ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant,

v.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR,  Respondent.

A.M. No. P-02-1651             June 22, 2006

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)

RESOLUTION

FACTS:

Notwithstanding the rulings, the Court could not, at that time, rule
definitively on the ultimate issue of whether respondent was to be held
administratively liable for there was need to give the State the opportunity to
adduce evidence that it has a more "compelling interest" to defeat the claim of the
respondent to religious freedom.
These issues have already been ruled upon prior to the remand, and
constitute "the law of the case" insofar as they resolved the issues of which
framework and test are to be applied in this case, and no motion for its
reconsideration having been filed.16 The only task that the Court is left to do is to
determine whether the evidence adduced by the State proves its more compelling
interest.

As James Madison said, the national government had no "jurisdiction" over

religion or any "shadow of right to intermeddle" with it.
If one accepts the Court’s assumption that these are the only two viable
options, then admittedly, the Court has a stronger argument. But the Free Exercise
Clause cannot be summarily dismissed as too difficult to apply and this should not
be applied at all. The Constitution does not give the judiciary the option of simply
refusing to interpret its provisions. The First Amendment dictates that free exercise
of "religion" must be protected. Accordingly, the Constitution compels the Court to
struggle with the contours of what constitutes "religion." There is no constitutional
opt-out provision for constitutional words that are difficult to apply.
Ruling:

Religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and not merely a privilege

against discriminatory legislation. With religion looked upon with benevolence and
not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances.

Considering that laws nowadays are rarely enacted specifically to disable

religious belief or practice, free exercise disputes arise commonly when a law that
is religiously neutral and generally applicable on its face is argued to prevent or
burden what someone’s religious faith requires, or alternatively, requires someone
to undertake an act that faith would preclude. In essence, then, free exercise
arguments contemplate religious exemptions from otherwise general laws.

Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has
to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so
that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state
end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties.174 Again, the Solicitor
General utterly failed to prove this element of the test. Other than the two
documents offered as cited above which established the sincerity of respondent’s
religious belief and the fact that the agreement was an internal arrangement within
respondent’s congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In fact, the records are
bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the
means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive
to respondent’s religious freedom.

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that
freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so
compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also
protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man
must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

In view whereof, the instant administrative complaint is dismissed.