Crimes Against Public Morals

A. Gambling and Betting

Case title: U.S. vs. Filart, G.R. No. 10263, 13 March 1915

Facts: It appears from the evidence in the case that the appellants entered into an
agreement whereby they would jointly sell to the public 450 tickets
successively numbered from one up, each number representing a chance on
an automobile which was the property of Filart, was to be drawn by lot as a
prize as soon as the tickets so numbered were sold. Of the 450 numbers 370
were sold for P5 each and the remaining 80 for P3 each.

As the boy drew out a paper indicating numbers from 1-450, Filart, with a list
of the 450 numbers referred to, struck from the list the number
corresponding to that drawn from the box. And the last number drawn from
the box should be the winning number and that the owner of that number
should win the automobile.

Issue/s: Whether said acts constitute the crime of gambling.

Ruling: YES. Section 7 of Act No. 1757 provides “The playing at and the conducting
of any game of monte, jueteng, or any form of lottery or policy . . . is hereby
prohibited, and any person taking any part therein . . . shall be punished as
provided in section 3 hereof ”

A lottery is said to be "a species of gaming, which may be defined as a

scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons who have
paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the chance to obtain a
prize." It is also defined as "a scheme for the distribution of prizes by
chance:" and "a scheme by which result is reached by some action or means
taken, and in which a result man's choice or will has no part, nor can human
reason, foresight, sagacity, or design enable him to know or determine such
result until the same has been accomplished." It has also been stated that
"where a pecuniary consideration is paid, and it is held determined by lot or
chance, according to some scheme held out to the public, what the party
who pays the money is to have for it it is a lottery."
Doctrine: In the case of Equitable Loan Co. vs. Waring, 117 Ga., 599, that three
elements enter into a lottery scheme: (1) A consideration; (2) chance: (3) a
prize, or some advantage or inequality in amount or value which is in the
nature of prize.

Case title: U.S. vs. Olsen, G.R. No. 11602, 6 March 1917

Facts: Walter E. Olsen and Co., dealers in tobacco, and especially cigars and cigarettes,
desiring to introduce to the Philippine trade a brand of cigarettes known as the
"Omar" brand, conceived and put into execution a scheme by which it was
hoped to place in the hands of a larger number of persons packages of the
cigarette named.

The accused advertised that 500 packages of cigarettes would be sold at 30 cents
a package - its regular price. In one of the packages was a coupon. The person
fortunate enough to buy that package with coupon would be entitled to a gold
watch.

Issue/s: Whether appellants be charged with maintaining and operating a lottery in

violation of Act No. 1757

Ruling: NO, not a lottery. The Act is entitled "An Act to prohibit gambling," etc. Section 1
of the Act which provides that “Gambling within the meaning of this Act consists
in the playing of any game for money or any representative of value or valuable
consideration or thing, the result of which game depends wholly or chiefly
upon chance or hazard, or the use of any mechanical invention or contrivance
to determine by chance the loser or winner of money or of any representative
of value or of any valuable consideration or thing." (mentioned sections 2-7,
but I think it’s not that relevant)

It prohibits only those games or operations in which the player stakes his
money or property, or some part thereof, upon a naked chance--those in
which for the money or property or some part thereof which he invests he
receives no consideration and can receive no consideration.
 In this case, every person who bought one of the packages received the full value
of his money in cigarettes and, accordingly, lost nothing by the purchase. On the
other hand, the company gained nothing by the sale of any one of the 500
packages, and necessarily lost the value of the watch in case all of the packages
were sold. In other words, a purchaser of a package of cigarettes paid absolutely
nothing for the naked chance to win the watch; while the company did not take
and could not possibly take anything from the purchaser in return for the chance
which it gave him to win the watch.

Doctrine:

Case title: U.S. vs, Salaveria, G.R. No. 13687, 12 November 1918

Facts: The municipal council of Orion, Bataan enacted an ordinance which prohibits the
playing of panguingue on days not Sundays or legal holidays. The justice of the
peace of Orion, when this ordinance went into effect, was Prudencio Salaveria,
now the defendant and appellant. Notwithstanding his official station, on the
evening of March 8, 1917, not a Sunday or legal holiday, seven persons
including Salaveria and his wife were surprised by the police while indulging in
a game of panguingue in the house of the justice of the peace. The chief of
police took possession of the cards, the counters (sigayes), a tray, and P2.07
in money, used in the game.

Issue/s: Whether the ordinance (in relation to Act no. 1757) which prohibits the playing
of panguingue was violated by the respondent.

Ruling: YES. Although this court has considered the method by which many other
games are played, it has never as yet authoritatively decided whether
panguingue was a game of skill or hazard. However, the decision of the trial
court, warrants the deduction that panguingue is not a game of chance or
hazard and is not prohibited by Act No. 1757. Therefore questioning the
validity of the said ordinance.
 Although panguingue is not entirely a game of chance, since it is a proper
subject for regulation by municipal authorities acting under their delegated
police power to improve the public morals and promote the prosperity of
their people, their action should be upheld by the courts. Ordinance No. 3 of
Orion, Bataan, is found to be valid.

The culprit in this case is himself a member of the Judiciary. Instead of

enforcing the law, he has scorned it. His example to the people of Orion has
been pernicious in its influence. If gambling is to be suppressed, not only the
weak and ignorant must be punished, but those with full knowledge of the law
and the consequences of violation.

Doctrine: Third. — The games known as "Panguingue" "Manilla," "Jung-kiang," "Paris-

Paris," "Poker," "Tute," "Burro," and "Treinta-y-uno" shall be allowed only on
Sundays an official holidays.

This ordinance provides a distinct penalty for the owner of the house and for
the gamblers.

Case title: Pontejos vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 158613-14, 22 February 2006

Facts: (This case is not related to the topic. Feeling ko namali lang si atty. But lagay ko
na lang yung gist, yung mga naka-bold yun yung mga crimes na cinommit)

There was estafa because Pontejos allegedly made false pretenses to Aquino in
order to receive ₱25,000. He supposedly assured the cancellation of
Hammercon’s license to sell and registration certificate, notwithstanding the
contrary decision issued by Imperial.

Pontejos was guilty of direct bribery for demanding and receiving ₱100,000
from Aquino in exchange for a favorable decision.Further, Pontejos should be
charged with unauthorized practice of law for providing legal services to
Aquino and receiving litigation expenses. He purportedly prepared the
pleadings that Aquino submitted; these pleadings where confirmed by the NBI
to have been authored by him.

Issue/s:
 Ruling:

Doctrine:

B. Offenses against decency and good customs

Case title: U.S. vs. Catajay, G.R. No. 2785, 23 August 1906

Facts: The trial court found be accused guilty of the crime of public scandal in violation
of the provisions of article 441 of Penal Code. Held, That it is an essential
element of the crime defined and penalized therein that the acts complained of
resulted in a grave public scandal.

It appears, however, that the acts complained of were committed at night, in a

private house, and at a time when no one was present except the accused, the
mistress of the house, and one servant, and we are of opinion that these
circumstances do not constitute that degree of publicity which is an essential
element of the crime defined and penalized in article 441 of the Penal Code.
(Decision of the supreme court of Spain, April 13, 1885.)

Issue/s: HALOS YAN NA YUNG FULL TEXT, SPANISH NA KASI YUNG IBANG
NAKALAGAY HAHA. LOOK NYO NA LANG DIN SA BOOK PAGE 373.

ARuling:

Doctrine:

Case title: U.S. vs. Samaniego, G.R. No. 5115, 29 November 1909
Facts: Juana Benedicto de Perez was a married woman, and accused Manuel
Samaniego knew that she was married. Juana and Samaniego, willfully, illegally,
and criminally and scandalously, without having any matrimonial tie between them,
habitually appeared together in public places and frequented together places of
recreation, suspicious places, vacant houses, and houses of bad repute, in the
daytime as well as in the nighttime; and lewdly and indecently went to bed together
in the house of the husband of Juana during the late hours of the night, dressed
only in their night clothes, and indecorously, indecently, and immodestly embraced
each other and caressed each other in the presence of the family, children, and
servants of the husband of Juana; all with public scandal and with scandal to the
community, and with shame and humiliation to the husband and family of the said
Juana Benedicto de Perez.

They were tried on the charge of adultery but the evidence was insufficient to
warrant the conviction of either of the defendants, so they were acquitted. In the
judgment acquitting the defendants the court included permission to the
prosecuting attorney to file against either or both of the said defendants a new
information charging them with the crime defined in article 441 of the Penal Code.

Issue/s: Whether the defendants be charged of grave scandal.

Ruling: NO. The acts complained of lack many of the elements essential to bring them
within the purview of the article of the Penal Code invoked by the prosecution.
Every act that was in anywise public fails entirely of those qualities which offend
modesty and good morals by "grievous scandal or enormity." The occurrence at
the residence on the night of the 6th of November did not have that publicity which
is required by the article of the Penal Code referred to.

- Acts were not committed in public places or within the public knowledge
or view. Pp. 372

Juana was mentally deranged.

Case title: People vs. Kottinger, G.R. No. 20569, 29 October 1923
Facts: Accused was charged for violating sec 12 of Act 277 (Libel Law) for having kept
for sale in his store obscene and indecent pictures. The said pictures were six
different postures of non-Christian inhabitants in the Philippines in native dress
as they appear and can be seen in the regions where they live.

Issue/s: Whether said pictures were obscene or indecent within the meaning of
Libel Law.

Ruling: No. The word “obscene” and the term “obscenity” may be defined as
meaning something offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy.
“Indecency” is an act against good behavior and a just delicacy. The test
ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular
publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of statutes, is
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may
fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency.

The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live,

without attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress.
The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of
all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of
this type. The Court is convinced that the post-card pictures in this case
cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul or filthy.

The Court hold that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in
native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which
they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel
Law. Defendant is acquitted.

Doctrine:

Case title: People vs. Go Pin, G.R. No. L-7491, 8 August 1955
Facts: Accused is a Chinese alien charged for violating Art 201 of the RPC for
having exhibited at a recreation center a large number of films which are
allegedly indecent and /or immoral. The counsel for the defendant
contends that paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including
sculptures of that kind are not offensive because they are made and
presented for the sake of art.

Issue/s: Whether accused is guilty of Art. 201.

Ruling: Yes. The Court agrees with the counsel for appellant in part. If such
pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art
galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people
interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the
pictures here in question were used not exactly for art’s sake but rather
for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities
of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was
of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have
been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and
it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures
and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly
artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art
exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but
rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and
lust and for love for excitement, including the youth who because of
their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves
from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.

Doctrine:

Case title: People vs. Padan, G.R. No. L-7259, 28 June 1957
Facts: 4 accused were charged for violating Art. 201 of the RPC. Jose Fajardo
being then the manager and Ernesto Reyes as ticket collector and/or
exhibitor, hired their co-accused Marina Padan and Cosme Espinosa to
act as performers or exhibitionists to perform and in fact performed
sexual intercourse in the presence of many spectators, thereby exhibiting
or performing highly immoral and indecent acts or shows thereat.

Issue/s: Whether all accused are guilty of art. 201

Ruling: Yes. An actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of

lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it there is no room
for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity,
indecency and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it
does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting
influence specially on the youth of the land.

Doctrine:

Case title: People vs. City Court of Manila, G.R. No. L-36528, 24 September 1987

The accused were charged of violating Art. 201(3) of the RPC and RA
Facts: 3060 for publicly exhibited through the mechanical application of movie
projection equipment and the use of projection screen, indecent and
immoral motion picture scenes depicting and showing scenes of totally
naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex
act in various lewd and lascivious positions, among other similarly and
equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public
view. The accused moved to quash one of the two information on the
ground that its exposing him to double jeopardy.

Issue/s: Whether the two offenses constitute double jeopardy.

 No. The two information with which the accused was charged do not
Ruling: make out only one offense, contrary to private respondent’s allegations.
In other words, the offense defined in RA 3060 Sec 7 punishing the
exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined
in Art. 201(3) of the RPC punishing the exhibition of indecent and
immoral motion pictures.

It is evident that the elements of the two offenses are different. The
gravamen of the offense defined in RA 3060 is the public exhibition of
any motion picture which has bot been previously passed by the Board of
Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion picture may not be indecent or
immoral, but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its
public showing constitutes a criminal offense. On the other hand, the
offense punished in Art. 201(3) of the RPC is the public showing of
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows not just motion
pictures.

The nature of both offenses also shows their essential difference. The
crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent
need not be proved because it is presumed while the offense punished in
Art 201(3) of the RPC is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an
indispensable ingredient.

Doctrine:

Case title: Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, 26 July 1996

Iglesia ni Cristo has a television program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo”

Facts: aired in Channel 2 and Channel 13. The program presents and
propagates petitioner’s religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often
times in comparative studies with other religions.
Petitioner then submitted to the respondent Board of Review for
Moving Pictures and Television the VTR Tapes of its TV Program. The
Board classified the series as “X” or not for public viewing on the ground
that they “offend and constitute and attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law”
Issue/s: Whether the respondents can utilize Art. 201 for prior censorship of
speech

Ruling: Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the
subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be
utilized to justify prior censorship of speech.

Doctrine:

Case title: Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159751, 6 December 2006

Facts: Accused were charged for violation of Art. 201 of RPC for selling and exhibiting
obscene copies of x-rated VHS Tapes, lewd films depicting men and women
having sexual intercourse[,] lewd photographs of nude men and women in
explicating (sic) positions which acts serve no other purpose but to satisfy the
market for lust or pornography to public view.

Issue/s: Whether accused were engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.

Ruling: Yes. We emphasize that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention
to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 201,
considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene
materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is
committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require that a person be
caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to be
liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited
to the public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are engaged in selling
and exhibiting obscene materials.

Doctrine:
Case title: Nogales vs. People, G.R. No. 191080, 21 November 2011

Facts: Accused were charged of violating Art 201 of the RPC as amended in relation to
RA 8792 (electronic commerce act) after the police thru a search warrant seized
Ten (10) units of Central Processing Units (CPUs); Ten (10) units of monitors; Ten
(10) units of keyboard; Ten (10) units of mouse; and Ten (10) units of AVRs used
for advertising pornographic website.

Complaint for violation of Article 20110 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against
petitioners was dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence. The motion of the
respondents to release seized were partially granted. The CPUs and softwares
which were ordered to be retained by the NBI through SI Meñez shall be released
in favor of the petitioners herein with the condition that the hard disk be removed
from the CPUs and be destroyed. If the softwares are determined to be
unlicensed or pirated copies, they shall be destroyed in the manner allowed by
law.

Issue/s: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in ordering the
removal and destruction of the hard disks containing the pornographic and
obscene materials.

Ruling: No. While it may be true that the criminal case for violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code was dismissed as there was no concrete and strong
evidence pointing to them as the direct source of the subject pornographic
materials, it cannot be used as basis to recover the confiscated hard disks. At the
risk of being repetitious, it appears undisputed that the seized computer units
belonging to them contained obscene materials or pornographic files. Clearly,
petitioners had no legitimate expectation of protection of their supposed property
rights.

The CA is correct in stating that the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is a
reliable way of permanently removing the obscene or pornographic files.1âwphi1
Significantly, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 969 is explicit. Thus:

Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature,

films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the
violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be governed by the following rules:

a. Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the government to

be destroyed.
 b. Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an
acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture,
paintings or other materials and other articles involved in the violation referred to
in Section 1 hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to
be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of
Constabulary. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Clearly, the provision directs the forfeiture of all materials involved in violation of
the subject law. The CA was lenient with petitioners in modifying the ruling of the
RTC in that the CPUs and softwares, which were initially ordered to be retained
by the NBI, should be released in their favor with only the hard disk removed
from the CPUs and destroyed. If the softwares are determined to be violative of
Article 201 of the RPC, unlicensed or pirated, they should also be forfeited and
destroyed in the manner allowed by law. The law is clear. Only licensed
softwares that can be used for legitimate purposes should be returned to
petitioners.

To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic
materials involved in the violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code,
even if the accused was acquitted.

Doctrine:

Prostitution

Case title: People v CA, G.R. No. 183652, 25 February 2015

Facts: After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with his friends, went to
Alson’s palace for a drinking session to celebrate their graduation. During such
session, they shared their problems with each other. AAA became emotional and
started crying, prompting her to take her first shot of Empi. after consuming more
or less 5 glasses of drinks, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s
lap (one of the accused). Oporto then started kissing her head. This angered her
so she told them to stop. The group just laughed at her and still made her drink
more. She fell asleep but was woken up so that she could drink the remaining
liquor. She refused but they insisted so she drank. Again, AAA fell asleep.
 When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola
lodging house. She recognized that place because she had been there before.
She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And while she was
conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her
body, and having intercourse with her. At one point, AAA woke up while
Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. Alquizola then joined
and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.

Said accused were charged with the crime of rape of a 16-year old girl. The RTC
convicted Carampatana and Oporto guilty as principals and Alquizola as an
accomplice while the CA acquitted them of the crime charged, hence, this
present appeal, alleging that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting respondents. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and
ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware
of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never
showed any physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against
her alleged ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical report
which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving
the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before.

Private respondents aver that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and

executory and that the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

The OSG stated the following error:

“The appellate decision of acquittal is null and void for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, an exception to the principle of double jeopardy.”

Issue/s: Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the
private respondents?

Ruling: YES. The Court of Appeals erred in acquitting private respondents. As a

general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from
a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The
reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory,
and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.
 Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may
appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said
judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed
judgment null and void.

If there is grave abuse of discretion, however, granting petitioner’s prayer

is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.

The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting private respondents. It appears that in reaching its judgment, the
CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly
disregarded that of the prosecution. A more careful perusal will reveal that
it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the
accused, especially that of Oporto, Carampatana, and Alquizola. It
presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as though
these were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently
utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court held that the assailed CA decision be

Reversed and Set Aside and finding private respondents guilty of the
crime of rape.

Doctrine: Wala namang nabanggit about prostitution

Crimes Committed by Public Officers

Case title: Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, 26 February 1997
Facts: Alfredo Alarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally, he
engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left
at the former’s premises. A Warrant of Distraint of Personal Propert was issued
by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the Regional Director or his
authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, commanding the latter to
distraint the goods, chattels, or effects and other personal property of Ancla, a
sub-contractor of accused Alaracon and a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to Alarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender and
transmit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. Alarcon,
in signing the Receipt for Goods Seized Under Authority of National Internal
Revenue, assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt. Subsequently,
Ancla took out the distrained truck from Alarcon’s custody. For this reason,
Alarcon was charged before Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property under 217 of RPC.

Issue/s: Whether Alarcon was a “public officer” contemplated in Article 203 of RPC.

Ruling: No. To be a public officer, one must be:(1) Taking part in the performance of
public functions in the government, or Performing in said Government or any of
its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any
rank or class; and (2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public
functions or to perform public duties must be —a. by direct provision of the law,
or b. by popular election, or c. by appointment by competent authority.

After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus found Petitioner
Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals
erroneously charged before and convicted by Respondent Sandiganbayan which
had no jurisdiction over them. The Court said he obviously may not be deemed
authorized BY POPULAR ELECTION.

Doctrine:

Case title: Maniego vs. People, G.R. No. L-2971, 20 April 1951
Facts: On February 27, 1947, the accused, although appointed as a laborer, had been
placed in charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic violations in the
Sala of Judge Crisanto Aragon of the Municipal Court of the City of Manila. It
appears furthermore that the accused had been permitted to write motions for
dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against offenders without counsel, and to
submit them to the Court for action, without passing through the regular clerk. On
the day in question, Felix Rabia, the complainant herein, appeared and inquired
from the accused about a subpoena that he received. He was informed that it
was in connection with a traffic violation for which said Rabia had been detained
and given traffic summons by an American MP. The accused after a short
conversation went to Fiscal De la Merced and informed the Fiscal that the case
had already prescribed. The Fiscal having found such to be the case, instructed
the accused that if the traffic violator had no lawyer, he could write the motion for
dismissal and have it signed by the party concerned. This was done by the
accused and after the signing by Felix Rabia the matter was submitted to the
Court, which granted the petition for dismissal.

According to Felix Rabia, the accused informed Rabia that the latter was subject
to a fine of P15; that Rabia inquired whether the same could be reduced because
he had no money, and that the accused informed Rabia that he could fix the case
if Rabia would pay him P10; which Rabia did and the accused pocketed. This
charged was denied by the accused.

Issue/s: Whether the doctrine of "the temporary performance of public functions by a

laborer" should apply in defendant's case.

Ruling: Yes. The Court said that for the purposes of punishing bribery, the TEMPORARY
PERFORMANCE of public functions is sufficient to constitute a person a public
official. Indeed, common sense indicates that the receipt of bribe money is just
as pernicious when committed by temporary employees as when committed by
permanent officials.

Enough to recall that although originally appointed as a mere laborer, this

defendant was on several occasions designated or given the work to prepare
motions for dismissal. He was consequently temporarily discharging such public
functions. And as in the performance thereof he accepted, even solicited,
monetary reward, he certainly guilty as charged.

Doctrine:
Case title: People vs. Kulais, G.R. Nos. 100901-08, 16 July 1998

Facts: On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government
agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government
projects in Zamboanga City.

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to
check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the
Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on their
way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at them.

Issue/s: Whether the appellants are liable under Article 267, par. 4 of RPC and not under
Articler 268.

Ruling: Yes. The Court said that the victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra
and Calixto Francisco were members of the government monitoring team
abducted by appellants group.

The detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers - Gara was a
fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineers
Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping
occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under Article 267,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the trial court held.

Doctrine: In Article 267 par. 4, kidnapping is done against public officers or it is committed
simulating public authority which is punished by R. Perpetua. In Article 268, it is
done WITHOUT (e.g. not against public officers) the attendance of any
circumstances under 267 which is punished by R. Temporal.

Case title: People vs. Hipol, G.R. No. 140549, 22 July 2003

Facts: Appellant John Peter Hipol was charged with Malversation of Public Funds, as
defined and penalized under Article 217 of RPC.
 On December 19, 1993, appellant was employed as Cash Clerk II at the City
Treasurers Office of Baguio City. He was assigned at the Cash Division, headed
by the Cashier IV, Mrs. Nelia De Jesus. Appellant was likewise tasked to make
almost daily deposits of the collections of the City Treasurer to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB. Whenever appellant was absent, De Jesus would ask Lerma
G. Roque, a Utility Worker at the Baguio City Treasurer Office, to do the typing
jobs and sometimes deposit money collected for the City accompanied by an
officer from the City Treasurer Office.

On January 10, 1997, Roque was instructed by De Jesus to gather all deposit
slips covering all deposits of funds of the City Treasurer Office with PNB. Roque
inadvertently stumbled upon three PNB deposit slips inside appellants drawer
which did not appear to have been actually deposited and received by the
depositary bank. Appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him,
claiming that he does not know anything about the malversation of public funds.

Issue/s: Whether Hipol is a public officer which is contemplated under 217 of RPC or
conviction for malversation of public funds.

Ruling: Conviction for malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code requires proof that (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he
has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he
is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by
another person of such funds or property.cräläwvirtualibräry

It is clear from the facts established in this case that appellant is a public officer
occupying the Cash Clerk II position at the City Treasurers Office. By reason of
his position, appellant was tasked to regularly handle public funds every time he
deposited the collections of the City Treasurers Office to the city's depositary
bank. The fact that the obligation to deposit the collections of the City Treasurers
Office is not covered by appellants official job description is of no legal
consequence in a prosecution for Malversation. What is essential is that
appellant had custody or control of public funds by reason of the duties of his
office. He is an employee of, or in some way connected with, the government
and, in the course of his employment, he receives money or property belonging
to the government for which he is bound to account. Accordingly, what is
controlling is the nature of the duties of appellant and not the name or relative
importance of his office or employment.

Doctrine:
Case title: U.S. vs. Gacutan, G.R. no. 9601, 29 September 1914

Facts: From the evidence in the case as introduced by the prosecution it appears that
Domingo Pascua, about July 20, 1912, filed in appellant's court, he being the
justice of the peace in and for the municipality of Solana in the Province of
Cagayan, a complaint against one Elias Pagulayan for the said case was
decided, Pascua, at the request of appellant made several weeks before the trial
o said case, gave to appellant a female carabao worth about P80, in
consideration of which appellant agreed to decide said action adversely to
Pagulayan; that the carabao was delivered to appellant; and that thereafter,
August 12, 1912, the accused decided the case against Pagulayan, convicting
him of larceny and sentencing him to six months' imprisonment, to pay the costs
of the trial, and to indemnify Pascua in the sum of P50.

On the other hand, the appellant claims to have proved by his witnesses and by
Pascua's declarations that Pascua borrowed P20 from the appellant and
promised, in case of his failure to repay the sum loaned, that he would give the
appellant a carabao in settlement thereof, and that said carabao in question was
delivered to appellant in pursuance of said agreement.

Issue/s: Whether the judge of peace knew that the decision he rendered was unjust.

Ruling: Yes. The Court said that it is certainly an act injustice to convict a person
charged with a crime without regard to what the evidence in the case may be.
The accused promised Pascua to convict Pagulayan regardless of the evidence
in the case and apparently carried out his promise. In consideration thereof he
was to receive and did receive a carabao worth P80. It is an act of injustice for a
judicial officer to decide a case pending before him regardless of what the
evidence may show.

Doctrine:

Case title: Abad vs. Bleza, A.C. No. R-227-RTJ, 13 October 1986
Facts: On October 15, 1984, Lt. Col. Gregorio Abad of the PC charged Judge Bleza
with rendering a decision with malice, ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, and misconduct as a judge. After a cockfight held at the Imus, Cavite
cockpit on July 19, 1981, complainant Abad and one Potenciano Ponce had a
verbal tussle which culminated in Abad’s being shot in the chest by Francisco
Sabater, Jr., an alleged bodyguard of Ponce. Sabater, was charged with
frustrated homicide and Potenciano Ponce with attempted homicide before the
Regional Trial Court where the respondent presides.

The judge rendered a decision where he appreciated the “incomplete self-

defense and without any intention to kill the victim” as mitigating
circumstance where in fact those were not enumerated in Article 13 of RPC as
mitigating circumstances.

Issue/s: Whether the judge intentionally or knowingly rendered a decision with mitigating
circumstances of “without intention to kill the victim.”

Ruling: No. The judge was in error in appreciating as a mitigating circumstance ‘lack of
intention to kill the victim’ in fixing the penalty imposed on Sabater. Presumably,
what respondent had in mind was to consider the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed under Art. 13 of RPC
which is different from “lack of intention to kill.”

However, the Court said that the records fail to show malice, ill-will or even bias
on the art of respondent judge. His decision pointed out, one by one, this
glaring inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence which led to the
exculpation of defendant Ponce. It is believed that while the respondent
committed an error thus described, the game was done without malice or
deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.

Doctrine:

Case title: Louis Vuitton S.A. vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. MTJ-92-643, 27 November 1992
Facts: This is a complaint filed by Louis Vuitton, S.A., represented by counsel,
Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Peña and Nolasco Law Office, against
Judge Francisco Diaz Villanueva, on the ground that the latter knowingly
rendered a manifestly unjust judgment.

A criminal case was filed by Louis Vuitton, S.A. entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Jose V. Rosario,” accusing the latter of unfair competition as
defined by paragraph 1 of Article 189, Revised Penal Code. But the trial court
acquitted the accused because of lack of the element constituting said crime.
complainant assailed the judge decision for failure to consider the alleged lack of
credibility of Felix Lizardo, violated the constitutional mandate that decisions
should be rendered within three (3) months from submission of the case and
ignoring the ruling Converse Rubber Corp, vs Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co.,
that "the statute on unfair competition extends protection to the goodwill of a
manufacturer or dealer.”

Issue/s: Whether the respondent judge is guilty of knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust
judgment.

Ruling: The law requires that the (a) offender is a judge; (b) he renders a
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d)
he knew that said judgment is unjust.In some administrative casesdecided by
this Court, we have ruled that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

In this case, we are constrained to hold that complainant failed to

substantiate its claims that respondent judge rendered an unjust judgment
knowingly. It merely relied on the failure of respondent judge to mentioned
the motion in the decision, on his alleged reliance on the testimony of
defense witness and on the delay in the promulgation of the case. But
they are not enough to show that the judgment was unjust and was
maliciously rendered. A judgment is said to be unjust when it is contrary to
the standards of conduct prescribed by law.

Doctrine:

Case title: Ubarra vs. Mapalad, A.M. No. MTJ-91-622, 22 March 1993
Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Dela Cruz vs. Concepcion, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062, 25 August 1994

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: In re: Joaquin Borromeo, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, 21 February 1995

Facts:

Issue/s:
Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Wingarts vs. Mejia, A.M. No. MTJ-94-1012, 20 March 1995

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Guerrero vs. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-483, 25 September 1998

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:
Case title: Basa Air Base SLA vs. Pimentel, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1648, 22 August 2002

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Flores vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 136769, 17 September 2002

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: De Guzman vs. Dy, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1755, 3 July 2003
Facts: Respondent judge upon certiorari issued a TRO and Preliminary Injunction to a
criminal case filed against Cosico on the grounds of prejudicial question from a
separate case filed by Cosico.

Petitioner, counsel of the opposing party to Cosico filed an administrative

complaint for grave and serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the judiciary against the respondent judge. Complainant argues that the
latter was compadre of Cosico, and cited Rule 111 Section 7 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The rule states that prejudicial questions require a
previously instituted action involving an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action.

Respondent in her comment denied being compadre of Cosico and explained

that the 1985 Rules of Procedure was the governing law herein concerned at the
time she pronounced her decision which did not require the pendency of the
civil case to come prior the criminal case.

Issue/s: Whether error in which law to apply constitutes grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the judiciary.

Ruling: No,Petition Dismissed.

Petitioner failed to provide evidence to assert that Judge Dy acted in bad faith,
hence the presumption that the latter acted to perform his duties prevail. The Court
agrees with the Court administrator that since judicial remedies are available, it is
improper to charge such suit in an administrative proceeding.

Regardless, a criminal suit to remove respondent judge from office will not be
granted because it too requires conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice
on the part of the errant judge which was wanting in the case.

Doctrine: It is well-settled that judges can not be held to account criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith

Case title: Cortes vs. Sandiganbayan Justices, A.M. No. SB-04-11-J, 13 February 2004
Facts: According to the complainant, the accused committed the crime charged by
taking advantage of their official functions and through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, caused the sale of his property at
public auction. He averred that the sale was made without legal right or authority
to do so, as the real property taxes therefore were duly paid up to 1994. The
complainant further alleged that he was not notified of the said auction sale.
complainant claimed that he paid his taxes. to Ramon Castro, clerk and right
hand of the Municipal Treasurer. Mr. Castro was, however, forced to resign after
he testified before the Ombudsman on the matter, allegedly to cover up the
anomaly committed by the accused.

The complainant claimed that the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were
irregular, as it terminated the case without the defense having conducted a
cross-examination on him to rebut the direct testimonies against the accused.

Complainant also questions the pronouncement made by the Sandiganbayan

that "he slept on his rights" for failing to redeem the property in question within
the oneyear period as required under the law as this is erroneous. He avers that
there was no need for him to redeem the property as the auction sale was not
duly registered with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Bataan; hence, null
and void. Office of the Court Administrator moved for the DISMISSAL of the
case.

Issue/s: Whether private respondents rendered its judgement in bad faith.

Ruling: NO. It must be stressed that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to
liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of his official acts, no matter
how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with
fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an
injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial oce untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment

The respondents cannot be held liable for violation of Supreme Court Resolution
No. 2-9-2002, as the same does not dene nor punish an offense, but merely
denes the extent of the consequence of an administrative complaint if led
against Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, Judges of the
Regular and Special Courts and court ocials who are lawyers

Doctrine: Absence of substantial evidence it is presumed that the respondents has

regularly performed his duties.
GHR

Case title: Diego vs. Castillo, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673, 11 August 2004

Facts: Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge
Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a
criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent Judge acquitted Cresencia Escoto on the charge of bigamy by

petitioner who was brother of subsequent husband of Cresencia to her first
husband Jorge Escoto. Respondent explains in his comment that the divorce
decree Jorge acquired in Texas did not annul his marriage to Cresencia being both
Filipino Citizens. He stresses however, that the issue before him was the culpability
of Cresencia since bigamy requires malice, and respondent judge ruled that
Cresencia acted in good faith as what a laywoman would think of a divorce decree
obtained from abroad.

Issue/s: Whether should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Ruling: No, respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of 10,000 and was let off with a
stern warning repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

This Court, in People v. Bitdu,4 carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact,

which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a
mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability.
The acquitted committed a mistake of law, hence the respondent judge as the
Court put, has been less than circumspect in his decision and constitutes gross
ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.

The respondent cannot be convicted of knowingly rendering an unjust judgement

because he acted in good faith which thus does not satisfy the elements required
of the crime.

Doctrine: 1. The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is
unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust.
Case title: In re: Subpoena Duces Tecum of Dir. Amante, A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, 2 March
2010

Facts: Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum for the submission of the: a)
latest PERSONAL DATA SHEETS and ADDRESS of former Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide and Former Associate Justice Alicia Austria - Martinez; b) Copy of the
criminal complaint entitled Oliver Lozano, Evangeline Lozano v. Hilario G.
Davide Jr., et al.; c) Order dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it to
the SC for action.

The criminal complaint stemmed from the participation of the accused in the
Resolution the First Division of this Court issued in Heirs of Antonio Pael v. CA.
The retired chief justice and Associate Justice allegedly committed the ff unlawful
acts: 1) Overturning the findings of fact of the CA; 2) Stating in the Resolution
that the "Chin-Mallari property overlaps the UP property," when the DENR
Survey Report stated that the "UP title/property overlaps the Chin-Mallari
property;" 3) Issuing a Resolution, for which three Justices voted, to set aside a
Decision for which five Justices voted. By these acts the retired Members of this
Court are being held criminally accountable on the theory that they violated the
Constitution and the law in ruling in the cited cases thereby causing “ undue
injury “ to the parties to these cases.

Issue/s: Whether respondent were guilty with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 for having knowingly, deliberately and with bad faith rendered an unjust
resolution.

Ruling: NO.A public official can violate Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 14 14 in
two ways: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or
(2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference; 15 15 in either case, these acts must be committed through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.

"Partiality" is denfined as a bias towards the disposition to see and report

matters as wished for, rather than as they are. "Bad faith" connotes not only
bad judgment or negligence but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious
wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounting to fraud. "Gross negligence," on the
other hand, is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other
persons are concerned.
Doctrine: A complainant's mere disagreement with the magistrate's own conclusions, to
be sure, does not justify a criminal charge under Section 3 (e) against the latter.
In the absence of alleged and proven particular acts of manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity are generally
presumed in the performance of official duties by public officers.. They should, at
the very least, know that the 1973 Constitution and its provisions have been
superceded by the 1987 Constitution

GHR

Case title: Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals Associate Justices, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-
201- CA-J 19 February 2013

Facts: Before us is a verified Joint Complaint-Affidavit1 filed against Court of Appeals

(CA) Associate Justices; all members of the former Special 14th Division, charging
them with grave misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service, gross ignorance
of the law, gross incompetence, and manifest partiality. The plaintiff allege that
the TRO granted by the respondents was done without the necessary hearing,
that the resolution they issued dealt new matters outside the scope of the RTC
decision petitioners sought relief from, and that the consolidated resolution should
not have been penned by raffled acting senior of the 14th division of CA Justice
Bato since the case was already designated to Justice Lantion who went on a 15-
day wellness leave.

The complainants anchor their arguments on the Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals which state that issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction
requires hearing, and that such cases must be resolved by the original designated
division, and ponencia where incase the ponencia is absent the two left justices
shall decide on their own.

Issue/s: Are the Associate Justices guilty of grave misconduct, conduct detrimental to the
service, gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and manifest partiality?

Ruling: No, Petition dismissed. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively
sanctioned.
 The Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allow issuance of preliminary injunction
and/TRO provided that a resolution requiring the enjoined party to comment is
furnished and given 10 days for the response, the party seeking relief may also be
required to reply within 5 days upon receipt.

Justice Bato acted within his discretion in acting as ponencia in the consolidated
resolution as the raffled acting senior member in the 14th Division while Justice
Lantion was on leave. Such designation was transparent and explicit that Justice
Bato may resolve all cases in the 14th Division, as well as in the 2nd Division.

The Justices acted in good faith with the consolidated resolution because they
were compelled to deal with new matters as the company concerned; NADECOR
moved to ratify a Memorandum of Understanding with a mining company that
would injure their existing MOU with the government, it's only valuable asset.
The Justices acted in preservation of the company in issuing the resolution which
is a mere interlocutory order to maintain the status quo ante the assailed RTC
decision.

Doctrine: 1. The provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering
knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case
submitted to him for decision" and has no application to the members of a
collegiate court such as the Sandiganbayan or its divisions, who reach their
conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment
after due deliberation. (the Court mentioned)
2. There are three ways by which administrative proceedings may be instituted
against justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and
special courts: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint
(as in this complaint) with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or
(3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. (Rule 140, Rules of Court)

Case title: In re: Hon. Rafael Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J, 21 January 1974

Facts: Respondent is charged with gross malfeasance in oce, gross ignorance of the
law, and for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Aforecited charges
stemmed from the order of the respondent his decision acquitting accused
Carlos Caramonte promulgated on September 21, 1968, in Criminal Case No.
690, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Isabelo Montemayor, et al.," for
Robbery in Band with Homicide.

DECISION of respondent:
 "The parties are notied that the Court intends to take judicial notice that the
Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large shing
industry operating in the Visayas; that the said compound is only about 500
meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz; and that the
neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated. SO ORDERED”

Petitioner contends that respondent judge made a secret ocular inspection of the
poblacion of the City of Cadiz. Without anybody to guide him, he visited the
places which he thought erroneously were the scene of the robbery where the
Chief of Police was killed by the Montemayor gang. Because of that undeniably
biased ocular inspection, the honorable trial judge, who is reputed to be brilliant,
issued a reckless, extremely senseless and stupid order.

Issue/s: Whether respondent judge is guilty of (a) dereliction of duty or misconduct in oce
( prevaricacion ), which contemplates the rendition of an unjust judgment
knowingly, and/or in (b) rendering a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance

Ruling: NO. Be that as it may, under Section 173 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the grounds for removal of a judge of first instance are (1) serious misconduct
and (2) inefficiency. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable
evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by
an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules.

In fact, in spite of the biting language of the complainants in their complaint and
in their memorandum, they admit that the respondent Judge is not dishonest as
far as they know. In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust
as it is contrary to law or is pot supported by the evidence, and the same was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

Doctrine: To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust judgment by
reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according
to Groizard, that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in
the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law
is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. 2 2 Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation.
Case title: Layola vs. Gabo, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1524, 26 January 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge granted the petition of Sta. Ana Chief of Police to take
custody of PO2 and SPO2 in a suit filed by herein petitioner without conducting
summary proceeding to determine if the weight of the evidence against the
accused was strong. The Respondent judge also denied the MR.

The original charge filed was murder for the death of the son of petitioner against
PO2 and SPO2. Murder a heinous and non-bailable crime. (Section 7 of Rule 114
of the Rules of Court)

Respondent Judge explains that he granted the petition on the impression that the
prosecution does not contend the release of the accused, motivated by the latter’s
comment ‘the indictment was based on circumstantial evidence’ He also explained
that the Chief of police properly sought the remedy available by Presidential
Decree 971, Presidential Decree 1184 and Executive Order No. 106. The cited
decrees allow police personnel to be in custody of their superior during trials
provided that their offense is service connected; the son of Loyola was a violator
of the law, who was then inside the cell of the Municipal Jail of Sta. Maria, Bulacan
where the accused were members of.

Issue/s: Whether the issued order of respondent without holding required summary
proceeding.

Ruling: The administrative complaint of issuing unjust interlocutory order DISMISSED for
lack of merit and for insufficiency of evidence.

The charge requires proof of moral certainty, If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of
moral certainty and does not suffice to convict, here the allegations were not
substantiated by evidence hence did not pass the test of moral certainty.

The Court finds the accused guilty only of gross ignorance of the law for not
conducting the said hearing, he was ordered to pay a fine of 20,000php, and given
stern warning that repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely (affirming
the Office of the Court Administrator recommendation)

Doctrine: 1. Elements in knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order

 - 1) that the offender is a judge; 2) that he performs any of the
following acts: a) he knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order
or decree; or b) he renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order
or decree through inexcusable negligence or ignorance

Case title: Gallardo vs. People, G.R. No. 142030, 21 April 2005

Facts: The case originated from a sworn letter complaint led with the Oce of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao by Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public
Health Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, charging herein petitioners
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to
appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the
mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan accruing to the
complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta
benefits.

In a resolution dated 26 July 1999, Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr.,

recommended the dismissal of the case, which recommendation was approved
by Prosecution Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil, Deputy Special Prosecutor
Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P . Tamayo. 7
7 This recommendation, however, was disapproved by Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto who stated in his own handwriting "[l]et the court determine if indeed
the evidence cannot stand the judicial scrutiny."

Petitioners fault the Sandiganbayan for not taking into account the findings and
recommendations of the Office of the Special Prosecutor which found no
probable cause to charge them. Allied to this assignment of error is petitioners'
allegation that the Ombudsman failed to accord them due process of law and
equal protection of the law.

Issue/s: Whether such order of the Ombudsman constitutes an unjust interlocutory order.

Ruling: No. The contention of the petitioner is untenable. These arguments are specious.
Petitioners' submission that they were deprived of due process hinges on the
erroneous assumption that respondent Ombudsman failed to assess and consider
the evidence presented by petitioners when he disapproved the recommendation
by the investigating prosecutor to dismiss the case, and that his ruling was not
supported by evidence on record.
 It may appear that the Ombudsman's one-line note lacks any factual or evidentiary
grounds as it did not set forth the same. The Ombudsman, contrary to the
investigating prosecutor's conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are
probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct
an investigation anew. 16 16 He is merely determining the propriety and
correctness of the recommendation by the investigating prosecutor, i.e ., whether
probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of the
latter. The fact that the Ombudsman merely wrote his recommendation for the ling
of the information against petitioners in a one-line note is not a sucient basis for
this Court to attribute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of respondent

Doctrine: A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but
to enforce by execution what has been determined. The resolution of the
Sandiganbayan sought to be reviewed or set aside is not in any sense judgment
or a nal order, but an interlocutory order. An order is interlocutory if it does not
dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its
merits

Case title: Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, A.M. No. 662-MJ, 30 September 1976

Facts: The respondent judge was filed a complaint for; 1. Malicious delay in the
administration of justice since although the case for frustrated homicide against
accused Garcia’s investigation was terminated, the respondent judge did not
resolve it until 18 months later. 2.Violation of Section 129 of the Revised
Administrative Code/ receiving salaries as municipal judge falsely certifying that all
civil and criminal cases submitted to him for decision within 90 days has been
decided by him (born of that particular case he released a delayed resolution for)

Respondent denies he deliberately delayed the decision on the case concerned,

he explained that it was the parties themselves which caused the delay due to their
unavailability hence, proceedings were not all held. He also adds that the delay
was due to the non-filing of the parties of their required memoranda.

Issue/s: Whether the respondent judge shall be held guilty of the charges filed against
him despite the delay was caused partially by the parties.
Ruling: No. The court appreciates the partial fault of the accused in the delay of their
case resolution to the respondent’s favor as it precludes that the respondent
maliciously delayed the same. The Court points out that the delay was because the
respondent judge acceded to the motions for postponement of both parties.

In order that a judge could be held criminally responsible for violation of Article 207
of the Revised Penal Code, the delay must have been done maliciously, that is, the
delay is caused by the judge with deliberate intent to inflict damage on either party
in the case.

On violation of Sec. 129 of the Revised Administrative Code:

The Court finds that his false certifications “might not have been intentional", but
rather due to his "inefficiency and negligence." This in company with the undue
delay he caused, the court resolves that he despite absence of bad faith in his
delayed decision has shown lack of due diligence in the performance of his judicial
functions. The Court orders the accused to pay a fine equivalent of his 3 months
salary.

Doctrine: In order that a judge could be held criminally responsible for violation of Article
207 of the Revised Penal Code, the delay must have been done maliciously, that
is, the delay is caused by the judge with deliberate intent to inflict damage on
either party in the case

Case title: Fagtanac vs. Yrad, A.M. No. R-54-RTJ, 19 June 1985

Facts: Judge Leviste in an order dated October 18, 1982, directed execution of the
judgment. When the inferior courts were reorganized pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 the same case was re-assigned to respondent Judge Yrad
who reiterated execution of the judgment in an order. BUT later on he issued
another order stating “... case are hereby ordered referred to the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform for certication whether the landholding in question is under
operation land transfer, whether defendants in this case are identied as tenant-
tillers and whether the case is proper for trial or not. “

Petitioner alleges that "the said Interlocutory Order as issued is unjust and it was
issued to unduly delay the administration of justice, by maliciously and unduly
delaying the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No.
4338 and the Order of Execution of the decision aforesaid."
Issue/s: Whether respondent is guilty of maliciously delaying the administration justice.

Ruling: NO. According to Justice Purisima, "it cannot be said that respondent Judge
knowingly or feloniously issued" the questioned order. And the investigator adds
that, "So also, inexcusable negligence or ignorance cannot be imputed to the
respondent Judge under the attendant circumstances." This takes care of Article
206. As to Article 207, the investigator says: "With the evidence at hand, the
accusation for malicious delay in the administration of justice, within the purview
of Article 207 of the Revised Penal Code, cannot also be sustained. The essence
of such malefaction is malice. Mere delay sans malice does not bring a judge
within the ambit of said penal provision."

The respondent judge justified the issuance of the questioned order thus: "The
undersigned, before his assignment to his present position, was a CAR Judge,
that is why he is aware of the effect of non-referral of cases led by alleged
landowners. The effect of the execution of the decision of which complainant
seeks to be executed may oust the tillers of the soil and since there is no
referral, the execution of the said decision is very doubtful. "Referrals shall be
made at any stage of the proceedings in accordance with Memorandum Circular
No. 2.

Doctrine:

Case title: U.S. vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 7540, 23 September 1912

Facts: Defendant Mendoza appeals to reverse his conviction as accessory due to his
alleged concealment of the crime of arson.

Mendoza is a bar lieutenant and was told of a fire within their barrio brought to
him was the incendiary yet he did not act on the incident reported, and even
advised the incendiary to go home. The appealed decision ruled the case to
acquit the incendiary for lack of evidence, but convicted Mendoza as accessory
after the fact in arson.

Issue/s: Whether his concealment of the crime would stand for conviction despite the
absence of proof of the principal act to arson.
Ruling: No, the decision was reversed. The Court explains that When a prosecution is
instituted against a person charged with crime, if the charge is not proven or the
facts shown do not constitute a crime, there is no ground for holding any person
guilty either as principal or as accessory.

Doctrine: The Court notes : that accused should have been charged with the crime of
"prevaricacion" had it been properly alleged;

2. A lieutenant of barrio who neglects his duty and fails to move the
prosecution of, and punishment for, a crime of arson, of the commission
of which he is informed, would, in case the alleged crime were afterwards
duly proven, be guilty of "prevaricacion" under article 355 of the Penal
Code, but not of concealment of the crime of arson

Case title: People vs. Mina, G.R. No. 45312, 13 June 1938

Facts: Defendant was charged with a violation of article 208 of the Revised Penal
Code.The case was commenced in the justice of the peace court of Asingan,
Pangasinan, the above-named defendant, being the chief of police of said
municipality, voluntarily, illegally, criminally and, in breach of his official duty,
maliciously defaulted in the prosecution and punishment of the violators of the law
prohibiting and penalizing the game of chance called ' Jueteng,' in that he failed
to le the corresponding criminal action against Juan Lazo who, in the aforesaid
municipality, was caught possessing jueteng lists and other objects relating to
said game, and tolerated and permitted said Juan Lazo to continue acting as
jueteng collector.

He first pleaded “not guilty” during the first arraignment. the defendant;
accompanied by his attorney, appeared and was permitted by the court to
withdraw hid plea of "not guilty" and substitute one of "guilty." The information
was again read and, after understanding the same, the defendant voluntarily
pleaded guilty. Thereupon the court rendered judgment nding him guilty of the
offense charged.

Defendant, through another attorney, led a motion for reconsideration and new
trial and prayed that the judgment of conviction be set aside, that he be permitted
to withdraw his plea of guilty and to plead not guilty, and that a new trial be held.
The motion was denied and the consequent exception noted.
Issue/s: Whether the court misused his discretion in denying the MR.

Ruling: NO.because the new evidence offered by the defendant, supposing it to be

newly discovered, did not tend either to alter the result of the case or to
exonerate him. The alleged new evidence consists of sworn statements of
Luciano de Guzman and Canuto de Leon who declared that they saw the arrest
of Juan Lazo and heard the defendant say to him that he would be released on
condition that he would accompany the defendant to the place where J u e t e n
g was being played and would help in the arrest of the bankers and collectors
thereof. This evidence, if admitted, far from justifying the conduct of the
defendant, would have further demonstrated his guilt, for the reason that there is
no law empowering him to release a violator even if the latter agrees to aid him in
the capture of other culprits.

Doctrine: Only the court, under the conditions prescribed by section 34 of General Orders,
No. 58, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2709, may exclude a defendant from
the charge and absolve him from all criminal responsibility

Case title: Sales vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, 16 November 2001

Facts: Mayor Sales files recourse against the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman from
denying him of due process in the latter’s denial of his motion to defer arrest
subject to the pendency of determining probable cause due to an improper
preliminary investigation conducted by the MCTC Judge Calvan.

Judge Calvan was related to the private respondent within the 3rd civil degree of
which rendered the initial warrant of arrest of Mayor Sales null as ruled by the
CA in granting mayor Sales’ petition for writ of habeas corpus. The CA also
stressed that Judge Calvan also did not conduct the hearing required prior to the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, he claimed to have done so but records show
only the witnesses of the prosecution were considered and the same should have
been under oath with Judge Calvan, instead it was signed by the Provincial
prosecutor. The stenographic notes were not signed by the stenographers either.
 The provincial prosecutor instead of conducting his own preliminary investigation
forwarded the records from MCTC to the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman requested the petitioner’s counter claims. The
Petitioner having long submitted the same to the provincial prosecutor did not act
upon the request. The Graft Investigation Officer 4 months later issued a resolution
recommending the filing of information of murder against the petitioner which the
Ombudsman approved. His motion to defer arrest was denied, hence the sought
recourse to this Court.

Issue/s: Whether the procedures prior the and the issuance of warrant of arrest by the
Sandiganbayan were followed.

Ruling: No. Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan and the resolution of Graft Investigation
Officer Set aside. the warrant of arrest quashed, and the preliminary investigation
remanded to the Ombudsman for its completion.

The Court explains the PI were improperly done 4 times with no one accomplishing
it, with everyone just ‘passing the buck’ worst was the Ombudsman to accede to
the faults of Judge Calvan, and the last to pass the buck to the Sandiganbayan
who the same merely went with what the Ombudsman had approved of,
inconsiderate of the antecedent facts.

The stage of preliminary investigation can only be held after sufficient evidence has
been gathered and evaluated warranting the eventual prosecution of the case in
court. The court explains that the purpose of conducting preliminary investigations
are :

1. To protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials
2. To protect the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution. To relieve the accused of going through a trial which is
prima facie not needed.

Petitioner Sales is entitled to an MR, as parties under PI are entitled upon an

adverse resolution. (Administrative Order no.7) He should have been accorded
such right before the filing of the information against him. Here he belatedly
received the resolution of the Graft investigation officer thus precluded him to file
MR.

0Doctrine: Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to

deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing
the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty
Case title: Soriano vs. Marcelo, G.R. No. 163178, 30 January 2009

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 115439-41, 16 July 1997

Facts: Paredes was formerly the Provincial Attorney. During his stint, Paredes applied
for and was granted a free patent over a vast tract of land. However, it was
cancelled because apparently, it has already been designated and reserved as a
school site. The court found that Paredes had obtained title thereto through
fraudulent misrepresentations in his application, and somebody came forward
and filed a case of perjury against him. However, the same was dismissed on the
grounds of prescription. Then again, another case was filed against him for
violation of RA 3019 for using his former position as Provincial Attorney to
influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his.
Paredes was represented by respondent Atty. Sansaet, a practicing attorney.
 Documents were found to be falsified, in conspiracy with Paredes’ counsel
and the clerk of court where the perjury case was filed. Gelacio claims that
no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal.
Hence, another case was filed for falsification of judicial records. It was then
that respondent Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness against his client
Paredes, claiming that the latter contrived and induced him to have the graft
case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by having him and co-
respondent prepare and falsify the subject documents. But the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion on the grounds of attorney-client privilege since the lawyer
could not testify against his own client. In view of such relationships, confidential
matters must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as
his lawyer, in his professional capacity, and therefore privileged.

Issue/s: Whether privileged communication in attorney-client relationship is present?

Ruling: No. There is no privileged communication rule to talk about. The privilege applies
only if the information was relayed by the client to the lawyer respecting a past
crime. The reckoning point is when the communication was given, not when the
lawyer was made to testify.

Doctrine: A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to

past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by
the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is
bound to respect. Statements and communications regarding the commission of
a crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney,
consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken
stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney
and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing
in reference to communications between attorney and client.

Case title: People vs. Abesamis, G.R. No. L-5284, 11 September 1953

Facts: The accused being then the Justice of the Peace and a public officer,
demand and receive from Marciana Sauri the amount of P1,100 with the
agreement that he would dismiss the case for Robbery in Band with Rape
against Emiliano Castillo, son of said Marciana Sauri, which was then
pending in his Court.
Issue/s: Whether the accused is gulty of direct bribery?

Ruling: No. The crime charged does not come under the first paragraph. To fall
within that paragraph the act which the public officer has agreed to
perform must be criminal.

It is possible, under the allegations of the information to regard the crime

charged as falling within the second paragraph of article 210. This
paragraph, however, distinguishes between two cases: one in which the
act agreed to be performed has been executed and one in which the said
act has not been accomplished, but there is telling whether the information
is for one or the other. The information is, therefore, defective in that
aspect. But while the information is insufficient to hold the accused for trial
for direct bribery under the first or second paragraph of article 210, it is a
sufficient indictment for indirect bribery under article 211.

Doctrine:

Case title: Formilleza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-75160, 18 March 1988

Mutia, a coterminous employee, wanted to become a permanent

Facts: employee. The accused being in charge of the appointment of employees,
demanded money. The PC soldiers arranged an entrapment. Mutia
passed the marked money under the table in which the accused was
sitting on her right. Thereafter, the soldiers arrested the accused.
Whether or not the accused is guilty?
Issue/s:

Ruling: No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of
the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have
accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention
on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the
same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for
safekeeping or pocketing the same.
Doctrine: Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or
act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude
that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise
will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by
simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other
property.

Case title: Magno vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147904, 4 October 2002

Facts: This petition originated from a case filed by a private respondent on for the
disqualification of petitioner as mayoralty candidate in the elections on the
ground that he was previously convicted of four counts of direct bribery.
Thereafter, the petitioner applied for probation and was discharged.
Petitioner argues that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral
turpitude.

Whether direct bribery is a crime involing moral turpitude?

Issue/s:

Ruling: Yes, Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that
the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits
an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for
some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
renege on the duties which he owes his fellow men and society in general.
Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position
is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct
clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty
and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude.

Doctrine: ELEMENT # 3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be

received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime
but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is
his official duty to do;
Case title: Marifosque vs. People, G.R. No. 156685, 27 July 2004

The accused a public officer being a qualified member of the Police Force
Facts: directly received from Yu Su Pong and Hian Hian Sy the total amount of 5,
800 pesos in consideration for his recovery from alleged robbers, eighteen
Shellane gas filled cylinder/s tanks, to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victims in the aforesaid amount.

The petitioner contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

do not demonstrate with certainty that the receipt of the alleged "bribe
money" constitutes the act punishable by the offense. He draws attention
to the following findings of fact (1) that he was not the one who asked for
reward from private complainant Yu So Pong but the asset; and (2) that
Hian Hian Yu Sy had no direct knowledge of the alleged transaction, i.e.,
the demand for money in consideration of the return/recovery of twenty-
one Shellane gas tanks, between private complainant Yu So Pong and
the accused.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accused is guilty of direct bribery?

Yes. The instant case falls within the second paragraph of Article 210.
Ruling: There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the
contemplation of Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, which includes
all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said
government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or
subordinate official or any rank or class." At the time of the incident, the
petitioner was a police sergeant assigned to the Legazpi City Police
Station. He directly received the bribe money from Yu So Pong and his
daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in exchange for the recovery of the stolen
cylinder tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime within the
meaning of Article 210. The act of receiving money was connected with
his duty as a police officer.

Doctrine:

Case title: Tad-y vs. People, G.R. No. 148862, 11 August 2005

Facts: Petitioner was an employee at the City Engineer’s Office of Bacolod City.
That petitioner-accused accepted the amount of ₱4,000.00 which he
demanded from Julio Encabo, a representative of Mildred Wong who will
 secure a certificate of occupancy for the building of the latter and handed it
over to his subordinate Nestor Velez, petitioner’s co-accused. And in
consideration of the amount thus given, petitioner would sign the
certificate of occupancy, which is his duty as engineer in charge of
structural designs at the City Engineer’s Office of Bacolod City. It must be
added that petitioner signed the certificate of occupancy, the original of
which was kept at the records section of the City Engineer’s Office, after
receiving the envelope containing ₱4,000. Subsequently. in an entrapment
operation conducted by the PNP Criminal Investigation Service Command,
the accused were arrested.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accused are guilty of bribery?

Ruling: No. There is no evidence on record that the petitioner and Encabo met on
April 24, 1995. In fact, it was only on April 25, 1995 that Encabo arrived at
the OCE to make arrangements for the final inspection of the building by
the officers concerned, the signing of the certificate of inspection by said
officers, and the signing of the certificate of occupancy by the building
official.There is also no credible evidence on record that the petitioner
demanded ₱4,000.00. The accused even inquired for the purpose of the
envelope given.
Doctrine: The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the
Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have
accepted the gift material consideration. There must be a clear intention
on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the
same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for
safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied
by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not
sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has
been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous
individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical
custody some gift, money or other property

Case title: Acejas vs. People, G.R. No. 156643, 27 June 2006

Facts: The accused being then employed both as Immigration officers of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila demanded 1
million pesos in exchange for the return of the passport of said Japanese
Takao Aoyagi confiscated. The petitioners delivered 25k marked money.
Issue/s: Whether or not the accused were guilty of bribery?

Ruling: The elements of direct bribery are present. First, there is no question that
the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez
extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport and
the promise of assistance in procuring a visa. Petitioner Acejas was his
co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff,
 which Acejas received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the
money was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an act that
did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of
the passport were made in the exercise of official duties.

Doctrine: The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1)

agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present; 2) accepts the gift in consideration of the
execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3) abstains from
the performance of official duties

Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which
contained the following elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2)
who received the gifts or presents personally or through another, 3) in
consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act
related to the exercise of official duties.

Case title: Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 155574, 20 November 2006

Facts: Garcia, LTO-Regional Director, Gabo and Tagupa, empl Garcia, LTO-
Regional Director, Gabo and Tagupa, employees of the same office were
charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for their alleged
frequent borrowing of motor vehicles from Oro Asian Automotive Center
Corporation (Company), which is engaged in the business of vehicle assembly
and dealership in CDO, knowing that said regularly transacts with the accused's
LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine
and chassis numbers as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer's report and
other similar transactions which require the prior approval and/or intervention of
the said accused Regional Director and employees and/or their said LTO office in
Cagayan de Oro City, to the damage and prejudice of and undue injury to said
Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, including complainant Maria Lourdes
Miranda.

Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting petitioner of fifty-

six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Issue/s: Can petitioner be convicted of any other crime (i.e., Direct Bribery or Indirect
Bribery) charged in the information?
Ruling: The Court ruled that there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution
showing that petitioner committed any of the three acts constituting direct
bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner
asking for something in exchange for his performance of, or abstaining to
perform, an act in connection with his official duty. Hence, from the evidence on
record, petitioner cannot be convicted of Direct Bribery.

The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211, RPC

is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material
consideration. The alleged borrowing of vehicle by petitioner can be considered
as the gift in contemplation of the law however, the court finds that the (56)
delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that petitioner received the vehicles
considering that his signatures do not appear therein.

Due to insufficient evidence, the petitioner is hereby acquitted of the

crime charged in the information.

Doctrine:

Case title: Go vs. Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, G.R. No. 172602, 13 April 2007

Facts: The accused Vicente Rivera, Jr. DOTC Secretary, and Henry Go, Chairman and
President of PIATCO, were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019,
also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Rivera in conspiracy with
Go entered into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) after
the project for the construction of the NAIA IPT III was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession
Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957
as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall
assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default specifically
Article IV, Section 4.04 (c) in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which
term is more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines

Go contends that Section 3(g) of RA 3019 does not embrace a private

person within its proviso.
Issue/s: WON Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA
3019.

Ruling: The court ruled that the fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019
is "that the accused is a public officer" does not necessarily preclude its
application to private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with
conspiring with public officers in the commission of the offense thereunder. This
is consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts
of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices
act.

The finding of the probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the
Ombudsman is a function duly belonging to the latter. As a rule, courts do not
interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in determining probable
cause, unless there are compelling reasons.

Doctrine:

Case title: Go vs. Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, G.R. No. 172602, 3 September 2007

Facts: This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner of the Decision
dated April 13, 2007.

Petitioner, a private individual, stands charged with violation of Section 3(g) of

Republic Act No. 3019, the clear terms of which punishes public officers who, on
behalf of the government, enter into contracts or transactions manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government, whether or not the public officer
profited or will profit thereby.

Issue/s: WON a private individual who conspired with a public officer be guilty for
violating Section 3(g).
Ruling: The Court stated that Section 3(g) is a crime that can only be committed by
public officers. The criminal liability of the public officers for violation Section 3(g)
is separate and distinct from the liability of private persons. In other words,
notwithstanding the allegation of conspiracy to violate Section 3(g), the liability of
private individuals who participated in the transaction must be established under
the appropriate provision which is Section 4(b), for knowingly inducing or causing
the public officers to commit Section 3(g) where criminal intent must necessarily
be proved. This is in clear recognition that Section 3(g), a malum prohibitum,
specifically applies to public officers only.

Hence, motion for reconsideration was granted and sandiganbayan was directed
to dismiss criminal case in so far as petitioner go is concerned.

Doctrine:

Case title: Merencillo vs. People, G.R. No. 142369-70, 13 April 2007

Facts: Lucit Estillore, agent of Cesar, went to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) office
in Tagbilaran City to ask for the computation of taxes and to apply for a
certificate authorizing registration (CAR). The computation was approved by
petitioner in his capacity as group supervisor. And was advised that the CAR
would be released after 7 days. On the same day, private complainant Cesar
received a call from Estillore saying that petitioner wanted to see her "for some
negotiation." She proceeded to petitioner's office where the latter demanded
P20,000 in exchange for the approval of the CAR.

When Cesar was able to return to the BIR, petitioner repeated his demand for
P20,000 even if the CAR had been signed and was ready for release. On Cesar's
inquiry, the releasing clerk informed Cesar that she (Cabangon) was still waiting
for petitioner's go signal to release the document.

Due to petitioner's refusal to release the CAR, petitioner visited and complained
RDO Balagon. Subsequently, Cesar received a call from petitioner informing her
that she could get the CAR but reminded her of his demand. He told her that he
was willing to accept a lesser amount. It was at this point that Cesar decided to
report the matter to the authorities. Merencillo was then apprehended in an
entrapment set up by the PNP of Bohol.
Issue/s: WON Merencillo was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that although the two charges against petitioner
stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and
distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance
between the elements of the offenses charge

The violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor

necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all
the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those
enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present,
share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of
RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is
required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is
specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the
law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a)
performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which
does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an
act which is his official duty to do.

Doctrine:

Case title: Balderama vs. People, G.R. Nos. 147578-85, 28 January 2008

Facts: Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
discriminate against passengers and would transport them to their destinations
only on a "contract" basis, the LTO created a team to look into the veracity of the
complaints. Petitioners in these cases were members of the team, popularly
known as "Flying Squad."

The team flagged down for inspection an "SJ Taxi" owned by the respondent.
The team impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective.
However, upon inspection, the results showed that it was not defective and was
functioning normally. The vehicle was released to the respondent.
 The respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle,
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 301. He alleged that prior to the
impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting "protection
money" from him. They went to his office and proposed they would not
apprehend his drivers and impound his vehicles for violations of LTO rules,
provided he gives them the amount of P400.00 every 15th and 30th day of the
month. They agreed to the reduced amount of P300.00. On the same day, he
started giving them P300.00 and from then on, every 15th and 30th day of the
month until June 15, 1992. Thereafter, he failed to give them the agreed amount
because his business was not doing well.

Issue/s: WON petitioners violated Article 210, RPC.

Ruling: Yes. The elements of direct bribery present. It was duly established that the
accused demanded and received P300.00 as "protection money" from
respondent on several dates. As against the prosecution's evidence, all that the
accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest of defenses. It was found
out that petitioners participated directly in the malicious apprehension and
impounding of the taxi unit of respondent, causing him undue injury.

Doctrine:

Case title: Catalan vs. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7360, 24 July 2012

Facts: Atty. Catalan filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa contending that (1) Silvosa
appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case (Esperon case) for which
he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Silvosa bribed his then colleague
Prosec. Toribio for P30k to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
frustrated murder; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa for direct
bribery.

Issue/s: WON the findings in a criminal proceeding are binding in a disbarment

proceeding.
Ruling: Yes. First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment. Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of
conviction.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the 3rd element of direct bribery.

Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at

bribing Pros. Toribio merits at least the penalty of suspension. His excuse that
his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is
unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The
practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to
exercise this privilege.

Atty Silvosa was disbarred.

Doctrine:

Case title: Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2709, 30 June 1950

Facts: The petitioner was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with
attempted bribery by offering the sum of P6 to patrolmen A. Caudal and L. de los
Santos in consideration of their refraining from arresting him for a violation of the
Price Tag Law (Republic Act No. 71), which offer the said police officers rejected,
and placed the offeror under arrest.

Upon denial of his motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner filed the
present petition for certiorari (which we interpret to mean prohibition), praying
that the respondent judge be ordered to refrain from further proceeding on the
ground that he has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case

The penalty for the attempted crime is two degrees lower, which is destierro in its
minimum and medium periods. That means that the culprit shall be banished
from his present residence (not imprisoned) for a period of not less than 6
months and 1 day and not more than 4 years and 2 months

Issue/s: WON the court of first instance has original jurisdiction to try an offense
penalized with destierro or banishment.
Ruling: No. Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under
the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by article
71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 3 of Commonwealth Act
No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the
latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical
and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place
offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the
peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.

Doctrine:

Case title: Victoriano vs. Alvior, A.M. No. P-1597, 1 March 1978

Facts: Alvior, a clerk of court, solicited the assistance of Garbanzos, a private individual
representing Ernado Commercial, to facilitate a requisition. Being a representative
of Ernado Commercial, Garbanzos used the opportunity to manipulate the canvass
to ensure that Ernado Commercial would be declared the lowest bidder.

After confirming the fact of delivery of the items covered by subject requisition
voucher by Ernado Commerce and the signing of the Abstract Quotation of Price,
an inspection was made, and it was discovered that the 100 bundles of braided
abaca twine were overpriced at P12.00 per unit.

Then Garbanzos gave Alvior 200 pesos as a token of gratitude for allowing the
former to do what he did.

Issue/s: Whether the accused is guilty of indirect bribery.

Ruling: Yes. The charge against respondent Alvior for misconduct in office for having
received money, in connection with the performance of his official duty, from
Garbanzos, as token of the latter's gratitude, is clearly meritorious. Respondent's
acceptance of money under the circumstances is a dishonest act.
 Being a public officer, and having accepted a gift in the form of money which was
offered to him by reason of his office, herein respondent Alvior is chargeable with
indirect bribery punishable under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. The fact
that the evidence is wanting as to direct connivance between Alvior and Garbanzos
is of no moment since in indirect bribery "it is not necessary that the officer should
do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts
gifts offered to him by reason of his office"

Doctrine:

Case title: Pozar vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62439, 23 October 1984

Facts: Petitioner, an American citizen and a permanent resident of the Philippines, was
charged in an Information, with the crime of Corruption of a Public Official. AsThe
petitioner was an applicant for probation. He went to the office looking for a
Probation Officer named Danilo Ocampo. Since the latter was not around at that
time. Two days later, he was able to give such envelope to the said Ocampo which
contained some official papers connected with the appellant’s application for
probation and attached thereto was a P100 bill. Such bill was given under the
circumstance which would make the receiving public officer liable for bribery.

Issue/s: Whether the act constitutes indirect bribery.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court said that the circumstance attending the alleged
commission of the crime would not show that the petitioner is guilty. The said
petitioner is a foreigner, and is unfamiliar with the said transaction. Such bill might
be for advancing the expenses of whatever documentation might be needed in the
application for probation. Hence, the Supreme Court acquitted such person for the
crime of corruption of public officials

In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs an act or refrains from
doing something, because of the gift or promise; in indirect bribery, it is not
necessary that the officer should do any particular act or even promise to do an
act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered to him by reason of his office.

Doctrine:
Case title: Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 155574, 20 November 2006

Facts: Garcia and Nabo, being then public officers or employees of the LTO, borrow
units Asian Automotive Center’s Service Vehicle knowing that said corporation
regularly transacts with the accused’s LTO Office for the registration of its motor
vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis numbers as well as the
submission of its vehicle dealer’s report and other similar transactions which
require the prior approval and/or intervention of the said accused Regional
Director and employee.

Ma. Lourdes Miranda, the complainant, whose child was run over an killed in a
vehicular accident; the driver of the ill-fated motor vehicle was accused Nabo,
subordinate of Garcia. Miranda successfully traced the said vehicle and
eventually discovered the existence of numerous delivery receipts in the files and
possession of the Company own by certain Aurora Chiong; and that said
discovery led to the institution of the subject criminal cases against herein
accused.

Mrs Chiong recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and he would need a
vehicle to transport water thereto. For this purpose, he would, on a weekly basis,
borrow from the Company a motor vehicle, either by asking from her directly
through telephone calls or through Yungao, her Liaison Officer. Every time
accused Garcia would borrow a motor vehicle, the Company would issue a
delivery receipt for such purpose, which has to be signed by the person whom
accused Garcia would send to pick up the motor vehicle. Yungao testified that
the names and signatures of the persons who actually received the Company’s
vehicles were reflected on the faces of the delivery receipts.

The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting petitioner of

fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.

Issue/s: Whether the petitioner is guilty of indirect bribery.

Ruling: No.Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts
offered to him by reason of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect
bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public
officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration.
The alleged borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be
considered as the gift in contemplation of the law. To prove that petitioner
borrowed a vehicle from the Company for 56 times, the prosecution
adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts allegedly signed by petitioner’s
representative whom the latter would send to pick up the vehicle. The
Supreme Court however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently
prove that petitioner received the vehicles considering that his signatures
do not appear therein. In addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it
was petitioner’s representatives who picked up the vehicles. If the identity
of the person who allegedly picked up the vehicle on behalf of the petitioner
is uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it was the petitioner who
received the vehicles in the end.

Doctrine:

Case title: Go vs. Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, G.R. No. 172602, 13 April 2007

Facts: An Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging Vicente C.

Rivera, as then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman and
President PIATCO, with violation of Section 3 (g) 4 of RA 3019, also known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This was in connection with
the PIATCO contracts, where the Government awarded in favor of PIATCO
the project for the development of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Passenger Terminal III under a build-operate-and-transfer
scheme. However, these contracts were later on declared null and void
for being contrary to public policy because Paircargo Consortium,
PIATCO's predecessor-in-interest, was not a qualified bidder as it failed to
meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law.

Issue/s: Whether Article 212 or corrupt practices act (RA 3019) can be committed by a
private individual.
Ruling: Yes.SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction

manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby. As earlier mentioned, the elements of this
offense are as follows:

1. That the accused is a public officer;

2. That he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government;

and

3. That such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to

the government.

The fact that one of the elements of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is
a public officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons
who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers in
the commission of the offense thereunder.

Doctrine:

Case title: Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24, 11 September 2013

Facts: Petitioner Disini was charged and convicted in Sandiganbayan for corruption of
public officials and violation of section 4 of Anti-graft and corrupt practices act.

During the period from 1974 to February 1986 Disini unlawfully conspired with
President Marcos by promising gifts by way of stock in a mining corporation in
consideration of contracts for engineering and architectural services which Disini
subsequently received.
 In another criminal case this time for violation of sec 4 of Anti-graft and corrupt
practices act it was alleged that President Marcos was a golf partner and a close
personal friend of Disini and that Disini’s wife Paciencia Disini was actually the
first cousin of the first Lady Imelda Marcos.

In the said complaint it was alleged that Disini took advantage of such close
personal relation to gain projects for the National Power Corporation (NPC) at
Morong, Bataan wherein Disini managed to obtained projects for the said
corporation and others through the direct intervention of then President Marcos.

Issue/s: Whether there is sufficiency of information to hold Disini guilty of said crime.

Ruling: Yes.The information were sufficient in form and substance. For the corruption of
public officer complaint: The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and
promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in
consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in caused the
award of the contracts in favor of Disini by taking advantage of his position and in
committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that
would make him liable for direct bribery. The second element of corruption of
public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under circumstances,
not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for director indirect bribery.
Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disini's
offers, promises and gifts — an essential element in direct bribery — the allegation
that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct
bribery.

For the complaint regarding the violation of Sec 4 of R.A 3019 the information
contained if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the
offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini,
the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the
family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with
and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage
of such family and close personal relations, requested and received
$1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the
entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government
in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with
whom Disini had family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and
obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for
Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.

Doctrine:
Case title: PDIC vs. Casimiro, G.R. No. 206866, 2 September 2015

Facts: Petitioner PDIC filed a Joint-Affidavit charging private respondents Cu (as the
85.99% owner of BDBI, Zate (as Chairman/President of BDBI), and Apelo (as a
former employee of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted as Bank
Officer-In-Charge that examined BDBI’s books and records, of the crimes of Direct
Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials, as well as violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause,
finding that while it may be said that certain amounts were indeed deposited to
Apelo's bank account, there is no proof that Apelo subsequently withdrew the
same.

Issue/s: Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the dismissal of the petition,

Ruling: Yes. Gomez's affidavit outlines such scheme as follows: (a) Apelo would provide
Cu an "advance warning" of any impending surprise bank examinations on BDBI
by BSP; (b) upon receipt of the "advance warning," Cu would then make the
necessary steps to misrepresent BDBI's status, such as instructing BDBI
employees on how to cover the possible findings/exceptions of the BSP
examiner on the books of BDBI, as well as infusing cash into BDBI's vault in
order to make it appear that the cash listed in the books reflect the actual cash in
vault, and thereafter returning such cash to the source; (c) in exchange for such
"advance warnings," Cu and/or Zate gave Apelo as "professional fees" the
aggregate amount of P140,000.00 by depositing the same to the latter's bank
account; and (d) to cover up such amounts given to Apelo, Cu and/or Zate,
instructed Gomez to initially cover the unofficial and unbooked cash
disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's books as
"Other Cash I tems," and thereafter, regularize and remove from BDBI 's books
such disbursements by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until they
were completely covered. To support such statements, Gomez provided copies
of deposit slips showing that such amount was indeed deposited to Apelo's bank
account. She likewise asserted that in the course of her employment at BDBI,
she does not know of any official or legitimate transactions that BDBI had with
Apelo that would warrant the disbursement of the aforesaid amount in the latter's
favor.

In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict private
respondents of the crimes charged against them.
Doctrine:

Case title: U.S. vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 3968, 21 March 1908

Facts: Marcos Lopez, Juan Alarcon, and Narciso Sagal, the former being the municipal
treasurer and deputy of the provincial treasurer, at Escalante, Occidental
Negrosand the latter being clerks of the municipal treasury of Escalante, duly
appointed and qualified and discharging their respective offices, collected from
several residents of their municipality greater fees than those prescribed by Act
No. 1147 for branding and registering of cattle, with prejudice to the owner, to
the amount of P174.50.

Issue/s: Whether the crime is estafa and not illegal exaction.

Ruling: Yes. The defendant committed the acts charged in said complaint, in the manner
and form as therein charged. These facts constitute the crime of estafa and not
that of illegal exaction. (no explanation as to why it is estafa and not illegal
exaction)

Doctrine: In Illegal exaction, the offender is limited to those public officers entrusted with
the collection of taxes, licenses fees and other imposts. He is thus an
accountable public officer. If otherwise, the crime would be estafa.

Case title: People vs. Policher, G.R. No. 41008, 23 October 1934
Facts: Isidoro T. Policher was charged with and convicted of the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents. Accused, the then duly
appointed treasurer of said municipal district and as such was in charge and
responsible, among other official duties, for the issuance of cedula certificates
with intent to gain and of prejudicing and defrauding Moros Somampot, Donato
Marcos and Tindigan Dipatuan, falsified cedula certificates by erasing the names
written thereon of persons to whom said cedula certificates had originally been
issued so as to reissue them, and in fact he reissued them, in order to
appropriate for himself the proceeds of this reissuance of the cedula.The
certificates in question, amounting to P36.

Appellant was the municipal treasurer of the municipal district of Kolambugan, of

the Province of Lanao, instead of delivering the nine cedulas in question to the
taxpayers who had paid for them, they were retained in the appellant's office on
the ground that the interested parties had not furnished all the necessary data
relative to their personal circumstances.

Issue/s: Whether or not he could be held liable for the crime of estafa or that of
malversation, having appropriated his collection from said three Moros instead of
depositing it in the Government coffers.

Ruling: The court is of the opinion that the appellant cannot be declared guilty of estafa
because the proven facts show, for the reasons already stated, that the crime
committed was not estafa but malversation, which is a crime entirely different
from the former and for the existence of which some elements not belonging to
estafa are necessary. The appellant, upon entering trial, was undoubtedly
unprepared to defend himself from the charges for malversation and falsification
except only from falsification and estafa, and it would be taking him by surprise if
he were to be sentenced also for malversation.

It has been stated during the consideration of this case that under the allegations
contained in the information, the appellant may also be declared guilty of
malversation in as much as it has been proven that he appropriated his collection
from the aforesaid three Moros instead of depositing it in the safe. In the
information, however, there is no allegation to justify the inference, without
resorting to the proven facts, that it is the Government that sustained the injury
resulting from the appellant's crime. What the information clearly expresses and
states is that it was the three Moros in question who sustained the injury.
Therefore the various acts of malversation committed by the appellant should not
be taken into consideration in this case because he was not charged therewith.

Doctrine:
Case title: Ramsical vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99, 13 December 2004

Facts: The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS) is a government-owned or controlled corporation. It was
designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support
to the AFP military retirement system. Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS was to
be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional appropriations and
compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; (2) donations, gifts, legacies,
bequests and others to the system; and (3) all earnings of the system which shall
not be subject to any tax whatsoever.

On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of

Representatives representing the First District of the Province of South Cotabato,
filed a "Complaint-Affidavit" with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She
alleged that anomalous real estate transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at
General Santos City and questionable payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to
the government had been entertained into between certain parties. She then
requested the Ombudsman to investigate Ramiscal, Jr. (President of the AFP-
RSBS), together with twenty-seven (27) other persons for conspiracy in
misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government millions of
pesos in capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.

On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special

Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24) separate Informations with
the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other accused. The filing of
the Informations was duly approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The
first twelve (12) Informations were for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Informations and to defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, pending resolution of
the aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a "Notice of
Appearance" as private prosecutors in all the aforementioned cases for the
Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI) on March 9, 1999. The
notice of appearance was apparently made conformably to the letter-request of
Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are
members thereof. In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients,
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and
contributors of AFP-RSBS.

Issue/s: WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS

FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND ARTICLE
172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE
RISE TO CIVIL LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE PARTY
Ruling: The offended party may be the State or any of its instrumentalities, including local
governments or government-owned or controlled corporations, such as the AFP-
RSBS, which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of their properties
or funds, reparation, or indemnification. For instance, in malversation of public
funds or property under Article 21752 of the Revised Penal Code, frauds under
Article 21353 of the Revised Penal Code, and violations of the Forestry Code of
the Philippines, P.D. No. 705, as amended, to mention a few, the government is
the offended party entitled to the civil liabilities of the accused. For violations of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, any party, including the government, may be
the offended party if such party sustains undue injury caused by the delictual acts
of the accused. In such cases, the government is to be represented by the public
prosecutor for the recovery of the civil liability of the accused.

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty
or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or
omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by
the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to
recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that
he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the
satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy,
subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and
not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
unrelated party.

Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or beneficiaries of

the AFP-RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not have a legal right to intervene in
the criminal cases merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional
right of such members to have access to the records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are
such members entitled to intervene therein simply because the funds of the AFP-
RSBS are public or government funds. It must be stressed that any interest of the
members of the AFP-RSBS over its funds or property is merely inchoate and
incidental. Such funds belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical personality
separate and independent of its members/beneficiaries.

As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the
government, which was allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other
accused of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, based on the actual
and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the AFP-
RSBS. The AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes
charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions, nor is it entitled to the
civil liability of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it is not the offended party in the
said cases.
 We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the offended party in
Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification of public documents under
paragraph 4, Sec. 1, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing
that in the felony of falsification of public document, the existence of any prejudice
caused to third person or the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes
immaterial. The controlling consideration is the public character of a document
and the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth therein solemnly
proclaimed. The offender does not, in any way, have civil liability to a third person.

However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered thereby is underpriced by
a public officer and his co-conspirators to conceal the correct amount of capital
gains and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing undue injury to the
government, the offenders thereby commit two crimes – (a) falsification of public
document defined in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b)
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, a special penal law. The offender
incurs civil liability to the government as the offended party for violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, but not for falsification of public document under
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

Doctrine:

Case title: U.S. vs. Regala, G.R. No. 9632, 23 September 1914

Facts: On the 1st day of February, 1912, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of
Pampanga presented an information against the appellant Lorenzo Regala for
estafa. The accused appeared before the court for trial. The cause was duly
opened and the trial proceeded with, the Government presenting as witnesses
Luisa Garcia, Juan Montemayor, Juan Manlulu, and Gervasio Lalic. These
witnesses having testified, the court came to the conclusion that it was without
jurisdiction, dismissed the case and ordered the prosecuting attorney to present
an information of the justice of the peace.

On the 9th of August of the same year the prosecuting attorney, instead of
presenting a information for estafa to the justice's court, as ordered, filed an
information against said accused in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
charging him with malversation of public funds. The information alleged:
 That the said accused on one of the days of the month of October, 1911, in the
municipality of Floridablanca, Pampanga, P. I., voluntarily, illegally, and criminally,
being, as he was, a public official, namely, justice of the peace of the aforesaid
municipality of Floridablanca, and charged for the reason with the care and
custody of public funds, collected from Juan Montemayor the sum of P12 which,
according to the representations of the accused, Luisa Garcia had claimed before
him as such justice of the peace was due her from said Juan Montemayor the
said sum of P12 for delivery to the said Luisa Garcia; but the said accused
delivered to said Luisa Garcia the sum of P16 only, which was, as a matter of fact,
the only sum claimed from the beginning, neglecting and refusing to deposit the
remaining P6 in the municipal treasury and refusing to give an account of the
same, thereby embezzling the same and converting the same to his own use.

The cause went to trial and the accused was found guilty and sentenced to two
months' imprisonment, to indemnify Juan Montemayor in the sum of P6, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accused can be tried for the commission of malversation of
public funds?

Ruling: No. The acts alleged to have been committed by the first information constitute
the crime of estafa against the complaining witness. As a necessary result those
alleged in the second information do not constitute the crime of malversation of
public funds.

The money paid by the debtor to the accused and herein complained of was paid
involuntarily and under false representations and pretense made by the accused
for the purpose. The accused represented to the complainant that he was
authorized and required to collect P6, the amount of the claim against him, and
P6 damages. The debtor paid upon the representation and the accused received
in accordance therewith. This representation was false. The creditor neither
required nor authorized such a collection. Wherever false representations are
knowingly and intentionally made and money obtained by virtue thereof which is
subsequently converted to the use of the person making the false representations
or of some person other that the one from whom it was obtained, a criminal action
lies.

The charge of malversation of public funds has no foundation. The funds were not
public funds. Section 790 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides what fees or
sums a justice of the peace is authorized to collect in civil and criminal actions and
the disposition which must be made thereof.
 It has not been contended that the P6 collected by the accused constituted in any
sense any of the fees enumerated in the section 71 & 73 of Act No. 136. No civil
action was begun. No witnesses were sworn or oaths taken; no record was made
and no expenses incurred. There arose no occasion for the collection of any of
the fees specified in the Code of Civil Procedure. As a necessary result, no part of
the money collected was public money and the accused was under no duty to the
public in relation thereto.

We are also of the opinion that the plea of former jeopardy was well founded and
that the present action should be dismissed for that reason alone. The accused
having already been put in jeopardy for his acts under one charge, cannot now be
tried for the commission of the same acts under another charge.

Doctrine:

Case title: U.S. vs. Udarbe, G.R. No. 9945, 12 November 1914

Facts: It is plainly proven:

(1) That the defendant was appointed municipal president of the municipality of
Magsingal on October 28, 1912, on which date he entered upon the duties of his
office, and while on duty as said president, the municipal council on December 9
of the same year, 1912, and under his presidency, approved and passed
Regulation No. 7, for the leasing of fishponds in the said municipality, article 10
whereof provided that the lease holders of various sections of said fishponds,
among which was section 102, should continue in their leases so long as they
paid the rental fixed for each of the respective sections, without prejudice to
granting them to others who might desire to bid for them, in case such lease
holders should waive their preferential right;

(2) that on the 16th of the said month of December, when the auction or bidding
for the different sections of said fishponds was held in the town hall of said
municipality, it was recorded in Minute No. 54, series of 1912, entered for that
purpose (folio 13, back of 13 and folio 14 of the Minute Book, Exhibit A of the
prosecution), that the accused, who participated therein and moreover presided
over the auction, took part in the bidding for the said section No. 102 of the
fishpond of Pagsanaan, and that that section was adjudicated to him as the
highest bidder for the sum of two pesos a year;
 (3) that said defendant paid the municipal treasurer of Magsingal on January 10
of the following year, 1913, the sum of P2 as the price of the lease for the said
section No. 102 up to the close of that year;

(4) that said defendant, who held the office of president of the said municipality
from October 28, 1912, as has already been stated, and who still held it on March
30, 1914, when this case was tried, continued in the lease of the said section No.
102 of said fishpond, which was awarded to him on December 16, 1912, until the
same month of December of said year 1913, that is, for a period of one year.

Issue/s: Whether the municipal officers, by election or by appointment, could enter into
contracts with the municipal council regarding the lease of realty belonging to
them for the use of their municipality, without infringing section 28 of the
Municipal Code.

Ruling: No. The Attorney-General very correctly stated that the purpose of such legal
provision was to prevent fraud; that to permit the municipal officers to become
directly or indirectly interested in the contracts or commercial transactions of the
municipality could easily, in view of their influence, operate to the effect that such
contracts or business should be awarded to them under conditions less
advantageous for the municipality by preventing competition on the part of
others, and besides, after the contracts had been awarded to them, they might
not fulfill the conditions therein stipulated, in this way prejudicing the
municipality’s interests. He added that the leasing of realty to the municipality
could not be regarded as embraced in the contracts and business mentioned in
sections 39 and 40 of the Municipal Code, such as construction of buildings,
installation and maintenance of lights, etc., for the reason that in such contracts
of lease that fraud which the law seeks to prevent could not take place. And
finally, noting that article 397 of the Penal Code punishes as guilty of fraud the
public officer who becomes directly or indirectly interested in any kind of contract
or operation in which he has to intervene because of his office, he concluded by
saying that in order to be included in this legal provision it was merely necessary
that the officer intervene in the contract or transaction by reason of his office, and
therefore, as the leasing of any property by the municipality for its own use must
be the subject of a resolution of the municipal council, all the officers who take
part in the deliberations of said council, to wit, the president, vice president, and
the councilors, are prohibited from leasing their property to the municipality.

The defendant became interested and took direct part in the leasing of property
of the municipality of Magsingal, wherein he had to intervene by reason of his
office as president of said municipality, and he has therefore openly violated the
provisions of said section of the Municipal Code.

Doctrine:
Case title: Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, 12 April 2011

Facts: The Republic commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan by
complaint, impleading as defendant respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
(Cojuangco) and 59 individual defendants. Cojuangco allegedly purchased a
block of 33,000,000 shares of SMC stock through the 14 holding companies
owned by the CIIF Oil Mills. For this reason, the block of 33,133,266 shares of
SMC stock shall be referred to as the CIIF block of shares.

• Contention of the Republic of the Philippines:

That Cojuangco is the undisputed "coconut king" with unlimited powers to deal
with the coconut levy funds, who took undue advantage of his association,
influence and connection, acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand
E. Marcos, misused coconut levy funds to buy out majority of the outstanding
shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation.

Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and ACCRA law offices plotted, devised,
schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the
use of coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures
that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK. CIC,
and more than twenty other coconut levy-funded corporations, including the
acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization through
presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.

• Ruling of the Sandiganbayan:

Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033-F was dismissed for failure of plaintiff
to prove by preponderance of evidence its causes of action against defendants
with respect to the twenty percent (20%) outstanding shares of stock of San
Miguel Corporation registered in defendants’ names.

Republic of the Philippines appealed the case to the Supreme Court invoking that
coconut levy funds are public funds. The SMC shares, which were acquired by
respondents Cojuangco, Jr. and the Cojuangco companies with the use of
coconut levy funds – in violation of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.’s fiduciary
obligation – are, necessarily, public in character and should be reconveyed to the
government.

Republic of the Philippines appealed the case to the Supreme Court invoking that
coconut levy funds are public funds. The SMC shares, which were acquired by
respondents Cojuangco, Jr. and the Cojuangco companies with the use of
coconut levy funds – in violation of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.’s fiduciary
obligation – are, necessarily, public in character and should be reconveyed to the
government.
Issue/s: Whether Respondent Cojuangco Jr. used the coconut levy funds to acquire
SMC shares in violation of his fiduciary obligation as a public officer.

Ruling: Cojuangco violated no fiduciary duties. It does not suffice, as in this case, that
the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the
administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be prima facie showing that
the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association
or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.

Republic’s burden to establish by preponderance of evidence that

respondents’ SMC shares had been illegally acquired with coconut-levy funds
was not discharged.

The conditions for the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil
Code (like the trustee using trust funds to purchase, or a person acquiring
property through mistake or fraud), and Section 31 of the Corporation Code
(like a director or trustee willfully and knowingly voting for or assenting to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation, among others) require factual
foundations to be first laid out in appropriate judicial proceedings. Hence,
concluding that Cojuangco breached fiduciary duties as an officer and member
of the Board of Directors of the UCPB without competent evidence thereon
would be unwarranted and unreasonable.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan could not fairly find that Cojuangco had
committed breach of any fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the Board
of Directors of the UCPB. For one, the Amended Complaint contained no clear
factual allegation on which to predicate the application of Articles 1455 and 1456
of the Civil Code, and Section 31 of the Corporation Code. Although the trust
relationship supposedly arose from Cojuangco’s being an officer and member of
the Board of Directors of the UCPB, the link between this alleged fact and the
borrowings or advances was not established. Nor was there evidence on the
loans or borrowings, their amounts, the approving authority, etc. As trial court,
the Sandiganbayan could not presume his breach of fiduciary duties without
evidence showing so, for fraud or breach of trust is never presumed, but must be
alleged and proved.

The thrust of the Republic that the funds were borrowed or lent might
even preclude any consequent trust implication but is more inclined to be a
contract of loan. To say that a relationship is fiduciary when existing laws do not
provide for such requires evidence that confidence is reposed by one party in
another who exercises dominion and influence. Absent any special facts and
circumstances proving a higher degree of responsibility, any dealings between a
lender and borrower are not fiduciary in nature.

Doctrine:
Case title: PNB vs. Tugab, G.R. Nos. 45040-41, 26 November 1938

Facts: In the justice of the peace court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the provincial
fiscal of said province filed an information against the herein defendant charging
him with having misappropriated the sum of P5,498.44 belonging to the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and the sum of P829.60 belonging to the
Philippine National Bank which sums of money were under his care and custody
as cashier in the office of the provincial treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya.
Simultaneously said fiscal brought a civil action against said defendant for the
recovery of the said sums of money, and upon petition filed by said fiscal the
court ordered the attachment of the properties of the defendant, which
attachment was subsequently lifted upon the filing of a bond. Because of a
demurrer interposed to the complaint the fiscal amended the latter and filed two
separate complaints one for the Province of Nueva Vizcaya and the other for the
Philippine National Bank.

The criminal case for malversation of public funds was remanded to the Court of
First Instance of said province in view of the waiver by the accused of the
preliminary investigation. As soon as said case was received in said court the
fiscal filed a motion for dismissal on the ground that upon another detailed
investigation, it was discovered that the funds were not misappropriated by the
defendant but by Dioscorro Navarrete. The case was dismissed by the court and
the fiscal filed against Dioscorro Navarrete an information for qualified theft. After
the preliminary investigation, and the case having been elevated to the Court of
First Instance, after the corresponding trial navarrete was acquitted because of
reasonable doubt. In view thereof, the acting provincial fiscal again filed an
information against the herein defendant for malversation of the same public
funds through negligence in the care and custody of the same which was the
cause of their abstraction and loss. When this new criminal case reached the
Court of First Instance and after the defendant had waived the preliminary
investigation the provincial fiscal amended the information and filed another
charging said defendant with the same crime but alleging therein that he himself
misappropriated said funds. Trial having been held and all the evidence adduced,
the court, in its decision of June 29, 1935 acquitted the defendant, with costs de
oficio and cancelled the bond.

Issue/s: Whether or not he could be exempted from Civil liability?

Ruling: No. According to article 116 the civil action to demand an obligation arising from
the commission of a crime is extinguished when a final judgment is rendered in a
criminal case declaring that the facts which could have given rise to civil liability
did not exist. But this ruling is not applicable to the present case because in the
information which resulted in the defendant’s acquittal of malversation it was not
charged that the said defendant had been negligent in the custody of the funds
and that by reason of his negligence said funds were lost or misappropriated by
other persons, but it was therein charged that he himself misappropriated said
funds which were under his care and responsibility. Consequently, the trial court
had no jurisdiction to make the pronouncement that the appellant did not commit
the crime for not having been negligent in the custody of said funds.

According to article 217 of the Revised Penal Code malversation of government

funds or properties may be committed by direct appropriation of the same by the
public officer or when thought negligence or lack of care by the latter government
funds or properties are unlawfully misappropriated by others. In the amended
information under which the appellee was tried, the fiscal charged him with the
first crime, wherefore, it is clear that the trial court could not have lawfully
sentenced nor acquitted him of the second, nor could it make a finding of
exemption from civil liability, which is invoked by the appellee and upon which
the appealed order is based.

There is another reason which makes the appealed order untenable. Section 633
of the Revised Administrative Code provides that any public officer charged, by
reason of his official duties, with the custody of government funds and properties
is primarily responsible therefor to the government.

Doctrine:

Case title: People vs. Sendaydiego, G.R. Nos. L-33252-54, 20 January 1978

Facts: Provincial Treasurer Sendaydiego, in conspiracy with Samson, an

employee of a hardware, in conspiracy with provincial auditor, used six
forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge
fund. The auditor was acquitted while the treasurer died in the course of
appeal.

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not there is a complex crime of malversation through falsification.

 2. Whether or not a private person can also be guilty of malversation.

Ruling: 1. No. The falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex crime
because the falsifications were not necessary means for the commission of the
malversation. In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the
malversation. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose
of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate
offenses. Each falsification and each malversation constituted independent
offense which must be punished separately. The overall result is that in these
three cases six separate offenses of falsification and six separate crimes of
malversation were committed.

Yes. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of he said twelve

offenses. As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the
falsification because he was in possession of the forged vouchers and he
used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he
conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. A
private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing
malversation is also guilty of malversation.

Doctrine:

Case title: Catingub vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-28701, 25 March 1983

Facts: Petitioner was the Temporary Branch Supervisor of a PCSO sweepstakes outlet
in Cagayan de Oro City. He was found to be short of P12,314.50, and when
asked to explain he could not provide an explanation, he could not provide a
definite answer.

He was charged with malversation in the CFI of Manila City, where he likewise
filed a Motion to Quash stating that the court had no jurisdiction to try him as the
offense was committed in Cagayan de Oro. The trial court dismissed the motion.
On appeal to the CA, it likewise dismissed his motion to quash.

Issue/s: Whether or not the CFI of Manila City has jurisdiction to hear the case.
Ruling: Yes. Although the offense happened in Cagayan de Oro City, PCSO
sweepstakes proceeds and booklets are required to be delivered by fieldmen to
either the branch office or in the Manila City branch. This ruling is all in fours with
the ruling in People v. Angco which declared that both the courts in the places
where the amount was embezzled, and where it was supposed to be turned over
have concurrent jurisdiction to try the case. The filing of the case is a matter of
discretion of the fiscal in the said localities, and not of the accused.

Doctrine:

Case title: Quizo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 77120, 6 April 1987

Facts: Petitioner was the Mail Order Teller of Cagayan de Oro post office. He was
found by the Commission on Audit to have had a shortage of P17,421.17 in his
consisting of disallowed ‘vales’ of his co-employees and accommodated private
checks. However, on the same date he restituted the amount of P406.18, and six
days after he restituted the whole amount. This notwithstanding, an information
for malversation of public funds was filed by the Tanodbayan in the
Sandiganbayan, which on motion for reconsideration was withdrawn through
motion to dismiss by the Tanodbayan, stating that there was no actual damage
to the government as the full amount was restituted and the accused never
embezzled or pocketed the money for personal use, them being vales of his co-
employees.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss stating that damage to the
government is not an essential element of malversation of public funds and
likewise the motion for reconsideration was subsequently dismissed.

Issue/s: WON the Sandiganbayan may continue hearing the case, notwithstanding the
motion to dismiss of the Tanodbayan.

Ruling: No. In the case of People v. Pineda it was ruled that:

 “A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file
a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence
to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a
different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of
abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a
prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his
conviction.”

Likewise, the accused has presumption of guild because 'the bulk of the reported
shortage actually referred to the items disallowed by the Audit Team representing
cash advances extended to co-employees. The cash advances were made in
good faith.

Doctrine:

Case title: Tinga vs. People, G.R. No. L-57650, 15 April 1988

Facts: Tinga was the Municipal Treasurer of Bogo, Cebu and concurrently the Deputy
Provincial Treasurer. Upon audit by the COA, it was found that he had a total
shortage of P144,094.98. Likewise, when asked of the missing amount he could
not provide an explanation and that upon demand for restitution, he could not
turnover the amount; only doing so after fifteen days from date of discovery
(upon depositing the amount with the Municipality, it returned the sum of
P4,345.93 because it was discovered that it was wrongly charged). He was then
charged with malversation of public funds in the Sandiganbayan which
subsequently convicted but held him accountable only for the sum of
P70,879.72. He filed a petition for certiorari with the SC on the grounds that the
audit of the COA was replete with errors as proven by the findings of the
Sandiganbayan.

Issue/s: WON the Sandiganbayan wrongly convicted petitioner.

Ruling: Yes. The audit done by the COA was replete with errors as noted by the
Sandiganbayad (i.e. the actual robbery Tinga was a victim of, the failure of the
clerk to turn over the required amount). His right to due process was likewise
violated because his request for re-audit with the COA was rejected, despite the
findings of the Sandiganbayan of the errors and that the amount returned to him
is of a considerable amount. PETITIONER ACQUITTED.
Doctrine:

Case title: Mahihay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 61442, 9 May 1989

Facts: The petitioner, Modesto Mahinay, was employed as Cashier I of the Butuan
General Hospital from July 1, 1973 to October 31, 1977.

On October 13, 1977, Antonio T. Martirez, Resident Auditor of the Butuan

General Hospital examined in the presence of Modesto Mahinay, the cash and
accounts of Modesto Mahinay covering the period from July 1, 1973 to
October 31, 1977. Antonio Martirez found Modesto Mahinay to have incurred
a shortage of P 20,619.40. Consequently, Antonio Martirez prepared his report
of examination which was signed by the petitioner.

Subsequently, a letter of demand was sent by Antonio Martirez to the petitioner

requiring the latter to produce the missing funds and to submit an explanation on
how the shortages had been incurred. The petitioner submitted his reply letter
dated January 25, 1979, but failed to restitute the amount.

The petitioner was charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds before
the Sandiganbayan which found him guilty of the charge. He filed a petition with
the Supreme Court stating that he was wrongly convicted.

Issue/s: WON the Sandiganbayan wrongly convicted petitioner.

Ruling: No. Petition denied.

In the case, the petitioner admitted that the total shortage of P20,619.40
represents the "vales" of Mr. Alcordo for travels, telegrams, mails, for
entertainment of his superiors, newspapers and salary differentials from 1971 to
1976, and Alcordo did not give him reimbursement receipts representing the
"vales" .
 Moreover, the respondent court found: (a) that the petitioner continued to
disburse funds from his collection to issue "vales" to Alcordo despite the latter's
transfer to another place of assignment and inability to submit the required
vouchers that could have established the legality of the disbursements or "vales"
and (b) that per findings of the Resident Auditor, the petitioner juggled or
manipulated the cash book entries and made it appear that he made deposits to
conceal the "vales" or amounts loaned which were never redeemed by Alcordo
and/or other employees concerned, and which deposits in turn, were verified by
the Auditing Examiner to be fictitious since the said deposits were not supported
by any slips nor could said deposits be traced to the bank statements.

Doctrine:

Case title: Estepa vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-59670, 15 February 1990

Facts: Petitioner was a Senior Paymaster in the Treasurer's Office of Manila, and was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of malversation of public funds through
negligence for losing fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) in the course of transporting
the P850,000 given to him while inside the premises of the Central Bank.

Issue/s: WON malversation of public funds (Art. 217) may be committed through
negligence.

Ruling: Yes. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that
the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he did not have
them in his possession when demand therefore was made and he could not
satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. An accountable public officer may
be convicted for malversation even if there is no direct evidence of personal
misappropriation, where he has not been able to explain satisfactorily the
absence of the public funds involved.

Doctrine:
Case title: Cimafranca vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94408, 14 February 1991

Facts: Petitioner was a former Provincial Fisheries Inspector and Fishery Aide, and was
issued a Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver as to the former position and a
Briggs and Stratton Engine when he assumed the latter position. After he was
separated from the service, the revolver and engine was demanded of him by the
government authorities three times, but he failed to turn over the property; only
returning it during the trial.

He was charged and convicted by the Sandiganbayan of malversation of public

property (Art. 217). Through a petition for review, he contended that the fourth
element of the offense of malversation was not present because he returned the
subject public properties, albeit only during the trial:

“The elements of the offense of malversation are —

a) That the offender be a public officer;

b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties
of his office;

c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he
was accountable;

d) And, that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through

abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.”

Issue/s: WON petitioner was wrongfully convicted of malversation of public property.

Ruling: No. Under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code above
reproduced, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing
funds or property to personal uses. The burden is on the accused to overcome
this presumption.

In the present case the petitioner failed to overturn this prima facie evidence of
his guilt because he failed to turnover the property despite repeated demands.

Doctrine:
Case title: Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 93885, 14 May 1991

Facts: Petitioner was the Postmaster of the Municipality of San Juan, Southern Leyte.
P160,905.63. The amount broken down being:

Personal "vales" of postal employees 128,182.77

"Vales" for food, drinks, office

supplies and other miscellaneous items 8,725.30

Unremitted collections for the use of

Postage Meter Machine 19,295.76

Unreimbursed travel allowance 2,325.19

Stale checks 2,364.07

TOTAL

160,893.07

Required to produce immediately the missing funds and to explain in writing

within seventy-two (72) hours the fact of shortage, petitioner neither restituted the
missing sum nor made any written explanation. As a consequence, petitioner
was charged with malversation of public funds before respondent
Sandiganbayan and was likewise convicted by the same court.

Petitioner contended in his petition to the Supreme Court, that he cannot be

convicted of intentional malversation since there is no evidence showing that he
appropriated the funds for his personal use.

Issue/s: 1. WON petitioner was wrongfully convicted.

2. WON petitioner committed the malversation through negligence.

Ruling: 1. No. Respondent court categorically found that petitioner knew that his
granting of "chits" and "vales" which constituted the bulk of the shortage, as
earlier shown in the itemization thereof, was a violation of the postal rules and
regulations. This is confirmed by petitioner's own memorandum to his employees
exhorting them to pay their cash advances and stressing that the practice indeed
constituted such violation. As further pointed out by respondent court, such
practice is also prohibited by Memorandum Circular No. 570, dated June 29,
1968, of the General Auditing Office of which fact petitioner could not be
unaware.

Although the giving of vales is allowed under Sec. 69 of Presidential Decree No.
1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines,
postmasters are only allowed to use their collections to pay money orders,
telegraphic transfers and withdrawals from the proper depository bank whenever
their cash advances for the purpose are exhausted. Cash advances of employees
are not covered by ‘vales’.

2. No. Petitioner committed the malversation intentionally, because his act

of giving the vales were made intentionally and voluntarily.

Even if the crime ahe was convicted of was malversation by negligence but the
information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this
case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in
order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo
or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense
of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. A possible exception
would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars of the
indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that it
may be said due process was denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous
comprehension of the charge against him. That no such prejudice was
occasioned on petitioner nor was he beleaguered in his defense is apparent from
the records of this case.

Doctrine:

Case title: Zambrano vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 82067, 10 April 1992
Facts: Zambrano is employed in the National Food Authority as Cashier I, and is
designated as the Special Disbursing Officer. The auditor of COA conducted an
audit examination of the accounts and accountabilities of the Zambrano. The
result was that he had a shortage of P 1,207,835.19. Zambrano failed to offer any
convincing evidence to support her alternative claims that she did not incur any
shortage in her accountabilities. She even tried to exculpate herself but in vain,
by throwing blame on others for her failure to account for the missing money,
making it appear that she was either acting under orders of her superiors or that
she acted out of fear or duress.

Issue/s: WON the crime of malversation is present

Ruling: Yes. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that
the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he did not have
them in his possession when demand therefor was made and he could not
satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. An accountable public officer may
be convicted for malversation even if there is no direct evidence of personal
misappropriation, where he has not been able to explain satisfactorily the
absence of the public funds involved.

Doctrine:

Case title: Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96915, 3 July 1992

Facts: Petitioner is the Special Disbursing Officer of NFA. He is assigned in 8 different

stations. Auditor Eway conducted a spot auditing examination of petitioner’s
cash and accounts in Dipolog City, one of his stations. The exam found that he
has a shortage of P98,122.51, and the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of
malversation of public funds. Upon review, SC found that Sandiganbayan failed
to consider that: 1. the petitioner has other vaults which contains the “missing
funds” that can be found in the petitioner’s other stations; and 2. the
collections in Dipolog City are deposited in the NFA cashier. SC then revised
Sandiganbayan’s decision and acquitted the petitioner.

Issue/s: WON the petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds

Ruling: No. The prima facie presumption on failure of an accountable officer to produce
public funds is not applicable where audit examination is incomplete. The ruling
in Tinga v. People (160 SCRA 488) that" the prima facie presumption under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code arises if there is no issue as to the
accuracy, correctness and regularity of the audit findings and if the fact that
funds are missing is indubitably established," has no application in the instant
case in the light of the haphazard examination of the cash accountability of
petitioner in violation of the Manual of Instructions of Treasurers and Auditors.
The audit examination conducted by Auditor Eway failed to establish that the
funds were indeed missing since she did not follow standard auditing procedures
by not including in her examination the funds petitioner kept in the vaults located
in Tampilisan and Sindangan.

Doctrine:

Case title: Felicidad vs. Gorospe, G.R. No. 102494, 3 July 1992

Facts: Capt. Tomas E. Tijano, Commanding Officer of the 353rd PC Company, made a
surprise inspection in the Police Station of Tomas Oppus including a `showdown’
inspection of all firearms issued. Petitioner, who reported for work that morning,
failed to show up during the inspection. He disappeared from the station and
failed to report back for work for the next succeeding days. More than two (2)
years after he disappeared, petitioner surrendered to the police station the
Armalite rifle (M16) and revolver Caliber .38 which had been issued to him. He
defended that the firearms were stolen by his friend. Nonetheless, he was still
convicted of malversation of public property. Petitioner argued that he is not
liable for malversation as the armalite rifle and revolver were not appropriated by
him for his own use and that his delay in accounting for the armalite rifle and
revolver did not constitute conversion of the same.

Issue/s: WON the petitioner is guilty of malversation of public property.

Ruling: Yes. To establish the elements of malversation and justify conviction, the
prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property;
and that he could not account for them, did not have them in his possession, and
could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. (De
Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA 337.) In the present case, when the petitioner
deliberately absented himself from the surprise inspection and "showdown" of
firearms, and went AWOL for two (2) years without surrendering his firearms or
explaining his failure to produce them, he became liable for malversation.

His allegation that the firearms were stolen from him was evidently rejected by
the Sandiganbayan as unworthy of belief in view of his failure to report to his
superiors the alleged theft upon its alleged occurrence. That omission and his
subsequent disappearance lead to no other conclusion than that he appropriated
the firearms for his own benefit and advantage, or allowed another or others to
use or misappropriate them. Malversation consists not only in misappropriating
or converting public funds or property to one’s personal use but also in
knowingly allowing another or others to make use of or misappropriate the funds
or property (Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 415).

Doctrine:

Case title: Kimpo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 95604, 29 April 1994

Facts: Petitioner Kimpo, a Special Collecting Officer of the Bureau of Domestic Trade at
General Santos City, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the
Sandiganbayan of malversation of public funds. Accused submitted his letter-
explanation to Auditor Mendoza wherein he laid the blame for the shortage on his
office clerk whom he had already relieved and alleged that he had not benefited,
directly or indirectly, from the missing funds. Accused’s defense cannot be
accepted, nor can it absolve him from criminal liability for the missing public
funds. He was the primary accountable officer for such funds and the fact, which
was not definitely or conclusively established by his evidence, that another
person, albeit a private individual, was responsible for the misappropriation
thereof, cannot be considered in exculpation or justification of such primary
accountability.

Issue/s: WON the accused is liable for malversation of public funds through negligence.
Ruling: Yes. To allow public accountable officers to adopt the practice resorted to by the
accused in allowing private individuals to perform public functions would lead to
chaos and anarchy and would render nugatory all applicable norms of public trust
and accountability. His bare and unsupported claim that, after discovery of the
shortage upon audit examination, he took steps to charge Yvette Samaranos for
Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents does not, in any way, erase his
criminal liability which could be characterized as malversation of Public Funds
through negligence. In his case, such negligence may be described as gross and
inexcusable, amounting to a definite laxity resulting in the deliberate non-
performance of his duties.

Doctrine:

Case title: Meneses vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100625, 10 May 1994

Facts: An audit team was directed to conduct the audit examination of the cash and
accounts of the accused. Audit examination revealed that the accused had a
shortage of P2,522,661.93, as determined from her cash book. Petitioner’s
defense, relying on Quizo v. Sandiganbayan, is that she had not benefitted a
single centavo from the missing funds; rather, said funds were disbursed as cash
advances to her co-employees in good faith and in continuance of a practice
tolerated in her office. The practice of disbursing public funds, under the "vale"
system as a defense in malversation cases, was advanced, briefed and argued in
Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, and found not meritorious.

Issue/s: WON accused is guilty of malversation of public funds

Ruling: Yes. The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an
accountable officer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public
funds by other persons, which is punishable by the law. To tolerate a such
practice is to give a license to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending
operation with the use of public funds. There is no law or regulation allowing
accountable officers to extend loans to anyone against "vale" or chits given in
exchange by the borrowers. On the other hand, in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, we
held that the giving of "vales" by public officers out of their accountable funds is
prohibited by P.D. No. 1145, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code
of the Philippines and Memorandum Circular No. 570, dated June 24, 1968 of the
General Auditing Office.

Doctrine:

Case title: Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 103501-03, 17 February 1997

Facts: Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena, General Manager of Manila

International Airport Authority (MIAA) over the phone to pay directly to the
president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC). In obedience to President Marcos' verbal
instruction and memorandum, Tabuena caused the release of P55 Million of
MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.

The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta
themselves, "out of the ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". Not
only were there no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement, the P55
Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was
presented. Defense witness Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice
President and Corporate Comptroller of PNCC, even affirmed in court that there
were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for the months of January to June of
1986.

In the defense of Tabuena, his claim was that he acted in good faith. Tabuena
claimed that he was merely complying with the MARCOS Memorandum which
ordered him to forward immediately to the Office of the President P55 Million
in cash as partial payment of MIAA's obligations to PNCC, and that he
(Tabuena) was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC.

Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of malversation

Ruling: He was acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena acted in strict
compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the
Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the
highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly
issued.
And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment
of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution
constrains one to act swiftly without question.

Doctrine:

Case title: Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, 26 February 1997

Facts: Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally, he

engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left
at the former’s premises. A Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued
by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the Regional Director or his
authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the
latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of
Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The
Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to transfer,
surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by
taxpayer Ancla. Azarcon, in signing the “Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things
Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue,” assumed the
undertakings specified in the receipt. Subsequently, however, Ancla took out the
distrained truck from Azarcon’s custody. For this reason, Azarcon was charged
before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or
property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue/s: Can Azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated
by the BIR as a depositary of distrained property?
Ruling: No. Article 223 of the RPC defines a public officer as “any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or
classes”. Azarcon obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election.
Neither can his designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property
qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent authority.
While it is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution,
authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring “any person” to
preserve a distrained property there is no provision in the NIRC constituting such
person a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR’s power
authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to
include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The charge against Azarcon
should forthwith be dismissed.

Doctrine:

Case title: Quinon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 113908 & 114819, 18 April 1997

Facts: 2 Criminal charges of “malversation of public property “was filed against Pablo
B. Quiñon, the Station Commander of Calinog Iloilo PC/INP.. Both are owned and
was allegedly used in abuse by Quiñon for private interest .

1. Criminal Case No. 16279:

- two (2) pistols and their magazines and and one (1) shotgun with a
total value of P15,000.00

The proceedings of this case are summarized as follows:

i. Quiñon pleaded not guilty on arraignment

ii. proceeded with pre-trial and trial

iii. various postponements and resets of trial were made due to various
reasons of Quiñon for not appearing due to hypertension, change of counsel and
withdrawal of counsel

iv. The prosecution presented its evidence before the court.

 v. Quiñon and his counsel was given an opportunity to present
evidence but did not appear on the date given by Sandiganbayan.

vi. Sandiganbayan issued an order for Quiñon to be arrested, therefore he

was declared that he waived his right to present evidence. But Sandiganbayan
gave him an opportunity to how cause in writing why judgment on the bond
shall not be rendered under the circumstances within 30 days.

vii. Quiñon responded 10 weeks after, through a motion for reconsideration,

insisting that he was denied of due process for his lawyer was not notified and
that he was sick (hypertension)

viii. Such MR was denied by Sandiganbayan

2. Criminal Case No. 19561:

- two (2) revolvers and a shotgun with a total value of P16,000.00.

This was filed by Office of the Iloilo Provincial Prosecution, which resulted in the
filing by the Office of the Ombudsman after the preliminary investigation of the
Provincial prosecution.

Quiñon filed a 2 motions to quash, both denied.

Issue/s: 1. Whether Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction?

2. Whether Special Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan, or the Iloilo Provincial
Prosecutor who had authority to file the information?
3. Whether the informations in both criminal cases charge an offense?
4. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to re-open the case and present evidence after the
prosecution rested its case?

Ruling: 1. Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Sandiganbayan is a regular court

and is included in the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 which
states "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts;"

“The term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts.”
 2. Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) confers on the Office of the Special
Prosecutor the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is thus completely
inconsequential that the complaint by which Criminal Case No. 16279 was
instituted — charging a crime cognizable by the Sandiganbayan — might have
been originally filed with the Iloilo Prosecution Office, or the preliminary
investigation therein conducted.

3. Yes, all elements are present, to wit:

a. That the offender be a public officer.

b. That he had the custody of control of funds or property by reason of the

duties of his office.

c. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which
he was accountable.

d. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated, or consented or, through

abandonment or negligence, permitted another reason to take them.

The delivery to Quiñon, by reason of the duties of his office as PNP Station
Commander, of the firearms belonging to the Government, necessarily and
inescapably entailed the implicit obligation on his part to safely keep the firearms,
use them for the purposes for which they were obviously entrusted to him, and to
return them to the proper authority at termination of his tenure as commander, or
on the demand by the owner; the duty, in other words to account for said
firearms. And his act — also expressly stated in the information — of malversing,
misappropriation and converting the firearms to his own personal use and
benefit, with abuse of trust and confidence — completed the basic description of
the crime of malversation attributed to him.

4. No, In Pulido v. Lazaro (158 SCRA 107 [1988]), the Court ruled that "there
was no denial of due process where petitioner had many opportunities and had
afforded adequate hearing to argue his case." Far from being tainted by error,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan's challenged resolution, founded upon the
undisputed facts on record, correctly reflected the legal principles involved, viz.:

Doctrine:

Case title: Marasigan vs. Buena, A.M. No. 95-1-010-MTCC, 5 January 1998
Facts: An investigation by COA was heldon the accountabilities of Lilia S. Buena, clerk
of court and ex oficio sheriff of Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), Naga
City.

A comparison was made among the following official records: (1) MTCC docket
book; (2) cash book maintained by respondent; and (3) file copies of official
receipts issued to acknowledge collection of the fees mentioned.

The examination disclosed that from the latter part of 1989 until 1993, the total
collection reflected in the cash book was only P8,092.00, while in the docket
book it amounted to P89,742.00, revealing a shortage of P81,650.00.

She manifested willingness to restitute the missing amount, expressing her

wholehearted repentance and further pleading for utmost consideration and
leniency. The City Auditor's Office in Naga City confirmed the full payment by
respondent of the cash shortage.

But Fiscal Audit Division (FAD) was able to find another shortage apart from the
aforementioned amount, a deficit in JDF collections amounting to P29,776.00.
She was able to pay P18,000, and promised to pay the rest which the FAD
considered.

Mrs. Buena was forced to falsify official receipts to solve her financial dilemma. It
was due to her son’s hospitalization due to being hit by a stray bullet during
police operation, and she hoped for the damage claim by NAPOLCOM but gave
up due to expensive travel expenses for she is a widow with 2 children, the
aforementioned and the youngest, who was sick of typhoid fever. She also
incurred loans from JUSLA and GSIS, subsequent amortizations for which were
deducted from her salary, resulting in her low take-home pay. She also
expressed that she was 27 years in service long and faithful years of public
service, and active and voluntary work in her parish and in the Gift of Love
ministry.

Office of Court Administrator, in its recommendation, finds her guilty and

dismisses her.

Issue/s: Should Mrs. Buena be dismissed?

Ruling: The court believed that the extreme penalty of dismissal with its accessory
penalties is TOO HARSH. The concurrence of these three factors should serve to
mitigate the penalty of respondent. In the exercise of the Court's discretion, they
consider it just and fair to deem respondent resigned from her post effective
immediately. They allowed her to claim leave credits and retirement benefits in
order to provide her and her family a new lease on life, so that she may not
succumb again to dark temptations caused by financial troubles. In the same
vein, the Court's action is without prejudice to her re-employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the government where she may be qualified.

Doctrine: This is an administrative case not a criminal case

Case title: Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 125213, 26 January 1999

Facts: Provincial Auditor directed Auditor and Auditing Examiners to examine the cash
and other accounts of petitioner Milagros L. Diaz, then postmistress of Tandag,
Surigao del Sur. They then required petitioner Diaz to produce all she was
officially accountable for. Petitioner, who was bonded for P100,000.00, was
found to have made cash payments in the total amount of six thousand one
hundred seventy-one pesos and twenty-three centavos (P6,171.23) The audit
team also found petitioner to have sold postage stamps in the sum of P8,020.40
which she had failed to record in her cash book, and since Quijada neither
considered the cash items in the aforesaid amount of P6,171.23 as having been
validly disbursed, he reported that petitioner had incurred a total "cash
shortage" of P14,191.63.

The investigating prosecutor, issued an order dismissing the complaint on the

basis of her finding that the shortage was incurred to defray operational
expenses for the Tandag post office.

Sandiganbayan rejected the order of prosecution. petitioner was arraigned. She

pleaded not guilty.

During a pre-trial, a letter was sent by Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts
confirming the respondent had reimbursed the entire amount for which petitioner
was held accountable

The Sandiganbayan rejected such withdrawal, and still convicted the accused
guilty of malservation of public property (217).
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner really has misappropriated public funds

Ruling: ACQUITTED. Lack of evidence

The conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan that the amounts paid by petitioner
to the Bureau of Posts under O.R. No. 6645668 and No. 6645670 were
"restitution's" would seem to be less than accurate. The amounts were
"replenishments” coming from the Regional Office in checks issued out in
petitioner's name which she paid, after encashment, to the Bureau of Posts. The
sum of P9,807.29 that was replenished, when added to the ten items certified to
be accounts payable and to two items replenished by checks issued after 04
March 1983, approved as operational expenses in the amount of P4,377.64,
totalled P14,284.43, or even P92.80 more than the supposed "shortage" of
P14,161.63.

The Sandiganbayan noticeably depended on the recommendations of COA in

convicting appellant. The Court could not help but observe that upon being
informed that the Bureau of Posts had reimbursed the entire amount alleged to
be her shortage, Auditor Quijada opined that his audit report had to be altered to
reflect that fact. Auditor Quijada's acquiescence to the alteration of his report to
conform to the advice would somehow manifest that the audit was not
conducted with sufficient thoroughness.

Doctrine: The Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code that the "failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer,
shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal uses." The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if the
accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that
he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would
be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has
repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use
thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the
presumption is deemed never to have existed at all.

Generally, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this
Court but there are established exceptions to that rule, such as, sans preclusion,
when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise
and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a
mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of
evidence are contradicted by evidence on record. In these instances, this Court
is bound to review the facts in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Case title: Salamera vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 121099, 17 February 1999

Facts: Petitioner was elected to and assumed the position of mayor of the municipality
of Casiguran, province of Aurora. He received from Casiguran Barangay Captain
one .38 Caliber Revolver.

The gun was owned by and licensed to Ponciano Benavidez, an uncle of Antonio,
who mortgaged it to him.

Petitioner brought it, while in attache case, to Manila. On their return to the
province, their car was stopped at a spot checkpoint in Quezon City, where Pat.
Alfredo B. Villanueva of the Quezon City Police saw the revolver.

On petitioner's instruction, his security men surrendered the gun to police officer
Villanueva.

Back home, the licensed owner of the gun claimed it from petitioner. The
accused mayor informed Ponciano (owner) that the gun was confiscated by the
Quezon City Police.

Issue/s: Did the Barangay Captain's surrender of the gun to petitioner mayor invest the
gun with public character sufficient to consider the gun as public property for
which the mayor is accountable?

Ruling: NO, There was no reason to surrender or confiscate the gun. It was duly
licensed to Ponciano Benavidez. The license is not transferable. Antonio could
not validly possess the gun. He should have returned the gun to Ponciano, the
licensed owner or surrendered it to the local police or to the Constabulary
Provincial Commander. By turning over the gun to petitioner mayor, the gun did
not become public property because it was not intended for public use or
purpose nor was it lawfully seized. The gun continued to be private property, that
is why the gun owner rightfully asked for its return to him, not to be turned over
to the public coffer or treasury. Petitioner's failure to return the gun after demand
by the private owner did not constitute a prima facie evidence of malversation.
The property was private and the one who demanded its return was a private
person, not a person in authority. The presumption of conversion will not apply.

Nevertheless, petitioner made restitution of the value of the gun to the private
owner, Ponciano Benavidez. Obviously, petitioner did not malverse the gun by
dolo or culpa to his private use or benefit.

ACQUITTED
Doctrine:

Case title: Martinez vs. People, G.R. No. 126413, 20 August 1999

Facts: Information against the petitioner (Officer-in-Charge and Acting City Mayor of
Caloocan City) was about him receiving cash advances from the city government
which were earmarked for specific projects. Specifically, petitioner received the
following:

1. Disbursement Voucher No. 3273 (100k);

2. Disbursement Voucher No. 201 (145k)

3. Disbursement Voucher No. 223 (300k);

4. Disbursement Voucher No. 1877 (200k)

Petitioner failed to liquidate despite demands from treasurer, which caused him
to be charged with Sandiganbayan of 4 counts of malversation.

One of the case involving Voucher No. 3273. The petitioner filed a motion to
quash contending that no prima facie evidence against him and it does not
constitute 214 violation.

SandiganBayan denied it.

Arraigned and plead not guilty

Filed another motion to quash-denied.

Required to file a rejoinder - objected

Issue/s: 1. Prima facie evidence?

2. Grave abuse of discretion on denying motion to quash?

Ruling: 1. There is prima facie evidence when he was demanded to submit

liquidation, but petitioner refused.
 2. No, correctly denied. From such denial, the appropriate remedy is not an
appeal or review on certiorari brought to a higher court. The remedy is for
petitioner to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law

Furthermore, the petition may also be dismissed because petitioner had

been arraigned on July 26, 1996, after the court denied his motion to
quash. There is no showing that he objected to entering a plea because
he wanted to question the denial of the motion to quash before a
superior court. By entering his plea, petitioner waived all objections
which are grounds of a motion to quash. The exceptions thereto have no
application.

Doctrine:

Case title: Morong Water District vs. Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 116754, 17 March 2000

Facts: Edgard Sta. Maria received from petitioner a cash advance of P33,190.73 for
Wawa pipeline extension project in Morong, Rizal. Edgard later on submitted a
partial liquidation of 15k against the cash advance advance of P33,190.73.
Respondent Sta. Maria allegedly used the money as payment for the Sitio Wawa
Pipeline Extension. (Project 1)

A reimbursement Expense Receipt indicating that the P15,000.00 was paid to

and received by a certain Engineer Ricardo Reyes.

The remaining P16,790.40 was liquidated and was used for the Paglabas Pipeline
Extension in compliance with the request of the Municipal Mayor.(project 2)

Sta. Maria was later on ousted, then was sued by Morong Water District through
San Diego (officer in charge) alleged violations of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

Complaint alleges that project 1 never took place and that they took it for
personal use for no person by the name of engineer Ricardo Reyes has ever
been employed by the agency Local Water Utilities Administration.

On his counter, he stated he was ousted due to the charges against him and the
designs of project 1 is on the office of petitioner.

Graft Investigation Officer dismissed the case for lack of substantial evidence.
 Appealed to SC by Rule 65:

Issue/s: Is he guilty of malversation?

Ruling: Sc: backed up by substantial evidence of the findings of fact made by the
Ombudsman. Who favored the respondents.

Edgard's duty to liquidate was fulfilled. Project 2 (16k+) was authorized by the
Board of Directors as per Board Meeting and was duly receipted by the Filacon
Enterprises.

As to Project 1 (15k) there also appears a reimbursement expense receipt which

is attached by the complainant as its Annex "D." The same was signed by a
certain civil engineer Ricardo Reyes. The civil engineer was said, according to the
certification as no an employee. But the reimbursement expense receipt did not
however state that Engineer Ricardo Reyes is an employee of LWUA. Hence, the
certification of said agency will not be conclusive evidence of Ricardo Reyes
being a fictitious person, as there was no representation of said fact in the
reimbursement receipt.

The public respondents act of dismissing the complaint against herein private
respondents is neither whimsical or capricious. In fact, the complaint of petitioner
was taken up by the Office of the Ombudsman in two extended discussions.
Such fact virtually dispels any allegation that arbitrariness or abuse of discretion
attended the resolution of petitioners complaint.

Doctrine:

Case title: Enriquez vs. People, G.R. No. 119239, 9 May 2000

Facts: ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA had incurred a shortage in their accounts as

Municipal Treasurer and Administrative Officer/designated as Acting Cashier,
respectively, which they had attempted to conceal through a bad check.

Sandiganbayan found the denials of the accused and their acts of shifting the
blame and passing the responsibility for the dishonored check to each other as
unacceptable and indicative of their guilt.
Issue/s: Whether or not the amount represented in the dishonored check constituted
public funds

Whether ENRIQUEZ and/or ESPINOSA really misappropriated said public funds,

where the instant petitions focus themselves.

Ruling: No evidence to prove that the Pasig Treasury incurred a cash shortage in the
amount of P3,178,777.41, which amount, incidentally, is even less than the
amount of the dishonored check. As per report of the audit team, the alleged
shortage was computed and based on the value of the dishonored check. It was
only the drawn check, based on the audit examination that brought about the
shortage.The audit examination lacked the thoroughness and completeness
required by the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors and Other
Guidelines

There is no evidence that ENRIQUEZ or ESPINOSA had received such an amount

which they could no longer produce or account for at the time of the audit.

There is no showing that the subject check was received by the Pasig Treasury in
an official capacity; that there was a duty to receive or collect the said amount;
and that there was an obligation to account for the same.

The Sandiganbayan clearly erred in inferring from the incident that transpired on
September 23, 1987, wherein ESPINOSA deposited checks with the Quezon City
Treasury for which she was issued an official receipt in the amount of
P3,583,084.18, but which she later corrected to conform to the actual amount of
the checks as P583,084.18, as indicative of a modus operandi to cover-up a
shortage in the amount of P3 million. ESPINOSA has explained, and her
testimony remains unrebutted, that she requested that the correction be made
because she discovered 15 minutes after she was issued the official receipt that
the checks and the accompanying statements of checks 17 had not been
endorsed and signed by ENRIQUEZ.

Doctrine: Pro Reo

Case title: Estrella vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126160, 20 June 2000
Facts: Petitioner was appointed as Municipal Cashier. Based on official receipts
petitioner apparently had a daily collection amounting to P247, 753.28. Under the
rules, petitioner was supposed to turn over the amount to Galvez but failed to do
so. As a recourse, he should have deposited it. At the end, he had a liability of
P218, 349.99 and was convicted of malversation.

Issue/s: Whether or not the court a quo erred in its decision convicting petitioner.

Ruling: No. Supreme Court affirmed the decision in toto. The elements of malversation
of public funds are: 1) the offender is a public officer, 2) he had custody or control
of the funds or property, 3) these funds or property were public funds or property
which he is accountable, 4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated, or
consented or through abandonment or negligence permitted another person to
take them. Petitioner was not able to produce his cash liability nor explain his
failure to produce.

Doctrine:

Case title: Diego vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 139282, 4 September 2000

Facts: Diego was convicted as a principal of the crime of Malversation of Public

Property by the Sandiganbayan. The facts are as follows.

Diego was a Police Superintendent and he was also the Evidence Custodian of
the NCR Criminal Investigation Service Command. He was safekeeping forty
plastic bags of shabu amounting to 5,000,000 pesos. He was subpoenaed for
two times in the case of People vs De La Cruz and asked by the court to bring
the shabu evidence. His fellow policemen accompanied him, but the hearings
were postponed. On the third subpoena, he went to the court alone. Along the
way, he was held up taking with the malefactors the 5 million worth of shabu.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accused committed malversation.

Ruling: Yes. Malversation can be committed through abandonment or negligence, or
permitted another person to take them. In the case, petitioner is a public officer
and one of his official duties is to safekeep the evidence. He lost the shabu which
is a public property through petitioner’s negligence. Sandiganbayan is correct
that the fact the shabu was worth 5 million, he should have been more careful
and brought colleagues with him to accompany him and ensure the safety of the
evidence. If he brought colleagues with him, it would not deter the crime, but he
would have shown that he exercised diligence in his work.

Doctrine:

Case title: Rueda vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 129064, 29 November 2000

Facts: Rueda was the municipal treasurer of Tiagon, Camarines Sur. There was an
audit examination of the accountabilities of petitioner Rueda, and it was assumed
that Rueda had a cash shortage of P107, 299.02. The auditors sent a formal
written demand to petitioner Rueda requiring him to immediately produce the
sum of the shortage, and explain why such happened. In his defense, the
assumed “shortage” was the result of unliquidated cash advances made by
several municipal officials and employees of Tiagon evidenced by chits and
vales, and legitimate expenses of the municipal government. Rueda contested
that employees took cash advances from the cash collections of the municipal
collectors before the cash collections were turned over to him as a treasurer.

Sandiganbayan found him guilty of Malversation

Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner misappropriated the public fund

Ruling: No. The law requires that there must be a shortage in the cash liability of the
accused. In this case, there was no cash liability because vales and chits are not
considered cash. Also, the law requires that the public officer must receive the
money or property, and later fails to account for it. In the case, Rueda did not
receive the cash. SC acquits Rueda.

Doctrine:
Case title: Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, 20 July 2001

Facts: Agullo, Disbursing Officer of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways, was
convicted for malversation of public funds. The case stemmed from the audit
conducted by Gerez which yielded a P26, 404.26 cash shortage on petitioner’s
accountability. Petitioner contested that the amount must have been stolen
during her absence due to stroke. She had the money with her when she lost
consciousness and woke up in the hospital bed.

Issue/s: Whether the accused is liable for malversation of public funds.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court acquitted the accused. It is important that the accuse
rebuts the presumption by adequate evidence that he did not use the money for
personal reasons. In the case, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused used the money for personal use. The prosecution relied on the
presumption only. Based from the scrutiny of evidence, the defense was able to
overcome the presumption that she did not use the money for personal reasons
because it might have been stolen or taken away from her when she collapsed.

Doctrine:

Case title: Quinon vs. People, G.R. No. 136462, 19 September 2002

Facts: Quinon was convicted of a crime of malversation of public property. He was the
Station Commander he was issued a number of firearms and ammunitions. Later
on, he was transferred to Camp Tirador. The now who replaced him, Aviador, did
an inventory and found out the petitioner did not turn over the firearms issued to
him. Upon request, he returned other firearms but remained unreturned two .38
caliber pistols. Petitioner contends that he is not “accountable officer” in the
purview of Art. 217.
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner is an accountable officer.

Yes. Supreme Court held that within the purview of Art. 217, an accountable
Ruling: officer is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of
the duties of his office. To be liable for malversation, an accountable officer need
not be a bonded official. What is decisive is the nature of the duties that he
performs and that as part of, and by reason of said duties, he receives public
money or property which he is bound to account. In the case, by reason of his
office as Station Commander, he has the obligation on his part to safely keep the
firearms, and use them for purposes entrusted to him.

Doctrine:

Case title: Querijero vs. People, G.R. No. 153483, 14 February 2003

Facts: Querijero was the cashier of the Integrated Provincial Health Office in Lucena.
The team of COA auditors went to the office of the petitioner on July 29 and was
informed that she has been absent since July 9. She was informed that her safe
will be opened but she did not respond. Upon opening of her safe, there was
P165, 722.78 shortage.

Defense presented witness, it was established by her side that there were
amounts that have been deposited. As to the remaining balance, she was not in
charge of it, rather Villapando.

Issue/s: Whether or not Querijero is guilty of malversation

Ruling: No. Supreme Court held that there were irregularity in the audit of the COA
team. Although there were other accountable officers, it was petitioner who was
only audited, and her safe was the only one opened. Supreme Court said that COA
should have done an audit to the whole team responsible. It was therefore not
proven beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty.

Doctrine:
Case title: People vs. Hipol, G.R. No. 140549, 22 July 2003

Facts: Hipol was charged with malversation of public funds as defined under Art. 217.
He was Cash Clerk II at the City Treasurer’s Office. His duties include depositing
the money of the collection of the City Treasurer. One time, Roque stumbled
upon the drawer of the appellant and saw blank slips that were undeposited.

Issue/s: Whether he is guilty of malversation.

Ruling: Yes. His daily task involves depositing money although it was not part of his
official job description. What was essential was that appellant had custody or
control of public funds by reason of the duties of his office. Moreover, the trial
court erred in appreciating the element of taking advantage of public office as an
aggravating circumstance as it is inherent in the crime.

Doctrine:

Case title: Inding vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143047, 14 July 2004

An Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Ricardo S.

Facts: Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 , otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

Inding filed Omnibus Motion to dismiss case for lack of jurisdiction arguing that
under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC
and not the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against
him. He asserts that under Adm. Order No. 270, Dapitan City is only a
component city, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified
as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG 25. Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.
 On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, contend that Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan has
original jurisdiction over violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by the
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, without qualification and regardless
of salary grade. They argue that when Congress approved Rep. Act No. 7975
and Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware that not all the positions specifically
mentioned in Section 4, subparagraph (1) were classified as SG 27, and yet were
specifically included therein.

Issue/s: Does the Sandiganbayan have original jurisdiction over the petitioner?

Ruling: Yes. RA 7975, as well as RA 8249, constitutes an exception thereto as it

expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of RA 3019, the reckoning period is the time of the
commission of the offense. RA 7975 provides that Sandiganbayan has original
jurisdiction over cases involving violations of RA 3019 by, among others,
“Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher.” Furthermore, this category
specifically included, among others, members of the sangguniang panlungsod.
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the
general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as “occupying
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher. [Sec 4a (1) (a-g)]” The legislative intent is manifest during the sponsorship
speech when it was still a Senate Bill where Rocco stated, “The bill provides for
an extensive listing of other public officers who will be subject to the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Hence, Sandiganbayan has proper jurisdiction
over violations of RA 3019 committed by officials enumerated therein except for
those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their
salary grades.

Doctrine:

Case title: Ramsical vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99, 13 December 2004
Facts: Ramsical was charged with falsification of public documents. Together with 27
persons, he was involved in real estate transactions and questionable payments
of transfer taxes with private parties. They allegedly falsified a deed of sale
amounting to two million, when in fact, they received 10 million pesos. The
petitioner posted bail but contended that he is not liable to civil liability.

Ramsical refuted the allegation of AGFOI that he had civil interest in the criminal
cases involved. He posited that AGFOI was neither a member nor a beneficiary of
the AFP-RSBS. Moreover, considering that it was funded partly by the national
government and individual soldiers by way of salary deductions, the AGFOI never
contributed a single centavo to the funds of the AFP-RSBS. Further, AGFOI, as
an organization, has a distinct personality of its own, apart from the individual
members who compose it.Hence, it is of no moment if some members of AGFOI
are or have been members and beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS

Issue/s: Whether criminal indictments for violation of RA 3019, Article 172 in relation to
Art. 171 of the RPC give rise to civil liability in favor of any private party?

Ruling: Parties who suffered injuries could assert their right to restitute the civil liability of
the accused. Here, however, it is the government who is the offended party and
not AGFOI. It bears stressing that in the felony of falsification of public document,
the existence of any prejudice caused to third person or the intent to cause
damage, at the very least, becomes immaterial. The controlling consideration is
the public character of a document and the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does not, in any
way, have civil liability to a third person. However, if falsification is done to
conceal violation of RA 3019, the offender is civilly liable for violation of the Anti-
Graft Corrupt Practices Act.

Doctrine: In relation to malversation: There is civil liability when malversation is

committed against the government. Government can demand recovery of
civil liability. **Amount involved not amount of damage**

Case title: Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 161784-86, 26 April 2005
Facts: The first Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27435, charged
petitioners, the Municipal Accountant and the Municipal Mayor of Carmen, Cebu,
with malversation of funds. Second Amended Information charged the said
accused with illegal use of public funds. Then again, a third Amended
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27437, charged the same accused
with illegal use of public funds.

The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the said Amended Informations on the
ground that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8294, the Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over the crimes charged. She averred that the Amended
Informations failed to allege and show the intimate relation between the crimes
charged and her official duties as municipal accountant, which are conditions
sine qua non for the graft court to acquire jurisdiction over the said offense. She
argued further that according to Tan vs. Sandiganbayan, municipal accountant is
not an accountable officer. Sandiganbayan denied petition.

Issue/s: Does Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case of the public accountant?

Ruling: Rep. Act No. 8249, which amended Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,
provides, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes
and felonies committed by public officers and employees, at least one of whom
belongs to any of the five categories thereunder enumerated at the time of the
commission of such crimes.

Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a constituent

element of the crime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the
Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the
crime charged, or that the accused committed the crime in the performance of
his duties.

We reiterate that the classification of the petitioner’s position as SG 24 is of no

moment. The determinative fact is that the position of her co-accused, the
municipal mayor, is classified as SG 27, and under the last paragraph of Section
2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the position of one of the principal accused is classified
as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
offense.

Doctrine: One who conspires with the provincial treasurer in committing six counts of
malversation is also a co-principal in committing those offenses, and that a
private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing
malversation is also guilty of malversation.
Case title: Chan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149613, 9 August 2005

Facts: Chan seeks the reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s decision, finding her guilty of
malversation of public funds. Chan is an accountant clerk II assigned in the NBI-
Cebu. Her function includes cashier and collection officer. During her leave, a
COA auditor found a shortage in petitioner’s cash accountability. It was reflected
in her cash report in 1996, affixing her (Chan’s) signature. Thus, the auditor
demanded restitution. During the pendency, Chan was discovered to have
accumulated a shortage amounting to 330k for her accountability. She asked for
re-audit due to joint accountability of Bas, her alternate during her absence.
Chane granted loans through vale for the Bas’ accountability.

Issue/s: Whether Chan is liable for malversation?

Ruling: Petition was denied. Chan granted vales. The grant of loans through the "vale"
system is a clear case of an accountable officer consenting to the improper or
unauthorized use of public funds by other persons, which is punishable by the
law. To tolerate such practice is to give a license to every disbursing officer to
conduct a lending operation with the use of public funds. The fact that
petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and
will not exculpate him from his criminal liability. And as aptly found by
respondent Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the) immediate superiors of the
accused (CHAN) have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for
convenience did not legalize the disbursements"

Doctrine:

Case title: Pondevida vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 160929-31, 16 August 2005
Facts: State auditors discovered Pondevida had a shortage of 1,176,580.59 based on
his cashbook. He was charged before Sandiganbayan for complex crime of
malversation of public funds through falsification of commercial documents
relating to checks disbursements. Mayor Amigable, and three private individuals
conspired with Grande in falsifying the commercial document consisting of a
check of Land Bank of the Philippines with V.N. Grande Enterprises as the payee,
making it appear therein that the municipality of Badiangan has some accounts
payable to VN Grande Enterprises for some purchases. Sandiganbayan
convicted Pndevida of the crime charged.

Issue/s: Is Pondevida guilty of the crime?

Ruling: Yes. A public officer may be liable for malversation even if he does not use
public property or funds his custody for personal benefit, but consents to
the taking thereof by another person or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted such taking. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that by
his overt acts of drawing and issuing the checks to the order of Grande, Celis,
and Tiu, they were able to encash the checks. Even if petitioner received
893,860 from them, the day after the checks were encahsed, the felony of
malversation has already been consummated. Restitution of said amount after
consummation is not ground for acquittal.

Doctrine:

Case title: Doldol vs. People, G.R. No. 164481, 20 September 2005
Facts: The Provincial Auditor conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of
Conrado C. Doldol, the Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The
State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a shortage of P801,933.26. The State
Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on their examinations
showing his shortages. On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer
requesting that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and cash account, taking
exception to the findings of the State Auditors. Instead of pursuing his request for
a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On September 15, 1995, he
remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was issued
Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage,
as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on or before
November 30, 1995. However, he reneged on his promise. Two informations for
malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Carlos City. Doldol was convicted.

Issue/s: Whether a person convicted of malversation may assail his conviction when he
had already partially paid the alleged shortage?

Ruling: The said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant's
commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer
of compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of appellant's
guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

Doctrine: Return of funds is not exempting or that the offender be acquitted. Implied
admission of guilt = mitigating circumstance.

Case title: People vs. Uy, Jr., G.R. No. 157399, 17 November 2005

Facts: Accused were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of
Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents. He was found
guilty by Sandiganbayan. Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under
the allegations in the information without violating his constitutional right to due
process and to be informed of the accusation against him. He points out that the
information alleges willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of
while the judgment found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to
malice.
Issue/s: Can accused be held guilty of Malversation?

Ruling: Yes. Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of

misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through negligence by
allowing another to commit such misappropriation. To sustain a charge of
malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence and while
the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission
of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the
existence of negligence because both are equally punishable in Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. The felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is
committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and
prescribes a uniform penalty therefore.

Doctrine: An accused charged with willful malversation, in an information containing

allegations similar to the present case, can be validly convicted of the same
offense of malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the
latter mode of perpetrating the offense. This is based upon the theory that the
greater (with malice) includes the lesser (thru negligence) offense.

Case title: Alejo vs. People, G.R. No. 173360, 28 March 2008

Facts: Petitioner was charged with Malversation of public property. He is a

commanding officer of the Real Estate preservation Economic welfare center and
he is accountable for confiscated illegal logs. He embezzled the logs confiscated.

Petitioner is also charged with Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and direct bribery which
were interrelated with malversation.

Issue/s: 1. Are confiscated logs considered public property?

2. Is the petitioner guilty of malversation of public property?

Ruling: 1. In accordance with Art. 222 of the RPC, property seized or deposited by
public authority may be object of malversation. Thus, the confiscated
logs are considered public property.
 2. Petitioner is guilty of malversation of public property. A public officer may
be accountable and convicted even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation, and the only evidence is shortage. In the case, the
prosecution was able to muster direct evidence that petitioner had
misappropriated the subject confiscated logs through the unified
testimonies of witnesses.

Doctrine:

Case title: Torres vs. People, G.R. No. 175074, 31 August 2011

Facts: Petitioner Jesus U. Torres was charged with the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds. Upon his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
RTC convicted petitioner. Petitioner then filed Notice of Appeal that it was
appealing the decision of RTC before the CA. Subsequently it filed a
Manifestation and Motion saying that it appealed before the wrong tribunal and
prayed that the case be referred to Sandiganbayan instead for appropriate
action. Office of the Solicitor General prayed that the appeal be dismissed
outright, since transmittal to the proper court, in cases of erroneous modes of
appeal, are proscribed. CA dismissed outright the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner also maintains that the Information clearly charged him with intentional
malversation and not malversation through negligence, which was the actual
nature of malversation for which he was convicted by the trial court.

Issue/s: 1. Did the CA err in dismissing the appeal outright instead of certifying the
case to the proper court?
2. Can petitioner be held guilty when the information charged him with
intentional malversation while the decision was malversation thru
negligence?

Ruling: 1. No. RA 8249 provides that “the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction
or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.”
 2. Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through
negligence.[22] To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be
criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a
case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it
will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of
negligence because both are equally punishable under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or

the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.

Doctrine: The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that as part of
his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account and failed
to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is
committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school principal
of a public high school, such as petitioner, may be held guilty of malversation if
he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriated the same.

Case title: Cua vs. People, G.R. No. 166847, 16 November 2011

Facts: Petitioner was found guilty of malversation of public funds. He is a Collection

and Revenue agent and he misappropriated portion of tax collections for his own
personal gain. He paid for his shortage through his salaries. He claims that
payment of cash shortage would extinguish his criminal liability.

Issue/s: 1. If shortage and failure to provide a reasonable excuse could establish

guilt in malversation?
2. If payment of cash shortage will extinguish criminal liability?

Ruling: 1. Yes. The court held in cases of malversation, the prosecution has only to
prove that the accused received public funds or property and that he
could not account for them.If the officer cannot provide a reasonable
excuse for its disappearance, he may be convicted of malversation.
 In the case, the prosecution proved shortage but the retaliation of Cua,
alleging discrepancy of documents and the BIR for not prompting him
clearly doesn’t constitute a satisfactory or reasonable explanation for his
failure to account for the missing amount.

2. No. Payment will not extinguish criminal liability.

Doctrine:

Case title: Manuel vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, 8 February 2012

Facts: An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging Mayor and
Treasurer the Municipality of Infanta, Pangasinan with the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds. Sandiganbayan convicted them of the crime.

The Sandiganbayan reasoned that Gosudan’s acts of allowing other persons to

borrow municipal funds constituted solid proof of malversation. In the case of
Mallare, his act of accepting the subject loan for himself from Gosudan amounted
to a conspiracy with the latter in the commission of the crime of malversation.
The full restitution of the total amount of the loaned public funds did not
exonerate Mallare and Gosudan because the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds was already consummated upon the latter’s granting of the loans, and
upon the former’s acceptance and taking of the amounts lent to him. Restitution
of the loaned amounts could only mitigate their civil liabilities, not exonerate them
from criminal liability.

Issue/s: Are Mallare and Gosudan guilty of Malversation?

Ruling: Yes. In People vs. Pantaleon, it was clearly discussed that municipal treasurers
and municipal mayors are accountable for Local Government Funds. The
standard practice in the disbursement of public funds is that they cannot be
released and disbursed without the signatures of the Mayor and the Treasurer. In
this case, the written approvals of Mallare and Gosudan were essential before
any release and disbursement of municipal funds could be made. Hence, any
unlawful disbursement or misappropriation of the subject funds would make
them accountable.
 The subject loans that Gosudan extended to the said municipal officials and
employees including herself were unofficial and unauthorized loans and,
therefore were unlawfully disbursed funds from the coffers of the municipality
making him guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Moreover,
Mallare’s acceptance of the subject loan amount of P300,998.59 without any
supporting official voucher is proof that there was a conspiracy in the illegal
disbursement of the subject loan amounts.

Doctrine: Full restitution of the lent public funds cannot exonerate Mallare and Gosudan
from the crime charged because payment does not extinguish criminal liability.

Case title: Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, 29 July 2015

Facts: Accused were charged of malversation of public funds through falsification of

public documents. Accused as an official of the locality, conspiring with the Vice
Governor, participated in the scheme of questionable grants and donations to
fictitious entities using provincial funds. As a result of this complaint, the
Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit in Sarangani Province. Among
the irregularities discovered by the Special Audit Team was a ₱20,000.00 financial
assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a cooperative whose members were
mostly government personnel or relatives of the officials of Sarangani Province.

FALSIFICATION: The petitioner ordered Tangan to sign above the name of

Remulta in the letter-request to make it appear that the latter, as WIP Secretary,
consented to the request for financial assistance. The letter-request was made
on January 24, 2002, but Gadianante dated it to January 7, 2002, so that the
transaction would not look suspicious (considering that both the disbursement
voucher and check were also dated January 24, 2002).

Issue/s: Whether the petitioner is guilty of malversation through falsification of public

documents?

Ruling: Yes. All elements of malversation are present and considering that falsification
was made, as a necessary means to commit the crime, it must be complexed.
Doctrine: Elements: (a) that the offender be a public officer; (b) that he had custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that those
funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable;
and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. All these
elements have been established by the prosecution.

Case title: Valenzuela vs. People, G.R. No. 205693, 14 February 2018

Facts: An Information was filed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
accusing Venezuela of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Sandiganbayan
convicted Venezuela of the crime but gave him the benefit of mitigating
circumstance for his partial refund of his liabilities reducing unliquidated cash
advances to 2,572,808. While Municipal Mayor, Venezuela received public funds,
by reason of the duties of his office. COA demanded Venezuela to liquidate cash
advances but he cannot produce the same. His failure to have duly forthcoming
the public funds with which he was chargeable, served as prima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds to his personal use.

Issue/s: 1. Is Venezuela guilty of malversation?

2. Considering that COA only demanded Valenzuela to liquidated his cash
advances after his being mayor, does it exonerates him from his liability for
Malversation?

Ruling: 1. Yes. One, Venezuela was a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan from 1997 to 1998, the period relevant to the time of
the crime charged. Notably, he falls within the definition of a public officer.

Likewise, during Venezuela's tenure as the municipal mayor, he incurred

unliquidated cash advances which belonged to the Municipality of
Pozorrubio for the use by the said municipality. The Local Government Code
provides that municipal mayors as chief executives of their municipalities are
responsible for all government funds pertaining to the municipality.

Finally, anent the last element for the crime of malversation of public funds,
Venezuela failed to return the amount upon demand. His failure or inability to
return the shortage upon demand created a prima facie evidence that the
funds were put to his personal use, which Venezuela failed to overturn.
 2. Demand is not necessary in malversation. Demand merely raises a prima
facie presumption that the missing funds have been put to personal use. The
demand itself, however, is not an element of, and is not indispensable to
constitute malversation. Malversation is committed from the very moment
the accountable officer misappropriates public funds and fails to
satisfactorily explain his inability to produce the public finds he received.
Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that Venezuela received the
demand after his term of office, this does not in any way affect his criminal
liability. The fact remains that he misappropriated the funds under his
control and custody while he was the municipal mayor.

Doctrine: The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise on the

amounts or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission of the
crime, does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability. At best, such acts of
reimbursement may only be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender.

Case title: People vs. Batoy, G.R. No. L-32463, 30 July 1982

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Manlangit vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158014, 28 August 2007
Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Frias vs. People, G.R. No. 171437, 4 October 2007

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 174504, 21 March 2011

Facts:

Issue/s:
Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Santos vs. People, G.R. No. 199935, 8 April 2013

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Lumauig vs. People, G.R. No. 166680, 7 July 2014

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:
Case title: Manzanaris vs. People, G.R. No. L-64750, 30 January 1984

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, 5 May 1991

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Abdulla vs. People, G.R. No. 150129, 6 April 2005
Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 161784-86, 26 April 2005

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Tetangco vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 156427, 20 January 2006

Facts:

Issue/s:
Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Ombudsman vs. Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, 7 March 2012

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:

Case title: Ysidoro vs. People, G.R. No. 192330, 14 November 2012

Facts:

Issue/s:

Ruling:

Doctrine:
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