1. Krivenko vs.

The Register of Deeds, City of Manila

FACTS: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The
registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but
was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land
within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land

HELD: No. Under the Constitution, all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of capital of
which is owned by such citizen, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession
at the time of the inauguration of the Government. Thus, the provision of law explicitly
states that aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands
in the Philippines and, consequently, all acquisitions made in contravention of the
prohibition since the fundamental law became effective are null and void.

2. Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Siu Si Temple

FACTS: The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a
deed of donation executed in due form, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel
of residential land in favor of the unregistered religious organization, Ung Siu Si Temple,
operating through three trustees, all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly
accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting
in representation and on behalf of the latter and its trustees. Counsel for the donee Uy
Siu Si Temple claimed that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes,
is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing
as follows: Section 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or
denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of other
country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon which to
build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable institutions. & Section. 2. Such
religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three Trustees
for the use of such associations

ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign religious organization may own a parcel of land

HELD: No. The provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be
deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith.
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The fact that the appellant religious
organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition,
since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty
per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed
to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos;
and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the
controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. To permit religious
associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to drive
the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in

3. Heirs of Paz Macalalad v. Rural Bank of Pola, Inc.

FACTS: Herein petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT No. T-11748
alleging that she is the sole surviving legal heir of one Leopoldo Constantino, Jr. and that
the latter owned a parcel of land located at Pinagsabangan II, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.
After the death of Leopoldo, it was made to appear that the latter sold the subject lot to
the Spouses Pimentel in whose names a new TCT was issued. Thereafter, the Spouses
Pimentel obtained a loan from Rural Bank of Pola, Inc. and gave the subject parcel of land
as collateral for the said loan respondent bank, acting in bad faith, in utter disregard of
its duty to investigate the validity of the title of the Spouses Pimentel and without
verifying the location of the lot, accepted the same as collateral for the Spouses Pimentel's
loan subsequently, the Spouses Pimentel failed to pay their loan leading respondent bank
to foreclose the mortgage over the subject property where it emerged as the highest
bidder consequently, respondent bank obtained ownership of the disputed lot and the
TCT in the name of the Spouses Pimentel was cancelled and a new one was issued in
respondent bank's name. Petitioners contend that the Deed of Sale from which the
respondent bank supposedly derived its title to the property is a complete nullity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is a purchaser in good faith

RULING: Yes. The Court reiterates the settled principle that no one can give what one
does not have. Stated differently, no one can transfer a right to another greater than what
he himself has. Applying this principle to the instant case, granting that the deed of sale
in favor of the Spouses Pimentel was forged, then, as discussed above, they could not
have acquired ownership as well as legal title over the same. Hence, they cannot give the
subject property as collateral in the mortgage contract they entered into with the
respondent bank. However, there is an exception to the rule that a forged deed cannot be
the root of a valid title - that is when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. In the
present case, even assuming that the deed of sale between Leopoldo and the Spouses
Pimentel was indeed forged, the same may, nonetheless, give rise to a valid title in favor
of respondent bank if it is shown that the latter is a mortgagee in good faith. Such good
faith will entitle respondent bank to protection such that its mortgage contract with the
Spouses Pimentel, as well as respondent bank's consequent purchase of the subject lot,
may no longer be nullified.

4. Amancio vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Sarmiento owned a property. They obtained a loan amounting of P65,370 to

Moran Sison. Unable to pay the loan, Sison, forclosed the land in which it was auctioned
and sold to Puzon. The property was again sold to Rodeanna Realty Corporation.
Occupied by settlers, Puzon filed an ejectment case against the squatters. However,
Rodeanna Realty Corporation filed a complaint against sarmietos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rodeanna Realty Corporation was a purchaser in good faith

HELD: No. The universal principle is that a purchaser may be considered a purchaser in
good faith when he has examined the certificate of title except when there exist facts that
would arise suspicion reasonably to go beyond the present title and to instigate those that
preceded it. The Rodeanna Realty Corporation did not investigate such claim of the
Sarmientos over the subject property prior to their knowledge of the actual possessor. To
say the RRC was a purchaser in bad faith.

5. Agbayani v. Lupa Realty Holding Corp

FACTS: Agbayani, through a complaint for reivindicacion, cancellation of title and

document with damages, seeks the cancellation of the TCT issued in favor of Lupa Realty
Holding Corp. insisting that he never sold the property and his signature in the Deed of
Sale is a forgery. Lupa however contends that Agbayani, through a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale, sold the property to his brother Nonito who then sold it to Moriel Urdas
and from whom respondent purchased the property. Lupa insisted that it was a innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith. The RTC ruled in favor of Lupa but was reversed
by the Court of Appeal mainly ruling that the action for declaration of nullity of the 1997
DAS is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title
since it cannot be collaterally attacked.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by Tranquilino Agbayani a collateral attack on a
Torrens Title
HELD: No. The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set
aside such proceeding or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief an attack on the proceeding is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of title may
be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as void.
The complaint alleged that the deed of absolute sale is a falsified document and prayed
that the TCT be declared void and be cancelled. Hence, the action is a direct attack on
Lupa Realty’s TCT.

6. Bernas vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Natividad Deita is the owner of a 5,831-sq m property which she entrusted to
her brother, Benigno, so that he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of his
children's education in Manila. The property was leased by Bernas pursuant to a
production sharing arrangement executed between Bernas and Benigno. Natividad
played no part in this arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister
but when the owners sought to take possession, Bernas refused to relinquish the
property. Bernas was claiming that he was an agricultural lessee entitled to security of
tenure. Natividad filed an action for recovery of possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the consent by a legal possessor, even if without the consent of
landowner, sufficient to create tenancy relationship

HELD: Yes. As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and capacity
to enter into an agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. The law expressly grants him,
as legal possessor, authority and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on
the property he legally possessed.

7. GSIS vs. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Romerico Datoy

FACTS: The Metro Davao Agri-Hotel Corporation obtained a P20 million commercial
loan from the GSIS. This loan was secured by a mortgage over 2 parcels of land. The first
parcel was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-234689, while the second, an
agricultural land, was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-54074. As the Metro
Davao Agri-Hotel Corporation was unable to pay its loan obligations, the Government
Service Insurance System foreclosed both properties. After the lapse of the redemption
period, ownership of the 2 properties was consolidated in the GSIS. Respondent issued a
Notice of Coverage concerning the agricultural land. Subsequently, the DAR offered to
pay the GSIS P2,343,370.24 for the property. The latter, in turn, sent a letter to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office protesting the coverage. Petitioner insists that under
Section 39 of the GSIS Act of 1997, its properties cannot be utilized for agrarian reform
purposes, adding that the same provisions exempt its properties from agrarian reform
coverage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
54074 may be excluded from compulsory agrarian reform coverage.

RULING: No. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

has settled that the exemptions from agrarian reform coverage are contained in an
exclusive list which are enumerated under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The exemptions under RA 6657
form an exclusive list. Furthermore, Section 7 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law is even more specific. It explicitly states that lands foreclosed by government
financial institutions are subject to agrarian reform. Section 3 of the same law even cites
GSIS as an example of a government financial institution. Thus, petition is denied.

8. Republic v. Mendiola

FACTS: Respondents, filed a verified application for registration of title to land under
the Property Registration Decree over the subject property. They claimed that they
inherited the subject property from their late parents and have been in physical and
continuous possession thereof in the concept of an owner even before June 17, 1945. They
also submitted as evidence, conversion plan and geodetic engineer's certificate of the
subject property, tax declarations, and certification from the DENR-NCR verifying the
subject property as alienable and disposable. Republic, as represented by the OSG, filed
an appeal contending that conversion plan, technical descriptions of the property, and
the Certification issued by the DENR-NCR are insufficient proof of the alienable and
disposable character of the subject property, and that Certification from the DENR
Secretary classifying the land as alienable and disposable is required before a property
can be registered.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can register their title over the land

HELD: No, respondents are not entitled to their application for registration. According
to Section 14 of PD 1529, an applicant for registration of title over a parcel of land must
establish the following: (i) possession of the parcel of land under a bona fide claim of
ownership, by himself and/or through his predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945,
or earlier; and (ii) that the property sought to be registered is already declared alienable
and disposable at the time of the application. Moreover, Certifications issued by the
CENRO, or specialists of the DENR, as well as Survey Plans prepared by the DENR
containing annotations that the subject lots are alienable, do not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the property sought to be
registered belongs to the inalienable public domain. Alienability of the property must be
proved by presenting a copy of the original classification of the land approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
In the case at bar, respondents failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR
Secretary had indeed released the subject property as alienable and disposable.
Therefore, the application for registration filed by the respondents should be denied for
failure to observe the rules and requirements on land registration.

9. Republic v. Malijan-Javier

FACTS: The respondents filed the said application over a parcel of land, to which the
petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an Opposition on the grounds that the
applicants have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier; that tax declaration does not
constitute sufficient evidence of a bone fide acquisition of the land; and the land is that of
public domain. The respondents presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
establish ownership, such as the testimony of Hernandez, a Special Land Investigator of
DENR, stating that the land has not been forfeited in favor of the government and that it
was outside a reservation or forest zone. Maglinao, a Forester of DENR-CENRO also
declared that the land was within the alienable and disposable zone. MCTC granted the
application of the respondent. CA affirmed the decision. In this petition, the Republic
contends that the application should have been dismissed because the respondents did
not attach a copy of the original classification approved by DENR and certified as true
copy by its legal custodian.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of the required attachment to the application for
registration of land title affect the validity of its approval

HELD: Yes. Under PD 1529, it provides that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain may apply for registration of
land title. To qualify under such circumstance, (1) the land must form part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and (3) under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier. To satisfy the claim, the CENRO, which only verifies the declaration of
DENR, is not sufficient to establish that the land is alienable and disposable. It should be
accompanied by a positive act of the government in reclassifying the property into an
agricultural land and released as alienable, such as an official publication of the DENR
Secretary’s issuance declaring it alienable and disposable. In this case, there was no
substantial compliance to the requirement of proving that the land may be the subject of
private appropriation. Hence, the application for registration for land title was denied.

10. Lucena vs. Court of Appeal

FACTS: Petitioner secured a loan from Rural Bank of Naujan, Inc. amounting to 3,000.
He was able to pay his loan of 2,000 leaving a balance of 1,000. The said property
mortgaged was foreclosed and auctioned. The rural bank was able to secure the
foreclosed property. However, prior to the auction sale, publication for such notice for
the purpose of foreclosing it was made in the municipality and not in the barrio where
the private property is located.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid foreclosure

HELD: No. The law provides that it shall be sufficient publication in cases where such
notices of foreclosure are pasted in at least of the most conspicuous places in the
municipality and barrio where the land mortgaged is located. Moreover, if fails to comply
its requirement in the proper foreclosure of such property in which the Court adheres to
its invalidity as such.