RESPONDENT

ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE PETITION FILED BY NWRWA IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana, that the petition
filed by NWRWA is not maintainable as the Supreme Court's ruling is supreme and
cannot be changed in any other way.
2. As per the Order XL rule 1, Supreme Court Rules 1966 a review petition in a
criminal proceeding can be filed only on the ground of an error apparent on the face
of the record.The only valid justification for filing a review petition is to correct an
apparent mistake or the severe injustice that results from a Supreme Court ruling.. In
the present case, as there is no error in the judgement it cannot be subjected to review
petition under Art. 137.
3. In Northern India Caterers (India) v Lt. Governor Of Delhi (1979)¹ the Court held
that “a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgement delivered by this Court
merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision in the case. Normally the
principle is that a judgement pronounced by the Court is final and departure from
that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling
character make it necessary to do so. If the attention of the Court is not drawn to a
material statutory provision during the original hearing the Court will review its
judgement. The Court may also reopen its judgement if a manifest wrong has been
done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice.” In this case
the review petition was filed only to overrule the judgement without necessary
grounds.
4. Similarly , in the State of Haryana v. Prem Chand and Ors. The Supreme Court²
dismissed the review petition as they found no error apparent on the face of the record
necessitating review of the judgement in light of the decisions in the case of P.N.
Eswara Iyer and Ors v. Registrar³ and Sow Chandra Kanta & Anr. v. Sheik Habib⁴ as
such the review petitions were dismissed.The Supreme Court's ability to review its
own judgments is not an inherent authority, but rather a safeguard against the
Supreme Court's human frailties in order to guarantee the administration of justice. It
must therefore only be used sparingly. As there is no specific grounds were produced
before the Hon’ble Court to review its decision, the petition is not maintainable.

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5. The famous dictum, that is, “justice should not only be done, but must also appear to
be done” which was laid down by Lord Hewart in the case of Rex v. Sussex Justices⁵
also show the maintainability of the judgement by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The
Preamble of the POCSO Act also restates the same, that is, the best interests of the
child should be secured. Through this judgement it is very clear that the best interest
of Kannaki is protected by law.
6. As the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which protects the wellbeing and
interest of the child, there is no need for a revision under Art.136. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court made its decision considering the basic facts that Kannaki is leading a
happy and comfortable life and the Court cannot ignore this fact.
7. There are no such errors in the judgement made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. So,
the review petition should be rejected considering the triviality of this petition.

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ISSUE 2
WHETHER SECTION 42A OF POCSO ACT IS RELEVANT?

1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Protection Of
Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 is an act that was for the
protection of children from sexual offences and harassment or any kinds of offences
against children.Section 42A of the POCSO Act⁶ states that “the provisions of this act
shall be in addition to and in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time
being in force and, in case of any inconsistancy, the provisions of this act shall have
overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency”.
This Act was inserted by Criminal (Amendment) Act 13 of 2013. Eventhough the
law objects to any kind of derogation , this Act explicitly derogates the provisions of
the PCMA and IPC. Although POCSO has the right to override the provisions of any
other law which it may find inconsistent with the POCSO Act under Section 42A it
cannot override the provisions mentioned in the Sec 3 of PCMA and the exception 2
to Section 375.
2. Eventhough the Section 42A provides that the provisions of the said act will not
derogate any other law, the POCSO Act expressly derogate the exception 2 to section
375 . Exception 2 to section 375 provides that sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a
man with his own, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. Thus ,
this exception states that the sexual intercourse with his own wife who is above the
age of 15 does not constitute a crime even she concieved at the age of 17. That is, the
provisions of POCSO Act derogate the law provided under exception 2 to Section
375.
3. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that no crime has been
committed in the marriage of Kannaki and Raghu and hence does not violate Section
3 of the PCMA. Section 3 of the PCMA gives account only to the choice of the child
who was a contracting party at the time of marriage and does not address any offence
as there is no crime committed under the said provision. Hence, it is clear that even
though the law objects to any kind of derogation , this Act explicitly derogates the
provisions of the PCMA and IPC.

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ISSUE 3
WHETHER SECTION 3 OF PREVENTION OF CHILD MARRIAGE ACT IS
VIOLATIVE OF POCSO ACT?
1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, Section 3 of
Prevention of Child Marriage Act is not violative of POCSO Act.Section 3 of
the Prevention of Child Marriage Act,2006 states that “every child marriage,
whether solemnised before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be
voidable at the option of the contracting party who was a child at the time of
the marriage”.. It also provides that “a petition for anulling a child marriage by
a decree of nullity may be filed at the District Court only by a contracting
party to the marriage was a child at the time of the marriage”. Section 3(2) of
Prevention of Child Marriage Act further states that, “if at the time of filing a
petition, a petitioner is a minor, a petition may be filed through his or her
guardian or next friend along with the Child Mrriage Prohibition Officer ''.
2. It is obvious that Kannaki is satisfied with her family life because she is
happily married to Raghu and has a happy life with him, their children, and
her relatives. She also has no objections to the marriage. The marriage cannot
therefore be regarded as null and void. “The Thing speaks for itself”,
according to the Latin proverb res ipsa loquitur. Kannaki, who also filed an
appeal in this case seeking the accused's release, has no objections to Raghu's
marriage to her. Kannaki submitted the appeal for the accused's acquittal as
well as the complaint that was made by the hospital, who is not one of the
parties listed in Section 3(2). Because of this, it is obvious that Kannaki has
given her marriage her tacit approval.
3. Section 3 of PCMA protects the interests of the child as it is as per the option
of the child the marriage becomes voidable when the child attains the
majority. Kannaki has not any objections and she is willing to live with the
accused,thus Section 3 of PCMA protects the interests of the child according
to their choice. The law which protects the interests of the child is not
violative of the POCSO.
4. The definition of rape is excluded from the exception 2 to section 375, which
shields a husband from legal action for engaging in non-consensual sexual

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 activity with his wife if she is over the age of fifteen.Thus, it clearly states that
there exists no such crime, even though she was conceived at the age of 17.
5. The marriage at an early age with close relatives is a custom practising in
Thirukkulam village. The marriage of Kannaki has happened as per the
traditions and customs of their village.Art.13(3) provides that “law” includes
any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage
having in the territory of Indiana the force of law; As custom was a source of
law, a village's customs and traditions can be regarded as law. In Yunus Khan
v. State of Haryana and Ors.⁷it is submitted that a Muslim boy or Muslim girl
who has attained puberty is at liberty to marry anyone he or she likes and the
guardian has no right to interfere. The decision of the High Court in the above
case, thus clearly states that the custom can prevail over the statutory law.
6. Article 29(1) provides that “any section of the citizens residing in the territory
of Indiana or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its
own shall have the right to conserve the same”. Article 29(1) extends to all the
citizens irrespective of the fact whether they are in majority or minority, the
only condition being that such a section must have a distinct language, script
or culture of its own. It is an absolute right for the minorities to preserve the
culture and cannot be subjected to reasonable restrictions in the interest of the
general public. It is the tradition and culture of the Thirukulam village to
marry their close relatives. The marriage between raghu and Kannaki was held
as per the traditions and culture of the village. Thus the marriage between
them should be protected under Article 29(1) of the Constitution of Indiana.
7. As the provision in PCMA stands to guarantee the best interest of the child,
and laws are maintained to guarantee these interests, so it is not violative of
POCSO.

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