex and require at least one fulltime technician to be present to moni-
tor the operation of the system and to ensure its maintenance.
An evaluation of the levelized cost of electricity provided by these alter-
native technologies for a typical village of 500 households in sub-Saharan
Africa was conducted by the Rocky Mountain Institute in 2017. The results
are shown in Table 5.4, where electricity usage for a household is assumed to
average 5kWh/month, there are no productive loads, and the cost of capital
is set at 15%.93
These costs are variable and highly site specific, and determining the least
cost option for a given village depends on a careful examination and evalua-
tion of all the factors that influence the levelized cost.
One factor to note is that solar-diesel minigrids produce lower cost elec-
tricity than solar-battery minigrids. The difference in cost is not huge, but
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Table 5.4 Cost of electricity from electrification options

Technical option Levelized cost of electricity ($/kWh)
Grid connection $0.30–$3.00 depending on the distance to the village
Solar-diesel minigrid $1.60
Solar-battery minigrid $1.70
Solar home system $3.20
Solar lantern >$7.00
Source Rocky Mountain Institute
in many cases, the cost of power from a photovoltaic system with a die-
sel backup is the least cost option. In 2017, RMI’s finding was that sizing
purely solar-battery minigrids for peak load while planning for high reliabil-
ity was significantly more expensive than sizing minigrids that use a diesel
generation component.94
But there are other factors to take into account. Diesel generators obvi-
ously require fuel—which may require someone in the village to travel a
considerable distance to obtain. A diesel engine also needs regular mainte-
nance by a mechanic and spare parts that may not be easily available. On the
other hand, the batteries of a solar-battery system are expensive, and in a hot
tropical climate their lifetime may only be a few years. They then need to be
replaced and this expense must be planned for from the beginning of the
operation of the minigrid.
Storage and fuel costs also vary in response to the requirement for high
reliability—such as telecom towers, where minigrid operators may need
to run the diesel generator while using the batteries as an uninterruptable
power source. In less demanding settings, batteries can act as the night
time supply and curtailments are acceptable to keep storage costs down.
Minigrids generally rely on lead-acid batteries, but the declining cost of
lithium-ion batteries is making these batteries a more common form of
storage, and may soon improve the competitiveness of solar-diesel-battery
and solar-battery minigrids against solar-diesel systems.95
Solar Home Systems may function as a useful first step for households
that may eventually hook up to a minigrid or to the main power grid. A
household that purchases a solar home system no longer needs to purchase
kerosene on a regular basis—which is a significant expense for a typical
low-income rural family without access to electricity. Once the home sys-
tem is paid for (after a year for the M-Kopa system), the family has slightly
more disposable income, and if a connection to a minigrid is available that
could provide more power for a productive use that generates a revenue or
for more appliances like a refrigerator. The household may choose to also
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M. J. Bush
connect to the minigrid. The solar home system can still be used for charg-
ing mobile phones and provide some of the lighting, but connection to a
minigrid provides greater flexibility and more power. There is no reason why
the two systems could not be operational in the same house.
Energy Efficiency
Energy is not something that should be wasted. Solar energy is free: but cap-
turing it and using it requires equipment, materials, manpower and machin-
ery—all of which costs money. With wind power, the machinery involved
is even more capital intensive. If the energy has to be stored—either as heat
or as electricity, the cost of renewable energy quickly escalates. It is still less
costly than fossil fuel alternatives—but that doesn’t mean it should use it
negligently.
The global picture at first sight looks encouraging. Since 2010, the
amount of primary energy required to generate a unit of economic output—
measured as gross domestic product or GDP, declined at an average rate
of 2.1% annually. This is better than previous decades when the reduction
was averaging about 1.3%. But there are very substantial differences among
countries and regions. Efficiency improvements in China—a 5.2% reduc-
tion in 2016, have had a considerable impact. Without China, global energy
intensity would have improved by only 1.1% in 2016.96
Energy intensity improved by 2.9% in the US and by 1.3% in the
European Union. Japan and India both posted gains. In a few countries,
Brazil for example, energy intensity has actually increased—but in the case
of Brazil, this is because the country’s GDP has declined significantly since
2014.
Changes in a country’s energy intensity are influenced by improvements
in energy efficiency as well as changes in economic structure—such as the
shift away from energy intensive industries towards less intensive service sec-
tors. A decline in energy intensity is therefore not solely the result of gains in
energy efficiency.
However, there is evidence that energy use has peaked in many advanced
economies. Twenty-two IEA member countries have already reached their
historic peak. In the majority of countries, this peak occurred between 2005
and 2010. Total energy demand for OECD97 countries as a whole peaked in
2007.98 In these countries, although national populations have been slowly
rising, improvements in energy efficiency and structural changes have more
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than offset the increase in demographic numbers and per capita energy use
has been falling.
Outside of the OECD countries, the story is different. Primary energy
demand in non-OECD countries has been rising rapidly since the year
2000, and although energy intensity, measured as energy demand per unit
of GPD, has declined, the demand for energy has been rising strongly—
which is normal in emerging economies. But it’s a reminder that declining
energy intensity doesn’t necessarily mean declining emissions of greenhouse
gases—and as we have noted in Chapter 3, global emissions of carbon diox-
ide ticked up again in 2017 (see Fig. 3.3). Moreover, atmospheric concen-
trations of CO2 (which directly causes global warming) are still increasing
steadily (see Fig. 2.4).
Globally, energy efficiency improved 13% between 2000 and 2016.
Without this improvement, global final energy use in 2016 would have
been 12% higher—equivalent to adding the annual final energy use of the
European Union to the global energy market. Energy savings from efficiency
improvements in the IEA member countries made up nearly half of the
global total, equivalent to the current energy use of Germany, France, and
the UK combined.99
Efficiency gains vary. Eight of the top ten countries that show the larg-
est improvement in efficiency since 2000 are European. The difference in
improvement rates before and after 2008 highlights the impact of policy
developments, particularly in China, where the influence of the 11th and
12th Five-year plans is seen in a 16% improvement in the efficiency effect
since 2008.
Although efficiency gains in the US have been slower than China and
several European countries over recent years, improvements commenced
long before 2000—particularly fuel economy standards—which are a major
driver of efficiency improvements in the transport sector.100
Industry
Industrial energy intensity—measured as final energy consumption per

unit of gross value added, has been improving in the manufacturing sectors
(including heavy industry) since the year 2000. The greatest improvements
have been in the IEA member countries—less so in the emerging economies.
In the IEA countries, energy intensity has improved in all major indus-
try sub-sectors, although there are substantial differences among the sectors.
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M. J. Bush
For basic metals, which includes iron, steel and aluminium manufactur-
ing, final energy use dropped by 10% and energy intensity was 15% lower.
Energy intensity fell by 20% in non-metallic minerals, which includes
cement production, and by 14% in the paper and printing industries. There
was less variation in the food, beverage and tobacco subsector where energy
intensity dropped by 8% between 2000 and 2016.
Energy intensity improvements were largest in the chemicals and vehicles
subsector. This may reflect technological improvements such as automation
and the use of industrial robots, as well as strong demand particularly for
plastics and vehicles. Generally, vehicle manufacturing is the largest user of
industrial robots, which improve the sector’s energy productivity through
the greater automation of production. In 2015, the global supply of indus-
trial robots was 50% higher in the vehicle manufacturing industry than in
the second largest sector—electronic manufacturing. Industrial robots are
also used in the metals and chemicals manufacturing sub-sectors.101
Making more stuff with less energy not only saves money (because energy
is never free), it also reduces emissions of greenhouse gases, because indus-
try is never going to run entirely on renewable energy. So improvements in
energy intensity are important from a climate change perspective.
Energy Management Systems
An energy management system creates a structure to monitor energy con-
sumption and improve energy efficiency in an industrial or commercial firm.
The implementation of energy management systems is a key element of
industrial energy efficiency policy in many countries. For example, the ISO
50001 Energy Management Systems standard provides a structured frame-
work to manage energy enabling an organisation to raise energy efficiency,
reduce costs, and improve energy performance.
The ISO 50001 standard has been available since 2011. It is based on
Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle which requires an organization to do the
following:
• Conduct an energy review—analyse data, identify areas of significant

energy use and areas for energy performance improvement
• Establish an energy baseline
• Establish energy objectives and targets that are measurable and have time-
lines for achievement
• Establish an action plan to achieve energy objectives and targets
• Implement the action plan
• Check performance
• Monitor, document and report all of the above.
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Canada was the first country in the world to adopt the ISO standard as their
energy management systems standard: this is CAN/CSA-ISO 50001.102
The total number of ISO 50001 certificates has grown from 459 in 2011
to 11,985 in 2015. Europe has the largest number of certificates among
European countries, with 85% of the total. Germany dominates—with
almost 6000 certificates issued up to 2015, principally because of tax incen-
tives provided to certified companies.103
Buildings
According to the IEA in 2017, the building sector is not on track to achieve
global climate targets, although progress is being made. The amount of
energy used by buildings has been slowly increasing: rising 4% from 2010 to
2016. Although energy efficiency has been improving, it has been outpaced
by the upward trend in total floor area—which correlates closely with energy
use.
On the other hand, building-related GHG emissions have declined: peak-
ing at around 9.5 GtCO2e in 2013 and then decreasing to 9.0 GtCO2e in
2016, in spite of the increased floor area.
A combination of both building envelope and equipment policies is
critical for the transition to energy efficient, and eventually to zero energy,
buildings. Highly efficient building envelopes enable the best use of efficient
heating and cooling equipment such as low temperature waste heat, district
heating, heat pumps, and rooftop photovoltaic systems.
Because energy efficient homes are slightly more expensive, and heat
pumps are more expensive than gas-fired furnaces and electric baseboard
heaters, improvements in building envelope and HVAC equipment effi-
ciency needs to be mandated through building codes, and if necessary incen-
tivised through tax breaks.
In the US, California, once again, is leading the way with the lat-
est 2016 Building Energy Conservation Code, while in Chicago, Energy
Benchmarking is the foundation of that city’s strategy for reducing car-
bon emissions from large buildings. Emissions from the properties subject
to the energy benchmarking ordinance represent 20% of citywide carbon
emissions, and since 2015 the median carbon emissions per square foot for
reporting buildings has fallen by 91%.104
In Europe, commercial and residential building consume about 40% of
primary energy and are responsible for about a quarter of greenhouse gas
emissions. European energy policy foresees a substantial reduction of energy
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M. J. Bush
consumption in buildings by 2020. The Energy Performance of Building

Directive (EPBD) states that Member States shall ensure that that new
buildings occupied and owned by public authorities shall be ‘nearly zero
energy buildings’, (nZEBs) by the end of 2018, and that all new buildings
are nZEBs by the end of 2020.
An nZEB is a building with very high energy performance where the
nearly zero or very low amount of energy required should be extensively cov-
ered by renewable sources produced on-site or nearby.105
The precise definition of a ‘nearly zero energy building’ has been left up
to the governments of the EU Member States—a decision which may reflect
the divergence of views concerning the pace at which governments intend to
transition to renewable sources of energy.
Inside the building envelope, substantial energy savings can be made with
more efficient equipment and smart technologies.
The IEA Energy Efficient End-Use Equipment Technology Collaborative
Programme (IEA 4E-TCP) has reported savings of between 16 and 26%
over the last decade for major household appliances—including switching
from halogen to LED lighting. The programme estimates that the market
for efficient lighting will continue to grow and that 90% of all indoor light-
ing will be CFLs and LEDs by 2022 due to a combination of improved pol-
icy and decreasing costs.106
In general, more energy can be saved by switching from one type of tech-
nology to another, rather than trying to improve the efficiency of existing
equipment. For example, heat pumps enable energy savings of 60–85%
compared to instantaneous and storage water heaters. Japan’s Top Runner
programme and Australia’s white certificate schemes have enabled the water
heating markets in both countries to have increasing sales of highly efficient
heat pumps.
Heat pumps are increasingly recognized as one of the best options for
reducing building energy requirements. Recent technical advances enable
heat pumps to work effectively in cold climate and at outside air tempera-
tures down to −25 °C. Cold climate heat pumps could shift a substantial
part of global heating use away from less efficient electric and gas heating
systems in colder climates—like Canada for instance. In district heating sys-
tems, large scale heat pumps are an increasingly cost-effective way to meet
both energy efficiency targets and countries’ emissions reduction targets.
This is leading to new approaches to policy, such as the European heating
and cooling strategy.107
In conclusion, buildings will increasingly become all-electric—with all
services: heating, cooling, lighting, appliances, and communications being
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provided by highly efficient equipment. To reduce emissions of greenhouse

gases, the electrical power consumed by buildings must be sourced from
renewable energy—either from grid-connected electrical power generated
from wind or solar, or from rooftop or minigrid photovoltaic systems.
Smart and Well-Connected
The exponential growth in connected devices is a technological trend that
promises substantial improvements in the way energy is managed and used.
Their market penetration is growing rapidly. One estimate is that at least four
billion household connected devices were already installed worldwide at the
end of 2016. Simple devices have been around for decades: the programmable
thermostat for instance. But ‘smart’ devices now include washing machines,
dish washers, refrigerators and water heaters that figure out the optimum time
to operate according to the cost and timing of electrical power provided by
the grid. Although saving money is the main objective, switching lights off
when a sensor detects an empty room, and which turns down the heating or
cooling units when a home or building is vacant clearly saves energy.
The downside is that being smart takes energy. Power consumption
by connected devices includes the energy used by the network infrastruc-
ture (routers, switches, and data centers), the energy used by the connected
device to monitor and process information from the sensors, and the energy
needed to maintain the device’s connection to the wider network—called
network standby. This network standby is often a connected device’s largest
draw on power.
The installation of smart meters is growing rapidly—to around 570 mil-
lion units in 2016. For the all -electric home, smart meters enable custom-
ers and smart devices to adjust energy use in response to changes in energy
prices in real time. They are also increasingly important in the management
of photovoltaic minigrids in developing countries—where they control the
provision of electricity to homes using very little electricity, but where its
careful management, including pre-payment programs, are essential.
Transport
Transport accounted for 28% of global final energy consumption in 2016,

of which about three quarters was for road transport. This energy was almost
entirely from petroleum products—since the number of electric vehicles,
although rising rapidly, is still less than 0.2% of the total number of vehicles
on the road worldwide.
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Improvements in vehicle efficiency is therefore a priority because they

translate directly into reduced emissions of greenhouse gases—and reduced
levels of air pollution in urban environments.
Ten years ago, only four governments had introduced mandatory emis-
sion or fuel economy standards for light duty vehicles (LDVs). In 2016, that
number had risen to 10: Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India,
Japan, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the US—all countries in the
top 15 global vehicle markets. Almost 80% of new LDVs sold globally are
subject to some kind of fuel economy standard.108 The LDV group includes
cars, sports utility vehicles (SUVs), light trucks, and pickups.
Although efficiency standards for LDVs have been introduced and
enforced in many countries, standards for heavy duty vehicles (HDVs)
are lagging. Between 2010 and 2015, the amount of goods transported by
trucks grew by 65% and truck sales increased by 60%. This increase drove
HDV fuel demand up by 50%. Yet only 16% of HDV stock was covered by
efficiency standards in 2016.109
For LDVs, meaning cars and light trucks, there are diverging trends.
Although the growth of electric and zero emission vehicles contin-
ues strongly, EVs and ZEVs are still vastly outnumbered by gas- and die-
sel-powered vehicles—both on the road and in terms of new registrations.
Moreover, light trucks, pickups, and SUVs are gaining popularity over
smaller passenger cars. Their share of all major markets grew in 2016.
China’s light truck market share grew by more than a quarter from 2014
to 2016 and is close to 50% of the LDV market. Light truck’s share of the
LDV sales is highest in Canada and the US, where it is almost double the
share of the major European markets. LDV sales in the European market
changed only marginally between 2010 and 2015, but in the US, sales rose
from 11 million to more than 16 million during the same period.110
When it comes to vehicle fuel efficiency, it’s all about government policy.
In Europe, strict fuel economy standards coupled with substantial taxes on
gasoline and diesel fuel have led to a widespread preference for smaller more
efficient vehicles. At the other end of the scale, in the US and Canada, less
stringent standards and only modest taxes on fuel (although they are higher
in Canada), have had little effect in inducing a shift towards more energy
efficient vehicles.
That may change if the standards proposed in 2012 during the Obama
administration are fully implemented. The proposed CAFE standard will
lead to significant fuel efficiency improvements by 2025. However, at the
time of writing, the Trump administration is considering rolling back the
proposed standards.
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Strengthening fuel economy standards ought to be a win-win situation for

the LDV-buying public. More efficient engines mean less fuel purchased for
a given journey, and lower emissions means less air pollution in the urban
environment—an impact that has measurable health benefits.
Strategies for Improving Energy Efficiency
The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) pub-

lishes an annual report that assesses all 51 US states in terms of their perfor-
mance in improving energy efficiency and gives each one a score. California
regularly tops the list—although in 2017 it slid down a notch coming in
second after Massachusetts. But California is the only state to have held a
spot among the top five in all 11 years the scorecard has been published.111
The ACEEE evaluates the performance of the US states in six categories
of energy efficiency:
• Utility and public benefits programs and policies

• Transportation policies
• Building energy efficiency policies
• Combined heat and power
• State government initiatives
• Appliance efficiency standards.
After reviewing the American states’ policies to improve the efficiency

of energy use each year for the last decade, the ACEEE is in a position to
make some pertinent and useful recommendations for both US states
and Canadian provinces seeking to improve energy efficiency in their
jurisdictions.112
1. Establish and fund an Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) or

similar energy savings target. These policies set specific energy savings
targets that utilities or independent program administrators must meet
through customer energy efficiency programs and market transformation.
2. Adopt policies to encourage and strengthen utility programs designed
for low-income customers and work with utilities and regulators to
recognize the nonenergy benefits of such programs. States and pub-
lic utility commissions can include goals specific to the low-income sec-
tor either within an EERS or as a stand-alone minimum acceptable
threshold.
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M. J. Bush
3. Adopt updated and stricter building energy codes, improve build-

ing compliance, and enable efficiency program administrators to be
involved in code support. Mandatory building codes are one way to
ensure a minimum level of energy efficiency for new residential and com-
mercial buildings. In addition, model codes are only as effective as their
level of implementation so improved compliance activities are increas-
ingly important.
4. Adopt tailpipe emission standards and set qualitative targets for
reducing vehicle-miles-travelled. A comprehensive approach to trans-
portation energy efficiency must address both individual vehicles and the
transportation system as a whole.
5. Treat cost-effective and efficient combined heat and power (CHP) as
an energy efficiency resource equivalent to other forms of energy effi-
ciency. Combined heat and power should be treated as an eligible tech-
nology in the EERS or Renewable Portfolio Standard. If this is done,
total energy savings target levels should be increased to take into account
CHP’s potential.
6. Expand and highlight efforts such as funding for energy efficiency
incentive programs, benchmarking requirements for government
building energy use, and investments in energy-efficiency-related
R&D centers. Government initiatives complement the existing land-
scape of utility programs, leveraging resources from the government’s
public and private sectors to generate energy and cost savings that benefit
taxpayers and consumers. Local government agencies have many oppor-
tunities to lead by example including by reducing energy use in public
buildings and vehicle fleets and by enabling the market for energy service
companies that finance and deliver energy-saving projects.
7. Explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms to lever-
age private capital and lower the up-front costs of energy efficiency
measures. Utilities may offer some form of on-bill financing program to
finance energy efficiency in homes and buildings, and governments can
help by passing legislation, increasing stakeholder awareness, and remov-
ing the legal barriers to the implementation of these financing programs.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the pathways to a low carbon global economy by
transitioning to renewable energy technologies such as large-scale solar pho-
tovoltaic energy and utility-scale wind power. Other technologies such as
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geothermal district heating also have great potential, while hydropower con-
tinues to generate substantial and reliable electrical power worldwide.
The immediate priority areas of action are the power sector and trans-
portation. The generation of electricity using solar and wind energy is less
expensive than coal-fired power plants and is even competitive with power
from natural gas in many locations. Furthermore, the cost of renewable
energy systems continues to fall—which is not the case for the fossil fuels.
Led by China, the electrification of the world’s transportation systems
is well underway, and although the number of electric vehicles (EVs) on
the roads is still relatively small, the rate at which EVs are moving into the
global market is phenomenal.
Small-scale solar photovoltaic energy is also the key to providing elec-
tricity to the hundreds of millions of rural families without electricity in
Africa and Asia, where lighting and sometimes cooking is still done using
dirty kerosene fuels that pollute the air in the home and sicken the children.
Electricity is also the key to unlocking the immense transformative potential
of rural economies.
At the same time, increasing the efficiency of using energy is paramount.
This is particularly important in the built environment where net-zero-
energy buildings are technically feasible and economically viable. Europe is
taking the lead on facilitating this transition in the built environment.
The European Commission has set out an ambitious plan to transition
to a low carbon economy that will reduce emissions of greenhouse gases
by 80% in 2050 compared to 1990 levels. Other countries, starting with
Canada and the USA, should follow suit.
In the next chapter we delve more deeply into how renewable energy
technologies are designed and deployed, and how they can totally replace
fossil fuels. This is the clean energy revolution.
Notes
1. See A brief history of hydropower. Accessed at: https://www.hydropower.
org/a-brief-history-of-hydropower.
2. See the Wikipedia article Wind turbine. Accessed at: https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Wind_turbine.
3. See Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017. International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 2017. Available at: http://irena.org/
publications/2018/Jan/Renewable-power-generation-costs-in-2017.
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4. Sierra club press release: https://www.sierraclub.org/press-release/2017/11/

new-coalition-aims-take-europe-beyond-coal.
5. REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report, p. 30.
6. See 100% Commitments in Cities, Counties & States. Sierra Club. Accessed
at: https://www.sierrraclub.org/ready-for-100/commitments.
7. Ibid.
8. See Mayors for clean energy. Accessed at: https://sierraclub.org/
ready-for-100/mayors-for-clean-energy.
9. See World’s poorest countries to aim for 100% green energy. Accessed at:
www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-38028130.
10. See Baleriacs launch pioneering plan to phase out emissions. Accessed at:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/15/baleriacs-launch-
pioneering-plan-to-phase-out-emissions.
11. Renewables 2017 Global Status Report. REN21, p. 26.
12. Ibid., p. 26.
13. See How do you build a healthy city? Copenhagen reveals its secrets.
how-build-healthy-city-copenhagen-reveals-its-secrets-happiness.
14. REN21, p. 29.
15. Including Japan—which unveiled plans in 2017 to build 45 new coal fired
power plants using ‘high efficiency low emissions’ technology fuelled by
high quality black coal imported from Australia. See http://www.abc.net.
au/news/rural/2017-01-31/japan-coal-power-plants/8224302.
16. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report, p. 24.
17. See the European Commission article: 2050 low carbon economy. Accessed
at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en.
18. See the European Commission article. Ibid.
19. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit.
20. See Renewables 2017: Analysis and Forecasts to 2022. Market Report
Series. Executive Summary. International Energy Agency. Accessed at:
https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/renew2017MRSsum.pdf.
21. See From oil to solar: Saudi Arabia plots a shift to renewables. Accessed at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/business/enery-environment/
suaidi-arabia-solar-renewables.html. Also Saudi Arabia shortlists bid-
ders for first solar power project. Accessed at: https://www.thenational.
ae/business/energy/saudi-arabia-shortlists-bidders-for-solar-power-pro-
ject-1.693483, and also ACWA wins Saudi Arabia’s 300 MW solar tender.
Accessed at: https://www.pv-magazine.com/2018/02/06/acwa-wins-saudi-
arabias-400-mw-solar-tender/.
22. See Renewables 2017: Solar leads the charge…. Op. cit.
23. See Explaining Poland’s coal paradox. Accessed at: https://www.forbes.com/
sites/thebakersinstitute/2018/03/28/explaining-polands-coal-paradox/2/.
5 Coming Clean
265
24. See Paris declaration on electro-mobility and climate change & call to action.
Accessed at: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/521376/paris-electro-mo-
bility-declaration.pdf.
25. Ibid.
26. See Electric and plug-in hybrid cars whiz past 3m mark worldwide.
Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/dec/25/
electric-and-plug-in-hybrids-cars-3m-worldwide.
27. See Nordic EV outlook 2018. International Energy Agency. Available at:
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Nordic
EVOutlook2018.pdf.
28. See In Norway, Electric and Hybrid Cars Outsell Conventional Models. Accessed
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/business/energy-environment/
norway-electric-hybrid-cars.html and also Electric cars on course to be the new
normal in Norway. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-02/
electric-cars-on-course-to-be-the-new-normal-in-norway.
30. See Why electric vehicles are gathering speed in Latin America. Accessed
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/opinion/electric-vehicles-lat-
in-america.html.
31. See Global EV Outlook 2016, IEA. Op. cit.
32. See the CEM website at: http://www.cleanenergyministerial.org/about-
clean-energy-ministerial.
33. See California governor pushes for 5 million zero-emission cars. Accessed
at: https://www.apnews.com/, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/
california/articles/2018-01-26/california-governor-pushes-for-5-million-ze-
ro-emission-cars.
34. See the BNEF article: E-buses to surge even faster than EVs as conven-
tional vehicles fade. Accessed at: https://about.bnef.com/blog/e-buses-
surge-even-faster-evs-conventional-vehicles-fade/.
35. See EV sales in China are 142% higher than same time last year. Accessed
at: https://www.renewableeneregyworld.com/articles/2018/07/ev-sales-in-
china-are-142-percent-higher-than-same-time-last-year.html.
36. See New York City aims for all-electric bus fleet by 2040. Accessed at: https://
insideclimatenews.org/news/26042018/nyc-air-pollution-electric-bus-public-
transportation-mta-clean-technology.
37. See IEA predicts 250 million EVs on the road by 2030. Accessed at:
https://cleantechnica.com/2019/05/30/iea-predicts-250-million-evs-on-
the-road-by-2030/.
38. See 10 giant companies commit to electric vehicles sending auto industry
a message. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/19092017/
electric-cars-ev100-coalition-charging-fleet-ikea-dhl.
266
M. J. Bush
39. See Two European cities and a whole country join movement to outlaw gas
guzzlers. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/europe-gasoline-vehi-
cles-2495953780.html.
40. See World’s largest battery and rapid-charge network launches to accelerate EV
adoption. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/renewable-energy-net-
work-london-2571350395.html.
41. See Electric cars: Charge points could be requirement in new build homes.
Accessed at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-44759150.
42. See the 2015 paper by Kate Palmer and colleagues: “The total cost of
ownership and market share for hybrid and electric vehicles”. Applied
Energy 209 (2018): 108–119. Accessed at: https://reader.elsevier.com/
reader/sd/9EC392FC00DB56E4A69D5AF68A9983A1E6E40B0519F-
28C3A2B7D706C0F08001B01C40592A2A82DA317925E4A984FE9D-
9See also Electric cars already cheaper to own and run than petrol or
diesel-study. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/
dec/01/electric-cars-already-cheaper-to-own-and-run-than-petrol-
or-diesel-study.
43. See Electric vehicle battery cost dropped 80% in 6 years down to $227/
kWh—Tesla claims to be below $190/kWh. Accessed at: https://electrek.
co/2017/01/30/electric-vehicle-battery-cost-dropped-80-6-years-227kwh-
tesla-190kwh/.
44. See Electric buses are coming, and they’re going to help fix 4 big urban prob-
lems. Accessed at: https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/
10/24/16519364/electric-buses.
45. See TTC plans to buy fist electric buses, targets emission-free fleet by 2040.
Accessed at: https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/transportation/2017/11/08/
ttc-plans-to-buy-first-electric-buses-targets-emissions-free-fleet-by-
2040.html.
46. See Electric buses: Clean transportation for healthier neighborhoods and
cleaner air. Available at: https://uspirg.org/reports/usp/elecctric-bus-
es-clean-transportation-healthier-neighborhoods-and-cleaner-air/.
47. Ibid.
48. The ‘present time’ in this book refers to 2018.
49. See the report by the International Transport Forum: Decarbonizing mar-
itime transport: pathways to zero-carbon shipping by 2035. Available at:
https://www.itf-oecd.org/decarbonising-maritime-transport.
50. See the ICCT report on black carbon emissions and fuel use. Op. cit.
51. See the report by the International Council on Clean Transportation:
Black carbon emissions and fuel use in global shipping 2015. Accessed at:
https://www.theicct.org/publications/black-carbon-emissions-global-
shipping-2015.
5 Coming Clean
267
52. See the International Maritime Organization’s Initial Greenhouse gas strat-
egy. Accessed at: https://www.theicct.org/publications/IMO-initial-
GHG-strategy. Also UN body adopts climate change strategy for shipping.
Accessed at: http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/
06GHGinitialstrategy.aspx.
53. See the International Maritime Organization’s Initial Greenhouse gas strat-
egy. Accessed at: https://www.theicct.org/publications/IMO-initial-GHG-
strategy.
54. See Decarbonising maritime transport: Pathways to zero-carbon shipping by
2035. Op. cit.
55. See Decarbonising maritime transport: The case of Sweden. https://www.
itf-oecd.org/decarbonising-maritime-transport-sweden/.
56. See Ports go electric in drive to decarbonize and cut pollution. Accessed at:
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/07072017/california-ports-electric-
vehicles-air-quality-redcue-emissions.
57. See the article in Wikipedia which is a good overview of the environmental
impact of aviation. Environmental impact of aviation. Accessed at: https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_of_aviation.
58. See The US solar market is now 1 million installations strong. Accessed at:
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-u-s-solar-market-
now-one-million-installations-strong#gs.9Dau5Ew.
59. See Recent facts about photovoltaics in Germany. Fraunhofer
ISE. Accessed at: https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/ise/en/doc-
uments/publications/studies/recent-facts-about-photovoltaics-in-germany.
pdf.
60. Global trends in renewable energy investment 2017. Frankfurt School
FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre, 2017.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. See California set to require solar on most new homes. Accessed at: https://
www.ecowatch.com/california-solar-homes-2566690235.html?.
64. See Why California’s new home solar requirement includes batteries and not
zero net energy. Accessed at: https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ugc/
articles/2018/05/17/why-californias-new-home-solar-requirement-in-
cludes-batteries-and-not-zero-net-energy.html?.
65. Solar Energy Industries Association 2018: Solar means business. Accessed
at: www.seia.org/solarmeansbiz.
66. See the Report: Brighter future: a study on solar in US schools. Available at:
https://www.thesolarfoundation.org/brighter-future-a-study-on-solar-in-
us-schools/.
67. See http://www.tdsb.on.ca/About-Us/Facility-Services/Solar-Schools-Project.
68. The abbreviation ‘th’ means ‘thermal’, and denotes power in the form of
heat, as opposed to electricity.
268
M. J. Bush
69. Solar heat worldwide. Op. cit.

70. Developing geothermal district heating in Europe. Accessed at: https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/energy/intelligent/projects/sites/iee-projects/files/projects/docu-
ments/geodh_final_publishable_results_oriented_report.pdf.
71. Boundary dam reference.
72. See Quest carbon capture and storage project Alberta. Available at: https://
www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/quest-carbon-capture-
and-storage-project-alberta/.
73. See Blueprint for industrial CCS in the UK. Available at: https://teessidecol-
lective.co.uk/teesside-collective-blueprint-for-industrial-ccs-in-the-uk.
74. The data are from the IEA Report Energy Access Outlook 2017. Available at:
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/pubication/WEO2017
SpecialReport_EnergyAccesOutlook.pdf.
75. See the World Bank data. Available at: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.7.
76. See the IEA Report: Energy Access Outlook 2017: From poverty to prosper-
ity. Available at: https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publica-
tions/WSEO2017SpecialReport_EnergyAccessOutlook.pdf.
77. See Energy within reach: Growing the minigrid market in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Available at: https://www.rmi.org/insight/energy-within-reach/.
78. See the Report: Accelerating mini-grid deployment in sub-Saharan Africa:
Lessons from Tanzania. Available at: https://wri.org/sites/default/files/accel-
erating-mini-grid-deployment-sub-saharan-africa_1.pdf.
79. See the Status of Implementation of Rural Energy Projects in Tanzania, press
release, Rural Energy Agency, July 28, 2015.
80. See the report: Accelerating mini-grid deployment in sub-Saharan Africa:
Lessons from Tanzania. Available at: https://wri.org/sites/default/files/accel-
erating-mini-grid-deployment-sub-saharan-africa_1.pdf.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. See Small power producers (SPP) framework. Accessed at: http://www.iea.
org/policiesandmeasures/pams/unitedrepublicoftanzania/name-154661-en.
php.
85. See Accelerating mini-grid deployment in sub-Saharan Africa. Op. cit.
86. EarthSpark communication.
87. See the Report: Solar under storm. https://www.rmi.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/Islands_SolarUnderStorm_Report_digitalJune122018.
pdf.
88. See the solar company making a profit on poor Africans. Accessed at: https://
www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-mkopa-solar-in-africa/.
89. See the M-Kopa website: www.m-kopa.com.
90. The countries were Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.
The survey if 2300 households was conducted in the spring of 2018.
5 Coming Clean
269
91. See Powering opportunity: The economic impact of off-grid solar. Available at:
https://www.gogla.org/powering-opportunity-the-economic-impact-of-
off-grid-solar.
92. See Energy within reach: growing the minigrid market in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Op. cit.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. See the International Energy Agency (IEA) Report: Energy efficiency 2017.
Available at: https://www.iea.org/efficiency/.
97. See the glossary for a list of the OECD countries.
98. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 17
99. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 20.
102. See the reports from Natural Resources Canada. Available at: http://www.
nrcan.gc.ca/energy/efficiency/industry/cipec5379.
104. See 2017 Chicago Energy Benchmarking Report. Available at: www.
CityofChicago.org/EnergyBenchmarking.
105. See the Factsheet: Nearly zero energy building definitions across Europe.
Accessed at: http://bpie.eu/uploads/lib/document/attachment/128/BPIE_
factsheet_nZEB_definitions_across_Europe.pdf.
108. See the report by the International Council on Clean Transportation
(ICCT): Light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards, 2017
global update. Accessed at: https://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/pub-
lications/2017-Global-LDV-Standards-Update_ICCT-Report_23062017_
vF.pdf.
111. See the 2017 state energy efficiency scorecard, published by the American
Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE). Available at: https://
aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1710.pdf.
112. These recommendations are taken from the ACEEE report referenced
above.
6
Getting Technical
Introduction
Although renewable energy accounts for only about 20% of global primary
energy, it is rapidly gaining ground. We saw in Chapter 5 that the growth
of wind power and solar photovoltaic electricity is an order of magnitude
greater than the other energy technologies—although hydropower contin-
ues to generate much more power than wind or solar simply because large
hydroelectric power plants have been generating electricity in many coun-
tries for decades.
As the demand for electricity and electrical power ramps up in the emerg-
ing economies, and as the need to provide electricity in rural villages in
Africa and Asia becomes a higher priority, it is solar photovoltaic technolo-
gies that are increasingly providing the much-needed energy.
In this chapter we look more closely how the renewable energy technolo-
gies: wind, solar, hydropower, geothermal, and biofuels, are being employed
around the world, and particularly in emerging economies. Wind turbines
and solar photovoltaic installations are now fully cost-competitive with fossil
fuel power—and even with electricity generated by natural gas. Moreover,
wind power and solar energy have zero emissions of carbon dioxide and
methane—the principal greenhouse gases. They are technologies that don’t
require any pipelines, oil tankers, or coal trains in order to deliver energy to
cities. Renewable energy technologies are the safest and cleanest power tech-
nologies available—with almost zero environmental impact.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_6
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M. J. Bush
Wind Power
Wind power is one of the oldest energy technologies. The first wind-driven
devices are recorded in what was then Persia in the seventh century—
although the Chinese may have invented similar devices several centuries
earlier. The first machines, called panemones, were primitive devices consist-
ing of a vertical rotating shaft turning a mill stone. The shaft was positioned
inside a circular wall with an opening facing the prevailing wind. Attached
to the shaft were paddles that caught the wind on one side of the shaft fac-
ing the opening—turning the shaft. Lifting water and grinding grain were
the earliest forms of work driven by the wind—applications that continued
for over a thousand years.
In Asia and China in the tenth century, windmills were being used for
irrigation and drainage. By the thirteenth century the machines were widely
available in Europe. In low-lying Holland the machines were extensively
employed to pump water from the coastal polders. The Dutch refined wind
technology in several ways. They invented a rudimentary aerofoil; they cre-
ated the spoiler and the air brake; and they improved the overall efficiency of
the machines.
The first windmills in America copied the European models. But by the
middle of the nineteenth century Daniel Halladay has begun to experiment
with the design that eventually developed into the familiar multi-bladed
water pumping machine still to be seen across the rural North American
landscape.
In August 1854, Halladay patented the first commercially viable wind-
mill—Halladay’s Self-Governing Windmill. Halladay had been approached
to work on the design by a local businessman, John Burnham. Burnham was
involved in the pump business and understood that if a reliable source of
power could be found to bring ground water to the surface, he could signifi-
cantly increase his sales.
Halladay’s design allowed a windmill to automatically turn to face chang-
ing wind directions, and it regulated and maintained a uniform speed by
changing the pitch of the fan blades—without human intervention.
In July of 1854, the New-York Tribune, described Halladay’s new wind-
mill with its self-furling ‘sails’1: “the wind wheel is ten feet, and it has been
in operation for six months without a hand being touched to it to regulate
the sails.” The article went on to detail the unique design stating that the
windmill would stand still during a storm with high winds, the edge of the
sail wings facing into the wind, and as the storm died down the wings would
6 Getting Technical
273
gradually resume their position to catch the breeze. The windmill had also
successfully drawn water from a well 28 feet deep, moving it more than 100
feet to a small reservoir in the upper part of a barn. The cost of this new-
fangled invention was only $50—but with the cost of the pumps and pipes
running to an additional $25.
Halladay quickly formed the Halladay Windmill Company of Ellington,
eventually moving the firm to South Coventry in Connecticut, and man-
ufacturing in that town until 1863. Burnham then persuaded Halladay to
move the business to Batavia, Illinois—closer to the expanding Midwestern
market and the growing number of water-thirsty locomotives powering
across the country on an expanding network of railroads. Halladay’s US
Wind Engine and Pump Company’s products sold in the thousands to this
market, where wind power made it significantly easier to provide water for
crop irrigation and livestock.
Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, more than
six million multibladed water-pumping windmills are estimated to have
been erected in North America. They were also among the first machines
to be mass-produced. Factories in the US and Germany exported them
to South America, Africa, Australia, Japan and to nearly all the European
countries.2
Although several million water-pumping windmills were in operation
during the early part of the twentieth century, it was the development and
evolution of the airplane wing and propeller that stimulated the develop-
ment of the modern high-speed machines. And it was quickly recognized
that the high rotational speeds were ideal for driving an electrical generator.
In the early 1920s, innovators were using aircraft propellers to build sim-
ple wind turbines to charge batteries that powered electric lights and the first
electric appliances and radios.
In the 1930s, small wind machines that generated electricity came onto
the north American market. Between 1930 and 1960 thousands of wind
powered turbines were sold and installed in many countries. But production
in the US slowed in the 1960s after the Rural Electrification Administration
succeeded in providing American farms and rural homes with inexpensive
electricity generated by a distant coal-fired power plant linked to a transmis-
sion system.
By 1957, the Jacobs Wind Company in the US had sold over 30,000
wind turbines worldwide. Larger experimental wind turbines followed.
In 1957, Johannes Juul in Denmark built a machine with three 24-meter
blades that generated 200 kilowatts (kW) of electrical power.
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M. J. Bush
The energy crisis in the 1970s triggered an intense interest in wind power
in the US. More sophisticated science was brought to bear on the design and
construction of the rotors, and in 1981, the first US wind farm started up in
California at Altamont Pass. But before that, a 2-megawatt (MW) machine
had been constructed in Denmark, and the Danish company, Vestas, started
production—soon followed by other Danish manufacturers.
In the 1980s, the first offshore machines were installed near the coast of
Denmark; and by 1990 there were 46 windfarms generating power across
the USA.
The Twenty-First Century
By the turn of the twenty-first century, total installed wind power capacity
had reached 17,400 MW—which almost doubled two years later. And then
doubled again—reaching more than 59,000 MW in 2005.3
Twelve years later, in 2017, the global installed capacity for wind power
had surged to nearly 539 GW (i.e. 539,000 MW). China leads in terms
of new installations, followed by Germany and the US, with India passing
Brazil to rank fourth. Other countries in the top ten were France, Turkey,
the Netherlands, the UK and Canada.4 On a per capita basis, Denmark,
Sweden, Germany, Ireland and Portugal would be the top five countries.
Wind power has now become the least-cost option for new power generat-
ing capacity in an increasing number of markets. At least, thirteen countries
(mostly European but including Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Uruguay), now
generate more than 10% of their electricity from wind.5 Figure 6.1 shows
wind power global capacity and annual additions between 2007 and 2016.
How It Works
In principle, it’s simple enough. The wind turns the turbine blades—usually
three of them. The blades are attached to a drive shaft running through a
gear box that increases the rotational speed, and the gears connect to a gen-
erator that produces electricity.
A modern megawatt-scale turbine is a sophisticated machine. The vari-
able-pitch aerofoil blades are computer-controlled to extract the maximum
amount of energy from the wind, and the machine is constantly monitored
remotely to produce maximum performance, and to ensure that there are
no problems with the gearbox and generator. Figure 6.2 shows the main ele-
ments of a modern wind turbine.6
6 Getting Technical
275
Fig. 6.1 Wind power global capacity and annual additions from 2007 to 2017, giga-
watts (Source REN21 Renewables 2018 Global Status Report)
Fig. 6.2 Principal elements of a large wind turbine (Source U.S. Department of

Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy)
The amount of power produced by a wind turbine obviously depends

on how hard the wind blows. But it also depends on the characteristics
of the machine. All wind turbines have a characteristic power curve that
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M. J. Bush
Fig. 6.3 Power curve for a Vestas V80 2 MW turbine (Source Wind Power Program)
shows how much power the turbine will produce at different windspeeds.
For example, Fig. 6.3 shows the power curve for a Vestas V80 2 MW wind
turbine.7
The cut-in speed is the windspeed at which the blades begins to turn
and the machine starts to produce electrical power. In this case, the Vestas
V800 starts to generate power when the windspeed is about 3 meters/second
(m/s). As the windspeed increases, the turbine produces more power until,
at its rated power speed of 14 m/s, the machine is producing its full rated
output—which in this case is 2000 kW.
If the windspeed increases above the machine’s rated power speed, the
output remains constant until the windspeed becomes excessive—in which
case the turbine shuts down. Called the cut-out speed, for the Vestas V800
this occurs at a windspeed of 25 m/s—which would be reckoned gale-force
winds on the Beaufort scale.
Capacity Factor
The capacity factor of a power technology is a measure of how much elec-

tricity a power plant actually produces compared to how much it would pro-
duce if it operated at full rated capacity 100% of the time.
For fossil fuel-powered plants capacity factors are high—often above
80%. But for solar and wind energy, their power output is intermittent,
and capacity factors are lower. A wind turbine can never operate at its rated
power 100% of the time, because for a significant period, the windspeeds
6 Getting Technical
277
at the site will be outside the range of windspeeds at which the turbine pro-
duces full power. In addition, the physics of air flowing through a turbine
limit the absolute maximum efficiency to just under 60%.
This is critically important because it means that a wind turbine
rated at 2 MW can never produce an amount of electricity equal to
2 MW × 8760 hours a year = 17,520 MWh/year. It’s physically impossi-
ble given the variability of the wind regime and the physics of the air flow
through the turbine blades.
The capacity factors for solar photovoltaic energy and wind power will
always be low compared to fossil fuel-powered technologies and nuclear
energy. But the cost of energy produced by a technology is not only deter-
mined by its capacity factor. Solar and wind energy technologies have zero
fuel costs. This is the crucial factor in the calculation of the cost of energy
produced by renewable energy technologies compared to power generated
from coal, oil, and natural gas—a calculation which shows that electricity
from wind turbines in good locations is now less costly than electricity from
fossil fuels including natural gas. And most importantly, there are no emis-
sions of carbon dioxide, methane, and the other greenhouse gases—a factor
that should be a game-changer even if the cost of electrical power came out
to be about the same.
Windspeed Distribution
It’s obvious to everyone that the wind is highly variable. Wind speeds vary
over not only the space of a few seconds, but also between night and day,
and throughout the seasons. Moreover, knowing the average or mean wind-
speed at a particular place isn’t good enough to accurately calculate the
power output of a specific wind turbine that is located at the site. For this,
we need to know the windspeed distribution.
Wind speeds at a site proposed for a wind turbine need to be measured
for at least a year (and preferably two or three) in order to get an idea of the
wind speeds at the site and their variability over time. Windspeeds can be
measured by an anemometer, recorded, and graphed as a histogram—plot-
ting the time the wind blows for every increment of speed between zero and
say 25 m/s. Figure 6.4 shows a windspeed distribution for an actual site in
the UK, recorded hourly over the period 2005–2007. In this observatory,
the windspeed was measured in knots.
The mean windspeed is 10.2 knots equal to 5.25 m/s, but the distribu-
tion of wind speeds is not symmetrical about the mean. It is skewed towards
278
M. J. Bush
Fig. 6.4 Histogram of hourly windspeeds at Plymouth, UK (Source Wind Power

Program)
the right. The most frequently occurring wind speed is around 5 knots or
2.6 m/s.8
To estimate the average power from a wind turbine over a period of
time, it is necessary take a wind turbine power curve, like the one shown in
Fig. 6.3, and multiply the power at every increment of wind speed by the
fraction of time the wind is blowing at that speed. In practice, this is cal-
culated by employing a computer model of the wind turbine’s performance
and the wind speed distribution. To formulate the model, the windspeed
distribution has to be approximated by a mathematical formula—a prob-
ability distribution function. We will not go into the mathematics here,
except to note that software packages are available (like the WindPower pro-
gram) that compute the energy produced by a wind turbine installed at a
site with a specified windspeed probability distribution. For instance, the
estimated output from the 2 MW Vestas offshore wind turbine calculated by
the WindPower program is shown in Table 6.1.9
So for a site where the mean windspeed is measured at 7 m/s (generally
the minimum mean windspeed needed for a reasonably good wind power
site), the 2 MW Vestas turbine would generate about 5672 MWh of elec-
tricity—assuming no losses in power transmission. The machine’s capacity
factor at this site is estimated to be about 32%.
6 Getting Technical
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Table 6.1 Annual energy output for a 2 MW Vestas offshore wind turbine
Mean windspeed (m/s) Energy output (kWh/yr) Capacity factor (%)
5.0 2,855,846 16.3
6.0 4,285,160 24.5
7.0 5,672,087 32.4
8.0 6,909,340 39.4
9.0 7,939,894 45.3
10.0 8,739,939 49.9
Source Wind Power Program
KīƐŚŽƌĞ
KŶƐŚŽƌĞǁŝŶĚ
Fig. 6.5 Global weighted average capacity factors for new onshore and offshore
wind turbines (Source International Renewable Energy Agency)
If cost data are available, the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) from this
turbine can then be calculated.
As wind turbines have become larger and more technically advanced,
capacity factors have been trending upwards. This has been driven by
not only by the increase in the average hub height, turbine rating, and
rotor diameter, but also by the trends in resource quality in new projects.
Figure 6.5 shows global weighted average capacity factors for new onshore
and offshore wind power capacity additions by year of commissioning from
1983 to 2017.10
Figure 6.5 shows that for onshore wind energy, capacity factors for new
turbines are approaching 30%. For offshore wind turbines, capacity factors
are higher—over 40%. In both cases, the trend continues to be upwards—a
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M. J. Bush
sign of the continuing technical advances being made in the design and
operation of these machines.
There are significant regional variations, however. Capacity factors for
onshore wind turbines are highest in the US: over 40%, driven not only by
technology improvements but also the trend towards the location of projects
in areas with the best resources.11
Capacity factors are useful for making quick estimates of wind farm
power outputs and for cross checking manufacturers claims of superior
performance.
Let’s say we are looking at a new 20 MW offshore wind farm off the coast
of the UK. Approximately how much electricity would you expect that wind
farm to produce in a typical year?
Offshore wind turbines are now showing capacity factors of more than
40%. Taking this number as a ballpark figure, we would estimate the output
as 0.4 × 20  MW × 8760  hours/year = 70,080 MWh/year. A more accurate
calculation would be based on the wind turbine’s power curve and the site’s
windspeed probability distribution as discussed above. For a large windfarm
the calculation is complex—because wind speed patterns and the windfarm’s
power output are affected by the precise location of each turbine, and this
needs to be modelled mathematically in order to obtain an accurate estimate
of the windfarm’s energy output over the course of the year.
Wind turbines are becoming larger and more efficient. In March 2018,
General Electric (GE) unveiled a plan to develop the largest and most pow-
erful offshore wind turbine to date. Called the Haliade-X, the nacelle of
this mammoth machine will stand 260 meters above the waves. Its three
107-meter-long blades will drive a generator producing 12 MW of electric-
ity at its rated output—enough power for about 16,000 homes. Although
not yet in service (planned for 2021), GE estimates the turbine’s capacity
factor at an impressive 63%—which is a good bit higher than offshore wind
turbines currently in operation.12
Wind Resources
The excellent Wind Atlas website shows mean windspeeds for regions across
the globe in considerable detail. Figure 6.6 shows a screenshot from the web-
site. The mean wind speed for a site is available at three different heights:
50, 100 and 200 meters. As a first cut, if one assumes a typical windspeed
distribution for the indicated mean windspeed, it is possible to estimate the
power output of any turbine if the power curve is known. Even if only the
6 Getting Technical
281
Fig. 6.6 Wind energy resources map of North America and Europe (Source Wind
Atlas)
rated power and the rated windspeed for the turbine are known, it is still
possible to make a reasonably good estimate of the energy produced by the
turbine for a given location.13
Figure 6.6 shows that on the east coast of North America from Virginia
northward up to Newfoundland and Labrador, wind resources are excellent.
The Great Lakes also look good; so too does the east coast of James Bay and
Hudson Bay. Some of the best wind resources are along the coastal areas of
the Irish and North Seas. Scotland, Scandinavia, and Iceland have some of
the best wind regimes.14
Across the mid-west of the US, wind resources are also good. In 2017,
oil-rich Texas alone added 2.3 GW of wind power capacity, for a year-end
total of 22.6 GW. If the Lonestar state were a country, it would rank sixth
worldwide for cumulative wind power capacity. Wind power accounted for
nearly 15% of electricity generation in the state during 2017. Utility-scale
wind power accounted for more than 15% of annual generation in eight
additional states, more than 30% in four states (including Iowa, at 36.9%)
and 6.3% of total US electricity generation.15
Not surprisingly, wind farms are being built and operated in areas with
the best wind resources. Table 6.2 shows the world’s largest wind farms oper-
ating in 2017, with a capacity greater than 500 MW.
The windfarm at Gansu in China is planned for a huge 20,000 MW total
capacity, but reportedly has operational problems linked to a lack of demand
for electricity in the region and the transmission of this amount of intermit-
tent power.16
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M. J. Bush
Table 6.2 Largest operational onshore windfarmsa

Wind farm Capacity (MW) Country State/province
Gansu Wind Farm 7965 China Gansu
Alta Wind Energy Center 1548 USA California
Muppandal Wind Farm 1500 India Tamil Nadu
Jaisalmer Wind Park 1064 India Rajasthan
Shepherds Flat Wind Farm 845 USA Oregon
Roscoe Wind Farm 781.5 USA Texas
Horse Hollow Wind Energy Center 735.5 USA Texas
Capricorn Ridge Wind farm 662.5 USA Texas
Fantanele-Cogealac Wind Farm 600 Romania Fantanele and
Cogealac
Fowler Ridge Wind Farm 599.8 USA Indiana
Sweetwater Wind Farm 585.3 USA Texas
Cedar Creek Wind Farm 551 USA Colorado
Whitelee Wind farm 539 UK Renfrewshire
Buffalo Gap Wind Farm 523.3 USA Texas
Dabancheng Wind farm 500 China Xinjiang
Meadow Lake Wind farm 500 USA Indiana
aThe list is from Wikipedia—which has a more comprehensive list. See https://en.wiki-
pedia.org/wiki/List_of_onshore_wind_farms
Source Wikipedia
Offshore windfarms tend to be smaller. The largest in 2017 was the

London Array with a capacity of 630 MW. Only six offshore wind farms are
above 500 MW—four of which are in UK waters. However, this disparity is
changing. Much larger offshore wind farms are in the works—nearly all of
them planned for European waters.17
In 2018, the 660 MW Walney Extension Offshore Wind Farm was pow-
ered up in the Irish Sea, approximately 19 km from the coast of Cumbria in
the UK, and close to the original 367 MW Walney Offshore Wind Farm.
The Walney Extension wind turbines will generate enough electricity to
power more than 460,000 homes. Figure 6.7 shows the world’s largest off-
shore windfarms.
Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE)
The LCOE from a wind power project is a function of the cost of instal-
lation, the quality of the wind resource, the technical characteristics of the
wind turbines, operation and maintenance costs, the cost of capital, and the
economic life of the project. The LCOE therefore largely depends on four
factors:
6 Getting Technical
283
Fig. 6.7 World’s largest offshore windfarms in 2018 (see the September 2018
Guardian article: World’s largest offshore windfarm opens off Cumbrian coast.
Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/06/worlds-largest-
offshore-windfarm-opens-cumbrian-coast-walney-extension-brexit) (Source Wikipedia)
• Capacity factor. This is the result of the interplay of several variables,

among which are the characteristics of the wind energy resource, the tech-
nical characteristics of the turbine, and its operational availability.
• Total installed cost. The cost of the turbine is generally the largest cost
item. Offshore projects have higher installation and operation and main-
tenance (O&M) costs.
• Operation and maintenance. There are both fixed and variable costs
associated with the operation and maintenance of the turbines and their
ancillary equipment. O&M can represent 20–25% of the LCOE.
• Cost of capital. The weighted cost of capital (WACC) is a major factor in
the calculation of the LCOE.
During the period 1983 to 2016, the LCOE of onshore wind energy
dropped by an average of 15% for each doubling of installed capacity.
Figure 6.8 shows the evolution of the LCOE of onshore wind projects
between 1983 and 2017. The global weighted average value declined from
USD 0.40/kWh in 1983 to USD 0.06/kWh in 2017.18 Moreover, the
trend is still downward—and this is expected to continue as turbine designs
improve, machines get larger and more efficient, and economies of scale
continue to exert a downward impact on costs.
The LCOE of offshore wind projects is higher—but is also trending
downwards. From 2010 to 2016, the global weighted average of offshore
wind decreased from USD 0.17 to USD 0.14/kWh. This was made pos-
sible by improved technology that has allowed higher capacity factors that
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M. J. Bush
Fig. 6.8 Global weighted average levelized cost of electricity for onshore wind pro-
jects 1983–2017 (Source International Renewable Energy Agency)
have more than offset the increase in installed costs because of the larger and
heavier machines. The prices awarded in auctions in 2016 and 2017 for pro-
jects coming online by 2020–2022 range from USD 0.10/kWh to as low as
USD 0.06/kWh.19
The technology is rapidly evolving. In the US, wind farms are being
‘repowered’ as technology upgrades increase their energy production. As the
largest windfarms are getting older, their owners are starting to ‘repower’
them with more efficient generators, new electronics, and longer lighter
blades. In 2017, the US wind industry completed 15 repowering projects
totalling 2136 MW. The upgrades extend the life of the projects without
having to build a new windfarm. Since the infrastructure and power pur-
chase agreements (PPA) are already in place, the increased energy output
produces greater revenues from the same location.20
In Europe, repowering has become a billion-dollar industry. While most
repowering involves the replacement of old turbines with fewer, larger, and
more efficient and reliable machines, some operators are switching even rel-
atively new machines for upgraded turbines and software improvements.21
European wind power is rapidly gaining ground over nuclear energy.
Although Britain has eight operating nuclear plants, over the first three
months of 2018, UK residents received more electricity from wind power
than from nuclear energy—the first time that wind had overtaken nuclear in
the UK. One of the reasons reported for this increase in production was due
6 Getting Technical
285
to a new transmission line between Scotland and north Wales that opened in
December 2017. This allowed wind turbines to keep generating electricity,
whereas in the past their output might have been curtailed once the grid
they fed into became unable to accept more power.22 This is a point worth
noting—solar and wind energy, because of their intermittency—may require
upgraded electrical transmission systems that can handle their characteris-
tic unpredictability and variability. But technical advances and the falling
costs of utility-scale storage batteries are increasingly solving the problem of
intermittency.
Environmental Impacts
There are essentially three types of environmental impact associated with the
installation and operation of large wind turbines: noise, aesthetics, and wild-
life mortality.
Wind turbines make noise, and for many people noise is bothersome and
if loud enough, definitely annoying and stressful.
A comprehensive study of the noise issues and health impacts of wind tur-
bines was conducted by Health Canada in 2014. The study focused on over
1500 families living within 600 meters of a wind turbine in Ontario and
Prince Edward Island. The researchers investigated the prevalence of health
effects or health indicators among people exposed to wind turbine noise
(WTN) using both self-reported and objectively measured health outcomes.
They also looked at low frequency noise and infrasound from wind turbines
to see if there was an adverse community reaction.
The study could not find any statistical correlation between turbine noise
and sleep disturbance, illness, stress and quality of life.
However, in some cases, wind turbines clearly annoy people that are too
close to them. There was a statistical correlation between WTN and annoy-
ance linked to noise, shadow flicker, blinking lights and visual impact. In
all cases, as expected, annoyance got worse with increasing exposure to
noise levels. Community annoyance fell significantly at distances between
1 and 2 km from the turbines. Communities on Prince Edward Island liv-
ing within 550 meters of a wind turbine were recorded as being ‘highly
annoyed’.
Interestingly, annoyance was significantly lower among 110 participants
who received personal benefit from the installation of the turbines: either
rent, payment or other indirect benefits of having wind turbines in the
area—such as some form of community improvement.23
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M. J. Bush
The takeaway from the Health Canada study is perhaps the obvious one
that large machines with long rotating blades that make a noise can be
annoying if you live too close to them. But it helps if you gain from their
presence. But clearly, wind turbines should not be located too close to com-
munities. A rule of thumb would be that 1 km is the minimum, but 2 km
is better. Offshore wind projects would seem to have a definite advantage in
this respect.
Noise is clearly an issue in other jurisdictions as well: in June 2018, a
judge in Minnesota recommended that the Freeborn Wind Farm be denied
an operating permit, saying the southern Minnesota project failed to show it
could meet state noise standards.24
Aesthetically, some people just don’t like wind turbines. Whether by
themselves on a hillside, grouped into a windfarm on land, or out to sea
on the horizon, many people object to their presence and see wind tur-
bines as an unattractive blot on the landscape. An eyesore. This objection
may diminish as the turbines are located farther away from the observer’s
viewpoint, but one suspects that some people are just never going to like
wind turbines intruding on the landscape even if they are at a considerable
distance.
This is the NIMBY syndrome: Not In My Back Yard. But if you want
electricity, the technology has to be in someone’s back yard. Generating
megawatt-scale electrical power to light and heat hundreds of thousands of
homes requires lots of big, noisy, machinery and infrastructure. It can’t go
underground. But if the electricity is generated by wind, all that machinery
can go out to sea—which is more than fossil fuels and nuclear energy can do.
Birds and Bats
Wind turbines are big machines and the tip of the long rotating blades is
moving extremely fast. It is undeniable that wind turbines kill birds and fly-
ing mammals such as bats.
But how big of a problem is it really?
The US Fish and Wildlife Service has looked into this question and esti-
mated the level of threat to birds from several human activities. Table 6.3
shows their assessment—necessarily approximate but nonetheless instructive.
It’s clear that wind turbines are not the main problem. Even oil pits kill
more birds than wind turbines. But cats have a lot to answer for.25
What about bats?
6 Getting Technical
287
Table 6.3 Common human-caused threats to birds in North America

Rank Hazard Type Median/average
(million kills/year)
1 Cats Predation 2400
2 Collision Building glass 303
3 Collision Vehicle 200
4 Poison – 72
5 Collision Electrical lines 25
6 Collision Communication towers 6.5
7 Electrocutions – 5.4
8 Oil pits Suffocation and drowning 0.75
9 Collision Wind turbines 0.174
Source US Fish and Wildlife Service
Unfortunately, wind turbines can kill lots of bats—perhaps as many as a

million every year in the US. Bats tend to congregate around tall trees and
it is thought they mistake the turbines for trees. The fragile animals are fre-
quently struck by the blades, but they can also be killed by the large and
sudden changes in pressure caused by the swirling air.
Since bats only fly in relatively light winds—when turbines are not pro-
ducing much power, one proposed solution is to raise the cut-in speed of
turbines in areas where bats fly from 3 or 4 m/s up to 6 m/s. A study by
Bat Conservation International in 2010 showed that higher cut-in speeds
reduced bat mortality by up to 90%.26
If wind turbines kill a bat species that is listed as an endangered, the US
Fish and Wildlife Service could order wind turbine operators to raise the
turbine’s cut-in speed—which would reduce the wind farms’ power output
and revenue and certainly push up the LCOE.
Windfarms positioned several kilometres out to sea presumably would
not kill any bats—so this is another argument in favour of offshore wind.
Solar Photovoltaic Energy

Compared to the other sources of renewable energy, photovoltaic electricity
was a late starter. Although the photoelectric effect had been studied since
the late nineteenth century, it wasn’t until 1954, in the Bell Labs in the US,
that the first functional solar cell was produced.
At first very expensive, the technology only started to become commer-
cialized in the late 1950s—mainly for satellites that needed low levels of
power for long periods of time. In 1958, Vanguard I & II, Explorer III, and
288
M. J. Bush
ŶŶƵĂůĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ
Fig. 6.9 Solar PV global capacity and annual additions from 2007 to 2017 (Source
REN21 Renewables 2018 Global Status Report)
Sputnik-3 satellites were launched—each powered by solar PV arrays. In

1959, Explorer VI was launched with an array of 9600 cells.
Terrestrial applications were few and far between because photovoltaic
cells were expensive. Communication systems in isolated areas was an early
niche market. In 1962, Bell Labs launched Telstar—the first telecommuni-
cation satellite. A year later, Japan installed a 212-Watt PV array on a light-
house—the world’s largest array at that time.27
Since that time the pace of photovoltaic power deployment has been
fast and furious. In 2017, 98 gigawatts (that’s 98,000 megawatts) of solar
photovoltaic capacity was added worldwide—equivalent to the instal-
lation of more than 40,000 solar panels every hour.28 By the end of that
year, global solar PV capacity totalled just over 400 GW. Figure 6.9 charts
the exponential increase in PV installed capacity worldwide from 2007 to
2017.
China once again leads the way, followed by the US, Japan, India and
Turkey—together these five countries accounted for about 84% of addi-
tional capacity. While China dominates both the use and the manufacturing
of solar PV, emerging markets on all continents have begun to contribute
significantly to global growth. By the end of 2017, 29 countries had more
than 1 GW installed. Per capita, the leaders are Germany, Japan, Italy,
Belgium and Australia.
6 Getting Technical
289
In the US, solar PV was the country’s leading source of new generating
capacity in 2017. More than 10 GW of capacity was brought online for a
total of 51 GW. California led the field for capacity added (5.2 GW), fol-
lowed by North Carolina (1 GW) and Florida (0.4 GW).
Photovoltaic technology and applications exist at many levels: from res-
idential kilowatt-scale systems up to centralized gigawatt-scale installations
operated by utilities managing transmission and distribution networks
providing electricity to millions of customers. The degree of penetration
of residential systems depends strongly on the incentives provided by gov-
ernments, and other factors such as the cost of electricity from the utility,
and the cost and availability of financing. Where Feed-in-tariffs (FITs) are
a financially attractive option, households can be quick to take advantage
of the policy. However, in many countries, FITs have been scaled back, and
although net metering is available in many jurisdictions, this policy has not
been as influential as feed-in-tariffs in inducing households to install resi-
dential photovoltaic systems.
In Germany, the solar-plus-storage market is growing rapidly as consum-
ers shift from FITs to self-consumption. The share of newly installed resi-
dential systems paired with storage rose 14% in 2014 to more than 50% in
2016, when that country represented about 80% of Europe’s home energy
storage market. Australia’s market has also been predominantly residential.
By late 2017 almost 1.8 million rooftop solar PV installations (residential
and commercial) were operating in that country.
In addition to Australia, Germany and Japan, interest in solar-plus-stor-
age is picking up in other developed countries (e.g. France, Italy, and the
UK) for on- and off-grid systems where incentives are persuasive and the
option is financially attractive.29
Although demand is rising rapidly for off-grid solar PV in Africa and
other regions, grid-connected systems continue to account for the majority
of existing and new installations. In terms of the fraction of added capacity,
decentralized rooftop grid-connected systems have been declining—particu-
larly with the transition from FITs and net metering to self-consumption—
although it ticked up slightly in 2017.
Centralized large scale projects by contrast have comprised a rising share
of annual installations—particularly in emerging markets, and now repre-
sent the majority of annual installations.30
Floating PV installations are also growing in number and scale. Since
2015, more than 100 plants have started up, floating on hydropower res-
ervoirs, industrial water sites, aquaculture ponds, and other areas of water.
The benefits of floating PV modules include increased efficiency (because the
290
M. J. Bush
Table 6.4 The largest solar photovoltaic power plants (300 MW or greater)a

Name Country Capacity (MWp) Size (km2)
Tengger Desert Solar Park China 1547 43
Kurnool Ultra Mega Solar Park India 1000 24
Datong Solar Power Top Runner China 1000 –
Longyangxia Dam Solar Park China 850 23
Bhadla Solar Park India 746 40
Kamuthi Solar Power Project India 648 10
Pavagada Solar Park India 600 53
Solar Star (I and II) USA 747 13
Topaz Solar Farm USA 550 25
Copper Mountain Solar Facility USA 552 –
Desert Sunlight Solar Farm USA 550 16
Golmud Solar Park China 500 23
Mesquite Solar Project USA 400 –
Yanchi Solar Park China 380 –
Charanka Solar Park India 345 20
Springbok Solar Farm USA 328 12
Enel Green Power Mexico Mexico 310
Cestas Solar Park France 300 2.5
Stateline Solar USA 300 6.8
aSee the Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_photovoltaic_
power_stations#World’s_largest_photovoltaic_power_stations
Source Wikipedia
modules are cooler) and reduced evaporation from the reservoirs. Japan leads
in terms of the number of installations due in part to the country’s FIT pol-
icy combined with limited roof and ground space. Other countries with pro-
jects include China, India, South Korea and Brazil.31
Megawatt-scale photovoltaic power plants are getting larger—particularly
where there is plenty of both sunshine and available land.
Table 6.4 lists the world’s largest solar photovoltaic power plants with a
capacity of 300 MW or greater.
Perhaps sensing the end of the road for their formerly free-flowing oil,
Saudi Arabia is diversifying its energy resources and exploiting the solar
energy it has in abundance. The country’s first solar project is planned to be
a 300 MW installation at Sakaka in north-western Saudi Arabia. The contract
was awarded in 2018 to the Saudi energy group, ACWA, whose bid came in
at under US 3 ¢/kWh. The 300 MW plant is expected to involve a total pri-
vate sector capital investment of about $300 million and create 400 jobs.32
Clearly, Saudi Arabia is thinking big. In early 2018 it was reported that
Saudi Arabia and Japan’s SoftBank Group Corp. had signed a memorandum
of understanding to build a 200 Gigawatt (that’s 200,000 MW) photovol-
taic power plant.
6 Getting Technical
291
If built, the PV power plant would almost triple Saudi Arabia’s electricity
generation capacity, which stood at 77 GW in 2016. About two thirds of that
amount is generated by natural gas, with the rest coming from oil. The gigan-
tic PV project, which includes both power generation and module and equip-
ment manufacturing, will create as many as 100,000 jobs, and is expected to
shave $40 billion off conventional power costs. The development will reach its
maximum capacity by 2030 and cost close to $1 billion per Gigawatt.
The deal is just the latest in a number of record-breaking announcements
from Saudi Arabia—a country that is planning to massively scale up its
access to renewable energy.33
Photovoltaic Technology
A typical silicon photovoltaic (PV) cell is composed of a layer of phospho-

rus-doped (N-type) silicon on top of a thicker layer of boron-doped (P-type)
silicon. An electrical field is created near the top surface of the cell where
these two materials are in contact—called the P-N junction. When sunlight
strikes the surface of the PV cell this electrical field generates light-stimu-
lated electrons, resulting in a flow of current when the solar cell is connected
to an electrical load.
A typical silicon PV cell produces only about 0.5–0.6 volts DC under
open-circuit, no-load conditions. The current and power of a PV cell
depends on its efficiency and surface area and is proportional to the intensity
of sunlight striking the surface of the cell. Under peak sunlight conditions
a typical commercial PV cell with a surface area of 160 cm2 will produce
about 2 Watts of power.34
Photovoltaic cells are connected in series and parallel circuits to produce
higher voltages, currents and power levels. The PV cells are assembled into
modules (solar panels), which for large installations, are then interconnected
into an array—which may consist of thousands of individual panels.
The performance of PV modules and arrays are generally rated accord-
ing to their maximum DC power output under standard conditions—which
approximates the maximum insolation possible on the surface of the Earth.
PV panels are rated according to the maximum power they will produce
under these conditions. For example, a PV panel rated as being 200 peak
watts (written as 200 Wp) will produce 200 watts of direct current (DC)
power under the maximum level of sunshine possible. Since a PV panel in a
fixed position will not receive this level of insolation for more than an hour
or so a day (if it is perfectly oriented perpendicular to the sun’s rays), the
average power output of a PV array is a lot less than its rated power.
292
M. J. Bush
The capacity factor of a PV system is obviously low since for at least half
the time the module is not producing any power (at night), and even during
the day it reaches its peak power only for a few hours around midday. So
how much energy does a solar panel actually produce?
Although in most places the sun shines for at least 12 hours a day, only
for about 4 or 5 hours will the PV panel be producing at close to its rated
output. For instance, a 100-peak-watt panel (100 Wp) will produce about
400 Watthours of electricity when installed at a site with average insolation.
In a sunnier location, you should get about 500 Wh of energy from the
same system. This is a just a rule-of-thumb—but it enables you to make a
quick estimate of the energy produced by an array of PV panels.
Let’s say you are thinking of installing a 6000 Wp (6 kilowatts peak) PV
system on the roof of your house in Florida. Florida is pretty sunny, so let’s
reckon that we get on average 4.5 hours × 6  kW = 27 kWh of electricity a
day from the modules. That’s 9855 kWh of electricity a year—which gives
you a first cut at roughly the amount of electricity you might get out of your
system. It’s a ballpark figure. But it might be good enough for you to decide
whether or not to go ahead with a more detailed evaluation of the econom-
ics of the proposal.
For an accurate evaluation of the output from a PV system we need to
run a detailed simulation of the insolation at the proposed site over the
course of a year. These data need to be modelled together with the energy
losses associated with the equipment necessary for the operation of the sys-
tem—particularly the inverters which convert direct current (DC) electricity
to alternating current (AC), and the batteries (if these are included). One
of the best (and free) PV evaluation tools is the Photovoltaic Geographical
Information System (PVGIS) developed and supported by the Joint
Research Centre of the European Commission. It’s available at this site:
http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pvg_tools/en/tools.html.
Running the simulation for a site in Miami with a 6kWp photovoltaic
installation, the model produces the output shown in Fig. 6.10.
The model takes into account all the system losses and calculates the
monthly energy output from the PV panels—assumed to be optimally set
up at a slope of 26 degrees and an azimuth of −7 degrees (oriented slightly
to the south east).
The monthly energy output varies between about 700 kWh in September
to just over 900 kWh in March. The total energy output for the year is esti-
mated as 9400 kWh—about 5% less than our quick calculation based on
the rule-of-thumb method.
PVGIS can be used to model the performance of much larger photovol-
taic systems—even utility-scale PV power plants can be simulated by the
6 Getting Technical
293
Fig. 6.10 Energy output from the PVGIS model for a 6kWp photovoltaic system in
Miami, Florida (Source Photovoltaic Geographic Information System)
Fig. 6.11 Output data for a 30 MWp photovoltaic system in Djibouti, East Africa
(Source Photovoltaic Geographic Information System)
software, which will also calculate the levelized cost of the electricity pro-
duced by the power plant.
Take the example of a 30 MWp photovoltaic power plant to be installed
in Djibouti in east Africa. The capital cost of the system is estimated at
about $60 million. If we run this simulation for a site at Grand Bara in
Djibouti, we get the results shown in Fig. 6.11.
If the interest on capital is set at 5% p.a. and assuming a 30 year lifetime,
the levelized cost of energy is calculated as 9¢/kWh.35 That is pretty good for
Djibouti—where electricity is hugely expensive.
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M. J. Bush
Distributed Solar Energy
One of the most useful characteristics of photovoltaic energy is the extraor-

dinary range of the services that PV energy can provide—everything from a
tiny cell producing a fraction of a watt for a pocket calculator, to arrays of
thousands of PV modules generating megawatts of power. In between these
extremes is an application that has the potential to completely change the
way electricity is provided and used by residences, communities, commerce,
and industry.
In 2017, the US solar market installed 10.6 GW of PV capacity. This was
30% less than the record-breaking year before, but in line with the upward
trend in PV installations that has been rising exponentially for the last dec-
ade. About 60% of this capacity was for utility-scale PV power plants; the
other 40% was for distributed solar. This segment covers both residential
rooftop systems and non-residential systems—the latter fraction includ-
ing community-based PV systems and PV systems installed on commercial
buildings.36
The installation of thousands of small solar PV systems on residences and
commercial buildings has largely been driven by governments’ determina-
tion to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases on both sides of the supply-de-
mand equation. So in western Europe, megawatt-scale PV and wind power
is replacing coal-fired and nuclear power plants, while at the same time
strong financial incentives have been provided in order to induce house-
holds, businesses and communities to install kilowatt-scale PV systems to
reduce the aggregate demand for electricity from the centralized distribution
system.
In Europe, this policy was pioneered by Germany which introduced Feed-
in-Tariffs (FITs) to encourage the use of new energy technologies includ-
ing photovoltaic energy in 2001. FITs provide a revenue to any renewable
energy installation, including residential solar, that feeds electricity into the
grid. At first set close to 50 cents/kWh, a level than induced hundreds of
thousands of households in Germany to install rooftop PV systems, the tar-
iff has been progressively reduced—to around 15 cents/kWh, which is where
it stood in 2018.
In Ontario, Canada, the FIT program for PV electricity started in 2009
and offered extraordinarily high FIT rates to rooftop and ground-mounted
PV installations. Rates varied between 44.3 and 80.2 ¢/kWh37 with the
upper rate applicable for rooftop installations less than 10 kW. In addi-
tion, homeowners enjoyed the exceptional security of a 20-year contract!38
6 Getting Technical
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the cost of this generous program was excessive, and
Ontario’s FIT program was eventually discontinued.
The inducements and incentives for homeowners and communities to
install small-scale photovoltaic systems on rooftops or adjacent spaces has
been extremely successful where it has been instituted and supported by
national and regional governments. There are two principal incentive mech-
anisms: net energy metering and feed-in-tariffs—although additional finan-
cial incentives such as rebates, discounts, tax breaks and other benefits are
often included in the programs.
Net energy metering is an arrangement where the excess electricity pro-
duced by a roof-mounted (or adjacent) PV system (the amount of energy
not required by the building itself ), is fed back into the grid. In effect, the
electricity meter runs backwards and the utility’s client—the home or busi-
ness owner—is only charged for the difference between the amount of elec-
tricity he or she consumes and the amount injected into the grid. How the
calculation is figured out varies; different power companies have different
arrangements, and there are generally limits on how much electricity can be
fed back into the grid.
Feed in-tariffs, as discussed briefly above, require the residence or building
to have two electricity meters—one to measure the electricity supplied by
the grid (at night for example), and one to measure the electricity produced
by the PV system and fed to the grid during the day. The home or business
owner will have to deal with two electricity tariffs: one for incoming electric-
ity from the grid, and the other for electricity injected into the grid by the
PV system. Both of these tariffs may vary according to the time of day.
Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) are also common. This is a contractual
agreement between a utility and the owner of a solar photovoltaic system,
where the utility agrees to purchase electricity from the PV system for a fixed
price per kWh over a specified period of time.
In the US at the end of 2017, of the nine states that generated more than
1000 MW of solar PV electricity, three have more than half of that power
output from distributed PV systems. All three states are in the NE: New
Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York—where an impressive 87% of total
solar electricity generation is from distributed sources. Yet the north-east
region of the US has only modest solar resources. They key to the growth of
distributed energy systems in this region is policy: in recent years the three
states have expanded policies such as net metering and PPAs that are favour-
able to distributed generation. It’s a reminder that solar energy can be eco-
nomically viable even in regions with only average levels of insolation.39
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M. J. Bush
In California, which has a lot better sunshine and much more utility-scale
PV power, distributed solar accounts for about 40% of installed PV capacity.
This percentage will soon ramp up considerably: in 2018, the state passed a
landmark solar homes rule that mandates distributed solar on all new home
construction starting in 2020.
Community Shared Solar
As distributed solar energy becomes more widespread, people are exploring

new ways of using photovoltaic electricity. Not everyone is able to install
panels on their roof due to unsuitable or insufficient roof space, living in a
multi-unit condo building, or simply renting. However, there are some alter-
native business models are that are developing—like community solar and
shared solar.
These business arrangements make it possible for people to invest in solar
energy together. Shared solar falls under the community solar rubric allow-
ing multiple participants to benefit directly from the energy produced by
a single solar photovoltaic array. Shared solar participants typically benefit
by owning or leasing a portion of a system or by purchasing kilowatt-hour
blocks of renewable energy generation. Figure 6.12 shows schematically the
three most common arrangements.40
By aggregating customer demand, shared solar programs can reduce
the financial and technical barriers to investing in residential solar energy.
Instead of acting alone to purchase PV panels and hiring professionals to
complete individual site assessments, shared solar programs divide these
costs among all of the participants. Investments are even safe for those who
may eventually move—their share of solar can be transferred to a new home
within the same utility service area or sold to someone else.41
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŐƌŽƵƉƉƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐ KĨĨƐŝƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚƐŽůĂƌ KŶƐŝƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚƐŽůĂƌŝŶĂŵƵůƚŝͲƵŶŝƚ

ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ
Fig. 6.12 Three models of community and shared solar energy (Source US

Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy)
6 Getting Technical
297
Most onsite solar energy installations use net metering to account for the
value of the electricity produced when the PV system produces more energy
that is needed by the participants. Net metering allows customers to be cred-
ited for this excess electricity in the grid, usually in the form of kWh credits
during a given period. The electricity meter runs backwards, and custom-
ers purchase fewer units of electricity from the utility, so the electricity pro-
duced from the PV system is effectively valued at the retail price of power.42
Onsite Energy Storage
As the cost of batteries continues to fall, there is increasing interest in adding

energy storage to distributed energy systems—which for solar photovoltaic
power means residential and community shared solar including businesses
and commerce.
One reason for this interest is the notable increase in extreme weather
events that have impacted north America over the last few years—especially in
2017. Severe weather is now the leading cause of power outages in the region.
For a solar system to provide electricity during a utility power outage, it
must be designed to function as a stand-alone system that can isolate itself
from the grid, continue to generate power and provide energy to the build-
ing, and also store excess electricity for later use.
For safety reasons, operating standards require that grid-connected solar
PV systems automatically disconnect from the grid during a power outage.
This is because most conventional rooftop PV systems are not designed to
function as both a grid-connected and a stand-alone system. Instead they
disconnect from the grid and completely cease power production during an
outage. Figure 6.13 shows the basic components of a solar PV system with
energy storage.43
Installing solar PV technology in conjunction with energy storage allows a
solar PV system to provide power when the grid is down—in effect, it func-
tions as a stand-alone system.
Batteries are the most commonly used storage technology for small dis-
tributed solar PV applications, although other types of energy storage sys-
tems (ESS) may be used for larger utility-scale systems. Batteries are linked
to the PV panels though an inverter which automatically selects between
charging the batteries, providing electricity to the onsite load, or feeding
electricity into the grid. So it’s a more sophisticated piece of power condi-
tioning equipment than the simple inverter used in a PV system that has
no energy storage capacity. The inverter monitors the onsite load, the grid
298
M. J. Bush
Fig. 6.13 Basic components of a PV + energy storage system (Source Florida Solar

Energy Center)
status, the state of charge of the batteries, and the power being generated by
the PV system.
The principal barrier to the deployment of energy storage in distributed
energy systems has been the cost of the batteries, but costs have been falling
for the last decade. Lower battery prices, increased demand for backup power,
and uncertainty surrounding the future cost of electricity from the grid are all
factors stimulating interest in distributed energy systems with storage.
Residential PV systems with storage can generate benefits for grid opera-
tors. Storage can add value through:
• Demand side management to shave peaks in the load on the utility

system
• Improved power quality by smoothing the variable output of a PV system
• Providing power to critical facility during an outage
• An increased ability to integrate higher levels of distributed energy sys-
tems into the grid system
• Ancillary grid services such as voltage control.44
In order to provide these functions and services, distributed energy systems

with storage require very smart controls and meters.
The ability of a distributed energy system to operate as a stand-
alone system in the event of a major outage means the building has
6 Getting Technical
299
considerable value to communities and local agencies in the aftermath of

extreme weather.
For instance, Florida’s SunSmart Schools and Emergency Shelters
Program has installed 115 solar PV systems with storage at Florida’s
schools to create emergency shelters.45 The basic system in Florida schools
consists of:
• 10 kW photovoltaic system on a ground mounted array (about 100 m2)

• 48 kWh battery backup energy storage
• 3-phase building electricity
• Utility grid-connected
• Net metering power
• Data monitoring
Using schools as emergency shelters is a strategy that should be adopted

by island governments in the Caribbean and the Pacific. All islands have
schools and kitting them out with a solar PV system with energy storage
is relatively inexpensive and a potential life-saver during a major hurricane.
Schools can also be used to store essential supplies (water and food) for local
communities in the aftermath of hurricanes and cyclones.
Community based PV systems can also be designed and built with energy
storage. With the ability to run as a stand-alone system in the event of an
outage—‘islanded’ from the grid, the energy storage capacity enables the
community to have electricity while other residences and buildings are with-
out power.
Levelized Cost of PV Electricity
Rapid declines in installed costs and increased efficiency have dramatically

improved the economic competitiveness of photovoltaic power. The global
weighted average LCOE of utility-scale PV plants is estimated to have fallen
by over 70% between 2010 and 2017—from about $0.36 to $0.10/kWh.
LCOE costs vary by country. The Italian market experienced the largest
LCOE reduction driven both by reductions in the cost of modules and a
fall in the balance of systems (BOS) costs. In the US, these costs are higher,
but excellent solar resources mean than that the LCOE of utility-scale pro-
jects in the US is not significantly higher than other markets. The LCOE
of residential systems has also fallen at a rapid pace. In Germany, costs fell
from $0.55/kWh in 2007 to $0.15/kWh in 2017. Data from India, China,
300
M. J. Bush
>KͬŬtŚ
Fig. 6.14 SunShot targets for levelized costs of PV electricity in US cents/kWh (Source

US Department of Energy, Sunshot Initiative)
Australia and Spain—which all have higher insolation than Germany—

show that lower LCOE costs can be achieved even if installed costs are
sometimes higher. In these countries, the LCOE fell to between $0.08 and
$0.12/kWh at the beginning of 2017.46
In the US, the SunShot Program is funding research and development
intended to bring energy costs from PV systems down to as low as 3 ¢/kWh
by 2030. Figure 6.14 outlines the goals of the program for residential, com-
mercial and utility-scale PV systems.47
Progress towards these targets has been impressive. In September 2017,
the US DOE announced that the SunShot program had met the 2020 utili-
ty-scale target of 6¢/kWh three years earlier than expected—so a new target
of 3¢/kWh was set for 2030.48
Concentrating Solar Power

Concentrating solar power (CSP) comes in two main forms—defined by the
technologies employed to concentrate sunlight. The most spectacular version
is where a large field of reflecting mirrors (heliostats) focuses sunlight on a
cylindrical receiver mounted on a tower in the centre of the area of mirrors.
In full sunshine, the receiver atop the tower is brilliantly illuminated (and
extremely hot) and is visible from a long distance. Dubbed a ‘power tower’,
6 Getting Technical
301
the technology was first employed at scale at Barstow in California in the

late 1970s.
The second variant is called a parabolic trough, or linear trough system. It
consists of lines of multiple linear parabolic mirrors that focus sunlight onto
a pipe running along the focal axis of the mirrors. The pipe contains a heat
transfer fluid which conveys heat to a secondary thermal circuit that gener-
ates steam which drives a turbine and generator.
Other forms of CSP systems are the linear Fresnel lens technology, and
dish systems where a parabolic dish focuses sunlight onto a small heat engine
that generates electricity. However, the power tower and the linear trough
systems are the most common arrangement and for the moment the most
economically viable of the four technologies.
An important difference between CSP and photovoltaic systems is that
CSP technology only captures direct insolation. Unlike PV systems which
can generate power from diffuse solar radiation—even when its cloudy, CSP
technology is only feasible in regions which have an abundance of direct
insolation. Figure 6.15 shows schematically the how the power tower and
linear trough plants operate.
It should be noted that the power tower concept schematic shown in
Fig. 6.15 (which is from the US Department of Energy) does not show any
thermal energy storage—which is considered essential for the economic via-
bility of all CSP systems.
In 2017, CSP registered an additional 100 MW of capacity coming
online, bringing global installed capacity to around 4.9 GW. Table 5.1
shows that while there is considerable interest in this technology, its installa-
tion as a mainstream utility-scale power technology is advancing only slowly.
Nevertheless, its ability to provide dispatchable and baseload power—when
dŚĞµƉŽǁĞƌƚŽǁĞƌ¶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ dŚĞµůŝŶĞĂƌƚƌŽƵŐŚ¶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ
Fig. 6.15 The two main solar concentrating power concepts (Source US Department
of Energy)
302
M. J. Bush
thermal energy storage is part of the plant—is a huge advantage compared

to more variable sources of renewable power like wind and photovoltaics.
In the US, two large-scale power tower plants were operating in 2017.
In California’s Mojave Desert, the Ivanpah solar electric plant—the largest
in north America has 173,500 heliostats focusing sunlight on three towers.
At full power, the plant is capable of generating 392 MW of electricity. In
Nevada, the Crescent Dunes solar energy plant generates 110 MW from a
field of 10,347 heliostats.49
In 2017, for the second year running, South Africa led the market in new
addition. That country was the only one to bring new capacity online, com-
missioning the 100 MW Xina Solar One plant—which has 5.5 hours of
thermal energy storage.
An estimated 13 GWh of thermal energy storage—based almost entirely
on molten salts—was operational in CSP plants at the end of 2017. The
majority of CSP plants under construction will incorporate some form of
thermal energy storage—which continues to be viewed as essential to the
competitiveness of the technology.
Parabolic trough and power tower systems dominate the market with 0.9
GW of trough systems and 0.8 GW of tower systems under construction
at the end of 2017. China’s CSP market is also gathering speed—the gov-
ernment announcing 20 new projects of all types: parabolic trough, power
tower, and Fresnel lens systems, with a combined capacity of 1 GW. Five
plants totalling 300 MW are slated to be operational before the end of 2018.
Other countries building CSP plants include India, Morocco, Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Chile, and Australia.50
The largest plant under construction is a 700 MW CSP plant in the
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park in the United Arab
Emirates—which has both a 200-metre power tower and a large field of par-
abolic trough collectors.
Spain remains the global leader in existing CSP capacity with 2.3 GW
operational at the end of 2017. The US is in second place with just over
1.7 GW of installed capacity. These two countries account for over 80% of
global CSP power production.51
While power from CSP plants is currently more expensive than wind
or photovoltaics, there is widespread confidence that costs can be brought
down, and that this advantage—when coupled with the technology’s ability
to provide dispatchable and baseload electricity—will eventually make CSP
a mainstream renewable energy technology (but only where there is abun-
dant direct insolation). One US projection sees the LCOE for CSP plants
6 Getting Technical
303
falling to $0.06/kWh by the end of 2020—without subsidies—which would

make CSP a very attractive solar power technology.52
Hydropower
Hydroelectric power, or hydropower as it’s generally called, is the domi-
nant source of renewable energy used to produce electricity—accounting
for almost two thirds of the electricity generated from all renewable sources
of energy worldwide. However, global additions to capacity in 2017 were a
modest 21.9 GW—a lot less than the additional capacity registered by solar
and wind—as Table 5.1 shows.
The top ten countries for installed hydroelectric power capacity are shown
in Table 6.5.53
Together these countries account for 68% of the global total installed
hydropower capacity. The East Asia and Pacific region added the most
capacity in 2017—mainly as a result of the 9.1 GW brought online by
China. Next in line was Brazil (+3.4 GW), India (+1.9 GW), Portugal (+1.1
GW) and Angola (+1.0 GW).54
Regional Trends
In North and Central America, the increase in hydropower capacity was

modest compared to the other regions—but a notable feature was the
increased focus on pumped storage projects. About 510 MW of new capac-
ity was brought online in 2017, about a quarter of which was pumped
storage. In Canada, major storage projects under construction include
the Keeyask plant in Manitoba, Site C in British Columbia (1100 MW),
Muskrat Falls in Newfoundland and Labrador, and Romain-4 in Quebec.
In the US, 140 MW of capacity was added through retrofits to existing
facilities. 139 MW of pumped storage capacity was added at the Northfield
Mountain Unit in Massachusetts and the Ludington plant in Michigan. In
the Dominican Republic, work was underway on a small 10.7 MW installa-
tion at Hatillo on the Rio Yuna.
In South America, over 4 GW of capacity was added in 2017. In Brazil,
although 3.38 GW was added, the country decommissioned several large
installations from its 1-year pipeline of projects—reportedly in favour of
pursuing more decentralized renewable energy.55
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M. J. Bush
Table 6.5 Top 10 countries for installed hydropower capacity

Rank Country Hydropower capacity (GW)
1 China 341
2 USA 103
3 Brazil 100
4 Canada 81
5 Japan 50
6 India 49
7 Russian Federation 48
8 Norway 32
9 Turkey 27
10 France 26
Source International Hydropower Association
The continent with the largest untapped potential for hydropower is

Africa. Development is slow but steady. Only 1.9 GW of capacity was
added. Angola commissioned power generation units for the 2 GW Lauca
hydropower plant, and a second power plant at Cambambe. Cote d’Ivoire
commissioned the 275 MW Soubre plant; in Sudan the Upper Atbara and
Seitt dam project was completed; while across in Zimbabwe, the first unit of
the Kariba South extension project was commissioned.
Hydropower is the largest source of renewable energy in Europe—and
an additional 2.3 GW of capacity came online in 2017. About half of this
capacity was pumped storage. For instance, Portugal commissioned two
pumped storage projects: Foz Tua (263 MW) and Frades II (780 MW).56
Over 3.2 GW of capacity was added in 2017 in central and SE Asia, with
over half of this capacity commissioned in India—including the 1.2 GW
Teesta II project in the north-east state of Sikkim. Other hydropower pro-
jects were commissioned in Russia, Iran, Georgia and Nepal.
In East Asia and the Pacific region, the narrative is all about China. Over
90% of the total added capacity of 9.8 GW was commissioned in that
country—which increased its total installed capacity to 341 GW. Australia
announced plans to expand the 4.1 GW Snowy Mountains Scheme—a
pumped storage installation that links two large dams and which would
effectively operate as a giant 2 GW battery. Smaller projects are underway in
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Papua New Guinea.
Pumped Storage
The energy storage capability of hydropower installations has always been a cru-
cial component of modern energy infrastructure. Hydropower reservoirs can
6 Getting Technical
305
store energy by reducing output when other sources of power are available, or
alternatively, pumped storage can directly absorb surplus power from the grid.
The growing penetration of variable renewable energy (mainly wind and
solar) is raising interest in pumped storage capacity—due to its ability to
absorb excess power generated by wind and solar, and to avoid curtailment
of wind farm power when the grid is overloaded. Global pumped storage
capacity rose by more than 3 GW in 2017 for a year-end total of 153 GW.
New capacity was installed in China, Portugal, and Switzerland.57
In China, two large pumped storage plants were completed in 2017. The
five remaining reversible turbine generators of the Liyang facility were opera-
tional by the end of 2017 for a total of 1.5 GW of pumping capacity. China
also completed the first of 300 MW of a 1.2 GW storage plant in Shenzhen
City—the country’ first large scale pumped storage facility too be built
within an urban environment.58
Also in 2017, Portugal’s 780 MW Frades II and the 263 MW Foz Tua
pumped storage plants both came online. The larger Frades II plant has two
variable-speed turbines—which respond faster to voltage variations on the
grid. Many projects in Europe are now incorporating variable speed turbines
for flexibility, and a wider operating range—characteristics useful for accom-
modating increased levels of variable renewable energy.59
Scotland is the location of over 90% of the UK’s hydropower. Two of
the UK’s four pumped storage hydro facilities are located in Scotland. The
Cruachan installation is located within the 1126 meter high Ben Cruachan
mountain on the shore of Loch Awe, and the Foyers installation is on the
shore of Loch Ness. The two sites have a generating capacity of 440 MW
and 300 MW respectively.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Does hydropower produce greenhouse gases? It seems unlikely if you just

consider the electrical power generation—where no fuel is burned and there
are no emissions. But large reservoirs of water that have inundated extensive
areas of land can potentially produce emissions of methane.
The question has always been: how much? A 2014 article in Scientific
American claimed that global methane emissions from hydropower reservoirs
could be about the same as methane emissions from burning fossil fuels—
somewhere around 100 million tonnes a year. If that estimate is correct,
then utility-scale hydropower plants requiring large reservoirs and pumped
storage installations are very significant sources of methane which, as we
noted in Chapter 3, is a strong greenhouse gas.60
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M. J. Bush
Table 6.6 Median life-cycle Energy source gCO2e/kWh

carbon emissions
Coal 820
Gas 490
Solar PV (utility scale) 48
Hydropower 18.5
Wind offshore 12
Nuclear 12
Wind onshore 11
Source International Hydropower Association
Attempting to answer this question more precisely, in 2017 the

International Hydropower Association (IHA) conducted a study of 498 res-
ervoirs worldwide. The study measured emissions from hydropower reser-
voirs in boreal, temperate, subtropical and tropical climates in more than 50
countries. The results of the study showed a very large range of values: from
less than 1 gram of GHG emissions per kWh of energy output to as much
as 1000 g per kWh. For reference, Table 6.6 shows the median values for
GHG emissions for several sources of energy.61
The value shown for hydropower in Table 6.5 is the median value—which
means that half the measured values were below 18.5—and half were above.
But the majority of installations, 84% of reservoirs, showed emissions of less
than 100 gCO2e/kWh.
The IHA study confirms what we knew—that hydropower can produce
significant emissions of greenhouse gases—but at a level that is, on average,
considerably less than fossil fuel power plants. The range of values how-
ever is very large—which means that some hydropower plants around the
world emit just as much greenhouse gases as natural gas and coal-fired power
plants.
Environmental Impacts
Flooding large areas of land frequently comes with very considerable envi-
ronmental, social, and economic impacts. Large dams are notorious for cre-
ating long-lasting conflicts, and sparking protests from the communities that
are displaced, and by people whose livelihoods are disrupted by the flooded
land. Where a river runs through several countries—like the Nile, construct-
ing a large dam upstream—like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam the
Ethiopian government is building on the Blue Nile—can also create serious
international disagreements: Egypt is legitimately worried that the flow of
the River Nile will be disrupted and diminished, and that this will cause
6 Getting Technical
307
social and economic problems for farmers dependent on the river for irriga-
tion—particularly in the Nile delta.62
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project is huge. When completed
it will have an installed capacity of 6450 MW and will be the largest hydro-
power plant in Africa. It will flood about 1700 km2 of forested land and dis-
place about 20,000 people.
Writing in the 2018 Hydropower Status Report, the Ethiopian Minister
of Water, Irrigation and Electricity, Seleshi Bekele, stated:
By 2025, electricity access is expected to reach 100 percent in both rural and
urban areas of Ethiopia. To attain this, electrification enables the provision of
affordable electricity to poor households who are forced to use fuelwood to
meet their energy needs.63
But massive hydropower projects are not the solution to providing electric-
ity to rural communities. The cost of the transmission and distribution of
centrally generated electricity to poor villagers is nearly always totally uneco-
nomic. Only distributed systems—like photovoltaic minigrid systems—can
realistically provide power to dispersed rural communities in a country as
large as Ethiopia.
Closer to home in North America, the Site C hydroelectric plant in
British Columbia, Canada, continues to be hugely controversial. The Site C
dam is a large earth-fill dam on the Peace River near Fort St. John in north-
west British Columbia. The plant has a rated capacity of 1100 MW and will
cost at least $9 billion CAD. The dam will flood about 93 km2 of land. It is
due for completion in 2020.
The project has generated considerable opposition because of the flooding
of a large area of agricultural land, the lack of support from First Nations
groups and local landowners, the high cost of the project compared to alter-
natives, and its environmental impact.
Two Treaty 8 First Nations and local landowners made legal challenges
to the dam; these were eventually dismissed by a Federal Court of Appeal.
In an unprecedented move, 250 Canadian scholars as well as the President
of the Royal Society of Canada wrote to the Canadian government in May
2016 expressing their concerns about the approval procedures and the envi-
ronmental assessment process. However, the Federal government refused
to review the approval of the project, and in December 2017, the Premier
of British Columbia decided finally to authorize the completion of the
project.64
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M. J. Bush
But what is evident is that practically all large hydroelectric projects cre-
ate conflicts that can seriously delay construction and substantially increase
costs. The number of people displaced by large dams can run into the hun-
dreds of thousands.65 Cost overruns on large hydropower projects are the
norm—not the exception.
Hydropower used to be the only renewable energy technology capable of
generating megawatt levels of power—apart from nuclear energy. But that
is no longer the case. Utility-scale photovoltaic power plants, CSP systems,
and offshore and onshore wind farms are capable of generating almost as
much power—at less cost, with quicker completion (months not years), and
with much less social, cultural, and environmental impact and disruption.
Biomass Energy
The traditional use of biomass for cooking involves burning wood or charcoal
in simple cookstoves. In many countries (such as Haiti), and in the villages
of many others (such as India) this is still the principal form of cooking for
the majority of the population. However, cooking with wood and charcoal
(or worse with dung and agricultural residues) brings severe health impacts
caused by the smoke produced by the stoves and the fact that cooking often
takes place in the home where children are present or nearby. In most coun-
tries where biomass is used for cooking, there are national programs intended
to promote the introduction of cleaner fuels for cooking—either bottled LPG
gas or electricity. In spite of these programs, the global consumption of tradi-
tional biomass fuels has been increasing slowly—as population increases have
outpaced the introduction of more modern fuels for cooking.
Modern bioenergy includes wood pellets used as fuel in power plants,
liquid fuels used in the transport sector, and fuel gases containing methane
produced from organic waste.
One important aspect to consider at the outset is that biofuels contain
carbon. When burned to produce heat or used as fuel in an engine, they
produce emissions of carbon dioxide just like fossil fuels. In fact, wood
pellet-burning power plant emit more carbon dioxide per unit of electricity
produced than coal. Their advantage, compared to fossil fuels, lies in the fact
that the carbon produced during combustion is carbon that was absorbed
by the biomass when it was growing. Many people therefore consider bio-
fuels to be ‘carbon neutral’—meaning that when used as fuel, they do not
produce additional amounts of carbon. They simply return to the atmos-
phere what they had previously removed.
6 Getting Technical
309
However, this view is simplistic. Several detailed and careful studies have
shown that when the full life-cycle of the biomass fuel is taken into account,
including land use changes and the emissions produced by harvesting and
transporting the fuel to a power plant, biomass fuels actually result in the
generation of additional amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases. The use of wood as a fuel in any large scale application is not carbon
neutral.
A very detailed analysis of using forest biomass for power generation was
conducted in Massachusetts in 2010. Noting that forest biomass generally
emits more greenhouse gases than fossil fuels per unit of energy produced,
the study confirmed that over time, the re-growth of the harvested forest
eventually removes this excess carbon from the atmosphere. Dubbing this
excess the ‘carbon debt’, the analysis showed that after several years, biomass
begins to yield carbon dividends in the form of greenhouse gas emissions
that are lower than would have occurred if fossil fuels had been used to pro-
duce the same amount of energy. But getting to this point takes time.
If forest biomass is used as a fuel to replace oil for combined heat and
power (CHP), it takes about five years before there is a net benefit in terms
of reduced emissions. But if forest biomass replaces a coal-fired plant, it can
take as long as 21 years before there is a net benefit. Looking ahead 40 years
to 2050, the report calculates that the replacement of oil-fired thermal/CHP
capacity with biomass thermal/CHP would fully offset the carbon debt and
lower greenhouse gas levels compared to what would have been the case if
fossil fuels had been used over the same period—approximately 25% lower.
For biomass replacement of coal-fired plants, the net cumulative emissions
in 2050 are approximately the same but replacing a gas-fuelled plant with
forest biomass would not yield any benefit at all—emissions would be sub-
stantially higher with a biomass fuelled plant.66
The concept of carbon neutrality was again called into question in 2018
when the European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC) issued
a press release strongly cautioning that bioenergy from forests is not always
carbon neutral and may in fact increase carbon emissions. The EASAC sci-
entists noted that carbon neutrality involves a ‘payback’ period (the time
taken for forests to reabsorb the CO2 emitted during biomass combustion),
which ranges from decades to hundreds of years—depending on the type of
biomass and what happens to the forest and land area after harvesting.67
Notwithstanding the fact that wood pellet fuel is not carbon neutral, the
global production and trade of pellets used for power production and heat-
ing has continued to expand—with production reaching close to 30 mil-
lion tonnes in 2017. About half this amount was used for residential and
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commercial heating—most notably in Europe, and about half used for

power generation. Europe is the major market for this use—especially the
United Kingdom which alone used 7.5 Mt of wood pellets for power gen-
eration in 2017. The Drax power plant is the world’s largest biomass-pel-
let-based electricity generator. Three coal-fired units with a combined
capacity of 1.9 GW were converted to biomass pellets. The power plant
ensured its supplies of fuel by opening a plant in Louisiana, USA, that can
produce 45,000 tonnes of wood pellets annually.68
In 2018, substantial amounts of wood pellets were being exported from
the southeast US to Europe. In North Carolina, the wood fuel industry was
logging about 200 km2 of forest a year to meet the demand in Europe.69
The USA is the world’s main producer and exporter of wood pellets. In
2017, the US had the capacity to produce over 10 million tonnes (Mt)
of pellets annually. Actual production was 5.3 Mt of which 4.7 Mt was
exported to Europe. Other major producers and exports of wood pellets are
Canada and Latvia.70
Municipal solid waste (MSW) is potentially an important fuel. If left
to decay in a landfill the waste will produce significant amounts of
methane—so burning MSW as fuel for electricity of heat production is an
approach that has several advantages in terms of both waste management
and reducing emissions of carbon. In China, producing energy from waste
is widely employed as an alternative to landfill, and waste-to-energy plants
are also starting to be developed in other parts of Asia and in Africa. In
Ethiopia, construction began in 2017 on a waste-to-energy plant that will
process 1400 tonnes/day of municipal waste from Addis Ababa. The plant
is expected to produce 185 GWh of electricity a year—enough to meet the
demand of a quarter of Addis’ households. And in Chonburi, Thailand, a
waste-to-energy plant under construction in 2017 will process 100,000
tonnes of waste a year and generate over 8 MW of electrical power.71
Biofuels
The production and consumption of liquid biofuels is mainly concentrated

in the USA, Brazil, and Europe. The US and Brazil are by far the largest pro-
ducers of biofuels, followed by Germany, Argentina, China and Indonesia.
The main biofuels are ethanol, biodiesel (fatty acid methyl ester or FAME
fuels), and fuels produced by treating animal and vegetable oils and fats with
hydrogen (called hydrotreated vegetable oil, HVO, and hydrotreated esters
and fatty acids called HEFA).
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About two thirds of biofuels is ethanol; 29% was FAME biodiesel; and
6% was HVO/HEFA fuels. The use of biomethane as a transport fuel, while
growing rapidly, contributed less than 1% of the biofuel total.72
The US and Brazil are the main ethanol producers—most of which is used
in their countries. In the US, 90% of the ethanol is produced from maize and
blended with gasoline in a 10% mixture called E10 gasoline. In Brazil, ethanol is
produced from sugar cane. China, Canada and Thailand also produce ethanol.
Since biofuels also produce emissions of carbon when combusted in an
engine, there is a continuing debate about the degree to which biofuels are actu-
ally carbon neutral. And when ethanol is produced from maize—as it is in the
US and Canada, a further controversy centres on the ‘food versus fuel’ dilemma.
Advanced biofuels
The term advanced biofuel or second-generation biofuel refers to fuels that

are not derived from biomass sources that could be used as food or animal
feed—such as maize. The main types of advanced biofuels are:
• Ethanol derived from cellulose, hemicellulose, or lignin.

• Ethanol derived from waste material, including crop residue, other vege-
tative waste material, animal waste, and food waste and yard waste.
• Biomass-based diesel.
• Butanol or other alcohols produced through the conversion of organic
matter from renewable biomass.
• Other fuel derived from cellulosic biomass.
The aim is to produce fuels that demonstrate improved life-cycle carbon sav-
ings compared to biofuels produced from sugar, starch, and oils, as well as
fuels with less impact on land use—for example fuels from waste and resi-
dues. Some advanced biofuels (known as ‘drop in biofuels’) can replace fossil
fuels directly in transport systems including aviation, or for blending in high
proportions with conventional fuels.
The problem with advanced biofuels produced using chemical processes
is that the production requires considerable amounts of energy that itself
produces greenhouse gases. There are also exhaust gases when the biofuel is
combusted in an engine. And to this must be added the emissions produced
in collecting, transporting and processing the feedstock materials.
If carbon capture and storage technology can be integrated into biofuel
production, life-cycle emissions of carbon would be substantially reduced.
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But as of 2018, only a limited number of large-scale projects have demon-

strated the technical viability of this technology.
Where electric forms of transport are feasible, this is by far the best
option—always assuming that the electricity is generated from renewable
sources of energy. But for aviation and international marine transport, bio-
fuels may be the only viable, low-carbon option at the present time.
In this regard, several airlines have experimented with the use of biofu-
els for long-haul flights. Virgin Australia and Qantas have powered planes
with biofuels—the latter signing a long-term supply contract with Agrisoma
(France) to supply fuels based on carinata oil seed. And Hainan Airlines has
made a trans-Pacific flight from Beijing to Chicago using biofuel derived
from waste cooking oil.
For maritime transport, the use of biofuels to power ships has also been
demonstrated. For instance, following initiatives by the US Navy, the
Australian Navy has reportedly been trialling biofuels in its fleet. On the
railroads, trials are also underway. In the Netherlands, Arriva is supplying 16
new trains fuelled with biodiesel, and Indian Railways is experimenting with
the use of biodiesel, compressed biogas and ethanol to power its trains.73
In conclusion, this brief section has only skimmed the surface of biofuel
technology. However, it should be recognized that while biofuels do not in
principle inject additional fossil fuel carbon into the global carbon cycle,
their production and transportation certainly require energy inputs from
conventional fossil fuels. The life cycle emissions of biofuels may be less than
fossil fuels, but they are far from being zero.
Biogas
Biogas is a mixture of methane and carbon dioxide produced by the anaer-

obic digestion of organic materials—including food waste, sewage, manure,
animal dung, and plants gown specifically for the purpose. Small biogas
systems have been used in Asia for decades and were pioneered in China
where tens of millions of small household systems have been constructed
over the last 50 years, running on animal waste and even human night soil.
There are also several million small biogas plants operating in India. Small
biogas plants generate a gas that can be used for cooking—thus avoiding
cutting down trees for fuel and the noxious air pollution caused by burn-
ing wood, charcoal and dung in the home. Globally, as many as 50 million
biogas cookstoves are estimated to have been installed at the end of 2016,
with about 126 million people using biogas for cooking mainly in China
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313
and India. The use of biogas for cooking is growing elsewhere in Asia—in
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia and Nepal; and also in sub Saharan
Africa—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania. The Africa Biogas Partnership
Programme has promoted more than 58,000 biogas plants—installed in
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda since 2009.74
However, there is increasing interest in larger-scale systems—particu-
larly in biogas produced from feedlots, landfills, and food processing oper-
ations where substantial amounts of biogas can be produced. Biogas can be
upgraded to biomethane (often called renewable natural gas) by removing
the carbon dioxide and other gases, enabling the gas to be more easily used
for transport or for injection directly into natural gas pipelines. Applications
vary. In the US and Sweden, biomethane is used mainly for transport, while
in the United Kingdom it is used mainly as a pipeline gas.
More than 500 biomethane production facilities now exist in Europe.
For food processing factories that produce biodegradable waste that must be
disposed of correctly, it makes economic sense to produce biogas from the
waste and to use the fuel in the factory to produce heat or steam for the pro-
cessing of the food. For instance, the Swedish beer manufacturer Carlsberg
converted its brewery in Falkenberg, Sweden to 100% biogas in 2017. Not
all this biogas is produced in the brewery—most of it is piped in from local
energy supplier Orsted AB.75
Geothermal Energy
As a source of heat and hot water, geothermal energy has been around for
millennia. The first hot springs and health spas date back to Roman times or
perhaps even before.
As a source of high temperature heat that can be harnessed to generate
electrical power, the technology is more recent. The first recorded use of
geothermal steam was in 1904 in Larderello, Italy, when a steam vent was
harnessed to a simple turbine and generator generating enough electric-
ity to light four light bulbs. In 1911, the world’s first commercial geother-
mal power plant was constructed on the same site. For more than 45 years
there was little further development until, in 1958, the Wairakei geother-
mal power plant started operation in New Zealand. Two years later, Pacific
Gas and Electric, PG&E, started up the first geothermal power plant at The
Geysers in northern California. The Geysers now consists of an interlinked
network of geothermal plants that in total generate more than 700 MW.
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Fig. 6.16 Geothermal power capacity and additions, top ten countries and rest of
the world in 2017 (see Renewables 2018 Global Status Report) (Source REN21 Global
Status Report)
Geothermal resources can provide both heat and electrical power. In

spite of its inherent advantages, the global development of the technology is
growing only slowly. Table 5.1 shows that installed capacity worldwide has
stayed almost flat at around 13 GW since 2014—that’s only a fraction of the
total global installed renewable energy capacity—which was over 2200 GW
in 2018.
Nevertheless, there is continuing interest in the technology because once
up and running, the fuel is free. But operation and maintenance costs can be
substantial.
In 2017, Indonesia and Turkey continued to lead in terms of new installa-
tions, and the two countries accounted for most of capacity additions during
that year. Other countries adding capacity were Chile Iceland, Honduras,
Mexico, the US, Japan, Portugal and Hungary. However, the US remains
the global leader in terms of geothermal power output. Figure 6.16 shows
the rated power in 2016, and added capacity in 2017 for the top ten geo-
thermal power countries.
Although the US leads the field in terms of capacity, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Turkey are heavily invested in the technology. In May 2018,
it was reported that the Sarulla geothermal plant in Indonesia had reached
full capacity, with all three 110 MW units up and running.76
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315
Ethiopia is also the target of some serious money invested in geothermal

energy. Reykjavik Geothermal, an Icelandic company, is working on two
geothermal projects in the east African country. Planned to come online in
2025, they will reportedly generate over 1000 MW in total power.77
Iceland is famous for its geothermal resources. The country derives over
a quarter of its electricity from geothermal energy and has over 700 MW of
installed geothermal power capacity—much of which provides cogeneration
heat for district water and space heating.
How It Works
There are basically three ways that electricity can be generated from a high
temperature geothermal resource. If the well produces dry steam, it can
directly drive a turbine and generator.
Dry steam power plants are the simplest design. The steam is fed directly
to a turbine where it generates electricity; the steam is then condensed and
the condensate injected back under ground to replenish the aquifer produc-
ing the steam. At the Geysers in California, after the first 30 years of oper-
ation, the steam supply was becoming depleted and power generation was
reduced. The solution was to reinject the condensed steam back into the
reservoir.78
If the geothermal resource is liquid phase, hot brines are brought to the
surface—either under their own pressure or by a variety of techniques that
force the hot liquids to the surface. If hot brine under pressure is the geo-
thermal resource, steam can be produced from the brine in a flash separator.
The steam powers a turbine, and the condensate and water from the flash
separator are reinjected into the geothermal aquifer.
The third technology is more complex. Called a binary cycle system, it
uses the geothermal brine to heat a secondary fluid that boils at a lower
temperature than the temperature of the geothermal brine. The pressur-
ized vapor can power a turbine and generator before being condensed and
returned to the evaporator as a liquid in a closed loop system. The geother-
mal brine, now several degrees cooler, is reinjected into the geothermal aqui-
fer. Binary cycle systems permit lower temperature geothermal sources to be
exploited—down to about 150 °C.
Other configurations are possible. Hybrid power plants allow for the inte-
gration of several generating technologies. In Hawaii, the Puna flash/binary
combined cycle system is designed to optimize both flash and binary cycle
technologies.79
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Like all renewable energy technologies, geothermal power can be built

and operated on a small scale. In 2017, a 4 MW binary cycle plant came
online on the Portuguese island of Terceira in the Azores. Although small,
the plant provides 10% of the island’s electricity. Hungary’s first geother-
mal plant—a 3 MW plant at Turawell, produces both electrical power and
heat.
Several islands in the Caribbean have geothermal potential: Dominica,
Montserrat, and the Grenadine islands in the Caribbean are volcanic islands
with probable geothermal resources. But the technology is capital inten-
sive and complex. In Djibouti for example, where geothermal resources are
reckoned to be exceptionally good, the technology has been studied for over
30 years. Test wells have been drilled, drilled again, then drilled elsewhere.
The results are promising and the economics look good—on paper. But
donors are wary of investing in a technology with high upfront costs, long
lead times, complex engineering, and uncertain environmental impacts.
In 2015 the Green Climate Fund approved a program called: Sustainable
Energy Facility for the Eastern Caribbean, which supports the development
and exploitation of potential geothermal sites on Dominica, Grenada, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It
remains to be seen whether geothermal energy at these sites will be possible
but given the high cost of electricity on these islands, there is a good chance
that electricity generation from geothermal energy will prove to be an eco-
nomic proposition.
This funding was supplemented in late 2017, when the European Union
provided $14 million in grants to support geothermal development in the
eastern Caribbean. Exploratory drilling on the island of Nevis was underway
in late 2017.80
The big question for geothermal power generation is whether it can com-
pete with utility-scale solar photovoltaic plants and megawatt wind farms.
Power from solar and wind is already less expensive than geothermal electric-
ity, and the cost of electricity from solar and wind is expected to continue to
fall—whereas geothermal costs almost certainly will not. But if geothermal
energy is exploited for both power generation and district heating, the eco-
nomics look a lot more favourable.
Geothermal Direct Use
For several decades, geothermal heat from the Dogger aquifer has pro-
vided district heating to the Paris metropolitan area. At least four district
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317
heating systems in the Paris area expanded their geothermal capacity during
2017.81
Space heating and district heating is one of the largest and fastest grow-
ing sectors for the direct use of geothermal heat, although swimming pools
and other public baths may still be the single largest end-use category. Other
uses of direct heating include domestic hot water supply, greenhouse heat-
ing, industrial process heat, aquaculture, snow melting, and agricultural
drying.82 And Iceland is reportedly considering using geothermal heat and
power to grow fresh vegetables close to the Arctic Circle.
China is the most significant user of direct geothermal heat, followed by
Turkey, Iceland, Japan, Hungary, the US and New Zealand. Together these
seven countries account for three quarters of direct geothermal use.83
The term ‘geothermal energy’ generally refers to exploiting high tempera-
ture geologic resources that are several hundred meters underground. When
the earth near the surface is used as a thermal reservoir—for ground-based
heat pumps or for storing seasonal heat for several months at a time (like the
Drake Landing installation in Alberta, Canada), these technologies are not
usually filed under the ‘geothermal energy’ rubric—even though they are in
a sense geothermal systems.
Nuclear Power
Nuclear power has always been controversial. Proclaimed at first as one of
the cheapest sources of energy, the electricity was going to be “too cheap
to meter”.84 However, the risks inherent in nuclear power technology soon
became apparent. The first recorded accident was in Canada in 1952 at the
NRX reactor in Chalk River, Ontario. Since then there have been over 100
accidents worldwide among both civilian and military reactors.
The worst accident was in Chernobyl, Ukraine in 1986. A sudden surge
in power during a reactor system test resulted in an explosion and fire that
destroyed one of the reactors. Massive amounts of radiation escaped and
spread across the western Soviet Union and Europe. Over 200,000 people
had to be relocated from their homes.85
Within three months, 31 people were dead of radiation sickness. It is
estimated that a further 4000 died later from the widespread radioactivity.
It is believed that the area surrounding the reactor core will not be safe for
human habitation for at least another 20,000 years.86
The most recent disaster occurred in Japan when an earthquake and tsu-
nami struck the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011.
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The earthquake destroyed the external electrical supply to the power plant.
The back-up generators immediately powered up but were then swamped
by the tsunami wave which reached twice the height the plant was designed
to withstand. With no cooling system in operation, three reactor buildings
eventually exploded and fuel in the reactor cores melted—the worst case sce-
nario. The release of radiation was enormous. A wide area around the plant
was contaminated and half a million people were evacuated.87
The probability of a catastrophic accident at a nuclear power plant is
extremely low. But the consequences of an accident can be catastrophic.
Society has always had difficulty in deciding whether to approve and imple-
ment projects that bring substantial economic benefits but which carry a
risk of catastrophic failure—even if the probability of failure is estimated
to be extremely low. Governments have mostly chosen to proceed in these
instances—willing to accept the risk, and often persuaded by proponents
with a vested interest who argue that safety procedures are state-of-the-art
and can cope effectively with any foreseeable eventuality. The problem with
this logic is that in many cases, it is the incompetent actions of the plant
engineers, operators, and technicians—not the equipment and technology—
that is the root cause of the combined malfunctions and failures that lead to
disaster.
But the risks with nuclear power lie not just in the inherent possibility of
catastrophic accidents. The storage of spent fuel rods and other radioactive
waste materials from nuclear plants is another serious problem. Then there
is the cost of decommissioning nuclear power plants at the end of their life.
Because of the intense radioactivity, this process can take decades and cost
hundreds of millions of dollars.
The third strike against nuclear power is the link with nuclear weapons.
Examining this question is outside the scope of this book, but the fact that
the possibility that the technology can be used to surreptitiously and illegally
produce enriched uranium or plutonium for atomic weapons ought to be
enough just by itself to force a global moratorium on nuclear power.88
The inherent risks associated with nuclear power had led some govern-
ment to close down their nuclear power programs. Germany has commit-
ted to closing its plants by 2022; France—once a world leader in nuclear
power technology—is phasing them out; and in Japan most nuclear power
plants are closed following the Fukushima disaster. In other jurisdictions,
the plants currently operating will continue to generate power through their
planned lifetime, but no new plants are planned for construction.
However, new nuclear power plants continue to be built in China
and several other countries. In the US, many nuclear power plants have
6 Getting Technical
319
closed—but in 2018, construction was underway on two new reactors in the

state of Georgia. The two half-finished Vogtle nuclear reactors—$10 billion
over-budget and five years late—will finally cost about $25 billion.89
In the UK, the proposal to build Hinckley Point C is hugely controver-
sial. Said to be the world’s most expensive power plant, it is Britain’s first
new nuclear power reactor since 1995 and will cost twice as much as the
phenomenally expensive 2012 Olympic Games in London—an eye-water-
ing 30 billion dollars. With projects of this magnitude, scale, and cost—pol-
itics, propaganda, horse-trading, and plain old bribery and corruption are
all part of the play. Considering the much less expensive renewable energy
alternatives, Hinckley Point C makes absolutely no economic sense—but is
apparently still going ahead.90
One factor to take into account is that many nuclear power plants are
built on the coast so that sea water can be used for cooling. This makes them
especially susceptible to extreme weather and storms that drive high storm
surges of water onto coastal areas. The textbook example of this possibility is
the 2011 Fukushima accident mentioned above. To protect Hinckley Point
C, a concrete seawall 12.5 meters high and 900 meters long is being built to
protect the installation. But many experts are not convinced that a defensive
wall even that high will protect the power plant in the future—as sea levels
continue to rise and storms intensify.91
Energy Storage
One of the problems with renewable energy is that the main contenders and
the cheapest options—wind and solar—are intermittent. This means that
their power output is variable and to some extent unpredictable. This inher-
ent flaw has led many fossil-fuel defenders to argue that renewable energy
will always need substantial backup from natural gas power plants, and that
the cost of the backup system should be included in the assessment of solar
and wind—essentially rendering them more expensive compared to fos-
sil-fuel alternatives.
But when utility-scale photovoltaic energy and wind power are combined
with energy storage systems (ESS—aka batteries) the picture changes rad-
ically. When Bloomberg NEF published its New Energy Outlook in June
2018, one key message was emphatic: “Wind and solar are set to surge to
almost ’50 by 50’—50% of world generation by 2050 - on the back of pre-
cipitous reductions in cost and the advent of cheaper and cheaper batteries that
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M. J. Bush
will enable electricity to be stored and discharged to meet shifts in demand and
supply ”.92
The cost of wind power, utility-scale PV, and megawatt-level ESS are
falling dramatically. Cheap renewable energy and batteries fundamentally
reshape the electricity system—as the cheap batteries enable solar power
plants and wind farms to produce power when the wind isn’t blowing and
the sun isn’t shining. Most importantly, utility scale batteries produce dis-
patchable power.
Utility-scale batteries are the key to unlocking the enormous potential of
renewable energy. The Bloomberg report calls this combination the PV, wind
and batteries trifecta—meaning a 1-2-3 winning combination.93
Utility scale Lithium-ion batteries are becoming larger, less expensive,
and more reliable. The largest system may be Tesla’s 100 MW Li-ion battery
in South Australia.94 In the US in February 2018, Arizona Public Service
(APS) announced that it would install a 50 MW/135 MWh battery to help
shift the output of a 65 MW solar farm to deliver power in the evening—
when solar energy drops off. This initiative is part of APS’s plan to add up to
500 MW of energy storage to its system over the next 15 years. APS notes
that “these batteries will bring more clean energy to APS customers when they
need it most, by storing an abundance of mid-day solar and redistributing it at
peak times of customer usage later in the day ”.95
In May 2018, Tucson Electric Power signed a deal for 100 MW of
solar and a 120 MWh battery system for less than 4.5 cents/kWh over
20 years.96 Not to be outdone, Pacific Gas and Electric, a Californian util-
ity, requested approval in June 2018 for four energy storage projects total-
ling 2270 MWh—one of which would come in at 300 MW/1200 MWh
which, once operational, will be the largest battery energy storage system in
the world. These battery storage systems are being built to avoid the need to
keep three Calpine gas-fired plants running as ‘reliability must-run’ resources
and to shore up congestion issues in the region.97
In Puerto Rico, the government issued a request for proposals in early
2018 for 10 20-MW/20 MWh battery energy storage systems (BESS) to be
integrated into the national power grid. If necessary, the 10 systems will be
able to expand to 40 MW/160 MWh capacity.98
With MW-scale energy storage systems coupled up, wind farms and pho-
tovoltaic power plants are no longer intermittent. They will generate dis-
patchable electrical power. Batteries also are faster than natural gas peaker
plants to respond to changes in demand on the grid that can trigger varia-
tions in frequency.
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321
Behind the Meter
Battery energy storage systems provide an essential function at several

points and at different scales between where power is generated and where
the electricity is consumed. For wind farms, utility scale BESS smooths out
the inherent variability of wind power; whereas for solar, the BESS ena-
bles the power output from large photovoltaic fields to be shifted to the
evening hours when demand for electricity peaks. In buildings, smaller bat-
tery systems coupled to rooftop solar smooth out the demand profile and
allow electricity to be fed back to the grid if excess energy is available. Even
without rooftop solar, batteries may be cost-effective because they enable
a residence to take power from the grid when tariffs are low—keeping
consumption at high tariff hours to a minimum.
In May 2018, the California Energy Commission voted unanimously
to update the state’s building code to require rooftop solar panels on all
new apartment buildings and condo construction starting on January 1,
2020.99 Batteries are not mandatory, but in the US, they qualify for the
Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC)—and California has been providing
incentives for home batteries since 2001.100 Whether it makes sense to
install batteries in a residence with solar panels depends on the economics.
But there are advantages for both the homeowner and the utility. If neces-
sary, homeowners can top up their batteries at night when tariffs are lower;
and the utility has customers with a much flatter and more predictable
demand profile.
Batteries can also feed electricity back into the grid. By 2030, according
to the Bloomberg analysis, the configuration of many systems is character-
ized by photovoltaic energy that meets daytime demand, and batteries that
absorb excess generation and discharge at high value, low renewables times,
particularly in the evening.101
Severe weather is now the leading cause of power outages in north
America, and when the grid crashes, batteries can provide backup power for
residential and commercial users, and for essential services like clinics and
health centres. In Florida they know a thing or two about extreme weather.
The SunSmart Emergency Shelter Program has installed solar PV systems
with battery storage in well over 100 schools to create emergency shelters
throughout the state.102
In Australia, distributed solar with battery storage has becomes cheaper
than electricity from the grid in several regions. In 2017, an estimated 40%
of new rooftop solar installations included energy storage, mostly in the
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M. J. Bush
residential sector.103 Interest is also rising in the US with some developers

predicting a fourfold increase in residential energy storage in 2018—most of
it tied to rooftop solar.104
The management of energy at the point of consumption is becoming a
lot smarter. Smart meters can switch on home appliances at night when tar-
iffs are low (including charging an electric vehicle), or feed battery power
back to the grid where feed-in-tariffs are applicable. Linked to thermostats,
lights and appliances, residences and offices can keep energy consumption to
a minimum—and batteries ensure that when electricity is needed from the
grid, it is taken at times when tariffs are low.
Comparing the Costs
In most parts of the world, renewable energy is now the lowest-cost source
of new power generation. Onshore wind and solar photovoltaic are set by
2020 to consistently offer a less expensive source of new electricity than the
least cost fossil fuel alternative, without financial assistance. Expectations
about future cost reductions are once again being continually beaten by
lower values as new data becomes available. Moreover, new solar photovol-
taic and onshore wind are expected to increasingly cost less than the mar-
ginal operating cost of existing coal-fired power plants.105
The metric most commonly used to compare the cost of energy technol-
ogies is the levelized cost of energy or LCOE. The LCOE takes into account
the expected energy output of the power technology, the capital and operat-
ing costs, the cost of borrowing money, and the present value of future reve-
nue streams and expenditures.
However, for each technology there is a range of values—reflecting the
variation of most of the cost elements with the geographic location of the
technology. In addition, published values do not take into account the exter-
nal costs associated with the air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions of
fossil fuels—particularly coal.
For intermittent renewables such as solar and wind, it is reasonable to fac-
tor in the cost of BESS that enable these power technologies to compete on
the same basis as dispatchable systems.
There are essentially two key points to bear in mind:
First, utility scale solar energy and onshore wind power technologies are now
fully cost-competitive with coal and natural gas even when BESS costs are
6 Getting Technical
323
factored in for renewables, and the external costs of fossil fuel technolo-
gies are ignored.
Second, costs are falling, and are expected to continue to fall, for solar, wind,
and BESS—whereas the cost of fossil fuel power technologies is fore-
cast to remain constant or even to increase as emission controls becomes
stricter and carbon capture technologies become mandatory.
The second point is the most important—because it underscores the fact

that the transition to renewable energy is not a short-term phenomenon
induced by an anomalous period of abnormally low costs for solar energy
and wind power. The LCOE differential between renewable energy systems
and fossil fuel power plants is increasing every year.
The cost of photovoltaic panels has been falling exponentially for the last
40 years—made possible by a combination of technology innovation, econ-
omies of scale, and manufacturing experience. This decline is expected to
continue. In parallel, the cost of other key components such as inverters is
also falling. The capital expenditure of photovoltaic plants is projected to
drop by 50% over the period to 2035.106
As an example of how the cost of photovoltaic energy is falling faster than
policymakers can plan for, consider the SunShot program in the US referred
to earlier. In 2011, the US Department of Energy launched the SunShot
Initiative with the aim of reducing the total cost of solar energy by 75%—
thus making it cost competitive at large scale with conventional energy
technologies by the end of the decade. The target was to get PV electricity
down to 6 cents a kilowatt-hour by 2020. In 2017, the SunShot program
announced it had met this target already and set a new 2020 target of 3
cents per kWh.107 In 2018, that price has already been beaten: in Nevada a
bid for grid scale PV power came in at 2.3 cents/kWh.108
Wind turbine prices have fallen by a third since 2010, while at the same
time they have become more powerful, and capacity factors are rising.
Larger rotors, greater hub heights (where wind are stronger), more advanced
controls, and innovative technology have all contributed to lower costs and
greater power output. Onshore wind power is now one of the least expensive
sources of utility scale power.
At the same time the price of batteries has been falling dramatically—
largely due to economies of scale as manufacturing capacity and output has
risen sharply. Lithium-ion battery prices fell from $1000/kWh in 2010 to
$209/kWh in 2017. This downward trend in price is forecast to continue as
manufacturing capacity is expected to triple between 2018 and 2021.109
324
M. J. Bush
In 2018, Bloomberg New Energy published the LCOE for each power
technology taking into account construction, equipment, operation, main-
tenance, and financing costs. The benchmark global LCOE for onshore
wind was $55/MWh, while the equivalent for non-tracking solar PV was
$70/MWh—both these values are 17% down from the previous 12 months.
Offshore wind came in at $118/MWh.
BNEF’s analysis showed particularly low levelized costs of electricity for
onshore wind in India, Brazil, Sweden, and Australia; and low costs for pho-
tovoltaics in Chile, India, Australia and Jordan.110
Taking India as an example, the analysis showed that the benchmark
LCOE for onshore wind was just $39/MWh, and for utility scale PV it was
only slightly higher—at $41/MWh. By comparison. Coal comes in at $68/
MWh and combined cycle gas at $93/MWh.
Wind-plus-batteries and solar-plus-batteries in India show a wide range of
costs: $34–$208/MWh for wind and $47–$308/MWh for solar depending
on the characteristics of the project. But once again, costs are falling fast.111
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have looked in more detail at the principal renewable
energy technologies: wind power, solar photovoltaic energy, hydropower,
geothermal energy, and biofuels. All have the game-changing advantage that
they produce zero, or very low, emissions of carbon dioxide and methane.
Their rapid deployment is therefore one of the most important keys to curb-
ing global warming and reducing the threats posed by the climate crisis.
The principal disadvantage with solar energy and wind power is their
inherent intermittency and unpredictability—which means that the electric-
ity that they generate cannot be dispatched at levels and at times when it
is most needed. However, this significant technical problem has now been
solved by advancements in large-scale battery storage systems that can store
electricity and instantly dispatch megawatt levels of electrical power when
needed.
Rooftop photovoltaic systems with battery storage are growing in pop-
ularity. When coupled to smart meters that manage household appliances
(including charging an electric vehicle), the demand for electricity from the
grid is less variable and less costly for the power companies.
The cost of electricity from solar photovoltaic systems and wind power
is at record lows—and still falling. So too is the cost of batteries, which are
now an essential component of all renewable energy systems. The transition
6 Getting Technical
325
to a low carbon world is well underway. But emissions of greenhouse gases

continue to rise. The question now is this: How can the world accelerate this
fundamental shift to clean, low carbon, renewable and inexhaustible sources
of energy?
The most effective way to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and meth-
ane produced by the continued widespread use of fossil fuels is to put a price
on carbon—which is the element in these gases that are the principal cause
of global warming and the intensifying climate crisis. This approach has
been used in many countries and it has been shown to work. In the next
chapter, we look more closely at carbon pricing—one of the most effective
and powerful tools in in the emission reduction toolbox.
Notes
1. The rotor blades on the early machines were called sails.
2. See the History of wind turbines by Zachary Shahan. Available at: http://
windenergyfoundation.org/about-wind-energy/history/.
3. All the numbers and historical information are from the History of wind
turbines, op. cit.
4. See Renewables 2017 Global Status Report. Renewable Energy Policy
Network for the 21st Century (REN21). Available at: http://www.ren21.
net/gsr-2017/.
5. REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report.
6. See https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/how-do-wind-turbines-work.
7. WindPower Program Basic Concepts. Accessed at: www.wind-power-pro-
gram.com.
8. Ibid.
9. The table is from the WindPower program computer run for the 2 MW
Vestas offshore turbine.
10. See Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017, IRENA 2018. Available
at: http://irena.org/publications/2018/Jan/Renewable-power-generation-
costs-in-2017.
11. Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017. Op. cit.
12. See GE announces Haliade-X, the world’s most powerful offshore wind tur-
bine. Available at: https://www.genewsroom.com/press-releases/ge-an-
nounces-haliade-x-worlds-most-powerful-offshore-wind-turbine-284260.
13. See the Wind Atlas website at: https://globalwindatlas.info.
14. Ibid.
15. REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit.
326
M. J. Bush
16. See It can power a small nation. But this wind farm in China Is mostly idle.
Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/asia/china-gan-
su-wind-farm.html.
17. See the Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
offshore_wind_farms.
20. See Aging wind farms are repowering with longer blades, more efficient tur-
bines. Available at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/27032018/wind-
power-blades-capacity-clean-energy-technology-jobs-ge-siemens-lee-
ward-midamerican-repowering.
21. REN 21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit.
22. Wind power overtakes nuclear for first time in UK across a quarter.
Accessed at: https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/pt/2018/05/
wind-power-overtakes-nuclear-for-first-time-in-uk-across-a-quarter.html?.
23. See the study by Health Canada. Accessed at: https://www.canada.ca/en/
health-canada/services/environmental-workplace-health/noise/wind-tur-
bine-noise/wind-turbine-noise-health-study-summary-results.html.
24. See Judge’s ruling against Minnesota wind farm causes alarm for advocates.
Accessed at: http://www.startribune.com/judge-s-ruling-against-minneso-
ta-wind-farm-causes-alarm-for-advocates/485312391/.
25. See The impact of free-ranging domestic cats on the wild life of the United
States. Accessed at: https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms2380. The
estimated body count for birds killed by cats is between 1.3 and 4.0 billion
birds each year—just in the US. Also see the US Fish and wildlife Service
report: Threats to birds. Accessed at: https://www.fws.gov/birds/bird-enthu-
siasts/threats-to-birds.php.
26. See Wind turbines kill more than 600,000 bats a year. What should we do?
Accessed at: https://www.popsci.com/blog-network/eek-squad/wind-tur-
bines-kill-more-600000-bats-year-what-should-we-do. Also Bat killings by
wind energy turbines continue. Accessed at: https://www.scientificamerican.
com/article/bat-killings-by-wind-energy-turbines-continue/.
27. See The history of solar. US Department of Energy/Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy. Accessed at: https://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/
solar_timeline.pdf.
28. REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. See ACWA wins Saudi Arabia’s 300 MW solar tender. Accessed at: https://
www.pv-magazine.com/2018/02/06/acwa-wins-saudi-arabias-300-mw-so-
lar-tender/. Also From oil to solar: Saudi Arabia plots a shift to renewables.
6 Getting Technical
327
Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/business/energy-envi-

ronment/saudi-arabia-solar-renewables.html.
33. See Saudis, SoftBank plan world’s largest solar project. Accessed at: https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-28/saudi-arabia-softbank-
ink-deal-on-200-billion-solar-project.
34. See Florida Solar Energy Center website: http://www.fsec.ucf.edu/en/con-
sumer/solar_electricity/basics/index.htm.
35. This is the result of a simulation run on the PVGIS website with the input
data as shown in the text. What is surprising is the optimal azimuth—
which is angled significantly to the south-east. The levelized cost of elec-
tricity is estimated as 9¢/kWh.
36. See US solar market insight, 2017 year in review. Available at: https://www.
greentechmedia.com/research/repoirt/us-solar-market-insight-2017-year-
in-review#gs.zct2qTU.
37. These values are in Canadian dollars.
38. See Solar electricity handbook 2017 edition. Accessed at: http://solarelectric-
ityhandbook.com/canada-feed-in-tariff.html.
39. See The state(s) of distributed solar—Where are the biggest gains? Accessed
at: https://www.renewablenergyworld.com/ugc/articles/2018/05/29/the-
states-of-distributed-solar--2017-upgate.html.
40. Community and shared solar. Department of Energy, Office of Energy
Efficiency & Renewable Energy. Available at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/
solar/community-and-shared-solar.
41. Community and shared solar. Ibid.
42. See A guide to community shared solar: Utility, private, and nonprofit project
development. Available at: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/54570.pdf.
43. The diagram is from the Florida Solar Energy Center webinar notes.
Available at: https://www.cleanegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ESTAP-
webinar-slides-10.24.17.pdf.
44. See Distributed solar PV for electricity system resiliency. National
Renewable Energy Laboratory. Available at: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy15osti/62631.pdf.
45. See the FSEC information. Accessed at: https://www.cleanegroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/ESTAP-webinar-slides-10.24.17.pdf.
46. Renewable power generation costs, IRENA 2017. Op. cit.
47. See the Sunshot Initiative website at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/
sunshot-initiative.
48. Ibid.
49. See Power tower system concentrating solar power basics. Accessed at:
https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/articles/power-tower-system-
concentrating-solar-power-basics.
50. See Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit.
51. Renewable 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit.
328
M. J. Bush

53. See the Hydropower Status Report 2018. International Hydropower
Association. Available at: https://www.hydropower.org/publications/2018-
hydropower-status-report.
54. Hydropower Status Report 2018. Op. cit.
55. Hydropower Status Report 2018. Op. cit., p. 12.
58. Ibid.
60. See Methane emissions may swell from behind dams. Accessed at:
https://scientificamerican.com/article/methane-emissions-may-swell-
from-behind-dams/.
62. See Egypt’s rice farmers see rough times downstream of new Nile mega-dam.
Accessed at: https://www.yahoo.com/news/egypts-rice-farmers-see-rough-
times-downstream-nile-1603341997.html.
63. Ibid.
64. See the Wikipedia article: Site C dam. Also the letter from the President
of the Royal Society of Canada. Available at: https://rsc-src.ca/sites/default/
files/pdf/PM_Trudeau_19.05.2016.pdf.
65. The record is held by China’s Three Gorges dam which reportedly dis-
placed as many as 1.2 million people. See https://www.theguardiancom/
environment/blog/2015/jan/12/12-dams-that-changed-the-world-hoover-
sardar-sarovar-three-gorges.
66. The biomass sustainability and carbon policy study by the Manomet
Center for Conservation Sciences is available at: https://www.manomet.
org/wp-content/uploads/old-files/Manomet_Biomass_Report_Full_
June2010.pdf.
67. See the press release issued by the European Academies Science Advisory
Council, and the commentary on forest bioenergy and carbon neutrality
issued on the same day. Available at: https://easac.eu/fileadmin/PDF_s/
reports_statements/Carbon_Neutrality/EASAC_Press_Release_on_
Carbon_Neutrality_15_June_2018.pdf.
68. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report 2018. Op. cit.
69. See Burning wood as renewable energy threatens Europe’s climate goals.
Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/21062018/forest-bio-
mass-renewable-energy-paris-climate-change-emissions-logging-wood-pel-
lets-electricity/.
70. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
6 Getting Technical
329
74. Ibid.
75. See Carlsberg launches carbon neutral brewery in Sweden. Accessed at:
https://www.beveragedaily.com/Article/2017/11/27/Carlsberg-launches-
carbon-neutral-brewery-in-Sweden.
76. See Sarulla geothermal plant I Indonesia reaches full capacity. Accessed at:
https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2018/05/sarulla-geother-
mal-plant-in-indonesia-reaches-full-capacity.html/.
77. See Ethiopian geothermal is private equity’s next $4-billion bet. Accessed
at: https://www.renewableenergyworkd.com/articles/2018/ethiopian-geo-
thermal-is-private-equity-s-next-4-billion.bet.html.
78. See the Wikipedia article: Geothermal Power. Accessed at: https://en.wiki-
pedia.org/wiki/Geothermal_power/.
79. See the Geothermal Energy Association’s website. Accessed at: http://www.
geo-energy.org/basics.aspx.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. See “Too cheap to meter”: A history of the phrase. Accessed at: https://
public-blo.nrc-gateway.gov/gov/2016/06/03/too-cheap-to-meter-a-history-
of-the-phrase/.
85. See the article by the Union of Concerned Scientists: A brief history of
nuclear accidents worldwide. Accessed at: https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclea-
power/nuclear-power-accidents/history-nuclear-accidents#.Wzp3b9JKjIU.
86. See Chernobyl: History of a tragedy by Serhii Plokhy review—Death of the
Soviet dream. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/
may/20/chernobyl-history-of-a-tragedy-serhii-plokhy-review-death-of-the-
soviet-dream.
87. See a brief history of nuclear accidents worldwide. Op. cit.
88. See the article by Physicians for Social Responsibility: Dirty, danger-
ous, and expensive: The truth about nuclear power. Accessed at: https://
www.psr.org/blog/resource/durty-dangeros-and-expensive-the-truth-
about-nuclear-power/.
89. See Betraying ratepayers and clean energy future, Georgia panel approves
Vogtle nuclear reactors. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/vogtle-nu-
clear-plant-2519385301.html.
90. See Hinckley Point: The ‘dreadful deal’ behind the world’s most expen-
sive power plant. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/
dec/21/hinkley-point-c-dreadful-deal-behind-worlds-most-expenive-
power-plant/. And see also Nuclear plans should be rethought after fall in
offshore windfarm costs. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/envi-
ronment/2017/sep/11/huge-boost-renewable-power-offshore-windfarm-
costs-fall-record-low.
330
M. J. Bush
91. See As shorelines creep inland and storms worsen, nuclear reactors around
the world face new challenges. Accessed at: https://ensia.com/features/
coast-nuclear/.
92. See Bloomberg NEF’s New Energy Outlook Overview. Accessed at:
https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/.
93. See Bloomberg NEF’s New Energy Outlook Overview. Accessed at:
https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/.
94. See Tesla’s enormous battery in Australia just weeks old, is already respond-
ing to outages in ‘record’ time. Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-switch-wp/2017/12/26/teslas-enormous-battery-in-austral-
ia-just-weeks-old-is-already-responding-to-outages-in-record-time/.
95. See APS seeks partner to bring customers more clean energy using batter-
ies. Accessed at: https://www.aps.com/en/ourcompany/news/latestnews/
Pages/aps-seeks-partners-to-bring-customers-more-clean-energy-using-bat-
teries.aspx.
96. See APS to install 50 MW, 135 MWH solar-shifting battery. Accessed at:
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/aps-to-install-50-mw-135-mwh-solar-
shifting-battery/516850/.
97. See PG&E to replace 3 gas plants with world’s biggest battery projects.
Accessed at: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pge-to-replace-3-gas-plants-
with-worlds-biggest-battery-project/526991/.
98. See Elon Musk’s unprecedented solar + storage vision for Puerto Rico
moves forward. Accessed at: https://pv-magazie-usa.com/2018/06/28/
elon-musks-unprecedented-solarstorage-vision-for-puerto-rico-moves-for-
ward/.
99. See https://www.energymanagertoday.com/california-building-code-solar-
0176469/.
100. See California home battery rebate: Self-Generation Incentive pro-
gram (SGIP) explained. Accessed at: https://news.energysage.com/
california-energy-storage-incentives-sgip-explained/.
101. See the Bloomberg New Energy Outlook Overview cited above.
102. See the Florida Solar Energy Center information. Accessed at: https://
www.cleanegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ESTAP-webinar-slides-
10.24.17.pdf.
103. The numbers are from the Renewables 2018 Global Status Report.
Available at: http://www.ren21.net/status-of-renewables/global-status-
report/.
104. See Residential storage faces sunny prospects this year. Accessed at:
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/residential-storage-faces-sunny-
prospects-this-year/520966/.
105. See the IREA 2019 report Renewable power generation costs in 2018.
Accessed at: https://www.irena.org/publications/2019/May/Renewable-
power-generation-costs-in-2018.
6 Getting Technical
331
106. See Bloomberg New Energy Outlook Overview. Op. cit.

107. See SunShot mission outlined. Accessed at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/
solar/sunshot-initiative.
108. See Nevada’s 2.3 cent bid beats Arizona’s record—Low solar PPA price.
Accessed at: https://www.greentecchmedia.com/article/read/nevada-beat-
arizona-record-low-solar-ppa-price#gs.Z_KdHk4.
109. Bloomberg New Energy Overview. Op. cit.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
7
Pricing Down Carbon
Introduction
There is now indisputable evidence that the climate is changing because of
the emission of greenhouse gases from the combustion of fossil fuels: coal,
oil, and natural gas. Although there are several natural sources of some of
these carbon gases, most of the emissions are coming from electrical power
generation using coal or natural gas, from the combustion of gasoline and
diesel fuel in cars and trucks, and from the natural gas and other fuels used
for space heating and water heating in commercial buildings and homes.
If the principle that ‘the polluter pays’ is rigorously applied, then the
emissions of carbon dioxide and methane should be taxed at their source
or at the point where people use the fuels that produce the emissions.
This approach is favoured by most economists and is now applied in over
45 countries in the form of a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade arrangement.
However, countries have adopted different policies when it comes to the dis-
bursement of the substantial carbon revenues that governments receive from
setting a price on carbon.
In this chapter we will look at how effective these carbon pricing policies
have been in the US, Canada, and Europe. We also examine the feasibility of
policies that aim to power the world’s countries 100% on renewable sources
of energy, and whether we can really power a modern industrial economy
without fossil fuels.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_7
334
M. J. Bush
Dialling It Down
There are essentially three approaches to reducing emissions of carbon diox-
ide and methane. The first one, favoured by economists, is to impose a
levy of some kind on these emissions. If polluting the environment incurs
costs for the polluter because of charges they are forced to pay that are pro-
portional to the level of their emissions, most industries will find a way to
reduce them. At the same time, if the cost of goods and services that rely
heavily on fossil fuels (like refuelling your car) increases, then consumers
will gradually shift to less carbon-intensive modes of transport and purchase
goods that have a smaller carbon ‘footprint’.
The second approach is for regulators to set standards, performance tar-
gets, or emissions limits and to impose a financial penalty–a fine—if the
standards are not met or the limits on emissions are exceeded. This approach
works well in some circumstances: improving the fuel efficiency of vehicles,
setting stringent building codes, or stopping the constant pollution of a river
with toxic industrial waste.
The third approach is to incentivise industries to transition to a more effi-
cient or less polluting system of production, and to encourage consumers to
switch to less polluting modes of transport by subsidizing zero- or low-emis-
sion alternative technologies to the point where they are the least-cost
option. The cost of shifting to the less polluting option may be subsidized if
it is potentially a barrier to making the transition.
All these policies are being implemented in different ways and to different
degrees in many countries around the world. Over 180 countries signed up
and ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement under which they agreed to substan-
tially reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases before 2050, and many of
them have imposed, or plan to impose, a price on carbon.
Carbon Pricing
On the first day of the 21st meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP21) of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
held in Paris at the end of November 2015, an international coalition of gov-
ernments and strategic partners was formed with the aim of coordinating
action on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by setting a price on carbon.
Called the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, one of its first actions
was to establish a High-Level Commission with the aim of exploring and
evaluating the carbon-pricing options that would induce the change in
7 Pricing Down Carbon
335
behaviours needed to keep global average temperatures to below 2 °C above

pre-industrial levels.1
The High-Level Commission issued its report in May 2017.2 It summa-
rized its findings as follows:
1. Tackling climate change is an urgent and fundamental challenge;

2. A well-designed carbon price is an indispensable part of a strategy for
reducing emissions;
3. Achieving the Paris objective will require all countries to implement cli-
mate policy packages;
4. Explicit carbon-pricing instruments can raise revenue efficiently because
they help overcome a key market failure: the climate externality;
5. Carbon pricing by itself may not be sufficient to induce change at the
pace and on the scale required for the Paris target to be met and may need
to be complemented by other well-designed policies tackling various mar-
ket and government failures as well as other imperfections.
The most important conclusion in this report is that a well-designed car-

bon price is indispensable if the Paris targets are to be attained. At the same
time, the report clearly recognized that other complementary policies may
be required. It states:
These policies could include investing in public transportation infrastructure

and urban planning; laying the groundwork for renewable-based power gener-
ation; introducing or raising energy efficiency standards, adapting city design,
and land and forest management; investing in relevant R&D initiatives;
and developing financial devices to reduce the risk-weighted capital costs of
low-carbon technologies and projects.3
What these observations by some of the world’s best economists underscore

is that although carbon pricing is regarded as indispensable, complementary
policies that focus more directly on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases
may also play an important role in meeting the Paris Agreement targets.
Although several countries and sub-national jurisdictions introduced car-
bon pricing schemes decades ago, the concept has increasingly gained trac-
tion over the last few years. At the One Planet Summit in December 2017,
on the second anniversary of the adoption of the Paris Agreement, leaders
of governments, businesses and international organizations reaffirmed their
commitment to accelerate global efforts to fight climate change and to
strongly support carbon pricing at regional and national levels.4
336
M. J. Bush
Tax, Cap or Trade?
Two main policy options are available for introducing and maintaining
a price on carbon. One option involves setting a price through a tax or
levy on greenhouse gas emissions or the carbon content of fossil fuels. The
second major option, known as cap-and-trade, limits the total allowable
volume of emissions over a specific period of time (the cap) from a spec-
ified set of sources, and allows emitting industries to trade their emission
rights.
If a cap-and-trade system functions well and emissions decline, green-
house gas (GHG) pollution will be reduced each year by a predictable
amount—but the price at which the emission rights trade will be uncer-
tain. This means that the price of carbon in a cap-and-trade scheme can be
hard to predict, and the level of government revenues from such a scheme is
uncertain.
On the other hand, a carbon tax requires industry to pay for every ton of
GHG released into the atmosphere, usually at a fixed price. Carbon taxes
are generally easier to administer than cap-and-trade because they involve
neither a market-based trading system (which has to be set up and man-
aged), nor require the enforcement of rules to prevent market manipula-
tion. Moreover, a carbon tax can be added to existing taxes, and industries
producing emissions can predict their liabilities reasonably well. However,
although a carbon tax provides certainty about the price (and therefore gov-
ernment revenues), there is less certainty about the level of reductions that
will be achieved.
The question of which carbon pricing mechanism is optimal continues
to be debated by economists, policy analysts and political scientists. Some
argue for a direct carbon tax, while other advocate cap-and-trade, while a
third group has argued that the two policies are functionally equivalent—
meaning that a cap-and-trade system can be designed to essentially mimic a
carbon tax and vice versa.5
Figure 7.1 illustrates schematically how a carbon tax works. There are
two industries emitting the same amount of carbon pollution. When a car-
bon tax is imposed, each industry has a strong financial incentive to reduce
its emissions. The cost of reducing carbon emissions is higher for industry
A than for Industry B, so Industry A reduces emissions only to the point
where it makes more sense to pay the tax on its remaining emissions. For
industry B, it is less expensive to reduce emissions—so it cuts back further,
but still pays tax on the lower level of emissions which would cost more to
reduce than paying the tax.6
337
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ƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ
ƚŚĂƚĐŽƐƚůĞƐƐ
ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨ
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ǁŚŝĐŚĞŵŝƚƚĞƌƐ
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Fig. 7.1 How a carbon tax reduces emissions (Source Ecofiscal, Canada)
ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚďǇƚĂŬŝŶŐ
ĂĐƟŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƐƚůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ
ƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨĐĂƌďŽŶ
WĞƌŵŝƚƐďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ĨƌŽŵ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƵĐƟŽŶ
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WĞƌŵŝƚƐƐŽůĚƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
ĞŵŝƩĞƌ
Fig. 7.2 How a cap and trade system reduces emissions (Source Ecofiscal Canada)
Each industry can decide what is its best option. This flexibility of when
and how to reduce emissions, and to what level, means that the total costs
to the economy are lower than they would be under a regulatory system
that simply required both industries to use specific technologies or achieve a
specified level of emissions performance.7
A cap and trade system is more complicated. Figure 7.2 shows schemati-
cally how a cap and trade system operates.
Government policy establishes a maximum allowable level of green-
house gas emissions which is less than present emission levels—this is the
cap on emissions. Allowances or permits are issued to industries and they
are allowed to emit carbon only up to the level of those permits. Industries
and businesses can either reduce their emissions in line with the cap or buy
338
M. J. Bush
additional permits if they decide not to reduce their emissions—but they

have to purchase those permits at the market price. Industries that reduce
their emissions below their allowance are permitted to sell their allowances
at the market rate, and the supply and demand for allowances determines
the market price of carbon.
A cap and trade system is therefore more flexible than a carbon tax
scheme—but more complicated to set up and to administer. Over time,
governments rachet down the cap, and the number of allowances available
on the market is reduced. The price of purchasing an allowance therefore
rises—providing an additional financial incentive for industries to take steps
to reduce their emissions.
The Global Overview
In mid-2018, 45 national and 25 subnational jurisdictions had imple-

mented schemes to put a price on carbon. These initiatives cover about 11
billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (11 GtCO2e), which is about
20% of global GHG emissions. The Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition
has set a target of 25% of GHG emissions covered by 2020.8
Carbon prices vary substantially—from less than $1/tCO2e (in Mexico,
Poland and Ukraine) to a maximum of $139/tCO2e levied in Sweden.
Roughly half of the emissions covered are at prices less than $10/tCO2e.
Overall, most carbon prices are judged to be a lot lower than those needed
to achieve the Paris Agreement targets.9 In order to reach those targets, the
price of carbon needs to be somewhere in the range of $40–$80/tCO2e—a
price much higher than those being applied across the globe in mid-2018.
However, carbon prices are on the rise. Most initiatives saw an increase in
2018. One substantial change was the growth in the European Allowance
(EUA) price from $7/tCO2e to $20/tCO2e—almost three times the level of
the previous year.10
In addition, tax rates increased in France where the carbon tax rate rose
from $38/tCO2 to $55/tCO2, while the Swiss carbon tax rate rose from
$88/tCO2e to $101/tCO2e. Only eight countries and one jurisdiction has
carbon prices above $25/tCO2e. In descending order these are: Sweden,
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Finland, Norway, France, Iceland, Denmark,
and the Canadian province of British Columbia.11
At the bottom end of the scale, 25 countries have a price on carbon
below $25/tCO2e. Figure 7.3 shows this group of countries and subnational
jurisdictions.
339
Fig. 7.3 Carbon prices below $25tCO2e (State and trends of carbon emissions 2018 )
(Source World Bank Group)
340
M. J. Bush
Carbon Revenues
In 2017, governments raised over $30 billion in carbon pricing revenues
from allowance auctions, direct payments to meet compliance obligations,
and carbon tax receipts. This revenue represents a 50% increase compared
to 2016 receipts. Part of this substantial increase was due to auction reve-
nues from the (then) newly launched emission trading scheme in Ontario,
Canada, and income from new carbon taxes in Alberta, Canada; Chile, and
Colombia. Other sources included a larger number of allowances bought at
auctions in California combined with higher auction sale prices, the increase
in the European EUA price, and the carbon tax rate hike in France.12
However, there is an important difference between the two methods of
setting a price on carbon: much more revenue is generated from carbon tax
policies than from cap-and-trade schemes.13
Carbon revenues are generally disbursed in three different ways:
1. Green spending, where revenues are invested in energy efficiency meas-

ures and renewable energy initiatives, as well as programs intended to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions related to agriculture and forestry, land-
fill management, electric and other zero emission vehicles, and mass
transit.
2. General funds, where governments disburse carbon revenues on pro-
grams unrelated to emissions reductions or adaptation to climate change
impacts
3. Revenue recycling, where carbon revenues are directly returned to some
part of the population through individual or business tax cuts or rebates
in order to offset the negative impacts of higher energy costs.
How governments spend their carbon revenues differs quite markedly.

Table 7.1 shows data from 2013/2014 for several major jurisdictions.14
Several countries and jurisdictions invested all their carbon pricing rev-
enues in green initiatives: among them Quebec, France and Japan. At the
other end of the scale, British Columbia recycled all revenue back to house-
holds and businesses—even adding in a bit more for good measure. Iceland
directed all carbon revenue into general funds.
The case of Australia is instructive. In 2014, that country’s carbon tax had
the world’s largest overall pool of revenues ($8.8 billion) but also the largest
per capita burden of any tax ($391 annually). The carbon price was set at
$30 per tonne of CO2, but this reasonable price, coupled with the country’s
Table 7.1 Disbursement of carbon revenues 2013/2014a
Carbon pricing system Annual revenue Green spend- General funds Revenue recy-
(millions) ing (%) (%) cling (%)
Cap-and-trade systems
European Union Emissions Trading System Phase III $4640 80 20 0
California AB 32 Cap and Trade System $1034 45 4 55
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (USA) $447 49 32 12
Quebec cap-and-trade system for emission allowances $100 100 0 0
Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program $92 90 10 0
Carbon tax systems
Australia carbon pricing mechanism (cancelled) $8790 15 1 53
Sweden carbon dioxide tax $3680 0 50 50
Norway carbon dioxide tax $1580 30 40 30
United Kingdom carbon floor price $1530 0 85 0
British Columbia carbon tax shift $1100 0 0 102
France domestic consumption tax on carbon dioxide $452 100 0 0
Japan tax for climate change mitigation $490 100 0 0
Iceland carbon tax on carbon of fossil origin $30 0 100 0
aNote that the data are from 2013 or FY 2013/2014 and so are to some extent out of date, although the revenue disbursement poli-
cies may still be applicable. Percentages do not always add up to 100% because the spending categories are not comprehensive, and
annual revenue budgeting may not match annual revenue
Source Science Direct
341
342
M. J. Bush
high coal-fired greenhouse gas emission intensity, together with an over-

night launch of the scheme and the fact that carbon taxes generated revenue
from the full range of emissions, meant that Australia’s carbon tax system
resulted in an economic shock greater than other similar carbon pricing sys-
tems. Even though more than half the revenue was earmarked for recycling,
the tax was unpopular. Repealing the carbon tax was therefore a major ele-
ment of the opposition party’s campaign platform and the tax was eventually
cancelled.15
The turmoil in Australia over carbon pricing continued into 2018. In
August, prime minister Malcolm Turnbull was forced out of office after pro-
posing “modest emission targets” for the country’s energy sector—which is
heavily dependent on coal. Australia is one of the world’s top coal exporters,
accounting for almost 40% of global exports.16
The Australian experience underscores the political difficulty of introduc-
ing carbon pricing in some jurisdictions unless careful attention is paid to
how it is introduced, its revenue-sharing policy, and its packaging and mar-
keting. In British Columbia, Canada, there was political opposition to the
carbon tax, but because it was revenue-neutral, with all the revenue recycled,
efforts by opposition political parties to cancel the tax failed.
Table 7.2 Key issues and enabling measures supporting carbon pricing

Key issues Enabling measures
1. Ensure equitable distribution of costs • Targeted support for affected industry
and support businesses and firms and compensation for firms and workers
• Cash transfers for households and
consumers
• Investments that foster structural change
in energy and infrastructure
2. Alleviate the effect of unilateral • Impose carbon tariffs and border carbon
policies like carbon leakage adjustments
• Support affected industries such as
trade-exposed industries
3. Build and strengthen public support • Reduce income taxes
• Showcase climate projects and low car-
bon investments
• Provide information and communication
about impacts and benefits
• Ensure appropriate timing and sequenc-
ing of implementation actions
• Consider carefully the wording and fram-
ing of the policy
Source UN Environment Programme

343
In a similar vein, the emissions trading scheme operating in Ontario,

Canada, in collaboration with Quebec and California, was cancelled in
2018 when the provincial government changed hands. Justifying the can-
cellation of the program, the new provincial Environment Minister, Rod
Phillips, stated: “We’re sending a clear message: Ontario’s carbon-tax era is over.
It’s a punishing, regressive tax that forces low- and middle-income families to pay
more ”.17
One result of the cancelation of the cap-and trade program was that the
province’s $377 million (CAD) Green Ontario Fund—which supported
energy efficiency measures and promoted electric vehicles–was immediately
closed down.
These examples underscore the reality that public support for carbon pric-
ing is often limited, in part because politicians have failed to communicate a
clear narrative on how and why setting a price on carbon would benefit con-
sumers and the local economy. The key issues are shown in Table 7.2 along
with several proposed measures to address them.18
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) cap-and-trade system
covers nine eastern states in the USA: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Maryland and
Delaware. Launched in 2009, it was the first carbon-trading scheme devel-
oped and implemented in the US, and the second (after British Columbia,
Canada) in North America.
It is a major carbon pricing initiative. The current group of RGGI states
account for more than one-eighth of the population of the US and more
than one-seventh of America’s gross national product. However, it should be
noted that the RGGI only covers fossil-fuelled electric power plants with a
capacity of 25 MW or greater.19 In 2009, when the RGGI program started,
these sources accounted for less than a third of the CO2 emissions generated
by the nine participating states.20
A comprehensive review of the program’s performance over the period
2015–2017 showed that the RGGI was working successfully: not only cut-
ting greenhouse gas emissions but also boosting the regional economy and
creating jobs. The analysis also found that the RGGI cap-and-trade system
had not undermined the reliability of the power grid and, most importantly,
had not led to a net increase in household electricity bills.21
344
M. J. Bush
In 2009, the first credits issued to participating industries and power plants
totalled 188 million tons of carbon dioxide. The cap was progressively low-
ered and stood at 84.3 million tons in 2017. Since 2000, emissions of CO2
have fallen by almost two-thirds—which is an impressive achievement.22
It is interesting to note, however, that emissions of carbon dioxide were
falling even before the RGGI went into effect in 2009. This decline perhaps
was due to the 2008 financial crisis, and in many US states emissions ticked
back up after this period. This did not happen in the RGGI states and the
continuing decline in CO2 emissions after 2010 is almost certainly the result
of the cap-and-trade scheme.
Over the period 2015–2017, auctions for emission allowances under the
RGGI program generated approximately $901 million. The RGGI states
disburse this money in different ways—but among essentially eight types of
economic activities.
1. Energy efficiency. Investments in this category are judged to have the

most rapid economic impact by reducing the demand for electricity and
natural gas for heating and reducing household payments for electric-
ity and fuels. Investments stimulate businesses offering energy-efficiency
audits, upgrades to inefficient equipment, residential retrofits, and the
installation of energy efficient appliances. The growth of the energy-effi-
ciency sector creates jobs and has a state-wide positive economic impact.
2. Clean technology R&D. This category covers grants and investments to
support research focused on developing new technologies aimed at reduc-
ing GHG emissions—for example: clean technologies, alternative trans-
portation, and carbon capture and storage.
3. Direct bill assistance. Carbon pricing increases the cost of electricity
for households and businesses. This can be a serious financial burden
for low-income families. Many states have introduced rebates, payment
credits, and other means to reduce bills paid by consumers, especially for
low-income families. This is sometimes called recycling carbon revenues.
4. Greenhouse gas programs. The GHG reduction programs include a
variety of expenditures aimed at reducing GHG emissions—for example
grants for CO2 emissions reduction technologies, direct investment in
‘green’ start-up companies; efforts to reduce vehicle-miles travelled; cli-
mate change adaptation measures; investments in existing fossil-fuel fired
power plants to make them cleaner or more efficient.
5. Program administration. This category includes the costs associated with
the administration of a state’s CO2 budget trading program and/or related
consumer benefit programs.
345
6. Renewable energy. Grants and investments in utility-scale wind power

and solar photovoltaic systems displace power generated from fossil fuels.
Distributed energy systems—like solar photovoltaic installations on res-
idences and businesses, reduce the demand for electricity, lower utility
bills, and create significant state-wide jobs and employment.
7. Education, outreach, and job training. This includes funds for pro-
grams to educate business and residential consumers about ways to
increase energy efficiency and reduce consumption. It includes financial
support for training workers in new skills: energy audits, installing energy
efficient equipment, distributed energy systems, and providing energy
efficiency measures.
8. General funds. Some states allocate a small part of carbon revenues to
budgets unrelated to energy or climate change.
Table 7.3 shows the ways in which the nine RGGI states allocated funds
during the third compliance period from 2015 to 2017.
It is noteworthy that the nine states opted for very different investment
strategies. Vermont disbursed nearly all revenues on energy efficiency meas-
ures and nothing on direct billing assistance. Conversely, New Hampshire
directed almost 80% of its revenues towards providing assistance for con-
sumers facing higher utility charges, and less than 20% on energy efficiency
measures. It is also worth noting that only three of the RGGI states diverted
a small fraction of their carbon revenues into general funds. Overall, the
amount of revenue than was diverted into general funds was less than 1%.
So 99% of revenues were directed towards programs aimed at further reduc-
ing emissions of greenhouse gases.
The exception is the support for direct billing assistance—which does not
directly induce or encourage a reduction in GHG emissions. It may in fact
have the opposite effect—as it tends to weaken the price signal intended to
change consumer behaviours. However, this may be a policy intended to
ensure that a carbon pricing initiative is not vulnerable to cancelation by
political parties ideologically opposed to what they will often condemn as an
unwarranted ‘tax’.
Overall, just over half the RGGI carbon revenues were spent on energy
efficiency measures. Figure 7.4 shows the disbursement breakdown for the
RGGI program as a whole. The category ‘other disbursements’ includes
GHG programs; clean technology R&D; education, outreach and job train-
ing; and general funds.23
We should recall that the RGGI cap-and-trade program only covers fos-
sil-fuel power plants over 25 MW capacity. The RGGI was specifically aimed
346
M. J. Bush
Table 7.3 Allocation of carbon revenues among RGGI states, 2015–2017

Energy effi- Clean technol- Direct bill GHG pro- Program Renewable Education, General
ciency (%) ogy, R&D (%) assistance (%) grams (%) admin. (%) energy (%) outreach, & job funds (%)
training (%)
Connecticut 53.3 – – – 5.2 32.5 – 9.0
Maine 77.3 0.5 16.8 – 4.1 – – 1.3
Massachusetts 64.4 5.1 – 16.3 6.9 7.3 – –
New Hampshire 19.2 – 78.9 – 2.0 – – –
Rhode Island 37.3 1.0 32.1 0.3 11.8 17.1 0.3 –
Vermont 94.9 – – – 5.1 – – –
New York 55.7 5.7 – 0.7 7.2 25.4 5.3 –
Delaware 62.1 – 3.7 0.2 10.6 22.6 – 0.8
Maryland 31.4 0.1 39.4 7.9 9.6 10.2 1.4 –
Source Analysis Group
347
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WƌŽŐƌĂŵ ϭϬй
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ŝƌĞĐƚďŝůůŝŶŐ
ŶĞƌŐǇ
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Fig. 7.4 Disbursement of carbon revenues by the RGGI states (Source Inside Climate
News)
at reducing emissions from larger power plants, and within that narrow
mandate the program has been extremely successful—reducing emissions
from these power plants by almost half from 2009 to 2017 and having a
substantial positive economic impact.
But what about the other sources of greenhouse gases in these nine
states?
The US Energy Information Administration has published data on energy-
related carbon dioxide emissions for all the US states. Energy-related
CO2 emissions includes the combustion of coal, petroleum, and natu-
ral gas within a state to produce electricity, to transport people or goods,
to operate industrial processes, and to directly fuel equipment in resi-
dential and commercial buildings. Table 7.4 shows energy-related emis-
sions from the nine RGGI states for the period 2009–2016 in million
tonnes CO2.24
Overall, there was a decrease of 5.6% in energy-related emissions over the
eight-year period. All the states except Delaware saw their emissions of ener-
gy-related carbon dioxide fall.
The review of the RGGI program by the economists of the Analysis
Group offered the following observations and conclusions.
• The RGGI program continued to generate substantial economic benefits

for the states while reducing CO2 emissions. The program led to approxi-
mately $1.4 billion in economic value added as a result of program imple-
mentation in the 2015–2017 period—providing empirical evidence that
348
M. J. Bush
Table 7.4 Energy-related emissions of CO2 in the RGGI states, MtCO2

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 % change
2009–2016
Connecticut 35.9 36.2 34.9 34.1 34.9 35.1 36.5 34.3 −4.5
Maine 18.4 18.1 17.6 15.9 16.6 16.5 16.8 16.5 −10.3
Massachusetts 70.3 71.8 68 61.7 65.6 63.7 65.6 64.2 −8.7
New Hampshire 17.1 16.6 16.2 14.6 14.3 14.9 15.1 13.8 −19.3
Rhode Island 11.3 11 11 10.5 10.2 10.6 10.9 9.8 −13.3
Vermont 6.2 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.0 −3.2
New York 173.9 174.5 164.9 161.5 162.7 170.1 168.3 163.7 −5.9
Delaware 12.0 11.8 12.9 13.9 13.6 13.3 13.4 13.3 10.8
Maryland 70.5 69.1 64.4 59.9 59.2 61.3 59.5 57.6 −18.3
Totals, MtCO2 415.6 415 395.7 377.6 382.9 391.5 392.2 392.2 −5.6
Source US Energy Information Administration

349
carbon-control programs for the power sector can provide positive eco-
nomic outcomes.
• RGGI’s third compliance period led to overall job increases amounting
to over 14,500 new job-years over the study period, with each of the nine
states experiencing net job-year additions. Examples include workers who
perform efficiency audits and who install energy efficiency measures in
residences and commercial buildings, and staff performing training on
energy issues.
• The experience of the RGGI states demonstrates that states can collabo-
rate successfully in developing programs to control CO2 emissions, and
that market-based CO2 allowance programs—when combined with state-
driven centralized auction of CO2 allowances and with local reinvestment
of auction proceeds—can help states meet emission-reduction targets
while generating positive economic benefits.
• How allowance proceeds are used affects their economic impacts. Use of
auction proceeds to invest in energy efficiency produces the biggest eco-
nomic bang per buck in terms of net positive benefits to consumers and
to the economy.25
The last point deserves more emphasis. It highlights the fact that carbon
pricing schemes—whether carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems, are much
more effective in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, when the revenues
from the scheme are invested in programs that directly target the reduction
of emissions. When structured and managed in this manner, carbon pric-
ing works in two complementary ways: (1) by introducing price signals
that induce less carbon-intensive activity, cleaner technology, and lower
emissions from power plants and industry, and (2) by providing funds for
programs focused on energy efficiency and renewable energy that directly
reduce emissions. Furthermore, these investments funded by carbon rev-
enues can have a substantial positive economic impact on the local and
regional economy in terms of employment, new business opportunities, out-
reach and training.
The RGGI program is well on the way to achieving its objectives—inso-
far as those objectives are limited to only reducing emissions from fossil-fuel
fired power plants. But since the program has limited coverage, its impact on
the totality of sources of carbon dioxide emissions has so far been modest—
at least up until 2016. And it would be interesting to know more about why
emissions increased in the state of Delaware?
350
M. J. Bush
Quebec Cap-and-Trade System for Emission

Allowances
Quebec’s cap-and-trade system presents an interesting contrast to the RGGI
because Quebec’s power plants generate electricity almost entirely from
renewable energy—predominantly hydropower. So whereas the RGGI
objective is to reduce emissions from power plants, Quebec’s goal is to
reduce emissions from transportation, industry, and the built environment.
In 2009, these three sectors accounted for 85% of the provinces’ emissions
of greenhouse gases—the largest of these being transportation.26
The other notable difference is that Quebec invests almost all of its carbon
revenues into ‘green’ programs, and none at all into direct bill assistance.
The program started in 2013 when Quebec joined the Western Climate
Initiative’s carbon market. A year later, on 1 January 2014, Quebec linked
its system with California’s—creating the largest carbon market in North
America. It was the first in the world to be operated by subnational jurisdic-
tions in different countries.
The program is intended to be a flexible market mechanism to induce
a carbon cost in business decision-making and to facilitate low-cost GHG
emission reductions while encouraging the implementation of clean tech-
nologies. All businesses that emit 25,000 tonnes or more of carbon dioxide
equivalent a year are subject to the cap-and-trade system.
For the first compliance period in 2013/14 (phase I), only the industrial
and electricity sector were included in the system. During subsequent com-
pliance periods, fossil fuel distributors were included in the program.27 But
the coverage is not 100%: only 85% of industries that emit greenhouse gases
are covered by the program.
In the Quebec cap-and-trade system, there are three types of emission
allowance—all of which are fully interchangeable with California’s allowances.
1. Emission units distributed free of change, auctioned off or sold by mutual

agreement by the government
2. Offset credits stemming from GHG emission reductions in sectors not
subject to the cap-and-trade system
3. Credits for early reductions. Emitters and participants in the cap-and-
trade system must each have an account in the tracking system in which
their emission allowances are held.28
Figure 7.5 shows schematically how the system works. With emissions

capped, an industry that exceeds the cap (industry A) must purchase
351
Fig. 7.5 How Quebec’s cap-and-trade system works (Source Le Quebec en action

verte)
allowances from the carbon market in order to be in compliance. Industry

B has taken steps to reduce its emissions, and now has allowances available
that it can sell to the carbon market.29
As in all cap-and-trade systems, the cap on emissions is reduced each year
in line with the emission targets set by the jurisdiction. Quebec has set a
goal similar to the target set by the European Union, with the aim of reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% over the period 1990–2020—with
the goal of getting at least an 80% reduction from 1990 levels by 2050.
Table 7.5 shows the emission caps proposed through to 2020.30
The cap in 2030 will be set at 44.14 MtCO2e.31 To put these caps in
perspective, Quebec’s actual emissions up to 2016 are shown in Table 7.6.
Reducing 1990 emissions by 20% by 2020 would imply a target of 69
MtCO2e. So the 2020 cap has been set at less than the target—which may
reflect the fact that only 85% of industries are regulated by the program,
and that some energy-intensive industries subject to international compe-
tition receive a portion of free allowances. These include aluminium, lime,
cement, chemical and petrochemicals, metallurgy, mining and pelletizing,
pulp and paper, and petroleum refining.32
Table 7.6 shows that emissions of greenhouse gases in 2014 were about
9% down on 1990 levels but since that time have been essentially flat. It’s
clear that Quebec is not going to reach its 2020 target.
352
M. J. Bush
Table 7.5 Total caps Year Emission cap, MtCO2e

of emissions units
2013 23.20
granted
2014 23.20
2015 65.30
2016 63.19
2017 61.08
2018 58.96
2019 58.85
2020 54.74
Table 7.6 Quebec’s Year MtCO2e

actual emissions of
1990 86
greenhouse gasesa
2005 86
2011 82
2012 80
2013 80
2014 78
2015 78
2016 78
2017 78
aNational inventory report 1990–2017: Greenhouse
gas sources and sinks in Canada. Environment and

climate change Canada 2019. Accessed at: http://pub-
lications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En81-
4-1-2017-eng.pdf
Carbon Revenues
Quebec has budgeted for revenues of approximately $2665 million (CAD)

over the 8-year period from 2013 to 2020: so the province is expecting to
receive revenues averaging about $330 million a year over this period. Over
80% of carbon revenues generated by the cap-and-trade program is invested
in measures to increase energy efficiency—predominantly in the transport
sector where public transport employing hybrid or electric buses is allocated
more than half of the total budget. Figure 7.6 shows the budget for the dis-
bursement of carbon revenues for the period 2013–2020.33
More than 70% of the budget for energy efficiency shown in Fig. 7.6
is for a single budget line: The promotion of public transport and alternative
means of transport by improving the supply and by developing the infrastructure
and enabling sustainable choices.34
There are no indications that Quebec’s successfully operating carbon pric-
ing mechanism is having a negative impact on its economy. The province’s
353
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Fig. 7.6 Disbursements budgeted for Quebec’s carbon revenues, 2013–2020 (Source

Le Quebec en action verte)
GDP grew 3.1% in 2017. Although this was slightly less than the national
average of 3.3%, it was still the province’s strongest rate of growth since
2000 and more than twice that of 2016. Among the ten Canadian prov-
inces, Quebec recorded the 4th highest GDP growth rate.
Quebec’s manufacturing output rose 3.7% in 2017 with growth in 15 of
19 subsectors. There were significant increases in food manufacturing, plas-
tics and rubber products, fabricated metal products and machinery manu-
facturing.35 Unemployment rates also fell: declining from 7.6% in 2013 to
6.1% in 2017—less than the national average of 6.3%.36
Quebec’s per capita GHG emissions also dropped significantly: declining
from 11.4 t/CO2e to 9.4 t/CO2e per capita from 2005 to 2017. The lat-
ter number is less than half the Canadian national average in 2017 of 19.5
t/CO2e per capita and is less than Ontario’s and British Columbia’s figures
of 11.2 and 12.5 t/CO2e respectively. 37
British Columbia
The Canadian province of British Columbia introduced a carbon tax in
2008. It applies to the purchase or use of all fossil fuels within the province
and covers about 70% of the province’s greenhouse gas emissions. The goal
is to reduce emissions to 80% below 2007 levels by 2050.
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M. J. Bush
In 2008, the carbon tax was set at $10 per tonne of CO2 equivalent
emissions–increasing by $5 each year up to $30 a tonne in 2012. In 2008,
the tax raised pump prices on gasoline and diesel by 2.34 and 2.69 cents
per litre respectively.38 In April 2018, the carbon tax was raised to $35/
tCO2e—a figure that is projected to increase pump prices by 7.78 and 8.95
cents/litre for gasoline and diesel fuel respectively. The tax will again increase
in $5 annual increments rising to $50/tCO2e in 2050.39
One unique characteristic of the BC carbon tax is that it is designed to
be revenue-neutral. Revenue collected from the carbon tax must, by law, be
recycled into the economy in the form of tax cuts. Carbon revenues can-
not be used to fund government programs. Personal income and corporate
income tax rates were reduced from 2008 onwards, and low-income families
are compensated for the higher fuel prices through a refundable tax credit.40
The carbon tax in British Columbia has been hailed by several analysts
and organizations as an outstanding success. For instance, in 2015, two lead-
ing environmental economists stated that “British Columbia has given the
world perhaps the closest example of an economist’s textbook prescription for the
use of a carbon tax to reduce emissions ”.41
But a closer look at the data—particularly the GHG emissions data
reported by the Canadian government in early 2018 in its National Inventory
Report—paints a very different picture. The relevant data are set out in
Table 7.7—which also shows data for Quebec and Ontario for comparison.
The odd formatting of the years in Table 7.6 follows the format of
Canada’s National Inventory Report.42 The first thing to notice is that emis-
sions of greenhouse gases in British Columbia over the most recent period
have actually increased. From 2011 to 2017, emissions rose by 4.6%. Only
if the reference point is taken as 2005, is there a slight fall in emissions. But
if the British Columbia carbon tax program is working so successfully–as
its many proponents often proclaim, there should absolutely be an overall
downward trend in emissions over the seven year period through to 2017
(which is the latest year for which emissions data are available).
For Canada as a whole, over the period 2011–2017 emissions also
increased—but to a lesser degree than British Columbia.
In contrast to British Columbia, GHG emissions in both Quebec and
Ontario declined over all three periods (from 1990, 2005 and 2011). Over
the period 2011–2017, emissions fell by 4.5% in Quebec and by 7.8% in
Ontario—while in British Columbia as noted above, they actually rose. And
while emissions per capita fell by 5.0% over this period in British Columbia,
they declined more rapidly in Quebec and Ontario: by 8.2% and 13.6%
respectively.
Table 7.7 Emissions per capita for Canada, British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario 1990–2017
1990 2005 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Canada (all provinces and territories)
GHG emissions MtCO2e 602 730 700 711 722 723 722 708 716
Population, millions 27.691 32.242 34.343 34.751 35.152 35.535 35.833 36.265 36.713
Emissions per capita, tCO2e 21.8 22.7 20.4 20.3 20.4 20.1 19.9 19.4 19.5
British Columbia
GHG emissions MtCO2e 52 63 59.3 60 61 60 59 61 62
Emissions per capita, tCO2e 15.5 14.8 13.2 13.3 13.3 13 12.7 12.6 12.5
Quebec
Emissions per capita, tCO2e 12.4 11.4 10.2 9.8 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.3 9.4
Ontario
Emissions per capita, tCO2e 17.4 16.3 13 12.6 12.4 12.1 11.8 11.5 11.2
Source National Inventory Report Canada

355
356
M. J. Bush
The data also show the dubious value of analysing carbon tax or cap-and-
trade performance in terms of per capita emissions. As the data for British
Columbia demonstrate, per capital rates can fall even when emissions are
rising—simply because the population is increasing at a faster rate than
emissions.
The poor performance of British Columbia’s carbon tax program has
prompted that province’s government to try a different approach. In April
2018, the carbon tax was raised to $35 per tonne of CO2 equivalent emis-
sions—a tax rate that will rise each year by $5 a tonne until it reaches $50
a tonne in 2021. The carbon tax scheme is still revenue-neutral—with the
new revenues being used to provide carbon tax relief, protect affordability,
and maintain industry competitiveness. However, carbon revenues will also
be used to encourage new “green initiatives”.43
In 2018, the province committed to taking ‘sector-specific action’ to
reduce emissions and build a more resilient, low-carbon economy.44 So
British Columbia appears to be moving away from a strictly revenue-neutral
carbon pricing system to an approach that recognizes that complementary
policies focused on energy efficiency and renewable energy are essential if
greenhouse gas emissions are to be substantially reduced.
California
California’s cap-and-trade program began its compliance obligation scheme
on 1 January 2013. The state’s program is the fourth largest in the world,
after the cap-and-trade programs of the European Union, South Korea, and
the Chinese province of Guangdong.
The goal is to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by
2020, and then to reduce them further by 40% by 2030. The cap-and-trade
program applies to large electric power plants, large industrial plants, and
fuel distributors of natural gas and petroleum—and covers approximately
450 sources responsible for 85% of the state’s greenhouse gas emissions.
Smaller industries emitting less than 25,000 tCO2e a year are exempt.
Emissions of greenhouse gases have been falling since 2007. In 2016
GHG emissions were 429 MtCO2e which is already below the state’s tar-
get set for 2020—which is the 1990 level of about 431 MtCO2e. At the
same time, California’s economy is vigorously healthy: Its GDP grew 3.1%
in 2017—the 6th highest among American states. In 2015, California had
the highest GDP growth of 4.6%, and the state has been among the top six
performing states in terms of GDP since 2012.45
357
Fig. 7.7 Trends in California’s GDP, population, and GHG emissions since 2000
(Source California Air Resources Board)
California’s progress in reducing emissions has been good since 2007—

which was well before the cap-and-trade program was introduced. Figure 7.7
shows the most important metrics.46
What is clearly evident from Fig. 7.7 is not just the declining level
of emissions, but the reduction in the carbon intensity of the economy.
California’s GHG emissions per unit of GDP dropped by about 35% over
the period from 2000 to 2016—a remarkable achievement.
How did the state of California manage to produce these emission
reductions in an economy larger than Canada’s? Figure 7.8 shows the level
of emission of the big three sources of emissions: Transportation, electric
power, and industry.
The largest source of emissions is transportation and although emissions
in 2016 were down compared to 2007, more recently, emissions have been
rising again.
But it’s the electric power sector where the reductions have been sub-
stantial: the sector cut emissions by more than 70 MtCO2e between 2008
and 2016. It’s not hard to see why. The decline in emissions is driven pri-
marily by the large increase in renewable energy resources as a result of
California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (first enacted in 2002), and since
2013 by the cap-and-trade program. Higher energy efficiency standards have
kept electricity consumption from increasing despite a growing population
and steady economic growth as shown in Fig. 7.7. In addition, the energy
intensity of imported electricity has been declining steadily over time as
California imports a greater share of renewable power and divests from long
term coal-fired electricity contracts.
358
M. J. Bush
Fig. 7.8 Trends in California GHG emissions by sector 2000–2016 (Source California

Air Resources Board)
In 2016, 46% of total electricity generation came from zero carbon,

clean energy sources—which include solar, wind, hydropower and nuclear.
Electric power emissions dropped by 15 MtCO2e from 2015 to 2016 due
to increased supplies of renewable energy including a 33% growth in solar
generation in 2016, and a drop in coal-fired electricity imports with the ter-
mination of long term coal contracts. Rooftop photovoltaic power genera-
tion was five times the level it was in 2011. Wind power ramped up through
2013 but has remained relatively constant since that time.47
California is not sitting back and relaxing. Not with wildfires, drought,
and heat waves seemingly intensifying each year. In 2018, Senate Bill 100
was approved—legislation that mandates that California will be powered
100% by clean energy by 2045. Clean energy includes nuclear power–so
strictly speaking this is not 100% renewable, but it is carbon free. Although
California is not the first US state to commit to 100% clean energy (Hawaii
was the first in 2015), California is the world’s fifth largest economy, and so
its commitment has global significance. It is the largest jurisdiction in the
world to move towards 100% clean energy.48
The benchmarks on this pathway to 100% zero-carbon energy are set by
California’s Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) which requires investor-
owned utilities, publicly owned utilities, electric service providers, and
359
community choice aggregators to increase procurement from eligible renew-

able energy resources to 33% of total procurement by 2020, and to 50% of
total procurement by 2030.49
The state has also introduced measures to manage energy demand as well as
supply. In 2018, the California Energy Commission amended the state’s build-
ing code to require that new single-family residences and low-rise multi-family
buildings have rooftop photovoltaic systems installed during construction.
It’s worth noting that although California’s residential electricity tariffs
are relatively high, the average home electricity bill is no higher than many
other states—because of improvements in energy efficiency in the building
envelope, home appliances, and residential heating systems.50
To recap, it is clear from these case studies in the US and Canada that pric-
ing carbon through a tax or cap-and-trade scheme provides price signals that
induce changes in industry practice and consumer behaviour–which lead to
lower consumption of fossil fuels and reduced emissions of greenhouse gases.
But pricing carbon is far from being the only tool available. There is plenty of
experience with carbon pricing programs in North America and Europe that
demonstrates that complementary programs that improve energy efficiency
through appliance standards and building codes, induce utility-scale switch-
ing to renewable energy (including as a priority phasing out coal), incentiv-
ize the purchase of electric vehicles, build out public transport infrastructure,
and encourage a less energy intensive life-style, also have a substantial, and
often much more rapid, impact on greenhouse gas emissions.
Fossil Fuel Subsidies

Reducing fossil fuel subsidies should also be an essential part of a carbon
pricing policy. In effect, these subsidies act as a negative emissions price—
discouraging investments in clean energy and energy efficiency, tilting the
balance in favour of carbon-intensive fuels and making it more difficult for
renewable energy and energy efficient equipment to compete. Subsidizing
fossil fuels is a ‘perverse subsidy’—making greenhouse gas emissions worse,
not better.
Energy subsidies damage the environment, causing more premature
deaths through local air pollution, exacerbating congestion and other
adverse side effects of vehicle use, and increasing atmospheric greenhouse
gas concentrations. Fossil fuel subsidies impose substantial fiscal costs, which
need to be financed by some combination of higher public debt, higher tax
360
M. J. Bush
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Fig. 7.9 Fossil fuel consumption subsidies, 2017 (billion dollars) (International Energy
Agency, World Energy Outlook: Fossil-fuel subsidies. Accessed at: https://www.iea.org/
weo/energysubsidies/) (Source International Energy Agency)
burdens, or the scaling back of potentially productive public spending (for

example, on health, education, and infrastructure) all of which can be a drag
on economic growth. And although one of the stated objectives of energy
subsidies may be to provide support to low-income households, studies
show that most of the benefits from energy subsidies are typically captured
by richer households.
Most importantly, energy subsidies discourage much-needed investments
in energy efficiency, renewable energy, and energy infrastructure.51
In the Middle East, oil and gas subsidies reduce electricity prices to
30–45% of what they would be if full reference prices were paid. Electricity
generation from oil is currently one of the lowest-cost options in the
region—but would be more expensive than wind and solar if the subsidies
for oil were lifted.52 Fifteen of the top countries subsidizing fossil fuels in
2017 are shown in Fig. 7.9. In total, the International Energy Agency esti-
mates that energy subsidies were over $300 billion in 2017.53
361
Table 7.8 Global fossil fuel subsidies, million USD (2017)

Fossil fuel 2015 2016 2017
Oil 139,681 104,542 136,956
Electricity 101,929 116,643 106,472
Natural gas 73,203 48,062 56,640
Coal 1362 1826 2327
Total 316,175 271,073 302,396
Source International Energy Agency
Table 7.8 Shows global fossil fuel subsidies over the period 2015–2017
according to the International Energy Agency.54
Total subsidies rose over 11% from 2016 to 2017, but the 2017 total was
less than 2015. Oil gets the lion’s share of subsidies followed by electricity
and natural gas. Subsidies for coal are much lower but coal is the only fossil
fuel where subsidies have consistently increased since 2015.
In September 2009, at a summit meeting in the USA, the G20 countries
took a key step towards reforming energy subsidies. Together, they com-
mitted to phasing out ‘inefficient’ fossil fuel subsidies. However, as Fig. 7.9
shows, six G20 states are still among the top 15 energy-subsidizing coun-
tries: China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, India, Mexico, and Argentina.
The International Monetary Fund has also reviewed the question of
energy subsidies in a working paper entitled: How large are global energy sub-
sidies? The IMF summarized its findings as follows:
• Post-tax energy subsidies are dramatically higher than previously esti-

mated—$4.9 trillion in 2013 and projected to reach $5.3 trillion in 2015.
• Post-tax subsidies are large and pervasive in both advanced and develop-
ing economies and among oil-producing and non-oil-producing countries
alike. But these subsidies are especially large (about 13–18%) relative to
GDP in Emerging and Developing Asia, the Middle east, North Africa,
and Pakistan, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
• Among different energy products, coal accounts for the biggest subsidies,
given its high environmental damage and (unlike for road fuels) no coun-
try imposes meaningful excises on its consumption
• Most energy subsidies arise from the failure to adequately charge for the
cost of domestic environmental damage—only about one quarter of the
total is from climate change—so unilateral reform of energy subsidies is
mostly in countries’ own interests.
• Eliminating post-tax subsidies in 2015 could raise government revenues
by $2.9 trillion, cut global CO2 emissions by more than 20%, and cut
pre-mature air pollution deaths by more than half.
362
M. J. Bush
The IMF report is careful to explain the assumptions and uncertainties

around these estimates—but nevertheless states:
The key findings of the paper are clear: energy subsidies are very large; their
removal would generate very substantial environmental, revenue, and welfare
gains; and their reform should begin immediately, albeit gradually, given the
uncertainty of the precise level of energy taxes required.55
The IMF estimates of energy subsidies are an order of magnitude higher

than those calculated by the IEA because the IMF methodology specifically
accounts for the external costs of the production of fossil fuels; whereas the
IEA methodology is based on a price-gap approach that that considers only
the difference between the end-user price and a reference price for each fuel.56
Finally, it should be noted that fossil fuel price support disproportionately
benefits richer households. The top income quintile on average receives six
times more in subsidies than the bottom quintile. Reducing fossil fuel subsi-
dies therefore leads to more equitable impacts. Moreover, reducing fossil fuel
use by reducing fuel subsidies will improve air quality and public health.57
One Hundred Percent Clean?

Although several small islands nations and the US state of Hawaii have set
a goal of 100% renewable energy before 2050, the big news in 2018 was
the declaration by California that it had a set a goal of 100% clean energy
by 2045. California’s economy is world class: larger than Canada’s and most
European countries. If California is aiming to go 100% clean energy by
2045, this has major global implications. So is 100% clean energy possible
for all the US states and even all countries? Some analysts believe it is.
In 2015, Professor Mark Jacobson and colleagues at Stanford University
published a paper entitled: 100% clean and renewable wind, water and sun-
light (WWS) all-sector road maps for the 50 United States, which presented
‘roadmaps’ for each of the 50 United States to convert all their energy sys-
tems to ones powered by wind, water and sunlight.58
The roadmap foresees all energy sectors being electrified by 2050 with
power generated by a mix of wind energy, concentrated solar power, geo-
thermal, solar photovoltaic, tidal and wave energy, and hydroelectricity.
Nuclear power, coal with carbon capture, liquid and solid biofuels are not
included in the analysis—but greater energy efficiency is an important and
essential part of the program.
363
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Fig. 7.10 Energy sources in the 100% clean energy scenario for the USA (Source
Energy and Environmental Sciences)
Ground transportation will be driven by battery electric vehicles (BEVs)

and hydrogen fuel cell (HFC) vehicles—where the hydrogen is produced
by the electrolysis of water. BEVs with fast charging capabilities or battery
swapping will power long distance light-duty transportation; battery-HFC
hybrids predominate in heavy duty transport and long-distance shipping
while batteries will power ferries and short-distance marine craft. Aircraft
will be powered by electrolytic cryogenic hydrogen with batteries for idling,
taxiing, and internal power.
Space heating and cooling will be powered by heat pumps with some elec-
trical resistance heating. Water heating is provided by heap pumps with solar
water heaters used for preheating. Cookstoves are all-electric.
High-temperature industrial processes—always a difficult sector to power
with renewable energy—will be fired by electric arc furnaces, induction fur-
naces, dielectric heaters, resistance heaters and some combusted electrolytic
hydrogen.
In 2050, under this scenario the mix of clean energy sources in the US are
shown in Fig. 7.1059:
As we have noted in earlier chapters, the transition to renewable energy
also brings very substantial health benefits because the noxious air pollu-
tion caused by fossil fuel combustion is eliminated. The scenario estimates
that premature deaths from air pollution in the US would be reduced by
tens of thousands a year. In addition, across all 50 US states, the shift to
100% clean energy would generate a net increase of 2 million long-term
364
M. J. Bush
jobs. Moreover, the number of accidents and the environmental destruction

caused by oil pipeline ruptures, railcar derailments, oil rig explosions, tanker
disasters, and natural gas pipeline fires would all drop dramatically. With the
oil and gas sector substantially scaled back, emissions of methane would also
drop significantly—another major benefit in terms of global warming,
But not everyone agrees with the feasibility of this 100% clean energy
scenario for the United States. A year after the report was authored by the
Stanford team, a rebuttal was published by the US National Academy of
Sciences. Entitled: Evaluation of a proposal for reliable low-cost grid power
with 100% wind, water and solar, the article asserted that the Stanford study
had significant shortcomings including invalid modelling tools, modelling
errors, and implausible and inadequately supported assumptions.60
It should be noted, however, that the principal disagreement among these
experts centres around the optimal mix of clean energy technologies—rather
than whether 100% clean energy is technically feasible. Both sets of authors
believe that 100% clean energy is possible for the US—but they disagree
on which technologies could best provide the required electrical power, and
whether nuclear energy and low-carbon (but not zero-carbon) technologies
should be included.
The fact that energy experts are arguing over the details is a good sign.
None of them is asserting that a transition to 100% clean energy (or close
to it) is impossible. Only that the road to that destination is not yet clearly
mapped out.
Petrochemicals
A world without fossil fuels doesn’t mean a world without hydrocarbons—
nor a world without the emission of greenhouse gases. Large quantities of oil
and natural gas are refined and processed to produce the hydrocarbon liq-
uids and gases which are the building blocks of the petrochemical industries.
Called hydrocarbon gas liquids (HGLs) or natural gas liquids (NGLs), these
hydrocarbons are processed by the petrochemical industries to manufacture
a wide range of everyday household, commercial, and industrial products—
the majority of them some form of plastics. Table 7.9 lists the principal
HGLs and how they are processed and used.61
The majority of HGLs in the US are produced by the processing of natu-
ral gas. In 2016 the volume of HGLs produced in the USA was just over 4.0
million barrels a day—about 13% of total US petroleum consumption.62
Moreover, the US petrochemical industry is expanding rapidly. Since 2016,
Table 7.9 Hydrocarbon gas liquids, uses and products
Hydrocarbon gas Uses End-use products End-use sectors
liquid (HGL)
Ethane Petrochemical feedstock for ethylene Plastics; anti-freeze; Industrial
production; power generation detergents
Propane Fuel for space heating, water heating, Fuel for heating, cooking and Industrial—including manufactur-
cooking, drying, and transportation; drying; plastics ing and agriculture, residential,
petrochemical feedstock commercial, and transportation
Butanes: nor- Petrochemical and petroleum refinery Motor gasoline; plastics; syn- Industrial and transportation
mal butane and feedstock thetic rubber; lighter fuel
isobutane
Pentanes plus (natu- Petrochemical feedstock; additive to Motor gasoline; ethanol Industrial and transportation
ral gasoline) motor gasoline; diluent for heavy crude denaturant; solvents
oil
Refinery olefins (eth- Intermediate feedstocks in the petro- Plastics; artificial rubber; Industrial
ylene, propylene, chemical industry paints and solvents; resins
and butylene)
Source US Energy Information Administration
365
366
M. J. Bush
state regulators in Louisiana and Texas have approved 31 new oil, gas, and
petrochemical projects along the Gulf Coast—a construction boom that has
seen the petrochemical companies build or expand liquid natural gas termi-
nals, refineries, ethylene crackers, and chemical and fertilizer plants in order
to take advantage of cheap and plentiful supplies of oil and gas unlocked
by fracking. In 2016, the Marcellus shale region of the US was produc-
ing 660,000 barrels a day of NGL—more than 30 times the production
recorded in 2010. The construction of new petrochemical plants and LNG
storage facilities has kept pace.63,64
It follows that even if all the sectors of a modern economy are 100% elec-
trified, a lot of the raw materials needed to keep that economy up and run-
ning will continue to be produced by the refining and processing of oil and
natural gas, and by the petrochemical industries—all of which are significant
sources of emissions of greenhouse gases.
The manufacture and consumption of plastics needs to be kept to a mini-
mum. In this context, the grass roots campaigns to reduce the use of plastics,
and to ban the use of single-use plastics should be intensified. A substan-
tial price on carbon emissions applied across the board to the petrochemical
industries should also be mandatory.
Metallurgical Coal
Not all coal is burned to produce high temperatures and the steam necessary
to generate electricity. A significant fraction of coal, about 16% in Canada,
is used in the steel industry.65 Called metallurgical coal, it is first converted
into an almost pure form of carbon in a battery of coking ovens where it
is heated to over 1000 °C in the absence of air. Without oxygen, the coal
cannot burn. Impurities are driven off as the coal melts and, after cooling,
it solidifies into a porous black coke used in the production of steel in basic
oxygen furnaces. Both the US and Canada are major exporters of metallurgi-
cal coal—mainly to Asia.
The coking process produces a variety of chemical pollutants most of
which are both toxic and carcinogenic. The US EPA classifies coke oven
emissions as a Group A known human carcinogen.66
Modern coking plants employ several control technologies in an effort to
limit emissions of the toxic gases, dust, and vapours. But it is impossible to
reduce pollution to zero in heavy industry especially when coal is a feed-
stock. The liquids produced from the oven bottoms are valuable by-prod-
ucts, but they are also carcinogenic.
367
There are ways to make steel without using coal, but as long as coal
remains relatively cheap and easily available in many countries, it will con-
tinue to be used in steel-making. This is a situation where a substantial price
on carbon is likely to lead to technical innovations that will reduce the need
to use carbon as a reducing agent in making steel.
Phasing out the use of coal to generate electricity therefore does not mean
immediately closing all the mines. The mineral will still be needed in the
manufacture of steel—but at much lower quantities than are mined at pres-
ent. As a price on carbon gradually raises the cost of this mineral for the steel
industry, other less environmentally damaging ways to manufacture steel
will be adopted by the industry.
Cement Production
Coal provides roughly 90% of the energy used to run cement plants around
the world. The cement industry consumes about 330 million tonnes of
coal a year—which was 6% of global coal consumption in 2017. Over the
last 20 years, there has been a trend away from coal used in the produc-
tion of cement, particularly in Europe, because of concerns over emissions
of carbon dioxide and problems with the management of the solid waste.
However, both India and China use large quantities of coal for the produc-
tion of cement. Where coal is a cheap fuel, it will continue to be used in the
cement industry.67
Conclusion
Government policies can accelerate the transition to a low carbon economy
by introducing fiscal and regulatory measures that impose a price on carbon.
Many countries have successfully used this approach to induce changes in
consumer behaviour and industry practice and to facilitate a shift towards
renewable sources of energy and higher levels of energy efficiency.
Both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes have shown that they can
lead to a reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon
dioxide but also methane. Complementary policies that directly regulate cer-
tain emissions or which mandate improvements in energy efficiency and set
performance standards are also critically important.
In a number of countries including Canada and Australia, setting a price
on carbon has been politically risky—and experience shows that introducing
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M. J. Bush
a carbon pricing mechanism, of whatever sort is preferred, needs to be care-

fully managed if the policy is not to become politicised and socially divisive.
Fossil fuel subsidies undermine and negate policies intended to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and all countries should commit to phasing out
these subsidies—especially the G20 countries which have not yet imple-
mented this policy. It is nonsensical to commit to reducing emissions of
greenhouse gases in line with the targets set under the Paris Agreement while
at the same time continuing to subsidise the consumption of fossil fuels.
Although coal is the fuel with the most damaging environmental impact,
it continues to be used not just to generate electricity but also in the steel
industry and the manufacture of cement. Alternative fuels are available
which could be used in these industries. Setting a realistic price on carbon
would induce a shift towards the use of fuels that emit far lower levels of
greenhouses gases.
Although setting a price on carbon is sound economic and environmental
policy, the most powerful impetus that is driving the transition to renewable
and inexhaustible sources of energy is the fact that the cost of solar energy,
wind power, and the energy storage systems that allow them to provide dis-
patchable electricity, is falling rapidly. Power from large-scale photovoltaic
arrays and large wind farms is already fully competitive with fossil fuels
including the least expensive option which is natural gas. And this price
comparison doesn’t include the substantial external costs associated with the
use of fossil fuels—like the significant health impacts of their air pollution,
and the cost of cleaning up the mess they make after all the accidents.
Given the substantial economic and environmental advantages of renew-
able energy technologies, the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy
should have been well underway by now. But the change is occurring only
slowly. One of the reasons for this lack of progress is because there is strong
industry-led opposition to policies that promote solar energy, wind power,
and electric vehicles. Renewable energy should be an irresistible force. But it
sometimes seems as if it has met an immoveable object.
That immoveable object is comprised of several interlocking elements: the
oil and gas industry giants, the petrochemical conglomerates, the climate
change deniers, and the politicians that provide the best government policy
that money can buy. They oppose any kind of systemic change in the energy
sector because business-as-usual means profits-as-usual.
In the next chapter we look at how these companies and politicians have
waged a long and dirty war against climate science and the truth about
global warming and the intensifying climate crisis.
369
Notes
1. See Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition: Official Launch Event and Work
Plan. Accessed at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatefinance/
brief/carbon-pricing-leadership-coalition-release-of-official-workplan/.
2. Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Carbon Pricing
Leadership Coalition. Available at: https://www.connect4climate.org/sites/
default/files/files/publications/CarbonPricingReportFinal.pdf.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
4. See State and trends of carbon pricing 2018. World Bank Group. Available
at: http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29687/.
5. See Carl, J., and Fedor, D.: “Tracking global carbon revenues: A survey
of carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade in the real world.” Energy Policy 96
(2016): 50–77.
6. See Clearing the air: How carbon pricing helps Canada fight climate change.
Accessed at: https://ecofiscal.ca/reports/clearing-air-carbon-pricing-helps-
canada-fight-climate-change/.
7. Ibid.
8. State and trends of carbon pricing 2018. Op. cit.
9. State and trends of carbon pricing 2018. Op. cit.
10. See Blow for coal power as EU carbon emissions price hits 10-year high.
Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/aug/13/blow-
for-coal-companies-eu-price-carbon-emissions-hits-ten-year-high.
11. State and trends of carbon emissions 2018. Op. cit.
12. Ibid.
13. See Tracking global carbon revenues: A survey of carbon taxes versus cap-and-
trade in the real world. Science Direct. Accessed at: https://www.sciencedi-
rect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421516302531?via%3Dihub.
14. Ibid.
15. Since 2016, Australia has a policy called Direct Action, which pro-
vides financial incentives for polluters to reduce emissions through the
Emissions Reduction Fund. See http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-05/
the-carbon-pricing-debate-explained/8092506.
16. See Australian prime minister ousted over climate policy. Accessed at:
https://www.ecowatch.com/australia-prime-minister-climate-policy-
2598685521.html/.
17. See the Toronto Star, 26 July 2018, p. A4.
18. UN Environment Programme Emissions Gap Report 2018. Available at:
https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018.
19. See the RGGI website: https://www.rggi.org/progra-overview-and-design/
elements.
370
M. J. Bush
20. Emission data for the nine RGGI states published by the EIA shows that a
total of 415.6 MtCO2 was emitted by the states in 2009 from all sources.
See the EIA web page: Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by state
2000–2015.
21. See the report from the Analysis Group: The economic impacts of the regional
greenhouse gas initiative on nine northeast and mid-Atlantic states. Review
of RGGI’s third three-year compliance period (2015–2017). All the data
about the RGGI program are taken from this report. It is available at:
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing/
analysis_group_rggi_report_april_2018.pdf.
22. Ibid.
23. The pie chart is from: Carbon markets pay off for these states as new busi-
nesses, jobs spring up. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
16042018/cap-and-trade-economics-energy-efficiency-jobs-rggi-region-
al-greenhouse-gas-initiative-carbon-market-data.
24. The data are from the US Energy Information Administration: Energy-
related carbon dioxide emissions by state 2000–2016. Available here:
https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/analysis/pdf/table1.pdf.
25. Ibid.
26. See Le Quebec en action verte 2020: Plan d’action 2013–2020 sur les change-
ments climatiques. The report is available at: http://www.mddelcc.gouv.
qc.ca/changements/plan_action/pacc2020.pdf.
27. See A brief look at the Quebec cap-and-trade system for emission allowances.
Available at: http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/docu-
ments-spede/in-brief.pdf.
28. The tracking system is called the Compliance Instrument Tracking System
Service, or CITSS.
29. The schematic is taken from: A brief look at the Quebec cap-and-trade system
for emission allowances. Op. cit.
30. See the Quebec ETS database at: https://carbonmarketdata.com/en/
products/world-ets-database/wci-quebec-cap-and-trade-ghg.
31. See the report from the International Carbon Action Partnership:
Canada—Quebec cap-and-trade system. March 2018. https://icapcarbon-
action.com/en/.
32. See the report from the International Carbon Action Partnership. Op. cit.
33. See Le Quebec en action vert 2020: Plan d’action 2013–2020 sur les
changements climatiques. The report has a budget with 31 budget lines
which I have grouped into the categories shown in the pie chart. The report
is available at: http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/plan_action/
pacc2020.pdf.
34. The budget line in French is: Promouvoir le transport collectif et alternatif
en améliorant l’offre, en développant les infrastrucutures et en facilitant les
choix durables. See Le Québec en action vert 2020, p. 54. Op. cit.
371
35. See the reports from Statistics Canada. Accessed at: https://www150.stat-
can.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/180502/dq180502a-eng.htm.
36. See the data in the Statistics Canada database.
37. The per capita emissions data are calculated from the GHG emissions
shown in Table S-4 of the National Inventory Report 1999–2016 pub-
lished by Environment and Climate Change Canada in 2018, and from
the demographic data published by Statistics Canada which can be
accessed at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/tbl/csv/17100005-eng.zip.
38. See British Columbia’s Climate Action Plan. Available at: https://www.
cakex.org/documents/british-columbias-climate-action-plan.
39. See British Columbia’s Carbon Tax. Accessed at: https://wwww2.gov.bc.ca/
gov/content/environment/climate-change/planning-and-action/carbon-tax.
40. See British Columbia’s Climate Action Plan. Op. cit.
41. The quote is in the Carbon Tax Center Report: British Columbia’s Carbon
Tax: By the numbers. Avaliable at: https://www.carbontax.org/wp-content/
uploads/CTC_British_Columbia’s_Carbon_Tax_By_The_Numbers.pdf.
42. Environment and Climate Change Canada. National Inventory Report
1990–2017: Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada. Executive
Summary. Available at: https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/doc-
uments/pdf/climate-change/emissions-inventories-reporting/nir-exec-
utive-summary/National%20Inventory%20Report%20Executive%20
Summary%202018.pdf.
43. See British Columbia’s Carbon Tax. Accessed at: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/
gov/content/environment/climate-change/planning-and-action/carbon-tax.
44. See British Columbia: Climate Action Areas. Accessed at: https://www2.
gov.bc.ca/content/environment/climate-change/planning-and-action/
action-areas.
45. See the report from California’s Department of Finance: Accessed at: www.
dof.ca.gov/Forecasting/Economics/Indicators/Gross_State_Product/.
46. See the California Air Resources Board (CARB) report: California green-
house gas emissions from 2000 to 2016: Trends of emissions and other indi-
cators. Accessed at: https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/2000_
2016/ghg_inventory_trends_00-16.pdf.
47. Ibid.
48. See the article: California ups its clean energy game with 100% zero-carbon
electricity vote. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/28082018/
california-100-percent-clean-energy-electricity-vote-climate-change-lead-
ership-zero-carbon-electric-vehicles. And also California Assembly advances
100% clean energy bill. Accessed at: http://www.latimes.com/politics/
la-pol-ca-renewable-energy-goal-bill-20180828-story.html.
49. See the California Public Utilities Commission website at: http://www.
cpuc.ca.gov/RPS_Homepage.
372
M. J. Bush
50. See California’s mandatory PV code amendment: Is it really time for this?
Accessed at: https://www.raponline.org/blog/californias-mandatory-pv-code-
amendment-is-it-really-time-for-this/.
51. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper WP/15/105. Available
at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15105.pdf.
52. See the Report of the high level comission on carbon prices. Op. cit.
53. See the section on energy subsidies in the World Energy Outlook report
by the International Energy Agency. Accessed at: https://www.iea.org/weo/
energysubsidies/.
54. International Energy Agency Fossil-fuel subsidies. Accessed at: https://www.
iea.org/weo/energysubsidies/.
55. See the IMF working paper WP/15/105, op. cit. p. 6.
56. World Energy Outlook Fossil-fuel subsidies. Op. cit.
57. Emissions Gap Report 2018. UN Environment Program. Available at:
https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018.
58. See the paper by Mark Jacobson and Colleagues: 100% clean and renew-
able wind, water, and sunlight (WWS) all-sector energy roadmaps
for the 50 United States. Energy & Environmental Sciences, 20 May
2105. Available at: http://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2015/ee/
c5ee01283j#!divAbstract.
59. All the numerical data are taken from the paper by Mark Jacobson and col-
leagues. Op. cit.
60. Clack, C.T.M, Qvist, S.A., Apt Jay, Bazilian, M., et al.: “Evaluation of
a proposal for reliable low-cost grid power with 100% wind, water, and
solar.” Proceedings of the National Aacdemy of Sciences. Available at:
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1610381114.
61. US Energy Information Adminitration (EIA). Uses of hydrocarbon
gas Liquids. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.
php?page=hgls_uses.
62. US Energy Information Adminitration (EIA). What are hydrocarbon gas
Liquids? Available at: https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=
hgls_home.
63. See the article Climate emissions from the Gulf coast’s new petrochemical, oil
and gas projects same as 29 new coal power plants. https://www.desmogblog.
com/2018/09/27/texas-louisiana-new-petrochemical-oil-gas-projects-cli-
mate-change-29-coal-power.
64. See http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/news/31-new-or-expanded-
petrochemical-plants/.
65. See Coal Facts. Natural Resources Canada. Accessed at: https://www.nrcan.
gc.ca/energy/facts/coal/20071.
66. See Coke Oven Emissions. Accessed at: https://www.epa.gov/sites/produc-
tion/files/2016-09/documents/coke-oven-emissions.pdf.
67. See Global Cement Magazine. Accessed at: http://www.globalcement.com/
magazine/articles/974-coal-for-cement-present-and-future-trends.
8
Denial and Deception
Introduction
As global heating and the climate crisis has gradually become a problem
of international importance and concern, the link between the emission of
greenhouse gases and the consumption of fossil has increasingly come into
focus. The major oil companies and the coal conglomerates realised early on
that if governments were convinced that they needed to reduce the emis-
sions of carbon gases, they were very likely going to reorient national energy
policies towards renewable sources of energy and to gradually curtail the
consumption of fossil fuels—starting with coal-fired electricity generation.
Introducing measures to reduce the consumption of gasoline and diesel fuel
in the transport sector was almost certain to follow. This was not the vision
of the future that the coal and petroleum companies had in mind.
The companies envisioned a scenario which was not just business as usual,
but where coal, oil and natural gas increasingly dominated global energy sup-
ply through to at least the middle of the twenty-first century. There was no
solar energy or wind power in this scenario—only coal, oil and natural gas.
Since modern science will eventually explain geophysical phenomena
which may at first appear inexplicable, the fossil fuel companies knew that
they could not continue to deny the evidence-based facts. Even their own
scientists knew what was happening: emissions of carbon dioxide from the
combustion of coal and hydrocarbon fuels were causing the global climate to
slowly heat up.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_8
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M. J. Bush
So began a long, insidious, and surprisingly effective covert program,

funded and orchestrated by some of the largest fossil fuel companies, to
undermine and contradict the scientific basis for global warming, and to
convince the world that climate science was defective, riddled with errors,
and highly uncertain. They also falsely accused several leading climate sci-
entists of manipulating the data and fudging the numbers. The campaigns
to undermine and obfuscate the overwhelming scientific evidence that the
climate is changing and that the world is now confronted by a full-blown
crisis continue to this day.
Manufacturing Doubt
Oil companies are huge. The coal industry not much smaller. They have bil-
lions of dollars invested in coal mines, drilling rigs, supertankers, refineries,
gas processing plants, and pipeline networks. As countries increasingly tran-
sition to renewable sources of energy, many of these investments are now
under serious threat of becoming stranded assets.
The fossil fuel companies have fought hard and not always fairly to pro-
tect their global investments and substantial revenues. The first line of
defence was to claim that global warming simply wasn’t happening. When
this argument started to lose credibility, the companies switched to asserting
that even if the planet was warming, this was due to natural causes: long-
term cycles of varying solar radiation, sunspots, changes in the Earth’s orbit,
and other factors unrelated to carbon emissions from the combustion of fos-
sil fuels. When this explanation was increasingly challenged by climate sci-
entists and shown to be false, the fossil fuel companies searched for another
way to protect their position.
They hit upon a brilliant strategy. Their greatest fear was that govern-
ment legislators, in an effort to slow and reverse global warming and climate
change, would impose regulations that would rein in the operations of the
fossil fuel companies and limit their production of petroleum and coal—
businesses that are still hugely profitable. Since the science was becoming
increasingly convincing and persuasive, the strategy devised by the compa-
nies was not to argue that the science was wrong (which was becoming more
and more difficult)—but to argue that the science was uncertain, a concept
much easier to defend and disseminate.
This was a clever move. It’s not difficult to persuade people that scien-
tists are not completely certain about the causes of climate change—espe-
cially when you bring in your own scientists who distort the data, cherry
pick trend lines, and publish seemingly counterfactual studies in journals
8 Denial and Deception
375
financially dependent on funding from the fossil fuel companies and the
petrochemical firms that are closely tied to them.
The transparent procedures of science and scientific analysis helped the
subterfuge. Scientists publish their results in peer-reviewed journals, and
these results can be challenged by other scientists who may question the data
and methodology, spot errors and omissions, or propose alternative expla-
nations for observed phenomena. This is how science works: new ideas and
data are published and the scientific community has the opportunity to
examine the data, the methodology, and the analyses, and either concur, dis-
agree, or call for more study. If you then mix into this procedure false data
masquerading as reputable science, the final result is a greater level of dis
agreement, contentious debate, uncertainty about the data, and doubt about
the results. Under these circumstances, policymakers are unlikely to act to
control emissions of greenhouse gases from the combustion of fossil-fuels
if they believe that the scientific basis for such a decision is doubtful and
uncertain—even if in fact it isn’t.
It’s called manufacturing uncertainty and doubt—MUD. And several fos-
sil fuel companies have become experts in the field. But the fossil-fuel com-
panies were not the first to develop, finance, and promote this strategy. They
had borrowed it from someone else’s playbook: the tobacco companies—
which for years have mounted a very successful campaign of disinformation
to convince the world that smoking isn’t bad for your health.
Detection and Concern
The global warming story unfolds essentially in the USA—where in
1956, a young scientist called Charles Keeling, working out of the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography in San Diego, California, had started to sys-
tematically measure atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide at the
Mauna Loa observatory in Hawaii. His meticulously compiled results
showed that atmospheric levels of the gas were slowly increasing. We met
Charles Keeling earlier in Chapter 2 and a recent version of the Keeling
curve is shown in Fig. 2.4.
Keeling’s measurements were intriguing and several scientists understood
their implications. It was known that carbon dioxide absorbed long-wave
thermal radiation—the radiation emitted by the Earth. It was therefore pos-
sible that the rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would even-
tually lead to a warming trend in the global climate. No-one really knew
what to expect if that happened.
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M. J. Bush
Even before Keeling’s work was published, the first warnings about the
emissions of carbon dioxide from the combustion of coal and oil had come
from a Canadian physicist—Gilbert Plass. In 1953, Time magazine wrote a
story about Plass, then working at John Hopkins University, and his claim
that the spreading envelope of carbon dioxide around the Earth would serve
as “a great greenhouse”.1 Plass had published his ideas, at this point con-
sidered to be only a theory, in a paper entitled: The carbon dioxide theory of
climate change.2
The theory was reviewed and examined by scientists over the next dec-
ade, and although not all scientists at first agreed, the effects of rising atmos-
pheric concentrations of carbon dioxide—clearly evident from Keeling’s
measurements, increasingly became the focus of a substantial body of
research. In 1965, the American scientist Roger Revelle (who had hired
Keeling at Scripps) was asked to write a summary for the President’s Science
Advisory Committee (under President Lyndon Johnson) of the potential
impacts of carbon dioxide-induced warming. Revelle focused his report on
sea level rise, but he also made a startling prediction: “By the year 2000 there
will be about 25% more CO2 in our atmosphere than at present and this will
modify the heat balance of the atmosphere to such an extent that marked changes
in climate…could occur. ”3
President Johnson took the report seriously. He cited the work in a
Special Message to Congress in 1965, saying “This generation has altered the
composition of the atmosphere on a global scale through… a steady increase in
carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels. ”4
By 1968, the Edison Electric Institute, a trade association of inves-
tor-owned utilities, was certainly well aware of the issue. The EEI was
addressed by Donald Hornig, a science advisor to Johnson, who stated
bluntly: “The President’s Science Advisory Committee…estimated that at the
anticipated levels of fuel consumption by the year 2000, the carbon dioxide
level in the entire earth’s atmosphere will be increased by 25 percent, and carbon
dioxide is an absolutely unavoidable product of the combustion of fossil fuels ”.
He went to say: “Carbon dioxide is not toxic, but it is the chief heat-absorbing
component of the atmosphere. Such a change in the carbon dioxide level might,
therefore, produce major consequences in the climate—possibly even triggering
catastrophic effects such as have occurred from time to time in the past. ”5
Hornig’s warning to the electric power utilities (who were mostly gener-
ating electricity by burning coal) came during the same year that scientists
at the Stanford Research Institute delivered a report commissioned by the
American Petroleum Institute that sounded more alarm bells for the fossil
fuel industry. Titled: Sources, abundance, and fate of atmospheric pollutants,
377
the report warned that rising CO2 levels would result in increases in temper-
ature at the earth’s surface, and that significant temperature increase could
lead to melting ice caps, rising seas, and potentially serious environmental
damage worldwide.6
There was now a considerable amount of research being conducted in the
US both by scientists seeking to understand more about global warming and
the role of carbon dioxide, and by the electric power companies whose main
focus was on researching ways to remove carbon dioxide from the flue gases
of coal-fired power plants. The Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI, was
formed to coordinate the research.
Research, and More Research

The 1970s were the decade of research. This was not necessarily a delaying
tactic on the part of the fossil fuel companies—although later on, when they
knew the scope of the problem and understood its probable implications for
their business model and revenue stream, continually insisting on the need
for more research, and downplaying the urgency of taking action to reduce
emissions, became a common ploy, although not a very successful one.
There was still a lot of genuine uncertainty. Emissions from coal-fired
plants contain water vapour which might produce more clouds which could
have a cooling effect. Other emissions like sulphur dioxide could also pro-
duce cooling. And what about the natural sinks: the oceans, trees, agricul-
ture, soils and forests? Maybe more carbon dioxide was good for growing
plants and would increase agricultural productivity? You couldn’t rule it out.
What about the oceans? The oceans are an enormous potential reservoir of
dissolved carbon dioxide. Could the oceans absorb the excess CO2 in the
air and keep atmospheric concentrations more or less constant? If they did,
oceans would become more acidic. Was this a problem or not? Computers
were becoming more powerful, and the first computer models of the atmos-
phere were being developed and tested against historical data.
As the research intensified, the warnings grew louder. But then they were
side-lined by what was perceived as a more imminent threat.
The 1973 oil embargo against the USA by the Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), caused huge disruption in energy mar-
kets and the US economy. Oil prices went through the roof, and since the
embargo coincided with a devaluation of the US dollar, a global recession
seemed certain. In November 1973, the Nixon administration announced
Project Independence to promote domestic energy independence.
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M. J. Bush
The embargo triggered measures in the US that focused on energy conser-

vation and the development of domestic energy sources—including the
creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a 55 mph speed limit on US
Highways, and the imposition of fuel economy standards.7
Energy independence was now a top priority in Washington, DC.
Congress put checks in place to curb the use of oil and natural gas in power
plants. This was good news for coal and nuclear power, and the electric
power companies soon went on the offensive. In 1976, American Electric
Power, an investor-owned utility, placed an advertisement in the New York
Times. Under a large tableau which showed US proven reserves of coal being
20 times larger than oil and gas reserves combined, the ad warned omi-
nously in boldface type: If every Politician hung this on his office wall,
he’d soon see the severity of our energy problem. And its solution. The
solution evidently was coal.
The ad is also interesting because it is one of the first put out by one of
the major energy companies to attack people who were opposed to coal. The
ad proclaimed: The problems generally associated with the mining and burning
of coal have been solved. Except—the destructive, regressive actions of a small
minority…the fanatical environmentalists. ”8 Of course, it wasn’t true that the
problems with coal had been solved. If anything, they would only get worse.
The Electric Power Research Institute continued to provide a fair and bal-
anced view of the global warming issue without deliberately emphasizing
the uncertainties. In 1978, an article appeared in the EPRI Journal entitled:
CO2 and spaceship Earth, which included extensive quotes and analysis from
climate change experts. The article noted: The most widely accepted theory
holds that man-induced influences on the atmosphere—mainly the generation of
CO2 from fossil fuel combustion—will cause a significant rise in global tempera-
tures over the next 25–200 years.9
The same year, President Carter signed the National Climate Act. The Act
established a National Climate Program intended to “enable the United
States and other nations to understand and respond to natural and man-in-
duced climate processes and their implications.”10
By now, the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was focused on the
problem. Its first report, published in 1979, concluded that “If carbon diox-
ide continues to increase, the study finds no reason to doubt that climate changes
will result and no reason to believe that these changes will be negligible.” In
plain English: climate change will occur and its impact will be significant.
But how soon would these changes occur and how large would they be?
Those were the big questions.
There were two more NAS reports: in 1980 and 1983. The first of these
reports was almost dismissive of the issue: recommending more research and
379
saying that the problem was not that urgent. Many scientists didn’t agree—
but it was clear that there were still serious uncertainties surrounding the
issue—particularly the question of the sensitivity of global temperatures to a
doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels.
The third report: Changing Climate: Report of the Carbon Dioxide
Assessment Committee was really two reports in one: with the scientists
sounding the alarm, and the economists essentially saying it was still too
early to decide what to do.11
The research continued. The Electric Power Research Institute published
a series of reports on the issue. The institute was not denying that carbon
dioxide emissions would lead to higher global temperatures. Its main focus
was on how this would affect business. The June 1986 edition of the EPRI
Journal reported that a study was underway using Florida Power and Light
as a case study. The results were published in 1988 and concluded that “cli-
mate changes possible over the next 30 years may significantly affect the electric
utility industry. ” One of the key takeaways from this study was that utilities
would come out ahead if they incorporated climate change predictions in
their long-term planning. This report mostly focused on the probable need
to increase electricity generation capacity in order to meet rising electricity
demand caused by higher temperatures—an approach that framed climate
change adaptation more as a business opportunity. In other words, more
coal-fired power plants were needed—not fewer.12
But not all the reports were so ignorant of the global implications. In an
article published by the Edison Electric Institute in 1987, the authors (all
three were top scientists), noted that:
Twenty years ago, the “greenhouse effect” was only the subject of speculation
among a few scientists. Today as evidence for it accumulates, the greenhouse
issue is debated not only among scientists, but also in federal government reports,
Congressional hearings, and major newspapers and magazines…One implication
of that argument is that the global temperature rise…may be just the start of a
much larger increase, irreversibly ordained by the stuff we’ve already put into the
air. That argument implies that if we wait until we’re sure we’ve caused a real prob-
lem, the problem may already be much larger than we realize.13
But the most sophisticated research into carbon emissions and carbon chem-
istry was being conducted by the chemical engineers at Exxon. Through
much of the 1980s, Exxon researchers worked with university and govern-
ment scientists to produce models of the climate system that resulted in
several papers in peer-reviewed journals. This was genuinely good scientific
work. Exxon needed to know the science, and they had some of the best
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M. J. Bush
chemical engineers, chemists, and of course geologists in America already on

the payroll. Their work confirmed the analysis and projections being made
by mainstream climate scientists that emissions of carbon dioxide would
definitely lead to global warming. By the early 1980s, Exxon scientists and
managers were sufficiently informed about climate science to assert that
anthropogenic global warming was a potential threat to the company’s busi-
ness interests. Exxon knew it had a serious problem.14
In 1988, two landmark events dramatically changed the perception of
the issue and the tone of the narrative. The first was the testimony before
a Congressional committee by James Hansen, the Director of the Goddard
Institute for Space Studies (GISS). In June 1988, Hansen testified before a
Congressional hearing on climate, presenting research that showed that there
had been a warming of about a half a degree Celsius relative to the 1950–
1980 average. Hansen’s team had calculated that the probability that this
could be explained by natural events was only 1%. In other words, global
warming had started.15
This was major news. The New York Times put the story on its front page
under the headline: Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate.
Hansen was quoted as testifying that: “Global warming has reached a level
such that we can ascribe with a high degree of confidence a cause and
effect relationship between the greenhouse effect and observed warning. It’s
already happening now.”16
The second event was the inauguration of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, the IPCC, by the World Meteorological Organisation
(WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The
IPCC’s goal was to assess in a comprehensive manner all the evidence relevant
to understanding human-induced climate change and its potential impacts.
It was now clear to the electric power utilities and the fossil fuel companies
that the US government was likely to impose restrictions on the emissions of
carbon dioxide from electricity generation and the petroleum industry, and
that pressure was building internationally to take measures to tackle global
warning. This was the year that the electric power utilities and the fossil fuel
industries started to organize to take concerted action to counter the evidence.
The Decades of Denial

By 1989, a year after Hansen’s testimony, political attacks on climate
change science had begun to take shape. In the pages of the Executive
Intelligence Review, a publication of conspiracy theorist Lyndon Larouche,
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the greenhouse effect was described as a hoax—a flagrant lie repeated by

President Donald Trump almost 40 years later.
The George C. Marshall Institute was the first organisation to go on the
attack. Founded in 1984, it was a conservative think tank originally set
up to defend President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. But
by the late 1980s, the Institute was taking more than a passing interest in
the debate over climate change. In 1989, it issued its first report attack-
ing climate science. It printed and circulated a paper which was later pub-
lished as a small book entitled Global Warming: What Does the Science Tell
Us. The central claim was that the warming that Hansen and other scien-
tists had found didn’t track the historical increase in atmospheric CO2
levels. According to the paper, a slight increase in the sun’s energy output
was responsible for the climate warming that had been detected by James
Hansen.
To support their claim they used Hansen’s own published data—but only
the bits that could be interpreted as supporting their claim. It was a clumsy
attempt to distort the evidence—but since few policymakers or politicians
were going to go back to Hansen’s original paper to check, the Marshall
Institute’s article had widespread impact. The result was doubt about the
veracity of Hansen’s testimony and uncertainty about the science.
Meanwhile, the fossil fuel companies were joining forces.
The Global Climate Coalition, the GCC, was founded in 1989 as a pro-
ject under the auspices of the National Association of Manufacturers. But
many of its members were from the fossil fuel industries. The American
Petroleum Institute and all the major oil companies were members—includ-
ing BP and Shell. American Electric Power, Edison Electric Institute, the
National Coal Association together with many of the largest US utilities.
The GCC described itself as “an organisation of trade associations estab-
lished in 1989 to coordinate business participation in the international policy
debate on the issues of global climate change and global warming. ”17 The GCC
was one of the most outspoken and confrontational industry groups oppos-
ing any initiatives to reduce greenhouse gases.
GCC’s advocacy activities included lobbying government officials, grass-
roots lobbying through press releases and advertising, participation in inter-
national climate conferences, criticism of the processes of international
climate organisations (like the IPCC), critiques of climate models, and per-
sonal attacks on scientists and environmentalists.18
The GCC was set up as a Non-Governmental Organisation, an NGO.
This status permitted the GCC to register with the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the UNFCCC, and allowed GCC mem-
bers to attend official UN conferences as GCC delegates.
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M. J. Bush
The Edison Electric Institute, although a member of the GCC, was not
standing idly by. In 1991, the New York Times reported on leaked docu-
ments that exposed a detailed public relations campaign to “reposition
global warming as theory (not fact)”. Dubbed the Informed Council on
the Environment or ICE, the campaign was backed by EEI, the Southern
Company (a large utility), the Western Fuels Association, Peabody (a coal
company), and the National Coal Association. In 1991, ICE ran a series of
ads mocking global warming. One featured a drawing of a crazed chicken
frantically running away under the headline: Who told you the earth was
warming….Chicken Little? A second ad in the same year proclaimed in
large typeface: The most serious problem with catastrophic global warm-
ing is—it may not be true.
These ads were part of a well organised public awareness campaign coordi-
nated by ICE which had three objectives:
1. Demonstrate that a consumer-based media awareness program can posi-

tively change the opinions of a selected population regarding the validity
of global warming.
2. Begin to develop a message and strategy for shaping public opinion on a
national scale.
3. Lay the groundwork for a unified national electric industry voice on
global warming.
The creative strategy was summarized as follows:
• The radio creative will directly attack the proponents of global warming
by relating irrefutable evidence to the contrary, delivered by a believable
spokesperson in the radio broadcast industry.
• The print creative will attack proponents through comparison of global
warming to historical or mythical instances of gloom and doom. Each ad
will invite the listener/reader to call or write for further information, thus
creating a data base.19
Note that the ‘creative’ strategy was not only focused on undermining the
validity of the science; it was also focused on directly attacking the ‘propo-
nents of global warming’ themselves.
In 1990, the IPCC published its first assessment report—dubbed AR1.
The report reiterated that the unrestricted use of fossil fuels would pro-
duce a “rate of increase of global mean temperature during the next century
383
of about 0.3°C per decade; this is greater than that seen over the past
10,000 years.”20
The AR1 also specifically addressed and rejected the Marshall Institute’s
argument that the sun was mostly to blame for any warming effect.
ExxonMobil’s Denial Campaign

ExxonMobil arguably developed and carried out the most sophisticated dis-
information campaign among all the fossil fuel and utility companies work-
ing to undermine the science and to create doubt and uncertainty about
global warming and climate change in the minds of the public. The com-
pany had almost unlimited financial resources, and some of the smartest
engineers and media savvy people already on the payroll.
By 1997, mainstream scientific acceptance of the view that global warm-
ing would lead to climate change and that this was being caused by emis-
sions of greenhouse gases from man’s activities was well established. This
international recognition and concern eventually led to the formulation of
the Kyoto Protocol—a treaty that was negotiated in December 1997 at the
city of Kyoto, Japan, and which came into force in 2005. The protocol is a
legally binding agreement under which industrialized countries will reduce
their collective emissions of greenhouse gases by 5.2% compared to the year
1990.21
The majority of the world’s industrialized nations signed up to the proto-
col and committed to begin reducing their carbon dioxide emissions accord-
ing to the agreed timetable. Several oil companies including BP, Shell, and
Texaco accepted the scientific consensus and, to their credit, withdrew from
the GCC advocacy group. But not Exxon.
In 1998, Exxon helped create a small task force called the Global Climate
Science Team: the GCST. The group set to work to explicitly create uncer-
tainty on the issue of global warming and by extension climate change.
A memo which surfaced a few years ago sets out what the GCST calls a
“Draft Global Science Climate Communications plan”.
The Action Plan defined the project goal as: “A majority of the American
public, including industry leadership, recognizes that significant uncertainties
exist in climate science, and therefore raises questions among those (e.g. Congress)
who chart the future U.S. course on global warming.”
In text that has now become infamous, the Action Plan then explained
that “Victory will be achieved when:
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M. J. Bush
• Average citizens “understand” (recognize) uncertainties in climate science;

recognition of uncertainties becomes part of the “conventional wisdom”.
• Media “understands” (recognizes) uncertainties in climate science.
• Media coverage reflects balance on climate science and recognition of the
validity of view points that challenge the current “conventional wisdom”.
• Industry senior leadership understands uncertainties in climate science,
making them stronger ambassadors to those who shape climate policy.
• Those promoting the Kyoto treaty on the basis of extent (sic) science
appear to be out of touch with reality.”22
The final outcome of the GCST plan was therefore intended to be twofold:
first to inculcate the belief among the general public and industry lead-
ers that there were substantial uncertainties in climate science to the point
where this became mainstream thinking; and secondly, to undermine and
finally nullify the Kyoto Protocol.
How were these objectives to be achieved? There were essentially three
complementary strategic elements to the plan:
1. A National Media Relations Program would identify, recruit and train a

team of five independent scientists to participate in media outreach. The
team was to consist of “new faces” who were to add their voices to those
recognized scientists who already were vocal.
2. A Global Climate Science Information Source would inject credi-
ble science and scientific accountability into the global climate debate
thereby raising questions about and undercutting the “prevailing scientific
wisdom”.
3. A National Direct Outreach and Education program was to inform
and educate members of Congress, state officials, industry leadership, and
schoolteachers/students. This included informing teachers/students about
uncertainties in climate science so as to “begin to erect a barrier against
further efforts to impose Kyoto-like measures in the future.”
This last element of the program is especially alarming. The plan was to
work with the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) to develop
school materials that presented what the GCST considered to be a “cred-
ible, balanced picture of climate science for use in the classrooms nation-
wide.” These ‘educational materials’ were to be distributed directly to schools
through “grassroots organizations of climate science partners.”23
It was a detailed action plan—and Exxon (now ExxonMobil) faithfully
carried it out. In the years that followed, the company executed the strategy
385
as planned: underwriting a wide array of front organisations to publish

in-house articles by contrarian scientists and individuals who denied the
science and who constantly raised objections about legitimate research that
presented evidence and results that were widely accepted by the scientific
community as factual. The network that ExxonMobil created masqueraded
as genuine scientific institutions, but they were fronts—publishing now-dis-
credited studies that presented distorted data, contrarian arguments, and
false conclusions.
The amount of money involved is astonishing. Data from several source
shows that The Heartland Institute received $650,000 from ExxonMobil
between 1998 and 2006. But that was just a small fraction of the total
amount of cash the company spent keeping these climate denial front organ-
isations up and running. In total between 1998 and 2014, ExxonMobil
channelled nearly $31 million to 69 groups that spread climate disinforma-
tion out to the American public. Even so, the oil company was outpaced by
the financial support provided by the Koch Brothers. These petrochemical
industry tycoons have donated more than $100 million to 84 groups over
the last 20 years.24
Mixing the Message
ExxonMobil funds a wide assortment of supposedly independent and non-

profit organisations and think tanks. Some are well known conservative
organisations like the American Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute,
and the Heartland Institute, which are known for their opposition to reg-
ulatory action on greenhouse emissions and other environmental standards.
But there are other organisations that were set up specifically to counter
the mainstream scientific evidence that climate change is primarily caused
by anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and the other greenhouse
gases. In this group, we find the American Council for Capital Formation
Center for Policy Research, the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow,
the International Policy Network, and other obscure but impressive-sound-
ing centres and ‘institutes’ that provide erroneous, contrarian, and mislead-
ing information on global warming.25
By generously funding a network of organisations all publishing inac-
curate and misleading information about climate change, and citing each
other’s work and in-house ‘scientists’, ExxonMobil created the impression
that there was a substantial body of scientific evidence and opinion which
disagreed with mainstream climate science and the findings of the IPCC
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M. J. Bush
Assessment Reports. The articles presented as scientific papers are rarely

peer-reviewed or published in well-established and reputable journals like
Science or Nature. The result is media coverage of seemingly contradictory
evidence and disingenuous arguments that inevitably lead to uncertainty and
doubt about the validity of the consensus among the majority of scientists.
ExxonMobil was careful not to be too closely associated with these fake
institutions. And in another clever move, the company funded genuinely
independent academic research groups to continue researching the science.
For instance, ExxonMobil’s corporate citizen report for 2005 states:
Our climate research is designed to improve scientific understanding, assess

policy options, and achieve technological breakthroughs that reduce GHG
emissions in both industrial and developing countries. Major projects have
been supported at institutions including the Australian Bureau of Agricultural
and Resource Economics, Battelle pacific Northwest Laboratory, Carnegie
Mellon, Charles River Associates, the Hadley Centre of Climate Prediction,
International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme, Lamont
Doherty Earth Observatory at Columbia University, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Princeton, Stanford, the University of Texas and Yale.26
There is no reason to believe that the statement above isn’t true. It bolsters
ExxonMobil’s corporate image and credentials as a responsible supporter of
objective scientific research into global warming and climate change. But
these institutions and organisations are not the only ones that the oil com-
pany supports.
The resulting cacophony of conflicting evidence and contradictory ‘science’
leads to the required result: uncertainty, doubt, fatigue with the issue, and lit-
tle or no inclination by policymakers to introduce effective regulatory meas-
ures to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and the other greenhouse gases.
ExxonMobil also sent out different messages to different social groups. In
internal documents and scientific papers, the company tended to be more
honest in its assessment of the evidence and in its characterisation of the
science. But for the general public the message was different. In a series of
weekly advertorials the company ran in the New York Times from 1972 to
2001—seen by several million people each time, the content was skewed
towards expressions of doubt. In other words, ExxonMobil’s research con-
tributed to climate science—while at the same time, loudly raising doubts
about it.27
ExxonMobil’s scientists and executives were generally aware of, and
accepted, the evolving climate science from the 1970s onward—but they
painted a different picture in the company’s advertorials. The majority of
387
ExxonMobil’s peer-reviewed publications acknowledge that climate change

is real and human caused. Exxon’s internal documents reflected the scien-
tific reality. Uncertainties are often mentioned and even highlighted, but
usually in the context of broader scientific understandings and are generally
consistent with the evolving science. In contrast, ExxonMobil’s advertori-
als overwhelmingly focus on the uncertainties, casting doubt on the grow-
ing scientific consensus. The peer-reviewed publications and the advertorials
sometimes contradicted each other even in the same year.28
The advertorials included several instances of explicit factual misrep-
resentations. An advertorial in 2000 directly contradicted the IPCC and pre-
sented ‘very misleading’ data, according to the scientist who did the analysis.
Another advertorial in 1996 claimed that the warming effect of greenhouse
gas emissions could be offset by the cooling effect of other combustion prod-
ucts such as particulates. But this theory had been rejected by the IPCC one
year earlier.29 Once again, ExxonMobil was mixing up the message—a tactic
for undermining public understanding of scientific knowledge that has been
dubbed the Scientific Certainty Argumentation Method or SCAM.30
In December 2017, Inside Climate News published an ‘infographic’
called Climate denial: The long campaign of misinformation, which is an
amusing and informative summary of the cast of characters in the 70-year
campaign by the fossil fuel companies to deny climate change science and to
sow doubt and uncertainty where in fact there is none.31
It is naïve to believe that the climate change denial campaign is over. At
the time of writing this book, there were at least five new paperback books
on climate change advertised on Amazon. They all purport to be scientific,
but they all dispute the science and deny the evidence for global warming
and climate change. Is this part of a new strategy by the fossil-fuel indus-
tries and their allies in the petrochemical industries: to dominate the pop-
ular press by ‘experts’ who dispute established climate science? One clue to
their veracity is to look for the way they provide references for their claims.
Either there are no references—a sure sign of dubious arguments and dodgy
evidence, or the authors reference to each other’s work in a sort of inbred
cabal of climate deniers.
Getting Personal
Michael Mann is Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric Science at
Pennsylvania State University and director of the University’s Earth System
Science Center. He is well known for his work on climate change and for his
outreach work speaking about climate science.
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M. J. Bush
In 1998 and 1999, Mann, along with colleagues Malcolm Hughes and
Raymond Bradley, published studies that reconstructed the average temper-
ature of the northern hemisphere over last 1000 years. The graph, shown in
Fig. 8.1, was reprinted in the IPCC Third Assessment Report and received
widespread attention. It was dubbed the ‘hockey stick’ curve because of its
distinctive shape.32
The graph became an iconic image in the global warming and climate
change debate because it showed that rapid global warming in the north-
ern hemisphere had started sometime around 1900—and that this warm-
ing trend was continuing. The hockey stick graph generated a significant
amount of controversy—with climate contrarians attempting to refute the
validity of the analysis.
Although the data and statistical analysis have been challenged, the find-
ings have been reaffirmed by several high-level and reputable reviews includ-
ing one by the NAS in 2006.33
Inevitably, it wasn’t long before Michael Mann became a personal target
of the anti-climate science movement. In 2005, Congressman Joe Barton
of Texas demanded that Mann hand over detailed information about
the sources of his research support, and the source and location of all his
Fig. 8.1 Average temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere over the last 1000 years
(Source Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
389
data—even though the scientific results and all the data had been published
in peer-reviewed journals and was in the public domain.
At the time, Barton stated that the idea that we must take action to slow
global warming is “absolute nonsense.” The Washington Post said Barton
was “hunting witches.” Mann responded to Barton, saying the data he
wanted had been available in the public domain for years, and could be
found in a public archive. Many US politicians objected to Barton’s demand
including Republicans Sherwood Boehlert and John McCain.34
In the lead-up to the 2009 United Nations Copenhagen Climate Change
Conference, conflict between the anti-science movement and climate sci-
entists arose when email exchanges between researchers at the University of
East Anglia Climatic Research Unit and other climate scientists (including
Mann) were hacked. The scientists were accused of falsification, manip-
ulation and suppressing key data. However, eight subsequent independent
investigations cleared the scientists, finding no evidence of fraud or scientific
misconduct.
As a result of the hacking, Mann was subjected to personal attacks: he was
called a liar, a charlatan, and a scumbag. He and his family received thinly
veiled death threats. In 2010, he was sent a letter laced with white powder
and an email that said, “You and your colleagues who have promoted this
scandal ought to be shot, quartered, and fed to the pigs along with your
whole damn families.” The white powder turned out to be corn starch.
“Those behind this campaign to discredit the case for climate action have
long recognized that one very effective means of attacking the science is
to vilify individual scientists, to make examples of us, so that other scien-
tists are afraid to speak out,” said Mann. “I think it’s a very carefully crafted
means of attack.”
In 2010, Ken Cuccinelli, Virginia’s attorney general, still searching for
evidence of fraud, used a civil investigative demand under the state’s Fraud
Against Taxpayers Act (generally used to prosecute Medicaid fraud) to
demand every email, record, or document involving Mann from 1999 to
2005, when he was on the faculty at the University of Virginia. An editorial
in the journal Nature strongly objected saying: “Given the lack of evidence
of wrongdoing, it’s hard to see Cuccinelli’s subpoena… as anything more
than an ideologically motivated inquisition that harasses and intimidates sci-
entists.” The journal was right.
State courts ultimately considered Cuccinelli’s efforts an abuse of power,
with the Virginia Supreme Court rejecting the demands. But when the
court rejected Cuccinelli’s demands, the American Tradition Institute, now
known as the Energy and Environmental Legal Institute (E&E Legal), a
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M. J. Bush
Koch Brothers-funded group, attempted to use state open records laws to

demand the same emails.
The case went all the way to the Virginia Supreme Court, which ulti-
mately rejected E&E Legal’s efforts as being in violation of the protections
afforded academics in furtherance of academic freedom.35
The attacks on Michael Mann were clearly intended to harass and vex
him and his family to the point where he would perhaps eventually with-
draw from working on climate science and switch to a less stressful area of
research.36 This has not happened.
The Thomas Karl Affair

The 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC, AR5, published in 2014, showed
what appeared to be a curious lag in the upward trend of global warming.
The observed global mean surface temperature (GMST) showed a much
smaller increasing linear trend over the period 1998-2012 than over the
past 30 to 60 years. The reduction in the observed GMST trend was most
marked in the Northern Hemisphere winter. The IPCC report called the lag
a ‘hiatus’. The GMST trend from 1850 to 2012 is shown in Fig. 8.2.37 In
retrospect, the term ‘hiatus’ was a poor choice of words. It suggested that
a global warming had ceased for a significant period of time—which was
hardly the case as Fig. 8.2 shows. Nevertheless, for the small group of vocal
people that categorically deny that global warming exists, the text in the
AR5 report was seized upon as evidence that they were right all along and
that global warming was fiction.
Fig. 8.2 Global mean surface temperature anomalies relative to the 1961–1990

mean (see Climate Change 2013. The IPCC 5th Assessment Report WG1. Available
at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_all_final.pdf) (Source
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
391
Climate scientists were puzzled by the ‘hiatus’. None of the sophisticated

climate models predicted this slowing trend. The IPCC report suggested
three possible explanations: (a) internal climate variability, (b) missing or
incorrect radiative forcing, and (c) model response error.38 The scientists
went back and checked the models and the data.
In June 2015, one of the groups re-analysing the data reported its find-
ings. The reputable magazine Science published their results in a paper
entitled: Possible artefacts of data biases in the recent global surface warming
hiatus.39 The lead author was Thomas Karl. The scientists: most of whom
were based at NOAA—the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration, summarized their findings as follows:
Much study has been devoted to other possible causes of an apparent decrease
in the upward trend of global surface temperatures since 1998, a phenome-
non that has been dubbed the global warming “hiatus”. Here we present an
updated global surface temperature analysis that reveals that global trends
are higher than those reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, especially in recent decades, and that the central estimate for the rate
of warming during the first 15 years of the 2st century is at least as great as
the last half of the 20th century. These results do not support the notion of a
“slowdown” in the increase of global surface temperature.
So there was no hiatus. Lamar Smith, a Republican senator from Texas, and
a vociferous denier of climate change, smelled a rat.
At the time of the publication of what was subsequently called the ‘Karl
study’, Lamar Smith was Chairman of the influential House Committee on
Science, Space and Technology. Even though he heads up the House Science
committee, he is not a scientist. But he’s a good friend of the oil and gas
industries—which have rewarded his support with more than $600,000 in
campaign finance contributions during his career in Congress.40
The response to the Karl study from the Science committee (on which the
Republicans had a majority) was described as “swift, sweeping and caustic in
tone from the start.”41
Smith wrote to the NOAA on July 14, 2015, berating Dr. Kathryn
Sullivan, a former astronaut and the NOAA Administrator under the
Obama Administration for not making the data used in the Karl study
public—only to learn from NOAA that the data had been public for one
year prior to the publication of the Karl study. Smith then issued a subpoena
on October 13 to the Department of Commerce requesting internal com-
munications between NOAA scientists regarding global temperature data.
NOAA pushed back but eventually provided much of the documentation.
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M. J. Bush
A month later on November 18, 2015, during a Science Committee hear-

ing on the upcoming Paris climate talks, Lamar Smith alleged that NOAA’s
scientists had altered the data to get politically correct results in an attempt
to disprove the ‘hiatus’ in global temperature increases. Smith sensed a
conspiracy: suggesting that the timing of the release of the Karl study was
somehow part of a government plot, asserting: “NOAA conveniently issues
its new release promoting this report just as the Obama administration was
about to announce its extensive climate change regulations.”42
Smith continued his investigation. On the same day, November 18, he
sent a seventh letter to the Administration about the Karl study alleging that
NOAA had rushed to publish the paper—an allegation which proved to be
false since the paper had been reviewed twice, a process that had taken six
months.
By this time there was strong blowback from several major US science
organisations—including the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, the American Chemical Society, the American Geophysical Union,
the American Meteorological Society, the American Statistical Association,
the Ecological Society of America, and the Geological Society of America.
Writing to Chairman Smith in November 2015, they expressed grave con-
cerns about the committee’s investigation into the Karl paper, describing it
as an inquest, “despite a lack of public evidence of scientific misconduct.”
They went on to say: “Disagreements about the interpretation of data, the
methodology, and findings are part of daily scientific discourse. Scientists
should not be subjected to fraud investigations or harassment simply for
providing scientific results that some may see as politically controversial.”43
The fuss was dying down—as it usually does when climate deniers can
find nothing in the way of evidence or data to support their contrarian point
of view—when, and just like in a Shakespeare play, a new character emerged
from the shadows.
John Bates was a senior scientist at NOAA at the time Thomas Karl and
his colleagues published the paper refuting the idea of a hiatus in the upward
trending global temperatures. Bates knew all about the paper, its methodol-
ogy, data analysis and its contentious findings—because he was the person
who signed off on the paper before it was submitted to Science.
In February 2017, over a year after the paper was published in Science,
Bates was quoted on a blog post as saying that he thought there were flaws
in the way that data had been formatted, and in the way the data was
archived. He was careful to stress that the data had not been manipulated
and that he did not question the conclusions of the study.
393
Bates’ concerns about database management and accessibility were

instantly repackaged by the sensational UK tabloid media and trumpeted
in Britain’s Daily Mail on February 4, 2017, under the headline Exposed:
How world leaders were duped into investing billions over manipulated
global warming data.
Chairman Lamar Smith wasted no time. In fact, it is clear he was ready
and waiting. The day after the Mail on Sunday article was published,
the Science Committee issued a Press Release almost as sensational as the
Daily Mail’s: Former NOAA Scientist Confirms Colleagues Manipulated
Climate Records headlined the text issued by the Committee on February
5, 2017. It appears that Chairman Lamar Smith knew about the sensa-
tional UK tabloid press article well in advance: enough time for the Science
Committee to prepare its companion text and issue it as a widely publicized
press release the next day.
John Bates scrambled to set the record straight—and in two interviews on
February 6, sought to stress that there was no manipulation of the data and
that he was not questioning the conclusions of the study. “It’s not trumped
up data in any way shape or form”, he protested.44 But by then it was too
late: his protests of innocence were drowned out by the clamour of denier-
sphere war cries.
As is often the case, demonstrably false information about global warm-
ing and climate change, once released into the popular media and onto the
platforms of the climate-denial front groups, continues to echo loudly for
years. The conservative pseudo-scientific organisations set up with the help
of funding from ExxonMobil had a field day.
The Balancing Act

Contrarian scientists and global warming deniers have been very effective
in getting their point of view carried in the mainstream media. This seems
surprising given that all reputable climate scientists accept that anthropo-
genic global warming is a scientific fact, and that it definitely leads to cli-
mate change. The reason is that the campaign to cast doubt on the science
and to emphasise and exaggerate uncertainties among the general public has
been largely successful. And it has been bolstered by several high-profile pol-
iticians in both the US and Canada continuing to argue that while global
warming is apparently happening, it may be caused by natural phenomena
other than human activities, that the science is still uncertain, and that not
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all scientists agree. The last point strictly speaking is correct—about 3% of

scientists for one reason or another still refuse to accept the incontrovertible
evidence.
The Fairness Doctrine was established in 1949 in conjunction with the
rise of television and required broadcast journalists to dedicate airtime to
controversial issues of public concern in a balanced manner. While the doc-
trine did not formally apply to print journalism, many editors have applied
the logic to the question of climate change. The contrarian scientists have
benefitted from this doctrine and have frequently insisted on equal airtime
and media attention for their views. This policy has once again strengthened
the public’s perception that there are substantial uncertainties around the
science and that there at least two and maybe several equally valid points of
view about global warming and climate change. Which is not true. In main-
stream science the evidence is overwhelming and incontrovertible.
The Fairness Doctrine works well when it comes to politics and contro-
versial issues related to social, economic, and environmental policy. It doesn’t
work so well when it comes to science. When journalists want to cover sci-
ence, they should ask for information from the most knowledgeable scien-
tists working in government agencies or reputable academic institutions. The
last person the media should contact for commentary is a person working
out of a little-known institute bankrolled by the fossil fuel companies or
their allies in the petrochemical industries.
When Scott Pruitt was confirmed as head of the US Environmental
Protection Agency in 2017, he proposed that the best way to decide whether
climate change is a threat or not was to have a debate on television. There is
to be a red team (against?) and a blue team (for?). Or vice versa.
It will be an ‘objective’ discussion, said Pruitt, “It’s what the American
people want”.
It’s been done before. There was a famous debate in Oxford, England,
in 1860 after Darwin published The Origin of the Species. Could we really
be descended from apes? Impossible said the Bishop of Oxford. But look at
the evidence, said the scientists: Joseph Hooker and Thomas Huxley. This
event is instructive because once again this was a fundamental clash of ideas
where scientific evidence was simply disregarded as inauthentic and untrue.
Not because the evidence wasn’t there, but because for the Church of
England the evidence was irrelevant. The truth for the Church comes from
a different source. The word of God is at a different level—altogether more
authoritative.
There are tens of thousands of scientists around the world working on
climate science. These are men and women who have been trained to the
395
highest levels in meteorology, oceanography, physics, atmospheric chemis-

try, hydrology, conservation biology, and geophysics. In the US, Canada, the
UK, and Australia; across Europe, and in every country that has universities
with departments teaching science and technology. Thousands of the best
scientists on the planet agree that the climate is changing because of global
warming, that this is caused by the emissions of greenhouse gases, and that
these gases originate predominantly from the global production and con-
sumption of huge quantities of fossil fuels.
It should not be necessary to ‘balance’ the views of reputable scientists
with solid scientific credentials with the opinion of charlatans who claim
that the science is flawed and that scientists are manipulating the data. This
media policy just plays into the hands of the fossil fuel and petrochemical
companies that benefit from the doubt and uncertainty that these conflict-
ing points of view create among the general public.
SLAPPing Them Around

The acronym SLAPP is short for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation. It refers to a lawsuit initiated by a company or a person with
substantial financial resources suing an individual or an organisation for a
large amount of money for doing or saying something they disagree with
and don’t like. The entity filing the lawsuit doesn’t have to win the case or
even necessarily to go to court. The cost of mounting a defence to any kind
lawsuit can be huge—even before you get to court. For the target of the
SLAPP–often an individual lacking substantial financial resources, a com-
munity group, or an environmental NGO, the potential cost of fighting
back against the legal action is prohibitive. In many instances, the only real-
istic option is to back down, retract what you said, and keep quiet. Which of
course is the objective of the SLAPP.
The most famous of these legal cases concern a paper published in
Cosmos: A Journal of Emerging Issues in the summer of 1992. Entitled “What
to do about Greenhouse warming: Look before you leap”, it was authored by
three people: S. Fred Singer, Roger Revelle, and Chauncey Starr. Singer was
the lead author. The article argued that scientists didn’t know enough about
global warming to justify any action at that time. It concluded by stating:
Drastic, precipitous and, especially unilateral—steps to delay the putative

greenhouse impacts can cost jobs and prosperity and increase the human costs
of global poverty, without being effective. Stringent controls enacted now
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would be economically devastating particularly for developing countries for

whom reduced energy consumption would mean slower rates of economic
growth without being able to delay greatly the growth of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere.45
The paper emphasised and exaggerated the costs of taking action, down-
played the degree of warming projected for the twenty-first century, and
echoed the familiar refrain of the need for caution and more research.
The problem was that the second author, Roger Revelle, a highly
respected and influential scientist, did not agree with this conclusion.
Revelle had insisted for years that global warming was real and that action
needed to be taken to address the issue. But at the time the article was writ-
ten, he was over 80 years old and in poor health. Many of his colleagues
were shocked by the article, which had been written mostly by Singer, and
argued forcefully that Revelle’s viewpoint had not been accurately reflected
in the text and certainly not in the conclusion. In the words of one of his
young colleagues, Justin Lancaster, Revelle had been “hoodwinked”.46
Lancaster also stated publicly that what Singer had done was unethical.
Singer sued for libel. Lancaster, just out of grad school, did not have the
means to fight the lawsuit and was forced to retract his statements. In an
article published in 2006, he said:
Over ten years ago, I was forced by a SLAPP suit to retract my statements
exposing the Cosmos myth…Likely to prevail at trial because my statements
were true, I regretted deeply that I could not then afford to continue.
In fact, in the same article he stated that he was rescinding and repudiat-
ing his 1994 retraction and making available the evidence that supported his
statements.47
But by then of course it was too late. The 1992 Cosmos article authored
by Singer with Revelle’s name attached had been widely circulated as evi-
dence that Revelle had changed his mind about the danger of global warm-
ing. This was important because Al Gore had been a student of Revelle’s at
Harvard and had publicly acknowledged his admiration for his work and
commitment. In the climate denial community mindset, Revelle’s sup-
posed change of mind showed that Al Gore’s advocacy for action on climate
change was without foundation and should be rejected.
More recently, fossil fuel and logging companies in the US have come up
with new twist on the SLAPP concept. They have invoked the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO: legislation aimed
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at mobsters and organized crime, to go after environmental organisations

protesting against oil and gas pipelines and industries like logging that fre-
quently have substantial environmental impacts. In 2016, a company called
Resolute Forest Products, one of Canada’s largest logging and paper compa-
nies, filed a lawsuit against Greenpeace under the RICO act, claiming that
Greenpeace’s real objective was simply to raise money, and that its advo-
cacy work in protecting the environment was a sham. Resolute claimed that
Greenpeace’s emails and correspondence asking the public for financial sup-
port constituted wire fraud.48
The Resolute lawsuit was unprecedented. But a few months later, one of
the companies involved in developing the Dakota Access Pipeline, Energy
Transfer Partners, filed its own RICO lawsuit against Greenpeace and two
smaller environmental groups: Banktrack and Earth First. The complaint
alleged that Greenpeace and the other advocacy groups were operating an
illegal enterprise to further their own interests while damaging the company.
The lawsuit further alleged that Greenpeace was supporting eco-terrorism, a
violation of the Patriot Act, and drug trafficking.49
SLAPP lawsuits are becoming more frequent. In May 2017, sev-
eral energy companies filed lawsuits against their critics. Murray Energy
Corporation, an Ohio based coal company, filed a libel claim against The
New York Times after it published an editorial critical of the company, and
the following month, Murray filed a lawsuit against comedian John Oliver,
HBO, and Time Warner. In August, Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation., which
has been accused of polluting water wells in Dimock, Pennsylvania, sued
one of the town’s residents for $5 million, alleging that his claim that the
pollution of his water well was due to fracking had ‘harmed’ the company.50
The suits against Greenpeace, because of their use of anti-racketeering law,
are potentially much more damaging and costly. They are clearly intended
to force Greenpeace, and other environmental organisations opposing the
expansion of fossil fuel industries, to back down and to desist from environ-
mental activism.
In the US, state legislation is increasingly being used as a weapon against
individuals and NGOs opposed to oil and gas infrastructure developments,
particularly new pipelines, that will lead to greater emissions of greenhouse
gases.
Dozens of bills and executive orders have been introduced in at least 31
states since January 2017 that aim to restrict protests that have intensified
as environmentalists focus on blocking fossil fuel projects—especially pipe-
lines. In many cases, the bills expand the definition of rioting and terrorism,
and even increase penalties for blocking traffic. In early 2017, an Oklahoma
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state lawmaker introduced a bill to stiffen penalties for interfering with pipe-
lines and other infrastructure. The bill imposes harsh punishments: up to
10 years in prison, $100,000 in fines, and up to $1 million in penalties for
any organisation found to be a ‘conspirator’ in violating the law. This means
that if someone protesting a pipeline is found guilty of violating the law, an
organisation he is a member of, even if it didn’t organize the protest, can be
charged with conspiracy and face a million dollar fine.51
Soon after Oklahoma’s critical infrastructure bill passed, the conservative
organisation American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), one of the
organisations funded by ExxonMobil to argue against global warming, used
the bill to write model legislation for other states. In at least six more states,
lawmakers introduced similar bills that impose steep penalties for trespassing
on or tampering with pipeline property and other infrastructure.52
In South Dakota in 2019, a law was passed that enables state and local
governments, as well as third parties, to seek civil damages from people or
organisations that engage in what is called “riot boosting”. North Dakota
also enacted a similar law based on the Oklahoma template circulated by
ALEC. Riot boosting, is defined under the law as the use of force or vio-
lence by three of more people acting together—even if they act “indirectly
through any employee, agent or subsidiary.”53
In June 2019, it was reported that the Trump administration was seeking
to dramatically escalate federal penalties for pipeline protesters. Under newly
proposed changes, pipeline protesters could face up to 20 years in prison for
disrupting the construction of oil and gas infrastructure. Updates proposed
to the Transportation Department’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) would make interrupting pipeline construction
or damaging existing pipelines a federal crime. Acts considered to be “van-
dalism, tampering with, or impeding, disrupting or inhibiting the opera-
tion” of pipelines would be met with fines or potentially several years in jail.
Under current law, damaging existing pipelines can lead to up to 20 years
jail time, but those under construction are now included as well as “disrup-
tion” to pipelines.54
Prepping the Kids
In March 2017, a letter in the form of a memorandum was sent out to
thousands of science teachers across America. It came from the Center for
Transforming Education, a group affiliated with the Heartland Institute—
the conservative organisation which ExxonMobil helped set up in the 1980s.
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Since that time, ExxonMobil has mostly cut its links to the Heartland
Institute—because it has become so outspoken, extreme, and vociferous in
promoting climate change denial than even ExxonMobil has backed off.55
The letter sent out to the schools included a new glossy book published
by the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (the
NIPCC—the name of course easily confused with the widely-respected
group of international climate scientists: the IPCC). The book is called Why
Scientists Disagree About Global Warming: The NIPCC Report on Scientific
Consensus.
The memo opens with a question for science teachers: “How do you teach
global warming?”
The memo then asks teachers to “consider the possibility that the science in
fact is not ‘settled’ ”. And continues by saying: “If that’s the case, then students
would be better served by letting them know a vibrant debate is taking place
among scientists on how big the human impact on climate is, and whether or not
we should be worried about it. ”
This was in 2017—when all the major national and international sci-
entific institutions including the IPCC and the National Academies of
Science in the US and Canada—representing the consensus view of liter-
ally thousands of climate scientists around the world, had concluded that
global warming and climate change was underway, getting worse, and was
cause by man-made anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. There is
no ‘vibrant debate’—only the echo chamber resonating with the crackpot
notions and conspiracy theories of the climate change denial system.
The book distributed to teachers by the NIPCC opens with these words:
“Probably the most widely repeated claim in the debate over global warming is
that ‘97% of scientists agree’ that climate change is man-made and dangerous.
This claim is not only false but its presence in the debate is an insult to science. ”
So the goal of the book is clear: to set out the climate change denial pseu-
do-scientific message wrapped up in a beautifully presented publication. The
authors are Dr. Craig Idso, Dr. Robert M. Carter, and Dr. S. Fred Singer—
the same Fred Singer (mentioned earlier in this chapter), who sued Justin
Lancaster for libel in 1993. The book comes with a video: a 10 minutes
DVD produced by The Idea Channel.
Quick to respond, the NSTA a professional organisation representing
55,000 teachers in the US, sent a letter to its members calling on them to
resist what they called an “unprecedented attack.” The National Center
for Science Education, a non-profit that works to ensure the integrity of
science education and combat ideological interference, launched a fund-
raiser to counter the misinformation. The NCSE had previously fought
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for the accurate teaching of evolution and helped to develop the 2013
national science standards that made the teaching of global warming part of
the public school curriculum.56
But the Heartland Institute is very well funded by the oil and gas, and
the petrochemical industries, and science teachers in rural areas often strug-
gle to find teaching materials for classes on science. It’s quite possible that
many teachers use the propaganda materials even if they weren’t completely
convinced of their veracity. The fact that children are looking at a nicely
packaged book and companion video reinforces the impression that there
are two sides to the issue, each of equal weight, and strengthens the view in
children’s minds that climate science is confusing, uncertain, and ‘unsettled’.
In 2016, the Oklahoma Energy Resources Board (OERB) published Petro
Pete’s Big Bad Dream. This is a story for kindergarten children in which a
‘Bob the Builder’ type of cartoon character wakes up one morning to find
that everything around him made of plastic and rubber has mysteriously dis-
appeared. His toothbrush, hardhat (he’s an engineer), and the tires on his
bike have all gone missing. The story follows Petro Pete as he walks to his
school—the Petroville Elementary school, where his teacher Mrs. Rigwell,
extolls the wonderful benefits of the petroleum industry to Petro Pete and
his friend Sammy Shale. Petro Pete gets the message and declares: “having
no petroleum is a nightmare.”
It’s not too sophisticated—but it doesn’t need to be. The kids love it.
Schools and libraries across Oklahoma have received more than 9000 com-
plementary copies of “Petro Pete’s bad dream” since it was published in 2016.
This children’s story is just the latest in an illustrated series produced by
the OERB, an agency funded by the Oklahoma’s petroleum industry, which
has reportedly spent more than $40 million over the last couple of dec-
ades on K-12 education with a strong pro-industry bias. It’s all free for the
schools.57
A similar program in Ohio shows teachers how to “frack” Twinkies using
straws to pump for cream and proposes materials for the curriculum in a
charter school that explains the benefits of fracking. A national program
whose sponsors reportedly include BP and Shell, claim it’s too soon to tell if
the earth is warming up, but “a little warming might be a good thing.”58
It’s not just happening in Oklahoma. Lawmakers created the OERB in
1993 as a state agency funded by a voluntary tax on local oil and gas pro-
ducers to publicise the industry. Kansas, Illinois, and Ohio soon followed
suit with similar legislation.
For example, the Ohio Oil and Gas Energy Education Program
(OOGEEP) is a non-profit education program funded by the state’s oil and
gas industries. Its mandate includes:
401
1. The promotion of a positive public awareness of the local oil and gas
industry, and its vital energy and economic benefits to Ohio.
2. The development and implementation of educational materials and work-
shops in schools and public outreach programs.
3. To provide a factual and timely response to the public on questions, situa-
tions or concerns affecting the Ohio oil and gas industry.59
OOGEEP’s teaching materials don’t say much about global warming or cli-
mate change. They focus more on the how petroleum products are an essen-
tial part of modern life, the benefits they have brought to Ohio, and how
hydraulic fracturing is absolutely safe. The environmental impacts of oil
exploration, fracking, pipelines, and petroleum refining are not mentioned.
It’s not just in the US that the oil companies are interested in helping
with your children’s education. In 2014, the province of Alberta, Canada,
released a plan for public schools that enlisted Suncor Energy and Syncrude
Canada in the creation of the school curriculum. Oil giant Cenovus is
expected to partner in developing curriculum for grades four to 12.
Canada’s oil and gas industry has taken a notable interest in curriculum
design and the concept of ‘energy literacy’.
The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), the coun-
try’s largest oil and gas lobby body, caused uproar in 2013 when it partnered
with the Royal Canadian Geographic Society in the creation of ‘Energy
IQ,’ described as “an energy education resource for all Canadians…to engage
Canadian teachers and students through curriculum-linked in-class learning
tools, and to increase energy knowledge among the general public and commu-
nity leaders.”
CAPP has led Energy in Action programs in Alberta since 2004 to teach
children about the petroleum industry and its role in “environmental stew-
ardship”. In 2011 Alberta awarded CAPP the Friends of Education Award
for the program. More than 59 oil and gas companies have participated in
the outreach program which has run through more than 80 schools across
Canada.60
Regulatory Capture
Setting up fake scientific institutes and paying the salaries of numerous lob-
byists is expensive. A less costly and more effective strategy is to get your
people elected to, or otherwise inserted into, the government agencies that
control the messaging and promulgate or enforce the regulations that the
fossil-fuel and petroleum industries vehemently dislike. If at the same time
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these inhouse fossil fuel colleagues are also climate change deniers so much
the better. It all helps to weaken any pressure to take stronger government
action to curb the emissions of greenhouse gases from the fossil fuel and
petroleum industries, and to limit the support for renewable energy technol-
ogies that compete with coal, oil, and natural gas.
Regulatory capture is defined as a situation where “regulation is…directed
away from the public interest and toward the interest of the regulated indus-
try by intent and action of industries and their allies.”61
It’s not uncommon of course for governments to employ advisors and
appoint administrators whose thinking aligns closely with government pol-
icy. The problem arises when government policy is squarely at odds with evi-
dence-based science, and when these senior staff have umbilical ties to the
industries that they are supposed to be regulating.
Under the 2001 Bush Administration, the Clear Skies Initiatives, despite
the appealing name, significantly relaxed the regulations concerning the
emissions of mercury from coal fired power plants. Asked about these
changes to mercury emission limits, Bush officials reportedly answered,
“The EPA, in its expert judgment, concludes that utility emissions do not
pose hazards to public health.” A couple of weeks later, the Washington Post
reported that the ‘expert judgment’ had in fact come directly from industry:
“At least a dozen passages in the EPA’s proposal were lifted, sometimes ver-
batim, from memos prepared by West Associates, an industry organisation
representing western coal burners and…a powerful Washington law firm
that often represents corporations on environmental issues.” It seemed that
the EPA was taking directions from precisely the people it was supposed to
be regulating.62
Drafting soft government legislation that is supposed to regulate the fossil
fuel industries is still a favourite pastime of many of the organisations set up
with funding from ExxonMobil. But a man on the inside is always useful—
particularly if he is in a senior policymaking position.
Philip A. Cooney joined George Bush’s administration in 2002 and was
appointed to head up the Council on Environmental Quality. Before taking
up this position, Cooney had been a lobbyist for the American Petroleum
Institute. He is most famously known for systematically altering government
reports in order to downplay the adverse effects of man-made emissions on
the Earth’s climate. His interference led to the resignation of Rick Piltz, a
senior associate in the US Climate Change Science Program, who charged
that Cooney had been auditing government climate reports to emphasize
doubts about global warming. According to Piltz’s resignation letter, Cooney
edited documents to “create an enhanced sense of scientific uncertainty
403
about climate change and its limitations.”63 This was right out of the GCSC
playbook.
In a report in the New York Times on June 8, 2005, entitled: Bush aide
softened greenhouse gas links to global warming, it was asserted that Cooney
repeatedly edited government climate reports in ways that downplayed the
links between emissions and global warming, and exaggerated the impor-
tance of any uncertainties in the science.
The dozens of changes attributed to Cooney include inserting a phrase
like “significant and fundamental” before the word “uncertainties”. He
would change ‘difficult’ to ‘extremely difficult’ if the phrase related to the
attribution of observed ecosystem changes to global warming. In one well
documented case, he crossed out a paragraph describing the projected reduc-
tion of mountain glaciers and snowpack. His note in the margin explained
that the text was “straying from research strategy into speculative findings/
musings.” Factual statements like: “The Earth is undergoing a period of rela-
tively rapid change” were changed to read: “The Earth may be undergoing a
period of relatively rapid change”.64 Small revisions perhaps—but always in
the direction of emphasizing uncertainty and casting doubt on the science.
More recently, under the Trump administration, it appears that regulatory
capture has become the predominant strategy of the fossil fuel and petro-
leum industry—a strategy facilitated by the President himself.
Scott Pruitt, a former Attorney General of Oklahoma and self-described
“leading advocate against the EPA’s activist agenda” has close links to the fos-
sil fuel industry. As the state’s Attorney General, Pruitt famously sued the
Environmental Protection Agency at least 14 times. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
he was Trump’s first choice to head up the EPA.
Pruitt has explicitly sought to reorient the EPA towards industrial and
industry-friendly interests, often with little or no acknowledgement of the
agency’s health and environmental missions, for example:
• Political appointments—appointees have deep ties with industries,

including the leader of the EPAs transition team, Myron Bell from the
Competitive Enterprise Institute, and of course Pruitt himself.
• Rhetoric—Pruitt has regularly championed the interests of regulated
industries, while rarely affirming environmental and health protections.
His first speech as Administrator did not include the words “pollution”,
“health”, ecology” or “climate change”. In contrast, Pritt asserted that
“regulation exists to give certainty to the regulated” and emphasized an
EPA commitment to “enhance economic growth”.
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• Executive orders—Several of Pruitt’s executive orders explicitly under-

mine environmental regulations without mentioning health effects
on people and environments. For example, Executive Order 13783
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, targets “regu-
latory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy production…and pre-
vent job creation”.
• Restructured science advisory boards—Pruitt dismissed many members of
the EPA’s Science Advisory Board and its Board of Scientific Counsellors,
created a new rule preventing EPA-funded scientists from serving on
those boards, and–for the first time in the agency’s history—allowed lob-
byists on scientific advisory boards.
• Pruitt’s own meetings and schedule, now posted after many Freedom of
Information Act requests, are almost exclusively with company and trade
organisations and rarely with environmental, public health, or citizen
groups.65
By July 14, 2018, Scott Pruitt was under several separate federal investi-
gations by the Government Accountability Office, the EPA inspector gen-
eral, the White House Office of Management and Budget, the US Office
of Special Counsel, and two House committees, scrutinizing his spending
habits, alleged conflicts of interest, extreme secrecy, and his management
practices. Pruitt resigned from the EPA in July 2018 and was replaced by
Andrew Wheeler.66
Wheeler is reckoned to be a safer pair of hands than Pruitt, but Senate
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, at the time of Wheeler’s confirmation
hearing, referred to him as “a former industry lobbyist who has worked on
behalf of big polluters and climate change deniers. He has spent years work-
ing to undermine or lobby against the environmental protections he may
soon oversee”.67
The George Washington University’s Regulatory Studies Center’s mission
is supposedly to improve regulatory policy through “research, education
and outreach”. According to its website, the Center is a leading source for
applied scholarship in regulatory issues, and a training ground for anyone
who wants to understand the effects of regulation and ensure that regulatory
policies are designed in the public interest. Key funders of the RSC include
the Charles Koch Foundation, the Searle Freedom Trust Foundation, and
the ExxonMobil Foundation, each of which has given more than $1 million
to the centre. No surprise then that the RSC advocates forcefully for less
US government oversight of industry and recommends changes that would
result in less regulation in the future. According to one report, of 55 public
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comments submitted unuder the auspices of the RSC between 2013 and
2018, three-quarters were authored or coauthored by individuals with past
or present affiliations with Koch-funded organisations.68
Expunging the Record
One of the most astonishing and unprecedented actions of the Trump
administration has been the systematic erasure of scientific material related
to climate change from online media. It is hard to think of a more effec-
tive way to shut down the public’s understanding of climate science than by
scrubbing clean all references to it on the Web. The US government’s reach
thankfully only extends to government publications and websites—but on
these platforms the policy has been systematically applied.
For example, the US Geological Survey’s Science Explorer website—a tax-
payer-funded online database for the public to browse USGS science pro-
grams and activities—has been purged of thousands of formerly searchable
climate science links. This sort of informational cleansing was discovered
by a member of the US National Academy of Sciences, Peter Gleick, and
reported online in September 2017.
Gleick noted the extent to which climate-related links have been
expunged from the site a month after the Trump administration took over.
• In December 2016, there were 5962 climate science items linked on the
site. In September 2017 there were only 416 and more than half of those
were just pictures.
• In December 2016, the USGS webpage “Effects of #Climate Change”
had 2825 items. It now has zero.
Gleick found the archived pages on the Wayback machine but pointed out
that archived material is harder for the public to access—effectively putting
them out of reach of the general public.
In August 2017, the Environmental Data & Governance Initiative dis-
covered that the National Institute of Environmental Health and Sciences
had altered climate change language, updated climate change references, and
reduced access to a Web resource with information on climate change and
human health across several webpages.
In addition, it was reported in 2017 that staffers from a number of federal
agencies, including the Department of Agriculture and the department of
Energy had been instructed to specifically avoid the phrase “climate change”.69
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M. J. Bush
Big Oil, Big Pockets

The fossil fuel industries in the US have continued to manipulate the pol-
icy environment in their favour. Top-down regulatory capture is a hugely
cost-effective strategy, but sometimes weakening environmental legislation,
manipulating public opinion, impugning climate scientists’ reputation, and
constantly stressing the uncertainty of the science doesn’t always have the
desired effect—particularly when there is vigorous and vocal local organisa-
tion in favour of action to curb emissions of greenhouse gases and to block
any expansion of oil and gas industrial development. In cases such as these,
the fossil fuel industries and lobby groups go directly on the attack.
In March 2018, Washington State voters got Initiative 1631 on the bal-
lot for the US mid-term elections. Voters were asked to decide whether to
approve a modest fee to be levied on emissions of carbon—effectively a
carbon tax. Although other US states have carbon pricing mechanisms in
place—particularly California and the north-eastern states cooperating
in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Washington State’s carbon tax
would have been the US’s first straightforward carbon tax. Needless to say,
the major oil companies didn’t like it.
Oil companies have contributed most of the almost $30 million that
was raised to defeat the ballot measure—more money than has ever
been spent on any ballot initiative campaign in the state’s history. A list
of the companies opposing the initiative brings up some familiar names
(Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Contributions to the defeat of Initiative 1631a

Rank Company Donation
1 BP America $11.6 million
2 Phillips 66 $7.2 million
3 Andeavor (formerly owned by Marathon) $6.1 million
4 America Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers $1.0 million
5 Valero Energy Company $995,000
6 Koch Industries $950,000
7 US Oil & refining Co. $558,531
8 Chevron USA Inc. $500,000
9 PBF Energy $400,000
10 The HollyFrontier Companies $250,000
aInside Climate News. These voters could approve the first U.S. carbon fee. Big
oil is spending millions to defeat it. 29 October 2018. Accessed at: https://insidecli-
matenews.org/news/29102018/election-2018-washington-carbon-fee-ballot-initia-
tive-price-carbon-big-oil-opposition
Source Inside Climate News
407
Supporting the initiative were some major conservation organisa-

tions—The Nature Conservancy, the League of Conservation Voters, and
some well-known philanthropists who believe the climate science such as
Michael Bloomberg and Bill Gates. In total, the group supporting the ini-
tiative raised about $14 million—still a tidy sum, but less than half of the
amount raised by the oil and petrochemical companies to block the initia-
tive.70 In November 2018, Initiative 1631 was defeated.
Sunblock
It’s not just action on climate change that poses a threat to the profitability
and business model of the fossil fuel industries. Renewable energy also chal-
lenges their predominant position as suppliers of electricity. They may have
accepted that they have to coexist with large hydroelectric power plants, but
that doesn’t mean that they are going to go along with solar energy and wind
power.
One focus of the well-funded think-tanks and front organisations set up
by the oil companies and the petrochemical industries has been on blocking
initiatives to promote residential roof-mounted photovoltaic systems, and
on providing incentives to encourage people to switch to electric vehicles.
The attack on residential solar has been most forceful in the US—where at
least 20 fossil-fuel backed groups and electric utilities are behind some of the
country’s most aggressive campaigns to slow the growth of solar energy in
at least 12 states, including attempts to reduce net metering benefits and to
create demand charges for customers with solar power.
A national network of utility interest groups and fossil-fuel think tanks
has provided the funding, model legislation and political cover to discourage
the growth of rooftop solar power and to attack key solar policies.71 The cast
of characters is a familiar one:
• The Edison Electric Institute, the trade group that represents US inves-
tor-owned electric utilities, launched a wave of attacks on solar energy in
2012. Since then the EEI has worked with the ALEC to create model leg-
islation to repeal state renewable electricity standards, attack net meter-
ing, and fund other anti-solar initiatives.
• The American Legislative Exchange Council, ALEC, provides utility
and fossil-fuel interests with direct access to state lawmakers–drafting
model anti-solar legislation that then be replicated by state legislatures.
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ALEC’s anti-net metering policy document has inspired copycat leg-

islation in states like Washington and Utah, and its model “Electricity
Freedom Act” legislation has been used to repeal renewable energy stand-
ards in at least 19 states. ExxonMobil has been an important funder of
ALEC since its inception.72
• The Koch brothers have provided funding to the national fight against
solar by funnelling tens of millions of dollars through a network of shad-
owy non-profits. The Koch-funded campaign organisation Americans for
Prosperity has also carried out anti-solar organising efforts.
• The Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA), is a Houston based front group
for the utility and fossil-fuel industry, representing companies like Florida
Power and Light, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Shell Oil. CEA has provided
support to utilities fight anti-solar battles in Florida, Indiana, Maine and
Utah.
• The Indiana Energy Association successfully lobbied on behalf of the
state’s largest electric utilities to end net-metering, replacing it instead
with a new solar policy that limits consumer compensation for generating
rooftop solar energy.73
American electric utilities have used the support provided by these well-
funded anti-solar interests as well as their own resources to fiercely attack
solar energy policies in their states.
Two major Arizona utilities: Arizona Public Service and Salt River Project,
have successfully pushed for anti-rooftop solar policies. APS has also been
accused of improperly cultivating influence with the state commissions
that regulates utilities and funnelling dark money into recent commissioner
elections.74
In Utah, Rocky Mountain Power has tried to eliminate net metering and
charge additional fees to its 20,000 customers that generate rooftop solar
power. Public outcry from ratepayers and the solar industry forced RMP to
back down and provide net metering compensation.
In Texas, El Paso Electric renewed is past attempt to create a separate and
more expensive rate class for solar customers. In 2015, the utility spent $3.1
million on filing and negotiating fees—an amount charged to ratepayers
before dropping the proposal, only to try again in 2017.
In 2015, Nevada Energy successfully lobbied the state utilities commis-
sion to eliminate net metering, a move that effectively halted the growth of
rooftop solar in its service territory for two years. After widespread public
protest, state legislators effectively reinstated net metering in 2017.
409
These are only a few of the many anti-solar initiatives that were on-going
in American states in 2017.75
Electric utilities have employed a range of financial tools and tricks to try
and render rooftop solar power a less attractive option. These include:
Demand charges. These charges are based not on the amount of electricity a
household actually uses, but on peak electricity demand for a short period
of time (typically 15 to 60 minutes) over the course of a month. As a
result, the savings resulting from using less electricity from the grid are
offset by short periods of heavy electricity use, for example at night or on
a cloudy day.
Time of use rates. Utilities have shifted the most expensive time-of-use rates
to later in the evening when they know solar energy production is drop-
ping off. Utilities can thus minimise net metering payments to solar cus-
tomers and charge them more for night-time electricity use.
Solar use fees. These are extra monthly charges levied on customers with
rooftop solar systems. Utilities justify the charges by arguing that they are
necessary to ensure grid reliability, subsidize net metering programs, and
maintain infrastructure.
Solar rate class. This is a mechanism that blatantly discriminates against
rooftop by charging solar customers more per kilowatt-hour than regular
customers.
The most flagrant attempt to mislead and hoodwink the electorate and
undermine rooftop solar occurred in Florida in 2016. In November 2016,
Florida voters narrowly defeated Amendment 1—a utility-backed measure
to limit rooftop solar expansion that was marketed as a pro-solar measure
by a utility-backed organisation called Consumers for Smart Solar. Florida’s
investor-owned utilities had poured more that $20 million into this political
committee. Its aim was quite simply to deceive voters into believing that the
amendment would promote rooftop solar. In reality it would do the opposite.
Amendment 1 attempted to use the popularity of solar energy to embed
new language into the Florida constitution that could have been used as a
legal mechanism to raise fees on solar users and to keep out companies that
could compete with the utilities to provide solar energy. Amendment 1 was
called “one of the most egregious and underhanded attempts at voter manip-
ulation in the state’s history.”76
But Florida utilities strongly influence the state’s legislature. The Miami
Herald observed that the companies were likely to turn to the Florida
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M. J. Bush
Legislature or the Public Service Commission to push through proposals

that would weaken the state’s net metering laws and end tax rebates to solar
customers. The utilities reportedly gave at least $9 million to legislative cam-
paigns and Governor Rick Scott to influence this outcome. In recent years,
the Republican-led legislature and the governor-appointed utility board
sided with utility companies by approving requests to expand the fleet of
natural gas generating power plants, weaken incentives for customers to save
energy, and reduce incentives to install rooftop solar.77 This is regulatory
capture working well in Florida.
Fuelling US Forward
Koch industries is a billion-dollar energy and industrial conglomerate with a
powerful vested interest in maintaining and expanding the production and
consumption of oil and natural gas. Run by the billionaire Koch brothers,
the company has funded strongly conservative organisations for decades–
including several well-known ‘think tanks’ which continue to disseminate
disinformation about how climate science is ‘unsettled’ and uncertain. The
Koch brothers have repeatedly voiced scepticism that fossil fuel use contrib-
utes to global warming.78
For the oil majors and the petrochemical companies, the increasing mar-
ket penetration of electric vehicles is a clear threat to their business model—
whose profitability rests on the assumption that the demand for oil and
natural gas continues to grow strongly for the foreseeable future.
Not long after the Obama administration took office in the US, it set an
ambitious goal of having 1 million plug-in electric vehicles on the road by
2015. That hasn’t happened; but the sale of electric vehicles in the US and
Canada is growing strongly—albeit from a very small base. Moreover, it is
clear to most business analysts that electric vehicles are going to make up
a substantial fraction of the transport sector within a decade or so, since a
number of surveys have shown that a majority of people would purchase
an electric car if the cost was comparable with a conventional vehicle. As
the cost of car batteries continues to decline and economies of scale start
to have a greater impact, it is certain that the sticker price of electric vehi-
cles will continue to fall. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that electric
vehicles are less expensive to operate and maintain, and that their life-cycle
costs, even in 2018, were less than comparable vehicles with gasoline
or diesel engines.
411
The pro-fossil fuel advocacy group Fueling US Forward (FUSF) was

formed in August 2016 and is widely believed to have strong links to the
Koch brothers. The principal objective of FUSF was to promote the con-
sumption of fossil fuels by rebranding them as ‘positive’ and ‘sustainable’,
and to remove government subsidies for electric vehicles. In 2017, FUSF
went on the attack with the production and posting of a video entitled
“Dirty secrets of electric cars”. The video is so full of errors that it would be
normally be considered something of a joke, but like all disinformation cam-
paigns that are generously funded by the fossil fuel industries, the original
messaging was widely viewed and rebroadcast by other conservative and cli-
mate change-denying media platforms.79
The numerous factual errors in the video were quickly challenged and
debunked by commentators posting on other websites, but once again, this
propaganda serves the purpose of creating doubt in the minds of people who
are not familiar with the technology, and who are not in a position to fact-
check the erroneous claims that the ‘rare earth’ materials used to fabricate
electric vehicle batteries are all produced by child slave labour in Africa.
The Koch brothers have continued to try and impede the growth of
electric vehicles in America. The electric vehicle tax credit, first established
under the George W. Bush administration, offers $7500 in tax benefits to
consumers. It also has a cap on the number of vehicles sold by a manufac-
turer, and once that cap is reached the credit is gradually phased out. In late
2018, several US congressmen, both Republican and Democrat, were pro-
posing to extend the credit through to 2028 and to eliminate the cap.
In October 2018, a Koch lobbyist sent a letter to senators strongly urg-
ing them to oppose the proposal to continue the subsidy and remove the
cap. The letter claimed that Koch Industries supported ending all energy
subsidies, including the substantial subsidies the company itself benefits
from. This claim is mere window dressing, since the Koch brothers know
full well that removing the generous subsidies to the oil and gas industry
is never going to happen under the Trump administration. Koch indus-
tries has spent a considerable amount of money to bolster its insistence
that electric vehicles should not be promoted, and that conventional vehi-
cles burning gasoline and diesel fuels are the better option. According
to the Union of Concerned Scientists, Koch Industries has supported at
least 18 anti-electric vehicle groups to the tune of $152.7 million over the
period 2012 to 2016. Needless to say, substantial financial contributions
have also been made to the election campaigns of friendly Republican
politicians.80
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President Trump’s plan to roll back car efficiency standards in 2019 has
also pleased the oil and gas industry, as less efficient internal combustion
engines will burn greater quantities of fuel. They will also produce greater
amounts of greenhouse gases—but the environmental impacts of these emis-
sions is clearly not of great concern to the fossil fuel companies.
According to a New York Times investigation published in 2018,
Marathon Petroleum, the US’s largest oil refiner, worked with oil industry
groups and a conservative policy network financed by the Koch brothers to
run a ‘covert campaign’ to roll back vehicle emission standards. Marathon
teamed up with the ALEC (which has been funded by both ExxonMobil
and Koch Industries) to draft legislation for states supporting the industry’s
position. Its proposed resolution, dated 18 September 2018, describes fuel
efficiency rules as “a relic of a disproven narrative of resource scarcity” and
states that “unelected bureaucrats” shouldn’t dictate the cars that Americans
drive. In other words, wasting energy is fine—especially when it adds to the
bottom line of the oil industry.
A separate but related campaign on Facebook, run by an oil-industry
lobby representing ExxonMobil, Chevron, Phillips 66 and several other
oil companies, urged people to write to state regulators to support the
rollback.81
Denying the Science
While the oil majors and the petrochemical conglomerates in the US have
waged an almost unceasing campaign on the veracity of climate science and
continued to manufacture uncertainty and doubt at every opportunity, a
handful of people have taken the stage to categorically deny the evidence
that the planet is warming.
In the US, the climate contrarians are mainly fringe academics, often with
good credentials, who seem to enjoy the publicity and notoriety that comes
with vehemently opposing mainstream science. And funding for dubi-
ous research to ‘prove’ that global warming is either irrelevant or caused by
extra-terrestrial influence is always available from sources bankrolled by the
fossil fuel industries and their allies.
In the USA in 2019, media attention was focused on William Happer, a
Princeton-educated physicist who was appointed by the Trump administra-
tion as deputy assistant for emerging technologies on the National Security
Council. He is reportedly tasked with leading a proposed Presidential
Committee on Climate Security to advise President Trump on climate
413
issues. Happer is notorious for saying in 2014 that “the demonization of car-
bon dioxide is just like the demonization of the poor Jews under Hitler.”82
Happer believes that lots of carbon dioxide is good for plants, and that
the Earth needs more of it, not less. Happer is a very good physicist, but
clearly doesn’t want to listen when hundreds of equally well-trained physi-
cists are saying that what he believes is nonsense, or at least is only half the
story—and not the half that matters.
In contrast to well-qualified scientists who simply think that they know
better than anyone else—even if all the scientific evidence contradicts them,
there are a few climate deniers that capture the attention of the media sim-
ply by being a lot more flamboyant and colourful than mainstream climate
scientists—who have a tendency to be cautious and careful. In the UK,
a country with a long history of producing amusing but generally harmless
eccentrics, Christopher Monckton, the 3rd Viscount Monckton of Brenchley,
has enjoyed a great deal of attention because of his rather bizarre views on
climate change. Although having absolutely no background or training in sci-
ence, this has not prevented him from lecturing, mostly in America, on why
global warming is not happening and climate change is nonsense.
In 2009 he appeared before the House Subcommittee on Energy and
Environment, and in 2010 before the House Select Committee on Energy
Independence and Global Warming. This appearance was followed by tours
of Australia, New Zealand, China and India. He was invited once again to
the US in 2012 to speak before the California State Assembly.
In December 2012, Monckton took Burma’s seat at the COP18 Climate
Change Conference in Doha without permission and made a short speech
attacking the idea of man-made climate change. He was escorted from
the building and given a lifetime ban from attending UN climate talks.
Monckton stated that there had been no global warming over the last sixteen
years, and that the science should be reviewed. Between 2009 and 2010,
Monckton was filmed while on his climate change tour, and the video was
later broadcast by the BBC in a program entitled Meet the Sceptics.83
While Christopher Monckton is certainly the most outrageous and per-
haps the most famous of the world’s climate deniers, he is by no means alone
on the stage. Anthony Watts is the founder and editor of a popular blog
called Watts Up with That. Watts studied electrical engineering and meteor-
ology at Purdue University and so should understand the basics of climate
science. Nevertheless, he has made a career out of disputing the evidence—
particularly the meteorological data published in the US. It’s a well-man-
aged website and Watts writes engagingly and authoritatively, which perhaps
explains why the blog is so popular.
414
M. J. Bush
The blog has scored some notable successes—such as when in 2007

readers spotted a discrepancy in data published by the GISS. The insti-
tute promptly corrected the error, but the smallest insignificant error made
by any agency that is reporting numbers related to climate is immediately
seized upon by climate deniers as evidence of a deliberate manipulation of
climate data by international agencies and ‘proof ’ that global warming has
no scientific basis.
While the performance of English eccentrics and American climate
deniers might seem amusing but largely irrelevant, the constant undercur-
rent of climate contradiction has an impact on the public’s perception of the
issue—particularly in the US.
A total of 13% of Americans polled in a survey in 2019 believe that the
climate is changing but that human activity is not responsible. A further 5%
believe the climate is not changing at all. So that adds up to almost one in
five Americans who presumably believe that action to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases is unnecessary.84
Conclusion
The fossil fuel companies have employed nearly every trick in the book to
try and ensure the continuation of the preeminent position of coal, oil and
natural gas as the world’s principal sources of energy. In the 1990s, as scien-
tists increasingly understood and confirmed the link between emissions of
carbon dioxide and global warming and reported on the adverse effects of
a warming planet on the global climate, many scientists and policymakers
started to accept that the use of fossil fuels for the generation of electricity
would eventually have to be curtailed, and that renewable sources of energy
would need to be developed and deployed at scale. Investment in the design
and manufacture of electric vehicles soared, and nearly all the major car
companies produced and demonstrated concept electric cars. For the fossil
fuel companies, the writing was on the wall–but it was not a message they
were prepared to accept. It still isn’t.
By 1991 the campaign of disinformation intended to sew doubt and
uncertainty about global warming in the minds of the American public was
in full swing. The amount of money allocated to this cause was huge. But
the fossil fuel and petrochemical companies have very deep pockets, and oil
companies like ExxonMobil and their allies like the Koch Industries have
spent hundreds of millions of dollars to persuade the public and compliant
politicians that climate science is flawed and unsettled.
415
The complex web of deceit, denial, and disinformation orchestrated by

ExxonMobil and channelled through a multifaceted set of bogus thinktanks
masquerading as legitimate scientific institutions was the most sophisti-
cated effort. It has been very successful. Even in 2018, a considerable num-
ber of people are unsure if global warming and climate change are really as
much of a threat as mainstream science asserts. The constant attacks on the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have undermined its author-
ity—even though the IPCC has won a Nobel prize and its reports represent
the most detailed and careful summary of the findings and conclusions of
hundreds of the world’s best scientists.
The efforts by the fossil fuel and petrochemical companies to undermine
and limit government policies to introduce carbon pricing, improve the fuel
efficiency of vehicles, and to promote renewable energy technologies such as
solar energy and wind power have continued to the present day, and show
no sign of letting up. At the same time, pro fossil-fuel classroom propaganda
targeting young schoolchildren is becoming the norm in many American
states. In the US, oil and gas industry lobbyists and their allies have suc-
ceeded in capturing many of the regulatory agencies charged with oversee-
ing their activities and ensuring their compliance with environmental laws
which, in 2019, were being systematically weakened and rolled back by the
Trump administration.
Notes
1. Time Magazine. Science: Invisible Blanket. 25 May 1953. Accessed at:
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,890597,00.html?
2. Plass, G.N.: The carbon dioxide theory of climate change. Bulletin of the
American Meteorological Society 34 (1953): 80.
3. Revelle, R. et al.: Atmospheric carbon dioxide, in President’s Science
Advisory Committee, Panel on Environmental Pollution, Restoring the
quality of our environment: report of the panel on environmental pollution
(Washington, DC, The White House). 1965.
4. Quoted in the book by Oreskes, Naomi and Conway, Erik: Merchants of
Doubt. Bloomsbury Press. 2010. Much of the material in this chapter is
based on this really excellent book.
5. See the report from the Energy and Policy Institute: Utilities knew:
Documenting electric utilities’ early knowledge and ongoing deception on cli-
mate change from 1968–2017. Available at: https://www.energyandpolicy.
org/utilities-knew-about-climate-change/.
416
M. J. Bush
6. The report from the Stanford Research Institute is only partially available.
See https://www.smokeandfumes.org/documents/document16.
7. The Office of the Historian: Milestones 1969–1976. Oil Embargo 1973–1974.
Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo.
8. The ad is shown on page 33 of the EPI report (Utilities Knew ) cited above.
9. EPI Report. Op. cit.
10. See https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/95/hr6669/summary.
11. See Merchants of Doubts. Op. cit. The NAS Report is available at: https://
www.nap.edu/catalog/18714/changing-climate-report-of-the-carbon-
dioxide-assessment-committee.
12. EPRI Report. Op. cit.
13. EPRI Report. Op. cit.
14. Banerjee, N., Cushman, J.H., Hasemeyer, D., and Song, L.: Exxon: The
road not taken. Inside Climate News. 2015.
15. Merchants of Doubt. Op. cit., page 184.
16. https://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-ex-
pert-tells-senate.html.
17. See the Sourcewatch website: Global Climate Coalition. Accessed at:
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Global_Climate_Coalition.
18. See the Wikipedia entry for the Global Climate Coalition. Accessed at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Climate_Coalition.
19. See ClimateFiles: 1991 Information Council on the Environment test
denial campaign plan and survey. Available at: http://www.climatefiles.
com/denial-groups/ice-campaign-plan/#document/p3/a320609.
20. Quoted in Merchants of Doubt. Op. cit.
21. See http://kyotoprotocol.com.
22. Smoke, Mirrors & Hot Air: How ExxonMobil uses big tobacco’s tactics to man-
ufacture uncertainty on climate science. The Union of Concerned Scientists.
2007. The Global Science team memo is appended to this report, which
is available at https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/docu-
ments/global_warming/exxon_report.pdf.
23. Ibid.
24. Inside Climate News. How big oil lost control of its climate misinformation
machine. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/22122017/
big-oil-heartland-climate-science-misinformation-campaign-koch-api-
trump-infographic.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Supran, S., and Oreskes, N.: “Assessing ExxonMobil’s climate change com-
munications (1977–2014)”. Environmental Research Letters 12 (2017):
084019.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
417
30. Mentioned in Supran and Oreskes. Op. cit.

machine. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/22122017/big-
oil-heartland-climate-science-misinformation-campaign-koch-api-trump-
infographic.
32. See the IPCC 3rd Assessment Report at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/
uploads/2018/05/SYR_TAR_full_report.pdf.
33. See Michael Mann’s book: The hockey stick and the climate wars. Accessed
at: https://www.michaelmann.net/books/hockey-stick.
34. Environmental Defense Fund. Perspectives of scientists who become tar-
gets: Michael Mann. Accessed at: https://climatesciencedefensefund.
org/2017/07/20/perspectives-of-scientists-who-become-targets-michael-
mann/.
35. Ibid.
36. Union of Concerned Scientists: How the fossil fuel industry harassed climate
scientist Michael Mann. Accessed at: http://www.ucsusa.org/how-fossil-fu-
el-industry-hrassed-climate-scientist-michael-mann#.W8Y782hKjIU.
37. The text is from Climate Change 2013: The physical science basis. Chapter 9:
Evaluation of climate models. Available at: www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-re-
port/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_Chapter09_FINAL.pdf.
38. See Climate Change 2013. The IPCC 5th Assessment Report WG1.
Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_
all_final.pdf.
39. Karl, T.R., Arguez, A., Huang, B. et al.: “Possible artifacts of data biases in
the recent global surface warming hiatus”. Science 348 (6242): 1469–1472.
Accessed at: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/348/6242/1469/.
40. Huffington Post. Meet the House science chairman who’s trying to put global
warming research on ice. Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
federal-eye/wp/2015/12/22/meet-the-house-science-committee-chairman-
whos-trying-to-put-global-warming-research-on-ice/. See also the 2015 arti-
cle in The Guardian: Lamar Smith, climate scientist witch hunter. Accessed at:
https://theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2015/
nov/11/lamr-smith-climate-scientist-witch-hunter/.
41. Report of the Democratic staff of the House Committee on Science, Space
& Technology for Democratic Members and Staff: Much ado about noth-
ing: A minority review of the majority’s climate science investigation. March
2017.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. OSS Foundation. S. Fred Singer. Accessed at: http://ossfoundation.us/
projects/environment/global-warming/myths/s.-fred-singer.
418
M. J. Bush
46. OSS Foundation. The Cosmos Myth. Accessed at: http://ossfoundation.us/

projects/environment/global-warming/myths/revelle-gore-singer-lindzen.
More information about the lawsuit against Justin Lancaster can be found
in the excellent book by Hoggan, James: Climate cover-up: The crusade to
deny global warming. Greystone Books. 2009.
47. Ibid.
48. Inside Climate News. Industry lawsuits try to paint environmental
activism as illegal racket. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/04102017/greenpeace-rico-racketeering-lawsuit-environmental-activ-
ism-resolute-dakota-access.
49. Ibid.
50. Ecowatch. Fracking giant sues Dimock resident for $5 M for speaking to
media about water contamination. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/
fracking-dimock-2474053132.html.
51. Inside Climate News. How energy companies and allies are turning the
law against protestors. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
22082018/pipeline-protest-laws-felony-free-speech-arrests-first-amend-
ment-oklahoma-iowa-louisiana.
52. Ibid.
53. Inside Climate News. More states crack down on pipeline protesters, including
supports who aren’t even on the scene. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.
org/news/28032019/pipeline-protest-crackdown-state-law-legislation-
south-dakota-conspirators-riot-boosting.
54. See Trump pushes up to 20 years in prison for pipeline protestors. Accessed
at: https://thinkprogress.org/trump-pipeline-protestors-20-years-texas-
7d6e4e06a33b/.
machine. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/22122017/big-
oil-heartland-climate-science-misinformation-campaign-koch-api-trump-
infographic.
56. Inside Climate News. Educators decry conservative group’s climate propa-
ganda sent to schoolteachers.
57. Public Integrity. Oil’s pipeline to America’s schools: Inside the fossil-fuel
industry’s not-so-subtle push into K-12 education. Available at: https://
apps.publicintegrity.org/oil-education/. Also see Oil’s pipeline to America’s
schools. Accessed at: https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2017/06/15/
oils-pipeline-to-americas-schools/.
58. Ibid.
59. See http://www.oogeep.org/about-page/about/.
60. See Alberta Partners with Major Oilsands Companies to Develop
Kindergarten to Grade Three Curriculum. Accessed at: https://thenarwhal.
ca/alberta-partners-major-oilsands-companies-develop-kindergarten-grade-
3-curriculum.
419
61. Quoted in the American Journal of Public Health article. The Environmental
Protection Agency in the early Trump Administration: Prelude to Regulatory
Capture. Accessed at: https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/
AJPH.2018.304360.
62. Quoted in the excellent book by James Hoggan and Richard Littlemore:
Climate Cover-up: The crusade to deny global warming. Greystone Books.
2009.
63. Quoted in the Wikipedia entry Phillip Cooney.
64. New York Times. Bush aide softened greenhouse gas links to global warming.
8 June 2005. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/08/politics/
bush-aide-softened-greenhouse-gas-links-to-global-warming.html.
65. This bulleted text is taken from the article in the American Journal of Public
Health. Op. cit.
66. See the Wikipedia entry for Scott Pruitt at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Scott_Pruitt.
67. CNN Politics: A former coal lobbyist is the new leader of the EPA. Accessed at:
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/andrew-wheeler-epa/index.html.
68. See the report from Public Citizen: A key cog in Charles Koch’s master plan:
How the purportedly unbiased George Washington University Regulatory
Studies Center advances an agenda to deregulate America. Available at:
https://www.citizen.org/article/koch-cog-rsc/.
69. Ecowatch. No results found: Thousands of climate science links purged from
USGS online database. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/climate-
change-usgs-2487110840.html. Also see Energy department tells staff to stop
using the phrase ‘climate change’. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/
energy-dept-bans-climate-language-2336490869.html.
70. Inside Climate News. These voters could approve the first U.S. carbon fee. Big
oil is spending millions to defeat it. 29 October 2018. Accessed at: https://
insideclimatenews.org/news/29102018/election-2018-washington-car-
bon-fee-ballot-initiative-price-carbon-big-oil-opposition.
71. See Blocking the sun: Utilities and fossil-fuel interests that re undermining
American solar power. Accessed at: https://frontiergroup.org/reports/fg/
blocking-sun-1.
72. See Smoke, Mirrors and Hot Air. Appendix B. Op. cit.
73. See the Blocking the sun pamphlet. Accessed at: https://frontiergroup.org/
sites/default/files/resources/Factsheet%20-%20Blocking%20the%20
Sun%202017.pdf.
74. Blocking the sun. Op. cit.
75. Ibid.
76. Miami Herald. Florida voters say no to misleading solar amendment. 8
November 2016.
77. Miami Herald. Op. cit.
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78. Huffington Post. The Kochs are plotting a multimillion-dollar assault

on electric vehicles. Accessed at: https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/
koch-electric-vehicles_us_56c4d63ce4b0b40245c8cbf6?
79. See Ecowatch. Koch brothers launch attack to kill electric cars. Accessed at:
https://www.ecowatch.com/koch-brothers-electric-cars-2456866524.html.
80. See DeSmogBlog. The Koch brothers’ last ditch attempt to kill the electric
vehicle tax credit. Accessed at: https://www.desmogblog.com/2018/12/14/
koch-brothers-last-ditch-attemp-kill-electric-vehicle-tax-credit/.
81. New York Times. The oil industry’s covert campaign to rewrite American car
emissions rules. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/cli-
mate/cafe-emissions-rollback-oil-industry.html.
82. See Trump advisor compared ‘demonisation’ of carbon dioxide to the
Holocaust. Accessed at: https://news.sky.com/story/trump-adviser-com-
pared-demonisation-of-carbon-dioxide-to-the-holocaust-11730520,
and also the DeSmogBlog article at: https://www.desmogblog.com/
william-happer.
83. See the entertaining Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Christopher_Monckton,_3rd_Viscount_Monckton_of_Brenchley.
84. See US is hotbed of climate denial, major global study finds. Accessed at:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/07/us-hotbed-
climate-change-denial-international-poll/.
9
How to End the Climate Crisis
Introduction
The reports about the worsening impacts of climate change that were published
in 2018 and 2019 have convinced increasing numbers of people that govern-
ments need to take much more forceful action to reduce emissions of green-
house gases, and that this can only be achieved by making major changes in
the way energy is provided to people in all countries across the world. Shutting
down coal-fired power plants, electrifying the transport sector, making cities
and towns car-free and pedestrian-friendly, and generating solar photovoltaic
electricity throughout the built environment, are all measures that are essential
if the climate crisis is to be brought to an end. These changes amount to a par-
adigm global shift in the use of new forms of energy. This has happened before
in the history of mankind, but never in a situation like the present where the
steadily worsening climate makes the pace of this transition so urgent.
These changes have started; they are underway, but the pace of change is far
too slow, and the risk is that while politicians continue to argue, ponder and
prevaricate, the global climate will soon change abruptly as tipping points are
reached and triggered that set the Earth on a path from which it cannot recover.
This is not science fiction—it is a real possibility before the middle of this century.
But bringing an end to the climate crisis is possible. We understand the
science and we have the technology. This last chapter outlines in realistic and
practical terms what people can do to help set the world on a more sustain-
able development trajectory—a path that does not lead to uncontrollable
global heating and disastrous climate change.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_9
422
M. J. Bush
The IPCC Special Report

In October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the
IPCC, issued a special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C
above pre-industrial levels and related greenhouse gas emission pathways.1
The most important conclusion of the IPCC’s review—which collates
and summarises the evidence and findings of many of the world’s top cli-
mate scientists, is that the commitments made by countries that signed up
to the 2015 Paris Agreement are nowhere near sufficient to limit warming
to 1.5 °C. Human activities are estimated to have already caused global
warming of about 1.0 °C above pre-industrial levels. If emissions continue
to rise at the current rate, global warming will reach 1.5 °C sometime after
2030. Moreover, on its present course, the world is on a pathway that leads
to warming of at least 3 °C by 2100. Most scientists believe that warming
of this magnitude will have disastrous environmental and economic conse-
quences, particularly in tropical countries and small island states where the
impacts of climate change are expected to be most severe.
Global warming of 1.5 °C is generally thought to be manageable. But
there are significant regional differences. Warming is increasing at a higher
rate over land compared to the oceans, and most importantly is increasing 2
or 3 times faster than average in the Arctic—where the Greenland ice sheet
is melting and permafrost soils are likely to slowly release carbon in the form
of methane—a powerful greenhouse gas that fiercely stokes global heating.
Climate related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply,
human security, and economic growth are all expected to increase. Regions
at higher risk include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, small island devel-
oping states, and the poorer developing countries. Populations at dispropor-
tionately higher risk of adverse consequences of global warming of 1.5 °C
include disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, many indigenous peo-
ples, and communities dependent on agriculture or coastal livelihoods.
Countries in the tropics and southern hemisphere subtropics will experience
the largest impacts on economic growth.
Sea level rise will continue beyond 2100 even if global warming is limited
to 1.5 °C. Marine ice sheet instability in Antarctica and the irreversible loss
of the Greenland ice sheet will result in a substantial rise in sea level—proba-
bly of several metres. Many coastal cities, submerged by higher sea levels and
increasingly uninhabitable will be abandoned, causing widespread social and
economic disruption.
Increased warming increases the exposure of small islands, low-lying
coastal areas and deltas to the risks associated with sea level rise for many
9 How to End the Climate Crisis
423
human and ecological systems—including saltwater intrusion, flooding and

damage to coastal infrastructure. Some vulnerable regions, including small
islands and least developed countries, are projected to experience multiple
interrelated climate risks even at global warming of 1.5 °C.
In its 2014 Assessment Report, the IPCC had considered the risks for five
areas of concern: unique and threatened ecosystems; extreme weather events;
distribution of impacts; global aggregate impacts; and large scale singular
events. In the 2018 Special Report, the risk of all these areas of concern is
judged to have increased.2
The Carbon Budget
The carbon budget is the upper limit on the cumulative amount of carbon
that can be emitted into the atmosphere if warming is to be held below a
specified level. Constraining global warming therefore requires limiting the
total cumulative emission of CO2 that has occurred since the preindus-
trial period. At the end of 2017, the remaining budget was estimated to be
between 420 and 580 GtCO2. In 2018, emissions of CO2 were running at
about 42 GtCO2 per year—which suggests that global warming of 1.5 °C
could be reached within 10–14 years.
Moreover, when methane and black carbon are factored in, the budget
could be substantially reduced. Carbon release from permafrost thawing
and methane release from wetlands could reduce the budget by up to 100
GtCO2 over the course of this century.3
The danger is that the carbon budget is going to be exceeded within a
decade if fossil fuels continue to be mined, fracked, pumped and burned at
their present rates. This realisation has led to the campaign known as ‘Keep it
in the ground’, which was discussed earlier in Chapter 3. The IPCC Special
Report confirmed that a large fraction of global fossil fuel reserves, including
the majority of coal reserves, must remain unused and left in the ground if
global warming is to be kept to manageable levels.
Small Island Developing States
The IPCC report contains a stark warning for small island countries. The
continuing warming trend amplifies the exposure of small islands to the
risks associated with sea level rise, saltwater intrusion into island aqui-
fers, bleaching of coral reefs and the destruction of marine ecosystems and
fisheries.
424
M. J. Bush
Just a few days after the IPCC report was issued, and as if to drive the
point home about rising sea levels, an island close to Hawaii became perma-
nently overwashed by the ocean—effectively it disappeared.
East Island was small: only about 1 km long and 130 m wide. The tiny
island was battered by Hurricane Walaka in October 2018 and was almost
totally washed away. The island was an important habitat for endangered
Hawaiian monk seals, Hawaiian green sea turtles and several species of sea-
birds. Hawaiian monk seals are among the most endangered marine mam-
mals in the world—and around 80% of their population are found in the
vicinity of the north-western Hawaiian Islands. Hurricane Walaka was one
of the most intense Pacific hurricanes on record, and the second category 5
hurricane of the 2018 Pacific hurricane season.4
This event is a grim warning for small island states—particularly the
low-lying coral islands in the Pacific: Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu—to name only a few.
Business as Usual
It would be reassuring to report that national governments were alert to the
dangers of global warming and the climate crisis, and were taking serious
and effective measures to try and keep global warming below 2 °C and ide-
ally below 1.5 °C. But this is not happening.
In 2018, the demand for all fuels increased, led by natural gas which
has emerged as the fuel of choice in many countries. Demand for all fuels
rose, with fossil fuels meeting nearly 70% of the growth for the second year
running. Solar and wind posted double-digit growth, but that was not fast
enough to meet the increasing demand for electricity around the world.
Figure 9.1 shows how primary energy demand has increased significantly
since 2015.5
Since 2014, improvements in energy efficiency have slowed. In 2017 and
2018, higher economic growth has not been matched by higher energy pro-
ductivity, and although gaining ground, renewables did not ramp up fast
enough to meet the rise in demand for electricity.
After a brief pause between 2014 and 2016, emissions of energy-related
emissions of carbon dioxide rose again in 2017 and then once more in 2018.
This was the highest rate of growth since 2013, and 70% higher than the
average increase since 2010.
425
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Fig. 9.1 Average annual global primary energy demand growth by fuel, 2011–2018
(Source International Energy Agency)
The increase in 2018 emissions was driven by strong global economic

growth—which pushed energy consumption up by 2.3% in 2018, nearly
twice the average rate of growth since 2010. Table 9.1 shows the top ten
countries in terms of emissions of carbon dioxide.6
The data show that although as a percentage China’s emissions increased
only a modest 2.2% from 2017 to 2018, in absolute terms the increase was
huge (almost 200 million tonnes of CO2): accounting for almost a third
of the total global rise in CO2 emissions from 2017 to 2018. India’s emis-
sions increased by almost as much as China. Emissions from China, India,
South Korea, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have all risen substantially since 2010.
Shamefully, Canada’s emissions have also risen since 2010.
Since 2010, emissions from the USA and Europe have fallen significantly;
and they are down slightly in Japan over the same period.
Once again, coal coal-fired power plants were the largest single contrib-
utor to the growth in emissions with an increase of almost 3% compared
with 2017. Coal alone generated 30% of global CO2 emissions and is esti-
mated to be responsible for one third of the 1 °C increase in global aver-
age surface temperatures above pre-industrial levels. This makes coal the
single largest source of the global temperature increase the planet is now
experiencing.7
On the Wrong Track
It is also instructive to look more closely at countries’ commitments under
the 2015 Paris Agreement. After all, maybe the increase in global emissions
that we are witnessing at present will soon slow down and then start to
426
M. J. Bush
Table 9.1 Top ten CO2 emitting countries in 2018, MtCO2

Country 2010 2016 2017 2018 Change 2017– % change % change
2018 (MtCO2) 2017–2018 2010–2018
1. China 8128.8 9110.2 9220.9 9419.6 198.7 2.2 15.9
2. USA 5403.3 4928.9 4889.1 5017.9 128.8 2.6 −7.1
3. European Union 3944.6 3474.1 3509.1 3439.6 −69.5 −2.0 −12.8
4. India 1661.1 2235.9 2318.7 2481.1 162.4 7.0 49.4
5. Russian Federation 1492.2 1501.5 1488.4 1550.8 62.4 4.2 3.9
6. Japan 1185.2 1180.2 1173.4 1150.1 −23.3 −2.0 −3.0
7. South Korea 614.7 661.0 677.2 696.0 18.8 2.8 13.2
8. Iran 518.0 593.9 622.1 656.4 34.3 5.5 26.7
9. Saudi Arabia 485.1 597.6 591.1 571.0 −20.1 −3.4 17.7
10. Canada 530.1 540.9 554.6 555.3 0.7 0.1 4.8
Global total 30,980.1 32,715.4 33,039.7 33,684.9 645.2 2.0 8.7
427
decrease. Isn’t this what the 181 countries that ratified the Agreement have
supposedly committed to?
The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) is an independent scientific analysis
produced by three research organisations tracking climate action since 2009.
The group tracks progress towards the globally agreed aim of holding warm-
ing well below 2 °C, and pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5 °C.
The CAT quantifies and evaluates climate change mitigation commit-
ments and assesses whether countries are on track to meeting those objec-
tives. It then aggregates country action to the global level and determines the
likely temperature increase by the end of the century. The programme tracks
32 countries covering about 80% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The
organisation evaluates:
• The effect of current abatement policies on emissions: The policies a

government has implemented or enacted and how these are likely to
affect national emission over the time period to 2030.
• The impact of pledges, targets and Nationally Determined
Contributions on national emissions over the time period to 2030.
• The fair share and comparability of effort: Whether a government is
doing its “fair share” compared with others towards the global effort to
limit warming consistent with the Paris Agreement.
CAT’s work is important because many governments are asserting that they
are working towards the emission reduction targets they have set in align-
ment with the 2015 Paris Agreement. But are these countries on track to
actually achieve those objectives?
Climate Action Tracker ranks countries according to the degree to which
their emission reduction efforts are consistent with the Paris Agreement tar-
gets. Figure 9.2 shows the results for 31 countries. All the top ten global
emitters are shown except for Iran (for which data are presumably hard to
obtain). Of the top-ten emissions group shown in Table 9.1, only India is
implementing a programme that is compatible with the 2 °C target. Two
countries: Morocco and The Gambia, are undertaking programmes that are
consistent with achieving the more stringent Paris target of limiting global
warming to no more than 1.5 °C.
The USA’s commitment is considered to be ‘critically insufficient’: it
has threatened to pull out of the Paris Agreement. Both Canada and the
European Union are rated as insufficient’.8
428
M. J. Bush
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h WĞƌƵ
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Fig. 9.2 Comparison of countries’ commitment to meeting the Paris Agreement

targets (Source Climate Action Tracker)
Can We Trust the IPCC Reports?

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has done sterling work. It
was awarded the Nobel prize in 2007 for its “efforts to build up and dis-
seminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the
foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change.”9
But there’s a problem with the work of the IPCC. It is increasingly
being criticised for being so cautious that its assessments of climate change
impacts are becoming misleading. Although it carefully collates and presents
the work of hundreds of world’s best scientists in its voluminous working
group reports, the summary reports for policymakers—the much shorter
reports that most people actually read, are subject in draft form to intense
scrutiny and oversight by government representatives, and are routinely
edited, watered down, and softened into text that is considered to be more
acceptable to all parties. The result is a sort of ‘lowest common denomina-
tor’ approach, and an avoidance of any mention of climate impacts that are
considered to be overly dramatic. This is a problem because global warm-
ing feedback loops and geophysical tipping points may quite probably give
rise to events that have a catastrophic global impact—and that’s definitely
dramatic.
429
In 2014, The Guardian newspaper reported increasing evidence that the

policy summaries on climate impacts and mitigation by the IPCC were sig-
nificantly ‘diluted’ under political pressure from some of the world’s biggest
greenhouse gas emitters, including Saudi Arabia, China, Brazil, and the USA.
In a scathing critique of the way the IPCC’s summary reports are changed
so that they align more closely with the national policies of fossil fuel
dependent countries and their industrial allies, one of the senior IPCC sci-
entists, David Wasdell, wrote:
Greatest pressure to establish grounds for the highest possible (carbon) budget
come from those countries whose national economy, political power and social
stability depend on sustaining the asset value and production revenue derived
from exploitation of their resources of fossil energy. Additional pressure was
applied to the political agents by those vested interests whose sustained profit-
ability was based on the extraction, refining, marketing and use of fossil energy
as the ground of the global economy….The summary for policymakers is a
document of appeasement, not fit for purpose. In reality, if my calculations are
correct, we not only don’t have much of a carbon budget left, we have already
overshot that budget—we’re in overdraft.10
Another lead author on the one of the reports wrote:
At our IPCC meeting, they treated the SPM (summary for policymakers) as
though it were a legal document rather than a scientific report. To achieve con-
sensus, the text of the SPM was made vaguer in many places, and its content
diluted to the extent that in some places not much substance remained.11
The result of this politically motivated interference in the contents of the

Summary for Policymakers report is that policymakers and their advisors are
unaware of the enormity of the problems posed by global heating and the
huge economic costs that will eventually become due. They are essentially
being told not to worry.
Risky Business
Sir Nicolas Stern, who authored the influential 2006 review of the econom-
ics of climate change, stated in 2016 that the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report
(AR5) had systematically and grossly underestimated the risks of unmanaged
climate change, and that many of the report’s estimates of climate change
costs did not account for factors such as catastrophic changes and tipping
points.12
430
M. J. Bush
Stern went on to say that the Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) which
underpin much of the IPCC assessments of risk, suffer from major short-
comings. Not only do they give the misleading impression that a business-
as-usual emissions trajectory has no negative consequences for economic
growth, they generally omit the huge costs of air pollution from the com-
bustion of fossil fuels—costs which are saved if renewable sources of energy
are used instead.13
One of the difficulties of risk assessment is when the scenario being
assessed for risk has a low probability of occurring, but a massively destruc-
tive impact if it does. If the event has never actually occurred—like the sev-
eral tipping point scenarios being assessed, and if the extent of the damage
can never be accurately quantified because estimates differ wildly and by
orders of magnitude, how on earth can the risk of these catastrophic events
be evaluated?
Traditional climate assessment have focused primarily on areas where the
science is mature and the uncertainties well characterized. For example, in
the IPCC nomenclature, future outcomes are considered ‘unlikely’ if they
lie outside the central 67% of a normal probability distribution. For many
types of risk assessment however (such as air travel or nuclear safety), a 33%
chance of occurrence would be considered unacceptably high; a 1% or even
a 0.1% chance would be more typical thresholds.14
While a one-in-three chance is strictly speaking ‘unlikely’, no-one in their
right mind would board an aircraft that had a one-in-three chance of crash-
ing. For catastrophic events, accepting a one-in-three chance that they may
occur is insane.
The range of climate change possibilities for which society must be pre-
pared is often more important than the most likely future outcome, espe-
cially when the range of outcomes includes those that are particularly severe.
To be useful in a risk context, climate change assessments therefore need a
much more thorough exploration of what are called the ‘tails’ of the proba-
bility distributions of physical variables such as sea level rise, global tempera-
tures, and precipitation.15
The Fat Tail Problem
In a normal distribution of probabilities, the curve is symmetric about the

mean value, and the chance that an event could take place further than 2
standard deviations from the mean value is a slim 2.1%. It has an equal
probability of occurring in this range either above or below the mean.
431
But this is an idealized distribution that is rarely found when evaluating the
probability of climate change events. In particular, the probability of the
global temperature increase resulting from higher atmospheric concentra-
tions of carbon dioxide exhibits a curve that is skewed to the right. It has
what is called a ‘fat tail’. What this means is that the probability of an event
occurring more than 2 standard deviations above the mean value is as high
as 10%—a very significant probability if we are talking about an event with
catastrophic global impacts.16
In their book Climate Shock: The Economic Consequences of a Hotter
Planet, economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman explored the
implications of this fat-tailed distribution for climate policy. As an exam-
ple, they looked at the expected global temperature if atmospheric levels
of greenhouse gases rise to about 700 ppm. The models predict that global
temperatures will then be about 3 °C above pre-industrial levels. The stand-
ard deviation of the probability distribution is 1.5 °C, so with a normal dis-
tribution there would be only a 2.1% chance that temperature would be
above 6 °C. A temperature rise of 6 °C would definitely be catastrophic for
the planet and could conceivably lead to the destruction of the majority of
ecosystems and extinction of most of the species on the planet—including
most of its human population.
If there is only a 2.1% chance of temperatures rising to this level, this
level of risk might be acceptable. But with a fat-tailed probability distribu-
tion as shown in Fig. 9.3, the probability of global temperatures rising to
6 °C is actually more than 10%. This is the probability of absolutely cata-
strophic impact caused by atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
rising to 700 ppm. One in ten.17
Permafrost Carbon Emissions
Permafrost soils hold enormous quantities of frozen carbon—twice as much

as is circulating in the atmosphere. As the soil warms the carbon is released
either as carbon dioxide or methane—depending on factors that vary with
soil composition and temperature. The emission of permafrost carbon due
to rising surface air temperatures is potentially one of the strongest and most
dangerous of the positive feedback loops that have the potential to run out
of control so quickly that it amounts to a tipping point.
A 2014 study estimated that around 200 billion tonnes equivalent of
CO2 could be released due to melting permafrost by 2100. This would cause
up to 0.5 °C of extra warming for a business as usual scenario. The authors
432
M. J. Bush
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Fig. 9.3 Probability of global warming for atmospheric CO2 equivalent concentra-

tions of 700 ppm (Source Climate Shock)
stated that the climate projections of the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report and
their associated emission targets do not adequately account for emissions
from thawing permafrost and the effects of this feedback loop on global cli-
mate. They recommended that the IPCC commission a special assessment
focusing on carbon release caused by permafrost thawing.18
But there is another even more worrying problem which potentially
would have an even stronger influence on global temperatures.
Arctic permafrost caps huge amounts of old, geologic methane in subsur-
face reservoirs. Thawing permafrost opens up pathways for this methane to
migrate to the surface where it is released to the atmosphere. This geologic
methane is distinct from the biogenic methane produced by bacterial action
in the upper active layer of thawing permafrost soils. In large areas of the
Arctic, this source of methane is sealed by a cap of permafrost. However,
geologic methane can reach the surface if pathways in this cap exist along
faults or form due to permafrost thawing. An aerial survey of the Canadian
Mackenzie Delta in 2016 detected strong emissions of geologic methane.
The conclusions of this study were that thinning permafrost in a warming
climate may result in increased emissions of geologic methane that is cur-
rently trapped under thick continuous permafrost. In other Arctic regions
with oil and natural gas reservoirs that are currently capped under mainly
continuous permafrost, such as the North Slope of Alaska or Siberia, meth-
ane releases from these geologic sources need to be included when address-
ing future methane emissions.19
If substantial releases of geologic methane from subsurface Arctic reser-
voirs coupled with biogenic methane from thawing permafrost soils start to
433
occur, their effect on the rate of global warming will accelerate a positive
feedback loop that will generate greater emissions—essentially producing
a tipping point that is uncontrollable. There is no question that geologic
methane is now being released. A report in 2018 documented geologic
methane venting from Esieh Lake in Alaska.20
Scientists are also concerned about the stability of huge deposits of meth-
ane hydrates stored below the ocean floor on the shallow East Siberian
Arctic Shelf. These deposits are protected from warmer surface temperatures
by a layer of frozen sub-sea permafrost. The concern is that warmer water
could create areas of unfrozen permafrost called taliks through which large
quantities of methane could be released into the water column and then
vent into the atmosphere. The loss of sea ice leads to seabed warming, which
produces offshore permafrost melt, which generates the release of methane
and produces more global warming in a classic positive feedback loop.
There is still a degree of uncertainty around the level of risk posed by
this scenario. Some scientists argue that the process will take hundreds if
not thousands of years. This is the view presented in the IPCC reports. But
other scientists say that this assessment considerably underestimates the risk.
For example, in 2017, Russian scientists announced that in some areas of
the East Siberian Arctic Shelf the roof of the subsea permafrost had already
reached the depth of hydrate stability—the destruction of which “may cause
massive releases of bubble methane.”21 The scientists warn that the East
Siberian Arctic Shelf holds about 80% of the entire subsea permafrost in the
Northern Hemisphere, under which there are huge hydrocarbon reserves in
the form of methane hydrates, oil and free gas.22
In March 2019, temperatures across Alaska were 22 °C above normal—a
situation a meteorologist described as “startling”.23
Arctic Sea Ice
The IPCC has consistently downplayed the rate at which the extent of sum-
mer sea ice is decreasing. For instance, the 2014 report stated that a nearly
ice-free Arctic Ocean in the summer was possible only under the highest
emissions scenario.24
The reality is different. Arctic summer sea ice has declined by nearly 50%
since satellite observations began in the 1970s. Moreover, the overall thick-
ness, volume, and age of sea ice has decreased by 80% since 1979. Older
thicker multi-year ice used to cover much of the Arctic—but now virtually
all the sea ice in the Arctic Ocean is new ice from the previous one or two
434
M. J. Bush
winters—quite thin and vulnerable to melt. Because the ice is thin, most sci-
entists believe that an ice-free Arctic Ocean in summer is inevitable within
the next decade or two.25
Scientists have warned that climate models have not been able to ade-
quately reproduce observed multi-decadal sea-ice variability and trends in
the Arctic region. Declining sea ice extent is a factor in two positive feed-
back loops that contribute to rising global temperatures: the reduction in the
planet’s reflectivity (albedo) over the north polar regions, and the warming
of the Arctic Ocean seabed that may potentially lead to the release of meth-
ane from subsea hydrates.
A key finding from a 2011 report by the International Cryosphere
Climate Initiative (ICCI) was that observed changes in the Arctic had far
outpaced any projections from scientific modelling, with loss of sea ice, gla-
ciers, snow cover, and permafrost occurring at rates far more rapid than even
the most pessimistic IPCC modelling scenarios.26
The Greenland Ice Sheet
The IPCC has consistently been behind the curve in assessing the risks asso-
ciated with the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. For example, in 2014,
the IPCC reported that “over the period 1992 to 2011, the Greenland and
Antarctic ice sheets have been losing mass, likely at a larger rate over 2002 to
2011.” The report went on to say that the loss of the Greenland ice sheet would
take a millennium or more with a threshold of between 1 and 4 °C of warming.
In short, it sounds like there is nothing much for policymakers to worry about.
In fact, the annual rate of loss had doubled in the period 2003–2010
compared to the rate throughout the twentieth century.27 In 2018, the
International Cryosphere Climate Initiative reported that the ice sheet
was losing mass as much higher rates than those predicted or observed as
recently as five years ago, that most of the significant Greenland glaciers had
retreated and thinned, and that calving of ice at the edges of glaciers into
icebergs had accelerated. The extensive melting has many scientists con-
cerned that Greenland’s ice sheet, especially along the edges, may be vulnera-
ble to rapid ice loss and sudden disintegration into icebergs.28
Antarctic Ice Sheet
In the IPCC 2014 summary report for policymakers it was acknowl-

edged that abrupt and irreversible ice loss from the Antarctic ice sheet was
435
“possible”, but the report declined to provide any kind of data, saying that
“current evidence and understanding is insufficient to make a quantitative
assessment.”29
This seems odd. Surely there was evidence of some degree of loss of mass?
In fact, satellite observations of accelerating ice mass loss in West Antarctica
were well established by this time. Data from the GRACE satellites in
2009 clearly showed that over the period 2002–2009 there was an increase
in mass loss from both ice sheets: Greenland and Antarctica, and that the
combined contribution of both ice sheets was accelerating. The satellite data
confirmed that the two ice sheets play an important role in global sea level
rise, and that their contribution is continuously and rapidly growing.30 The
IPCC apparently preferred to consult its Earth System Models rather than
the data from sophisticated and very accurate satellites.
The satellite data were reinforced by a detailed analysis that was published
in June 2018. The data showed that the Antarctic Peninsula, the smallest ice
sheet in Antarctica has lost an average of 20 billion tonnes (Gt) of ice a year
over the 25-year study period. Moreover, the rate of loss increased during
the study period and especially since the year 2000—in fact it tripled over
the period between 1992 and 2017.31
Over the Antarctic ice sheet as a whole, the loss of mass was calculated
at almost 220 billion tonnes a year—and the rate of loss is increasing. The
most rapid loss is occurring in the West Antarctic ice sheet, where the ice is
being melted from below by warm ocean waters—a process that may be pro-
ducing instability in the largest glaciers. These include the Pine island and
Thwaites glaciers which are both losing more mass than any other glacier in
the world.32
A more recent detailed assessment, published in early 2019, calculated the
rate of melting from the Antarctic ice sheet as being even higher: at about
250 billion tonnes a year over the period 2009–2017. Moreover, the analysis
confirmed once again that the rate of loss of mass is increasing.33
Sea Level Rise
This is an area of analysis where the IPCC continues to ignore much of the
data and to be overly cautious to the point of almost misrepresenting the
evidence.
In the 2014 IPCC Summary for Policymakers report, the range of sea level
rise in 2100 is given as somewhere between 0.26 and 0.82 metres. Even at
the upper bound of the range of uncertainty, the maximum sea level rise
projected for 2100 is less than 1 metre. This is way below other estimates
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M. J. Bush
made by reputable scientific agencies. In 2008, the US geological Survey

warned that sea level rise will substantially exceed official UN projections
and could top 1.5 metres by the end of the century. Australian government
reports noted: Recent research, presented at the Copenhagen Climate Conference
in 2009, projected sea level rise from 0.75 to 1.9 metres relative to 1990 with
1.1 to 1.2 metres the midrange of the projection. Even at that time, estimates
of sea level rise were ranging from 0.5 to 2 metres by 2100.34
The misleading projection of sea level rise is probably the worst example
of the IPCC’s inclination to downplay risk and to avoid any discussion of
the results of scientific work that could be viewed as being overly dramatic.
An updated 2017 NOAA report on sea level rise projected a worst-case sce-
nario of 2.5 metres by 2100. The report noted the growing evidence that
both the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are losing mass at an increas-
ing rate, and that worst-case scenarios are looking increasingly more likely
and so should be taken in account in policymaking and coastal zone
planning.35
The IPCC estimates of sea level rise are based on what it calls ‘multi
model simulations’.36 Clearly these simulations are inaccurate and give a
dangerously false impression to policymakers that sea level rise is unlikely
to pose a serious problem between now and the end of the century. This is
simply not true.
One of the IPCC report’s most forceful statements was actually deleted
from the initial draft of its last assessment report. It was a text box that listed
climate change impacts of a magnitude that might imperil unique ecosys-
tems or risk catastrophic one-off events like the collapse of the Greenland
and Antarctic ice sheets. It also discussed what it would take to stabilize
climate change in sufficient time to stave off these worst impacts. The box
stated that rapid and deep emission reductions would be required to keep
global warming below 2 °C and noted that the carbon budget of about 1000
gigatonnes would be exhausted in the next 20 or 30 years.37
Apparently, some delegates felt that the proposed language and wording
were ‘unbalanced’. In discussions among delegates and scientists, it eventu-
ally proved impossible to find language that everyone could accept. The way
the IPCC works is that scientists write the text but it has to be approved by
governments. The scientists can veto inaccuracies but governments can also
prevent the inclusion of certain text. So the text box was dropped from the
final version of the report.38
The fundamental conclusion from the analysis and the scientific work
referred to in this section is that the IPCC reports cannot be relied on to
present a realistic assessment of the risks the world is running as it continues
437
to emit substantial quantities of greenhouse gases, and as climate change

becomes more intense and destructive as global temperatures continue to
rise. There is an urgent need for clear, evidence-based, peer-reviewed reports
evaluating climate change and its impacts, written by scientists unfettered by
government interference and unimpeded by lobbying by fossil fuel and pet-
rochemical industry vested interests.
Settling the Argument
As the climate crisis continues to intensify, it should be clear to everyone
that the global response to global heating, climate change, and the greater
risk of storms, wildfires, and flooding is totally inadequate. Given the over-
whelming evidence that many tropical countries are facing a catastrophic
future, and small islands even an existential threat, why is the global
response so weak?
In the US, a 2017 poll found that only two-thirds of respondents believed
that global warming is caused by human activities. This figure was up
slightly from 2016, but still shows that a third of Americans do not believe
that global warming is caused by human activity. Moreover, only 71% of
those surveyed agree that “most scientists believe that global warming is occur-
ring ”—meaning that 29% of the people surveyed believe that most scien-
tists do not agree, which implies that these respondents are uncertain and
doubtful about the science—exactly the objective of the campaign waged by
ExxonMobil and the fossil fuel companies for the last 30 years.39
The figures are similar in Canada—where nearly a third of Canadians say
they are not convinced that climate change is being caused by human and
industrial activity—which implies once again that they do not believe the
science—or the scientists.40
Extreme weather like wildfires, hurricanes, heatwaves and drought—
which have all seriously afflicted the US over the last few years, may have
persuaded more Americans that climate change is real, but the message from
the White House and from senior advisors in the Trump administration
continues to be that the science is unsettled and the evidence doubtful. In
Canada, the weak response may simply be because for most Canadians cli-
mate change isn’t yet having much of an impact—in spite of the increas-
ing number of wildfires and floods, and the report in 2019 that stated that
Canada is warming at a rate that is twice the global average.
Part of the problem is that there is not nearly enough unbiased and objec-
tive media coverage of the impacts of the changing climate. The IPCC
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M. J. Bush
reports do a decent job of collating and presenting the scientific consensus

and the evidence supporting the science—but in overly cautious language
that is sometimes impenetrable for the layman. Even the summary for pol-
icymakers is heavy going and so interwoven with the careful language of
probabilities, confidence levels and interquartile ranges that it is often dif-
ficult to separate out the core message from the thicket of detail provided
in the text. What is needed is a report accompanying the IPCC summaries,
free from interference and written in language that the layman can grasp and
understand and illustrated with photos and infographics that get the key
messages across.
Managing the media, reinforcing the message, and countering the fake
news and contrarian pseudo-science takes money. And at the moment, the
scientists and engineers that speak about global warming are being outspent,
outplayed, and outmuscled by the fossil fuel industries and the petrochemi-
cal conglomerates.
Every reputable scientist knows that the climate is changing and that
the science is incontrovertible. But you wouldn’t believe it if you listen to
many politicians in Canada, the US, and the UK. The best climate scientists
should be on television almost every night and certainly every time a major
climate report is issued by the peer-reviewed scientific journals and by the
IPCC. This is not happening—and it’s leaving the field open for the charla-
tans and climate contrarians who exploit the media to convey their message.
They have no access to the peer-reviewed scientific journals, but they seem
to have easy access to the mainstream media.
Part of the problem is that many media platform are still locked into the
idea of equal time for opposing ideas—which has been debunked as unwar-
ranted when the issue being addressed is evidence-based climate science.
This perspective is compounded by the fact that most media people are not
scientists, do not fully understand climate science, and may believe them-
selves that the science is unsettled. They are therefore persuaded that debat-
ing climate science with climate deniers is in the public interest—thereby
contributing to the very problem reputable mainstream scientists are trying
to overcome.
Action Not Words
It should be clear when readers get to this point in the book that people
need to take action. It’s not enough to stand back and hope for the best.
Nor it is a good idea just to leave it up to the politicians—even if govern-
ment ministers swear that they are committed to tackling climate change.
439
You have to look at what your government is actually doing, learn more
about what policies work, and what is just lip service and window dressing
to attract votes from people who are justifiably concerned about the future
of the planet and the fate of their children.
If we look again at the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) graphic show-
ing the global emission gaps, we can identify an interesting characteristic.
In global terms, we can see that the 1990 emission level of 36 GtCO2e is
close to where the world needs to be in 2030. The median emission level
to meet the 2 °C target is 39 GtCO2e. Figure 9.4 shows the level of emis-
sions in 1990 and CAT’s estimate of the median value of emissions in 2030
that would keep the world on track to meet the upper target of 2 °C of
warming.41
If a government is proposing to take effective action to reduce its GHG
emissions, at a minimum it should be aiming to reduce its emissions to
1990 levels by 2030. In fact, two of the top three emitters: the USA and
the European Union may have already achieved this target. US emissions of
CO2 from energy consumption rose after 1990, but then started to fall and
are now (at the end of 2018) only 4.6% above 1990 levels; and in Europe,
GHG emissions have been consistently falling since 1990 and continue to
do so.42
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ϭ͘ϱŵĞĚŝĂŶǀĂůƵĞ
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Fig. 9.4 Emission gaps and 1990 emission level as 2030 target (Source Carbon Action
Tracker)
440
M. J. Bush
To close in on the lower 1.5 °C target, global emissions need to be

brought down to about 28 GtCO2e in 2030, which is 78% of the 1990
value. So again, as a rule of thumb, any country that commits to reducing its
emissions to less than its 1990 value by 2030, and is implementing actions
consistent with that target, is largely on track to helping the world meet the
Paris Agreement target of keeping warming to less than 2 °C below pre-
industrial levels. If a country’s 2030 target is less than 78% of 1990 levels,
the plan is consistent with meeting the 1.5 °C Paris Agreement target.
It should be noted that these targets apply at every level of government. At
a minimum, emission reduction targets for a town or city, and even a small
municipality, should aim to bring emissions down to 1990 levels by 2030.
After 2030, global emissions of greenhouse gases will still need to con-
tinue to fall if the Paris Agreement targets are actually to be achieved by
2050. What should be a country’s emissions target for 2050? In 2018, the
European Commission issued a communication entitled A Clean Planet for
All which sets out a long-term vision for what it calls a “prosperous, modern,
competitive and climate neutral economy.”43 The target is ambitious: net
zero emissions by 2050. What this means in practice is that emissions fall
by about 90% compared to 2005 levels: from around 5000 million tonnes
of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) down to one tenth of that figure—about 500
MtCO2e. The remaining emissions—ones that are difficult to completely
eliminate—are compensated by the absorption of atmospheric greenhouse
gases by natural terrestrial sinks and by carbon removal technologies—most
of which are still are under development but which could very likely be
technically feasible and commercially viable within the next decade.
A Framework for Climate Action

Formulating a detailed logical framework for the actions required in order
to attain an overall goal is a methodology that produces a comprehensive
description of how a desired change is to take place in a specific context. The
method first identifies the desired long-term goal, and then works back from
this point to define the intermediate outcomes (sometimes called strategic
objectives) that need to be achieved in order for the goal to be attained.
The logical framework (often called a log frame) provides the basis for
identifying which activities and interventions will lead to producing the
strategic objectives essential for achieving the long-term goal. This leads to
better focused and more efficient planning and implementation and enables
a much more rigorous monitoring and evaluation system to be established
441
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ĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĨŝĞĚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ƐŝŶŬ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ
Fig. 9.5 Logical framework for a transition to a net zero greenhouse gas economy
by 2050 (The seven strategic objectives and much of the text is based on the EU publi-
cation: A clean planet for all )
since indicators can be formulated for each strategic objective and for each
associated activity.
As an example of how a log frame approach might be applied to solving
the climate crisis, we examine how governments could work towards achiev-
ing the 2050 emission target proposed by the European Union in 2019. The
target for the EU is: “greenhouse gas emissions neutrality by 2050.” This tar-
get, if it can be achieved, is compatible with the more stringent 1.5 °C goal
proposed under the Paris Agreement.44 The European plan has seven com-
ponents which are incorporated into the seven strategic objectives shown in
the logical framework presented in Fig. 9.5.
Strategic Objectives
All seven strategic objectives need to be operationalised if the net zero green-
house gas emission target is to be achieved and global heating held below
2 ºC above pre-industrial levels.
SO1: Buildings Are Zero Emission

Greatly improved energy efficiency plays a central role in curtailing emis-
sions of greenhouse gases. Higher efficiency means less energy used for a
given unit of economic production or level of service. Increased efficiency is
important in industry but much of the reduction in the demand for energy
will take place in buildings in both the residential and commercial built
environment. Since most of the buildings that will be occupied in 2050 have
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M. J. Bush
already been built today, a substantial retrofit and renovation programme is

essential. This will require switching away from fossil fuels to clean technolo-
gies for heating and cooling using electricity, district heating, renewable nat-
ural gas, or solar thermal energy. More efficient home appliances will be the
norm, and smart energy management systems that control buildings systems
will be standard.
The ideal form of construction is one that is net zero energy—so not
even an external source of renewable energy is required. Net zero neigh-
bourhoods, districts and communities have been constructed: such as the
Kaupuni Village housing project in Hawaii and the Sonnenschiff solar city
in Freiberg, Germany which produces four times the amount of energy it
consumes. The City of Cambridge, Massachusetts, has created a plan for all
buildings to be net zero by 2040. California is tightening its buildings codes
so that all new residential construction will be net zero energy by 2020.45
Renovating the existing building stock so that it conforms to more
stringent building codes that minimise energy consumption requires the
availability of financial instruments that enable and facilitate the initial
investment. It is generally a financially attractive option: payback times are
typically between five and seven years.
In the US, local governments use Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE)
programs to help property owners finance renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency improvements in residential and commercial properties, including
multi-family residential, industrial and agricultural properties. The PACE
concept began in 2008 as a pilot project in Berkeley, California. Since that
time, many states have followed suit.
PACE programs enable property owners to avoid the high initial costs
of installing clean energy technology, such as solar rooftop systems, or
energy-saving retrofits, by enabling access to low interest, long-term loans.
More importantly, PACE programs allow property owners to pay for these
improvements over time through adjustments to their property taxes. Once
a property owner opts for a PACE financing loan, the property remains sub-
ject to the PACE arrangement even if it is sold or transferred. The remainder
of the assessment is a lien on the property.46
Renovation and retrofits to buildings are driven by legislation that man-
dates much more stringent building codes, which need to be revised to
require all-electric buildings and super energy-efficient construction. A date
should be set for phasing out the use natural gas in buildings—which will
no longer be used for water and space heating. An energy audit should be
mandatory for all residences and offices; and in order to sell a property, a
valid energy audit will be required.
443
SO1 Policy Initiatives

Policy Action items
1. A
ll new buildings • New housing and office construction is 100% electric with heat
are to be 100% pumps providing heating and cooling
electric • District heating is employed on all multi-unit high rise buildings
• Rooftop solar electricity is routinely installed on all government
administrative and municipal buildings
• All new construction is ‘solar-ready’ with cabling pre-installed
2. A
ll new con- • Building codes are revised and mandate very high thermal effi-
struction is super ciency in all new buildings
energy efficient • All new buildings are net zero energy
• Home appliances are rated using the Energy Star system which is
obligatory
• Smart meters are standard and manage all energy consumption
in buildings
3. H
eat pumps are • Ground- and air-based heat pumps are promoted through
incentivised subsidies, incentives, and financing mechanisms that encourage
homeowners to switch from natural gas to electricity for heating
and cooling
• Innovative financing instruments incentive homeowners to elec-
trify and increase the thermal efficiency of residences
4. R
etrofitting and • The use of natural gas for water and space heating is phased out
renovating exist- and eventually prohibited
ing buildings is • PACE-type programs (Property Assessed Clean Energy) are
prioritised available in all countries and jurisdictions. Residences and offices
are taxed by municipalities according to their energy efficiency
ratings
• Energy audits for all buildings are mandatory and must be valid
when a building is sold—including all residential property
SO2 Energy Systems Are Fully Electrified

In 2019, most of the systems that provide energy to society continue to be
based on fossil fuels. By 2050, this structure has to radically change: with
the energy system becoming fully decarbonised based on renewable sources
of energy. The large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies will
lead to the electrification of the economy and to a high degree of decentrali-
sation. The global expansion of renewable energy has led to huge cost reduc-
tions in the last ten years particularly in solar and both onshore and offshore
wind power. In Europe in 2050, more than 80% of electricity is expected to
come from renewables, with the remainder generated by nuclear power.
The role of nuclear power is controversial. It does not produce emissions of
carbon and so can be included in a zero emissions portfolio of energy technol-
ogies, but strictly speaking it is not renewable. It also comes with considerable
risks. The assumption here is that nuclear power plants continue to operate up
to their design lifetimes, but that no new plants are constructed and those that
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M. J. Bush
are under construction but not yet completed are not commissioned. Shutting
down operating plants too quickly can create problems if alternative means of
generating baseload power are not yet fully operational. In Germany in 2017,
closing down several nuclear power plants led to an increase in the use of coal
when electricity demand peaked during winter months. This is not a good
trade off. Better to wait until renewable power systems are more than adequate
to meet peak demand before shutting down nuclear plants. Utility-scale pho-
tovoltaic systems and wind power are now the least expensive option, with a
levelized cost of electricity which is less than nuclear power. Moreover, several
forms of renewable power, such as ocean and wave energy, may soon provide
additional sources of clean electricity.
Rooftop solar electricity is a mature and cost-competitive technology but
in the US its deployment is being deliberately impeded by burdensome reg-
ulations and discriminatory tariffs imposed by electric power utilities that
seek to limit solar’s market penetration. Rooftop solar users should have the
right to net metering payments and feed-in-tariffs set by a regulatory agency
free from interference by the utilities.
The competitive deployment of renewable electricity also provides a
major opportunity for the decarbonisation of other sector such as heating,
transport and industry, either through direct use of electricity or indirectly
through the production of clean fuels like hydrogen produced by the hydrol-
ysis of water.
Utility scale photovoltaic power plants and wind farms produce elec-
tricity that is now less expensive than coal, natural gas, and nuclear power.
Advances in megawatt-scale energy storage systems mean that intermittency,
which is a natural characteristic of solar energy and wind power, is no longer
a technical problem. A price on carbon emissions applied to all power gener-
ation technologies will ensure that fossil fuel technologies pay for the cost of
their pollution and that these external costs are internalised.

Policy Action items
1. Coal is no longer used • All coal fired power generation is phased out by 2025
as a fuel for power • The majority of coal mines are closed and the local environ-
generation ment is cleaned up and restored to its original condition. All
tailings ponds must be stabilised, made safe, and pose no
hazard to people or biodiversity
• Coal miners are entitled to free and long-term healthcare,
unemployment benefits, and are prioritised for employment
in clean energy businesses
445
Policy Action items

2. R
ooftop solar • Residential and commercial rooftop solar users have the
energy technology is legal right to net metering arrangements
widely available and • Electric utilities are prohibited from imposing discriminatory
deployed at scale tariffs on solar rooftop users
• Rooftop solar with energy storage is incentivised and
included in PACE-type programs
3. C
arbon emissions • A price on carbon that reflects the external (social) cost of
from power plants are greenhouse gas emissions is imposed on all power plants
taxed • The price of a unit of carbon emissions increases substantially
over time
4. N
uclear power plants • Nuclear power plants continue to operate up to their
continue to operate in design lifetimes, but no new plants are constructed or
the medium term commissioned
5. R
esearch into clean • Governments finance research into wind turbine engineer-
energy technologies is ing technology and photovoltaic physics in order to increase
well funded capacity factors and reduce costs
• Funding for research and demonstration of ocean and tidal
energy systems ramps up
SO3 Mobility Is Clean and Connected

In most modern economies, the transport sector is responsible for a large
part of the emissions of greenhouse gases. All modes of transport, not just
road vehicles, need to contribute to the decarbonisation of the transport sys-
tem. Low and zero emission vehicles with highly efficient alternative power-
trains is the first line of this approach. The automotive industry has already
invested heavily in the development and commercialisation of electric
vehicles. The decarbonisation of automotive transport coupled with smart
autonomous technology brings major benefits including clean air, reduced
noise and fewer accidents, generating substantial health benefits particularly
for urban residents. The electrification of short-distance shipping and inland
waterways is technically feasible and increasingly viable as batteries become
less expensive.
Railways are the most efficient mode of transport for carrying freight
over medium to long distances. Until electrification is feasible, alternative
fuels and biofuels will be important. Hydrogen based technologies such as
fuel cells may also play a role. Aviation must undergo a shift to advanced
biofuels.
Clean mobility also means much greater use of public transport systems
that are smart managed, electrified and energy efficient. With the majority
of the population in modern economies living in urban areas, city planning,
safe cycling and walking paths, zero-emission public transport, and car-,
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M. J. Bush
bike, and scooter-sharing services, will drastically alter the way mobility is
organised and accessed. One substantial co-benefit is that the quality of life
in towns and cities will improve immeasurably.
While the electrification of the transport sector is well underway in several
countries, the market penetration of electric vehicles remains low in Canada
and the USA. The use of gasoline and diesel vehicles should be taxed, while
the use of electric vehicles needs to be strongly incentivised. In the US,
modest regulatory programs to raise the fuel efficiency of gasoline and diesel
vehicles have not been successful because fuel prices have remained relatively
low, and the purchase of SUVs and light trucks, which are less fuel-effi-
cient, has increased. However, in Europe, much stricter emission targets are
planned. Starting in 2020, new passenger vehicles will be limited to emis-
sions of no more than 95 grams of CO2 per kilometre—which translates
into fuel consumption figures of about 57 mpg or 4.13 litres of fuel per 100
kilometres.
In 2018, the Canadian province of British Columbia announced that by
2040 all cars and light trucks sold in the province will be zero emission vehi-
cles (ZEVs). In 2019, this policy was legislated and passed into law. In this
Canadian province, 10% of all cars are to be zero emission by 2025.47 The
state of California is aiming for 5 million zero emission vehicles operating by
2030.48
In parallel with the increased uptake of electric vehicles, public transport
networks and systems in and around cities should be substantially extended
and improved. The majority of people who reside in a high density urban
environment should not need a car. And if they need to travel outside of the
city to an area not serviced by rail, rental vehicles or Uber-type services can
provide the short term availability of a vehicle. Intercity train services (elec-
trified) should be high-speed, frequent and convenient. In cities, light rail
systems provide links to the suburbs. Underground trains run throughout
the downtown core and out to the largest suburban areas. If necessary, pub-
lic transport should be subsidized so that it is routinely used by the majority
of urban and peri-urban residents.
Other behavioural changes by individuals and companies will reduce the
need for travel. For long distance travel, developments in digital technology
and video conferencing may mean that for certain purposes like business
travel, preferences will change and demand for business travel may diminish.
Well-informed travellers and shippers may make more energy-efficient and
cost-effective decisions. Internalising the cost of transport is a prerequisite
for making the most efficient choices in terms of technology and mode of
transport.
447

Policy Action items
1. Zero emission vehi- • The sticker price of electric cars is cross-subsidised by
cles are strongly increased taxes on gasoline and diesel vehicles
promoted • Zero emission vehicles pay no annual license fee and no
toll road charges for a specified number of years
• Charging points for electric vehicles are widely available in
urban areas and along all highways.
• Building codes requires multiple charging points for all
condos and high rise apartment buildings
• All urban parking areas above a certain size require multi-
ple charging points
• Municipalities operate only electric buses and motor
vehicles
2. Gasoline and • The cost of an annual permit or license to operate a motor
diesel vehicles are vehicle is raised for gasoline and diesel vehicles
disincentivised • The excise tax on gasoline and diesel fuel is increased
• New gasoline and diesel vehicles have to meet stricter
emission targets that match European 2020 standards
3. Public transport is • Public transport is massively improved in terms of
prioritised extent, frequency of service, convenience, and customer
satisfaction
• Electric light rail urban transit (overground and under-
ground) is extensively built out
• All intercity rail services are high speed, electrified, and
cost-competitive with air travel
4. Urban design • Bicycle routes are made safer and extended throughout
encourages low urban centres
vehicle usage and • Pedestrian areas are created throughout the urban core
active mobility • More trees are planted every year in urban spaces
• The total area of parks in towns and cities must meet a
mandatory target
• Green spaces are created and protected by a national trust
system
5. Emissions from • Ferries and short haul cargo ships are electric powered
shipping are greatly • International agreements mandate that ships switch to
reduced fuels with lower emissions of greenhouse gases and black
carbon
SO4 Industry Is Efficient in a Circular Economy

Although the consumption of coal, oil and natural gas will fall precipitously
by 2050, the demand for raw materials will continue to grow. Building
large wind turbines and huge arrays of solar panels requires the mining of
millions of tons of minerals and the production of large quantities of plas-
tics produced from petrochemical feedstocks. Construction of the net zero
energy buildings that will house the next generation of urban residents will
require millions of tons of concrete and steel. How are countries going to
produce all of these raw materials, feedstocks, and finished products without
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M. J. Bush
generating substantial quantities of air pollution and the emission of green-

house gases?
Primary raw materials are indispensable elements of all sectors in a car-
bon-neutral economy. But a reduction of materials inputs through re-use
and recycling will improve competitiveness, create business opportunities
and jobs, and require less energy, thereby reducing pollution and greenhouse
gas emissions. Recovery and recycling of raw materials will be essential—
especially for those materials where the supply may possibly be limited: such
as cobalt, lithium, and the rare earths.
New less energy-intensive materials may play an important future
role; but so too may older ones—such as the use of processed and rein-
forced wood in construction. Becoming emissions free may mean signif-
icantly modernising existing installations or completely replacing them.
Digitalisation and automation are some of the more promising and effective
ways to increase competitiveness, leading to gains in efficiency and reduced
emissions. Many industrial emissions will be difficult to eliminate com-
pletely. However, carbon dioxide can be captured, stored and used. Instead
of fossil fuels, both hydrogen and sustainable biomass can be used as a feed-
stock for a number of industrial processes such as steel production and cer-
tain chemicals.49
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is an emerging technology that will be
important in substantially reducing emissions of CO2 from energy-intensive
industries such as steel and cement, biomass and synthetic fuel plants, and
in the production of hydrogen where natural gas may be the initial feed-
stock. If CCS technology can be commercialised relatively quickly, it will
play an important role in removing CO2 from the fossil fuel power plants
that are locked in and will continue to operate for a decade or more.
If CCS is to be developed at scale within the next decade a much larger
research and demonstration effort will be needed to ensure its deployment.
In addition, CCS requires new infrastructure for the transport of the cap-
tured CO2 and its storage in underground reservoirs. For CCS to deliver on
its potential, coordinated and forceful action is therefore required to galva-
nise research and innovation and to scale up successful pilot projects.
Methane emissions from oil and gas industries are harder to control.
However, they will inevitably decline in line with the diminishing impor-
tance of the oil and gas sector as renewable energy-powered electricity
becomes the norm, as the transport sector is electrified, and as the demand
for oil and gas falls significantly.
Substantial improvements in energy efficiency are possible in the indus-
trial sector—but until recently, industry has had no strong incentive to
449
improve operational efficiency.50 A shift towards more efficient industrial

practice needs to be driven by a combination of carbon pricing and regula-
tory control. The problem of carbon leakage will be resolved on a case-by-
case basis to ensure that vulnerable industries are not disadvantaged.

Policy Action items
1. C
arbon pricing is in • Carbon emissions are taxed directly or by a cap-and-trade
effect system.
• Carbon pricing increases substantially every year up to 2050
• Carbon leakage is minimised though an output-based pricing
mechanism
• Vulnerable industries may be exempted, but only if they have
an approved emission reduction plan
2. F uel switching is • Thermal coal is to be phased out after a specified period
mandatory • Alternative bioenergy fuels are developed
• Electric heating technologies are promoted including electric
arc and induction heating
3. C
arbon capture and • Research on CCS is prioritised and becomes mandatory within
storage (CCS) is a specified time period
mandatory
4. N
ew energy efficient • Variable speed electric motors are standard
technology is devel- • Cogeneration and combined heat and power fired by biofuels
oped and showcased is showcased
• Waste heating recovery is standard
• Energy efficient piping design is the norm
5. A
circular economy is • Industrial waste and household waste is measured and taxed
incentivised • Recycling of household waste is mandatory in all
municipalities
• Urban wastewater is treated and recycled for agricultural
production
• All municipal waste treatment plants produce biogas and
fertilizer for agriculture
SO5 Infrastructure Is Smart and Connected

A smart and energy-efficient clean economy needs smart infrastructure that
is fully interconnected and optimized for the most efficient operation, and
adjusted optimally in real time as conditions change. There needs to be
increased integration and compatibility across countries, states, and prov-
inces. New smart infrastructure is needed to support the developments in
electrical power transmission, energy storage systems, demand management
and, possibly, hydrogen pipelines.51
Transitions in the transport sector will require accelerated deployment of
relevant infrastructure, increased synergy between transport and energy sys-
tems with smart charging or refuelling stations that facilitate cross border
services and long distance travel.
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M. J. Bush
Much of the existing infrastructure and energy assets can be upgraded,

providing substantial employment opportunities and new technology areas
of growth.

Policy Action items
1. New smart technology • Governments support research, development, and
is developed demonstration of new smart technologies
• University research into smart management systems is
substantially funded
2. Net zero energy • Building codes require smart systems management in
buildings have smart all new buildings
energy management • All residential and commercial electricity meters are
systems smart and connected
3. New urban devel- • All new urban development projects must demonstrate
opment projects are state-of-the-art energy management systems and net
smart zero energy performance
4. International systems • Governments agree on international protocols so smart
are compatible energy systems can communicate and coordinate their
energy management protocols
5. Smart systems are • Smart technology is protected against cyber attacks
robust and resilient • Government fund research into cyber attack-resistant
protocols
SO6 Land Use Is a Net Carbon Sink

Sustainable biomass has a vital role to play in a net-zero emissions economy.
Biomass can directly supply heat, and it can be transformed into biofuels
and biogas—which can substitute for natural gas. However, all biomass
contains carbon, and so when biomass is burned it produces carbon diox-
ide. Biomass used for fuel must be combined with carbon capture and
storage—a technology still under development. Wood can also be used more
extensively as a building material, essentially locking up carbon for decades.
A net zero emissions economy may require greater amounts of biomass com-
pared to present levels of consumption, with the highest projections indicat-
ing an increase in bio-energy of up to 80% by 2050.52
Agricultural production generates significant emissions of greenhouse
gases but levels can be reduced by the introduction of more efficient and sus-
tainable production methods. Smart technologies allow more precise farm
operations optimising the application of fertilizers and chemicals. Treatment
of manure in anaerobic digesters would reduce non-CO2 emissions and also
451
produce biogas. There is also considerable potential for agriculture to seques-

ter and store carbon.
Improved farming systems including agroforestry techniques that effi-
ciently use nutrient resources exist, enhancing not only soil carbon but
supporting biodiversity and improving the resilience of farming to climate
change. These measures typically increase productivity and reduce inputs
and other environmental impacts such as eutrophication and air pollution.
Carbon stocks in soils can be increased through conservation and regenera-
tive agriculture, reducing soil disturbance and erosion. Restoring peatlands
and wetlands can drastically reduce emissions—these natural landscapes
should be carefully protected.
Enhancing carbon sinks is just as important as efforts to reduce emissions.
Maintaining and further increasing the natural sinks of forests, soils, agricul-
tural lands, and coastal wetlands is absolutely crucial for a net zero emissions
objective, as it allows for the offsetting of residual emissions from sectors
where decarbonisation is difficult, including agriculture itself. In this con-
text, nature based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches often provide
multiple benefits in terms of water management, biodiversity and enhanced
climate resilience.
In order to alleviate the multiple demands on land resources, improving
the productivity of aquatic and marine resources will play an important
role. This includes the production of algae, and other new sources of protein
which have the potential to relieve the pressure on agricultural land.
Setting a price on carbon will do little to induce a move to improve
agricultural techniques, so regulatory measures need to be drawn up, legis-
lated and implemented. Consumer behaviour and preferences can reduce
the demand for agricultural products with a substantial carbon footprint.
Carbon labelling of foodstuff is gaining in importance and should be man-
datory. The large carbon footprint of beef compared to pork and poul-
try needs to be better highlighted and shown on the packaging of all meat
products.53
It is absolutely essential that national governments forcefully protect their
forests, and if possible, enlarge them. The density of trees in most urban
spaces could be greatly increased, and this would have significant co-ben-
efits in generating a microclimate that lowers local temperatures, improves
air quality, reduces noise, and enlarges the extent of habitat for biodiver-
sity. Planting additional trees in all urban and peri-urban spaces should be
annual events in every municipality.
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M. J. Bush

Policy Action items
1. Emissions of CO2 from • All farm residences and buildings are electrified
agriculture are reduced • E lectric farm vehicles and biofuels are employed to the
maximum extent
2. Emissions of non-CO2 • Food labelling shows the carbon footprint of produce
gases are curtailed including country of provenance, energy and water
use
• The negative health impacts of eating excessive
amount of beef are better emphasized
• Governments sets standards for improved manure
management
• Fertilizer use is managed by smart technology
• Regenerative and conservation agriculture is strongly
promoted, incentivised, and showcased
3. Food waste is reduced • Supermarkets are forbidden from trashing unsold food
and required to pass it on to charities, animal feed or
composting companies
• Community activist groups that focus on reducing food
waste are eligible for government funding
4. Natural forests are • Forestry services are better funded and employ more
strictly protected professional staff
• Fire management services are better funded
• Forests are gradually enlarged and green belt areas
around cities are strictly protected against encroach-
ment and urban development
• Forest services employ smart technology, aerial surveil-
lance, and drones
5. Coastal wetlands • Governments define all coastal wetlands and peat-
and peatlands are lands as protected landscapes and fund their manage-
protected ment agencies
SO7 Governments Commit to Forceful and Effective Action

There is a wide range of policies that are crucially important in enabling and
facilitating a transition to a low carbon economy and substantially reducing
emissions of greenhouse gases. Perhaps the most important one is focused
on ensuring that the majority of people are convinced that climate change
is real, caused by human activity, and that forceful action needs to be taken
by their government. This applies at all levels of government: municipal and
regional as well as national and federal.
The small group of people and pseudo-scientists who peddle disinfor-
mation about global warming and climate change have to be pushed to
the side-lines and muted. This will not be easy. They are often generously
funded by the fossil fuel and petrochemical industries which continue to
manipulate and confuse public opinion in order to continue the world’s
dependency on petroleum-based fuels and coal.
453
Much more effort needs to be made to counter the disinformation of the

climate change deniers—because experience shows that only when all politi-
cal parties competing for power in a national or local government agree that
the problem of climate change needs to be urgently tackled is there likely
to be strong coordinated action—including an agreement to set a price on
carbon. Once the issue becomes politicised by politicians or candidates
who claim that the science is doubtful and that action on climate change is
unwarranted and will penalise “hard-working taxpayers”, coordinated effec-
tive government action becomes almost impossible.
Nothing much is going to change in terms of policy at national and regional
levels unless politicians and legislators are committed to working together to
take action to tackle global warming and the climate crisis. This means that the
electorate needs to vote for candidates that they can trust will work towards
developing and implementing legislation that is aimed at reducing carbon
emissions, promoting a shift to renewable energy, and eliminating the subsidies
for fossil fuels. Solar and wind energy no longer need to be subsidized—they
are less expensive than coal and competitive with natural gas. But the subsidies
for oil and gas exploration need to be shut down, together with all the tax deals
and loopholes that prop up the fossil fuel and petrochemical industries.
At the same time, the problem of regulatory capture needs to be
addressed. This can only be done once progressive politicians are in a major-
ity and have the power to restore the scientific credentials of agency staff and
leadership.

Policy Action items
1. C
limate science • Government environment agencies are more pro-active is
is accessible and using the mainstream media to explain the climate crisis and
explained more how it can be resolved
thoroughly in ways • Government environment agencies specifically target and
that the majority of debunk the disinformation campaigns of the fossil fuel and
people can readily petrochemical industries
understand • School boards check carefully the content of the science
curriculum in schools to ensure it does not contain fossil fuel
propaganda. Science schoolbooks are vetted for accurate
content
• Degree level courses in climate science and climate manage-
ment are taught in the major universities and colleges
• Popular TV channels regularly carry climate science programs
that convey a positive message that the crisis can be brought
to an end if all countries work together and local communi-
ties organise and get involved
• Advisory and regulatory agencies are staffed solely by scien-
tists with peer-reviewed scientific credentials
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M. J. Bush
Policy Action items

2. Policies that subsi- • G20 governments fully implement their commitment to
dise fossil fuels are eliminate all subsidies for fossil fuels including for oil and gas
eliminated exploration
• The external costs of fossil fuels are internalised through a
substantial price on carbon that reflects its real social costs
• Regulatory capture is eliminated. Agencies are staffed solely
by experts that have peer-reviewed credentials
• The heads of regulatory agencies have strong scientific cre-
dentials approved by a large majority of legislators and their
scientific peers
3. Research and • There is intensified development, demonstration and com-
development fosters mercialisation of carbon capture and storage technologies
clean and smart • Utility scale electricity storage systems are further developed
technologies and improved to bring down their costs through economies
of scale
• Research and development of lightweight and more powerful
vehicle batteries is prioritised and funded
• Research on advanced thermal storage technologies for con-
centrating solar power is intensified
Non-state Actors
Many communities in Canada, the US, and Europe are frustrated by what
they see as a lack of significant progress being made by their national gov-
ernments to take action against global heating and climate change. While
individual households can take measures to reduce their ‘carbon footprint’,
these actions do not make a significant difference unless almost everyone in
the community gets on board—a commitment that is often hard to achieve.
Moreover, using less energy in the home or using public transport more
often doesn’t change larger-scale locked-in fossil fuel supply systems such as
coal-fired power plants and the widespread use of natural gas for heating.
Cities and large companies can have a much greater impact. What are
called non-state actors (NSAs) can make an important contribution to cli-
mate action in addition to actually reducing emissions. They visibly demon-
strate community action and resolve and build confidence at the national
level that voters will support stronger government action.
The number of non-state actors participating in subnational climate
action is rising fast. More than 7000 cities in 133 countries and 245 regions
in 42 countries, together with more than 6000 companies with at least $36
trillion in revenues have pledged to take action to reduce their emissions of
greenhouse gases. Many of the cities are cooperating in international initia-
tives which are characterised by multi-country and multi-actor engagement
and coordination.54
455
If international cooperative initiatives are scaled up to their fullest poten-

tial, the impact could be considerable compared with current policy: up to
19 GtCO2e/yr according to one study—which would make a substantial
contribution to bridging the emissions gap to 2 °C pathways.55
Municipal and local government action is an area where individuals and
communities can have a real impact and see tangible results. Pressure on
large companies to install photovoltaic power systems, and to shut down
natural gas heating and cooling systems can result in high-profile changes
that influence policymaking at the national level.
Divestment
The campaign to persuade companies, academic and religious institutions,
and financial agencies to divest from fossil fuel companies and to shift their
investments to cleaner, less harmful alternatives started with the Do The
Math tour of the US in 2012. Led by Bill McKibben56 and the advocacy
group 350.org, the tour included numerous cities, and focused on showing
that if the Paris Agreement target of limiting global warming to 2 °C is to be
achieved, it is simply impossible to extract and burn all the global fossil fuel
reserves that the petroleum and coal companies are proposing to exploit. The
math was straightforward and compelling.57 The aim was to build support
for a fossil fuel divestment campaign modelled on the successful divestment
campaigns organised during the South African anti-apartheid movements of
the 1980s. The first institution to sign up was Unity College in Maine.58
The campaign has been extraordinarily successful. In 2018, the 1000th
divestment was recorded in what is now the largest anti-corporate cam-
paign of its kind every organised. Among the latest to sell their shares were
major French and Australian pension funds and Brandeis University in
Massachusetts, raising the total value of portfolios and endowments in the
campaign to almost $8 trillion.59
In 2018, the Government of Ireland made a powerful statement when
the lower house of Parliament passed a bill that requires the country’s sov-
ereign fund, valued at over $10 billion, to divest from fossil fuels “as soon
as practicable.”60 But the most significant move was made by Norway. In
2019, Norway’s parliament voted to instruct its $1 trillion sovereign fund to
withdraw an estimated $13 billion from oil, gas, and coal companies, and to
move up to $20 billion into renewable energy projects and companies.61
In 2014, students at the University of Toronto presented a petition
requesting that the University fully divest from direct investments in fossil
fuel companies within five years, and to stop investing new money in these
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M. J. Bush
industries. The university formed an Advisory Committee on Divestment from

Fossil Fuels to review the petition and to propose a response—which was to
be submitted to the university’s President by December 2015. The advisory
committee’s report was carefully reasoned and crafted. Its analysis and con-
clusions are worth examining in more detail.62
While acknowledging that that all fossil fuel companies engage in activ-
ities that are to “some degree socially injurious by their very nature”, the
Committee distinguished between industries that engage in what it called
“egregious behaviour and contribute inordinately to social injury”, and those
that provided important benefits that the Committee believed could not be
provided by other means.
In the first category—the firms that would be targeted for divestment—
the Committee identified three types of unacceptable behaviour:
1. Firms that derive more than 10% of their revenue from non-conventional
or aggressive extraction: such as open-pit mining of tar sands, Arctic
extraction or exploration, and the mining of thermal coal.
2. Firms that knowingly disseminate disinformation about climate science
or that deliberately distort science and public policy in order to thwart or
delay changes in behaviour or regulation.
3. Firms that derive more than 10% of their revenue from coal extraction
for power generation or firms that derive more than 10% of their revenue
from coal-fired plants.
The Committee stressed that the University had a moral obligation to refrain
from participating in and contributing to ‘socially injurious’ activities that
have no social benefits currently unavailable in any other way. It proposed
that the extent to which a fossil fuel company’s actions were consistent with
respecting the Paris Agreement’s target of 1.5 °C would be a “principled
way” of distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable behaviour, and there-
fore of guiding a divestment decision. The Committee recommended that
the University should determine a method to evaluate whether a given com-
pany’s actions blatantly disregard the 1.5 °C threshold and divest from direct
holdings in any company identified and acting in this manner.
The committee even went so far as to name names. The hit list included:
• ConocoPhillips Co., for its Arctic extraction activities and plans;

• ExxonMobil Corp., for its alleged funding of disinformation; and
• Peabody Energy Corporation, Arch Coal Inc., Alpha Natural Resources
LLC., Cloud Peak Energy, and Westmoreland Coal Company for their
production of thermal coal.63
457
When an institution decides to divest, it is making a strong statement and

sending a clear signal that helps to educate and to inform the debate high-
lighting the industry’s unacceptable corporate behaviour and their role in
exacerbating the climate crisis. Informing and shaping public opinion is an
important step in mobilising local communities, engaging the media, raising
the profile of the issue, and eventually shifting government policy towards
stronger action on climate change.64
But in some respects, the thoughtful analysis of the University of
Toronto’s academics is now out of date. The Committee essentially set aside
fossil fuel industries that, while considered to be ‘socially injurious’, nev-
ertheless were thought to provide indispensable benefits that could not be
generated by other means. We know now that clean sources of energy can
power virtually all the services provided by coal, oil, and natural gas. The
Committee would be well-advised to reconsider its analysis in light of the
latest information on the global deployment of inexhaustible clean sources
of power, and the increasing urgency of the climate crisis.
Divestment actions are unlikely to immediately weaken the financial posi-
tion of the fossil fuel industries. But divestment is increasingly having an
economic impact on fossil fuel firms that are vulnerable to the increasing
competitiveness of renewable sources of energy. Peabody, the world’s larg-
est coal company filed for bankruptcy in 2016—citing one of its problems
as being that the divestment movement made it harder to raise capital. In
2018, Goldman Sachs, one of the world’s largest financial services compa-
nies, stated that the divestment movement was a key driver of the coal sec-
tor’s 60% de-rating over the past five years.65 Even Shell, one of the world’s
largest oil companies, has stated that divestment should be considered a
“material risk” to its business.66
In the Streets
It should come as no surprise that many people are prepared to take to the
streets and confront the infrastructure of business-as-usual or moribund gov-
ernment policy much more directly. There is a climate crisis: the planet is
clearly in trouble, and people’s welfare and the future of their children is in
jeopardy unless forceful international programs on an unprecedented scale
start to be rapidly implemented. But all the evidence at this point in time
(2019) shows that the climate change policies proposed by national gov-
ernments are nowhere near strong enough to curb global heating and avoid
potentially catastrophic climate change.
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M. J. Bush
There are literally hundreds of environmental groups working tirelessly

to protect biodiversity, conserve fragile ecosystems, and nurture landscapes,
while trying to change government policy so that pollution is reduced,
emissions are curtailed, and public health and well-being is protected and
strengthened. Without them, the climate crisis would be far worse. But
emissions of carbon dioxide and methane have continued to increase, and
atmospheric concentrations of these greenhouse gases—which directly lead
to global heating—continue to rise and show no sign of stopping. Many
people are asking the question: How much longer can this situation be
tolerated?
Extinction Rebellion
A recently-formed international social movement called Extinction

Rebellion takes its name from the sixth extinction that many biologists and
climate scientists believe is already underway.67 It was established in 2018
with about 100 UK academics and colleagues signing a call to action about
the ecological crisis facing the world.
The statement issued by the group on the day it was founded is eloquent
and forceful. It is worth repeating:
The science is clear, the facts are incontrovertible, and it is unconscionable

to us that our children and grandchildren should have to bear the terrifying
brunt of an unprecedented disaster of our own making. […] Our government
is complicit in ignoring the precautionary principle, and in failing to acknowl-
edge that infinite economic growth on a planet with finite resources is non-
viable. […] When a government wilfully abrogates its responsibility to protect
its citizens from harm and to secure the future for generations to come, it has
failed in its most essential duty of stewardship. The “social contract” has been
broken, and it is therefore not only our right, but our moral duty to bypass the
government’s inaction and flagrant dereliction of duty, and to rebel to defend
life itself. We therefore declare our support for Extinction Rebellion, launch-
ing on 31 October 2018. We fully stand behind the demands for the govern-
ment to tell the hard truth to its citizens. We call for a Citizens’ Assembly to
work with scientists on the basis of the extant evidence and in accordance with
the precautionary principle, to urgently develop a credible plan for rapid total
decarbonisation of the economy.
An assembly took place at Parliament Square in London, England, on

31 October 2018 and drew more than a thousand people to hear the
459
“Declaration of Rebellion” against the UK government and speeches by

several people including 15-year old Greta Thunberg: the Swedish school-
girl “on strike” from school over her own government’s climate inaction, and
other speakers. The group then occupied the road in front of the Houses
of Parliament. Fifteen campaigners were arrested for continuing the sit-in in
the roadway. Protests continued the following month, with more than 60
people arrested for taking part in acts of civil disobedience. Campaigners
blockaded and spray-painted slogans on the UKs Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, unveiled a banner reading: Climate
Change…we’re fucked over Westminster Bridge, and glued themselves to the
gates of Downing Street.
On 17 November 2018, in what was called Rebellion Day, several thou-
sand people took part in a coordinated movement to block the five main
bridges over the River Thames for several hours causing major traffic dis-
ruption. The Guardian newspaper described it as one of the biggest acts
of peaceful civil disobedience in the UK in decades.68 There was support-
ing action by XR groups in Stockholm, as well as rallies in Dublin, Cork,
Galway, Belfast, Copenhagen, Berlin, Madrid and New York. Many people
are irritated by the demonstrations, which disrupt urban centres, rush hour
traffic, and orderly business. But that’s the point. Only when thousands of
ordinary people start to complain about the disruption and chaos caused by
the climate protesters do politicians start to pay attention. Eventually the
publicity and the clamour to “do something” pays off. On May 1, 2019,
the UK government declared a climate emergency and Ireland soon followed
suit.
The movement is gaining ground: Extinction Rebellion events are
planned for 27 other countries including Canada and the US.69
In Europe the protests are spreading. In January 2019, thousands of stu-
dents across Germany, Switzerland and Belgium skipped school to protest
their governments’ inaction on climate change. More than 12,500 students
walked out of their classrooms in Brussels, while students in Berlin and
Switzerland held protests. A Belgian student was quoted as saying “There’s
actually no point in going to school if our world is going to die.”70
Not everyone is ready and willing to participate in acts of civil disobedi-
ence. But we should applaud the courage and conviction of those who cam-
paign for a world that all of us will find safer and less harmful for ourselves
and our children. Yet we can all do something. Just watching from the side-
lines as others fight for our health and welfare and that of our children is
indefensible.
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M. J. Bush
Greta Thunberg
Greta Thunberg’s ‘Skolstrejk for Klimatet’71 started in August 2018 when

she sat alone outside of the Swedish parliament with a hand-painted sign
and some home-made flyers. The first day she sat by herself. On the second
day, a few people joined her, and after that there were people with her all the
time.
Her lone action and calm persuasive intelligence obviously resonated
strongly with both other schoolchildren and plenty of adults desperately
concerned about the worsening climate. Before long she was internation-
ally recognized advocate for strong action on climate change. She has been
lauded at the UN, met the French president, Emmanuel Macron, shared a
stage with the European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker, and
has been endorsed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel.72
Greta Thunberg’s steely determination to force governments take action
stands in sharp contrast to most people’s lack of resolve. Importantly, she
took the time to study climate change (when she was eight) and to under-
stand the dangers and the risks involved. She knows that global emissions
of greenhouse gases are still increasing—something that millions of people
around the world are not even aware of.
L’union Fait La Force

Haiti was the first country to expel a European colonial power (France)
in 1804, and although since that time the country has not prospered, the
motto: Union makes strength clearly signifies that Haitians understood that
you have to work together if you want to overcome a powerful adversary.
What is clear from this review of the different ways in which people have
organised to try and tackle global warming and lessen the impacts of the
changing climate is that, while individual action to reduce one’s carbon foot-
print is laudable, it is not strong enough to force real change at national or
international levels. But what does make a difference is concerted and coordi-
nated community action targeting policy and regulatory interventions at the
different levels of government.
Local government action aimed at combating climate change at the
municipal level gets lots of media attention and is noticed by local busi-
nesses and by regional and national politicians. Policymakers and politicians
pay close attention to shifts in public opinion. If they sense that a majority
461
of people now favour stronger action on climate change, they will start to
incorporate action on global warming into their political platform and pol-
icy portfolios.
To better focus this action and to examine how people and communities
can make a real difference on an individual basis we go back to the logical
framework discussed earlier in this chapter.
Most people are not in a position to directly intervene in govern-
ment policymaking or regulatory decision-making, but we can all do our
bit. There are many forms of action identified in the log frame policies
and action items where people, young and old and from all walks of life,
who are not scientists or engineers, and who are not involved with the
science of global warming and climate change can take action and make a
difference.
ACTION: Buildings are zero emission. If you own your home, you
should research all the incentive programs that are available in your area
to see if you can improve the thermal efficiency of your home and get help
with financing these improvements. These improvements may include addi-
tional thermal insulation, triple glazing, and other ways to make the house
more energy efficient. LED lighting should be standard, together with
Energy Star rated appliances. If you own a business, consider getting an
energy audit and looking into ways to save energy that have short payback
times. Also check out the deals on rooftop solar. You don’t need to be in a
warm and sunny climate to save money on electricity bills by installing a
solar photovoltaic system. As prices continue to drop, including the cost of
batteries, homeowners should check out the market and the economics at
least once a year to see when it makes sense to install solar panels on your
home together with storage batteries.
One area where parents can make a big difference is in schools. If you
have children of school age, consider advocating and lobbying for a solar
energy system on the roof of the school—a policy that has been promoted
both in Florida and Ontario. Not only is it cost effective if feed-in tariffs
apply, it is a great way to get schoolkids involved in the renewable energy
and climate change debate.
Heat pumps are the most efficient way of heating a home. They can be
expensive, but programs may be available to help defray the initial cost.
Homeowners should research what’s available and check out the payback
period.
For families in rented accommodation, the homeowner or landlord
has no incentive to invest money to reduce your energy bills. One way to
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M. J. Bush
promote improvements in building thermal efficiency and bring down

electricity and natural gas bills is through the enactment of more stringent
building codes. This means working on advocating for these regulations at
the municipal level. Renters should also advocate for residences to be taxed
at a rate that reflects the thermal efficiency of the building. An energy effi-
ciency tax will induce home-owners and landlords to invest in equipment
and technologies that reduce the cost of heating and cooling the building—
which is good for renters.
ACTION: Energy systems are fully electrified. This transition to renew-
able energy has started—it’s happening. But it has run into considerable
resistance from the oil and petrochemical companies, and from workers in
the coal and oil industries, many of whom will be laid off as the demand for
coal, oil and natural gas starts to decline. Governments have a duty to ensure
that workers and their families that are laid off and displaced from these sec-
tors are financially supported and are prioritized for work in the industries
that are expanding—like those than manufacture and install equipment and
machinery for solar energy, wind power, and energy efficiency technologies.
People can help by advocating for policies that allocate funding to help dis-
placed workers find new work in clean energy technologies—where surveys
in the US, Canada and Europe show that there are substantial opportunities
for employment.
Everyone should be advocating strongly for renewable sources of energy
to replace coal-fired power plants. Fields of photovoltaic arrays do not nor-
mally pose a problem, but not everyone likes large wind turbines close by.
Instead of completely blocking their installation, communities should work
with policymakers to find a more convenient and less intrusive location. In
some places, wind turbines have been installed too close to residential areas.
But in the right location, wind turbines make a huge contribution to clean
electricity production and the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
ACTION: Mobility is clean and connected. Electric vehicles are expen-
sive and not everyone can afford one, but if you can, by purchasing an elec-
tric car you are making a major contribution to tackling climate change. If
not, you should tacitly support government policies that increase the cost of
operating a gasoline or diesel vehicle—understanding why this policy is nec-
essary even if it means that running your car is now more expensive. People
should advocate loudly and forcefully for much more extensive municipal
and regional public transport employing electric buses and electrified rail
systems. Bicycle lanes are another focal point where everyone can make a
difference. Not only is it good for your health, not using your car cuts down
on emissions of greenhouse gases and urban air pollution—if it’s a gasoline
463
or diesel vehicle. There should be constant pressure on local and municipal

governments to create and maintain more and safer bike lanes.
ACTION: Industry is efficient in a circular economy. If you are a
shareholder in an industry that emits greenhouse gases, you should examine
ways that you and other shareholders working together may be able to influ-
ence corporate decision-making in favour of renewable energy and reduced
emissions. You should also support government policy to set a price on car-
bon emissions, keep abreast of research on carbon capture and storage, and
continue to badger investment and pension funds to divest from fossil fuel
industries.
A circular economy is based on the concept that materials are fully recy-
cled and that we should use less of them in the first place. Changing con-
sumer perception so that people are more aware of the problem and their
part in solving it is key. Not using single-use plastics is a good place to start;
and everyone should have a couple of shopping bags handy at all times
including keeping one in the car. Eventually, plastic shopping bags will be
banned in many cities.
ACTION: Infrastructure is smart and connected. Part of that infra-
structure is in your home. Smart thermostats and smart electricity meters are
widely available. The aim is to save money by saving electricity. It works.
ACTION: Land use is a net carbon sink. If you own a farm or an
agri-business, there are many ways in which you can reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and reduce your energy consumption. Conservation agriculture
and particularly regenerative agriculture should be adopted. Trees should be
growing in every available space around fields. There are now electric trac-
tors on the market. For the consumer, food labelling that shows the car-
bon footprint of foodstuff is becoming more widespread. Consumers can
advocate for this kind of labelling—which would show that locally sourced
agricultural produce uses less energy. Beef can taste awfully good, but its
production consumes huge amounts of water and energy. Prioritise chicken
and pork. Eat less meat—or go vegetarian.
ACTION: Stay informed. The absolute priority for everyone concerned
about the climate crisis is to know as much as possible about the science,
and to be able to recognise and contradict the charlatans and pseudo-
scientists who deny that climate change is caused by human action, and who
often have a vested interest in continuing to promote coal, oil and natural
gas as the only reliable sources of energy. But where should you get your
information from? There are dozens of books available on the internet that
deny that global warming is happening and that climate change is caused
by natural phenomena; and dozens of websites peddling the same nonsense.
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M. J. Bush
This disinformation and propaganda is often put out by the same fake insti-
tutes and conservative organisations that have generated and circulated dis-
information about climate change for the last 30 years. It is essential that
people concerned about the climate crisis get the right information. A list of
organisations in Canada, the USA, and UK, that can be trusted to provide
accurate objective information and data about global warming and climate
change is provided as an annex to this chapter. Readers can also check out
my website at www.climatezone.org.
They say that knowledge is power—just make sure your source of knowl-
edge is not from someone who has one hand in an oil company’s pocket.
Armed with the knowledge that global warming is happening fast, that cli-
mate change is real, and that the impacts of this change are contributing to
the worsening impacts and frequency of extreme weather, wildfires, melting
icecaps, and sea level rise, the next step is to make sure that your children are
also learning about what’s happening to the planet.
Every parent should be informed about the way climate science is being
taught to their children. It is more likely to be a problem in America, but
subtle forms of disinformation and manufactured ‘doubt’ may also be found
in schoolbooks in Canada and the UK. If the fossil fuel industry and their
advocates are supplying science textbooks to your school, parents should
take rapid and forceful action to shut this practice down.
Setting a price on carbon is often a controversial and divisive political
issue. Some politicians have shamelessly politicised the debate, mischarac-
terised the science, and misrepresented carbon pricing as an unwarranted tax
and an assault on “poor hard-working families”. It’s nothing of the sort—
and people need to understand why setting a price on carbon is sound eco-
nomic policy.
But a lot depends on the way carbon pricing is introduced and managed.
Although politicians in favour of carbon pricing shy away from calling it a
tax, in reality that’s what it is. But that doesn’t mean it should be instinc-
tively resisted—even though most of us don’t like taxes, and especially ones
that may raise the price of goods that we regularly purchase.
If you agree that “the polluter should pay”, then you should accept the
principle of a tax on carbon emissions—because this is the form of pollution
that is causing the greatest amount of damage to human health and that of
the planet. However, it is important that the financial burden of higher fuel
and electricity prices on low-income families is minimal. This means that
most of the revenue from taxing emissions of carbon should be returned to
taxpayers in the form of rebates or other forms of reimbursement such as the
carbon dividend policy in Canada.
465
When communities organise and act, local governments pay attention

and adjust to the new pressures. When local governments are innovative and
effective, policymakers take notice. Everyone should be part of at least one
local environmental organisation. There are literally dozens of them in all
cities, certainly in Europe and North America. Choose your area of concern
and get involved.
But the really big, lasting, changes are made by regional and national
governments.
Make Your Vote Count

At the time of finishing up writing this book in 2019, important elections
were looming in Canada and the US. In advance of Canada’s Federal elec-
tion, both the Green Party and the National Demographic Party (NDP)
presented comprehensive policies that aim to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions and which should enable Canada to meet its obligations under the Paris
Agreement—which at this point in time (mid-2019) is highly unlikely given
the country’s increasing levels of emissions (as can clearly be seen in Table 9.1).
Canada’s Liberal Party also has reasonably good environmental
credentials—the policies set out in The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean
Growth and Climate Change, are sound and comprehensive. The Liberals
deserve credit for legislating a nation-wide carbon levy that applies to all prov-
inces that don’t develop adequate and compliant emissions reduction plans of
their own. But the Liberals severely undermined their credentials with the pur-
chase in 2018 of the Trans Mountain Extension Pipeline that is intended to
convey close to 900,000 barrels a day of petroleum products including diluted
bitumen from Alberta to British Columbia. This pipeline is not needed. It is
in the ‘public interest’ only if this is defined solely in terms of money, and all
the harmful environmental impacts, including the emissions of greenhouse
gases from the increased production of bitumen, are ignored. Using a metric
that includes the triple bottom line of environmental, cultural, and economic
sustainability, the pipeline is very much against the public interest.
Voters whose primary concern is the economy and employment, and that’s
nearly all of us, should be aware of the ploy, favoured by fossil fuel advocates
and conservative politicians, that transitioning from oil and natural gas to
renewable sources of energy will lead to high levels unemployment and a seri-
ous economic crisis. This is nonsense. Hundreds of thousands of people are
now employed in designing, building, installing and maintaining renewable
energy systems across Canada, the US and Europe. In California, a state with
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some of most ambitious zero emission policies anywhere in North America

and an economy larger than Canada’s, unemployment levels are below aver-
age and the economy is flourishing—particularly advanced high-tech and
clean-tech companies that want to work in a business environment that pro-
motes their green credentials. In Europe between 1990 and 2016, greenhouse
gas emissions were reduced by 22% while GDP grew by 54%.73
It is therefore demonstrably false to assert that a choice has to be made
between the environment and the economy. A clean energy future will bring
full employment, a protected environment, less pollution in our cities and,
given enough time and commitment, an end to the climate crisis.
In the USA, a large field of Democratic Party candidates are jockeying for
pole position ahead of the 2020 presidential election. Many are advocating
for much stronger action on climate change. The proposal for a Green New
Deal is generating lots of talk and controversy—which is a healthy sign in a
democracy leading up to a hugely important election. It is encouraging to
see that the climate crisis is finally getting some serious and accurate media
attention, although the oil and gas industries and the petrochemical con-
glomerates are fighting hard to protect their commercial interests and they
continue to peddle disinformation and false narratives about an “economic
disaster” if the US complies with its Paris Agreement targets. There is no
question that if Donald Trump is re-elected in 2020, it will be an environ-
mental disaster on a global (not just American) scale.
In Europe, the European elections in May 2019 produced a strong result
for Europe’s Greens. Riding a surge of public concern over the climate cri-
sis, Greens achieved double-digit scores in several countries, finishing second
in Germany and Finland and third in Luxembourg and France. The Greens
now have 70 seats in the European parliament—a position that gives them
significant clout.74
In Canada, the Green Party has also had some successes. In 2019, there
are two federal MPs and the Green Party is the official opposition in the
Canadian province of Prince Edward Island. But overall the Greens remain
substantially behind the three main parties in most provinces and in the
federal parliament.
Conclusion
This last chapter has focused not only on explaining why urgent action to
end the climate crisis is so pressing, but also on outlining what needs to be
done to substantially force down emissions of greenhouse gases, slow and
finally reverse the pace of global heating, and eventually bring the climate
467
crisis to an end. There is no single solution to this global problem. But by

looking at each sector in turn: power generation, transport, industry, agri-
culture, and the built environment, it is possible to identify the measures
that need to be taken, and to map out a route that takes the world to a place
by 2050 where global heating is less than 2 °C, and where climate change
impacts are likely to be mostly manageable.
This is not to say that there will never be extreme weather. Ferocious
storms, huge wildfires, devastating drought and floods will be much more
common and destructive. Many people will die. Millions more in the most
vulnerable areas will try to migrate to safer less hazardous regions. This cli-
mate-driven migration will cause widespread turmoil, strife and conflict
across Europe and North America. This is simply going to be a fact of life
before we arrive at the middle of the twenty-first century. Moreover, there
is no way to avoid at least a metre of sea level rise before 2100, and many
scientists believe that sea levels will be substantially higher even before that
time. Several small island states will have to be abandoned, and many coral
islands will simply disappear for ever.
But there are many ways in which ordinary people and communi-
ties can pressure governments at municipal, regional and national levels to
take action. The most obvious one is to elect people who show that they
understand and believe climate science and can be trusted to develop pol-
icy initiatives and to support legislation that is aimed at reducing emissions,
driving a transition to renewable sources of energy, and greatly increasing
the efficiency with which energy is used in homes, businesses and industry.
Governments: national, state and provincial, all need to be fully committed
to working to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. If not, more progressive
and environmentally-aware candidates need to be elected. Regulatory agen-
cies that are effectively run by fossil fuel insiders and lobbyists need to be
loudly called out and challenged—if necessary, in the courts.
Setting a price on carbon is controversial in many American states and
Canadian provinces. The policy has become heavily politicised—which has
tended to obscure its validity. It is important that people understand the
importance of this policy and support its implementation. The financial bur-
den of higher energy costs can be offset by returning a significant part of
carbon revenues to taxpayers and low-income families.
Finally, and this is one of the aims of this book, people need to be bet-
ter informed about climate change, the climate crisis, and the importance
of strongly promoting renewable sources of energy. Although the subject
can appear to be quite technical, the underlying principles are not. Everyone
should know about the severe environmental impacts caused by the extrac-
tion and use of coal, oil and natural gas—including the enormous cost of the
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M. J. Bush
health impacts caused by burning these fuels. People need to be informed

about the Paris Agreement, their government’s commitments made under
that protocol, and the progress being made to meet emission reduction tar-
gets. Writing letters to politicians and to national newspapers, even if only to
ask good questions, keeps politicians on their toes and tells them that people
will hold them accountable if they are not working hard and staying com-
mitted to reducing global warming and fighting hard to legislate policies that
will help to mitigate the negative impacts of the changing climate.
The climate crisis can be brought to an end. This book has shown how
that can be accomplished. But much more forceful action is needed.
Everyone on the planet needs to lend a hand and to get involved.
I’d like to end this book with a few words from Greta Thunberg. When
she addressed the audience at the World Economic Forum in Davos in
2019, she said:
Adults keep saying, “We owe it to the young people to give them hope.” But
I don’t want your hope. I don’t want you to be hopeful. I want you to panic.
I want you to feel the fear I feel every day. And then I want you to act. I want
you to act as you would in a crisis. I want you to act as if the house was on
fire. Because it is.
She’s right.
Annex
Reliable Sources of Information Concerning Climate
Science75
Scientific Journals
Science https://www.sciencemag.org/.
Nature https://www.nature.com/.
Nature Climate Change https://www.nature.com/nclimate/.
Scientific American https://www.scientificamerican.com/.
Government Agencies
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences https://www.pnas.org/.
US Global Change Research Program https://www.globalchange.gov/.
Natural Resources Canada https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/environment/science.
Environment and Climate Change Canada https://www.canada.ca/en/envi-
ronment-climate-change.html.
469
American Meteorological Society https://www.ametsoc.org/AMS/.

US National Snow and Ice Data Center https://nsidc.org/.
Non-government Organisations
USA
Union of Concerned Scientists https://www.ucsusa.org/.
World Resources Institute https://www.wri.org/.
Rocky Mountain Institute https://www.rmi.org/.
Sierra Club https://www.sierraclub.org.
Fiends of the Earth U.S. https://foe.org.
Greenpeace USA https://www.greenpeace.org/usa.
Physicians for Social Responsibility https://www.psr.org/.
Environmental Defense Fund https://www.edf.org/.
Natural Resources Defense Council https://www.nrdc.org/.
350.org https://www.350.org.
Climate central https://www.climatecentral.org/.
Canada
Environmental Defence Canada https://environmentaldefence.ca/.
Climate Action Network Canada https://climateactionnetwork.ca/.
Friends of the Earth Canada https://foecanada.org/en/.
Greenpeace Canada https://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/.
Indigenous Climate Action https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com/.
International Agencies
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change https://www.ipcc.ch/.
United Nations Environment Programme https://www.unenvironment.org/
about-un-environment.
United Nations Development Programme https://www.undp.org/.
REN21 http://www.ren21.net/.
World Meteorological Organisation https://www.wmo.int/pages/index_en.html.
Internet Sites and Blogs
Canadian
Pembina Institute https://www.pembina.org/.
National Observer https://www.nationalobserver.com/.
The Narwhal https://thenarwhal.ca/.
Climate Zone https://climatezone.org/climate_science_at_work/.
The Energy Mix https://theenergymix.com/category/climate-and-society/.
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M. J. Bush
American
Ecowatch https://www.ecowatch.com/.
Inside Climate News https://insideclimatenews.org/.
Climate Nexus https://climatenexus.org/.
DeSmogBlog www.desmogblog.com.
Confronting Science Contrarians https://confrontingsciencecontrarians.
blogspot.com/.
Skeptical science https://skepticalscience.com/debunking-climate-consen-
sus-denial.html.
Think Progress https://thihnkprogress.org/.
Real Climate http://www.realclimate.org/.
Oil change USA https://oilchangeusa.org.
European
Climate Action Tracker https://climateactiontracker.org/.
Climate Transparency. https://www.climate-transparency.org/.
DeSmogUK https://www.desmog.co.uk/.
Books
Climate change adaptation in small island developing states, by Martin Bush.
Wiley-Blackwell. 2018.
Climate change and renewable energy: How to end the climate crisis, by Martin
Bush. Palgrave McMillan Press. 2019.
Climate change: What everyone needs to know, by Joseph Romm. Oxford
University Press. 2016
Climate cover-up: The crusade to deny global warming, by James Hoggan.
Greystone Books. 2009.
Drawdown: The most comprehensive plan ever proposed to reverse Global
Warming. Edited by Paul Hawken. Penguin Books, New York. 2017.
Exxon: The road not taken, by Neela Banerjee et al. Inside Climate News. 2015.
Falter, by Bill McKibben. Henry Holt and Co. 2019.
Field notes from a catastrophe: Man, nature and climate change, by Elizabeth
Kolbert. Bloomsbury. 2016.
Merchants of doubt, by Naomi Oreskes and Eric Conway. Bloomsbury Press.
2010
Reinventing Fire: Bold Business Solutions for the New Energy Era. Amory
Lovins and Rocky Mountain Institute. Chelsea Green Publishing. 2011.
The Climate Casino, by William Nordhaus. Yale University Press. 2013.
The hockey stick and the climate wars: Dispatches from the front lines, by
Michael E. Mann. Columbia University Press. 2012.
471
The madhouse effect: How climate change denial is threatening our planet,
destroying our politics and driving us crazy. Michael E. Mann and Tom Toles.
Columbia University Press. 2016.
The sixth extinction: An unnatural history, by Elizabeth Kolbert. Henry Holt,
LLC. 2014.
Notes
1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Special Report on
Global Warming of 1.5 °C, Summary for Policymakers is available at: http://
report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf.
2. The text and data are summarized from the IPCC, Special Report on Global
Warming of 1.5 °C, Summary for Policymakers. Op. cit.
3. Ibid.
4. See the Ecowatch article: https://www.ecowatch.com/hawaiian-island-
washed-away-by-hurricane-2614784143.html and this one from ABC news:
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-24/hurricane-walaka-wipes-out-nest-
ing-ground-threatened-sea-turtles/10424542.
5. International Energy Agency, Global Energy & CO2 Status Report 201.
https://webstore.iea.org/download/direct/2461.
6. The data are from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019. Available
at: https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-re-
view-of-world-energy.html.
7. Ibid.
8. See Carbon Action Tracker’s website at: https://climateactiontracker.org/
publications/climate-crisis-demands-more-government-action-as-emissions-
rise/.
9. The 2007 Nobel Peace prize was shared with Al Gore. See https://www.
nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2007/summary.
10. See The Guardian 2014 article: IPCC reports ‘diluted’ under ‘political pres-
sure’ to protect fossil fuel interests. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/earth-insight/2014/may/15/ipcc-un-climate-reports-diluted-
protect-fossil-fuel-interests.
11. Ibid.
12. See Sir Nicholas Stern: Current climate models are grossly misleading. Accessed
at: https://www.carbontax.org/blog/2016/02/28/sir-nicholas-stern-current-
climate-models-are-grossly-misleading/.
13. Ibid.
14. See the article: Reframing climate change assessments around risk:

Recommendations for the US National Climate Assessment. Accessed at: http://
iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7494/pdf.
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15. Ibid.
16. Wagner, G., and Weitzman, M. K., Climate Shock: The Economic

Consequences of a Hotter Planet. Princeton University Press. 2015.
17. Ibid.
18. See The impact of the permafrost carbon feedback on global climate. Accessed
at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264828451_The_impact_of_
the_permafrost_carbon_feedback_on_global_climate/download.
19. See Strong geologic methane emissions from discontinuous terrestrial permafrost
in the Mackenzie Delta, Canada. Accessed at: https://www.nature.com/arti-
cles/s41598-017-05783-2.pdf.
20. See Arctic lakes are bubbling and hissing with dangerous greenhouse gases.
Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/
arctic-lakes-are-bubbling-and-hissing-with-dangerous-greenhouse-gases/.
21. See What lies beneath: The understatement of existential climate risk. Available
at: https://www.breakthroughonline.org.au/whatliesbeneath. This report is
essential reading for anyone concerned about climate change and suspects
that the IPCC is downplaying many of the risks.
22. See also Ice-free Arctic in two years heralds methane catastrophe—Scientist.
Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/
jul/24/arctic-ice-free-methane-economic-catastrophe.
23. See Alaska temperatures expected to soar to 40 degrees above normal this
weekend. Accessed at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/alaska-temper-
atures-expected-to-soar-40-degrees-above-normal-this-weekend/. Also: Record-
breaking heat in Alaska wreaks havoc on communities and ecosystems. Accessed
at: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/record-breaking-heat-
alaska-wreaks-havoc-communities-and-ecosystems-180972317/.
24. See What lies beneath. Op. cit.
25. See the International Cryosphere Climate Initiative website at: http://

iccinet.org/arctic.
26. See the International Cryosphere Climate Initiative website. Op. cit.
27. See What lies beneath. Op. cit.
28. See the International Cryosphere Climate Initiative website. Op. cit.
29. IPCC Climate Change 2014, Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers.
30. See Increasing rates of ice mass loss from the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets
revealed by GRACE. Accessed at: https://www.ess.uci.edu/researchgrp/veli-
cogna/files/increasing_rates_of_ice_mass_loss_from_the_greenland__and_
antarctic_ice_sheets_revealed_by_grace.pdf.
31. See Mass balance of the Antarctic ice sheet from 1992 to 2017. Accessed at:
http://www.antarcticglaciers.org/2018/06/mass-balance-antarctic-ice-sheet-
1992-2017/.
32. See Antarctic ice loss has tripled in a decade. If that continues, we are in serious
trouble. Accessed at: https://nationalpost.com/news/world/antarctic-ice-loss-
has-tripled-in-a-decade-if-that-continues-we-are-in-serious-trouble/.
473
33. See Four decades of Antarctic Ice sheet mass balance from 1979 to 2017.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January 14, 2019.
Accessed at: https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2019/01/08/1812883116.
34. Reported in What lies beneath. Op. cit.
35. Ibid.
36. See the IPCC report, Summary for Policymakers Figure SPM.6. Op. cit.
37. This was an estimate of the carbon budget before the last IPCC Assessment
Report was published. In 2019, the carbon budget is estimated to be about
750 Gt and will be exhausted not long after 2030.
38. See the note: Why two crucial pages were left out of the latest UN climate
report. Accessed at: https://jeremyleggett.net/2014/11/04/why-two-crucial-
pages-were-left-out-of-the-latest-u-n-climate-report/.
39. See Global warming concern at three decade high. Accessed at: https://news.
gallop.com/poll/206030/global-warming-convern-three-decade-high.aspx.
40. See Nearly a third of Canadians don’t believe humans, industry ‘mostly’ cause
climate change: Poll. Accessed at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/poll-
abacus-carbon-tax-1.4603824.
41. Carbon Action Tracker. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/global/
cat-emissions-gaps/.
42. For the US data see the May 2019 Monthly Energy Review of the US
Energy Information Agency. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/
data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf. US emissions of CO2 fell more or less consist-
ently from about 2007 until 2018, when then ticked up once again. It is
not clear at this point whether CO2 emissions in the US will continue to
fall over the longer term. Emissions from coal are falling, but emissions from
natural gas are rising.
43. A clean planet for all: A European strategic long-term vision for a prosper-
ous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy. COM(2018) 773
final. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/
com_2018_733_en.pdf. Much of the text in this section is taken from this
report by the European Commission, which should be consulted for more
detail.
44. Ibid.
45. See DrawDown: The Most Comprehensive Plan Ever Proposed to Reverse Global
Warming. Edited by Paul Hawken. Penguin Books. 2017.
46. See Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programs. Available at: https://
www.c2es.org/document/property-assessed-clean-energy-pace-programs/.
47. See BCs zero emission vehicle mandate may be the toughest in North America:
here’s what you need to know. Accessed at: https://www.nationalobserver.
com/2018/11/22/analysis/bcs-zero-emission-vehicle-mandate-may-be-
toughest-north-america-heres-what-you. Also: https://www.theverge.com/
2019/5/30/18646486/british-columbia-zero-emissions-vehicles-act-ban-gas-
powered-cars-climate-change.
474
M. J. Bush
48. See California governor pushes for 5 million zero-emission cars. Accessed at:
https://www.apnews.com/, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/cal-
ifornia/articles/2018-01-26/california-governor-pushes-for-5-million-zero-
emission-cars.
49. See A clean planet for all. Op. cit.
50. See the book by Amory Lovins and colleagues at the Rocky Mountain
Institute: Reinventing Fire: Bold Business Solutions for the New Energy Era.
Chelsea Green Publishing, Vermont, USA. 2011.
51. See A clean planet for all. Op. cit.
52. Ibid.
53. See Carbon footprint of agricultural products—A measure of the impact of agri-
cultural production on climate change. Accessed at: https://www.wamis.org/
agm/meetings/teco14/S5-Desjardins.pdf.
54. See the 2018 Emissions Gap Report from the UN Environment Programme
(UNEP). Available from: https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/
emissions-gap-report-2018.
55. Data from the Emissions Gap Report 2018. Op. cit.
56. See the Wikipedia profile: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_McKibben.
57. See Chapter 3 for the numbers.
58. See The Guardian article: At last, divestment is hitting the fossil fuel industry
where it hurts. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/16/
divestment-fossil-fuel-industry-trillions-dollars-investments-carbon.
59. Ibid.
60. See the New York Times: Ireland moves to divest from fossil fuels. https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/07/12/climate/Ireland-fossil-fuels-divestment.html.
61. See Norway’s parliament approves expanded divestment from fossil fuel invest-
ments. Accessed at: https://ieefa.org/norways-parliament-approves-expand-
ed-divestment-from-fossil-fuel-investments/.
62. See Report of the President’s Advisory Committee on Divestment

from Fossil Fuels. Accessed at: https://www.president.utoronto.ca/
report-of-the-advisory-committee-on-divestment-from-fossil-fuels.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. See The Guardian article, At last, divestment is hitting the fossil fuel industry
where it hurts. Op. cit.
66. Ibid. See also 1000 divestment commitments and counting. Available at:

https://gofossilfree.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/1000divest-WEB-.pdf.
67. See Chapter 1 of this book.
68. See Dozens arrested after climate protest blocks five London bridges. Accessed
at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/17/thousands-
gather-to-block-london-bridges-in-climate-rebellion.
475
69. See the Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extinctin_

Rebellion/. Also the article at CounterCurrents: https://countercurrents.org/
2018/11/24/extinction-rebellion-from-the-uk-to-ghana-and-the-us-climate-
activists-take-civil-disobedience-world-wide/.
70. See School’s out forever. Accessed at: https://mail.yahoo.com/d/folders/32/
messages/30972?
71. School strike for climate.
72. See The Guardian article: Greta Thunberg, schoolgirl climate change warrior:
‘Some people can let things go. I can’t ’. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2019/mar/11/greta-thunberg-schoolgirl-climate-change-warrior-
some-people-can-let-things-go-i-cant.
73. See A clean planet for all: A European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous
modern, competitive and climate neutral economy. Available at: https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_en.pdf.
74. See The Guardian: European elections: Triumphant Greens demand more

radical climate action. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/
may/28/greens-eu-election-leverage-climate-policy.
75. This is not an exhaustive list and many observers may not agree with my
choice. Several US agencies, the US Environment Protection Agency for
instance, are not included on the list because they are now (in 2019) headed
up by people who are either linked to the fossil fuel industries or who deny
climate change is caused by human activities. The International Energy
Agency has done some very good work (including the Global Energy & CO2
Status Report ), but some of the IEA’s reports are far too conservative and
tend to downplay the huge advantages of renewable sources of energy.
Glossary
Absorption chillers Chillersthat use heat energy from any source (solar, biomass,
waste heat, etc.) to drive air conditioning or refrigeration systems. The heat
source replaces the electric power consumption of a mechanical compressor.
The chillers are generally supplied with district heat, waste heat or heat from
co-generation, or they can operate with heat from geothermal, solar or biomass
resources
Acidification
The increasing acidity of the oceans as they absorb carbon diox-
ide from the atmosphere. As emissions of CO2 continue to rise because of the
combustion of fossil fuels, the increased levels of CO2 in the atmosphere drive a
higher rate of absorption of the gas into surface waters. This lowers the pH level
of oceans which has a detrimental impact on the growth of many shellfish spe-
cies as well as coral
Adaptation The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate change and its
effects. Adaptation aims to implement actions that strengthen resilience, enhance
coping mechanisms, and reduce the risk of adverse impacts of climate change to
livelihoods
Afforestation Planting of new forests on lands that historically have not contained
forests
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use The main mitigation options within
AFOLU involve one or more of three strategies: prevention of emissions to
the atmosphere by conserving existing carbon pools in soils or vegetation or by
reducing emissions of methane and nitrous oxide; sequestration—increasing
the size of existing carbon pools and thereby extracting carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere; and substitution—substituting biological products for fossil fuels or
energy-intensive products, thereby reducing CO2 emissions
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 477

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0
478
Glossary
Albedo
The fraction of solar radiation reflected by a surface or object, often
expressed as a percentage. Snow-covered surfaces have a high albedo, the albedo
of soils ranges from high to low and vegetation-covered surfaces and oceans have
a low albedo. The Earth’s planetary albedo varies mainly through varying cloudi-
ness, snow, ice, leaf area and land cover changes
Altimetry A technique for measuring the height of the Earth’s surface with respect
to the geocentre of the Earth within a defined terrestrial reference frame (geocen-
tric sea level)
Anemometer A device that measures and records windspeeds. It generally consists of
a small rotor with three small cups that are turned by the wind at a rate propor-
tional to its speed
Anoxic Seawater or river water that has a very low level of dissolved oxygen, render-
ing the marine environment almost impossible for fish or marine animals
Anthropogenic Generated by people—human kind. The word is generally applied
to emissions of greenhouse gases, most (but not all) of which are produced by
human-created sources such as power plants, transportation, and industrial
processes
Arthropod Any of a phylum (Arthropoda) of invertebrate animals (such as insects,
spiders, arachnids, myriapods and crustaceans) that have a segmented body and
jointed appendages
Auction price The selling price of electricity offered by a company in response to
a tendering process initiated by a utility that wants to buy substantial amounts
of electrical power. Sometimes called a reverse auction—because the lowest price
wins the deal, although other factors besides price may be taken into account
Bagasse The fibrous matter that remains after extraction of sugar from sugar cane.
It can be burned as fuel in a power plant to generate electricity
Bakken The Bakken Formation is a subsurface rock formation that underlies parts
of Montana, North Dakota, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Various estimates
place the total reserves of oil at between 10 and 20 billion barrels. The develop-
ment of hydraulic fracturing has caused a boom in Bakken oil production since
2000
Baseline The state against which change is measured. The term ‘baseline scenarios’
refers to scenarios where no mitigation policies or measures will be implemented
beyond those that are already in force and/or are legislated or planned to be
adopted. Baseline scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future, but
rather counterfactual constructions that can serve to highlight the level of emis-
sions that would occur if policies do not change. Typically, baseline scenarios
are then compared to mitigation scenarios that are constructed to meet different
goals for greenhouse gas emissions, atmospheric concentrations or temperature
change. In much of the literature the term is also synonymous with the term
‘business as usual’
Glossary 479
Behind-the-meter Any generation capacity, storage or demand management device

on the customer side of the interface with the electricity distribution grid (i.e.,
the meter)
Biodiesel A fuel produced from oilseed crops such as soy, rapeseed (canola) and
palm oil, and from other oil sources such as waste cooking oil and animal fats.
Biodiesel is used in diesel engines installed in cars, trucks, buses and other vehi-
cles, as well as in stationary heat and power applications. Most biodiesel is made
by chemically treating vegetable oils and fats (such as palm, soy and canola oils,
and some animal fats) to produce fatty acid methyl esters (FAME)
Biodiversity The variety among living organisms from terrestrial, marine and other
ecosystems. Biodiversity includes variability at the genetic, species and ecosystem
levels
Biome Large naturally occurring community of flora and fauna occupying a major
habitat (for example, forest or tundra)
Bioenergy Energy derived from any form of biomass such as crops, trees, plant res-
idues, or any other form of plant life. Bioenergey can be solid, liquid or gaseous
and used for heat, power and transport
Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) The application of Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS) technology to bioenergy conversion processes.
Depending on the total lifecycle emissions, including land-use changes, trans-
port, and processing, BECCS has the potential for net carbon dioxide removal
from the atmosphere
Biofuel A liquid or gaseous fuel derived from biomass, primarily ethanol, biodiesel
and biogas. Biofuels can be combusted in vehicle engines as transport fuels and
in stationary engines for heat and electricity generation. Conventional biofuels
are principally ethanol produced by fermentation of sugar or starch crops (such
as wheat and corn), and FAME biodiesel produced oil crops such as palm oil and
canola and from waste oils and fats. Advanced biofuels are made from feedstocks
derived from the lignocellulosic part of biomass sources or from algae
Biogas/Biomethane Biogas is a gaseous mixture consisting mainly of methane and
carbon dioxide produced by the anaerobic digestion of organic matter (bro-
ken down by microorganisms in the absence of oxygen). Organic material
and/or waste is converted into biogas in a digester. Suitable feedstocks include
agricultural residues, animal wastes, food industry wastes, sewage sludge,
purpose-grown crops and the organic components of municipal solid wastes.
Raw biogas can be combusted to produce heat and/or power; it also can be
transformed into biomethane through a process that removes impurities includ-
ing carbon dioxide, siloxanes and hydrogen sulphides, followed by compression.
Biomethane can be injected directly into natural gas networks and used as a sub-
stitute for natural gas in internal combustion engines
Biomass Organic material that comes from plants and animals. As a potential
source of energy, the term generally refers to plants, trees, and animal waste that
could be a used as a fuel
480
Glossary
Biomass energy, traditional Solid biomass (including fuel wood, charcoal, agricul-

tural and forest residues, and animal dung), that typically is used in rural areas of
developing countries with traditional technologies such as open fires and ovens
for cooking and residential heating. Often the traditional use of biomass leads to
high pollution levels, forest degradation and deforestation
Biomass energy, modern Energy derived from the combustion of solid, liquid and
gaseous biomass fuels in high-efficiency conversion systems, which range from
small domestic appliances to large-scale industrial conversion plants. Modern
applications include heat and electricity generation, combined heat and power
(CHP) and transport
Biomass pellets Solid biomass fuel produced by compressing pulverised dry biomass,
such as waste wood and agricultural residues. Pellets typically are cylindrical in
shape with a diameter of around 10 millimetres and a length of 30–50 millime-
tres. Pellets are easy to handle, store, and transport and are used as fuel for heat-
ing and cooking applications, as well as for electricity generation and CHP
Black carbon The substance formed through the incomplete combustion of fossil
fuels, biofuels, and biomass, which is emitted in both anthropogenic and nat-
urally occurring soot. It consists of pure carbon in several linked forms. Black
carbon warms the Earth by absorbing heat in the atmosphere and by reducing
albedo—the ability to reflect sunlight—when deposited on snow and ice.
Building codes and standards Rules specifying the minimum standards for buildings.
These can include standards for renewable energy and energy efficiency that are
applicable to new and/or renovated and refurbished buildings
Cancun pledge In 2010, many countries submitted their existing plans for con-
trolling greenhouse gas emissions to the Climate Change Secretariat and these
proposals were formally acknowledged under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Developed countries presented
their plans in the shape of economy-wide targets to reduce emissions, mainly up
to 2020, while developing countries proposed action plans to limit their growth
of emissions
Cap-and-trade A carbon pricing mechanism that sets a cap on greenhouse gas emis-
sions from industries in a jurisdiction, but which allows them to purchase and to
trade in allowances the market price of which depends on the number and avail-
ability of the allowances
Capacity The rated power of a heat or electricity generating plant, or the aggre-
gate potential output of a collection of such units (such as a wind farm or set of
solar panels). Installed capacity describes equipment that has been constructed,
although it may or may not be operational (e.g., delivering electricity to the grid,
providing useful heat or producing biofuels)
Capacity factor The ratio of the actual output of a unit of electricity or heat gen-
eration over a period of time (typically one year) to the theoretical output that
would be produced if the unit were operating without interruption at its rated
capacity over the same period of time
Glossary 481
Capital subsidy A subsidy that covers a share of the upfront capital cost of an asset
(such as a roof-mounted photovoltaic system or a heat pump). This includes, for
example, consumer grants, rebates, or one-time payments by a utility or a gov-
ernment agency
Carbon budget For a given global temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5 °C or
2 °C long-term limit, the corresponding carbon budget reflects the total amount
of carbon that can be emitted for temperatures to stay below that limit
Carbon capture and storage Technologies that absorb and remove carbon dioxide
from an effluent gas stream and then pipe the compressed CO2 to a location
where it is permanently stored underground
Carbon cycle The term used to describe the flow of carbon (in various forms, e.g., as
carbon dioxide) through the atmosphere, ocean, terrestrial and marine biosphere
and lithosphere
Carbon dioxide A gas that is emitted into the atmosphere primarily from the com-
bustion of fossil fuels. It is the principal gas that contributes to global warming
through the greenhouse effect. The gas occurs naturally in nature, but the com-
bustion of fossil fuels has raised atmospheric concentrations substantially since
the eighteenth century. Its chemical formula is CO2
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) A conversion that puts emissions of greenhouse
gases on the same basis as carbon dioxide by accounting for their effect on cli-
mate. For a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, it describes the
amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability as the gas in
question when measured over a specified time period—generally a 100-year
period
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) Carbon Dioxide Removal methods refer to a set
of techniques that aim to remove CO2 directly from the atmosphere by either
(1) enhancing the natural sinks for carbon or (2) using chemical engineer-
ing to remove the CO2, with the intent of reducing the atmospheric CO2
concentration
Carbon intensity The amount of emissions of carbon dioxide released per unit of
another variable such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), output energy use or
transport
Carbon pricing Setting a price on carbon is a key mechanism aimed at reducing
global emissions of carbon dioxide and methane from power generation, indus-
try, and transport. Either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system are being
applied in over 25 countries and sub-national jurisdictions around the world
Carbon revenues The revenues that governments earn by setting a price on carbon—
either though a carbon tax or by setting up a cap-and-trade system
Carbon tax A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels. Because virtually all of the
carbon in fossil fuels is ultimately emitted as CO2, a carbon tax is equivalent to a
tax on CO2 emissions
Climate Climate is usually defined as the average weather over a long period of
time. In the modern era, the period for averaging these variables is 30 years, as
482
Glossary
defined by the World Meteorological Organization. The recorded metrics are

most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation and wind
Climate change A change in the state of the climate that can be identified (for exam-
ple, using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its
properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.
It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or
as a result of human activity
Climate change migration Climate change-induced migration is migration that can
be attributed largely to the slow-onset impacts of climate change on livelihoods
owing to shifts in water availability and crop productivity, or to factors such as
sea level rise or storm surge
Climate model A numerical representation of the climate system based on the phys-
ical, chemical and biological properties of its components, their interactions and
feedback processes and accounting for some of its known properties. The models
vary in complexity. Climate models are both a research tool to study and sim-
ulate the climate and used for operational purposes to make predictions about
future climate
Climate risk Potential for consequences from climate variability and change where
something of value is at stake and the outcome is uncertain. Often represented
as the probability that a hazardous event or trend occurs multiplied by the
expected impact. Risk results from the interaction of vulnerability, exposure, and
hazard
Climate sensitivity Climate sensitivity refers to the equilibrium change in the global
mean surface temperature following a doubling of the atmospheric equivalent
carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration
Climate system The highly complex system consisting of five major components, the
atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the lithosphere and the biosphere,
and the interactions between them. The climate system evolves over time under
the influence of its own internal dynamics and because of external forcings such
as volcanic eruptions, solar variations and anthropogenic forcings such as the
changing composition of the atmosphere and land-use change
CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) emission See, Carbon dioxide equivalent
Coastal erosion Erosion of coastal landforms that results from wave action exacer-
bated by storm surge from hurricanes and cyclones, and from sea level rise
Coastal zone The coastal zone is land area within 10 kilometres of the coastline
Co-benefits The positive effects that a policy or measure aimed at one objective
might have on other objectives, without evaluating the net effect on overall social
welfare. For instance, in the context of climate change, some adaptation meas-
ures have a positive impact on mitigation. Reducing the use of fossil fuels for
power generation has the substantial co-benefit of reducing the negative health
impacts of air pollution
Combined heat and power (CHP) (also called co-generation) CHP facilities produce
both heat and power from the combustion of fossil and/or biomass fuels, as
Glossary 483
well as from geothermal and solar thermal resources. The term also is applied to
plants that recover “waste heat” from thermal power generation processes
Combustion The burning of carbon-based fuels in the presence of air to produce
very high temperatures that can used to generate electricity or produce process
heat
Community energy An approach to renewable energy development that involves a
community initiating, developing, operating, owning, investing and/or benefit-
ing from a project. Communities vary in size and shape (e g., schools, neigh-
bourhoods, partnering city governments, etc.); similarly, projects vary in
technology, size, structure, governance, funding and motivation
Concentrating photovoltaics (CPV) Technology that uses mirrors or lenses to focus
and concentrate sunlight onto a relatively small area of photovoltaic cells that
generate electricity. Low-, medium- and high-concentration CPV systems oper-
ate most efficiently in direct sunlight
Concentrating solar collector technologies Technologies that use mirrors to focus sun-
light on a receiver thereby generating high temperatures that can be used to gen-
erate electricity
Concentrating solar power Technology that uses mirrors to focus sunlight into an
intense solar beam that heats a working fluid in a solar receiver, which then
drives a turbine or heat engine/generator to produce electricity. There are four
types of commercial CSP systems: parabolic troughs, linear Fresnel, power tow-
ers and dish/engines. The first two technologies are line-focus systems, capable
of concentrating the sun’s energy to produce temperatures of 400 °C, while the
latter two are point-focus systems that can produce temperatures of 800 °C or
higher
Conditional NDC Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) proposed by some
countries that are contingent on a range of possible conditions, such as the abil-
ity of national legislatures to enact the necessary laws, ambitious action from
other countries, availability of finance and technical support, or other factors
Conference of the Parties (COP) The meeting of representatives of the countries which
are party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). The COP currently meets once a year to review the Convention’s
progress
Confidence The validity of a finding based on the type, amount, quality and consist-
ency of evidence, and on the degree of agreement
Conversion efficiency The ratio of the useful energy output from an energy conver-
sion device and the energy input. For example, the conversion efficiency of a PV
module is the ratio of the electricity generated and the total solar energy received
by the PV module. If 100 kWh of solar radiation is received on the surface of
the PV panels and 20 kWh of electricity is generated, the conversion efficiency is
20%
Cost-effectiveness A policy is more cost-effective if it achieves a given policy goal at
lower cost. Integrated models approximate cost‐effective solutions, unless they
484
Glossary
are specifically constrained to behave otherwise. Cost-effective mitigation scenar-

ios are those based on a stylized implementation approach in which a single price
on carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) is applied across
the globe in every sector of every country and which rises over time in a way that
achieves lowest global discounted costs
Cryosphere The frozen places of the planet are called the cryosphere—from the
Greek word for cold kryos. The focus is principally on the Arctic and Antarctic,
but snow and ice are also found at many other locations (particularly high
mountains) and these are also part of the cryosphere
Curtailment A reduction in the output of a generator, typically on an involun-
tary basis, compared to what it could produce given the resources available.
Curtailment can occur for a variety of reasons, including a lack of transmission
access or transmission congestion. It has occurred more frequently with wind-
farms which in some circumstances may generate more energy than the trans-
mission system can handle
Disinformation The deliberate dissemination of inaccurate and contradictory infor-
mation and data with the aim of confusing people about the facts and creating
doubt and uncertainty. It has particularly been applied to the science of climate
change in an effort to impede government action on reducing emissions of
greenhouse gases from fossil fuels
Deforestation Conversion of forest to a non-forest usually agricultural area, espe-
cially for palm oil plantations or for grazing cattle for beef production
Decarbonization The process by which countries or regions aim to achieve a
low-carbon economy, or by which individuals aim to reduce their consumption
of carbon
Demand-side management The application of economic incentives and technology
in the pursuit of cost-effective energy efficiency measures and load-shifting on
the customer side, to achieve least-cost overall energy system optimisation
Deoxygenation The reduction of concentrations of dissolved oxygen in sea water
mainly due to global warming. Rising temperatures decrease the solubility
of oxygen in water, increase the rate of consumption via respiration, and may
increase stratification leading to areas of low dissolved oxygen
Distributed generation Generation of electricity from dispersed, generally small-scale
systems, that are close to the point of consumption. Rooftop photovoltaic sys-
tems are examples of distributed generation
Distributed renewable energy Energy systems are considered to be distributed if (1)
the systems are connected to the distribution network rather than the transmis-
sion network, which implies that they are relatively small and dispersed (such
as small-scale solar PV on rooftops) rather than relatively large and centralised;
or (2) generation and distribution occur independently from a centralised net-
work—such as a minigrid system
Distribution grid The portion of the electrical network that takes power off the
high-voltage transmission network (often called the grid) via substations (at
Glossary 485
varying stepped-down voltages) and feeds electricity to customers through low

voltage electricity lines
Disaster Severe disruption in the normal functioning of a community or a society
due to the occurrence of hazardous meteorological or geophysical events lead-
ing to widespread adverse human, material, economic or environmental impacts,
including mortality, that require immediate emergency response to satisfy critical
human needs and that may require external support for recovery
Discounting A mathematical operation making monetary (or other) amounts
received or expended at different times (years) comparable across time. The dis-
counter uses a fixed or possibly time‐varying discount rate from year to year that
makes future value worth less today
Displacement Forced removal of people, or people obliged to flee from their places
of habitual residence
Distress migration Movements from the usual place of residence, undertaken when
an individual and/or their family perceive that there are no options open to them
to survive except to migrate. This may be a result of a rapid-onset climate event,
other disasters, or conflict event, or a succession of such events, that result in the
loss of assets and coping capacities
Distributed solar energy Small-scale solar photovoltaic installations that are not con-
nected to the main power grid. Minigrids may also be considered distributed
solar energy systems if they operate independently from the main grid
Drop-in biofuels Liquid biofuels that are functionally equivalent to liquid fossil fuels
and are fully compatible with existing fossil fuel infrastructure
Drought A period of abnormally dry weather long enough to cause a serious hydro-
logical imbalance. Drought is a relative term. For example, shortage of precip-
itation during the growing season impinges on crop production or ecosystem
function in general (due to soil moisture drought, also termed agricultural
drought) and during the runoff and percolation season primarily affects water
supplies (hydrological drought). Storage changes in soil moisture and ground-
water are also affected by increases in actual evapotranspiration in addition to
reductions in precipitation. A period with an abnormal precipitation deficit is
defined as a meteorological drought
Earth System Model (ESM) A coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation model
in which a representation of the carbon cycle is included, allowing for interac-
tive calculation of atmospheric CO2 or compatible emissions. Additional com-
ponents (e.g., atmospheric chemistry, ice sheets, dynamic vegetation, nitrogen
cycle, but also urban or crop models) may be included
Ecosystem An ecosystem is a functional unit consisting of living organisms, their
non-living environment and the interactions within and between them. The
components included in a given ecosystem and its spatial boundaries depend on
the purpose for which the ecosystem is defined, in some cases they are relatively
sharp, while in others they are diffuse. Ecosystem boundaries can change over
time
486
Glossary
Ecosystem services
Ecological processes or functions having monetary or
on-monetary value to individuals or society at large. These are frequently classi-
n
fied as (1) supporting services such as productivity or biodiversity maintenance,
(2) provisioning services such as food, fibre or fish, (3) regulating services such as
climate regulation or carbon sequestration and (4) cultural services such as tour-
ism or spiritual and aesthetic appreciation
Electric vehicle (EV) A vehicle that uses one or more electric motors for propulsion.
A battery electric vehicle uses rechargeable battery packs to power the electric
motors. A hybrid EV has electric motor propulsion combined with a small con-
ventional engine running on gasoline. Fuel cell vehicles are EVs that use hydro-
gen as the energy storage medium
El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) The term El Niño was initially used to describe
a warm-water current that periodically flows along the coast of Ecuador and
Peru, disrupting local fisheries. It has since become identified with a basin-wide
warming of the tropical Pacific Ocean east of the dateline. This oceanic event
is associated with a fluctuation of a global-scale tropical and subtropical surface
pressure pattern called the Southern Oscillation. This coupled atmosphere–
ocean phenomenon, has time scales of two to about seven years, and is known
as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). The cold phase of ENSO is called
La Niña
Emissions gap The gap between the aggregate effect of countries’ present commit-
ments to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases to reduce global warming (as
specified in their NDCs), and what is actually required to keep global warming
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and ideally below 1.5 °C—as negotiated
under the Paris Agreement
Emission pathway The trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions over time
Energiewende German term that means “transformation of the energy system”. It
refers to the move away from nuclear and fossil fuels towards an energy system
based primarily on energy efficiency improvements and renewable energy
Energy access Access to clean, reliable and affordable energy services for cooking
and heating, lighting, communications and productive uses
Energy The ability to do work. Energy comes in several forms including thermal,
radiant, kinetic, chemical, potential and electrical. Primary energy is the energy
embodied in natural resources such as coal, oil and natural gas and renewable
sources such as solar energy, wind, and hydropower. Final energy is the energy
delivered for end-use. Conversion losses occur whenever primary energy needs
to be transformed for final energy use, such as combustion of fossil fuels for elec-
tricity generation
Energy audit Analysis of energy flows in a building, process or system, conducted
with the goal of reducing energy inputs into the system without negatively
affecting or reducing outputs
Energy efficiency A measure of the level of services delivered by a specific amount
of energy. Efficiency can be improved by reducing losses from the conversion of
Glossary 487
primary source fuels through final energy use, as well as other active or passive
measures to reduce energy demand without diminishing the quality of the ser-
vices being delivered
Energy intensity Primary energy consumption per unit of economic output. Energy
intensity typically is used as a proxy for energy efficiency in macro-level analyses
due to the lack of an internationally agreed-upon high-level indicator for meas-
uring energy efficiency
Energy service company (ESCO) A company that provides a range of energy manage-
ment solutions including selling the energy services from a renewable energy
system on a long-term basis while retaining ownership of the system, collecting
regular payments from customers and providing necessary maintenance service.
An ESCO can be an electric utility, co-operative, non-governmental organisation
or private company, and typically installs energy systems on or near customer
sites. An ESCO also can advise on improving the energy efficiency of systems
(such as a building or an industry) as well as on methods for energy conservation
and energy management
Energy storage system Any physical device capable of storing energy. The most
common systems are batteries capable of storing electricity. Large battery energy
storage systems (BESS) are now utility scale and capable of storing very large
amounts of electricity. Thermal energy storage systems store high temperature
heat generated by solar concentrating power systems
Ethanol (fuel) A liquid fuel made from biomass (typically corn, sugar cane or small
cereals/grains) that can replace gasoline in modest amounts for use in conven-
tional gasoline engines, or that can be used at higher blend levels (usually up to
85% ethanol, or 100% in Brazil) in slightly modified engines, such as in “flex-
fuel” vehicles
Eutrophication Over-enrichment of water by nutrients such as nitrogen and phos-
phorus. It is one of the leading causes of water quality impairment. The two
most acute symptoms of eutrophication are hypoxia (or oxygen depletion) and
harmful algal blooms
Excise tax A tax on the consumption or use of a specific good or service activity.
Excise taxes are mainly introduced with the intention to create public revenues
for local, state or federal governments. Common examples of excise taxes are
taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and fuel
Exposure The presence of people, livelihoods, species, ecosystems, environmental
functions, services, and resources, infrastructure, or economic, social, or cultural
assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected by a disaster
External costs An external cost occurs when producing or consuming a good or ser-
vice imposes a cost upon a third party. In the context of electricity generation,
the use of fossil fuels produces serious air and water pollution which imposes a
substantial cost on society—particularly the health cost associated with emissions
of particulate matter caused by the combustion of the fuel
488
Glossary
External forcing External forcing refers to a forcing agent outside the climate sys-
tem causing a change in the climate system. Volcanic eruptions, solar variations
and anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere and land-use
change are external forcings. Orbital forcing is also an external forcing as the
insolation changes with orbital parameters eccentricity, tilt and precession of the
equinox
Extreme heat event Three or more days of above-average temperatures, generally
defined as passing a certain threshold (for example, above the 85th percentile for
average daily temperature in a year)
Extinction In biology, extinction is the permanent extirpation of an organism
or of a group of organisms, normally a species. Many scientists believe that a
sixth extinction is now underway on Earth—caused by global warming, climate
change, and the widespread damage to terrestrial and marine ecosystems and
their biodiversity caused by human activities
Fatty acid methyl esters (FAME) See Biodiesel
Feed-in tariff A policy that typically guarantees renewable power generators
specified payments over a fixed period of time. Feed-in tariff (FIT) policies may
establish regulations by which generators can interconnect and sell power to the
grid
Final energy The part of primary energy, after deduction of losses from conversion,
transmission and distribution, that reaches the consumer and is available to pro-
vide heating, hot water, lighting and other services. Final energy forms include
electricity, district heating, mechanical energy, liquid hydrocarbons such as
kerosene or fuel oil, and various gaseous fuels such as natural gas, biogas and
hydrogen
Final energy consumption Energy that is supplied to the consumer for all final energy
services such as cooling and lighting, building or industrial heating or mechani-
cal work, including transport
Flood The overflowing of the normal confines of a stream or other body of water,
or the accumulation of water over areas not normally submerged. Floods include
river (fluvial) floods, flash floods, urban floods, pluvial floods, sewer floods,
coastal floods and glacial lake outburst floods
Flywheel energy storage Energy storage that works by applying available energy to
accelerate a high-mass rotor (flywheel) to a very high speed and thereby storing
energy in the system as rotational energy
Food security A state that prevails when people have secure access to sufficient
amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth, development and an
active and healthy life
Forced migration Migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists,
including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-
made causes, for example, movements of refugees and internally displaced per-
sons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical
or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects
Glossary 489
Fossil fuels Fuelscontaining carbon in biomass that died millions of years ago and
which was transformed by heat and pressure over millennia into coal, oil and
natural gas
Fossil fuel subsidies Fossil fuel companies benefit from global subsidies of more than
$5 trillion a year according to the IMF. The huge sum is largely due to polluters
not paying the external costs caused by the burning of coal, oil and gas. These
include the harm caused to local populations by air pollution as well as to people
across the globe affected by the floods, droughts and storms being driven by cli-
mate change
Fracking See Hydraulic fracturing
Geoengineering Geoengineering refers to a broad set of methods and technologies
that aim to deliberately alter the climate system in order to alleviate the impacts
of climate change. Most, but not all, methods seek to either reduce the amount
of absorbed solar energy in the climate system or increase net carbon sinks from
the atmosphere at a scale sufficiently large to alter climate
G20 The G20 membership comprises a mix of the world’s largest advanced and
emerging economies, representing about two-thirds of the world’s p opulation,
85% of global gross domestic product and over 75% of global trade. The
members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and
the European Union
Geothermal energy Heat energy emitted from within the earth’s crust, usually in the
form of hot water and steam. It can be used to generate electricity in a thermal
power plant or to provide heat directly at various temperatures
Giga A prefix which means a billion. As in GW (1 billion Watts), and Gt (1 billion
tonnes)
Glacier Glaciers are made up of fallen snow that, over many years, compresses into
large, thickened ice masses. Glaciers form when snow remains in one location
long enough to transform into ice. Due to their sheer mass, glaciers flow like
very slow rivers
Global warming potential An index representing the combined effect of the differing
times greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness
in absorbing outgoing infrared radiation
Greenhouse effect The effect of raising global temperatures due to increasing levels of
several atmospheric gases, most notably carbon dioxide, that absorb long-wave radi-
ation from the surface of the Earth, some of which re-radiated back to the surface.
This phenomenon is similar to the way a greenhouse traps heat within its structure
Greenhouse gases The atmospheric gases responsible for causing global warming
and climatic change. The principal greenhouse gases (GHGs) are carbon diox-
ide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Less prevalent, but very
powerful GHGs are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)
490
Glossary
Global warming Global warming refers to the gradual increase in global surface tem-
perature caused by emission of greenhouse gases, most of which are from anthro-
pogenic sources—principally the combustion of fossil fuels. Increasingly, the
term global heating is being applied to the changing climate
Hazard The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event
or trend or physical impact that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health
impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, ser-
vice provision, ecosystems and environmental resources
Heat pump A device that transfers heat from a heat source to a heat sink using a
refrigeration cycle that is driven by external electric or thermal energy. It can
use the ground (geothermal/ ground-source), the surrounding air (aerothermal/
air-source) or a body of water (hydrothermal/water-source) as a heat source in
heating mode, and as a heat sink in cooling mode. A heat pump’s final energy
output can be several multiples of the energy input, depending on its efficiency
and operating condition
Heat wave A period of abnormally and uncomfortably hot weather that frequently
causes mortality
Hydraulic fracturing The fracturing of subsurface rock formations holding oil and
natural gas which are difficult to access by conventional drilling. The rock is frac-
tured by pumping down fluids at high pressure which creates fissures in the rock
thereby releasing the hydrocarbons. Also called fracking
Hydropower Electricity derived from the potential energy of water captured when
moving from higher to lower elevations. Categories of hydropower projects
include run-of-river, reservoir-based capacity, and low-head hydro technology
Hydrological cycle The cycle in which water evaporates from the oceans and the land
surface, is carried over the Earth in atmospheric circulation as water vapour, con-
denses to form clouds, precipitates over ocean and land as rain or snow, which on
land can be intercepted by trees and vegetation, provides runoff on the land sur-
face, infiltrates into soils, recharges groundwater, discharges into streams and ulti-
mately flows out into the oceans, from which it will eventually evaporate again
Hydrotreated vegetable oil (HVO) and hydrotreated esters and fatty acids
(HEFA) Biofuelsproduced by using hydrogen to remove oxygen from waste cook-
ing oils, fats and vegetable oils. The result is a hydrocarbon that can be refined
to produce fuels with specifications that are closer to those of diesel and jet fuel
than is biodiesel produced from triglycerides such as fatty acid methyl esters
(FAME)
Hypoxic In the context of ocean water, having insufficient levels of dissolved oxy-
gen. See also anoxic
Ice sheet An ice sheet is a mass of glacial land ice extending more than 50,000
square kilometres. The two ice sheets cover most of Greenland and Antarctica.
Together, they hold more than 99% of the freshwater ice on Earth. The
Antarctic Ice Sheet, the larger of the two, has an area of almost 14 million km2.
The Greenland Ice Sheet covers about 1.7 million km2 of land on Greenland
Glossary 491
Impacts (consequences, outcomes) The term impacts primarily refers to the effects

on natural and human systems of extreme weather and climate change. Impacts
generally refer to effects on lives, livelihoods, health, ecosystems, economies,
societies, cultures, services and infrastructure due to the interaction of climate
changes or hazardous climate events occurring within a specific time period and
the vulnerability of an exposed society or system
Indirect land-use change Indirect land-use change refers to shifts in land use induced
by a change in the production level of an agricultural product elsewhere often
mediated by markets or driven by policies. For example, if agricultural land is
diverted to fuel production, forest clearance may occur elsewhere to replace the
former agricultural production
Industrial Revolution A period of rapid industrial growth with far-reaching social
and economic consequences, beginning in Britain during the second half of the
eighteenth century and spreading to Europe and later to other countries includ-
ing the United States. The invention of the steam engine was an important trig-
ger of this development. The industrial revolution marks the beginning of a
strong increase in the use of fossil fuels and emissions of carbon dioxide
Integrated assessment A method of analysis that combines results and models from
the physical, biological, economic and social sciences and the interactions among
these components in a consistent framework to evaluate the status and the con-
sequences of environmental change and the policy responses to it
Integrated assessment models Models that seek to combine knowledge from mul-
tiple disciplines in the form of equations and/or algorithms in order to explore
complex environmental problems. They describe the full chain of climate
change, from production of greenhouse gases to atmospheric responses. This
necessarily includes relevant links and feedbacks between socio-economic and
biophysical processes
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) An integrated approach for sustainably
managing coastal areas, taking into account all coastal habitats and uses
Integrated models Integrated models explore the interactions between multiple sec-
tors of the economy or components of particular systems, such as the energy
system. In the context of transformation pathways, they refer to models that,
at a minimum, include full and disaggregated representations of the energy sys-
tem and its linkage to the overall economy that will allow for consideration of
interactions among different elements of that system. Integrated models may
also include representations of the full economy, land use and land-use change
(LUC) and the climate system
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)
INDCs are submissions
from countries describing the actions they intend to take to reach the Paris
Agreement’s long-term temperature goal of limiting warming to well below 2 °C.
Once a country has ratified the Paris Agreement, its INDC is automatically con-
verted to its NDC, unless it chooses to further update it
492
Glossary
Internal migration (migrant)

Internal migration is migration that occurs within
national borders. International migration is migration that occurs across national
borders
Inverter (and micro-inverter) Inverters convert the direct current (DC) generated by
solar PV modules into alternating current (AC), which can be fed into the electric
grid or used by a local, off-grid network. Conventional string and central solar
inverters are connected to multiple modules to create an array that effectively is a
single large panel. By contrast, micro-inverters convert generation from individual
solar PV modules; the output of several micro-inverters is combined and often fed
into the electric grid. A primary advantage of micro-inverters is that they isolate
and tune the output of individual panels, reducing the effects that shading or fail-
ure of any one (or more) module(s) has on the output of an entire array
Investment tax credit A fiscal incentive that allows investments in renewable energy
to be fully or partially credited against the tax obligations or income of a project
developer, industry, building owner, etc
Joule A joule (J) is a unit of work or energy. A Watt is a unit of power equal to 1
Joule per second
Kigali Amendment The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer aims for the phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs) by cutting their production and consumption
Kyoto Protocol An international agreement, standing on its own, and requiring
separate ratification by governments, but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto
Protocol, among other things, sets binding targets for the reduction of green-
house gas emissions by industrialized countries
Land use Land use refers to the total of arrangements, activities and inputs under-
taken in a certain land cover type (a set of human actions). The term land use
is also used in the sense of the social and economic purposes for which land is
managed (e.g., grazing, timber extraction and conservation). In urban settle-
ments it is related to land uses within cities and their hinterlands
Land-use change (LUC) Land-use change refers to a change in the use or management
of land by humans, which may lead to a change in land cover. Land cover and
land-use change may have an impact on the surface albedo, evapotranspiration,
sources and sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs), or other properties of the climate
system and may thus give rise to radiative forcing and/or other impacts on cli-
mate, locally or globally. See also the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-
Use Change, and Forestry
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) A greenhouse gas inventory sector
that covers emissions and removals of greenhouse gases resulting from direct
human-induced land use, land use change and forestry activities
Leakage In the context of carbon pricing, leakage refers to a situation where the
reduction in emissions in a jurisdiction is offset to some degree by an increase
outside the jurisdiction—for instance where an industry decides to move its
operations to a jurisdiction where carbon prices are lower
Glossary 493
Levelized cost of electricity Thelevelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is a metric that

allows comparison of the different methods of electricity generation on a consist-
ent basis. It is calculated as the average total cost to build and operate a generat-
ing system over its lifetime divided by the total energy output of the system over
that lifetime. In principle, the LCOE is the average minimum price at which
electricity must be sold in order for the investment to break-even over its lifetime
Likelihood The chance of a specific outcome occurring, where this might be esti-
mated probabilistically
Lock-in Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with a standard even though partici-
pants would be better off with an alternative
Low elevation coastal zone An area of coastal land only a few metres above local
mean sea level. It is therefore a zone very vulnerable to inundation by storm
surge, king tides, and tsunamis. As global sea levels continue to rise, the low ele-
vation coastal zones will become increasingly vulnerable
Marine-based ice sheet An ice sheet containing a substantial region that rests on a
bed lying below sea level and whose perimeter is in contact with the ocean. The
best known example is the West Antarctic ice sheet
Market concession model A model in which a private company or non-governmen-
tal organisation is selected through a competitive process and given the exclu-
sive obligation to provide energy services to customers in its service territory. The
concession approach allows concessionaires to select the most appropriate and
cost-effective technology for a given situation
Mauna Loa Mauna Loa is the world’s largest and one of its most active volcanoes—a
giant shield volcano on the Big Island of Hawai’i. Regular measurements of
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have been recorded at the Mauna
Loa Observatory since 1958
Methylmercury An organic form of mercury, formed by micro-organisms in the
environment, that accumulates in the food chain—particularly of fish. It is
extremely toxic to humans
Mercury An element that occurs naturally in the environment and also in fossil
fuels. It is a neurotoxin and the element responsible for Minamata Disease
Methane A hydrocarbon with the chemical composition CH4. It is the main con-
stituent of natural gas. When released into the atmosphere it has a stronger
warming effect than carbon dioxide
Migration Movement of people that requires a change in the place of usual resi-
dence and that is longer term. In demographic research and official statistics, it
involves crossing a recognized political/administrative border.
Mini-grid/Micro-grid A mini-grid or micro-grid typically refers to an independent
grid network operating on a scale of less than 10 MW that distributes electric-
ity to a limited number of customers. Mini-/micro-grids also can refer to much
larger networks (e.g., for corporate or university campuses) that can operate
independently of, or in conjunction with, the main power grid
494
Glossary
Mitigation (of climate change) In the context of climate change, an intervention

to reduce the emissions, or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases. Examples
include using fossil fuels more efficiently or eliminating them in industrial
processes and electricity generation, switching to sources of renewable energy,
improving the thermal efficiency of buildings, promoting electric vehicles, and
expanding forests and other carbon ‘sinks’ to remove greater amounts of CO2
from the atmosphere
Molten salt An energy storage medium used predominantly to retain the thermal
energy collected by a solar tower or solar trough of a concentrating solar power
plant, so that this energy can be used at a later time to generate electricity
Monitoring Energy use is monitored to establish a basis for energy management and
to provide information on deviations from established patterns
Nationally Determined Contribution NDCs are submissions by countries that have
ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement and which present their efforts to reach
the Agreement’s long-term temperature goal of limiting warming to below 2
°C. New or updated NDCs are to be submitted in 2020 and every five years
thereafter
Natural disasters Disasters that have always been a natural part of the Earth’s climate
system and which are not directly caused by human action (such as nuclear acci-
dents, chemical fires, and explosions). They include earthquakes, storms, flood,
drought, tsunamis, and wildfires
Nearly zero energy buildings A very energy-efficient building that both generates its
energy (from photovoltaics or passive solar), and consumes energy for lighting,
cooling or heating, appliances and equipment, but which overall takes very little
energy from an external source
Negative emission technologies Technologies that remove carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere. The most promising technology is bioenergy with carbon capture
and storage (BECCS). Other negative emissions technologies include afforesta-
tion and reforestation, agricultural practices that enhance carbon storage, and
direct air capture and storage
Net metering/Net billing An arrangement in which utility customers with on-site
electricity generators (such as rooftop solar) can receive credits for excess electric-
ity, which can be applied to offset consumption in other billing periods. Under
net metering, customers typically receive credit at the level of the retail electricity
price. Under net billing, customers generally receive credit for excess power at a
rate that is lower than the retail electricity price
Net negative emissions A situation of net negative emissions is achieved when, as
result of human activities, more greenhouse gases are sequestered or stored than
are released into the atmosphere
Nitrogen dioxide A gas emitted by vehicles running on gasoline and diesel fuel. It
is a major constituent of the air pollution in urban areas where there are large
numbers of diesel vehicles. It is also produced by stoves, and heaters burning nat-
ural gas
Glossary 495
Nitrous oxide A greenhouse gas emitted principally by the use of synthetic fertiliz-
ers in agriculture. Where nitrogen-based fertilizers combine with soil conditions
favourable to denitrification, large amounts of nitrous oxide can be produced
and emitted to the atmosphere. The widespread and often poorly controlled use
of animal waste as fertilizer can lead to substantial emissions of nitrous oxide
from agricultural soils
Non-state and subnational actors Non-state and subnational actors include compa-
nies, cities, subnational regions, Non-governmental organisations, and commu-
nity groups that take or commit to climate action
Ocean acidification Ocean acidification refers to a reduction in the pH of the ocean
over an extended period which is caused primarily by the absorption of carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere
Ocean energy Energy captured from ocean waves, tides, currents, salinity gradients
and ocean temperature differences. Wave energy converters capture the energy
of surface waves to generate electricity; tidal stream generators use kinetic energy
of moving water to power turbines; and tidal barrages are essentially dams that
cross tidal estuaries and capture energy as tides ebb and flow
Off-take agreement An agreement between a producer of energy and a buyer of
energy to purchase/sell portions of the producer’s future production. An off-take
agreement normally is negotiated prior to the construction of a renewable energy
project or installation of renewable energy equipment in order to secure a market
for the future output (e.g., electricity, heat). Examples of this type of agreement
include power purchase agreements and feed-in tariffs
Off-taker The purchaser of the energy from a renewable energy project or instal-
lation (e.g., a utility company) following an off-take agreement. (See Off-take
agreement.)
Offset A unit of CO2e emissions that is reduced, avoided, or sequestered to com-
pensate for emissions occurring elsewhere
Oil sands Very large deposits of bituminous sands located in western Canada princi-
pally in the province of Alberta. The bitumen is extremely viscous and cannot be
extracted by conventional technology. Also referred to as tar sands
Oxides of nitrogen There are three oxides of nitrogen: nitrogen dioxide (NO2);
nitrous oxide (N2O) and nitric oxide (NO). As a group they are often referred to
as NOx
Ozone A gas that is related to oxygen but much more chemically reactive. It is pro-
duced by a complex chemical reaction when nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) react in the presence of sunlight. NOx is produced
when cars and trucks, electric power plants and industrial processes burn fossil
fuels. The interaction between these two chemicals create ozone pollution, the
primary harmful ingredient in urban smog
Paris Agreement The Paris Agreement’s central aim is to strengthen the global
response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global temperature rise
496
Glossary
this century well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to
limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 °C. The agreement also aims to
strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. It
was negotiated in 2015
Particulate matter Particulate matter is a mixture of solid particles and liquid drop-
lets found in the air. Some particles, such as dust, dirt, soot, or smoke, are large
or dark enough to be seen with the naked eye. Others are so small they can only
be detected using an electron microscope. PM10 refers to particles that have a
diameter of 10 microns or less; PM2.5 refers to even finer particles with diameters
that are 2.5 microns or smaller. This form of particulate matter when inhaled has
a severe impact on human health. In many developing countries, a major source
of particulate matter is the burning of traditional fuels such as wood and char-
coal, and the use of kerosene for lighting
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) A business model that gives customers (mainly in areas
without access to the electricity grid) the possibility to purchase small-scale
energy-producing products, such as solar home systems, by paying in small
instalments over time
Peaker generation plant Power plants that run predominantly during peak demand
periods for electricity. Such plants exhibit the optimum balance—for peaking
duty—of relatively high variable cost (fuel and maintenance cost per unit of gen-
eration) relative to fixed cost per unit of energy produced (low capital cost per
unit of generating capacity)
Permafrost Ground (soil or rock and included ice and organic material) that
remains at or below 0 °C for at least two consecutive years. In many areas of the
Arctic, permafrost soils appear to be slowly melting
Petcoke The term is short for petroleum coke. It is a by-product from the refining
of crude oil, consisting mostly of carbon, with variable amounts of sulphurs and
heavy metals
pH pH is a dimensionless measure of the acidity of water (or any solution) given
by its concentration of hydrogen ions (H+). pH is measured on a logarithmic
scale where pH = −log10(H+). Thus, a pH decrease of 1 unit corresponds to a
10-fold increase in the concentration of H+, or acidity. A reduction in ocean pH
means that the water is more acidic
Pico solar devices Small solar systems such as solar lanterns that are designed to pro-
vide only a limited amount of electricity service, usually lighting and in some
cases mobile phone charging. Such systems are deployed mainly in areas that
have no or poor access to electricity
Power The rate at which energy is converted into work, expressed in watts (joules
per second)
Power capacity The rated or nameplate capacity of an electrical power technology
Power coefficient When applied to wind turbines, the power coefficient indicates
how efficiently a turbine converts the energy in the wind to electricity. See also
capacity factor
Glossary 497
Power purchase agreement A contract between two parties, one that generates elec-
tricity (often from renewable energy) and one that wants to purchase it. It is
abbreviated to PPA
Primary energy The theoretically available energy content of a naturally occurring
energy source (such as coal, oil, natural gas, uranium ore, geothermal and bio-
mass energy, etc.) before it undergoes conversion to useful final energy delivered
to the end-user. Conversion of primary energy into other forms of useful final
energy (such as electricity and fuels) always entails losses. Some primary energy is
consumed at the end-user level as final energy without any prior conversion
Primary energy consumption The direct use of energy at the source or supplying users
with unprocessed fuel
Product and sectoral standards Rules specifying the minimum standards for certain
products (e.g., appliances) or sectors (industry, transport, etc.) for increasing
energy efficiency
Production tax credit A tax incentive that provides the investor or owner of a qual-
ifying property or facility with a tax credit based on the amount of renewable
energy (electricity, heat or biofuel) generated by that facility
Projection A projection is a potential future evolution of a quantity or set of quanti-
ties, often computed with the aid of a model. Unlike predictions, projections are
conditional on assumptions concerning, for example, future socio-economic and
technological developments that may or may not be realized
Progressive massive fibrosis A disease that afflicts coal miners, and more generally
known as black lung disease. It is caused by miners breathing in coal dust over
long periods of time
Radiative forcing The strength of factors that change the Earth’s energy balance are
quantified as Radiative Forcing (RF) in units of watts per square meter (W/m2)
Rainfed agriculture Agricultural practice relying almost entirely on rainfall as its
source of water
Rapid-onset event Event such as cyclones and floods which take place in days or
weeks (in contrast to slow-onset climate changes that occur over long periods of
time)
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) An effort to cre-
ate financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for devel-
oping countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon
paths to sustainable development. It is therefore a mechanism for mitigation that
results from avoiding deforestation. REDD+ goes beyond reforestation and for-
est degradation and includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of
forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks
Reforestation Planting of forests on lands that have previously contained forests but
that have been converted to some other use
Regulatory capture A situation created when people with close ties to industry are
employed by regulatory agencies with the result that regulation is directed away
from the public interest and towards the interest of the regulated industry
498
Glossary
Regulatory policy In the renewable energy context, examples include mandates or
quotas such as renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs and technology/fuel
specific obligations
Renewable energy Energy produced from renewable sources of energy, principally
solar energy, wind, and hydropower, but also including geothermal energy, and
wave, tidal, and ocean energy. Biomass is also a form of renewable energy—as
long as it is managed sustainably. Nuclear power, strictly speaking, is not a form
of renewable energy, although it has the major advantage of producing no emis-
sions of carbon
Renewable portfolio standard (RPS) An obligation placed by a government on a util-
ity company, group of companies or consumers to provide or use a predeter-
mined minimum targeted renewable share of installed capacity, or of electricity
or heat generated or sold. A penalty may or may not exist for non-compliance.
These policies also are known as “renewable electricity standards”, “renewable
obligations” and “mandated market shares”, depending on the jurisdiction
Representative Concentration Pathway The trajectory of greenhouse gas concentra-
tion resulting from human activity corresponding to a specific level of radiative
forcing in 2100. The low greenhouse gas concentration, RCP2.6, and the high
greenhouse gas concentration, RCP8.5, imply futures in which radiative forcing
of 2.6 and 8.5 watts per square meter, respectively, are achieved by the end of the
century
Resilience The capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with
a hazardous event or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that main-
tain their essential function, identity and structure, while also maintaining the
capacity for adaptation
Reverse auction See Tendering
Risk The potential for consequences where something of value is at stake and
where the outcome is uncertain, recognizing the diversity of values. Risk is
often represented as probability or likelihood of occurrence of hazardous events
or trends multiplied by the impacts if these events or trends occur. The term
risk is often used to refer to the potential, when the outcome is uncertain, for
adverse consequences on lives, livelihoods, health, ecosystems and species, eco-
nomic, social and cultural assets, services (including environmental services) and
infrastructure
Risk management The plans, actions or policies aiming to reduce the likelihood and/
or consequences of risks or to respond to consequences
Scenario A description of how the future may unfold. Scenarios typically include
an initial socio-economic situation, a description of the key driving forces,
and future changes in emissions, temperature or other climate change related
variables
Sea level rise Increases in the height of the sea with respect to a specific point on
land. Eustatic sea level rise is an increase in global average sea level caused by
an increase in the volume of the oceans as a result of the melting of land-based
Glossary 499
glaciers and ice sheets. Steric sea level rise is an increase in the height of the sea
induced by changes in water density as a result of the heating of the ocean.
Density changes induced by temperature changes only are called thermosteric;
density changes induced by salinity changes are called halosteric
Sequestration The permanent storage of carbon containing substances, in particu-
lar carbon dioxide, in terrestrial or marine reservoirs. Biological sequestration
includes direct removal of CO2 from the atmosphere through land-use change,
afforestation, reforestation, revegetation, carbon storage in landfills and practices
that enhance soil carbon in agriculture
Shale gas and oil Shale oil and gas are hydrocarbon resources that lie between layers
of shale rock, impermeable mudstone, or siltstone. While difficult to exploit with
conventional technology, they can be accessed by the hydraulic fracturing of the
shale
Shared Socioeconomic Pathway Scenarios, or plausible future worlds, that under-
pin climate change research and permit the integrated analysis of future climate
impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation. SSPs can be categorized
by the degree to which they represent challenges to mitigation (greenhouse gas
emissions reductions) and societal adaptation to climate change
Sink Any natural process or mechanism that removes a greenhouse gas from the
atmosphere. The main sinks are the land sink and the oceans—which both
absorb substantial quantities of carbon dioxide
Slow-onset climate change Changes in climate parameters—such as temperature,
precipitation, and associated impacts, such as water availability and crop produc-
tion declines—that occur over long periods of time (in contrast to rapid-onset
climate hazards, such as cyclones and floods, which take place over a period of
days or weeks)
Social cost of carbon The net present value of climate damages (with harmful dam-
ages expressed as a positive number) from one more tonne of carbon in the form
of carbon dioxide (CO2), conditional on a global emissions trajectory over time.
Small Island Developing States The United Nations recognizes 51 Small Island
Developing States. They are generally grouped by geographic region as shown
below
500
Glossary
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ĂŵŽĂ ŽŽŬ/ƐůĂŶĚƐ &ŝũŝ &ƌĞŶĐŚWŽůǇŶĞƐŝĂ

'ƵĂŵ <ŝƌŝďĂƟ DĂƌƐŚĂůů/ƐůĂŶĚƐ DŝĐƌŽŶĞƐŝĂ͕ƐƚĂƚĞƐ
WĂĐŝĮĐ EĂƵƌƵ EĞǁĂůĞĚŽŶŝĂ E͘DĂƌŝĂŶĂ/ƐůĂŶĚƐ EŝƵĞ
WĂůĂƵ WĂƉƵĂEĞǁ'ƵŝŶĞĂ ^ĂŵŽĂ ^ŽůŽŵŽŶ/ƐůĂŶĚƐ
dŝŵŽƌͲ>ĞƐƚĞ dŽŶŐĂ dƵǀĂůƵ sĂŶƵĂƚƵ
ŶŐƵŝůůĂ ŶƟŐƵĂΘĂƌďƵĚĂ ƌƵďĂ ĂŚĂŵĂƐ
ĂƌďĂĚŽƐ ĞůŝǌĞ ƌŝƟƐŚsŝƌŐŝŶ/ƐůĂŶĚƐ ƵďĂ
ŽŵŝŶŝĐĂ ŽŵŝŶŝĐĂŶZĞƉƵďůŝĐ 'ƌĞŶĂĚĂ 'ƵǇĂŶĂ
ĂƌŝďďĞĂŶ
,ĂŝƟ :ĂŵĂŝĐĂ DŽŶƚƐĞƌƌĂƚ WƵĞƌƚŽZŝĐŽ
^ƚ<ŝƩƐĂŶĚEĞǀŝƐ ^ƚ>ƵĐŝĂ ^ƚsŝŶĐĞŶƚΘ'ƌĞŶĂĚŝŶĞƐ ^ƵƌŝŶĂŵĞ
dƌŝŶŝĚĂĚĂŶĚdŽďĂŐŽ h^sŝƌŐŝŶ/ƐůĂŶĚƐ
ĂŚƌĂŝŶ ĂďŽsĞƌĚĞ ŽŵŽƌŽƐ 'ƵŝŶĞĂŝƐƐĂƵ
/D^ DĂůĚŝǀĞƐ DĂƵƌŝƟƵƐ ^ĂŽdŽŵĞĂŶĚWƌŝŶĐŝƉĞ ^ĞǇĐŚĞůůĞƐ
^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ
/D^ĐŽǀĞƌƐĨƌŝĐĂ͕/ŶĚŝĂŶKĐĞĂŶ͕DĞĚŝƚĞƌƌĂŶĞĂŶĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ
Not all the SIDS are islands: Belize, Guyana, and Suriname are also included. While
Singapore seems incongruous, the republic includes several dozen smaller islands that
are vulnerable to climate change impacts
Smart energy system An energy system that aims to optimise the overall efficiency
and balance of a range of interconnected energy technologies and processes,
both electrical and non-electrical (including heat, gas and fuels). This is achieved
through dynamic demand- and supply-side management; enhanced monitoring
of electrical, thermal and fuel-based system assets; control and optimisation of
consumer equipment, appliances and services; and better integration of distrib-
uted energy
Smart grid Electrical grid that uses information and communications technology to
co-ordinate the needs and capabilities of the generators, grid operators, end-users
and electricity market stakeholders in a system, with the aim of operating all
parts as efficiently as possible, minimising costs and environmental impacts and
maximising system reliability, resilience and stability
Smart inverter An inverter with software that is capable of rapid, bidirectional com-
munications, which utilities can control remotely
Solar collector A device used for converting solar energy to thermal energy (heat),
typically used for domestic water heating but also for space heating, industrial
process heat or to drive thermal cooling machines. Evacuated tube and flat plate
collectors that operate with water or a water/glycol mixture as the heat-transfer
medium are the most common solar thermal collectors used worldwide
Solar cooker A cooking device for household and institutional applications, that
converts sunlight to heat that is retained for cooking. There are five types of solar
cookers, box cookers, panel cookers, parabolic cookers, evacuated tube cookers
and trough cookers
Solar home system A stand-alone system composed of a relatively low-power pho-
tovoltaic module, a battery and sometimes a charge controller, that can power
small electric devices and provide modest amounts of electricity to homes for
Glossary 501
lighting, communication and appliances, usually in rural or remote regions that

are not connected to the electricity grid
Solar photovoltaics A technology used for converting light into electricity. Solar PV
cells are constructed from semiconducting materials that use sunlight to separate
electrons from atoms to create an electric current. Modules are formed by inter-
connecting individual cells
Solar-plus-storage A hybrid technology of solar photovoltaic arrays coupled with
battery storage. Other types of renewable energy-plus-storage plants also exist
Solar water heater A system consisting of a solar collector, storage tank, water pipes
and other components. There are two types of solar water heaters, pumped solar
water heaters use mechanical pumps to circulate a heat transfer fluid through the
collector loop (active systems), whereas thermosyphon solar water heaters make
use of buoyancy forces caused by natural convection (passive systems)
Storage battery A type of battery that can be charged by passing an electric current
through it. A lithium-ion battery uses a liquid lithium-based material for one of
its electrodes. A lead-acid battery uses plates made of pure lead or lead oxide for
the electrodes and sulphuric acid for the electrolyte
Storm surge The temporary increase, at a particular locality, in the height of the sea
due to hurricanes, cyclones, and storms. The storm surge is defined as being the
excess above the level expected from the tidal variation alone at that time and
place
Subsidy A government measure that artificially reduces the price that consumers
pay for energy or that reduces the production cost
Supercritical A type of power plant where the steam that drives the turbines is at a
temperature and pressure above critical point of water. The very high operating
temperatures and pressures increase the thermal efficiency of the power plant—
but also its cost
Sustainable development Development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs
Sustainable livelihood Livelihood that endures over time and is resilient to the
impacts of various types of shocks including climatic and economic.
System dynamics model A model which decomposes a complex social or behavioural
system into its constituent components and then integrates them into a whole
that can be easily visualized and simulated
Target An official commitment, plan or goal set by a government (at the local, state,
national or regional level) to achieve a certain amount of renewable energy or
energy efficiency by a future date. Targets may be backed by specific compliance
mechanisms or policy support measures. Some targets are legislated, while others
are set by regulatory agencies, ministries or public officials
Tendering (also called auction/reverse auction or tender) A procurement mechanism by
which renewable energy supply or capacity is competitively solicited from sellers,
who offer bids at the lowest price that they would be willing to accept. Bids may
be evaluated on both price and non-price factors
502
Glossary
Thermal energy storage Technology that allows the transfer and storage of thermal
energy. See Molten salt
Thermal expansion In connection with sea level, this refers to the increase in vol-
ume (and decrease in density) that results from warming water. A warming of
the ocean leads to an expansion of the ocean volume and hence an increase in sea
level
Tipping element Subsystems of the Earth system that are at least subcontinental in
scale and can be switched—under certain circumstances—into a qualitatively
different state by small perturbations
Tipping point A level of change in system properties beyond which a system reor-
ganizes, often abruptly, and does not return to the initial state even if the drivers
of the change are reduced or eliminated. For the climate system, it refers to a
critical threshold when global or regional climate changes rapidly from one sta-
ble state to a different state, and where the new state may create greatly increased
environmental hazards. The change is almost certainly irreversible
Transmission grid The portion of the electrical supply distribution network that
carries bulk electricity, generally over long distances, from power plants to sub-
stations, where voltage is stepped down for further distribution. High-voltage
transmission lines can carry electricity between regional grids in order to balance
supply and demand
Uncertainty A state of incomplete knowledge that can result from a lack of informa-
tion or from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It may have
many types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously defined con-
cepts or terminology, or uncertain projections of human behaviour. Uncertainty
can be created by disinformation campaigns intended to prevent concerted
action on climate change
Unconditional NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions (to the Paris Agreement
targets) proposed by countries without conditions attached
Variable renewable energy (VRE) A renewable energy source that fluctuates within
a relatively short time frame, such as wind and solar power, which vary within
daily, hourly and even sub-hourly time frames. By contrast, resources and tech-
nologies that are variable on an annual or seasonal basis due to environmental
changes, such as hydropower (due to changes in rainfall) and thermal power
plants (due to changes in temperature of ambient air and cooling water), do not
fall into this category
Vehicle fuel standard A rule specifying the minimum fuel economy of automobiles
Voltage and frequency control The process of maintaining grid voltage and frequency
stable within a narrow band through management of system resources
Vulnerability The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability
encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or suscepti-
bility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt
Watt A unit of power that measures the rate of energy conversion or transfer. A kilo-
watt is equal to 1 thousand watts (kW); a megawatt to 1 million watts (MW).
Glossary 503
One billion watts is a gigawatt, GW. A megawatt-electrical (MWe) is used to

refer to electric power, whereas a megawatt-thermal (MWth) refers to thermal/
heat energy produced. Power is the rate at which energy is consumed or generated
Watthour A unit of energy abbreviated as Wh. It is equal to the amount of energy
which is consumed by 1 watt of power delivered over a period of 1 hour. It gen-
erally refers to electricity but can refer to thermal energy—in which case it may
be written as Whth. The common unit of a kilowatthour (kWh) is one thousand
watthours. One million watthours is a megawatthour (MWh)
Weather The day-to-day variation in temperature, precipitation, sunshine, cloudi-
ness, and wind. Seasonal differences may also be referred to as ‘winter’ or ‘sum-
mer’ weather. However, measurable longer-term trends over decadal periods are
due to changes in climate
Index
A Alexandria 89
Aberfan tragedy 148 Alice, Texas 180
Access to electricity 241 Aliceville, Alabama 184
Acidic drainage 146 Aliso Canyon 181
Acidification 25 Allard, LaDonna Brave Bull 188
Acidity 119 Allowance auctions 340
Acid mine drainage (AMD) 146 Allowances or permits 337
Active layer 81 Altamont Pass 214
Active layer thickness (ALT) 22, 81 Amendment 1 409
Acute myocardial infarction 150 American Council for an Energy-
Adaptation 44 Efficient Economy (ACEEE) 261
Addis Ababa 310 American Council for Capital
Advanced biofuels 232, 311 Formation Center for Policy
Afforestation/reforestation 127, 132, Research 385
133 American Electric Power 378
Africa 36, 39 American Enterprise Institute 385
Africa Biogas Partnership Programme American Legislative Exchange Council
313 (ALEC) 398, 407, 412
African Development Bank 243 American Lung Association 34
Agriculture 220 American Petroleum Institute 376,
Airborne mercury 154 381, 402
Air pollution 32, 34, 37, 38, 49, 73, Americans for Prosperity 408
144, 146, 221, 226, 228 American Tradition Institute 389
Alberta Energy and Utilities Board 198 Ammonia 232
Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) 168 Anaerobic digestion 312
Alberta oil and gas fields 178 Anemometer 277
Alex 86
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 505

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0
506
Index
Animal dung 36 Balearic Islands 216

Anishinaabe 193 Baltic Sea 27
Antarctic 16 Bangkok 88
Antarctica 20, 422 Bangladesh 34, 75
Antarctic ice sheet 434 Banktrack 397
Anthracite and bituminous coal 135 Barbuda 85
Anthropocene Age 40 Barstow 301
Anti-electric vehicle groups 411 Barton, Joe 388
Apple 239 Basal Cambrian Sands 240
Aquaculture 26 Basic components of a PV + energy
Aquatic food chain 153 storage system 298
Arab Spring 93 Basic oxygen furnaces 366
Aragonite 26 Bat Conservation International 287
Arctic 16, 17, 60, 78, 82 Bates, John 392, 393
Arctic Ocean 433 Bats 286
Arctic permafrost 82 Batteries 243, 319, 320
Arctic sea ice 433 Battery Electric Bus (BEB) 229
Arctic sea ice extent 17 Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) 227,
Arctic tundra 81 228, 363
Arizona Public Service (APS) 320, 408 Battery energy storage system 320
Arkema chemical plant 165 Battery packs 228
Army Corps of Engineers 189 Behind the meter 321
Arsenic 147, 152 Belchatow power plant 154
Arthropod abundance 47 Bell Labs 287
Arthropod populations 46 Bell, Myron 403
Artificial plankton bloom 131 Benzene 143, 164, 176
Asia 39 Beyond Coal 215
Asthma 37, 150 Big Sandy River 147
Athabasca 166 Bike lanes 463
Athabasca deposit 167 Binary cycle system 315
Athabasca Oil Sands Project (AOSP) Biodiesel 310, 312
240 Biodiversity 43, 49, 130
Athabasca River 12 Bioenergy 130
Atmospheric Trust Litigation 197 Bioenergy production with carbon
Auction prices 221 capture 129
Automobile industry 157 Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and
Aviation 233 Storage (BECCS) 130, 132, 133
Biofuels 220, 233, 310
Biogas 312, 313
B Biological annihilation 46
Background rate 45 Biomass 36, 143
Bakken 184, 185 Biomass energy 132, 239, 308
Bakken field 183 Biomass feedstock 130
Bakken oil fields 188 Biomass fuels 38
Index 507
Biomass powered minigrids 244 C

Biomethane 313 CAFE standard 260
Birds and bats 286 Calcium carbonate 26
Bismarck 188 Caledonia, Wisconsin 183
Bitumen 167 California 13, 30, 72, 356
Black carbon 36, 67, 135, 230, 232 California drought 72
Black carbon emissions 231 California Energy Commission (CEC)
Black lung disease 145, 146 235, 321, 359
Blood mercury levels 154, 155 California’s cap-and-trade program 356
Bloomberg, Michael 407 Campaign of misinformation 387
Blue carbon 132 Camp Fire 14
Blue Nile 306 Canada 124
Blyth, James 214 Canada’s National Inventory Report
Bohai 2 oil rig 160 354
Borehole thermal energy storage 237 Canada’s pipelines 189
Borehole thermal storage 237 Canadian Association of Petroleum
Boston 89 Producers (CAPP) 189
Boundary Dam 3 240 Canadian Environmental Assessment
BP 162 Act 198
Bradley, Raymond 388 Canadian Mackenzie Delta 432
Bramble Cay melomys 44 Canadian oil sands 170
Brazil 69 Canadian Pacific 187
British Columbia 11, 13, 192, 307, Canadian pipelines 159
353 Canadian railways 183
British Columbia Environmental Office Canadian Transport Safety Board 183
192 CAN/CSA-ISO 50001 257
British Navy 157 Capacity factor 276
British Petroleum 135 Cap-and-trade 336
Bronchitis 37 Cap-and-trade program 352
Brush, Charles 214 Cap-and-trade schemes 367
Buffalo Creek 147 Cap-and-trade systems 337, 338, 341
Building codes 334, 462 Cape Town 73
Building energy codes 262 Cap on emissions 337
Building Energy Conservation Code Captain Aquifer 241
257 Carbon 109
Buildings 257 Carbon-14 66
Bulk carriers 230 Carbon budget 134, 138, 423
Bunter Aquifer 241 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway 129, 138, 219, 223, 239, 311
182 Carbon Capture, Utilisation, and
Bush meat 43 Storage (CCUS) 129
Butanol 311 Carbon capture with enhanced oil
Butterflies 44 recovery 240
508
Index
Carbon cycle 63, 109 Chemical additives 175

Carbon dioxide 49, 63, 64, 66, 67, 99, Chernobyl 317
102, 110, 112, 116, 122, 136, Chesapeake Bay 27
334 Childhood wasting 42
Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) 129 Children 37, 38
The carbon dioxide theory of climate China 29, 36, 75, 87
change 376 Cholera 70
Carbon fuels 32 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Carbon mineralization 133 Disease (COPD) 150
Carbon monoxide 34 Churchill, Winston 157
Carbon neutral 308 Ciguatera 78
Carbon price 334, 335, 338 Cinnabar 153
Carbon-pricing instruments 335 Clathrates 81
Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition Clean Air Act 34
334, 338 Clean Energy Ministerial 226
Carbon pricing revenues 340 Clean technology R&D 344
Carbon revenues 340, 352 Clear Skies Initiatives 402
Carbon revenues among RGGI 346 Climate change 44, 78, 92, 95, 97
Carbon storage 130 Climate change assessments 430
Carbon tax 200, 336, 367, 406 Climate change justice 196
Carbon tax rate 338 Climate Change Science Program 402
Carbon tax receipts 340 Climate denial front organisations 385
Carbon tax reduces emissions 337 Climate-driven migration 96
Carbon tax systems 341 Climate externality 335
Car efficiency standards 412 Climate Science Special Report 50, 83
Casselton, North Dakota 185 Climate Shock: The Economic
Catawba and Broad rivers 147 Consequences of a Hotter Planet
Cato Institute 385 431
Cats 287 Climate variability 97
Cattle ranching 120 Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) 216
Cellulosic biomass 311 CO2 and spaceship Earth 378
Cement industry 367 Coal 36, 143, 144, 202
Cement production 367 Coal ash 152
Center for Transforming Education Coal ash dumps 153
398 Coal ash dump sites 152
Central America’s Dry Corridor 97 Coal ash dust 152
Centre for Research on the Coal ash retention ponds 223
Epidemiology of Disasters Coal ash slurry 152
(CRED) 6 Coal cars 182
Chalk River 317 Coal dust 182
Charcoal 36 Coalfields 146
Charcoal stoves 37 Coal-fired electrical power generation
Charging points 228 222
Cheatgrass 92 Coal-fired generation technologies 223
Index 509
Coal-fired power plants 202, 215, 220, Concentrating solar power (CSP) 300,
223 301
Coal fuel cycle 223 Concerned Health Professionals of
Coal mine disasters 145 New York 181
Coal mine dust 145 Conference of Parties (COP21) 334
Coal miners 145 Conflicts 41, 92
Coal mine tailing ponds 147 Connected devices 259
Coal mining 145 Conservation agriculture 130, 463
Coal reserves 136 Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA) 408
Coal slag heaps 148 Consumers for Smart Solar 409
Coal train 182 Container ships 230
Coal train derailments 182 Control knob 64
Coal waste 147 Cook Islands 78
Coal waste slurry 147 Cooney, Philip A. 402
Coal Workers Health Surveillance Co-op refinery 164
Program (CWHSP) 145 COP21 124
Coastal blue carbon 132, 133 Copenhagen 216
Coastal communities 22 Copenhagen Climate Change
Coastal zones 26 Conference 389
Coke oven emissions 366 Coral bleaching 23, 24
Coking ovens 366 Coral reefs 22, 31, 49
Coking process 366 Coronary heart disease (CHD) 150
Cold climate heat pumps 258 Cost of electricity from electrification
Cold Lake 166, 168 option 253
Columbia River Gorge 184 Cost of the batteries 298
Combined heat and power (CHP) 262 Council on Environmental Quality 402
Combustion 144 Crescent Dunes solar energy plant 302
Commercial agriculture 119 Crop failures 70
Committee for a Constructive Crop pests 91
Tomorrow 385 Crosby 165
Community action 460 Crude oil 157
Community and shared solar energy Crude oil transported by rail 184
296 Cruise ships 230
Community based PV systems 299 Cryosphere 16
Community shared solar 296 Cuba 86
Compact of Mayors 215 Cuccinelli, Ken 389
Comparing the costs 322 Cyclic steam stimulation 168
Competitive Enterprise Institute 403 Cyclones 49
Competitiveness of electrification
options 252
Complementary policies 367 D
Complementary programs 359 Daily Mail 393
Computer models 377 Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) 188,
Concentrating solar concepts 301 397
510
Index
Dar es Salaam 244 Dominica 85

Dead zone 26, 27, 40 Drake Landing 237
Decarbonizing maritime transport 232 Drake Landing Solar Community 237,
Declaration of Rebellion 459 238
Deepwater Horizon 157, 159, 161–163 Drax power plant 310
Deforestation 119, 120 Drop in biofuels 311
Demand charges 409 Drought 6, 9, 41, 68–72, 78, 92, 93,
Denmark 237 95, 96
Deoxygenation 26 Drunken forests 22
Derailments 182 Dry Corridor 97
Desalination plants 73 Dry steam power plants 315
Desert Locust 79 Duke Energy 147
Destructive fishing 23 Dunnellon, Florida 183
Deutche Post DHL 225, 227
Diamondback moths 91
Diesel engines 68 E
Diesel exhaust from buses 228 E10 gasoline 311
Dilbit 159 Earth First 397
Direct air capture (DAC) 129, 133 Earthquake 6, 7, 9
Direct Air Capture and Carbon Storage Earth’s energy imbalance 61
(DACCS) 131 EarthSpark 249
Direct bill assistance 344 EarthSpark International 248
Direct insolation 301 Earth System Science Center 387
Dirty secrets of electric cars 411 East Africa 70
Disaster risk management 8 East Antarctica 21
Disasters, climate-related 10 East Island 424
Disasters, natural 6 East Siberian Arctic Shelf 433
Disbursement of carbon revenues 341, Economics of minigrids 251
347 Economists 334
Disbursements budgeted for Quebec’s Ecosystems 46
carbon revenues 353 Edison Electric Institute 376, 379, 381,
Dispatchable electrical power 320 382, 407
Dispatchable power 320 Education, outreach, and job training
Dissolved oxygen 27 345
Distributed energy systems 297 Edward Dean Adams power plant 214
Distributed solar energy 294 Effects of mercury 154
Distributed solar PV 297 Efficient lighting 258
Distribution of mini-grids in Tanzania Egypt 29, 87
245 Electrical transmission lines 157
District heating 237 Electric arc furnaces 363
District heating systems 258 Electric aviation 233
Dogger aquifer 316 Electric buses 226, 228, 229, 462
Domes Day book 213 Electric ferry 232
Domestic hot water systems 237 Electric home 259
Index 511
Electricité d’Haiti 248 Energy efficiency incentive programs

Electricity 219 262
Electricity for rural communities 242 Energy efficiency measures 262
Electric planes 233 Energy Efficiency Resource Standard
Electric powered forklifts 233 (EERS) 261
Electric Power Research Institute Energy efficiency standards 335, 357
(EPRI) 377–379 Energy efficient vehicles 260
Electric scooters 226 Energy independence 378
Electric tractors 463 Energy intensity 254
Electric trukcs 229 Energy intensity improvements 256
Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI) 226 Energy management systems 256
Electric Vehicles (EVs) 220, 224, 226, Energy Performance of Building
259 Directive (EPBD) 258
Elephants 43 Energy policy decision-making 223
Ellicott City, Maryland 183 Energy-related emissions of CO2 348
El Nino 24, 79, 94 Energy service companies 262
El Paso Electric 408 Energy Star rated appliances 461
El Yunque National Forest 46 Energy storage 319
Emission factors 137 Energy Storage Systems (ESS) 228,
Emission rights 336 297, 319
Emissions from shipping 230 Energy subsidies 359, 362
Emissions gap forecast 126 Energy use in public buildings 262
Emissions Gap Report 126, 127 Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) 240
Emissions of carbon dioxide 112 Enhanced weathering 130
Emissions of CO2 from the extraction Environmental costs 199
and processing of crude oil 169 Environmental Data & Governance
Emissions of methane 364 Initiative 405
Emissions trading scheme 343 Environmental impacts 144, 202, 285
Emperor butterfly 91 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
Employment 349 194
Enabling measures supporting carbon Environmental justice 164
pricing 342 Environmental law 196
Enbridge 159 Environmental Protection Agency 34
Enbridge Line 3 193 Erasure of scientific material 405
Enbridge Line 3 Replacement 190 Esieh Lake 433
Enbridge Northern Gateway 189, 190 Ethanol 310
Enchova 161 Ethiopia 70–72, 92
Energy and Environmental Legal Ethylbenzene 164
Institute (E&E Legal) 389 European Academies Science Advisory
Energy Benchmarking 257 Council (EASAC) 309
Energy efficiency 220, 254–256, 344, European Allowance (EUA) 338
349, 362 European Commission 200
Energy Efficiency Design Index 231 European EUA price 340
512
Index
European greenhouse gas emission Final energy consumption 217

reductions 219 First assessment report 101
European heating and cooling strategy Fish and shellfish 153, 154
258 Fish containing mercury 154
European Union 196 Fisheries 40, 76
European wind power 284 Fish species 90
Europe Beyond Coal 215 Flaring 68
EV100 227 Flash floods 75
EV purchase incentives 227 Floating PV 289
EV use and circulation incentives 227 Floods 6, 9, 49, 68, 73, 74
Executive Intelligence Review 380 Florida Power and Light 379
Expansion of agriculture 129 Florida’s SunSmart Schools and
Exploration 136 Emergency Shelters Program 299
Expunging the record 405 Flowback 176
External costs 144, 199, 200, 202 Flue gases 150
External costs of coal 200 Fly ash 152
External costs of energy 201 Food assistance 92
External costs per technology 201 Food insecurity 75, 76, 78, 94, 96, 97
Externalities 199 Food labelling 463
Extinction 44 Food price hikes 93
Extinction rates 45 Food prices 70, 93
Extinction Rebellion 458 Food riots 93
Extreme temperatures 5 Food safety 78
Extreme weather 76, 92 Food security 41, 79
Extreme weather events 297 Food versus fuel 311
Exxon 379 Ford Model Ts 157
ExxonMobil 384, 398, 402, 408 Forest area 119
ExxonMobil refinery 166 Forest management 133
ExxonMobil’s denial campaign 383 Forests 119
Forest soil 80
Forest wildfires 14
F Fort McMurray 12
Faecal Coliform Bacteria (FCB) 39 Fossil fuel combustion 32, 113, 114
The Fairness Doctrine 394 Fossil fuel consumption subsidies 360
Fall Army worm 72 Fossil fuel-powered electricity 200
Famine 96 Fossil fuel reserves 80, 135–137
Fast carbon 110 Fossil fuels 66, 143, 144, 202, 217
Fast carbon cycle 109 Fossil fuels - global reserves 137
Fatty acid methyl ester (FAME) fuels Fossil fuel subsidies 359, 368
310 Fourier, Joseph 63
Federal Emergency Management Fourth assessment report 101
Agency (FEMA) 11 Fracking 171
Feed-in-tariffs (FITs) 289, 294, 295 Fracking fluids 173–175
Index 513
Fracking process cycle 178 Glacier Bay National Park 19

Framework Convention on Climate Glaciers 16, 18, 19, 49
Change 123 Gleick, Peter 405
Freeborn Wind Farm 286 Global annual emissions 115
Freight train accidents 183 Global anthropogenic 111
Fresnel lens 301 Global anthropogenic methane 117
Friends of the Earth Canada 197 Global average temperature 125
Fuel economy standards 260 Global carbon budget 110, 121
Fuel efficiency of vehicles 334 Global Carbon Project 110
Fueling US Forward (FUSF) 411 Global Change Research Program 50
Fugitive leaks 178 Global Climate Coalition (GCC) 381
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power Global Climate Science Team (GCST)
plant 317 383
Global emissions of CO2 113, 115
Global energy intensity 254
G Global energy production 217
G20 countries 361 Global fossil fuel subsidies 361
Galena Park 166 Global GHG emissions 338
Garbage patches 30 Global livestock 118
Gas pipelines accidents 180 Global mean energy budget 63
Gas unlocked by fracking 366 Global Mean Sea Level (GMSL) rise 83
Gates, Bill 407 Global sea surface temperature 60
Gathering pipelines 180 Global temperatures 99
Gathering the gas 179 Global warming 50, 62, 122, 136, 137
General funds 340, 345 Global Warming Potential (GWP) 67,
Geologic methane 82, 432 177
George C. Marshall Institute 381 Global weighted average capacity
Geothermal 218 factors 279
Geothermal aquifer 315 Glomar Java Sea 161
Geothermal brine 315 Goddard Institute for Space Studies
Geothermal direct use 316 380
geothermal District Heating (geoDH) Gogama, Ontario 187
238 Google 239
Geothermal district heating and cool- Government Accountability Office 404
ing 238 GRACE satellites 20
Geothermal energy 313 Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 306
Geothermal heat and power 317 Grandpa’s Knob 214
Geothermal heating 238 Great Barrier Reef 24
Geothermal potential 316 Great Pacific Garbage Patch 30
Geothermal power capacity 314 Great Smog 144
Geothermal resources 238, 314 Green Climate Fund 316
Geysers 313, 315 Greenhouse 60, 102
GHG emissions 353 Greenhouse effect 63
514
Index
Greenhouse gas emissions 224 Heat pump systems 236

Greenhouse gas emissions from shale Heatwaves 2, 7, 9, 48, 78
gas 179 Heavy fuel oil 229, 230
Greenhouse gases 62, 64, 128, 169, HELE coal power 222
200 High-Efficiency Low-Emission (HELE)
Greenhouse gas programs 344 coal-fired power plants 222
Greenland 15, 20, 88 High-Level Commission 334
Greenland glaciers 434 Hinckley Point C 319
Greenland ice sheet 21, 422, 434 Hockey stick 388
Green Mini-Grids Africa Program 243 Holland 272
Greenpeace 397 Honour the Earth 193
Green spending 340 Hooker, Joseph 394
Grid-connected solar PV systems 297 Horizontal drilling 172
Ground-based heat pumps 317 Hornig, Donald 376
Group of Twenty (G20) 216 Horn of Africa 70
Guatemala 97 Horsepower 157
Gulf of Mexico 157 House Committee on Science, Space
and Technology 391
Household air pollution 36
H Household connected devices 259
Habitat 43 Household electricity bills 343
Habitat loss 44 Howarth, Robert 178
Haida Gwaii 131 Hughes, Malcolm 388
Haiti 7, 25, 37, 247 Human-caused threats to birds 287
Haliade-X 280 Human rights 196
Halladay, Daniel 272 Hurricane Florence 85
Halladay’s Self-Governing Windmill Hurricane Harvey 75, 89, 165, 166
272 Hurricane Hugo 47
Halladay Windmill Company of Hurricane Irma 85
Ellington 273 Hurricane Katrina 129, 166
Hansen, James 123, 380 Hurricane Maria 47, 85, 129
Hansom cabs 156 Hurricane Matthew 86
Harvard 80 Hurricane Michael 85
Harvey 86 Hurricanes 8, 49
Hawaii 362 Hurricane Walaka 424
Hawaiian monk seals 424 Huxley, Thomas 394
Hawksbill turtle 31 Hybrid species 90
Hazeltine Creek 148 Hydraulic fracturing 171, 173
Health 40 Hydraulic fracturing chemicals 176
Healthcare 78 Hydraulic fracturing water 173
Health costs 199 Hydrocarbon gas liquids (HGLs) 364,
Heartland Institute 385, 398, 400 365
HEAT GW thermal 218 Hydrocarbon liquids and gases 364
Heat pumps 238, 258, 363, 461 Hydrocarbons 364
Index 515
Hydroelectric minigrid 244 Industrial sector 220

Hydroelectric power 303, 407 Industry 239, 255
Hydrogen 232 Inez, Kentucky 147
Hydrogen fuel cells (HFCs) 66, 363 Infant mortality 150
Hydrogen sulphide 164, 179 Informed Council on the Environment
Hydropower 201, 218, 221, 303 (ICE) 382
Hydropower capacity 221 Initiative 1631 406
Hydropower minigrids 244 Insects 46, 91
Hydropower reservoirs 304 Inside Climate News 387
Hydrotreated esters and fatty acids Installed hydropower capacity 304
(HEFA) 310 Integrated Assessment Models (IAM)
Hydrotreated vegetable oil (HVO) 310 430
Hypoxia 26, 27 Intended Nationally Determined
Hypoxic waters 27 Contributions (INDCs) 124, 125
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) 100, 134, 380
I Intermittency 285
Ibiza 216 Internal Combustion Engine (ICE)
Ice field 19 157, 224, 228
Iceland 238 International aviation 229
Ice sheets 16, 19, 100 International Council on Clean
Ice shelves 16 Transportation (ICCT) 232
Idea Channel 399 International Cryosphere Climate
IEA Energy Efficient End-Use Initiative (ICCI) 434
Equipment Technology International Hydropower Association
Collaborative Programme (IEA 306
4E-TCP) 258 International Maritime Organization
Imperial Metals 148 (IMO) 231
Imperial Oil 168, 198 International Policy Network 385
Improving energy efficiency 261 International Transport Forum 232
Income generated by the solar home Invasive species 44, 71, 92
systems 251 Inverter 297
India 34, 75, 222 IPCC reports 428
Indiana Energy Association 408 IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report (AR5)
Indian Railways 312 429
Indigenous communities 168 IPCC Special Report 135, 422
Indigenous Environment Network 194 IPCC Summary for Policymakers
Indigenous peoples 78 435
Indonesia 29 Ischemic stroke 150
Industrial effluents 43 ISO 50001 Energy Management Systems
Industrial energy intensity 255 256
Industrial revolution 144 Ivanpah solar electric plant 302
Industrial robots 256 Ixtox I 160
516
Index
J Larderello 313
Jacobson, Mark 362 Largest solar photovoltaic power plants
Jacobs Wind Company 273 290
Jamaica 86 Larouche, Lyndon 380
Justice and human rights 195 LCOE differential 323
Juul, Johannes 273 League of Conservation Voters 407
Leishmaniasis 91
Les Anglais 248
K Les Anglais minigrid 248
Kalamazoo River 159, 189 Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE)
Kanpur 34 279, 282, 322
Karbuhn Oil Company 166 Levelized cost of electricity for onshore
Karl, Thomas 390 wind projects 284
Katrina 86 Levelized cost of PV electricity 299
Kearl Oil Sands 198 Life expectancy 40
Keeling, Charles 64, 375 Lighting 36
Keep it in the ground 136, 423 Lightning 14
Kenya 70 Lightning-ignited wildfires 15
Kerosene 36 Lignite 223
Kerosene lamps 248, 250 Linear trough 301
Keystone XL 194 Liquid biofuels 310
Kinder Morgan 192 Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) 36
Kingston, Tennessee 152 Liquified natural gas 232
Kiribati 78, 424 Lithium-ion batteries 320
Koch Brothers 385, 389, 408, 410, 411 Lizard Island 24
Koch industries 406, 410, 411 LNG-powered ocean-going dry cargo
Kyoto protocol 123, 124, 196, 198, vessel 232
231, 383 LNG-powered passenger ferry 232
Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act Locusts 79
(KPIA) 198 Loliondo 244
Kyoto targets 124 London 34, 35
London Array 282
Long-term jobs 363
L Los Angeles 229
Lac Megantic (Quebec) 158, 185, 186 Low carbon economy 367
LaDuke, Winona 193 Low Elevation Coastal Zones (LECZ)
Lake Oahe 188 44, 87
Lancaster, Justin 396 Low-volatility organic vapours 169
Land management 130 Lucifer 4
Land sink 129 Lung cancer 150
Land use change 101, 114 Luquillo rainforest 46
Land-use emissions 114
La Nina 79
Index 517
M Mekong delta 96
Macondo well disaster 162 Mendocino Complex fire 14
Magellan Midstream Partners 166 Mercuric sulphate 153
Major Canadian pipeline initiatives 190 Mercury 147, 152, 153, 156, 165, 170,
Major ice sheets 21 177, 202, 223, 402
Malaria 70, 91 Mercury cycle 155
Maldives 88 Mercury emissions 154, 156
Malnutrition 75, 94, 98 Mercury vapour 156
Management of photovoltaic minigrids Merthyr Vale coal mine 148
259 Metallurgical coal 366
Mann, Michael 387 Methane 66, 67, 82, 102, 116, 135,
Manufacturing doubt 374, 375 178, 334
Manufacturing uncertainty 375 Methane emissions 176, 178
Marathon Petroleum 412 Methane hydrates 81, 433
Marathon refinery 170 Methane leak 181
Marcellus shale 366 Methanol 232, 233
Marine and aviation 229 Methylmercury 153, 154, 170
Marine Environment Protection Miami 88, 89
Committee 231 Microbial action 81
Marine species 91 Microbial decomposition 80
Market manipulation 336 Microplastic particles 31
Market penetration of electric vehicles Migration 70, 97
228 Mildred Lake settling basin 167
Market price of carbon 338 Minamata Bay 155
Marrakesh Accords 124 The Minamata Convention 155
Marrakesh Vision 216 Minamata disease 155
Marshall Islands 88, 424 Minigrids 242, 246
Martin County Coal Corporation 147 Mixing the message 385
Massachusetts Department of M-KOPA 5 solar home system 250
Environmental Protection (DEP) M-Kopa Solar 250
197 Modern bioenergy 308
Massachusetts’s Global Warming Mohammed bin Rashid Al Mouktoum
Solutions Act (GWSA) 197 Solar Park 302
Mass extinctions 45 Molten salts 302
Mature Fine Tailings 167 Mosier, Oregon 184
Mauna Loa 65 Motiva refinery 164, 165
Mauna Loa observatory 99, 375 Mountaintop removal 146
Mayors for 100% clean energy 215 Mount Polley 148
Measles 70 M-Pesa 250
Mediterranean 90 Muir Glacier 19
Megawatt-scale PV and wind power Mumbai 75
294 Municipal and local government action
Megawatt-scale turbine 274 455
518
Index
Municipal solid waste (MSW) 310 Nigeria 29

Murray Energy Corporation 397 Nile delta 89
MW-scale energy storage systems 320 Nitrogen dioxide 34
Nitrogen oxide 144, 151, 177
Nitrous oxide 66, 67
N Nongovernmental International Panel
Nargis (cyclone) 6 on Climate Change (NIPCC)
NASA 22 399
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Nordhaus, William 123
364, 378 North Atlantic 27
National Center for Science Education Northern Mariana Islands 424
399 North Sea 88
National Climate Act 378 North Slope of Alaska 432
National Climate Program 378 Norway 225
National Coal Association 381, 382 No Tar Sands Oil 194
National Energy Board (NEB) 159, NRX reactor 317
180, 192, 193 Nuclear power 200, 219, 317
National Institute of Environmental Nuclear power programs 318
Health and Sciences 405 Nuclear weapons 318
Nationally Determined Contributions Nutrition 79
(NDCs) 125, 126, 137, 216
National Science Teachers Association
(NSTA) 384, 399 O
Natural disasters 92 Obed Mountain 148
Natural gas 135, 171, 177, 223 Ocean acidification 25
Natural gas liquids (NGLs) 364, 366 Ocean and terrestrial sinks 121
The Nature Conservancy 407 Ocean fertilization 131
nearly zero energy buildings, (nZEBs) Ocean Heat Content (OHC) 61, 62
258 Ocean iron fertilization 122, 129, 131
Negative emissions price 359 Ocean Ranger 160
Negative Emission Technologies Ocean sediments 81
(NETs) 128, 132, 133, 137 Ocean sink 121
Nepal 36 Ocean temperatures 61
Net energy metering 295 Ocean warming 26
Netherlands 87 Offshore disasters 159
Net metering 289 Offshore oil rig disasters 160
Network standby 259 Offshore permafrost melt 433
Net zero emissions 125 Offshore wind farms 282
Nevada Energy 408 Ogallala aquifer 194
New Hampshire 345 Ohio Oil and Gas Energy Education
New Orleans 89 Program (OOGEEP) 400
New York 88, 90, 229 Oil 135
Niagara Falls 214 Oil by train 195
Index 519
Oil carloads 183 Panemones 272

Oil companies 374 Pangani Falls hydropower project 244
Oil embargo 377 Pantglas junior school 149
Oil refineries 163 Parabolic trough 301
Oil sands 166, 170, 202 Paradise 14
Oil sands extraction 167 Parasites 91
Oil sands tailing ponds 167 Paris 34
Oilsands-tainted groundwater 168 Paris Agreement 125, 126, 136, 137,
Oil tanker accidents 158 216, 219
Oil tankers 230 Paris Agreement targets 338
Oil trains 183 Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility
Ojibwe band 193 and Climate Change & Call to
Ojibwe Indians 193 Action 224
Oklahoma Energy Resources Board Particulate matter (PM) 33, 34, 144,
(OERB) 400 146, 151, 164
Omnibuses 156 Pay-as-you-go 243, 249
One Planet Summit 335 Peace River 166, 307
Onshore wind 222 Permafrost 16, 22
Onshore windfarms 282 Permafrost carbon emissions 431
Onshore wind power 323 Permafrost soils 81, 422, 431, 432
Onsite energy storage 297 Permafrost temperatures 82
Ontario’s carbon-tax era 343 Permafrost thawing 135, 432
Open for business 235 Perverse subsidy 359
Organic aerosols 169 Pesticides 42
Organic pollution 40 Pests 76
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Petcoke 170
Countries (OPEC) 377 Petrochemical companies 366
The Origin of the Species 394 Petrochemical industries 364
Osaka 89 Petrochemicals 364
Outdoor air pollution 32 Petroleum 143, 156
Overfishing 23–25 Petroleum coke 170
Oxygen 26 Petro Pete’s Big Bad Dream 400
Oysters 26 PFCs 66
Ozone 151 Phasing out the use of coal 367
Photoelectric effect 287
Photovoltaic electricity 235
P Photovoltaic system in Miami 293
Pacific Gas and Electric 320 Photovoltaic systems installed on K-12
Pacific islands 78 schools 236
Paddington railway station 156 Photovoltaic technology 289, 291
Pakistan 75 Physicians for Social Responsibility
Palm oil 119 150, 181
520
Index
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Production of coal 150

Safety Administration 180 Program administration 344
Piper Alpha 161 Progressive massive fibrosis (PMF) 145
Planes with biofuels 312 Project Independence 377
Plass, Gilbert 376 Propane 36
Plastic pollution 27, 30 Proppant 173
Plastics 364 Proterra 40-foot bus 229
Plastic trash 44 Pruitt, Scott 404
Plastic waste 28, 29 Public transport 228, 462
Plug-in electric vehicles 410 Puerto Rico 46, 47, 84
Plug-in hybrids 220, 227 Pumped storage 304
Pneumonia 37 Pumped storage capacity 303
Poaching 44 Pumped storage hydro 305
Poisoning 43 Pumped storage projects 303
Poland 154, 223 Puna flash/binary combined cycle
Polar bear 44 system 315
Pollution 44 PV-hybrid minigrids 249
Population decay 46 PV-hybrid system 248
Port Arthur 164 PV system costs 234
Port-au-Prince 37
Portugal 14
Positive feedback 80 Q
Post-tax energy subsidies 361 Qantas 312
Poverty 95 Quebec Cap-and-Trade system 350
Power capacity GW 218 Quebec’s actual emissions 351
Power curve for a Vestas V80 276 Quebec’s cap-and-trade system 351
Power grid 234 Quest CCS 240
Powering Past Coal Alliance 215
Power outage 297
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) R
221, 284, 295 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Power sector 220 Organizations Act (RICO) 396
Power tower 300, 301 Radium 176
Price of food 93 Rail accidents 183
Price on carbon 338, 367 Rail cars 182
Primary energy 145, 254 Rail shipments 184
Primary energy demand 217, 255 Railway carbon 182
Principal elements of a large wind Railway locomotives 156
turbine 275 Rainfall patterns 76, 221
Probability of global warming 432 Rainfed agriculture 71, 74
Process heat 239 RE 100 216
Processing of natural gas 364 Ready for 100 215
Produced water 173, 176 Rebellion Day 459
Index 521
Record highs 4 Rhinos 43

Record lows 4 Rice 77
Reduced yields 76 Riggs Glacier 19
Reducing fossil fuel subsidies 359 Rio de Janeiro 89
Reef Check 25 Risk of a train accident 184
Refugee 70, 92, 95 River Tame 31
Refugee Convention 97 Rocky Mountain Institute 252
Regenerative agriculture 463 Rocky Mountain Power 408
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Rooftop and small ground-mounted
343, 406 solar PV systems 234
Regulatory capture 401 Rooftop solar 289, 321
Remaining carbon budget 135 Rotor diameter 279
Renewable energy 200, 223, 320, 345, Rural electrification 241, 249
349 Rural Electrification Administration
Renewable energy capacity growth 221 273
Renewable energy indicators 218 Russian supplies of natural gas 224
Renewable energy share
of global electricity production 221
of total final energy consumption S
217 Sakaka, Saudi Arabia 222
Renewable Portfolio Standard 357 Saltwater intrusion 96, 423
Renewable power generating capacity San Bruno, California 180
220 San Diego 233
Repowering 284 San Francisco 13
Reserves of coal 136 Santa Ana winds 13
Reserves of oil and gas 136 Santa Barbara 160
Reserves of oil, natural gas, and coal Sarulla geothermal plant 314
138 Saskatchewan 12
Residences and office buildings 220 Saudi Arabia 290
Residential and tertiary 233 Save the Fraser Declaration 189
Residential photovoltaic systems 234, Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program
289 (SREP) 243
Residential roof-mounted photovoltaic School buses 229
systems 407 Schools 236
Residential rooftop systems 294 Schools powered by solar energy 236
Residential solid fuel 68 Science Advisory Committee 376
Residual fuels 230 Science Explorer website 405
Resolute Forest Products 397 Science teachers 398
Respiratory problems 38 Scientific Certainty Argumentation
Revelle, Roger 376, 395 Method (SCAM) 387
Revenue recycling 340 Scotford Upgrader 240
Reykjavik Geothermal 315 Scripps Institution of Oceanography
RGGI cap-and-trade program 345 375
522
Index
Seacrest drilling ship 161 Solar Home Systems 242, 249, 253
Sea ice 16 Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC) 321
Sea ice extent 17, 18, 434 Solar photovoltaic 214, 217, 220
Sea level rise 16, 83, 96, 422, 435, 436 Solar photovoltaic capacity 288
Sea levels 82 Solar photovoltaic electricity 271
Second assessment report 101 Solar photovoltaic energy 157, 201,
Sewage 39 287
Shale formations 171 Solar photovoltaic mini-grids 244
Shale gas 171, 172 Solar photovoltaic panels 234
Shale gas fracking 181 Solar photovoltaic power 239
Shale gas production 178 Solar photovoltaic systems 234
Shale gas sites 178 Solar-plus-batteries 324
Shale gas well 172 Solar-plus-storage market 289
Shanghai 88 Solar PV global capacity 288
Shenzhen 88 Solar rate class 409
Shipping 68, 230 Solar thermal 236
Sickness 40 Solar thermal energy 236
Silica dust 146 Solar thermal technology 237
Silkeborg 237 Solar use fees 409
Site C hydroelectric plant 307 Solar water heaters 363
Sixth extinction 45 Somalia 70, 92
Sixth mass extinction 46 Sources and sinks 112
Slag heaps 156 South Africa 73
Slurry waste 148 Southern Ocean 27
Small biogas plants 312 Southern resident killer whales 192
Small distributed capacity 235 South Indian Ocean 31
Small distributed PV 234 South Sudan 70
Small island developing states 422, 423 Special Message to Congress 376
Small islands nations 362 Special report on global warming 102
Small-scale gold mining 156 Spent fuel rods 318
Small-scale hydropower 242 Sputnik-3 satellites 288
Smart meters 243, 249, 324 Stand-alone system 297
Smith, Lamar 391, 393 Standing Rock 188
Smith-Putnam machine 214 Standing Rock Sioux Reservation 188
Smoke 36 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 188
Social unrest 93 Stanford Research Institute 376
Soil carbon 80 Starvation 70
Soil carbon storage 133 Steam assisted gravity drainage 168
Soil organic carbon 130 Steam engine 156
Soil organic matter 80 Steel industry 366, 367
SolarCity 234 Steel-making 367
Solar cooling 237 Stern, Sir Nicolas 429
Solar-diesel minigrids 252 Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI)
Solar energy 63 123
Index 523
Storms 8, 9 Tanzania 244

Storm surge 83 Tanzania Electric Supply Company
Storm tide 84 (TANESCO) 244, 247
Strategic Defense Initiative 381 Tanzania Energy Development and
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Access Project (TEDAP) 247
Participation (SLAPP) 395 Target 236
Strategic Petroleum Reserve 378 Tax, cap or trade 336
StreetScooter 227 Teesside Collective project 240
Stunted children 41, 42 Tees Valley Process Industry cluster 240
Stunting 49 Telstar 288
Sub-bituminous and lignite 135 Temperature anomalies 61
Subsea permafrost 433 Temperature limit 123
Subsistence agriculture 119 Terrestrial carbon sink 121
Suess, Hans 66 Terrestrial sink 119
Sulphur 143 Tesla 239
Sulphur dioxide 34, 143, 151, 164 Tesla Powerwall 235
Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF6) 66 Tesla’s 100 MW Li-ion battery 320
SunRun 234 Texas 86
SunShot Initiative 323 Texas Barnett Shale 171
SunShot program 300, 323 Theewaterskloof Dam 73
SunShot targets for levelized costs of Thermal efficiency 461, 462
PV electricity 300 Thermal energy storage 301, 302
The SunSmart Emergency Shelter Third assessment report 101
Program 321 Thomas Fire 13
Supercritical HELE power plant 222 Time of use rates 409
Superfund site 152 Tokelau 88
Superstorm Sandy 86 Tokyo 88
Sustainable Energy Facility for the Toluene 164
Eastern Caribbean 316 Too cheap to meter 317
Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa Top Runner programme 258
(SEFA) 243 Top ten CO2 emitting countries 426
Svalbard 22, 60 Toronto 229, 236
Sweden 232 Total energy demand 254
Swedish Shipowners Association 232 Total installed renewable electric power
Swiss carbon tax 338 221
Syncrude 240 Toxic chemicals 43
Syncrude tailing pond 167 Toxic waste 147
TransCanada Energy East 190, 192
TransCanada Keystone XL 191, 193
T Transition to renewable energy 462
Tailing ponds 147, 148, 156 Transmission systems 285
Tailpipe emission standards 262 Trans Mountain Expansion Project
Taliks 433 190, 192
Tanker accidents 158 Trans Mountain Pipeline 159
524
Index
Transocean 162 Vanguard I & II 287

Transport 224, 259 Vanuatu 78, 424
Transport for London (TFL) 35 Vector-borne diseases 91
Transport policy 220 Vermillion Oil Rig 380 161
Transport sector 136 Vermont 345
Treaty 8 First Nations 307 Vertebrate extinctions 45
Trends in California’s GDP, population, Vestas 274
and GHG emissions 357, 358 Vestas V800 276
Trump, Donald 381 Virgin Australia 312
Tsunami 6, 7 Vivint 234
Tucson Electric Power 320 Vogtle nuclear reactors 319
Tundra 82 Vojens 237
Turbine rating 279 Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)
Tuvalu 78, 88, 424 164
Tyndall, David 63
Typhoon Haiyan 82
W
Wagner, Gernot 431
U Wairakei 313
UN Conference on Environment and Walmart 236
Development 123 Walney Extension Offshore Wind Farm
Undernourished people 41 282
Undernourishment 42 Walney Offshore Wind Farm 282
Union of Concerned Scientists 411 Warming soils 80
United Nations Environment Wasdell, David 429
Programme (UNEP) 39, 100, Waste coal slurry 148
126, 380 Waste-to-energy plants 310
United Nations Framework Wastewater 39
Convention on Climate Change Wasting 49
(UNFCCC) 137, 196, 334, 381 Water capping 167
University of East Anglia Climatic Water pollution 39
Research Unit 389 Water-pumping windmills 273
University of Hawaii 215 Water vapour 63, 64
UN’s Sustainable Development Goals We Are Still In 215
241 Weitzman, Martin 431
US Fish and Wildlife Service 287 Well contamination 175
US geological Survey 405, 436 West Antarctica 21
US petrochemical industry 364 Western Climate Initiative 350
Utility-scale PV power plants 294 Western Pacific 27
Wet ash ponds 152
Wetlands 66, 135
V Weyburn Enhanced Oil Recovery
Valero refinery 164 Project 240
Vancouver 13 Wheat 77
Index 525
Wheat yields 77 Working groups 100

White Thunder Ridge 19 World Glacier Monitoring Service
WHO Air Quality Guidelines 33 (WGMS) 18
Wildfires 11, 14, 16, 49, 72, 114, 129 World Health Organisation (WHO) 32
Wind Atlas website 280 World Meteorological Organisation
Wind energy 201 (WMO) 100, 380
Wind energy resources map of North World Resources Institute 22
America 281 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 45
Wind farm power 305 World’s largest offshore windfarms 283
Windmills 272
Wind-plus-batteries 324
Wind power 217, 271, 272 X
Wind powered turbines 273 Xina Solar One 302
Wind power global capacity 275 Xylene 164
WindPower program 278
Wind resources 280
Windspeed distribution 277 Y
Windspeed probability distribution Yellow fever 70
278
Wind speeds 277
Wind turbine noise (WTN) 285 Z
Wind turbine prices 323 Zebra mussels 92
Wood pellet fuel 309 Zooxanthellae 23
Wood pellets 310
Wood pellets for power generation 310

Climate Change and Renewable Energy How-To End The Climate Crisis 1st Ed

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Climate Change and

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© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020

Cover credit: © Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com

frequency of floods that displace thousands sometimes millions of people,

Markham, ON, Canada Martin J. Bush

The Sixth Extinction? 45

2 The Overheated Earth 59

3 The Carbon Cycle 109

4 Carbon Chaos 143

5 Coming Clean 213

6 Getting Technical 271

Windspeed Distribution 277

7 Pricing Down Carbon 333

Fossil Fuel Subsidies 359

8 Denial and Deception 373

9 How to End the Climate Crisis 421

Arctic Sea Ice 433

GIS Geographic information system

PV Photovoltaic solar energy

Fig. 1.1 Ratio of record highs to record lows in the USA

Fig. 1.9 Antarctic November sea-ice extent 1978–2018

Fig. 3.6 Global emissions of CO2 by country 1960–2017

Fig. 5.2 European greenhouse gas emission reductions projected

Fig. 6.9 Solar PV global capacity and annual additions from 2007

Fig. 8.2 Global mean surface temperature anomalies relative

Table 1.1 Occurrence and mortality of the five top types of disaster

Table 6.3 Common human-caused threats to birds in North America 287

© The Author(s) 2020 1

In the Middle East and northern Africa, temperatures were at record

everywhere. Across Asia, in the developing world, and everywhere fami-

management. However, it is generally accepted that heat-related deaths in

Trends in Climate-Related Disasters

The number of storms resulting in fatalities has slightly declined on a dec-

Fig. 1.3 Number of climate-related disasters occurring each year since 1960

Fig. 1.6 Wildfires blazing in Portugal in October 2017

In October 2017, huge wildfires burned across Portugal. At least 37 peo-

The Big Melt

Figure 1.9 shows the percentage change in the extent of Antarctic

employed together with more conventional land-based mass balance calcu-

Permafrost, or permanently frozen ground, is soil, sediment, or rock that

Coral Reefs and Oceans

Fig. 1.13 A ‘drunken forest’ in Alaska—caused by thawing permafrost (Source US

Warmer waters frequently result in coral bleaching. When seawater is too

if temperatures remain elevated and if other stresses continue to impact the

Haiti is an extreme example of the impact of overfishing on the marine

When carbon dioxide is absorbed by seawater, chemical reactions occur

A study reported in Science magazine estimated that in 2010, 275 mil-

Table 1.2 Top ten countries ranked by quantity of mismanaged plastic waste in

Outdoor Air Pollution

In 2016 the World Health Organisation published a comprehensive report

• Annual mean: 10 micrograms per cubic meter of air (10 µg/m3)

In terms of population numbers, fully 84% of the assessed populations

The US has made significant progress in reducing the emissions of the

• Many cities across the US experienced an increased number of days with

More cities suffered from a greater number of days when ground-level

Meanwhile, over in London, England, a report issued in October 2017 by

Household Air Pollution

Fig. 1.21 Charcoal market in Haiti—Just outside Port-au Prince in 2013 (Source

Globally, indoor air pollution is declining—thanks to huge efforts by sev-

Air Pollution and Children

As countries industrialize and urbanize, energy use tends to increase. If

Organic pollution is caused by the release of large quantities of organic

GIS Geographic information system

PV Photovoltaic solar energy

Fig. 1.1 Ratio of record highs to record lows in the USA

Fig. 1.9 Antarctic November sea-ice extent 1978–2018

Fig. 3.6 Global emissions of CO2 by country 1960–2017

Fig. 5.2 European greenhouse gas emission reductions projected

Fig. 6.9 Solar PV global capacity and annual additions from 2007

Fig. 8.2 Global mean surface temperature anomalies relative

Table 1.1 Occurrence and mortality of the five top types of disaster

Table 6.3 Common human-caused threats to birds in North America 287

Trends in Climate-Related Disasters

Fig. 1.3 Number of climate-related disasters occurring each year since 1960

Fig. 1.6 Wildfires blazing in Portugal in October 2017

Figure 1.9 shows the percentage change in the extent of Antarctic

Coral Reefs and Oceans

Fig. 1.13 A ‘drunken forest’ in Alaska—caused by thawing permafrost (Source US

Table 1.2 Top ten countries ranked by quantity of mismanaged plastic waste in

• Annual mean: 10 micrograms per cubic meter of air (10 µg/m3)

Fig. 1.21 Charcoal market in Haiti—Just outside Port-au Prince in 2013 (Source

Air Pollution and Children

In Sickness and in Health

Fig. 1.22 Prevalence of undernourishment in the world and absolute numbers in

Fig. 2.4 The Keeling curve—Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 measured at Mauna

Fig. 2.7 Number of people affected by floods between 1900–2015 (The graph

Species on the Move

Climate Change and Conflict

Table 2.4 Conflict, climate-related shocks, and food insecurity in 2016

Climate Change and Poverty

Climate change is a serious obstacle to the sustained eradication of poverty.

Too Hot to Handle

The special report on global warming of 1.5 °C was released in October

50. See the article on terrestrial permafrost by Romanovsky et al. in the

Fig. 3.6 Global emissions of CO2 by country 1960–2017 (Source Global Carbon

Table 3.2 The top ten emitters of carbon dioxide in 2018a

Figure 3.6 shows how CO2 emissions are now dominated by China,

Fig. 3.7 Estimated global anthropogenic methane emissions by source (Source

Table 3.3 US methane emissions in 2017