Aguinaldo v.

Aguinaldo
36 SCRA 137

FACTS: A writ of execution in favor of the plaintiffs, now appellees Victoria and Simeona
Aguinaldo was opposed by Cecilio Aguinaldo, appellant, by a motion to quash the writ of
execution based allegedly on the ground that defendant Segundo Aguinaldo died during the
pendency of the appeal. The motion was opposed by the appellees invoking Sec. 16, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a pending case,
it is the duty of his attorney to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian, or their legal representative and alleging that there was a failure on the part of the
counsel to comply with the above provision. Hence, the lower court gave counsel of record
a certain date within which to submit such but the aforesaid counsel in turn merely
manifested that he had ceased to be such as of May 31, 1956, and that the pleading will be
considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid order. In order that such a decision in
their favor will not be rendered nugatory by the above technicality, the plaintiffs had no
choice but to ask the court in a motion to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo
Aguinaldo, the defendants, being the legitimate children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, a
granddaughter, substituted as defendants. The lower court granted the aforesaid motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the counsel of defendant-appellees will be held liable.

RULING: Yes. Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment, or misuse Court
processes. Any effort on the litigant to delay, if not to defeat, the enforcement of a final
judgment, executory in character, by raising an objection that at best hardly rises to the level
of a technicality is not likely to elicit the sympathy of the Courts. Yet, in effect, that is what
the move taken by the defendants in his case amounted to. There is no reason to refuse
affirmance to the order of the lower court complained of, appointing appellants as legal
representatives of the deceased defendant and substituted in his place pursuant to the
Rules of Court in order that the execution that ought that have taken place long since could
at long last be effected. An excerpt from Villaflor v. Reyes is equally relevant: "There should
be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so
of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from
commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so,
where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for
vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable."