1. People vs Rondero G.R. No. 125687, Dec.

9, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DELFIN RONDERO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

When an accused appeals from the judgment of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open for
review of the appellate court, which is then called to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable. 1 With this precept in mind,
this Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice, will not hesitate to render the proper imposable penalty, whenever it sees fit, even the supreme penalty of death.

Before us is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41, sentencing herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y
Sigua to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of homicide.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his nine year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke
up his parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor, Barangay
Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested their other
neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to look for Mylene.

The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of March 26, 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the
seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he
was about five (5) meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well
about one (1) meter away. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. 2

Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latter's own
son. 3 Maximo and Andong continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began
to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they
found Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. 4 Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her
fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly
gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body while the other slipper was found
behind her back.

Half an hour later, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They found a pair of shorts 5 under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo
identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his hands. The policemen found
that the artesian well was spattered with blood. 6 After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City.
There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's body, he saw accused-appellant washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. 7 Acting on this lead,
the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested accused-appellant.

An autopsy of the body of the victim conducted by the Assistant City Health Officer of Dagupan City, Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, revealed the following injuries:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Contusion hematoma, anterior chest wall, along the midclavicular line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, right.
2. Contusion hematoma, along the parasternal line, level of the 1st intercostal space, left.
3. Contusion hematoma, posterior aspect, shoulder, left.
4. Contusion hematoma, anterior axillary line, level of the 3rd intercostal space, left.
5. Contusion hematoma, anterior aspect, neck.
6. Contusion hematoma, lower jaw, mid portion.
7. Contusion hematoma, periorbital, right.
8. Lacerated wound, 1" x 1/2" x 1/2", maxillary area, right.
9. Contusion hematoma, temporal area, left.
10. Contusion hematoma, mid frontal area.
11. Lacerated wound 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/4", frontal area, left.
12. Contusion hematoma, occipital area, right.
13. Abrasion, medial anterior aspect, elbow, left.
14. Abrasion, lateral aspect, buttock, right.
15. Abrasion, antero lateral aspect, iliac crest, right.
16. Contusion hematoma, upper lip.
17. Avulsion, upper central and lateral incisors.
18. Fresh laceration of the hymen at 1:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock position. Fresh laceration of the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock position.

INTERNAL FINDINGS

Massive intracranial hemorrhage with brain tissue injury. Fracture of the right occipital bone.

Note:

Vaginal smear was done at the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Prov'l Hosp. laboratory and the result showed no sperm cell seen. (March 26, 1994)

Cause of death: Cardio Respiratory Arrest

Due to: Massive Intracranial Hemorrhage Traumatic 8

For Mylene's burial, her parents spent P5,043.00 during her wake, 9 P9,000.00 for funeral expenses 10 and P850.00 for church services and entombment. 11

On March 28, 1994, the hair strands which were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with hair specimens taken from the victim
and accused-appellant, were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. 12

Meanwhile, on March 30, 1994, accused-appellant was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide in an information which reads:

The undersigned 4th Assistant City Prosecutor accuses DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua, of Pugaro District, Dagupan City, of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE,
committed as follows:

1
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1994, in the city of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, criminally and forcibly have carnal knowledge with one MYLENE J. DORIA, a 9-year old girl,
against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, criminally and unlawfully employed violence against her person, thereby causing the death of said
MYLENE J. DORIA, as evidenced by the Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Asst. City Health Officer, this city, to the damage and prejudice of the legal
heirs of said deceased, MYLENE J. DORIA in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential
damages.

Contrary to Article 335 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. In the meantime, the NBI sent a fax message to the Dagupan City Police Station saying that it could not
conduct an examination on the hair strands because the proper comparative specimens were not given. The NBI suggested that hair strands be pulled, not cut, from
the suspect and from the victim on the four regions of their heads so that all parts of the hair strands, from root to tip, may be presented. 13 Thereupon, accused-
appellant, who executed a "waiver of detention" including a waiver of the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution on the rights of the accused during
custodial investigation, 14 was allegedly convinced by a certain Major Wendy Ocampo to give sample hair strands. Another police officer went to the Doria's
residence to get hair samples from Mylene, who had not yet been interred. The hair strands taken from accused-appellant and the victim were later indorsed to the
NBI for laboratory testing. 15 Comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had
similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics to those of the victim's. 16
Alicia P. Liberato, the NBI Senior Forensic Chemist who conducted the microscopic examination on the hair samples, later reiterated the aforesaid findings in court.
17

At the trial, Dr. Cornel, the physician who conducted the autopsy on Mylene at around 9:30 o'clock in the morning of March 26, 1994, testified that the victim's death
probably occurred before 11:00 o'clock in the evening of March 25, 1994 judging from the rigidity of her lower and upper extremities. He explained that the contusions
and hematoma found on Mylene's body were possibly caused by a blunt instrument, a clenched fist or a piece of wood. 18 The lacerated wounds on her face may
have been caused by a bladed instrument, not necessarily sharp, or by hitting her head on a concrete wall with jagged edges. The abrasions on her elbow, right
buttock and upper hip may have been caused by a rough object that came in contact with her skin. 19 Dr. Cornel also explained that the victim's upper and lateral
incisors may have been avulsed by a sudden blow in the mouth using a blunt instrument, stone or wood. He added that the fresh hymenal lacerations at 1:00 o'clock,
6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions and the fresh laceration of the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions could have been caused either by sexual
intercourse or by an object forcibly inserted in Mylene's vagina. 20

Accused-appellant resolved not to testify at the trial, opting instead to present his wife and his father as witnesses to account for his whereabouts on the night of the
gruesome incident.

Christine Gonzales, wife of accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1994, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, she had a quarrel with her husband. Accused-
appellant was then slightly drunk and apparently irked when supper was not yet ready. He slapped his wife and shouted invectives at her, causing a disturbance in
the neighborhood and prompting his father, who lived just a house away, to intervene. When accused-appellant refused to be pacified, his father hit him in the nose,
mouth and different parts of the body. 21 His father left accused-appellant profusely bleeding. Accused-appellant then changed his blood-stained clothes and went to
bed with his wife. It was a little after 8:00 o'clock in the evening.

Christine woke up the next day at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning. She washed some clothes including the blood-stained ones her husband wore the night before.
After doing the laundry, she went out to pay her father a visit. On her way back home, Christine was informed by a child that her husband was arrested by the police.
Christine rushed home and found some policemen taking the newly washed undershirt and short pants of accused-appellant from the clothesline. The policemen
brought Christine with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked about the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told them about their quarrel
the night before. 22

Accused-appellant's father, Leonardo Rondero, corroborated Christine's story. He testified that on the night in question, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he was
resting at home, located only a house away from his son's, when he heard the latter having a heated discussion with Christine. Embarrassed at the scene that his
son was creating at such an hour, Leonardo went to the couple's house to pacify the slightly inebriated accused-appellant. Accused-appellant ignored his father and
continued shouting at his wife. Leonardo then hit him several times causing his nose and mouth to bleed profusely that it stained his sando and short pants. Startled
at the injuries that his son sustained, Leonardo went home. Early the next morning, March 26, 1994, at around 1:30 o'clock, Leonardo was awakened by his
neighbor, Maximo Doria, who sought his assistance to search for his missing nine-year old daughter Mylene. Leonardo willingly obliged. Thus, Maximo, Leonardo
and the barangay secretary searched the nearby houses for hours but failed to find Mylene. 23

On October 13, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment 24 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE:

For the crime you had wilfully and deliberately committed, this court finds you guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and punished by Section
6 of Republic Act No. 7659, in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, together with all its attendant aggravating circumstances without any mitigating
circumstance of whatever nature.

You, Delfin Rondero, are hereby therefore sentenced to die by electrocution pursuant to Article 81 of Republic Act No. 7659, for your heinous crime as charged in the
information as a punishment and as an example to future offenders.

You are hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim by paying to them an amount of P60,000.00 for the loss of life of Mylene J. Doria; P15,000.00 for
consequential damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages.

May God have mercy on your soul.

SO ORDERED. 25

Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration. On November 10, 1995, the trial court issued an order modifying its earlier decision, convicting accused-appellant of
the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act. No. 7610,
otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion perpetua
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. 26

In this appeal, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AMENDED TO HOMICIDE AND SENTENCING HIM
TO SUFFER LIFE IMPRISONMENT (sic) AND TO INDEMNIFY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THE AMOUNT OF P175,000.00 BASED ONLY ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF HOMICIDE.

2
III. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY TO (sic) THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE DESPITE ILLEGAL ARREST AND
ILLEGAL DETENTION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 27

The appeal has no merit.

Accused-appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not strong enough to sustain his conviction, asserting that Maximo Doria's
testimony that he saw him about a meter away washing his bloodied hands at an artesian well was highly improbable inasmuch as it was dark at that time. Accused-
appellant also considered it strange that when Maximo saw him, he did not bother to ask if he had seen Mylene. Finally, accused-appellant alleges that the slippers
presented in court as evidence are not the same ones which were recovered at the scene of the crime since the pictures presented in court did not show the leaf
painted in red on the left slipper.

Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. 28 Such evidence is
founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. 29
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction in criminal cases when there is more than one circumstance, derived from facts duly given and the combination of
all is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The test for accepting circumstantial evidence as proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is: the series
of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent
with his innocence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution avers that there are several circumstances availing which, when pieced together, point to accused-appellant as the author of the
gruesome crime committed on the night of March 25, 1994, to wit:

1. A few hours after the victim's probable time of death, Maximo saw accused-appellant, with an ice pick clenched in his mouth, washing his bloodied hands at an
artesian well. 30

2 A pair of slippers which Maximo identified as belonging to accused-appellant was found at the scene of the crime. One was found beside the victim's body while the
other was under her buttocks. 31 Maximo positively pointed to accused-appellant as the owner of the pair of slippers because of a distinguishing mark of the painting
of a red leaf on the left slipper. Maximo said accused-appellant used to frequent their house wearing the same pair of slippers for over a year. 32

3. The hair strands which were found on Mylene's right hand and the hair strands taken from accused-appellant were shown to have similar characteristics when
subjected to microscopic
examination. 33

4. Accused-appellant's undershirt and short pants which he wore on the night of March 25, 1994 had bloodstains. His wife admitted having washed the undershirt
and short pants in the early morning of March 26, 1994. 34

Contrary to the allegations of accused-appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Maximo stated on the witness stand
that he was able to identify accused-appellant because he focused his flashlight on him while he was washing his bloodstained hands at an artesian well located only
a meter away from where Maximo was standing. 35 Maximo considered it wise not to talk to accused-appellant because at that time he had an ice pick clenched in
his mouth and looked slightly drunk. As to the allegation that the slippers presented in court were not the same ones recovered at the scene of the crime, suffice it to
say that the photographs taken of the crime scene were not focused only on the pair of slippers; hence, the red leaf may be too minuscule to be noticed. In any case,
the pair of slippers shown in the photographs corroborate the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses that a pair of rubber slippers were indeed recovered at the
scene.

It might not be amiss to note that Maximo was not shown to have had any motive to impute so grave a wrong on accused-appellant. Prior to the incident, accused-
appellant used to frequent Maximo's house for a visit. 36 On the night of the incident, Maximo even sought the help of accused-appellant's father to search for
Mylene.

On the other hand, the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense are incredulous, to say the least. Leonardo Rondero, accused-appellant's father, testified that he
mauled his son in an effort to pacify him during a heated altercation with his wife, Christine. Leonardo said that he felt embarrassed because his son was shouting
invectives at Christine and was causing a scene in the neighborhood so he hit the accused-appellant several times. Leonardo's curious way of pacifying his son
resulted in bodily injuries on the latter. Strangely, despite his sustained injuries and profuse bleeding, accused-appellant and his wife just went to sleep after
Leonardo left. 37 We find it unnatural that a father, a barangay kagawad, would repeatedly hit his son in an effort to pacify him in the middle of a marital spat. We find
it even more unnatural that one who was bleeding profusely would act so insouciant as to just go to sleep without attending to his injuries.

Accused-appellant alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some hair strands were taken from him without his consent and submitted to the NBI for
investigation, in violation of his right against self incrimination. Aside from executing a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-
appellant executed a waiver of the provisions of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution regarding the rights of an accused during custodial investigation. 38 It
appears, however, that the waivers were executed by the accused without the assistance of a counsel of his own choice.

The use of evidence against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or admission without the assistance of counsel while under custodial investigation is
proscribed under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 17. No person shall he compelled to be a witness against himself.

3
The aforesaid rules are set forth in the Constitution as a recognition of the fact that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations in the
absence of procedural safeguards is inherently coercive in nature. However, to paraphrase Justice Sanchez in the case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 39
"Compulsion does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will,
disable him from making a free and rational choice or impair his capacity for making rational judgment would be sufficient. So is moral coercion tending to force
testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." Needless to say, the above-mentioned provisions are an affirmation that "coercion can be mental as well as
physical and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." 40

It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may
be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness 41 and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against
him. 42 Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from
the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search
warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant's wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the
clothesline without proper authority. 43 This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Simply put, accused-appellant's garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as
evidence.

Nevertheless, even without the admission of the bloodied garments of the accused as corroborative evidence, the circumstances obtaining against accused-appellant
are sufficient to establish his guilt.

Having disposed of the foregoing, we now come to the issue of whether accused-appellant should be convicted of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

It is a jurisprudential rule that an appeal throws a whole case to review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such error as may be found in the
judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or not. 44

The trial court dismissed the charge of rape holding that it has not been adequately proven due to the absence of spermatozoa in the victim's private part. It is well
settled that the absence of spermatozoa in the victim's private part does not negate the commission of rape for the simple reason that the mere touching of the
pudenda by the male organ is already considered as consummated rape. Mylene Doria was naked from waist down when she was found. Her private organ had
hymenal lacerations at 1:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions. There were fresh lacerations in the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions
as well. The trial judge even noted that "it can be conclusively deduced that her sex organ was subjected to a humiliating punishment." While the examining physician
speculated that the lacerations could have been caused by a piece of wood or rounded object, he did not rule out the possibility of forcible sexual intercourse.

The presence of physical injuries on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force on her person. Contusion was found on Mylene's face, arms and thighs. In
rape cases, when a woman is forcibly made to lie down, she will utilize her elbow as the fulcrum so that abrasions will be observed. In an attempt to stand, the victim
will flex her neck forward. The offender will then push her head backwards, causing hematoma at the region of the occiput. To prevent penetration of the male organ,
she will try to flex her thighs and the offender will give a strong blow to the inner aspects of both thighs so that the victim will be compelled to straighten them. 45

As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, aside from the hymenal lacerations, the examining physician testified that Mylene sustained abrasions on her left elbow,
right buttock and right upper hip and contusion hematoma at the occipital area, i.e., back part of the head, right side. 46 Indeed, the physical evidence indubitably
tells a harrowing crime committed against nine-year old Mylene Doria in a manner that no words can sufficiently describe.

Anent accused-appellant's third assignment of error, it might be true that accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was not lawful. The police officers who arrested him
had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that he was the perpetrator of the crime just committed. His warrantless arrest was not based on a personal knowledge
of the police officers indicating facts that he has committed the gruesome crime but solely on Maximo's suspicion that he was involved in the slaying of Mylene since
he was seen washing his bloodied hands in the early morning of March 26, 1994. 47 Nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that any irregularity attending the arrest
of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits himself to the
court by entering a plea of guilty or not guilty during the arraignment and participating in the proceedings.

Finally, we reiterate that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws
the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and
whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who unwittingly takes the risk
involved when he decides to appeal his sentence.

Accused-appellant's guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the rape and brutal slaying of Mylene Doria, this Court has no other recourse but to
impose the penalty of death upon accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
"when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." At this juncture, it should be stated that four justices of the court
have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to
the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

The award of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P75,000.00 in line with our ruling in People vs. Mahinay. 48 The award of moral
damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the sum of P15,000.00 as consequential damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City finding accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of special complex crime of
rape with homicide committed against Mylene J. Doria and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim the sum of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as consequential damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

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4
2. People vs Yatar G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages
amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:

That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have
carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting
upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of
force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The facts are:

On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother,
Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through
Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and
her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and
wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside
the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to
bring to the house of his mother.5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and
run towards the back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the
house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her
that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her
where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the
house of Isabel.8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba.
The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to
the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her
husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of
her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa
went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white
shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters
away from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited
through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.

Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR
DOUBTFULNESS.

II
5
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE
DOUBT.

Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.

The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court
in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight
on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and
unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the
appellate court’s highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.16

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness
is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a
portion of her small intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1,
1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words,
the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of
appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions
or hematoma were noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated
that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures
submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the
appellant’s assault on her virtue.22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be
that of appellant’s gene type.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a
person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue,
and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect,
where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It
can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the
innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents
involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime
scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is
helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be
compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method
by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting
sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30
Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.31
The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are
identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course of the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges,
under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA
typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to
the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as
being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim,
Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from
his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the
kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house
of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn
Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood
with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was
6
found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two
days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to
the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his
right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People
v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no
violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of
which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of
counsel.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the
application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented.

Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his
presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate
with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same
barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other.
This fact severely weakens his alibi.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he
should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence
denotes "something more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value."41 This may be necessary to
preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus
value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the
likely harm that would result from its admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond
reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory
conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case
passes the test of moral certainty.

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there
is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of
Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same house.46 She also testified that a
few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school."47 The victim told
Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June
25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to
kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to
his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant.

Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that
may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted
Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby
causing her untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was
achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant
killed the woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not
necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s
hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration
during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56
7
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant
lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one
hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral
ascendancy over the victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although
three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the
ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to
P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as
part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar
alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family of the
victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.

Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case
be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr.*, Puno*, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. People vs Gallarde G.R. No. 133025, Feb. 27, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RADEL GALLARDE, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, finding accused-appellant Radel Gallarde1 (hereafter GALLARDE)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. T-1978 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of Editha Talan (hereafter EDITHA) the amount of P70,000 as actual damages.2

On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide in an information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the field located at Brgy. Trenchera, [M]unicipality of Tayug, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one EDITHA TALAN, a minor-10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the
nose and mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her in the field, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said EDITHA TALAN.3

During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, GALLARDE, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.4 Trial of the case immediately ensued as the
defense waived the holding of the pre-trial conference.

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez, Renato Fernandez, SPO4
Oscar B. Lopez, and Dr. Perfecto Tebangin. The relevant and material facts established by their testimonies are faithfully summarized in the Appellee's Brief as
follows:

In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchea, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them
were appellant Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga
and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they partook beer (TSN dated October 13,
1997, pp. 3-4).

After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of
the kitchen to urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon appellant and Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at appellant but instead of minding him, the
latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house (Id., pp. 4-6).

Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look
for appellant. Soon Editha left enroute to where appellant fled (Id., pp. 7-8).

By 10:00 o'clock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed.
Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her (Id., p. 10).

Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia
and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. The searchers used a lighted
rubber tire (TSN dated Sept. 24, 1997, pp. 8-10 and 24).

When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the searchers went back to the house of appellant. About 7 meters away from
appellant's house, one of the searchers, Alfredo Cortez, found Editha's left foot slipper (TSN dated October 22, 1997, pp. 4-6). Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez
announced: "Tata, Radel is here!" pointing to the toilet about 6 meters away from appellant's house. The searchers found appellant squatting with his short pants. His
hands and knees were covered with soil. When confronted by ex-kagawad Hernandez why he was there, appellant answered he was relieving himself (Id., pp. 11-
16).

Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." When told — "according to Jimmy, you were with Editha." appellant
responded "I let her go and brought her back to the dike and let her go home." To the next question, "where did you come from since a while a go you were not yet in
this toilet?" appellant answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that appellant's statement
was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking (Id., pp. 16-20).

8
After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought appellant to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that appellant was the last
person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers (Id., pp. 21-22).

Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. As she reached for her slipper, she saw Editha's right foot slipper (the other one was earlier found near
the house of appellant) (Id., pp. 23-24).

Around 3 meters farther from Editha's right foot slipper; another slipper was found. It was old, 8 to 9 inches in length and appellant was seen wearing it in the morning
of that day (TSN dated Sept. 25, 1997, pp. 25).

The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide hole among the disheveled grass. Ex-kagawad Fernandez accidentally
dropped the lighted rubber tire and as his nephew Freddie picked it up, the latter exclaimed: "Uncle, look at this loose soil!" Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith
scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted out. The Fernandez screamed in terror (Id., pp. 5-6).

Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here already dead!" Mindful of appellant's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza
decided to bring appellant to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person
of appellant, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you" (TSN dated Oct. 21, 1997, pp. 4-
5).

The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was
completely naked when she was recovered. (Id., pp. 9-10)

The cause of Editha's death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed "suffocation of the lungs as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth,
associated with laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen (Exh. "T", TSN dated Oct. 23, 1997, pp. 22-23).5

On the other hand, GALLARDE was the lone witness for the defense. He interposed a denial and the alibi that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the
time the crime occurred. He declared that he is 18 years old, single, a former construction worker. He knew EDITHA, a neighbor whom he considered as a sister
because she used to come to his house. They never had a quarrel or misunderstanding. He neither raped not killed Editha.6

On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the court, GALLARDE admitted that he saw Editha on the night of 6 May 1997 in her
parent's house, particularly in the kitchen. He was there because he joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as he was called by Rudio Fernandez. He drank and had
dinner in the kitchen. After dinner he returned to the drinking place and eventually went home because he was then a little drunk. He knows Kgd. Mario Fernandez,
but after he left the Talan residence he did not see Kgd. Fernandez anymore. Kgd. Fernandez saw him inside his (Gallarde's) toilet on the night of May 6; thereafter
Fernandez took him to the barangay captain and later he was turned over to the PNP at Camp Narciso Ramos. The police informed him that he was a suspect in the
rape and killing of Editha Talan, and he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the Talan residence he was wearing short pants and rubber slippers.
Fernandez asked him at the police headquarters to pull down his shorts and he complied. He was then wearing briefs with a hemline that was a little loose. He was
informed that a cadaver was recovered near his house. When he was asked questions while in police custody, he was not represented by any lawyer.

GALLARDE further declared on cross-examination and on questions by the court that he considered Editha Talan as a sister and her parents also treated him in a
friendly manner. When he came to know that Editha's parents suspected him of the crime, he was still on friendly terms with them. However, he did no go to them to
tell them he was innocent because they brandished a bolo in anger.

Finally, he testified that in the evening of May 6 he came to know that Editha died. She was still alive when he was drinking at the back of the Talan house and left for
home. From the time he arrived, he never left again that night, and his mother and brothers knew it for a fact.7

On 12 February 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting GALLARDE of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because
of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. It observed:

Exh. "T" and Dr. Tebangin's testimony thereon show that the late Editha Talan sustained slit wounds inflicted as a means of suffocating her to death, a laceration of
the lower portion of her vagina, and a ruptured hymen. What allegedly oozed from her vagina was blood, coupled with dirt. Had then been observed the presence of
even just a drop of seminal fluid in or around her vagina, the Court would readily conclude that the laceration and rupture resulted from phallic intrusion. Without such
observation, however, "carnal knowledge" as element of rape would be an open question.

The trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as a mitigating or aggravating circumstance pursuant to Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code because GALLARDE's alleged inebriation on the night of 6 May 1997, was not satisfactorily proven.

As to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of the parties on 27 October 1997 fixing a liquidated amount of P70,000 as actual damages,
and leaving the matter of moral damages to the discretion of the court. The trial court was not inclined to award moral damages because the "evidence before it tends
to disclose that on the night of 6 May 1997, before she died, Editha was a much-neglected child."

Accordingly, in its decision8 of 12 February 1998, the trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court hereby convicts the accused RADEL GALLARDE Y HERMOSA of the crime
of MURDER, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00.9

His motion for reconsideration,10 having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution11 of 28 February 1998, GALLARDE seasonably appealed to us.

We accepted the appeal on 9 September 1998.

In his Appellant's Brief filed on 16 March 1999, GALLARDE alleges that the trial court committed the following errors:

1. In convicting [him] of the crime of murder in an information for rape with homicide.

2. In concluding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that [he] was responsible for the death of Editha Talan.

3. In not acquitting [him] on the ground of notches of proof beyond reasonable doubt.12

We sustain GALLARDE's contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the
accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term "homicide" as used in special
complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the
occasion of rape,13 it is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component
offense, the accused can be convicted of the other.14 In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of
rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of
the offense with which he is charged.15 It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of

9
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.16

In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted
of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the
evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information for which he is tried, or is
necessarily included in that which is charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict
an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right.17

Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution, although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of GALLARDE for the death of EDITHA.

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.18 The prosecution is not
always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any
criminal liability.19 Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided that the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.20

The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there
must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
doubt of the guilt of the accused.21

The importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of rape, where it is homicide. The nature of the crime of rape, where it is
usually only the victim and the rapist who are present at the scene of the crime, makes prosecutions for the complex crime of rape with homicide particularly difficult
since the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime. In these cases pieces of the evidence against the accused are usually circumstantial.22

The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other conclusion than that GALLARDE, and no other else, killed
EDITHA and that he is guilty therefor. We quote with approval the lower court's enumeration of the circumstantial evidence in this case:

1. Gallarde, 18, and Editha, 10, were neighbors and friends, even as she used to frequent his place.

2. Both were at the Talan residence on the night of May 6, 1997 while neighbors indulged themselves in beer.

3. Among said neighbors Cabinta saw them hand in hand by the toilet situated five (5) meters east of the Talan kitchen.

4. After Cabinta whistled he saw Gallarde run home towards north after letting go of Editha's hands. Neighbor Clemente also noticed that Gallarde disappeared, and
that Editha returned to the kitchen.

5. Cabinta followed Editha back to the kitchen, and saw her holding a kerosene lamp. She told him that she was going to look for "Dalpac," and off she went in the
same direction Gallarde took.

6. Gallarde wore short pants and rubber slippers at the drinking place. Subsequently he was seen wearing shorts in his own toilet.

7. At past 10:00 in the evening during an intensive search for the then missing Editha, her lifeless body was found in a shallow grave situated some distance behind
Gallarde's residence.

8. Before Editha's body was discovered, a searcher found a girl's slipper (Exh. "B"), 5-6 inches long, among thickets seven meters away from Gallarde's house.

9. Another searcher saw a second slipper (Exh. B-1), of the same color and size as the first one. Both slippers were Editha's, the searchers recalled.

10. A third rubber slipper (Exh. "C") was thereafter found in the field, near Exh. "B-1." It was an old slipper, 8-9 inches long and with a hole at the rear end.

11. Soil stuck to each one of the three slippers.

12. Gallarde was not at home when searchers went to look for him there, after Cabinta told them that Editha was last seen with Gallarde.

13. When Gallarde was discovered squatting in the dark toilet behind his house and beside the thickets, his shorts were up and on. His hands and knees were soiled.

14. At the toilet he was asked the innocent question of where Editha was and he answered revealingly, thus: "I did not do anything to her" and "I let her go and
brought her back to the dike and let her go home."

15. When asked where he had been, as the toilet was first seen empty, Gallarde said he was with Kiko and he slept at the latter's house, which answer Mario Bado
promptly refuted saying, "Vulva of your mother. . . Kiko was with me drinking." Bado and Kiko were not at the place of the Talans that night.

16. Yanked out of the dark toilet near his own house, Gallarde joined Kgd. Mario Fernandez sans protest.

17. Dr. Tebangin found on Editha's cheeks two slit wounds, each being an inch away from her nostrils. Both wounds were fresh and reddish.

From the lower portion of Editha's vagina blood oozed, accompanied by dirt.

Her hymen was ruptured and was still bleeding.

The medico-legal concluded that there must have been a forceful covering of Editha's nose and mouth because of the presence of the slit wounds on both sides of
her face, and that in 30 seconds unconsciousness and weakening resulted, with the vaginal injuries contributing to her death.23

As to the crime of rape, there is much to be desired with respect to the prosecution's evidence therefor, but not for the reason adduced by the trial court, namely, the
absence of spermatozoa in EDITHA's private part and thereabout. It is well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not negate the
commission of rape.24 Our doubt on the commission of rape is based on the fact that there is at all no convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the
rupture of the hymen of EDITHA were caused in the course of coitus or by a male organ. Our meticulous reading of the testimony of Dr. Tebangin disclosed that he
was never asked if the laceration and the rupture could have been caused by the penis of a human being. Needless to state, these could have been caused by any
object other than the penis of a person.

10
We cannot sustain the contention of GALLARDE that he was not positively identified as the assailant since there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the
crime. It does not follow that although nobody saw GALLARDE in the act of killing EDITHA, nobody can be said to have positively identified him. Positive
identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identity a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or
one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which
forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable
conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly
positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and
elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.25 If resort to circumstantial evidence
would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper
protection.

As discussed above, the circumstantial evidence as established by the prosecution in this case and enumerated by the trial court positively established the identity of
GALLARDE, and no one else, as the person who killed EDITHA.

We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that
"the same were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel,
being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination26 proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and
not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak
his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.27 The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.28 Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy;29 and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for
medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;30 to expel morphine from his mouth;31 to have the outline
of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints;32 and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move
his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.33

There is also no merit in GALLARDE's argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the place and time of the commission of the
crime is fatal and will justify his acquittal.

The place, time and date of the commission of the offense are not essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal
knowledge of a woman and that on the occasion of or as a reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed. Conviction may be had on proof of the commission
of the crime provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information, within the period of
the statute of limitation, and within the jurisdiction of the court.34

The allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or
some of the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court.35 The rule merely requires that the information shows that the
crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Court may even take judicial notice that said place is within its jurisdiction.36

As to the time of the commission of the crime, the phrase "on or about" employed in the information does not require the prosecution "to prove any precise date or
time," but may prove any date or time which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant."37

Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate time of the commission of the crime, which was sometime between 9:00
p.m., when GALLARDE left the house of Talan followed by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of EDITHA was found. This was further corroborated by the
examining physician who testified, on the basis of the degree of rigor mortis, that EDITHA died more or less, at 10:00 p.m. of 6 May 1997.38

Likewise, GALLARDE's alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. He did not present witnesses who could confirm his presence in his house. No member of his
family corroborated him on this matter. The defenses of denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve
no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.39

Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDE's claim is true, his stay in his house did not preclude his physical presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity.
The place where the body of EDITHA was found buried was a few meters from his house, the place pointed to in the alibi and can be reached in a short while. For
the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the
crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.40

Besides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution that might prompt them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against
him. It is settled that when there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the
witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit.41 Testimonies of witnesses who have no motive or reason to falsify or
perjure their testimonies should be given credence.42

With respect to GALLARDE's claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea.43 The records show no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial.44 GALLARDE's assertion that he was
denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and
counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.45 It is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest
or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived.46 It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the accused arraigned and trial
commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.47 Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.48

Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is punished with reclusion temporal.
In the absence of any modifying circumstance, it shall be imposed in its medium period. GALLARDE is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Accordingly, he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum.

As to the civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P70,000 as liquidated damages. This should be construed as actual damages. However, as indemnity for
death, the additional sum of P50,000, per current case law, should be awarded.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. T-1978 finding accused-appellant RADEL
GALLARDE guilty of the crime of murder is hereby modified. As modified, RADEL GALLARDE is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the
crime of Homicide, defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of
11
the medium period of of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay
the heirs of the victim, Editha Talan, the sum of P70,000 as liquidated actual damages and P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Editha Talan.

Costs against accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE in both instances.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Mapa vs Sandiganbayan 231 SCRA 783

PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO VERGARA, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

Estelito P. Mendoza for Placido L. Mapa, Jr.

Filemon Flores for J. Lorenzo Vergara.

PUNO, J.:

The denial of the right to be free from further prosecution of a cooperative witness who has been granted immunity is the core issue posed in this petition. On balance
are important rights in conflict: the right of an individual who has surrendered his constitutional prerogative to be silent to the State to be exempt from further
prosecution; the right of the State to prosecute all persons who appear to have committed a crime and its prerogative to revoke the immunity it has granted to an
accused for breach of agreement; and the extent of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as an impartial tribunal to review the grant of immunity extended by the
PCGG to an accused.

First, the facts.

On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara, together with Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, Fernando Balatbat, Ramon Aviado, Jr., Dominador
Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr., and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) as amended, docketed
as Case No. 11960 in the respondent court, as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 1985 and March 1986, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan,
accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr., J. Lorenzo Vergara, Ramon F. Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr., Jose C. Crisanto, Jr., acting in various
capacities as management officials of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and/or Pantranco North
Express Inc. (PNEI), all government-owned and controlled corporations, as well as Dolores Potenciano of BLTB, acting in concert in the performance of their duties,
in utter neglect of their fiduciary responsibilities, and with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating with one another and with accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III,
son-in-law of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and therefore related to the deposed President by affinity within the third degree, and Fernando Balatbat, did
then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, without proper board resolution and in disregard of better offers, promote and
facilitate the sale of a major portion of the public utility assets of the Pantranco Express, Inc., for a consideration of SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE MILLION
(P775,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to the North Express Transport, Inc. (NETI), which the accused knew to be a newly organized paper corporation
with a purported paid-up capital of only FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) PESOS and owned and controlled by accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, by misleading,
inducing and/or unduly influencing the Board of Directors of PNB, NIDC and PNEI into approving a Memorandum of Agreement and later a Purchase Agreement with
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions which made possible the premature delivery of said PNEI assets to NETI without any down payment,
and which, inter alia, allowed NETI to operate PNEI's franchises and utilize, even before the execution of the said Purchase Agreement, not only the PNEI assets
subject of the proposed sale, but also other utility buses and properties of PNEI not covered by the sale, thereby allowing NETI to derive an income from said
operation between the period of actual delivery and execution of the Purchase Agreement of the sum of EIGHTY-FIVE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE
THOUSAND, ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P85,689,180.00) PESOS before the actual payment of the agreed FIFTY-FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS down
payment, thereby giving accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III unwarranted benefits, advantages and/or preferences and causing undue injury to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED MILLION (P400,000,000.00) PESOS, and such other amounts as may be awarded by the Court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Except for petitioner Araneta, all the accused in Criminal Case

No. 11960 were arraigned. Their trial started on September 20, 1988.

In the interim, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos were charged in New York with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to the United States and concealing the investment of money through cronies and offshore organizations. To insure the
conviction of the Marcoses, the prosecution solicited the testimonies of witnesses. Among these witnesses were petitioners Vergara and Mapa. Petitioner Vergara
was interviewed in 1987 by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and by United States Prosecutor Charles La Bella. Petitioner Mapa was interviewed on
November 14, 1988 and August 11, 1989 also by Prosecutor La Bella at the behest of former Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez and former PCGG Chairman
Mateo Caparas. After their interviews, petitioners were requested to testify in the said RICO cases against the former First Couple. They were promised immunity
from further criminal prosecution. They agreed.

On May 16, 1990, the Philippine Government through the PCGG, and the petitioners formalized their separate agreements in writing. The agreement with petitioner
Mapa provided:

WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested MAPA to make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.,"
more particularly in the on-going trial of the case;

WHEREAS, MAPA is a defendant or respondent in several civil and criminal cases which the REPUBLIC has filed or intends to file in relation to this participation in
various contracts that are alleged to have resulted in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in violation of Philippine laws, rules and
regulations;

WHEREAS, on the basis of MAPA's express intent to make himself available as witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et
al.," and in light of REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of the civil and criminal cases which it has filed or intends to file against MAPA under the terms and conditions herein
below set forth.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties agree as follows:

1. MAPA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al."

12
2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants MAPA immunity from investigation, prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his
testimony and information are given, including any offense and commission of which any information, directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information is used as basis thereof, except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving false testimony.

3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of REPUBLIC’s review of the cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or intends to file against
MAPA within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the REPUBLIC shall cause the dismissal or exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or
respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigation.

4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to MAPA on the basis of and relying on MAPA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In case of breach
of his commitment to fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.", the
immunity herein granted shall forthwith be deemed revoked, and of no force and effect.

5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution to MAPA and his exclusion from PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or
investigations has been undertaken in the exercise of the PCGG's authority under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Accordingly, nothing herein shall be
construed as an admission by MAPA of any criminal or civil liability.

The agreement with petitioner Vergara stated:

WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested VERGARA to make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et
al.," more particularly in the on-going trial of the case;

WHEREAS, Vergara is a defendant in Criminal Case No. 11960 entitled "People vs. Gregorio Ma. Araneta, et al.", now pending before the Sandiganbayan, Second
Division;

WHEREAS, on the basis of VERGARA’s express intent to make himself available as witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
et al.," and in the light of REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of VERGARA's participation in Criminal Case No. 11960, the REPUBLIC approved to grant immunity to
VERGARA under the terms and conditions hereinbelow set forth.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties agree as follows:

1. VERGARA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al."

2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants VERGARA immunity from investigation, prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his
testimony and information are given, including any offense and commission of which any information, directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information is used as basis thereof, except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving false testimony.

3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of REPUBLIC’s review of VERGARA’s participation in Criminal Case No. 11960, the REPUBLIC shall
cause the dismissal of VERGARA from Criminal Case No. 11960.

4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to VERGARA on the basis of and relying on VERGARA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In case
of breach of h is commitment to fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et
al.", the immunity herein granted shall forthwith be deemed revoked, and of no force and effect.

5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from civil and criminal prosecution to VERGARA and his exclusion from Criminal Case No. 11960 has been
undertaken in the exercise of the PCGG's authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Accordingly, nothing herein shall be construed as a admission by
VERGARA of any criminal liability.

On the same day, May 16, 1990, former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote to petitioner Mapa the following letter:

Dear Sir:

With reference to the agreement executed between yourself and the Republic of the Philippines on May 16, 1990, we would like to confirm
that among the criminal cases which the Republic agrees to cause the dismissal of the case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mr. Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, et.
al., " Criminal Case No. 11960 of the Sandiganbayan. We understand that in that case the prosecution is in the process of closing its evidence with the submission of
its offer of documentary evidence and that it is your intention thereupon to submit a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the prosecution to prove its case. We affirm that if,
because of the situation of the case, it would not be possible for the Republic to file the necessary motion to cause the dismissal thereof, then we shall upon
submission of your Motion to Dismiss offer no objection to its favorable consideration by the court in relation to you.

We also affirm our understanding that we shall arrange with the U.S. prosecutors the grant of immunity in your favor no less broad or extensive than that granted to
Mr. Jaime C. Laya.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) M.A.T. Caparas

A similar letter was sent to petitioner Vergara.

The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. They travelled to New York to testify against the Marcoses. Their travel fare and hotel accommodations
were even furnished by the PCGG. But despite their availability and willingness to testify, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand. The result
was a debacle for the US prosecutors and the PCGG. Mrs.Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the jury. Earlier, former President Marcos was delisted as an accused as
he died in the course of the proceedings.

The legal struggle shifted back to the prosecution of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 before the respondent court. On the basis of the immunity granted to
them, petitioners filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on October 22, 1990. Deputized PCGG prosecutors Vivencio B. Dionido and Angel J. Parazo filed a Manifestation
interposing no objection to petitioners' Motion, viz:

That herein accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo Vergara were granted immunity by the Presidential Commission on Good Government from criminal liability
arising from cases which PCGG had or intends to file against them;

The PCGG, therefore, interposes no objection to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo Vergara in Criminal Case No.
11960-PCGG by reason of the immunity aforestated.

Despite PCGG's concurrence, the respondent court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss, by a vote of 4-1. 1 Petitioners were undaunted. On April 8, 1991, they filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. This was followed on May 23, 1991, by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration. The deputized prosecutors again filed a
13
Manifestation reiterating PCGG's acquiescence to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent court, however, refused to budge from its prior position. It
denied petitioners' motions.

Hence, this recourse where petitioners charge the respondent court with grave abuse of discretion in denying their Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration.
They pose the following issues:

2.00.a. Does the fact that the information provided by petitioners to the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) did not refer to Criminal Case No.
11960 make the immunity granted to them inapplicable to Criminal Case No. 11960?

2.00.b. Is it necessary that information furnished the PCGG, which would become basis of the grant of immunity, be submitted to the Sandiganbayan in order that it
may determine whether such information is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or liability of a respondent, defendant or an accused in an action involving the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth?

2.00.c. Does the fact that the prosecution in the RICO cases did not actually present petitioners as witnesses abrogate the immunity granted to them?

2.00.d. Was the immunity granted to petitioners too late considering that when it was granted, the prosecution in Criminal Case
No. 11960 had already rested its case?"

The proceedings before us took a new wrinkle with the appointment of Atty. David Castro as Chairman of PCGG. In its Comment dated January 6, 1992, the PCGG
somersaulted from its stance supporting the petitioners. Its Comment states:

1. The Presidential Commission on Good Government has indeed granted Messrs. Placido L. Mapa, Jr., and Jesus Lorenzo Vergara immunity from investigation,
prosecution and punishment for any offense for which civil and criminal cases have been or to be filed against them within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A but such immunity is conditional.

2. The conditions for giving such immunity is the cooperation said petitioners shall give to said Commission by way of information and testimony in cases now
pending or to be filed before the Sandiganbayan against other defendants therein to prove the latter's acquisition or accumulation of property or properties in violation
of existing laws.

3. Failure on the part of petitioners Placido Mapa, Jr. and Jesus Vergara to testify in favor of the government and against other defendants on matters referred to in
the immediately preceding paragraph nullifies the immunity granted to both defendants (emphasis supplied).

It reiterated its breakaway from petitioners in its Comment to the Reply of petitioners dated June 10, 1992, where it adopted the respondent Sandiganbayan's
questioned Resolution and Concurring Opinions dated
March 6, 1991. It further stressed that "[T]he granting of 'Immunity' from criminal liability and/or prosecution is a matter subject to the court's judicious determination
and approval, after applying the test of compliance and the standard of reasonableness with the rigid requirements for such grant under Section 5 of Executive Order
No. 14-A, as amended." The Solicitor General defended the stance of the PCGG and the respondent court.

We find merit in the petition.

The practice of granting government, its officials, and some accused or respondents immunity from suits, has a long history.

We begin with the Constitution which expressly grants some of these immunities. Article XVI, section 3 provides that "the State may not be sued without its consent."
The classic justification for the non-suability of the State is that provided by Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: ". . . there can be no legal right against the authority
which makes the law on which the right depends." 2 Article VI, section 11 of the Constitution also grants parliamentary immunities, viz: "A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof." Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz explains the rationale for this immunity in the following manners: ". . . The first is intended to ensure
representation of the constituents of the member of the Congress by preventing attempts to keep him from attending its sessions. The second enables the legislator
to express views bearing upon the public interest without fear of accountability outside the halls of the legislature for his inability to support his statements with the
usual evidence required in the court of justice. In other words, he is given more leeway than the ordinary citizen in the ventilation of matters that ought to be divulged
for the public good."3 The President was also immunized from suit during his tenure in the 1973 Constitution.

Aside from the Constitution, Congress has enacted laws giving immunity to witnesses to facilitate the solution of crimes with high political, social and economic
impact against the people. Some of these statutory grants are related in the impugned Resolution. Thus, PD 749 provides:

Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210, 211, 212 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said codes penalizing abuse or
dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and
who willingly testified, such violator shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given,
and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided, That this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where
the information and the testimony are given against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of any
of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered or gave bribe or
gift to the public official or is an accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving; And, Provided, finally, That the following conditions concur:

1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above- mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations;

2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer;

3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;

4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and

5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Likewise, under PD No. 1886, the Agrava Fact Finding Board, created to conduct a fact-finding inquiry in the Aquino-Galman double murder case, was given the
power to compel testimony of a witness. In exchange for his testimony, such a witness was extended transactional immunity from later prosecution. Section 5 of said
PD No. 1886 states:

No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a
subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but
his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled,
after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from

14
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor
shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.

Indeed, as early as April 16, 1951, R.A. 602, establishing a minimum wage law, extended transactional immunity to persons who testify or produce books, papers or
other records and documents before the Secretary of Labor or a Wage Board. A similar but not identical power is given to the prosecution under section 9, Rule 119
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused to be utilized as a state witness.

Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional
immunity and the used-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be
prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. 4 In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity,
a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. 5 In Kastigar vs. US, 6 the rationale of these immunity grants is well
explained, viz:

The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American
jurisprudence . . . The power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be
confronted with the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . .

xxx xxx xxx

But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a number of exemptions from the testimonial duty, the most important
of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an important advance in the development of our liberty. It
can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures that the witness
reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the
values that underlie the privilege.

Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence, are not incompatible with these values. Rather, they seek a rational
accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify. The existence of these statutes
reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those
implicated in the crime. Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses, and their primary use has been to investigate such offenses . . . (E)very State in the
Union, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one of more such statutes. The commentators, and this Court on several occasions, have
characterized immunity statutes as essential to the effective enforcement of various criminal statutes. . .

We shall now examine the powers granted to PCGG by Executive Order No. 14, as amended, to grant immunity from criminal prosecution. The pertinent sections
provide:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. A witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before the Sandiganbayan
if the witness believes that such testimony or provision of information would tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution. Upon such refusal, the
Sandiganbayan may order the witness to testify or provide information.

The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony, or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the other.'

Sec. 3. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or
testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or
accumulated the property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his civil
liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the
latter or by the Commission.

There are obvious differences between the powers granted to the PCGG under sections 4 and 5. Section 4 deals with the power which PCGG can use to compel an
unwilling witness to testify. On the other hand, section 5 speaks of the power which PCGG can wield to secure information from a friendly witness. Under section 4,
the hostile witness compelled to testify is not immunized from prosecution. He can still be prosecuted but "no testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case . . . ." In
contrast, under section 5, the friendly witness is completely immunized from prosecution.

The case at bench involves an exercise of power by PCGG under

section 5, supra. Petitioners are not hostile but friendly witnesses. It is not disputed that they furnished information to the PCGG during their interviews conducted by
PCGG lawyers and US prosecutor La Bella. Due to their cooperation, they were extended immunity from prosecution by the PCGG. In return, they flew to New York
to testify in the RICO trial of Imelda Marcos. As they were witnesses for the prosecution, their expenses were shouldered by the PCGG itself. At the last minute,
however, US prosecutor La Bella decided to dispense with their testimony. The rest is history. The prosecution failed to convict Mrs. Marcos.

The first issue is whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners. We sustain the jurisdiction of the
respondent court. To be sure, we have grappled with this once slippery issue in the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 76, 80-81, and we held:

We first ascertain whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to look into the validity of the immunity granted by the PCGG to Jose Y. Campos which was
extended to his son, petitioner-intervenor herein,
Jose Campos, Jr.

xxx xxx xxx

The powers of the PCGG are not unlimited. Its jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth must be within the parameters stated in Executive Order No. 14.
Necessarily, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which is tasked to handle the ill-gotten wealth cases must include the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
PCGG exceeded its power to grant immunity pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No.14.

15
It should also be noted that the respondent court has already acquired jurisdiction to try and decide Case No. 11960 where petitioners stand accused of violating RA
3019. It has started receiving the evidence of the prosecution against the petitioners. Petitioners, with the conformity of PCGG, then claimed their immunity via a
motion to dismiss addressed to the respondent court. The motion to dismiss is thus a mere incident well within the jurisdiction of the respondent court to resolve.

The next issue is a finer and more difficult one, i.e., gauging the range of the power of the respondent court to review the exercise of discretion of the PCGG granting
immunity to petitioners pursuant to section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended.

Respondent court, thru the Solicitor General, pushes the proposition that said power of review is plenary in reach. It is urged that its plenitude and panoply empower
the respondent court to reverse the grant of immunity made by the PCGG by supplanting the latter's judgment. The submission will warrant the respondent court in
examining the intrinsic quality of the given information or testimony, i.e., whether it truly establishes the "unlawful manner" in which the respondent, defendant or
accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question. Likewise, it will give a warrant to the respondent court to change the judgment made by
the PCGG that the witness' information or testimony is "necessary" to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused.

We are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition. Neither the text nor the texture of E.O. No. 14, as amended, lends color to the suggested
interpretation. Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, vests no such role in respondent court. In instances, where the intent is to endow courts of justice with the
power to review and reverse tactical moves of the prosecution, the law confers the power in clear and certain language. Thus, under section 9 of Rule 119, the
prosecution in the exercise of its discretion may tactically decide to discharge an accused to be a state witness but its decision is made subject to the approval of the
court trying the case. It has to file a proper motion and the motion may be denied by the court if the prosecution fails to prove that it has satisfied the requirements of
the rule on discharge of a witness. The rule is crafted as to leave no iota of doubt on the power of the court to interfere with the discretion of the prosecution on the
matter. In the case at bench, E.O. 14, as amended, is eloquently silent with regard to the range and depth of the power of the respondent court to review the exercise
of discretion by the PCGG granting a section 5 immunity. This silence argues against the thesis that the respondent court has full and unlimited power to reverse
PCGG's exercise of discretion granting a section 5 immunity. Legitimate power can not arise from a vacuum.

We observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity, section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, confers on the PCGG the power to grant immunity alone and on its
own authority. The exercise of the power is not shared with any other authority. Nor is its exercise subject to the approval or disapproval of another agency of
government. The basic reason for vesting the power exclusively on the PCGG lies in the principles of separation of power. The decision to grant immunity from
prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a
higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the
particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the
delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the
prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial
tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its
strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts
keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly
even and perpetually level.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant of a section 5 immunity made by the PCGG to the petitioners, the power of the
respondents court can go no further than to pass upon its procedural regularity. The respondent court should only ascertain: (a) whether the person claiming
immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge of its functions;
(b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or
accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question; and (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is
necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused. Respondent court cannot substitute its judgment to the discretion of
the PCGG without involving itself in prosecution and without ceasing to be a court catering untilted justice.

Applying this standard, we hold that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss based on a claim of
immunity granted by the PCGG under section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended.

The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. They gave the
information in the course of interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and US prosecutor Charles
La Bella. They collaborated with the prosecution.

Sec. 5 requires that the information should relate to "any case" which PCGG can prosecute as mandated by the Constitution and E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. It does
not limit said information to be given only in a case where the informant is himself an accused or a respondent. Such a reading adopted by the respondent court is
unduly restrictive of the intendment of section 5 of E.O.
No. 14, as amended, even as it is clearly in contravention of its plain language.

It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the petitioners would in the judgment of the PCGG, establish the "unlawful manner" with which the
Marcoses acquired or accumulated their properties and were "necessary" to prove their guilt. The totality of the circumstances of the case established this element.
Thus, after their interview, the PCGG was obviously convinced of the evidentiary value of the information given by the petitioners. It forthwith signed and sealed an
agreement with petitioners extending them immunity from prosecution. In the case of petitioner Mapa, "the Republic shall cause the dismissal or exclusion of MAPA
as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigation." In the case of petitioner Vergara, "the Republic shall
cause the dismissal of Vergara from Criminal Case No. 11960." This commitment was reiterated by former Chairman Mateo Caparas of PCGG in his May 16, 1990
letters to the petitioners, as related above. The parties' agreements were then implemented. Petitioners travelled to New York to testify in the RICO cases against the
Marcoses. It was even the PCGG that shouldered their expenses. All these circumstances prove the judgment of the PCGG that the pieces of information given by
petitioners would establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses acquired their wealth.

Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York can not nullify their immunity.
They have satisfied the requirements both of the law and the parties' implementing agreements. Under section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give
information to the prosecution, and they did. Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to make themselves available as witnesses in the said RICO
cases, and they did. Petitioners were ready to testify but they were not called to testify by the US prosecutors of the RICO case. Their failure to testify was not of their
own making. It was brought about by the decision of the US prosecutors who may have thought that their evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses. Since
petitioners' failure to testify was not of their own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice and equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal of
their immunity. Indeed, initially, the PCGG itself adopted the posture that the immunity of petitioners stayed and should not be disturbed. It joined the motion to
dismiss filed by petitioners in the respondent court. When the respondent court denied the motion, PCGG stuck to its previous position as it again joined the
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. It is only in this petition for review on certiorari that PCGG, after a change of Chairman, flip-flopped in its position.

We also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG granted a section 5 immunity to petitioners while they were already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No.
11960. Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended, does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons already charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as
the privilege of immunity so given will in the judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining its greater objectives, the PCGG is well within legal grounds to exercise this
power at any stage of the proceedings. This section 5 immunity frees and releases one from liability, and as it inures to the benefit of an accused, it can be invoked at
any time after its acquisition and before his final conviction. Our regard for the rights of an accused dictates this result. Thus, we have consistently held that laws that
decriminalize an act or a grant of amnesty may be given retroactive effect. They constitute a bar against the further prosecution of their beneficiaries' regardless of
the appearance of their guilt. To be sure, the guilt of the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 has yet to be established beyond doubt. The PCGG itself does not
16
appear certain and confident of the strength of its evidence against the petitioners in said criminal case. The records show that petitioners Mapa was granted
immunity not only because of the information he gave to the prosecution but also ". . . in light of Republic's review of the cases both civil and criminal which it has
filed or intends to file against . . ." him. Similarly, petitioner Vergara was granted immunity ". . . in light of Republic's review of Vergara's participation in Criminal Case
No. 11960 . . . ." After reviewing its evidence against the petitioners, PCGG appears to have sensed the sterility of its efforts of continuing their prosecution. Its former
chairman, M.A.T. Caparas, learned that petitioners would file a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 11960 after PCGG rest its evidence, "for failure of the
prosecution to prove its case." In his May 16, 1990 letters to the petitioners, he assured them that "we shall . . . offer no objection to its favorable consideration." This
is a patent admission that petitioners' Motion to Dismiss has merit and that the PCGG cannot prove its case against the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960.

Finally, we reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characterized the
grant as special privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it misread the raison d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against
self-incrimination vis-a-vis immunity statutes.

The days of inquisitions brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights. Not the least of these abuses is the expert use of coerced confessions to
send to the guillotine even the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right against self-incrimination was ensconced in the
fundamental laws of all civilized countries. Over the years, however, came the need to assist government in its task of containing crime for peace and order is a
necessary matrix of public welfare. To accommodate
the need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to
compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right
against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-
derivative-use immunity, as heretofore discussed. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Those given the privilege of immunity
paid a high price for it — the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against self-incrimination and the right to be
silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal
interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolutions of the respondent court dated March 7, and June 3, 1991 are annulled and set aside and the Amended Information against the
petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 is ordered dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Lim vs People G.R. No. 149276, Sept. 27, 2002

JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, Petitioners, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE
CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON CHAM, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa committed by means of
bouncing checks, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the Constitution.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties’ pleadings and documentary proofs, follow.

In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks, namely, Metrobank check no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992 in the
amount of P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated January 22, 1992 in the amount of P429,000. Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for
having been drawn against insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon request of petitioners who promised to replace the
dishonored check.

When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no. 464728, the private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818.

On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against petitioners and recommending the filing of an information for estafa
with no bail recommended. On the same day, an information for the crime of estafa was filed with Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against
petitioners. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-101574. Thereafter, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioners,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting affidavit of the complaining witness and its annexes that probable cause exists, that the crime charged
was committed and accused is probably guilty thereof, let a warrant for the arrest of the accused be issued.

No Bail Recommended.

SO ORDERED. 1

On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest" which was denied by the trial court. Likewise, petitioners’ motion for
bail filed on July 24, 2001 was denied by the trial court on the same day. Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the trial
court and was detained at the Quezon City Jail. However, petitioner Teresita Lim remained at large.

On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court and the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the petition of Jovencio Lim to post bail pursuant to Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated
November 6, 2001 which amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d), and qualified theft. Said Circular specifically provides as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion
temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2 (a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00.
17
In view of the aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning bail shall no longer be discussed. Thus, this decision will focus on whether or not PD 818 violates
Sections 1 and 19 of Article III of the Constitution, which respectively provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

x x x

Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. . . .

We shall deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted in contravention of Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution. In this regard, the impugned provision
of PD 818 reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall punished by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;

2nd. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3rd. The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.

Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized with reclusion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. This
penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe and disproportionate to the crime they committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the
Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly
oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive,
out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 2 Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the
defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.

In People v. Tongko, 3 this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather
than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or
obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like.
The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.

Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not
increase the amounts corresponding to the said new penalties. Thus, the original amounts provided for in the Revised Penal Code have remained the same
notwithstanding that they have become negligible and insignificant compared to the present value of the peso.

This argument is without merit. The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and categorically stated in the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling) cases committed by means of bouncing checks;

WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the people’s confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial
transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country;

WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing penalties provided therefor.

Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that
undermines the country’s commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD
818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to avert
was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we conclude
that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.

Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 4 The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this
case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.

With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, petitioners claim that PD 818 is violative of the due process clause
of the Constitution as it was not published in the Official Gazette. This claim is incorrect and must be rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due
process, is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders. 5 PD 818 was published in the Official Gazette on December 1, 1975. 6

With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part due to relation to counsel.

Mendoza, J., on leave.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. People vs Echegaray 267 SCRA 682
G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, Accused-Appellant.

18
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Free Legal Assistance Group Anti-Death Penalty Task Force for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; REGARDED WITH DISFAVOR IN CASE AT BAR. — This is one occasion where an affidavit of
desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the
Accused-Appellant. This court explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, promulgated on November 19, 1996, that: "As pointed out in
People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the
accused’s defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance,
create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge." In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered
as defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the
affidavit of desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-
appellant, particularly on the trial court’s jurisdiction over the case.

2. ID.; ID.; THE RULE IS THAT THE CLIENT IS BOUND BY THE MISTAKE OF THE COUNSEL; EXCEPTION. — The settled rule is that the client is bound by the
negligence or mistakes of his counsel. One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and
prevented, in effect, from having his day in court to defend himself.

3. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; POSSESSES POWER TO SECURE THE SOCIETY AGAINST THREATENED AND ACTUAL EVIL. — One of the indispensable
powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that
define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the
criminals in accordance with these laws.

4. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTY; DEATH SENTENCE; IMPOSABLE WHERE THE LAW ITSELF PROVIDES THEREFOR. — In Harden, we ruled: "The penalty
complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." (81 Phil. 741, 747 [1948]). Consequently, we have time and again
emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific
and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that: ". . . there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its
imposition on certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions." (88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951]) and this we have
reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 246, 253 [1995].

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR THE RESTORATION THEREOF. — Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to
re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is
subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails
(1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case,
death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that Congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death
penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime
should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that
there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes," for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need
to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEINOUS CRIME, DEFINED. — In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or description of heinous
crimes. Said clause provides that: ". . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995) traced the
etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans words, "haineus," meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton,"
denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime.
This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate
consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the
appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; R.A. No. 7659, IDENTIFIES CRIMES WARRANTING MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY AS WELL AS THOSE PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION
PERPETUA TO DEATH. — Insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of
death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by
death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not
to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the
trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In the first
place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while
it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN IMPOSABLE. — Construing R.A. No. 7659 in pari materia with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating
circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty,
and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the
imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the
trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may attend the
commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each
and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. No. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation
warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESTORATION THEREOF; RATIONALE. — The death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from
abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial
19
injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must
be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case of
People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996 "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to
justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can
mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act . . . an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already
in effect, Accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim’s grandmother that precipitated the
filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We find no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb our verdict.

On August 6, 1996, Accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the
Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).

On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of Accused-Appellant. The motion raises the
following grounds for the reversal of the death sentence:

" [1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon by the offended party and her mother before the filing of the complaint acted as a bar to
his criminal prosecution.

[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the accused-appellant from preparing
an adequate defense.

[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant was the father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the sentence of death against him
on this basis.

[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.

[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of counsel.

[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:

a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19 (I) of the 1987
Constitution.

b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings;
(2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant’s former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

I
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on
appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 1

"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded
when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court."

It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion,
the defense attempted to prove that:

a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of the alleged victim’s maternal grandmother;

b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;

c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated the alleged victim’s private part; and

d) the accused was in Parañaque during the time of the alleged rape.

In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review, the accused-appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:

a) the ill-motive of the victim’s maternal grandmother in prompting her grandchild to file the rape case;

b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and

c) the defense of alibi.

Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the accused-appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal of our judgment of
conviction, we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, the following matters:

a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar to the criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-appellant;

b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense in the Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant from adequately defending himself;

c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance that placed the accused-appellant within the coverage of the Death Penalty Law;

d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial court during the trial of the rape case.
20
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration, the only legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to the Affidavit of Desistance which
touches on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the prosecution of the accused-appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any time, even during appeal. 2

It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by the victim herself
in open court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused
because the latter might do the same sexual assaults to other women." 3 Thus, this is one occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor
inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the Accused-Appellant.

We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,

"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to
buttress the accused’s defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge." 5

In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and
convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no
bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court’s jurisdiction over the case.

II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. 6 One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a
way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having his day in court to defend himself. 7

In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had amply exercised the
required ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of him relative to his client’s defense. As the rape case was being tried on the merits,
Atty. Vitug, from the time he was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the Accused-
Appellant’s Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration of our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in support of his line of defense. There is no indication
of gross incompetency that could have resulted from a failure to present any argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the
preparation of his case against the prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the overwhelming evidence
of the prosecution. The alleged errors committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the new counsel could not have overturned the judgment of conviction
against the Accused-Appellant.

III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do
know that our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law was used to compensate for a wrong done to a private party or
his family, not to punish in the name of the state.

The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization throughout the later generations against past barbarity and the institutionalization of state
power under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an individual person with inherent human rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen
with the duty to serve the common weal and defend and preserve society.

One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government
enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries
and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.

Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the causes of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal laws
have been perceived as relatively stable and functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional
opposition to the death penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under
specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the
Spanish Penal Code of 1870.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the
cases of Harden v. Director of Prison, 8 People v. Limaco, 9 People v. Camano, 10 People v. Puda 11 and People v. Marcos, 12 In Harden, we ruled:

"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that ‘punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.’" 13

Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where
the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that:

". . . there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply
the law regardless of their private opinions." 14

and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion. 15

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide,
murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and
arson resulting in death. The list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-
Subversion Law, which carried the death penalty for leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses were created by more laws, among them, the
Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing with
death, among others, crimes involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.

In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and led to the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was
convened following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by the people.

Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped themselves into working
committees among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.

21
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed bill of rights to the rest of the commission. What is now Article III, Section 19 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:

"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted
to reclusion perpetua."

Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a consensus among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the death penalty should
be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to be done — whether the abolition should be done
by the Constitution or by the legislature — and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:

". . . [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should be done by the
Constitution — in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature — or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty.
And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is no
evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery
over the life of another man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should not
deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons
which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty." 16

The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the debate that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that "never
in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at its zenith during the last decade." 17 Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an
unwillingness to absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave society helpless in the face of a future upsurge of crimes or other similar
emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we abolish the death penalty in the Constitution, we should afford some amount of
flexibility to future legislation," 18 and his concern was amplified by the interpellatory remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate Justice
Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo,
and Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Teodoro C. Padilla put it succinctly in the following exchange with Commissioner Bacani:

"BISHOP BACANI. . . . At present, they explicitly make it clear that the church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital punishment.

MR. PADILLA. . . . So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital punishment.

BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of view, that right of the state is not forbidden.

MR. PADILLA. In fact . . . we have to accept that the state has the delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances.

BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake is whether or not under
the present circumstances that will be for the common good.

MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.

BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that delegation is forever under all
circumstances

MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine, under certain specified conditions or circumstances, whether the retention of the death
penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I do not believe this Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few days or even a month,
determine a positive provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even the legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous crimes, the most
grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and aggravating circumstances." 19

What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the national assembly provides for the death penalty," came from Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo,
however, expressed reservations even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:

". . . [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature. Arguments pro and con have
been given. . . . But my stand is, we should leave this to the discretion of the legislature.

The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after repealing this piece of
legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law and that the legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a constitutional body
like ours. If we will leave the matter of the death penalty to the legislature, let us leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature, but let us not have this half-
baked provision. We have many provisions in the Revised Penal Code imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke or repeal these pieces of legislation by means
of the Constitution, but at the same time say that it is up to the legislature to impose this again.

. . . The temper and condition of the times change . . . and so we, I think we should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes depending on the changing
needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the legislature composed of representatives elected by the people.

I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that we are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this to the legislature, let us
not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust it to the legislature 100 percent." 20

Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23) commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12) voting against it,
followed by more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:

"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."cralaw virtua1aw library

The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special criminal laws and the state
of the scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.

The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra, 21 we stated that "in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua" 22 thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. The constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty for
murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium, which we then, in People v. Masangkay, 23 People v. Atencio 24 and People v. Intino 25
divided into three new periods, to wit, the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium;
and reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the three-grade scheme under the Revised Penal Code. In People v. Munoz, 26 however, we reconsidered
these aforecited cases and after extended discussion, we concluded that the doctrine announced therein did not reflect the intention of the framers. The crux of the
issue was whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then, the aforementioned new three-grade penalty should
replace the old one where the death penalty constituted the maximum period. But if no total abolition can be read from said constitutional provision and the death
22
penalty is only suspended, it cannot as yet be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total inexistence of the death penalty in our
statute books. We thus ruled in Munoz:

"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods,
to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those
who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also
correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.

A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision
merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already
imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough." 27

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing
the death penalty.

The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the
death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and against capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on the policy issue of
death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:

"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES

Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body suspended the Rules of the Senate.

Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of death penalty.

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote on this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would mean a vote in
favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a vote against the
reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the Revised Penal Code.

INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ

x x x

The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first decide the question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed, and thereafter, a
seven-man committee would be formed to draft the compromise bill in accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of the death penalty, the
Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes on which death penalty would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the nominal voting would mean a
vote in favor of death penalty on at least one crime, and that certain refinements on how the penalty would be imposed would be left to the discretion of the seven-
man committee.

x x x

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAÑADA

In reply to Senator Tañada’s query, the Chair affirmed that even if a senator would vote ‘yes’ on the basic policy issue, he could still vote ‘no’ on the imposition of the
death penalty on a particular crime.

REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic policy issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the scale of penalties
found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to the Rules, but if
approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be appointed and whatever course it will take will depend upon the mandate given to it by
the Body later on.

The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino’s observations.

REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO

Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the Revised Penal Code.
However, he pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death penalty, the Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death penalty
is supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it? The death
penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply because the crime is heinous." 28

With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a
penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee was subsequently created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to
said vote. The mandate of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the committee would be the determination of the crimes to be
considered heinous.

On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech. He began with an
explanation as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by amending the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws and includes
provisions that do not define or punish crimes but serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the death penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:

". . . [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the work of drafting a bill, a
compromise bill that would be the subject for future deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to consider that the death penalty was imposed originally in the
Revised Penal Code.

So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons reimpose that penalty on
heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code that was affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as provided in the
Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been repealed — all provisions on the death penalty would be considered as having been repealed by the

23
Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling reasons, reimpose such penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article but many articles of the
Revised Penal Code that were actually affected by the Constitution.

And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional provision that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal Code itself in making this
compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the proposed draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific provisions of the Revised Penal
Code are actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions were totally repealed, and they had to be
reenacted so that the provisions could be retained. And some of them had to be amended because the Committee thought that amendments were proper." 29

In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it would have been better if the Senate were to enact a special law which merely
defined and imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:

". . . [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind that the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the Constitution
abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the Revised Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that where the death penalty has
already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal Code. So we thought that it would
be best to just amend the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes that may be considered as heinous. That is why the bill
is in this form amending the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole trouble is, when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the special bill the case of
murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime for which the death penalty shall be
imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in the case of kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do the same —merely reproduce.
Why will we do that? So we just followed the simpler method of keeping the definition of the crime as the same and merely adding some aggravating circumstances
and reimposing the death penalty in these offenses originally punished in the Revised Penal Code." 30

From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on its provisions.

The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each and every crime for
which the supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the statement in the preamble of the death penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the
alarming upsurge of [heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the case of each and every crime in the death penalty bill, there
was a significantly higher incidence of each crime after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the
majority of the Filipino people, than before such ratification. 31 Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for
the latter to accept the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying the reimposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there
were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina argued that the compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the State has
done everything in its command so that it can be justified to use an inhuman punishment called death penalty." 32 The problem, Senator Lina emphasized, was that
even the re-impositionists admit that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice system that may and must be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse
to the enactment of a death penalty bill was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of compelling reasons. As an initial reaction to
Senator Lina’s contentions, Senator Tolentino explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and refers to all the crimes covered by the bill and not to
specific crimes. He added that one crime may not have the same degree of increase in incidence as the other crimes and that the public demand to impose the death
penalty is enough compelling reason. 33

Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Tañada to whom the battle lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the definition of "heinous crimes" as
provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of compelling reasons for each and every capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly
showed his objections to the bill:

"Senator Tañada. . . . But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are described in the bill or are
crimes heinous because they are punished by death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be punished in the bill?

Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that is not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense is the most
important element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we should consider the relation of the offense to society in order to have a complete idea of the
heinous nature of these offenses.

In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by themselves connected with the effect upon society and the government have made them fall
under the classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of malversation and bribery becomes so grave
and so serious as indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason for the death penalty.

Senator Tañada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President, does the Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which would call for the
reimposition of the death penalty, should be separately, distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will be very clear to one and all that not only are these
crimes heinous but also one can see the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty therefor?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by the Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating the compelling
reason for each and every offense that is included in the substitute measure. That is why in the preamble, general statements were made to show these compelling
reasons. And that, we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would be sufficient notice as to what were considered compelling reasons by the
Congress, in providing the death penalty for these different offenses.

If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would suppose that with the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme Court would feel that it
was the sense of Congress that this preamble would be applicable to each and every offense described or punishable in the measure.

So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for each and every offense.

Senator Tañada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional limitations upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation, especially the provisions on
the Bill of Rights, particularly the one which says that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will clearly define
the acts and the omissions punished as crimes?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law, this is sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will more or less be a
matter of procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the Constitution with respect to due process itself which is a separate matter from the substantive law
as to the definition and penalty for crimes.

Senator Tañada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and these are:

1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;

2. There are compelling reasons; and

24
3. These involve heinous crimes.

Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does the distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state clearly the compelling
reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the bill?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I believe that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we state why a certain
offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised in the Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what the Supreme
Court will fell as a sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The accused can certainly raise the matter of
constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of due process. It will go into the very power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So that would be
entirely separate from the matter of due process." 34

Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill violated our international commitment in support of the worldwide abolition of capital
punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera
clarified, however, that in the United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different committees which vote on them for consideration in the plenary session.
He stressed that unless approved in the plenary session, a declaration would have no binding effect on signatory countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be
deemed irrevocably bound by said covenant and protocol considering that these agreements have reached only the committee level. 35

After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes,
and one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on August 16, 1993.

The Senate’s vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16, 1993 was a vindication of, the House of Representatives. The House had, in the Eight
Congress, earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of the death penalty for certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed
by the Senate when the Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from the House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during the Ninth
Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No.
62 was a merger of House Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955, 1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the Lower House.

In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-impose the death
penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of such power.

"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:

‘Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it. . . .’

The phrase ‘unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an amendment by then Comm.
Christian Monsod.

The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely
suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.

Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:

"‘The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some future time, the people might want to restore death penalty through initiative and referendum.

Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today.

x x x

I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness in which crimes
are now committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a mockery of public peace and order.

In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of heinous crimes — the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses, and many more,
and they are all crying for justice. We ought to listen to them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams, their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious
criminality of a few who put their selfish interest above that of society.

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows
a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are
repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.

Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.

The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two lovely daughters, will stand in the people’s memory for many long years as the epitome of
viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.

The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young business executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self of our people.

The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultman, a comely 16 year-old high school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model someday, at the hands of a
crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the sensibilities of Christians and non-Christians alike.

The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom Castanos, the lovely and promising couple from the University of the Philippines, is eternally
lodged in the recesses of our minds and still makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.

x x x

The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by this body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the overwhelming clamor of
the people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, there are sown the
seeds of anarchy — of self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands and exact vengeance in the nature of personal
vendetta.’

It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill No. 62.

25
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to listen to our constituents and heed their plea — a plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their
happiness under a regime of justice and democracy, and without threat that their loves ones will be kidnapped, raped or butchered.

But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will deter future
animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their selfish interest over and above that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.

Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty." 36

A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of
oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous
crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very
heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of
Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros
Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause:

"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not only for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also for other heinous
crimes such as treason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised Penal Code with or without additionally defined circumstances;
plunder, as defined in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner, driver or occupant
is killed; hijacking, as defined in . . . RA 6235; and arson resulting in the death of any occupants.

All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of its inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of decency and morality in a just and civilized society.

For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad 1 Phil. 437).
By the ‘allegiance’ is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to the government under which they live or to their sovereign in return for
the protection which they receive (52 Am Jur 797).

In kidnapping, the though alone of one’s loved one being held against his or her own will in some unidentified . . . house by a group of scoundrels who are strangers
is enough terrify and send shivers of fear through the spine of any person, even scoundrels themselves.

In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is being punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the commission of the
crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he commits and sees it merely as a form of self-amusement. When a homicide is committed by reason of the robbery, the
culprits are perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other personal property.

In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the parents over the personal shock and suffering of their child but the stigma of the traumatic
and degrading incident which has shattered the victim’s life and permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful
experience of police interrogation and court hearings.

Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the universal hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who are passengers and complement
of the vessel, and because of the fact that, in the high seas, no one may be expected to be able to come to the rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason,
Mr. Speaker, the crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of an entire nation or
nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance of subjecting the passengers to terrorism." 37

The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11, 1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on second reading.

On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House of Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it was up for
consideration on third reading. 38 The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2 abstentions

After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993 and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee
convened to incorporate and consolidate them.

On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the
Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect. 39

Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them,
herein accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case
was elevated to us on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence.

Now, Accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court’s affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A.
7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2)
that the death penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against punishment of such nature.

We reject accused-appellant’s proposition.

Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellant’s view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without complying with the twin
requirements of compelling reasons and heinous crimes.

At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the
following analysis.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes."cralaw virtua1aw library

The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that
Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or
designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this
death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."

In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that

26
". . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society."cralaw virtua1aw library

Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, 40 traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans’ word,
"haineus", meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.

We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the
circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on
society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a
mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and Tañada grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived as a mere
enumeration of capital crimes without a specification of the elements that make them heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that there were two types of crimes in
the death penalty bill: first, there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there were crimes penalized by mandatory capital punishment
upon the attendance of certain specified qualifying circumstances.

Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death:

(1) Treason (Sec. 2);

(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);

(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);

(4) Murder (Sec. 6);

(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);

(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than three days; (b) it was
committed simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);

(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);

(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or edifice; (b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane for public use; (d)
a building or factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or
government museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in an inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned, if the arson is perpetrated
by two or more persons (Sec. 10);

(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or more persons; and (c)
the rape is attempted or frustrated and committed with homicide (Sec. 11);

(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);

(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);

(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs (id.);

(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (id.);

(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);

(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts (id.);

(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)

(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);

(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);

(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and distribution of regulated drugs (id.);

(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec. 15);

(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);

(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);

(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and

(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).

All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. In other words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in each of foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily
penalized with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the
prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the
attendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in any
other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous,
odious, or hateful, or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.

On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed in the following crimes:

27
(1) Qualified bribery

"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.

If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)

(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to dehumanizing acts

"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of death] shall be
imposed." (Sec. 8)

(3) Destructive arson resulting in death

"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." (Sec. 10)

(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and qualified

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

x x x

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.

2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old

5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11)

(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under
this Section be the proximate cause of the death of victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)

(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited
drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.

Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)

(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 14)

(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a
regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.

Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)

(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or officers including members of police agencies and armed forces

"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1), 16, and 19 of
Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if those found guilty or any of the same offenses are government officials, employees or officers
including members of police agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)

(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the mandatory death penalty if convicted are government officials, employees or officers

"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of ‘planting’ any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II
and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the
latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)

(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form

28
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum [of death]
regardless of mitigating circumstances.

The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the
commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)

It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated
like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. The right of a person is not only to live but
to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own
physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political
and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the
very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must
not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory
penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily
penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence
involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion.
This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the
crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.

In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No.
7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals
the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in pari materia with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed
when (1) aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of
the maximum penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A.
No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the
guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of
circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The legislature cannot and need
not foresee and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the
determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing danger of
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing an innocent man or one
criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application of the mandate of
R.A. No. 7659.

In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement that the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
we note that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent demand of the abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every
heinous crime and statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.

We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes
are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences
so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be
frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before grasping it
by the ears and thrashing it to its demission.

The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case such reforms prove
unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by the constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to
resort to that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling
reason required by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in the socio-cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on
February 2, 1987 such as an unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations only of the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of
the conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the incidence of criminality because of
the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death penalty first proves
itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty was
suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the
first place did not require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that there be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.
Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should
first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to
as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been
an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."

We now proceed to answer accused-appellant’s other ground for attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is
violative of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

29
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in
Furman v. Georgia. 41 To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by
the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination
against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the
death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was trekked by American civil rights advocates
zealously fighting against racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:

"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task is not restricted to an
effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or
juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die . . . .

x x x

In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible ‘caste’ aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in
imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised. . . .

x x x

Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with
the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments."cralaw virtua1aw library

Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty
statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any
parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part
of the trial judges and sentencing juries.

Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted their death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks that were required by
the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, 42 Jurek v. Texas, 43 and Profitt
v. Florida. 44

Next, Accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike
murder, does not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention, Accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia.
45

In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:

". . . It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric
or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. It is also established that imposing capital
punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence from the infirmities which led the Court
to invalidate the prior Georgia capital punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia . . . .

x x x

In Gregg [v. Georgia] . . . the Court’s judgment was that the death penalty for deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition of severe punishment nor a
punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty when imposed for other crimes. . . .

That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.

x x x

. . . [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different. In reviving death
penalty laws to satisfy Furman’s mandate, none of the States that had not previously authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital felonies. Of the
16 States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes — Georgia, North
Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts.
When Louisiana and North Carolina, respondent to those decisions, again revised their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not
for rape; none of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States
(in addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes,
included rape among the crimes for which death was an authorized punishment.

x x x

It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a child, and the
rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the death sentence was mandatory. . . . The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction
in the United States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital
punishment when the victim is a child

The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.

. . . [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime
of raping an adult woman.

We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and
autonomy of the female victim and for the latter’s privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the
‘ultimate violation of self.’ It is also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat of force or intimidation, to over come the will and the capacity of
the victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the
community’s sense of security, there is public injury as well.

Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with
murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or
even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim,
30
life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which ‘is unique
in its severity and irrevocability’ . . . is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."cralaw virtua1aw library

The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for
the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that
rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman’s spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of
life.

Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.

Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court’s predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth." We have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining
essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the
perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the
national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have
so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and
the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of
rape, as we have held in the case of People v. Cristobal: 46

"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical
and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act . . . an outrage upon
decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."cralaw virtua1aw library

We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at the heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death
question to which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over death." But dealing with the fundamental question of death provides a context for
struggling with even more basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what the
rights are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.

"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting
zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized hyper fastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we
are to preserve the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquility and civility may rule
comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a . . . necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquility and ought to be retained on
this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival." 47

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED 48 for LACK OF
MERIT.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

Time has transformed man into a highly intellectual and civilized, as well as, I wish to believe, a humane and compassionate, being. The ancient edict of "an eye for
an eye, a tooth for a tooth" has since been abandoned by a society that recognizes the good in every man and gives a transgressor an opportunity to reform.
Somehow, however, certain vestiges of savage retribution still remain; indeed, the taking of a human life continues, at least in some penal systems, to be an
acceptable punishment.

In this country, the issue of whether or not the State should impose the death penalty has recently been resolved with the ratification, on 02 February 1987, of the
Constitution by 76.29% of the electorate. Section 19, Article III, thereof, states:

"Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua."cralaw virtua1aw library

Ours is a rule of law. The Supreme Court is not a political entity; it can merely apply and interpret the law. It cannot, and it will not, spare itself from this
constitutionally-mandated duty. Death penalty cases are not excepted. In the discharge of its grave responsibility, nevertheless, the Court must act with greatest
caution and strictest circumspection for there can be no stake that can be higher, and no penalty that can be graver, than the extinction by the State of human life.

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty now lies with the sound discretion of the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to
the conditions that the fundamental law has set forth, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and

(2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.

It appears to me that the Constitution did not contemplate a simple "reimposition" of the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal
Code or just because of it.

The term "compelling reasons" should be enough to indicate that there must be a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it
distinctively inexorable to mandate the death penalty. That milieu must have turned from bad to worse.

Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the "heinous nature" of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty
must be spelled out with great clarity in the law. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime could become "heinous" within the Constitutional concept when, to
exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death, or in the crime of rape when the offended party is callously humiliated or even
brutally killed by the accused.

I submit that, given the circumstances and the law before us, the Constitutional fiat (now being raised for the first time in the instant Motion for Reconsideration) in the
imposition of the death penalty has not been satisfied.

I, therefore, vote for imposing instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua (the next lower penalty than death).
31
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial
ground for his defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original) Motion for Reconsideration
filed by his previous counsel, 3 this transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court’s
sentence of death. 4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
(Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They
proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty
already imposed" to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces
imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from
the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas exclaimed, 6" (t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty."cralaw virtua1aw library

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that
when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute
books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With
such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it
must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people. 8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some
future time to enable or empower courts to re-impose it on condition that it (Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the
Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

(1) by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and

(2) to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before
it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity’s sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law, prescribes the death penalty on
certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised
Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe.
Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more severe sanction, either collectively for
all the offenses or individually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect
as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: In reviving the death
penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the
meaning of "heinous." Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable
penalty. It did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too
well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

"WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society."

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared
certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the
presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the
description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and
renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations.
Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case,
it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.
32
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or
absence of aggravating circumstances. 16 There’s nothing really new that Congress did which it could not have otherwise done had such provision not been included
in our fundamental law.

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the
possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already so
punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws. In short, Sec. 19, Article III of the Constitution did not have any impact upon the legislative action. It
was effectively ignored by Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

"So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death
as the maximum penalty."

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the charter’s effectivity, Congress, I submit, has
not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same
crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from
our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also
from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible
crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim." 20 Note that the honorable
commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I
believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already
existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:

1) the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until
then; or

2) even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter perversity, odiousness or
malevolence; or

3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness
as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in
a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the
capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble
and inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed
aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we should not
preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons"
requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel
Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

"MR. LAGMAN:
So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker?. . .

MR. GARCIA (P.).

The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN.
So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the
alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one of the compelling reasons. But before we dissect this particular "compelling reason,"
may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.)

Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.
Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.
Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained
at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstance after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the
penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN.

33
The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons
which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the
offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands
that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.

x x x

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice." With all due respect I submit that these grounds
are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the
Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between
1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted.

Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:

"MR. LAGMAN.
Very good, Mr. Speaker. Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN.
So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.
That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.
Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was reduced
from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN.
Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN.
No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN.
This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.
Obviously the Gentleman would agree with me, Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a
crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

This is what the statistics say. I understand we are reading now from the same document.

MR. LAGMAN.
Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.)

As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN.
But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

The document speaks for itself ."

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year
1987 as compared to 1991:
34
"Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in
1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death
penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991."cralaw virtua1aw library

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous
crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between
the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof.

This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely.
28 This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of
the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where
the right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that" (n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact
fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life
of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the people’s rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property, for people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict
application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech, assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most important of these rights is the
right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The
"Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

"(1) Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end
of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month, double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January
to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average of capital sentences
imposed in 1995.

(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty-one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn
between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent
(4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent
(4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn
subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.

(3) Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these
earn below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty-six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class;
only one (1) earns P30,000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are
unsure of their monthly income. Twenty-two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.

(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal husbandry; of these, thirty (30), or almost one-fifth
thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and construction industry, with thirty-one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields
(carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty-seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers.
Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors),
twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks, janitors,
MERALCO employee and clerk). About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even
CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.

(5) None of the DRC’s use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog;
twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan,
Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.

(6) Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with twenty-seven
(27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty-eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them
graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all."

The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless
in society — those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are
required. The best example to show the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings ill the trial court and even before this Court until the Free Legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.

35
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are
themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in
the minds of the latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and
that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the
unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a strange and
incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect
of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be a certain class or classes of people in our society who, by
reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal
environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be
more precise, such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged
are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that
in spite of themselves, they can be powered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone
ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people and
nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none
other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of
reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.

(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitutional right against the death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.

(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused because such a statute denigrates the
Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the underprivileged.

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.

(5) Congressional power to prescribe death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

(a) First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime
and itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances define or characterize the crime as "heinous" .

(b) Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling the enactment of the
law. It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.

(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally
and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is a fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While
the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits
such prerogative only to "cases of extreme gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 40a "punishment must be
carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would
not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize
the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital
punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only for reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes
of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling
reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH, as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, Jan. 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution
of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:

The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO
may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that
Congress may repeal a law.
36
Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the
present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has
transcended its power of judicial review.
At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to
wit:

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.

The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;

The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman
Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-
imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter, and
urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen
(113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor
on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address
incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that
the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on
petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999
merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999.
Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer
restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle
that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma
of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are
clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar
as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17
contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of
the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of
the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP

Acting Chief

Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a
Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary
Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the
Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that
sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections
17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court.
Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same
judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2

xxx xxx xxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between
the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become
final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.5

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has
unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz:
37
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the
cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does
not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then
passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event
are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the
penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the
executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state
this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen
the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is
ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under
investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests
the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil
or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust
the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when
by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the
execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to
popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can
diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final
decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out
the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and
supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in
criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to
enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under
the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with
legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10 Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules
of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70%
in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his
ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only
this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its function,
as is the case with the law in question." 12 The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More
completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however,
may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules
governing the integration of the Bar. 13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5),
Article VIII provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

38
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of
the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the
process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case
at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no
less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma
A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated
execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to
the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the
appropriate relief" state:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter
alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as
renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the
appropriate relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control over
the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code,
insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the
discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency
powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which
provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied)
For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence
of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the
Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date at execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights)
and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right
therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What
may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that
whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7,
1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose
petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the
Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and
they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of
litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive
ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public
respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the
President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses
collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing
the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power.
It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the
same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an
amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be
39
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to
save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the
United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over
arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect
the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by
those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked
several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his
executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be
granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and
Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital
punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five
(5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations
about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the
Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading
under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than
one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that
enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked
clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as
Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining
the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress,
unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among
others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life
was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will
not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its
citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital
punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the
death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.

The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;

The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled
"Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty,
notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all
means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon
session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments formally
adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review
Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes
in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably
never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral
predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and
righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate
deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure
that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the
Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than
the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law
cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass
their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of
the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.

Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

40
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth
by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death
sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things,
of what had been stated to be indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of
the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since for the
Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final
judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the
State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions.
Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening
events warrant it.1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The
pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus —

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio
suo, according to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been
affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power
over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution and the
executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state
this principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen
the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution,
functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement . . ..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the
prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally
incompatible and may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not prevent either the
President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the duration of the present regular session of
Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law
imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law,
then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for
its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In
People vs. Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the
conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the
capital offense must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be a
marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of
the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most
importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must
be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each
case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily
subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The
indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction,
not too unlikely beyond what might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims
and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most
respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue
that is fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent
thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the
majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will
not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any
event, the President will veto any such repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of
the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the
requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in
41
various death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of
my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit
with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that
death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means of lethal injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial
ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration
filed by his previous counsel,3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's
sentence of death.4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They
proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty
already imposed" to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces
imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from
the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried
out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed,6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that
when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute
books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With
such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it
must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some
future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress)9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the
Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before
it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on
certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised
Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe.
Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for
all the offenses or individually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect
as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death
penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

42
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning
of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It
did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware
of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared
certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the
presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the
description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and
renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations.
Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case,
it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or
absence of aggravating circumstances. 16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the
possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery,17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already to
punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death
as the maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has
not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same
crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from
our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also
from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible
crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable
commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I
believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already
existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:

the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until
then; or
even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter perversity, odiousness or
malevolence; or
the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as
to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in
a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the
capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble
and inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed
aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we should not
preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons"
requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel
Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the
death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice
was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

43
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be
punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers
to reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty
for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time,
justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit that these grounds
are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the
Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between
1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives
Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty
was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of
robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40
percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from the same document.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent.
Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I
have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year
1987 as compared to 1991: 25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death
penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous
crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between
the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the
same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
44
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow
weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of
its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of
the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where
the right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact
fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life
of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict
application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most important of these rights is the
right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The
"Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of
1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January to
June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed
in 1995.
Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn
between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent
(4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent
(4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn
subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.
Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn
below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only
one (1) earns P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are
unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth
thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields
(carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers.
Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors),
twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors,
MERALCO employee and clerk) About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even
CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty
six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense
and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27)
graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating
from high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless
in society — those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are
required. The best example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are
themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender
in the minds of the latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and
that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the
unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a strange and
incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect
of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people in our society who, by
reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal
environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be
more precise, such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged
are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that
in spite of themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that
everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people
and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none
other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of
reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

45
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.

(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.

(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused because such a stature denigrates the
Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the underprivileged.

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.

(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and
itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances define or characterize the crime as "heinous".

Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law.
It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally
and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the
Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such
prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and
ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend
society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize
the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital
punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of
"extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling
reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth
by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death
sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things,
of what had been stated to be indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of
the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since for the
Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final
judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the
State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions.
Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening
events warrant it.1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The
pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus —

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio
suo, according to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been
affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power
over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution and the
executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state
this principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen
the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution,
functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement . . ..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the
prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally
46
incompatible and may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not prevent either the
President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the duration of the present regular session of
Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law
imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law,
then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for
its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In
People vs. Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the
conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the
capital offense must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be a
marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of
the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most
importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must
be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each
case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily
subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The
indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction,
not too unlikely beyond what might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims
and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most
respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue
that is fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent
thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the
majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will
not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any
event, the President will veto any such repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of
the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the
requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in
various death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of
my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit
with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that
death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means of lethal injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial
ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration
filed by his previous counsel,3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's
sentence of death.4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They
proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty

47
already imposed" to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces
imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from
the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried
out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed,6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that
when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute
books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With
such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it
must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some
future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress)9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the
Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before
it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on
certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA

7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3)
by amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe.
Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for
all the offenses or individually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect
as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death
penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning
of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It
did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware
of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared
certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the
presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the
description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and
renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations.
Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case,
it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or
absence of aggravating circumstances. 16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the
possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery,17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already to
punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death
as the maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has
not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same
crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from
our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also
from the charter debates on this matter.

48
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible
crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable
commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I
believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already
existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:

the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until
then; or
even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter perversity, odiousness or
malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness
as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in
a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the
capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble
and inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed
aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we should not
preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons"
requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel
Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the
death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice
was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be
punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers
to reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty
for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time,
justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit that these grounds
are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the
Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between
1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives
Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty
was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.
49
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of
robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40
percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from the same document.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent.
Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I
have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year
1987 as compared to 1991: 25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in
1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death
penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous
crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between
the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the
same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow
weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of
its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of
the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where
the right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact
fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life
of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict
application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most important of these rights is the
right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The
"Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of
1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January to
June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed
in 1995.
Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn
between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent
(4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent
(4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn
subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.
50
Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn
below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only
one (1) earns P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are
unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth
thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields
(carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers.
Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors),
twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors,
MERALCO employee and clerk) About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even
CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty
six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense
and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27)
graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating
from high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless
in society — those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are
required. The best example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are
themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender
in the minds of the latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and
that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the
unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a strange and
incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect
of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people in our society who, by
reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal
environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be
more precise, such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged
are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that
in spite of themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that
everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people
and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none
other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of
reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.
The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.
Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused because such a stature denigrates the
Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the underprivileged.
Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and
itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances define or characterize the crime as "heinous".
Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law.
It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.

In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and
collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the
Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such
prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and
ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend
society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize
the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital
punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of
"extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling
reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.
51
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Pagdayawon vs Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 154569, Sept. 23, 2002

ROLANDO PAGDAYAWON, EDDIE SERNADILLA, FILEMON SERRANO, ALFREDO NARDO, JIMMY JACOB, RAMIL RAYOS, RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO
LARA, ROMEO NAVARETTE, ROLLY ABULENCIA, SANDY HINTO, CARLITO OLIVA, REYNALDO REBATO, ALEJANDRO GUNTANG, BLESSIE VELASCO,
JUAN MANALO, FIDEL ALBORIDA, NONILITO ABINON, PABLO SANTOS, IRENEO PADILLA, ALEJO MIASCO, CASTRO GERABAN, LEONARDO MORIAL,
RAMSHAND THAMSEY, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO, ROCHIE IBAO, JAIME CARPO, NOEL QUIMSOM, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISONS, THE PRESIDING JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS OF: [1] DAVAO CITY (BRANCH 33), [2] PASIG CITY (BRANCH 256, [3] MARIKINA CITY (BRANCH 272), [4]) LEGAZPI CITY, ALBAY (BRANCH
3), [5] NASUGBU, BATANGAS (BRANCH 14), [6] SAN CARLOS CITY, PAGANSINAN, [7] BAYOMBONG, NUEVA ECIJA (BRANCH 29), [8] URDANETA CITY
(BRANCH 46), [9] MALABON (BRANCH 170, [10] PARAÑAQUE CITY (BRANCH 259), [11] CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY (BRANCH 19, [12]. MALOLOS, BULACAN
(BRANCH 78), [13] ILOILO CITY (BRANCH 2), [14] CALAMBA CITY, LAGUNA (BRANCH 34), [15] MASSIN, LEYTE (BRANCH 24), [16] PAYALAN CITY, NUEVA
ECIJA (BRANCH 40), [17] PASIG CITY (BRANCH 166), [18] DAVAO CITY (BRANCH 17) [19] BULAN, SORSOGON (BRANCH 65), [20] BATANGAS CITY
(BRANCH 84), [21] TAYUG, PANGASINAN (BRANCH 51), [22] LIGAO, ALBAY (BRANCH 11) and all others acting under their control, supervision and instruction
relative to the issuance of the death warrants and the execution of the death sentences against petitioners, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM, J.:

At bar is the petition filed by thirty (30) 1 death row inmates which seeks (1) to enjoin the execution of their respective death sentences in view of the possible repeal
of laws authorizing the imposition of the death penalty by Congress and (2) a reexamination of RA 7659 2 and RA 8177 3 with the end in view of declaring them
unconstitutional.

It is well-settled that the Supreme Court has the power to control the enforcement of its decisions, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to
stay the execution of a death sentence which is already final. In the case of Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice 4 this Court, quoting from an early cases 5 held that:

"This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated. When in cases of
appeal or review the case has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the
proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the Judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ
of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide
for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the
executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefore can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) by command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state
this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen
the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is
ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement." (Emphasis supplied)

However, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioners cannot validly invoke our resolutions in the foregoing case of Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice in
support of their application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Certain portions of our Resolution dated January 4, 1999 cited by herein petitioners give
the impression that the possibility that Congress might rethink its position on the death penalty appears to be the primordial basis for staying Echegaray’s execution.
That is certainly no more than an initial impression. A close look at the peculiar circumstances obtaining at that time will put the matter in its proper perspective.

In our subsequent Resolution dated January 19, 1999, we took extra effort to emphasize the fact that Congress was not in session and this Court was on its
traditional recess until January 18, 1999 when Echegaray, through counsel, filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order on December
28, 1998. Hence, on January 4, 1999, moments before his scheduled execution, we issued a temporary restraining order during a special session called by Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. to deliberate on petitioner’s very urgent motion. Extreme caution, not haste, had to be taken for fear that any error of the Court in not
stopping the execution of the petitioner would preclude any further relief. In other words, time constraints necessitated the issuance of a temporary restraining order
in that case.

The mere pendency of a bill in either or both houses Congress should not per se warrant outright issuance of a temporary restraining order to stay the execution of a
death sentence that has become final. In fact, being speculative, it is not and should not be considered as a ground 6 for a stay of a death sentence. While
newspaper reports indicate the supposed acquiescence of a number of senators and congressmen to the abolition of the death penalty, such is by no means an
assurance that these same legislators will eventually vote for the modification or repeal of the law.

Consequently, the petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order should be denied.

Regarding the prayer for a re-examination of RA 7659 and RA 8177, suffice it to state that the constitutionality of the said Acts has been amply passed upon by this
Court in People v. Echegaray 7 and sustained in the later case of People v. Mercado 8 wherein the following rulings were made:

1. The death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state’s power to "secure society against the threatened and
actual evil."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. The offenses for which RA 7659 provides the death penalty satisfy "the element of heinousness" bar specifying the circumstances which generally qualify a crime
to be punishable by death.

3. RA 7659 provides both procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application.

4. The Constitution does not require that "a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven" before
the death penalty may be prescribed. Congress is authorized under the Constitution to determine when the elements of heinousness and compelling reasons are
present, and the Court would exceed its own authority if it questioned the exercise of such discretion.

Three justices of this Court maintain that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the majority view that the
law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed.

52
To be sure, the specific grounds raised by the petitioners in the instant petition, viz., that RA 7659 does not comply with constitutional requirement of "compelling
reasons Involving heinous crimes" under Section 19(1) Article III of the 1987 Constitution that it promotes arbitrariness for lack of objective standards in determining
whether a crime is heinous or not, are a rehash of the arguments already ruled upon by this Court in the two above-cited cases.

Neither does the substantial change in the composition of the Court since the promulgation of People v. Muñoz 9 and People v. Echegaray 10 warrant the re-
examination of RA 7659 and RA 8177. The validity or the constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who
compose the Court. The Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined what the law is (e.g. RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional) in the subject cases
and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change in its composition. Otherwise, we shall see the specter of the same or similar petition every three
or four years as new members are appointed to the Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In the meantime, perhaps the remedy lies not in the Supreme Court but in the Office of the President to which any plea for reprieve (or even pardon) ought to be
properly addressed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.

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9. People vs Galas G.R. No. 139413, March 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENDRICO GALAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Endrico Galas was charged with three counts of rape upon the complaint of his 15-year old daughter Sharon under the following informations 1:

"CRIMINAL CASE NO. 0333

That on or about the 5th day of February 1997 in the municipality of Sibunag, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused being the father of one Sharon Galas his fifteen (15) year old daughter, by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did lie and have carnal knowledge of said Sharon Galas without her consent and against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 0334

That on or about the 28th day of February 1997, in the municipality of Sibunag, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused being the father one Sharon Galas his fifteen (15) year old daughter, by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did lie and have carnal knowledge of said Sharon Galas without her consent and against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 0335

That on or about the month of July 1997, in the municipality of Sibunag, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused being the father of one Sharon Galas his fifteen (15) year old daughter, by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did lie and have carnal knowledge of said Sharon Galas without her consent and against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

The accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned on April 28, 1998. At the hearing on May 7, 1999, Accused manifested through counsel his desire to change his plea
of not guilty in the three cases to a plea of guilty only in Criminal Case No. 0334, which referred to the rape incident on February 28, 1997. His desire to change his
plea was reiterated at the hearing on June 3, 1999. Re-arraigned on February 28, 1997, the accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty in Criminal Case
No. 0334.

The prosecution presented the complainant as witness. Sharon recounted in detail the rape incident that occurred on February 5, 1997 and on February 28, 1997 in
the house of her grandmother, where she was then living with her father 2 . She testified that her father again had intercourse with her in July 1997 in the same
house, but she could not recall the time, and that the accused would have intercourse with her anytime he likes 3 . Her menstruation stopped in May 1997; the
accused gave her Medicol and boiled malunggay and her menstruation occurred again on July 4, 1997 4 . She was brought to the social worker and later to the
police station where her statement was taken. A medical examination conducted on August 7, 1997 at Guimaras Provincial Hospital by the rural health physician
confirmed loss of virginity and healed hymenal lacerations.

The accused was found guilty in Criminal Case No. 0334. Criminal Cases Nos. 0333 and 0335 5 were ordered dismissed thus:

"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against his daughter and is sentenced to suffer a penalty of DEATH.

Accused is also directed to indemnify the complainant the amount of P100,000.00, broken as follows:

P70,000.00 — by way of indemnity;

P30,000.00 — as moral and exemplary damages.

Criminal Cases Nos. 0333 and 0335 are ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

Criminal Case No. 0334 is before us on automatic review.

The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in his brief:

53
"I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON THE
BASIS OF AN IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY.

II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT." 6

Accused-appellant claims that his plea of guilt was improvidently made as he was not fully appraised of the consequences of his change of plea of not guilty to guilty.
The trial court failed to inform the accused that the imposable penalty is still death despite his change of plea. Accused-appellant further claims that the prosecution
failed to prove the true age of the victim.

The contention that the accused-appellant made an improvident plea of guilt is correct. The record of the proceedings upon his re-arraignment shows that when the
accused entered a plea of guilty on the February 28, 1997 incident, he was informed that because of his plea "he will be punished by reclusion perpetua or death" .

"COURT: Re-arraign the accused on the February 28, 1997 incident.

INTERPRETER:

(Reading the Information before the accused in the local dialect which he understood)

Q: Did you understand what has been read to you?

ACCUSED:

A: Yes, ma’am

INTERPRETER:

Q: Do you admit what is being charged or what has been read to you. What is your plea?

ACCUSED:

A: I am admitting the charges against me. I enter a plea of guilty on the 28 February 1997 incident.

INTERPRETER (to court)

Your Honor, the accused pleads guilty.

COURT: Atty. Calanza, have you informed your client of the effect and import of his plea?

ATTY. CALANZA: Yes, Your Honor. In fact the accused had been arraigned on three (3) informations where he entered a plea of not guilty. After pondering on the
charges against him, the accused changed his mind and told me that he will enter a plea of guilty on the 28 February 1997 incident only. We are in fact thankful to
the prosecutor and the complainant because they agreed to our bargaining. The delay on the trial, Your Honor, is because of our haggling with the prosecutor and
the complainant to agree on our bargaining.

COURT: But did you inform your client on the possible penalty which shall be meted to him?

ATTY. CALANZA: Yes, Your Honor. I told him that because of his intended plea of guilty he will be punished by reclusion perpetua or death.

COURT: Did he understand what reclusion perpetua is and what death is?

ATTY. CALANZA: Yes, Your Honor, I explained it to him exhaustively.

COURT: (to the accused in the local dialect)

Q: Did you understand the information which was read to you?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Did you understand that the information tells you that the complaint was filed against you by Sharon Galas, your daughter?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Did you understand that the information which was read to you says that you have carnal knowledge with your daughter Sharon Galas without her consent and
against her will?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Did you also understand that you have a carnal knowledge with your daughter by means of force and intimidation as read in the information?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Do you know that because of your plea of guilty you may be meted a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Did your lawyer inform you about this?

ACCUSED:
A: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: (to accused) Despite that you entered a plea of guilty?

54
ACCUSED: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: Now, after having been informed of that effect and import of your plea of guilt wherein you be meted a penalty of reclusion or death, do you still insist on
your plea of guilty?

ACCUSED: Yes, Your Honor, I admit. 7

Nowhere in the proceedings was it explained to the accused that the penalty imposable is death even if he pleads guilty. We are inclined to agree with the accused-
appellant that had he been so informed, he would not have changed his plea and voluntarily accept the imposition of a death penalty. This Court has held 8 that it is
mandatory for the trial court to accomplish three things to avoid an improvident plea of guilt, namely: 1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the accused’s plea; 2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise decree of his culpability and
3) inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. It is not enough to inquire as to the voluntariness
of the plea; the court must explain fully to the accused that once convicted, he could be meted the death penalty. Death is a single and indivisible penalty and will be
imposed regardless of the presence of a mitigating circumstance. 9 The importance of the court’s obligation cannot be overemphasized for one cannot dispel the
possibility that the accused may have been led to believe that due to his voluntary plea of guilt, he may be imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not
death. 10

Moreover, the record also does not show whether the accused was asked whether or not he wished to present evidence in his behalf and that if desired, he was
allowed to do so. After the presentation of the witnesses for the prosecution, namely Sharon Galas, 11 Dr. Tomas Saiton, Jr. 12 and Dra. Cynthia Amatril 13 , the
prosecution presented its documentary Exhibits 14 , and promulgation of judgment was forthwith set for June 22, 1999.

Accordingly, we hold that the plea of guilt entered by accused-appellant on June 3, 1999 should be disregarded and set aside.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it is believed that the evidence for the prosecution adequately established the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. This Court has held that the manner by which the plea of guilt was made, whether improvidently or not, loses its legal significance where the conviction is
based on the evidence proving the commission of the accused of the offense charged 15 . Complainant Sharon recounted in clear detail the rape incident that
occurred on February 28, 1997, thus:

"PROSECUTOR NIELO: (to witness)

Q: On the night of February 28, 1997, can you recall where were you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you?
A: There at our house.
Q: While you were at your house was your father also there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In the evening, did your father tell you anything?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he tell you?
A: He told me to turn off the lamp and then he ordered me to take off my dress.
Q: Where were you when your father told you to turn off the lamp?
A: There inside our house.
Q: Was that in the room where you were sleeping or in the sala?
A: There inside our house because we were about to sleep
Q: When you were about to sleep and your father who were the other person in the night of February 18 in the room or the portion of the house where you were
sleeping?
A: In our room only the two (2) of us and in the other room my aunt and her husband.
Q: So, there were only the two (2) of you in the night of February 28, 1997?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of lamp was that when your father told you to put off?
A: A kerosene lamp.
Q: And did you put off the lamp?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said he ordered you to undress. Did you undress?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you not resist?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why did you not resist?
A: Even if I will resist I could not overcome him because he is big and he had a bolo.
Q: When you undressed yourself, what did your father do?
A: He (took) off his clothes.
Q: What else?
A: He straddled on me.
Q: When you said undressed, you removed your shirt. What kind of clothes you were wearing when your father ordered you to undress?
A: T-shirt and short.
Q: And did you remove your t-shirt?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you remove your short?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about your panty? Were you having a panty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Was your father wearing trouser when you said he removed his shirt?
A: No, he was wearing short.
Q: What did your father do with his short? Did he remove his short?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was your father wearing a brief?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do with his brief? Did he remove his brief?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After you undressed yourself as ordered by your father and when he was already naked or after he removed his shirt and brief, what did your father do?
A: He straddled on me and kissed me and then inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: While kissing you, did he fondled your breast?
A: Yes, sir.
55
Q: What about your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was he able to insert his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after inserting his penis what did he do? Did he push and pull?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he was making that motion, was his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you not push him?
A: I pushed him but I cannot overcome him.
Q: And then when your father inserted his penis inside your vagina were you on the bed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, after your father inserted his penis and have that push and pull motion, what did he do?
A: Something warm came off from him and then there is blood in the blanket and he turned his back.
Q: Did you say anything to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you tell him?
A: I asked him, "Tay, why are you doing this to me?"
Q: And what did he say?
A: None." 16

Sharon’s testimony was corroborated by the rural health physician, Dr. Saiton, who testified on his findings in the medical certificate 17 that the victim had "hymenal
laceration old healed at 12, 3, 6 and 9 o’clock position", and his assessment "physical virginity lost" .

We affirm the trial court’s findings that the accused-appellant’s culpability was established by the evidence, particularly the clear and positive testimony of the child
victim herself. Although there was admittedly no physical resistance, Sharon testified that the accused always had a bolo with him and although complainant pushed
him she could not overcome the accused. The court correctly observed that this being a crime committed by a father against his daughter, the moral ascendancy and
influence of the father substitutes for violence or intimidation 18 .

Anent the imposable penalty, Section 11 of R. A. No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the following
attendant circumstance:

"When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."cralaw virtua1aw library

The information in Criminal Case No. 0334 alleged that the accused-appellant was the father of Sharon and that Sharon is fifteen (15) years old. Sharon testified that
she was seventeen (17) years old on June 3, 1999 when she testified in court 19 and that the accused-appellant is her father. 20 The accused-appellant admitted
that he was the father of Sharon when the information was read to him upon his arraignment 21 .

However, no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove Sharon’s age at the time she was raped other than her statement in court while describing her
personal circumstances, that she was seventeen (17) years old at the time she testified on June 3, 1999. Such casual testimony of the victim as to her age is not
sufficient.

To justify the imposition of death, proof of the victim’s age is indubitable. There must be sufficient and clear evidence proving her age, even if not denied by the
accused. 22 A duly certified certificate of his birth accurately showing the complainant’s age or some other authentic documents such as a baptismal certificate or a
school record, has been recognized as competent evidence 23 .

While it may be true that the testimony of a person as to her age, although hearsay, is admissible as evidence of family tradition 24 , we cannot consider Sharon’s
statement at the beginning of her testimony describing her personal circumstances as proof of age beyond reasonable doubt that we have considered indispensable
in the criminal prosecution of cases involving the extreme penalty of death. No corroborative or supporting evidence was presented by the prosecution. Although a
"certified transcription copy" of a certificate of live birth of Sharon Galas is found on page 10 of the Record of the preliminary investigation held by the 16th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Jordan, Guimaras, this document was not presented in evidence during the trial. Accordingly, it does not form part of the record of the case 25
and not having been formally offered nor marked as an exhibit, it cannot be considered as evidence nor be given evidentiary value 26 .

Accordingly, the accused-appellant may only be convicted of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. With respect to civil liability the court reduces
the award of civil indemnity to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and increases the moral damages to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), an award inherently
concomitant to and resulting from the odiousness of rape 27 . An award of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of exemplary damages is likewise justified
to deter similar perversities as the rape of one’s own daughter.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Endrico Galas is convicted of simple rape in Criminal Case No.
0334 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify Sharon Galas in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., is on leave.

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10. Arceta vs Judge Mangrobang G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004

OFELIA V. ARCETA, petitioner, vs. The Honorable MA. CELESTINA C. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro
Manila, respondent.

x--------------------------x

G.R. No. 153151 June 15, 2004

GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner, vs. The Honorable EDWIN B. RAMIZO, Presiding Judge, Branch 53, Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:
56
For resolution are two consolidated1 petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporary restraining
order. Both assail the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, also known as Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

In G.R. No. 152895, petitioner Ofelia V. Arceta prays that we order the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Navotas, Metro Manila, Branch 54, to cease and desist
from hearing Criminal Case No. 1599-CR for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and then dismiss the case against her. In G.R. No. 153151, petitioner Gloria S. Dy also prays
that this Court order the MeTC of Caloocan City to cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 212183, and subsequently dismiss the case against
her. In fine, however, we find that what both petitioners seek is that the Court should revisit and abandon the doctrine laid down in Lozano v. Martinez,2 which upheld
the validity of the Bouncing Checks Law.

The facts of these cases are not in dispute.

1. G.R. No. 152895

The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1599-
CR. The accusatory portion of said Information reads:

That on or about the 16th day of September 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to OSCAR R. CASTRO, to apply on account or for value the check described below:

Check No.: 00082270

Drawn Against: The Region Bank
In the Amount of: ₱740,000.00
Date: December 21, 1998
Payable to: Cash
said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue Ofelia V. Arceta did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason "DRAWN AGAINST
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS," and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned out
that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus go
against prevailing jurisprudence.

On October 21, 2002,4 Arceta was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should be without prejudice to the
present petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court.

Arceta then filed the instant petition.

2. G.R. No. 153151

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed by the MeTC of Caloocan
City as Criminal Case No. 212183. Dy allegedly committed the offense in this wise:

That on or about the month of January 2000 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Check No. 0000329230 drawn against PRUDENTIAL BANK in the amount of
₱2,500,000.00 dated January 19, 2000 to apply for value in favor of ANITA CHUA well knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was subsequently dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and
with intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check has
been dishonored and had not been paid.

Contrary to Law.5

Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any move on her
part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges on said ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition with this Court invoking its
power of judicial review to have the said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.

Both Arceta and Dy raise the following identical issues for our resolution:

[a] Does section 1 really penalize the act of issuing a check subsequently dishonored by the bank for lack of funds?

[b] What is the effect if the dishonored check is not paid pursuant to section 2 of BP 22?

[c] What is the effect if it is so paid?

[d] Does section 2 make BP 22 a debt collecting law under threat of imprisonment?

[e] Does BP 22 violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for non-payment of debt?

[f] Is BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power of the state?6

After minute scrutiny of petitioners’ submissions, we find that the basic issue being raised in these special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
concern the unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise put, the petitions constitute an oblique attack on the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks
Law, a matter already passed upon by the Court through Justice (later Chief Justice) Pedro Yap almost two decades ago. Petitioners add, however, among the
pertinent issues one based on the observable but worrisome transformation of certain metropolitan trial courts into seeming collection agencies of creditors whose
complaints now clog the court dockets.

But let us return to basics. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very
lis mota of the case.7 Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of
Congress. With due regard to counsel’s spirited advocacy in both cases, we are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites have been adequately met.
57
Perusal of these petitions reveals that they are primarily anchored on Rule 65, Section 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In a special civil action of certiorari
the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.9 Yet nowhere in
these petitions is there any allegation that the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A special civil action
for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is manifested.10

Noteworthy, the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any attachments or annexes in the form of a copy of an order, decision, or resolution issued by the
respondent judges so as to place them understandably within the ambit of Rule 65. What are appended to the petitions are only copies of the Informations in the
respective cases, nothing else. Evidently, these petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and appropriate cases
contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this Court’s power of judicial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their faces petitioners have
not come to us with sufficient cause of action.

Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart before the horse, figuratively speaking. Simply put, they have ignored the hierarchy of courts
outlined in Rule 65, Section 411 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the
matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings
in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on
the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the proceedings below. Needless to emphasize,
this Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.12 Taking into
account the early stage of the trial proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature.

Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative.13 We have examined the contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation
transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of petitioner Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing
Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As we stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling
reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be
deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing
checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.

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11. Cudia vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 110815, Jan. 16, 1998
G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998

RENATO CUDIA, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON. CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch
LVI, Angeles City, Respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner assails the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing his petition and finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy by the
filing of a second information against him, although a first information charging the same offense had been previously dismissed, over petitioner's vigorous
opposition.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat, 2 Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for
possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter
conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control one (1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six
(6) live ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence without having the necessary authority and permit to carry the same.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 (Emphasis petitioner's.)

The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter the Angeles City RTC). Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner
pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had
committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTC as to who
would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving
crimes committed outside of the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.

On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor
in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating "that thru inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled
into hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and
ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga" 4 and that the Provincial Prosecutor
had filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which two separate informations for the same offense had been filed against petitioner. The latter
filed his opposition to the motion, but the trial court nonetheless, granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3, 1990.

On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition - for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition - would violate his
right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petition could not have been convicted under the
first information as the same was defective. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.

58
Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILE THE
FIRST INFORMATION.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION FILED AGAINST
THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.

We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.

Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense . . ." Pursuant to this
provision, Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides in part that "(w)hen an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, . . . "

In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. 5

In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the existence of the following:

(a) Court of competent jurisdiction

(b) Valid complaint or information

(c) Arraignment

(d) Valid plea

(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. 6

It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded "not guilty" therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express
consent, nay, over his opposition even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether the first two requisites have been met.

As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. The
Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the case. In
the words of the Solicitor General:

The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal
cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202
SCRA 77). Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56. 7

It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or
defining its jurisdiction. Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the
Philippines, dated January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve are hereby defined as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

PAMPANGA

xxx xxx xxx

1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City - comprising ANGELES CITY and the municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as part
of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the
Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks in the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by
mere administrative policy of any trial court.

With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense
having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:

Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions
and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall
receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of
Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. 8 It must be exhibited or presented by the
prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. 9

59
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. 10 As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as
formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,
11 questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view,
an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent. 12

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient
because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot
be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution.
Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. 13

Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and
penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. 14 To rule
otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor
and the accused.

Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say
that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals 15 has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the
same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.

In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on
the strength thereof.

As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary
to invoke double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

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12. Flores vs Joven G.R. No. 129874, Dec. 27, 2002

JOAN M. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO C. JOVEN, Presiding Judge of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
and EMMANUEL NAVARRO, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by complainant Joan M. Flores assailing the Order dated March 4, 1997
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bislig, Surigao del Sur (Branch 29) in Criminal Case No. 1736-B, granting respondent-accused Emmanuel Navarro’s Motion to
Quash the Amended Information, and the Order dated May 6, 1997, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.1

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On January 23, 1996, petitioner caused the filing of a criminal complaint for Rape against respondent Navarro and nine other persons, namely, Alex Tañag, Ramil
Toledo, Benjie Pasukin, Marcial Plaza, Jr., Rodulfo Codira alias "Babie", Robert Piodo, Daniel Equibal, Judy Duron and Jorge Azaria, as principals by direct
participation.2 After preliminary investigation, an Information dated June 14, 1996 was filed with the trial court, accusing Navarro and his other co-accused of the
crime of Rape, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1736-B.

On October 18, 1996, before all the accused can be arraigned, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1736-B on the ground that it
does not sufficiently describe the crime of rape in any of its forms under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.3 On October 23, 1996, the trial court issued an order
re-setting the arraignment as the prosecution intends to file several other cases of rape against the accused.4

On November 27, 1996, an Amended Information for Rape was filed in Criminal Case No. 1736-B against Navarro, as the principal accused, committed as follows:

"That on or about the hours from 8:30 o’clock to 11 o’clock in the evening of January 18, 1996 at Purok 7, Gordonas Village, John Bosco District, Barangay
Mangagoy, Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, "the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other for a common purpose, with lewd and unchaste designs, and by means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloneously (sic) to wit: accused EMMANUEL NAVARRO has(sic) sexual intercourse with one Joan Flores, against the latters will, while accused Alex Tanag,
Ramil Toledo, Benjie Pasokin y Madis, Marcial Plaza, Jr. y Cubil, Rodulfo Codira alias Babie, Roberto Plodo y Ampalayo, Daniel Equibal y Degorio, Judy Doron y
Quita and Jorge Azaria y Tino held the victim and stood as guard, to the damage and prejudice of the afore-said Flores.

"CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659)"5

Similar Informations for Rape were likewise filed against the other accused, except Judy Duron, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1795-B, 1796-B, 1797-B, 1798-B,
1799-B, 1800-B, 1801-B and 1802-B, the only difference being that the accusatory portion of each Information individually named each of them as principal in
committing the crime of rape while the other co-accused held the victim and stood as guard.

Respondent Navarro then filed a motion to quash the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 1736-B on the grounds that: (1) the Amended Information does not
comply with the Order dated October 23, 1996; (2) the allegations in the Amended Information is in conflict with petitioner’s affidavit in that the Amended Information
named respondent Navarro as the only one who had intercourse with petitioner while her affidavit mentioned only Rodulfo Codira alias "Babie" as the culprit; and (3)
the Amended Information does not sufficiently describe the event on the night of January 18, 1996.6

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On March 4, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed Order granting the motion to quash, finding that Navarro was not one of those identified by petitioner to have
abused her, and that the Information failed to show his particular participation in the crime.7 Navarro, however, was not released from detention as Criminal Cases
Nos. 1795-B to 1802-B were still pending.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court per Order dated May 6, 1997 denied the same.8

Hence, petitioner, through her private prosecutors, filed the instant special civil action for certiorari.

Meanwhile, Navarro’s other co-accused were arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the charges against them. Trial commenced as regards their respective cases.9

On October 3, 1998, Navarro escaped from detention10 and has remained at large per manifestation of his counsel in his "Memorandum for the Respondents" filed
with this Court on November 5, 1999.11

On November 25, 1998, before the prosecution could present its evidence, it filed a motion to withdraw the respective Informations against the six principal accused
in Criminal Cases Nos. 1795-B, 1796-B, 1797-B, 1798-B, 1800-B and 1801-B for insufficiency of evidence.12 The motion was granted by the trial court in its Order
dated November 26, 1998, but the other accused whose cases were withdrawn remained as co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 1736-B (against Navarro), 1799-B
(against Rodulfo Codira) and 1802-B (against Jorge Azaria).13

On September 1, 1999, the Court gave due course to herein petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.14

Petitioner argues:

"9.a that during the clarificatory hearing conducted in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case by the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, respondent/accused
Navarro was identified as one of those nine (9) persons who sexually abused petitioner, the latter upon seeing respondent, spontaneously cried and declared, right
then and there, that he was even the one who burned her hand;

"9.b that on the alleged ground of insufficiency of the information (i.e., the facts charged do not constitute an offense because it failed to state with particularity
respondent/accused Navarro’s participation in the act complained of), public respondent should have realized that to resolve the issue, he need only determine
whether the ‘facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law’;"15

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the private prosecutors who initiated the instant petition have no personality to file the same as it is vested with the
public prosecutors,16 and that the assailed order of the trial court finds support in the records of the case as petitioner herself testified during preliminary investigation
that she became unconscious after she was sexually abused by Rodulfo Codira alias "Babie" and she did not know who took turns in abusing her.17

Anent the issue whether or not the petitioner has the personality or the right to file herein petition for certiorari – We rule in the affirmative. A perusal of the petition
filed in this case shows that petitioner herself caused the preparation and filing of the present petition and filed the same through the private prosecutor18. It is
beyond question that petitioner has the right or personality to file the petition, through her private prosecutors, questioning the dismissal of the criminal case against
respondent Navarro. For obvious reasons, the public prosecutors who filed the motion to dismiss which was granted by the trial court would not initiate the action.

As early as 1969 in the case of Paredes vs. Gopengco,19 it was already held that the offended party in a criminal case has sufficient interest and personality as a
"person aggrieved" to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal
construction of the rules in order to promote its object.

Later, in Mosquera vs. Panganiban,20 we recognized the right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process, subject to
the limitation that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. Citing Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,21 we held:

"Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to ‘any party,’
except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy.

"In People v. Guido, [57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court ruled that the word ‘party’ must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other
persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal
from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the offense. The right of the offended party to file a special civil
action of prohibition and certiorari from an [interlocutory] order rendered in a criminal case was likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes v. Gopengco [29 SCRA
688 (1969)] and People v. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)] which held that ‘offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as ‘person(s)
aggrieved’ to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the
Rules of Court in order to promote their object. . . ."

More recently, in Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,22 we held that the private respondent therein, as private complainant, has legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.23 This is so because a special civil action for certiorari may be filed by the persons aggrieved, which, in a criminal case, are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. Having an interest in the civil aspect of the case, the complainant may file such action, in his name, questioning the decision or action
of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds.24

We further ruled in the Perez case that while it is only the Office of the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to
bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law.25

Finally, double jeopardy does not apply. The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without
the express consent of the accused.26 The third requisite is not present in the instant case. Private respondent Navarro has not been arraigned.27

The next issue to be resolved is whether or not the writ of certiorari should issue in this case. Again, we rule in the affirmative. The trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the Information filed against Navarro in Criminal Case No. 1736-B.

First, contrary to the finding of the trial court, the records of this case adequately show that respondent Navarro was identified as one of those who sexually abused
petitioner. In her Sworn Statement executed on January 23, 1996 before MCTC Judge Antonio K. Cañon, petitioner, while admitting that it was only Rodulfo Codira
alias "Babie" whom she personally knew, nevertheless stated that she knew by face her other perpetrators as they "once in a while" pass by her residence or
frequent their neighborhood. She further declared under oath that she was able to identify them later at the police station during line-up, viz.:

"7. Q - How do you come to know that it was they Emmanuel Navarro ‘alias’ Tawing, Marcial Plaza, Jr. ‘alias’ Dodong, Bengie Pasokin, Rodolfo Codera ‘alias’ Babie,
Jorge Azaria ‘alias’ Cocoy, Robert Piodo, Judy Duron and Daniel Equibal sexually abused you.

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"A - Beforehand, I only know personally one of them Rodolfo Codera ‘alias’ Babie all others were only familiar through their faces because once in a while they will
passed(sic) by our residence as they were residence(sic) or frequenting our neighborhood. There at the police station, the police lined them up for my identification
with whom I have identified one by one according to their individual participation."28 (Emphasis Ours)

Petitioner later confirmed respondent Navarro’s identity when, during clarificatory questions propounded by Fiscal Cañedo at the Bislig Municipal Jail on March 25,
1996, she pointed to Navarro as one of those who came into the room after "Babie" left. She also tagged Navarro as the one who burned her hand. Thus:

"Q : After he left you, what happened?

"A : After Babie left me, there were others who entered the room.
"Q : Those who entered the room, can you recognize their faces?
"A : Yes.
"Q : If you see these persons who entered the room, can you recognize them:
"A : Yes.
"FISCAL CAÑEDO: We will request the private complainant to see the inmates inside Cell No. 1 and Cell No. 2, for her to identify the accused.
"INMATES INSIDE CELL NO. 1 AND CELL NO. 2 were presented one by one.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Q : Is he the one? (inmate no. 8)
"A : He is the one, he burned my hand (witness spontaneously pointed to inmate no. 8 while crying.)
"Q : What is your name?
"Inmate No. 8 - Emmanuel Navarro."29

The Court cannot fathom how the trial court concluded that respondent Navarro was not one of those identified by petitioner as one of her perpetrators when the
Sworn Statement executed by petitioner, as well as her response to the clarificatory questions of the Fiscal, not only narrated the facts and circumstances
surrounding her ordeal, but also explicitly and categorically identified respondent Navarro and his other co-accused as her alleged rapists.

Secondly, we find the Amended Information against respondent Navarro to be sufficient. Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a
complaint or information, to be sufficient, must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.30 In addition, it
must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and
undertake his defense.31

Particularly in rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e., (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.32

In this case, the Information sufficiently alleged that respondent Emmanuel Navarro, by means of force, had sexual intercourse with petitioner against her will. It
contained all the essential elements of rape as defined by law. The allegations describe the offense with sufficient particularity such that respondent Navarro will fully
understand what he is being charged with. The Information also sufficiently alleged respondent Navarro’s criminal culpability/liability for the crime, to wit: "accused
EMMANUEL NAVARRO has (sic) sexual intercourse with one Joan Flores, against the latters (sic) will." This is based on petitioner’s own account of the incident
wherein she stated that her perpetrators, including respondent Navarro, took turns in sexually abusing her33.

One final point. We observed that the original records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1736-B34, 1799-B35 and 1802-B36 pending with the trial court were elevated to this
Court. However, the records of the said cases do not show any resolution of this Court requiring the elevation of the records thereof. The Order dated July 26, 2002
purportedly requiring the elevation of the original records of the above criminal cases to the Supreme Court, referred to in the transmittal letter dated August 14,
2002, signed by Clerk of Court Domingo P. De Castro, is not found in the records of herein case. In effect, the trial judge was unnecessarily precluded from
proceeding further with the other pending cases, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 1799-B and 1802-B. Although Navarro was a co-accused in said cases, he is not the
principal accused therein. He is only one out of the nine other co-accused. In addition, Navarro had not been arraigned for the reason that he jumped bail and
remains at large up to the present.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari. The assailed Orders of the trial court dated March 4, 1997 and May 6, 1997 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1736-B is REINSTATED and the trial judge is directed to proceed therewith and immediately issue a warrant of arrest against accused
Emmanuel Navarro.

Considering that Criminal Cases Nos. 1799-B and 1802-B are still pending trial with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29), Bislig City, the Clerk of Court of this Court
is directed to cause the return of the original records thereof with immediate dispatch to the said trial court for further proceedings.

Atty. Domingo P. de Castro, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29), Bislig City is required to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of copy of
herein decision why he should not be cited for contempt of court and administratively charged in elevating the original records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1799-B and
1802-B without proper authority, thereby unduly delaying the trial of said cases which are not involved in the present petition which concerns accused Navarro only.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

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13. Philippine Savings Bank vs Spouses Bermoy G.R. No. 151912, Sept. 26, 2005

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES PEDRITO BERMOY and GLORIA BERMOY, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 14 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals denying the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner and its Resolution
dated 24 January 2002 denying reconsideration.

The Facts

Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank ("petitioner"), respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy ("respondent spouses") were charged with
estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 38 ("trial court"). The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154193,
alleged:

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That on or about May 11, 1994, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Philippine Savings Bank a
banking institution, duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws xxx, thru falsification of a public document in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
prepared, forged and falsified or caused to be prepared, forged and falsified an owner’s copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434, which is an imitation of, and
similar to the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 issued by the Regist[er] of Deeds for the City of Manila, and therefore, a public document, by then and there
typing on the blank spaces thereon the title no., description of a parcel of land containing an area of 350 square meters, located in Malate, this City, the names of the
accused as the registered owners thereof, and then signing, falsifying and simulating the signature of "ALICIA D. GANZON", Register of Deeds, appearing on the
lower right hand portion of the 1st page of said document; the name "EDGARDO C. CASTRO", Actg. Deputy, appearing on the right hand middle portion of the 3rd
page, and imprinting thereon several entries purportedly showing that the annotation thereon was a mortgage in favor A. C. Aguila and Sons, which was cancelled on
February 17, 1994, thereby making it appear, as it did appear, that accused are the registered owners of the said property, under said TCT No. 207434 which
purportedly is the owner’s copy of said title, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew, the same is an outright forgery, as the owner’s duplicate
copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 is in possession of the spouses EDGAR and ELVIRA ALAMO by reason of the previous mortgage of the said
property in favor of the latter since February 17, 1994 and which was later sold to them on June 19, 1995; that once the said document has been forged and falsified
in the manner above set forth, the said accused presented the same to the Philippine Savings Bank and used the said title as collateral in obtaining, as in fact, they
did obtain a loan in the sum of ₱1,000,000.00 from the said bank, and once in possession of the said amount of ₱1,000,000.00 with intent to defraud, they willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Philippine Savings Bank in the aforesaid amount of ₱1,000,000.00, Philippine Currency.3

Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.

The trial court set the pre-trial on 11 June 1997. After the hearing on that day, the trial court issued the following Order ("11 June 1997 Order"):

When the case was called for hearing, Atty. Maria Concepcion Puruganan, who entered her appearance as private prosecutor and Atty. Albino Achas, defense
counsel, appeared and upon their stipulation, they admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the identities of the accused.

Upon motion of Atty. Puruganan, private prosecutor, joined by public prosecutor Antonio Israel, without objection from Atty. Achas, let the initial hearing for the
reception of the evidence for the prosecution be set on June 18, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., as previously scheduled.4 (Emphasis supplied)

The minutes of the hearing, which respondent spouses signed, bore the following handwritten notation under the heading "remarks": "Postponed. Upon joint
agreement of counsels."5 This was the only notation made under "remarks." Nowhere in the one-page minutes of the hearing did it state that any of the accused
made any stipulation or admission.

During the hearings of 18 June 1997 and 3 September 1997, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Felisa Crisostomo ("Crisostomo"), manager of petitioner’s
Libertad Manila Branch, and one Hermenigildo Caluag ("Caluag"), also an employee of petitioner. Crisostomo testified that she came to know respondent spouses
when they applied for a loan in February 1994. Crisostomo stated that respondent spouses presented to her Transfer Certificate Title No. 207434 ("TCT No.
207434") issued in their name over a parcel of land in Malate, Manila ("Malate lot") which they offered as collateral for the loan. Crisostomo further stated after the
approval of respondent spouses’ loan application, respondent spouses executed in her presence a real estate mortgage of the Malate lot in favor of petitioner as
security for their loan. Caluag testified that he was tasked to register petitioner’s certificate of sale over the Malate lot6 with the Register of Deeds of Manila but the
latter refused to do so because the Malate lot had been mortgaged and sold to the spouses Edgar and Elvira Alamo.7

After presenting the testimonies of Crisostomo and Caluag, the prosecution rested its case.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent
spouses as the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, opposed the motion claiming that Crisostomo and Calang
had identified respondent spouses. The prosecution also pointed out that as borne by the 11 June 1997 Order, respondent spouses stipulated on their identity during
the pre-trial.8

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Order of 21 April 1998 ("21 April 1998 Order"), the trial court granted respondent spouses’ motion, dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-154193, and acquitted
respondent spouses. The 21 April 1998 Order reads:

The basic issues to resolve here boils down on (sic) the determination of whether the accused were identified by the prosecution witnesses as the perpetrators of the
act complained of during the trial of the case and whether they admitted their identities as the accused named in the information.

After carefully going over the length and breadth of the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, there is nothing in the transcript which would slightly indicate
that they identified the accused as the persons who obtained a loan from the Philippine Savings Bank and executed the corresponding documents. The identification
of an accused [by the witness] may be made by pointing to him directly in open court xxx or [by] stepping down from the stand and tapping his shoulder. If the
accused is not present during the trial, his identification may be effected through his pictures attached to the bail bond or some other means. The identification of an
accused as the perpetrator of an offense is essential in the successful prosecution of criminal cases. By the accused’s entering a negative plea to the allegations in
the information, he denies that he committed the offense. He cannot even be compelled to give his name during the arraignment and for which the Court may enter a
plea of not guilty for him.

As to the stipulation of facts regarding the admission of the jurisdiction of the court and the identities of the accused, a cursory reading of the Order of June 11, 1997
reveals that their express conformity to the stipulation of facts entered into by their counsel with the private prosecutor was never asked of them. Considering that the
admission of the identities of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime here charged is a matter which adversely affects their substantial rights, such admission
must have to involve their express concurrence or consent thereto. This consent is manifested in their signing the pre-trial order containing such admissions. As to
the minutes of the proceedings of June 11, 1997, suffice it to state that there is nothing to it (sic) which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place.

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, let this case be, as the same is hereby, DISMISSED and accused Pedrito Bermoy and Gloria Visconde [Bermoy] are, as
they are hereby, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.9

The prosecution, again through the private prosecutor, sought reconsideration but the trial court denied its motion in the Order of 28 May 1998.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General joined the petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 14 November 2001, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, denied the petition. It held:

In support of the demurrer to evidence, the defense counsel argued that neither of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was able to identify the accused as
allegedly those who committed the crime they were prosecuted for.

xxx
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Petitioner, however, argues that the testimonies of the two witnesses they presented identified the accused spouses as the perpetrators of the crime. xxx

We are not convinced. The xxx testimony proves only one thing: that a couple purporting to be the Bermoy spouses presented themselves to the Bank and obtained
the loan. Whether they are the same husband and wife accused in this case for Estafa is a different story. The failure of the prosecution to point in open court to the
persons of the accused as the same persons who presented themselves to the Bank is a fatal omission. They could be impostors who, armed with the fake title,
presented themselves to the Bank as the persons named in the title. The prosecution goofed. Had the witnesses been asked to point to the two accused as the same
couple who appeared before the Bank to obtain the loan, there would have been no doubt on their criminal liability.

Petitioner further argued that the law itself does not prescribe the ways to identify the accused, xxx [.]

True, there is no standard form provided by law [for] identifying the accused. Jurisprudence and trial practice show that the accused is usually identified by the
witnesses, prompted by the counsel, by either pointing at him or stepping down the witness’ stand and tapping him on the shoulder, or by means of photographs. The
trial court correctly pointed this out. How else can identification be done, it may be asked.

The petitioner also argues that "the identities of private [respondents] were clearly established as a result of the stipulation by and between the prosecution (thru the
private prosecutor) and the defense." It insists that the Order dated June 11, 1997, is sufficient admission by the accused as to their identities, and [was] allegedly
signed by them and their counsel as required under Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. There is no merit to this argument. If ever stipulations
were made on June 11, 1997, these must be made in writing, which must be signed by the accused and counsel as their conformity to such stipulations. The records,
however, show that the Order dated June 11, 1997, merely stated what transpired during that particular hearing and what the counsels signed was the minutes for
the same hearing. Hence, the identities of the accused were not stipulated upon for failure to comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court. The trial court
correctly ruled that "there [was] nothing xxx which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place."

xxx

In fine, we are more than convinced that the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper
identification of the accused. But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for
certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. xxx

In the case at bench, it is clear that this petition seeks to review the judgment of the trial court, which already had jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the
persons of this case. The trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused, either by denying it or by dismissing the case for lack of
sufficient evidence. If the demurrer is granted, resulting [in] the dismissal of the criminal case and the acquittal of the accused, this can no longer be reviewed unless
it can be shown that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. In this case, assuming the trial court committed an
error, the petitioner has not shown that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack [or] excess xxx of jurisdiction. The error, if any, is merely an error of
judgment.10

Petitioner sought reconsideration claiming that the Court of Appeals contradicted itself when it held, on one hand, that the trial court’s error did not amount to grave
abuse of discretion and stated, on the other hand, that any error committed by the trial court can no longer be reviewed without violating respondent spouses’ right
against double jeopardy. Petitioner also contended, for the first time, that it is the trial court’s duty to insure that the accused sign the pre-trial order or agreement
embodying respondent spouses’ admissions and that its failure to do so should not be taken against the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion in the Resolution of 24 January 2002 which reads:

The petitioner seems to have misunderstood our ruling regarding the issue on double jeopardy in connection with [the] petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that our
ruling has been contradictory for saying on one hand that "even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either by
appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy" while saying on the other hand "assuming that trial court
committed an error, the petitioner has not shown that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack excess (sic) or excess of jurisdiction." Petitioner asks:
"Which is which then?" – meaning, it has not understood what a petition for certiorari is for. If the petitioner read the decision carefully, in between the above-quoted
statements of the decision is the case of People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, December 8, 1994, 238 SCRA 48, where the Supreme Court explicitly explained that
"review of the sufficiency of the evidence and of the propriety of the acquittal of the accused [as a result of the grant of the demurrer to evidence] lies outside the
function of certiorari." True, a petition for certiorari alleges an error of the trial court but nowhere in our decision did it mention that the trial court in this case
committed an error. We merely made an assumption, without saying that there was an error committed by the trial court, to make a point. We meant that if the trial
court did commit an error in ruling that there was insufficient evidence resulting in the acquittal of the accused, such error can no longer be reviewed since it would be
one of judgment, which is not within the ambit of a certiorari. xxx

The petitioner again asks us: "Who has the duty of requiring the accused to sign the pre-trial order, the prosecution or the trial court itself?" It answers that it is the
trial court because it "has the sole and exclusive duty of seeing to it that all requirements in such proceedings be duly complied with x x x and that duty includes the
act of requiring or compelling the accused to sign the pre-trial order, [hence] it is plainly fundamentally erroneous to suppose that such duty can be delegated by the
trial court to the prosecution." The petitioner further argues that "the respondent Court was right off ousted of jurisdiction when it deliberately and without legal basis
refused to consider the stipulation of facts made by the parties in the eventual pre-trial order x x x despite the absence of signature of the accused in the said pre-trial
order."

The arguments of the petitioner are baseless. Nowhere in Rule 118 on Pre-Trial on the Revised Rules of Rules of Criminal Procedure does it require the prosecution
or the accused to sign the pre-trial order. All that is required for the trial court to do is to hold a pre-trial conference and issue an order reciting the actions taken, the
facts stipulated upon by the parties, and evidence marked. And if there were any agreements or admissions made or entered into by the parties during the pre-trial
conference, these should be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his or her counsel. Otherwise, such agreements or admissions may not be used
against the accused. xxx

Hence, it is not incumbent upon the trial court to require the parties to sign the pre-trial order to make the agreements and admissions as evidence against the
accused. If the parties made such admission as to the identities of the accused in this case, it is the look-out of the counsels, particularly the prosecutor, to require
the accused to sign. Why should the trial court remind the counsels what to do? If the private prosecutor wanted such admission as an evidence against the accused,
then she should have required the admission in writing [sic] and signed by the accused and their counsel as required by the rules. But, as the records show, all that
was signed was the minutes of the pre-trial conference. As already discussed in our decision, the trial court committed no error on this point.11

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in:

I. HOLDING THAT SUPPOSEDLY IT IS NOT THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO REQUIRE THE ACCUSED TO SIGN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER;

II FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATTERS STATED IN THE 11 JUNE 1997 PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS STIPULATIONS MADE BY THE PARTIES AND SHOULD
THUS BE BINDING ON THEM;
64
III. REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED WERE SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED DURING THE TRIAL BY THE WITNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION; [AND]

IV. HOLDING THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAD ALLEGEDLY ATTACHED IN THE CASE.12

In his Memorandum, the Solicitor General joins causes with petitioner. The Solicitor General contends that the trial court’s dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.13

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On Whether Double Jeopardy is

Applicable Here

Paragraph 1, Section 7, Rule 117 ("Section 7") of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure14 on double jeopardy provides:

Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal case:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;

(b) The court had jurisdiction;

(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.15

On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is
subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.16 A dismissal upon demurrer to
evidence falls under the first exception.17 Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.18

As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through
falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the
case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered "not guilty" pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-
154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on
respondent spouses.

The Extent of the Right Against

Double Jeopardy

The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is
prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case.19
The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court20 which provides that "[a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused
would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."

Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a
judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution21 and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of
the dismissal. Thus, we held in an earlier case:

In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and
the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the
express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial xxx In the case before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence xxx Hence, it clearly falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this Court is
constitutionally barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused.22 (Emphasis supplied)

The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not without any basis. As the Court explained in People v. Velasco23 —

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the
rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x" Thus, Green [v. United States] expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to
the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one’s liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to
insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. xxx [S]ociety’s awareness of the heavy
personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the
initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress

65
individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively
presumes that a second trial would be unfair.

On Petitioner’s Claim that the Trial Court’s

Dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was Void

Petitioner, together with the Solicitor General, contends that the Court can inquire into the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was void. They contend that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
disregarded evidence allegedly proving respondent spouses’ identity.24

The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from judgments of acquittal admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn and is limited
to the case where the trial court "act[ed] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process i.e. the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case xxx or that the trial was a sham xxx."25

None of these circumstances exists here. There is no dispute that the prosecution, through petitioner’s counsel as private prosecutor, was afforded its day in court.
Neither is there any question that the proceedings in the trial court were genuine. What petitioner points to as basis for the trial court’s alleged grave abuse of
discretion really concerns its appreciation of the evidence. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, any error committed by the trial court on this point can
only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. What this Court held in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals26 applies with equal force here —

Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
The argument that the judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by
the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer
be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

On the Other Errors Assigned by Petitioner

The Court will no longer rule on the other errors assigned by petitioner — on who has the responsibility to insure that the pre-trial agreement is signed by the
accused, on the effect of the 11 June 1997 Order, and on whether respondent spouses were identified during the trial. All these entail an inquiry into the merits of the
21 April 1998 Order, which, as earlier stated, cannot be done without violating respondent spouses’ right against double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 24 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Chairman

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Tupaz vs Judge Ulep G.R. No. 127777, Oct. 1, 1999

PETRONILA C. TUPAZ, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE BENEDICTO B. ULEP Presiding Judge of RTC Quezon City, Branch 105, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case before us is a special civil action for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, from trying Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321, and to nullify respondent judge’s order reviving the information therein
against petitioner, for violation of the Tax Code, as the offense charged has prescribed or would expose petitioner to double jeopardy.

The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On June 8, 1990, State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City, Branch 33, an information against
accused Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation, for nonpayment of deficiency corporate
income tax for the year 1979, amounting to P2,369,085.46, in violation of Section 51 (b) in relation to Section 73 of the Tax Code of 1977. 1 On September 11, 1990,
the MeTC dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction. On November 16, 1990, the trial court denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.
66
On January 10, 1991, SP Molon filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, two (2) informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-17321 2 and Q-91-
17322, 3 against accused and her late husband, for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. Criminal Case No. Q-91-
17321 was raffled to Branch 105, 4 presided over by respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep; Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86, then presided over by Judge
Antonio P. Solano. The identical informations read as follows:

"That in Quezon City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and upon verification and audit conducted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
on the 1979 corporate annual income tax return and financial statements of El Oro Engravers Corp., with office address at 809 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue,
Quezon City, Metro Manila, it was ascertained that said corporation was found liable to pay the amount of P2,369,085.46, as deficiency corporate income tax for the
year 1979 and that, despite demand of the payment of the aforesaid deficiency tax by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and received by said corporation, which
demand has already become final, said El Oro Engravers Corp., through above-named accused, the responsible corporate-officers of said corporation, failed and
refused, despite repeated demands, and still fail and refuse to pay said tax liability.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." 5

On September 25, 1991, both accused posted bail bond in the sum of P1,000.00 each, for their provisional liberty.

On November 6, 1991, Accused filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion to dismiss/quash 6 information (Q-91-17322) for the reason
that it was exactly the same as the information against the accused pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105 (Q-91-17321). However, on November 11, 1991,
Judge Solano denied the motion. 7

In the meantime, on July 25, 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died in Quezon City.

Subsequently, Accused Petronila C. Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a petition for reinvestigation, which Judge Ulep granted in an
order dated August 30, 1994. 8

On September 5, 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez stated that no new issues were raised in the request for reinvestigation, and no cogent
reasons existed to alter, modify or reverse the findings of the investigating prosecutor. He considered the reinvestigation as terminated, and recommended the
prompt arraignment and trial of the accused. 9

On September 20, 1994, the trial court (Branch No. 105) arraigned accused Petronila C. Tupaz in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321, and she pleaded not guilty to the
information therein.

On October 17, 1994, the prosecution filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file amended information in Criminal Case
No. Q91-17321 to allege expressly the date of the commission of the offense, to wit: on or about August 1984 or subsequently thereafter. Despite opposition of the
accused, on March 2, 1995, the trial court granted the motion and admitted the amended information. 10 Petitioner was not re-arraigned on the amended information.
However, the amendment was only on a matter of form. 11 Hence, there was no need to re-arraign the accused. 12

On December 5, 1995, Accused filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file and admit motion for reinvestigation. The trial
court granted the motion in its order dated December 13, 1995.

Prior to this, on October 18, 1995, Judge Ulep issued an order directing the prosecution to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17322, pending
before Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, after discovering that said information was identical to the one filed with Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 105. On April 16, 1996, State Prosecutor Alfredo P. Agcaoili filed with the trial court a motion to withdraw information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321.
Prosecutor Agcaoili thought that accused was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321, for nonpayment of deficiency contractor’s tax, but found that accused was
exempted from paying said tax.

On May 15, 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion for consolidation of Criminal Case No. Q-91-17322 with
Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On the same date, the court 13 granted the motion for
consolidation.

On May 20, 1996, Judge Ulep of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the motion for withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-
17321 and dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution.

On May 28, 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion to reinstate information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321,
14 stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect. He thought that Criminal Case No.
Q-91-17321 was identical to Criminal Case No Q-90-12896, wherein accused was charged with nonpayment of deficiency contractor’s tax, amounting to
P346,879.29.

Over the objections of accused, on August 6, 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the motion and ordered the information in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-17321 reinstated. 15 On September 24, 1996, Accused filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration. On December 4, 1996, the trial court
denied the motion.

Hence, this petition.

On July 9, 1997, we required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. On October 10, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his comment.
16

On October 26, 1998, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from
notice. The parties have complied.

Petitioner submits that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 because (a) the
offense has prescribed; or (b) it exposes her to double jeopardy.

As regards the issue of prescription, petitioner contends that: (a) the period of assessment has prescribed, applying the three (3) year period provided under Batas
Pambansa No. 700; (b) the offense has prescribed since the complaint for preliminary investigation was filed with the Department of Justice only on June 8, 1989,
and the offense was committed in April 1980 when she filed the income tax return covering taxable year 1979.

Petitioner was charged with nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979, which tax return was filed in April 1980. On July 16, 1984, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a notice of assessment. Petitioner contends that the July 16, 1984 assessment was made out of time.

Petitioner avers that while Sections 318 and 319 of the NIRC of 1977 provide a five (5) year period of limitation for the assessment and collection of internal revenue
taxes, Batas Pambansa Blg. 700, enacted on February 22, 1984, amended the two sections and reduced the period to three (3) years. As provided under B.P. Blg.

67
700, the BIR has three (3) years to assess the tax liability, counted from the last day of filing the return, or from the date the return is filed, whichever comes later.
Since the tax return was filed in April 1980, the assessment made on July 16, 1984 was beyond the three (3) year prescriptive period.

Petitioner submits that B.P. Blg. 700 must be given retroactive effect since it is favorable to the accused. Petitioner argues that Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
regarding the allowance of retroactive application of penal laws when favorable to the accused shall apply in this case.

The Solicitor General, in his comment, maintains that the prescriptive period for assessment and collection of petitioner’s deficiency corporate income tax was five (5)
years. The Solicitor General asserts that the shortened period of three (3) years provided under B.P. Blg. 700 applies to assessments and collections of internal
revenue taxes beginning taxable year 1984. Since the deficiency corporate income tax was for taxable year 1979, then petitioner was still covered by the five (5) year
period. Thus, the July 16, 1984 tax assessment was made within the prescribed period.

At the outset, it must be stressed that "internal revenue taxes are self-assessing and no further assessment by the government is required to create the tax liability.
An assessment, however, is not altogether inconsequential; it is relevant in the proper pursuit of judicial and extra judicial remedies to enforce taxpayer liabilities and
certain matters that relate to it, such as the imposition of surcharges and interest, and in the application of statues of limitations and in the establishment of tax liens."
17

An assessment contains not only a computation of tax liabilities, but also a demand for payment within a prescribed period. The ultimate purpose of assessment is to
ascertain the amount that each taxpayer is to pay. 18 An assessment is a notice to the effect that the amount therein stated is due as tax and a demand for payment
thereof. 19 Assessments made beyond the prescribed period would not be binding on the taxpayer. 20

We agree with the Solicitor General that the shortened period of three (3) years prescribed under B.P. Blg. 700 is not applicable to petitioner. B.P. Blg. 700, effective
April 5, 1984, specifically states that the shortened period of three years shall apply to assessments and collections of internal revenue taxes beginning taxable year
1984. Assessments made on or after April 5, 1984 are governed by the five-year period if the taxes assessed cover taxable years prior to January 1, 1984. 21 The
deficiency income tax under consideration is for taxable year 1979. Thus, the period of assessment is still five (5) years, under the old law. The income tax return was
filed in April 1980. Hence, the July 16, 1984 tax assessment was issued within the prescribed period of five (5) years, from the last day of filing the return, or from the
date the return is filed, whichever comes later.

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code finds no application in this case for the simple reason that the provisions on the period of assessment can not be considered as
penal in nature.

Petitioner also asserts that the offense has prescribed. Petitioner invokes Section 340 (now 281 of 1997 NIRC) of the Tax Code which provides that violations of any
provision of the Code prescribe in five (5) years. Petitioner asserts that in this case, it began to run in 1979, when she failed to pay the correct corporate tax due
during that taxable year. Hence, when the BIR instituted criminal proceedings on June 8, 1989, by filing a complaint for violation of the Tax Code with the Department
of Justice for preliminary investigation it was beyond the prescriptive period of five (5) years. At most, the BIR had until 1984 to institute criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General avers that the information for violation of the Tax Code was filed within the prescriptive period of five (5) years provided in
Section 340 (now 281 in 1997 NIRC) of the Code. It is only when the assessment has become final and unappealable that the five (5) year period commences to run.
A notice of assessment was issued on July 16, 1984. When petitioner failed to question or protest the deficiency assessment thirty (30) days therefrom, or on August
16, 1984, it became final and unappealable. Consequently, it was from this period that the prescriptive period of five (5) years commenced. Thus, the complaint filed
with the Department of Justice on June 8, 1989 was within the prescribed period.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the offense has not prescribed. Petitioner was charged with failure to pay deficiency income tax after repeated demands by
the taxing authority. In Lim, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 22 we stated that by its nature the violation could only be committed after service of notice and demand for
payment of the deficiency taxes upon the taxpayer. Hence, it cannot be said that the offense has been committed as early as 1980, upon filing of the income tax
return. This is so because prior to the finality of the assessment, the taxpayer has not committed any violation for nonpayment of the tax. The offense was committed
only after the finality of the assessment coupled with taxpayer’s willful refusal to pay the taxes within the allotted period. In this case, when the notice of assessment
was issued on July 16, 1984, the taxpayer still had thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to protest or question the assessment. Otherwise, the assessment would
become final and unappealable. 23 As he did not protest, the assessment became final and unappealable on August 16, 1984. Consequently, when the complaint for
preliminary investigation was filed with the Department of Justice on June 8, 1989, the criminal action was instituted within the five (5) year prescriptive period.

Petitioner contends that by reinstating the information, the trial court exposed her to double jeopardy. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court obtained her
permission before the case was dismissed. She was placed in jeopardy for the first time after she pleaded to a valid complaint filed before a competent court and the
case was dismissed without her express consent. When the trial court reinstated the information charging the same offense, it placed her in double jeopardy.

Petitioner also asserts that the trial court gravely erred when, over her objections, it admitted the amended information. She submits that the amendment is
substantial in nature, and would place her in double jeopardy.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that reinstating the information does not violate petitioner’s right against double jeopardy. He asserts that petitioner
induced the dismissal of the complaint when she sought the reinvestigation of her tax liabilities. By such inducement, petitioner waived or was estopped from claiming
her right against double jeopardy.

The Solicitor General further contends that, assuming arguendo that the case was dismissed without petitioner’s consent, there was no valid dismissal of the case
since Prosecutor Agcaoili was under a mistaken assumption that it was a charge of nonpayment of contractor’s tax.

We sustain petitioner’s contention. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again
tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In the
instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution,
without asking for accused-petitioner’s consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. 24 Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the
accused’s conformity. 25 As petitioner’s consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the
case. 26 Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected
right against double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We enjoin the lower court, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105, from trying Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321
and order its dismissal. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., C.J., dissenting :

68
I am unable to agree with the conclusion in the ponencia that reinstating the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 would expose petitioner to double
jeopardy.

As shown in the summary of facts in the ponencia petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on 20 September 1994 to the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321.
But, the information was amended by the prosecution to indicate therein the date of the commission of the offense, to with: "on or about August 1994 or subsequently
thereafter."

The amended information was admitted by public respondent Judge in the order of 2 March 1995.

There is at all no showing that petitioner was re-arraigned on the amended information. On the contrary, on 5 December 1995 she filed a motion for leave to file and
admit motion for reinvestigation, which the trial court granted in its order of 13 December 1995.

Not having been re-arraigned on the amended information, which validly supplanted the original information, the erroneous withdrawal of the information in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-17321 and its subsequent reinstatement cannot place the petitioner in double jeopardy. Firstly, the withdrawal had no legal effect since the
information was amended. Secondly, petitioner was not arraigned on the amended information. And, thirdly, petitioner is estopped on the matter since she had asked
for a reinvestigation on the basis of the amended information.

I vote then to DENY this petition.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. People vs Panfilo Lacson G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M.
JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration1 of the Resolution2 dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said court. In the aforesaid criminal
cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as Manuel Montero, a
former Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas,
Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14 years old,3 Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the
Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The
respondent opposed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.4

The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express
consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect,
there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following:

... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended
party; (3) whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5)
whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits of
desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or
beyond the 2-year bar.

The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the
cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the
new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is not precluded from
presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.

The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.

I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-
81689.

The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
because the essential requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of
the Court, the petitioners maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689. The respondent allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss
said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said
cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondent’s express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the
victims of the respondent’s motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.

The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to the RTC to determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22,
1999 hearing on the respondent’s motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause. The records allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling
city prosecutor was furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly
retained and authorized by all the private complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that Atty. Valdez merely identified the purported
affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm the truth of the allegations therein.

The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical
motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.

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The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He
contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial determination of the existence of
probable cause because criminal actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.

The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners meritorious.

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites
of the first paragraph thereof, namely:

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;

2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;

4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the
requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the
criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.5

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case
having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal
on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution6 without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with
the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.

Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to
supply its meaning.7 Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing
amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.8 The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case9 or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal10 does not amount to express consent.

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal.11 If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with
the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the
prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy12 or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute
of limitations.13

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an
offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation.14 However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a
criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and
new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation15 must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new
preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or
necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of
the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all,
"the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist
the court in dispensing that justice."16

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal
cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno,17 among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a
personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the
court for its examination. The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have personally determined the presence of probable cause, no
warrant of arrest should be issued against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed
therein that:

1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order
be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and

2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.

Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.18

The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or
expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized that:

... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-
accused in the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the
petitioner are: (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be
withheld, or if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the
consent of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "A."19

During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file
any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus:

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JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?

ATTY. FORTUN: It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants
of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further
conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.

JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express conformity of
the accused.

ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA: And with notice to the offended party.

ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA: Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?

ATTY. FORTUN: There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement, which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or
on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on
this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional dismissal.
Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?

JUSTICE ROSARIO: You were present during the proceedings?

ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ROSARIO: You represented the petitioner in this case?

ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in
respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.

JUSTICE GUERRERO: Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of probable cause?

ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE GUERRERO: Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what should the Court do?

ATTY. FORTUN: That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read
my prayer before the Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at the
scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this
incident.

JUSTICE GUERRERO: There is no general prayer for any further relief?

ATTY. FORTUN: There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.

JUSTICE GUERRERO: Don’t you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case
because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?

ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we
asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.

JUSTICE GUERRERO: If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case
should be dismissed?

ATTY. FORTUN: I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I
was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking the boat or
clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client.

JUSTICE GUERRERO: Continue.20

In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:

Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC
RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He
asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG’s claim.21

The respondent’s admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from
repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions.22

To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or
impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot and should not do.23

The Court also agrees with the petitioners’ contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or
of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must
be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a
priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the
private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to
confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the
requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively
comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the
consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine
71
jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover
on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his
property.

In the case at bar, even if the respondent’s motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his
motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing
on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely
five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately
given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were
residents of Dipolog City or Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.24 There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs
of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor,25 he did so only for
some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and
Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)26 executed their respective affidavits of desistance.27 There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico
Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs
of the victims of the respondent’s motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived
of their right to be heard on the respondent’s motion and to protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.

Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time
limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.

II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.

The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondent’s motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the
People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the State’s substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. They posit that under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the
State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the
said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the
Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced.
They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently
relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred beyond the two-year
period by a retroactive application of the new rule.28 Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002.

For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since
there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since ‘[t]he State’s witnesses were ready, willing and
able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.’29 According to the
respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.30 He asserts that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him.31 In any event, the
State is given the right under the Court’s assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-
bar under the new rule.

The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the
prejudice of the State because the prohibition against the revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from
the prohibition against the revival of a provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of a
provisional dismissal under said rule do not modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescription under
the Revised Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application of Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or information has already been filed against the
accused, which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period under Article 90.32

The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the
sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal
theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the
protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability.33 The periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are essential
elements of the offenses covered.34

On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar
an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.35

The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.36 It is but a limitation of the right of the
State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and
prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included
therein.37 He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new indictments.38 The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year
or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay.39 By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because
the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby diminished.40 But whether or not the
prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State
Supreme Court of Illinois held:

… This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be
punished—to be deprived of his liberty—shall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove
the flaw which the crime had created in the offender’s title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes barring civil remedies usually do. They
expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would enforce, and perfect the title which such
remedy would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very right which the state has against the offender—the right to punish, as the only liability which the
offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this liability are at an end. …41

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by
which one who has committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,42 this Court held that:

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
72
retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.

It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or
impair the independence of the Court. In a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,43 the United States Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the
court would produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding "the injustice of hardship" by a holding of
nonretroactivity.44 A construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and
injurious consequences.45 This Court should not adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided.46 Time and again, this Court has decreed that statutes are to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils
sought to be remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose.47

Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may
be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective
application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in
particular.48 In a per curiam decision in Stefano v. Woods,49 the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in determining whether a new rule or doctrine
enunciated by the High Court should be given retrospective or prospective effect:

"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."

In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed
with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the
periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly
and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the
accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that
the rule becomes a denial of justice.50 The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the
criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing
criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such
revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public
prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate
to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.51

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor,52 especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial
and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.53

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or
nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of
any fact more difficult.54 The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the
revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at
any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in
him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities
incompatible with the presumption of innocence.55 He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may
diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.56

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State
and the accused; not for the accused only.

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public
prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving
the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the
State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed
under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002
within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid
absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in
effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases
against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice
Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:57

We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their
rights ….

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the
administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.

To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a
rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without
requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to
justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts,58 "the
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." In Dimatulac v. Villon,59 this Court emphasized that "the
judge’s action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. This Court further said:
73
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which
have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of
justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.

In this case, the eleven informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-
year period.

In the sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET
ASSIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent with the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to forthwith
proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, Panganiban, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, J.J., concur.
Bellosillo, J., see Separate Opinion, concurring.
Puno, J., Please See Disent.
Vitug, J., See Separate (dissenting) Opinion.
Quisumbing, J., In the result; concur with J. Bellosillo's opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., I join the dissents of J. Puno & J. Gutierrez.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., dissent. Please see my dissenting opinion.
Carpio, J., No part.

Separate Opinion, Concurring

BELLOSILLO, J.:

If we make a mistake, we can only pray that their

ghosts will not haunt us for the rest of our days . . .

"Amen!" I say to the clear and concise ponencia of our colleague, Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr., who touched the issues head on and resolved them with the calm
deliberation of a dedicated jurist. Let me just add a few more thoughts in the effort to reveal and rectify the hazards and uncertainties ordinarily concealed by the glib
use of formal illogic.

This case springs from the brutal slaughter of suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang on 18 May 1995. Eleven (11) restless souls - who perished in a
shroud of mystery - remain shackled for more than half a decade by the bondage of popular apathy and neglect, and condemned to an ignominious fall by their
infamy. Stigmatized and denounced, their demise must have been hailed by many as the triumph of retributive justice –

x x x x Gifted with the liberty they know not how to use; with a power and energy they know not how to apply; with a life whose purpose and aim they comprehend
not; they drag through their useless and convulsed existence. Byron destroys them one after the other, as if he were the executioner of a sentence decreed in
heaven. They fall unwept, like a withered leaf into the stream of time x x x x They die, as they have lived, alone; and a popular malediction hovers round their solitary
tombs.1

The dictates of prudence however would counsel us at this time to reserve judgment on their sins and transgressions. The overriding consideration is the need to
unveil the truth, for truth alone is the veritable touchstone of justice. The rights of the eleven (11) victims, as much as those of the respondent and his co-accused,
deserve full recognition and protection. Only then can we say that we are truly civilized - a breed apart from savages.

But the manner by which the carnage of 18 May 1995 was carried out sparked a public indignation that prompted the Senate Committees on Justice and Human
Rights, Crimes and National Defense and Security to conduct a joint investigation on possible human rights violations involving police officers. The inquiry focused on
the issue of whether the death of the eleven (11) victims was the result of a "rub-out" or summary killing, or a "shoot-out" or with exchange of gunfire, between the
victims and the police considering that the principal antagonists were policemen and civilians. On 21 June 1995 the aforesaid Senate Committees, in Joint
Committee Report No. 1021, found thus -

There is no clarity as to whether the bodies were handcuffed or hogtied with ropes when they were killed. The evidence, however, establishes that those who died
were defenseless and that except for Soronda, none of them fired a gun. The forensic report and testimonies of De los Santos and De la Cruz show that eleven (11)
persons were killed in coldblood while in the custody of the law enforcers in the early morning of May 18 in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City (underscoring
supplied),

concluded that the killings were done in cold blood and recommended the filing of the appropriate charges against the police officers.2

Thereafter multiple murder charges were filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan against respondent and twenty-five (25) other police officers, docketed
as Crim. Cases Nos. 23047-23057. On motion of the accused, the Ombudsman conducted a reinvestigation of the cases resulting in the filing of Amended
Informations, this time charging respondent, among other officers, as a mere accessory after-the-fact. Arraignment followed and respondent entered a plea of not
guilty.

Respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan contending in the main that the highest ranking principal accused under the Amended Informations
held the position of Chief Inspector with a salary below that for Grade 27, for which reason, jurisdiction properly belonged to the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan. The issue of jurisdiction eventually reached the Supreme Court, which ordered the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
not because the highest ranking principal accused was receiving a salary below Grade 27 but because the Amended Informations did not show that the offenses
charged were committed in relation to, or in the discharge of, official functions of the accused.

The criminal cases were docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, and raffled to RTC-Br. 81 then presided over by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr.
Respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical motions praying for a judicial determination of probable cause, to hold in abeyance the issuance of
warrants of arrest in the meantime, and to dismiss the cases should the court find no probable cause.

During the hearing on the motions, the seven (7) or eight (8) victims’ next of kin executed affidavits of desistance while others recanted their affidavit-complaints. With
this development, the trial court in its Resolution of 29 March 1999 dismissed the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial, holding that "there is
no more evidence to show that the crime(s) have been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof."3
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Two (2) years later, or on 29 March 2001, Secretary Hernando B. Perez of the Department of Justice received a letter from PNP Director General Leandro R.
Mendoza indorsing for preliminary investigation the sworn affidavits of two (2) new witnesses relative to the Kuratong Baleleng incident. Secretary Perez constituted
a panel of State Prosecutors to investigate the matter. The panel issued several subpoenas to all the accused in Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
including respondent Lacson, requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and to appear at the preliminary conference.

Consequently, on 28 May 2001, respondent and several of his co-accused filed a petition for prohibition with application for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction with the RTC-Manila, seeking to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and the State Prosecutors from further conducting a preliminary investigation.
The prohibition case was raffled to RTC-Br. 40, Manila, presided over by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba. The filing of this petition notwithstanding, the Panel of State
Prosecutors proceeded to issue a Resolution finding probable cause to hold respondent and his co-accused for trial, for eleven (11) counts of murder. Accordingly,
Informations were filed before the RTC, Quezon City, and docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112.

Deviating from the normal procedure, the Executive Judge, Vice-Executive Judges and Presiding Judges of Quezon City dispensed with the customary raffle;
instead, assigned the cases to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao of RTC-Br. 81, Quezon City, presumably as the successor of Judge Agnir in the same branch.

Meanwhile, in the prohibition case before RTC-Br. 40, Manila, Judge Pasamba denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order thus-

After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment
and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of the finding of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court that no probable
cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioner herein and to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the
case in a different perspective since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases.4

Dissatisfied, respondent elevated the case on a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals which thereafter rendered the assailed Decision of 24 August 2001
granting the petition, declaring null and void all the proceedings conducted by the State Prosecutors, and ordering all the criminal Informations dismissed -

The present controversy, being one involving "provisional dismissal" and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the prescriptive period provided under
Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said provision is couched in clear, simple and categorical words.
It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after the issuance of the order without the case having been revived. It should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases x x x
was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon City’s Resolution x x x x5

Hence, the present recourse. The bone of contention, which crystallizes all the arguments of the parties into a single point of inquiry, bears upon the nature and
effects of a provisional dismissal which has become permanent after the lapse of the periods provided in Sec. 8, Rule 117, 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. For facility of reference, the controversial provision of Sec. 8 quoted hereunder -

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. - A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment x x x of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived (italics supplied).

Assuming that Sec. 8, Rule 117, is available to respondent although it is my position that it is not, the question that should be asked is: Does the provisional dismissal
of a criminal case which has become permanent under Sec. 8 effectively foreclose the right of the State to prosecute an accused? I have taken great pains analyzing
the position of respondent; regretfully, I am unable to agree for my conscience shivers at its debilitating, crippling if not crushing, impact upon our criminal justice
system.

The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Arts. 90 and 91 of The Revised Penal Code, which are quoted hereunder -

Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. - Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other
afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses shall prescribe in two months

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third
paragraphs of this article.

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

Evidently, respondent’s concept of a provisional dismissal that has become permanent under Sec. 8, Rule 117, emasculates and renders illusory its very purpose. It
effectively obliterates the different prescriptive periods under Art. 90, which are fixed on the basis of the gravity of the penalty prescribed for the offense, and
supplants it with a uniform period of one (1) year or two (2) years, as the case may be. It likewise substantially modifies the manner of computing the period of
prescription in Art. 91 since the reckoning of the one (1) or two (2)-year prescriptive period under Sec. 8 is constant and invariable, and without regard to the number
of interruptions. Regardless of the number of times the case against an accused is provisionally dismissed, the prosecution would always have a full grace period of
two (2) years within which to revive the case; much unlike Art. 91 wherein the period consumed prior to the filing of the complaint or information is tacked to the
period consumed after the dismissal of the case for purposes of determining whether the crime has prescribed.

Interestingly, a dividing line is drawn in the application of Arts. 90 and 91 of The Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, obviously in an attempt to lend a delusive semblance of plausibility to its construction of Sec. 8. It is posited that Art. 91 and Sec. 8 operate on "different
planes," so to speak, the vital distinction being that Sec. 8, Rule 117, contemplates a situation where a case had already been filed and was provisionally dismissed.

I do not agree. Article 91 of The Revised Penal Code distinctly speaks of "prescription x x x shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
him." It can readily be seen therefore that the concept of a provisional dismissal is subsumed in Art. 91 since in a provisional dismissal, proceedings necessarily
75
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted. Thus, to construe and apply Sec. 8 in the manner suggested above would undeniably result in a direct
and irreconcilable conflict with Art. 91.

In a provisional dismissal, the prosecution, the defense and the offended party, in effect, enter into a tacit agreement for a temporary cessation of hostilities, i.e., to
momentarily hold in abeyance the prosecution of the accused. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8 prescribes the requirements thereto: (a) consent of the accused, and (b) notice
to the offended party. It must be remembered however that permanent dismissal of a case is but an offshoot of its previous provisional dismissal and the subsequent
failure to revive within the time frames set forth in Sec. 8. But does the permanent dismissal of the case arising from a provisional dismissal affect the right of the
State to prosecute within the periods provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code? Certainly not, for the prescriptive periods prescribed by law cannot be affected
directly or indirectly by any agreement or consent of the parties, much less be held hostage to any procedural limitations. Verily, in matters of public crimes which
have a direct bearing on public interest, no agreements or personal arrangements should be brought to bear upon the penal action.

Courts cannot - by an act of judicial legislation - abridge, amend, alter, or nullify statutes. We do not sit as councils of revision, empowered to judicially reform or
fashion legislation in accordance with our own notions of prudent public policy. Certainly, lest we are prepared to ride roughshod over this prerogative of Congress,
we cannot interfere with the power of the legislature to surrender, as an act of grace, the right of the State to prosecute and to declare the offense no longer subject
to prosecution after certain periods of time as expressed in the statute.

Furthermore, the right of the State to prosecute criminals is a substantive, nay, inherent right. To unduly limit the exercise of such right for a short period of one (1) or
two (2) years through the expedient of a procedural rule is unconstitutional, considering the limitation in our fundamental law on the rule-making power of this Court,
that is, its rules must not "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights."6

Another decisive factor which militates heavily against the foregoing thesis that Art. 91 and Sec. 8 operate on "different planes," is the fact that the phrase "amounts
to an acquittal," which appeared in the original draft of what is now Sec. 8, Rule 117, was judiciously rejected by the Supreme Court when it approved the final draft
of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure -

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You know that prior to the wordings at present of Sec. 8, Rule 117, there was a final committee draft that said and I quote: "the
corresponding order shall state that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent and amount to an acquittal one year after the issuance without the case
having been revived." What I am trying to point out is that, as originally worded, Section 8 expressly stated that the dismissal would amount to an acquittal. But the
final wording eliminated the words "amount to an acquittal," isn’t it?

ATTY. FORTUN: I would not know that, Your Honor. I have not seen that revised (interrupted) x x x x

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Well, that is true that those words were eliminated precisely because we wanted to avoid making invocation of that rule equivalent to an
acquittal. All right, (interrupted) x x x x7

Had the intention been to confer on Sec. 8 the effect of acquittal, the Court should have retained the express provision to that effect in the final draft. Obviously, the
conspicuous absence therein of the phrase "amounts to an acquittal," or its equivalent, forecloses a speculative approach to the meaning of Sec. 8. Virtually crossed
out, such clause cannot now be incised from the original draft and grafted into the approved draft of the revised rules, without doing violence to its intent.

It must be stressed that Sec. 8 is nothing more than a rule of procedure. As part of the adjective law, it is only a means to an end - an aid to substantive law - and
should accordingly be interpreted and applied in that concept. It was never meant to modify the settled provisions of law on the matter of prescription of offenses; or
to unduly curtail the right of the State to bring offenders before the bar of justice. These matters are best left to the wisdom and sound judgment of the legislature.

Section 8 is very limited in scope and application. Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Consultant, Committee on Revision of the Rules, in his Treatise on Historical
Development and Highlights of Amendments of Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rationale of Amendments of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure), made the
following commentaries on the import of the provision -

There had been so many instances where the National Bureau of Investigation or other police agencies have refused to issue clearances for purposes of
employment or travel abroad, to persons who have pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of their cases by the court was merely provisional,
notwithstanding the fact that such provisional dismissals, more often than not, had been done five or ten years ago. This causes prejudice to the persons concerned.
Accordingly, a rule was provided that the provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both,
shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.8

Clearly, the feverishly contested provision is purely administrative or regulatory in character. The policy embodied therein is simply to grant the accused momentary
relief from administrative restrictions occasioned by the filing of a criminal case against him. He is freed in the meantime of the dire consequences of his having been
charged with a crime, and temporarily restored to his immunities as a citizen, solely for purposes of government clearances. Section 8 imports no intricate nor ornate
legal signification that we need not discern from it a meaning that too far deviates from what it actually purports to convey.

Indeed, were we to adhere to the thesis equating permanent dismissal with "finality" and "acquittal," we would be ascribing meaning to the provision which is not only
at war with the demands of reason but also contrary to the clear intention of the rule. The disastrous effect of respondent’s interpretation of Sec. 8 upon our criminal
justice system is not difficult to imagine. So construed, it would afford an accused, endowed with a fertile imagination and creativeness, a plethora of opportunities to
rig his prosecution by silencing witnesses and suppressing evidence then letting the case hibernate for a much shorter period of one (1) or two (2) years. To be sure,
our procedural laws could not have intended to sanction such a result. "A system of procedure," intoned Justice Cardozo, "is perverted from its proper function when
it multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant of a clear necessity."9

Respondent conjures up the ingenious hypothesis that although Sec. 8 of Rule 117 and the "double jeopardy" principle have different requisites, they are
nonetheless cognate rules since Sec. 8 of Rule 117 affords the accused benefits analogous to that bestowed under the "double jeopardy" principle.10 Implacable
and unyielding is he in the position that a provisional dismissal that attains the character of permanency produces the effect of a sui generis acquittal. In this respect,
according to him, Sec. 8 of Rule 117 is not in that Sec. 17 (Discharge of Accused to be State Witness) unique and Sec. 18 unique and Sec. 18 (Discharge of
Accused Operates as Acquittal) of Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is also invested with the benefits of double jeopardy when it grants the
accused state witness a discharge tantamount to an acquittal. In both instances, the absence of any or all of the essential requisites of double jeopardy does not
preclude the discharge of the accused state witness or one whose case has attained permanent dismissal.

It bears recalling that since Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence on double jeopardy was swept into the shores of Philippine constitutional and statutory history, our concept of
double jeopardy has faithfully adhered to the pronouncements first made by Kepner v. United States11 that "x x x (I)t is then the settled law of this court that former
jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective
indictment. The protection is not x x x against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried again for the second offense." The fundamental philosophy that
underlies the finality of an acquittal is the recognition of the fact that the state with its infinite resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual and expose him to a state of perpetual anxiety and embarrassment as well as enhancing the possibility that although innocent, he may be
found guilty.

Presently, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit in its prescription of the requisites for the invocation of double jeopardy and the resultant effect
thereon on acquittals. Section 7, Rule 117, states-

76
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Ensconced in the foregoing procedural tenet are the imperatives for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

In contrast, provisional dismissal under Sec. 8 of Rule 117 requires only the twin requirements of consent of the accused and notice to the offended party. When a
criminal case is provisionally dismissed upon the express application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because
his action in having the case dismissed is a waiver of his constitutional prerogative of double jeopardy as he, in a manner of speaking, throws a monkey wrench to
the judicial process and prevents the court from rendering a judgment of conviction against him. Jurisprudence has emphatically enunciated that double jeopardy
cannot be properly invoked where the case was dismissed with the express conformity of the accused. This much is given as one of the requisites of double
jeopardy, i.e., where the accused is acquitted or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. This assent by
the accused to the dismissal is the operative act that precludes the effects of double jeopardy from setting in, so that despite the permanency of the dismissal due to
the lapse of the periods set forth in Sec. 8 of Rule 117, the refiling of a case under a new information does not trample upon this venerable doctrine.

The permanence of the dismissal should not be understood as the harbinger of final and absolute liberation of the accused from future prosecution. It merely augurs
the demise of the unrevived cases but it does not prevent the state from exercising the right to re-prosecute the accused within the prescriptive period provided in Art.
90 of the Revised Penal Code. With more weighty reason can we not accommodate respondent in his plea to avail of the graces afforded by the doctrine since the
records would show that he has yet to enter his plea to the charges or that the trial on the merits has as yet to commence.

Respondent also fires a shot in the dark when he suggests that there exists no marked difference between revival and refiling of a criminal case as in fact, according
to him, the two (2) concepts are synonymous and interchangeable. A survey of jurisprudential antecedents reveal the distinction between the revival and refiling of a
new information. The authorities are unanimous in their recognition of the fact that a provisionally dismissed case can be revived as it does not call for the operation
of the rule on double jeopardy and that cases can also be refiled under a new complaint or information for the same offense. 12

While I agree however that the filing of Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102 - 01-101112 is NOT a revival of the earlier dismissed cases, I wish to emphasize, lest I be
misconstrued, that the "New Informations" in the subsequently refiled cases are new not because the respondent is charged thereunder as a co-principal, instead of
as a mere accessory, or that the number of the accused has been increased from 26 to 34; rather, the new Informations which are the bases for the prosecution of
the respondent again under the same offense, are new for the singular reason that they are separate and distinct from those in the previously dismissed cases.
Simply stated, it is not of consequence whether the allegations in the two (2) sets of Informations are quintessentially identical or different in form and substance
insofar as concerns the right of the state to prosecute the respondent anew after the provisional dismissal became permanent.

A question may be asked: Suppose that the new information is a verbatim reproduction of the information in the permanently dismissed case, can we not now say
that the newly filed case is a mere revival of the case previously dismissed? After all, stripped of semantic finery, their being identical would lead to the impression,
although erroneous, that one is but a revival of the other. On the surface one may see no apparent difference between the two (2) sets of Informations, but a subtle
yet significant functional distinction in fact exists. Once a case is permanently dismissed after the lapse of the prescriptive periods set forth in Sec. 8, the case is dead
and, for all intents and purposes, beyond resuscitation. All the on-going proceedings and those still to be had, e.g., preliminary investigation, arraignment, trial, etc.,
shall cease and be terminated. In the event however that the accused is prosecuted anew with the same offense, albeit under an identical information, the previously
terminated proceedings will not be reactivated, the previous case having been set at rest; instead, new proceedings will be conducted as if the accused has been
charged afresh. To my mind, the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 8, Rule 117 has in its favor the soundest policy considerations based no less on the fundamental
objectives of procedural rules.

Incidentally, I find it particularly disturbing that the Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were dismissed by the trial judge without complying
with one of the requirements of the first paragraph of Sec. 8, i.e., the dismissal must be with notice to the offended party. There is nothing in the records which would
show that all the offended parties were ever notified that the cases against respondent and his co-accused would be dismissed. Even if we proceed on the
assumption that the filing of affidavits of desistance by the offended parties may be considered a substantial equivalent of notice, still the dismissal appears to be
procedurally infirm since only seven (7) of the offended parties representing eight (8) of the eleven (11) victims, executed affidavits of desistance.13 No similar
affidavits were submitted for the three (3) remaining victims.14 Cannot the next of kin of these three (3) remaining victims, who were not even notified of the
provisional dismissal of the cases, prosecute those responsible for killing them within the prescriptive period provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code? Are they
now without any remedy in law if witnesses belatedly surface, they who cowered in fear at the time because of the positions of power held by those perceived to be
responsible therefor?

Significantly also, I am at a loss as to why the Court of Appeals reckoned the two (2)-year period from 29 March 1999 as the date of issuance of the resolution of
dismissal. When Sec. 8 speaks of "issuance" it should be construed not with reference to the date as appearing in the resolution of dismissal but on the date it was
actually delivered to the proper person and received by him. Otherwise, how would the offended parties know that such resolution was issued as to reckon with the
two (2)-year period after which the provisional dismissal would be considered permanent?

In the instant case, the records do not clearly identify who the offended parties are, or whether they were all notified of Judge Agnir's order of dismissal dated 29
March 1999 as they do not even appear to have been properly named. In the absence of such evidence, the reckoning point for computing the two (2)-year period
under Sec. 8 becomes indeterminable. Assuming that Sec. 8 is available to respondent, to which we do not even agree, still respondent has failed to discharge his
burden of proving that the two (2)-year period has indeed elapsed to make the provisional dismissal permanent.

These circumstances cast a heavy pall of doubt on whether the dismissal of the eleven (11) Informations has indeed attained the status of permanence as to prevent
the prosecution from refiling them. The notice requirement in the first paragraph of Sec. 8 as well as the notice of the order of dismissal are by no means trivial
formalities; they are meaningful and significant. The offended parties, seeking justice and vindication for the wrong done, would naturally be keenly interested in the
progress and outcome of the criminal prosecution. Hence, it is but proper that all of them be notified of the termination of the cases and given an equal opportunity to
object to the dismissal.

A view has been expressed that respondent’s rights to speedy trial and to speedy disposition of his cases were violated; this despite the fact that the right was not
invoked by respondent before us. Accordingly, the twenty-six (26) month delay in the refiling of cases relative to the Kuratong Baleleng killings is claimed to be
vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and hence sufficient to activate the protection of the Bill of Rights, specifically, on the rights to speedy trial and to speedy
disposition of his cases. Sections 14 (2) and 16, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution respectively provides -

Sec. 14. x x x x (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused x x x shall enjoy the right x x x to have a speedy, impartial and public trial x x x x

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

These provisions uphold the time-honored tradition of speedy justice for, as stated in the oft-repeated dictum, "justice delayed is justice denied." Their express
inclusion in the present Constitution was in response to the common charge against perennial delays in the administration of justice which have plagued our judicial
system.15
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The right to speedy trial under Sec. 14 and the right to speedy disposition of cases in Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, are kindred constitutional
norms similar in nature and legal effects, sharing common operational principles, and subject to the same test for purposes of determining violations thereof. Thus,
the cornerstone of both rights is to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial and disposition
of cases.

Speedy disposition of cases, like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances
of a particular case.16 Verily, these rights are more indistinct concepts than other constitutional rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with precision when
the rights have been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, these
rights cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months. There is no fixed point in the proceeding when a party may exercise or be deemed to have
waived these rights. Finally, the amorphous quality of the rights sometimes lead to the drastic remedy of dismissal of a case when the rights have been infringed.
This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that an accused who may be guilty of a grave offense will go scot-free without being tried and held
responsible therefor. Such a remedy is more radical than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial.

At any rate, the framers of the Constitution recognized the right to speedy disposition of cases distinctly from the right to speedy trial in criminal cases. It should be
noted that Sec. 16 covers all phases before, during and after trial, and extends protection to all parties in all types of cases: civil, criminal and administrative. In this
respect, it affords a broader protection than Sec. 14 (2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial in criminal cases.17

Against this backdrop, I turn to inquire into the parameters of the right to speedy disposition of cases. Just how broad is its mantle of protection as applied in criminal
cases? When does the right attach during the criminal process, and when may it be properly asserted by a party? A criminal prosecution has many stages, and delay
may occur during or between any of them. As applied in the instant case, it appears that the speedy disposition guarantee of the Bill of Rights is asserted to include
the period of delay from the provisional dismissal of the case to its revival or refiling since "respondent is as much entitled to a speedy reinvestigation and refiling of
the provisionally dismissed cases against him."18

Such interpretation, however, does not seem to be in consonance with the unmistakable language, nor by the obvious intent, of Sec. 16. The provision speaks of
"speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." It clearly and logically contemplates a situation wherein there exists an
outstanding case, proceeding or some incident upon which the assertion of the right may be predicated. Evidently, it would be idle, not to say anomalous, to speak of
"speedy disposition of cases" in the absence of anything to dispose of in the first place.

A review of pertinent jurisprudence attests abundantly to the indispensable requirement of a "pending case, proceeding or some incident," as sine qua non before the
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked. Thus, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan19 we held that the long delay of three (3) years in the
termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan was violative of the Constitutional right of speedy disposition of cases because political motivations
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Similarly in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan20 involving an inordinate delay in the
conduct of preliminary investigation, we ruled that such unjustified delay infringes upon the right to speedy disposition of cases.

In Binay v. Sandiganbayan21 we ruled out any violation of petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of cases despite a six-year delay from the filing of the charges in the
Office of the Ombudsman to the time the Informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan. Then in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.22 we rejected the allegation of inordinate
delay in terminating the preliminary investigation. Finally, in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan23 we held that the inordinate delay of six (6) years by the Special
Prosecutor (succeeding the Tanodbayan) in the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an Information for the offense with the Sandiganbayan
violated petitioner’s constitutional guaranty to speedy disposition of the case.

Invariably, the foregoing cases demonstrate that the broad protective cloak of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases becomes available only in
instances where preliminary proceedings have been initiated, or a case has already been filed or any other incident pertaining thereto already had. As we succinctly
stated in Binay v. Sandiganbayan24 -

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried (italics supplied).

It goes without saying therefore that the right to speedy disposition of cases is unavailing in the absence of any proceedings conducted before, during, or after, trial.
Significantly, there is no precedent, for indeed there is none, to support the novel conclusion that even after the dismissal of the cases, an accused may still invoke
the constitutional guarantee.

In the case before us, nothing was left to be done after the issuance of the 29 March 1999 Order of Judge Agnir dismissing all criminal charges against respondent
relative to the Kuratong Baleleng incident. During the hiatus following the dismissal of the criminal charges, no formal proceeding remained outstanding. Not even
court processes were issued to restrain respondent’s liberty or subject him to any form of public accusation; he was free to go about his affairs, to practice his
profession, and to continue on with his life. Respondent was legally and constitutionally in the same posture as though no charges had been made. Hence, it was
only at the time when he was subjected to another pre-indictment investigation and accused anew that respondent may invoke his right to speedy disposition of his
cases. The delay after the charges against him were dismissed, like any delay before those charges were filed, should not be included in reckoning the time and
determining whether he was denied his right to a speedy disposition of his cases.

The provisional nature of the dismissal of the original criminal cases is quite immaterial. The fact that the cases were dismissed conditionally or "without prejudice" to
the subsequent filing of new cases, does not make the order of dismissal any less a disposition of the cases. Although provisional, it nonetheless terminated all
proceedings against respondent such that there remained in the meantime no pending case which the court could act upon and resolve, and which could be made
the basis for the application of the right to speedy disposition of respondent's cases.25

Clearly, we would be reinventing the wheel, so to speak, if we are to include within the protective shield of the right to speedy disposition of cases the reinvestigation
and refiling of the provisionally dismissed cases. The matter of reinvestigation and refiling of cases at some future time are not by themselves "pending incidents
related to the dismissed cases;" they are mere possibilities or expectancies. The State has no definite decision yet on whether to really commence a reinvestigation
and refiling of the cases, and only indicates, at the most, a probable action at some future time. Until such time that the State decided to exercise these rights, they
cannot ripen into a pending case, proceeding or incident for purposes of the speedy disposition safeguard.

Certainly, the constitutional pledge mandates merely the swift resolution or termination of a pending case or proceeding, and not the initiation or institution of a new
case or proceeding. It has no application to inexistent proceedings but only to those currently being undertaken. Were we to hold otherwise, we would in effect be
granting to every accused an unbridled license to impose his will upon the State and demand that he be immediately reinvestigated and a case filed against him. The
determination of whether to file or when to file a case lies within the sole discretion of the prosecution depending upon the availability of his evidence and provided
that it is filed within the prescriptive period. As American Jurisprudence would hold -

It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from "fundamental conceptions of justice" when they defer seeking indictments until
they have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable
cause. It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able
to establish the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To impose such a duty "would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the
ability of society to protect itself." From the perspective of potential defendants, requiring prosecutions to commence when probable cause is established is
undesirable because it would increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed, and would add to the time during which defendants stand accused but
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untried x x x x From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause is equally unacceptable because it
could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful sources of information to evaporate before they are fully
exploited. And from the standpoint of the courts, such a requirement is unwise because it would cause scarce resources to be consumed on cases that prove to be
insubstantial, or that involve only some of the responsible parties or some of the criminal acts.26

To reiterate, respondent’s right to speedy disposition of his criminal cases attached only at that precise moment the Department of Justice constituted a panel of
prosecutors and conducted a new preliminary investigation. Even then, the conduct of the prosecutors cannot be assailed as violative of the speedy disposition
guarantee. As shown by the records, the government can hardly be accused of foot-dragging for, in fact, they lost no time in commencing the new preliminary
investigation and thereafter filing the corresponding Informations in court upon the appearance of new witnesses against respondent and his co-accused. The
expeditious action of the government in the instant case certainly cannot be viewed with suspicion.

In fairness to petitioners, they cannot be faulted in demonstrating alacrity in performing their mandate, nor can they be castigated for the so-called "unusual haste" in
reopening the cases against respondent. No impure motive should be imputed to them other than the fact that they regularly performed their duty in their apparent
desire to unravel the Kuratong Baleleng mystery.

For the petitioners, this is a classic case of "damn-if-you-do-and-damn-if-you-don’t" situation. Petitioners are being put to task for their alleged negligence and delay
in reviving the cases, but then again, they are also being pilloried for persecuting the respondent because of the supposed "unusual haste" and "uncharacteristic
vigor" in pursuing the criminal cases against him and his co-accused.

For the reasons stated, I decline to extend to respondent the protection guaranteed by Sec. 16. Plain common sense dictates that the provision cannot be applied to
situations not contemplated by it. Verily, we cannot expand the letter and spirit of the provision and read into it a meaning that is not there.

This does not, of course, mean that respondent is utterly unprotected in this regard. On the contrary, there are other constitutional and statutory mechanisms to
guard against possible and actual prejudice to the accused, resulting from the passage of time. Primarily, the statute of limitations under Art. 90 of The Revised Penal
Code is the principal safeguard against prosecuting overly stale criminal charges. The statute represents legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and
the defendant in administering and receiving justice; it protects not only the accused from prejudice to his defense, but also balances his interest in repose against
society's interest in the apprehension and punishment of criminals.27 This statute provides predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrefutable
presumption that the rights of an accused to a fair trial would be prejudiced.28

The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature
has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic
facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit
may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.29

Moreover, the sweeping command of the Due Process Clause always protects defendants against fundamentally unfair treatment by the government in criminal
proceedings. Procedural fairness required by due process decrees the dismissal of an indictment if it be shown that delay caused substantial prejudice to the rights of
an accused to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.

But even if we proceed on the assumption that respondent may rightfully invoke the speedy disposition clause for the respondent, still I find that the circumstances of
this case fail to measure up to the criteria set forth under the Balancing Test.

In Caballero v. Alfonso30 we adopted a four-factor Balancing Test to determine whether an accused has been denied the constitutional right to speedy disposition of
his case, i.e., (a) length of the delay, (b) reason for the delay, (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and, (d) prejudice caused by the delay.

With these relevant factors, the otherwise abstract concept of speedy disposition of cases is provided with at least a modicum of structure. The Balancing Test, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are considered, prescribes flexible standards based on practical considerations. It necessarily compels
courts to approach speedy disposition cases on an ad hoc basis. No single factor in the Balancing Test is definitive because all four (4) must be weighed against the
others in determining whether a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases occurred. In other words, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must
still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out in full
recognition of the accused’s interest in the speedy disposition of his case as specifically affirmed in the Constitution.31

I proceed to consider the four (4) factors in the Balancing Test in seriatim. The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until it is shown that the
delay has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary delay from presumptively prejudicial delay, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the
balance.32 Considering the serious nature of the charges against respondent, and more importantly, the criminal cases sought to be filed being deeply impressed
with public interest, involving as they do high ranking police officers, I am of the view that the claimed two (2) years and three (3) months lag between the provisional
dismissal of the first criminal cases on 29 March 1999 and the filing of new Informations on 6 June 2001 sketches below the bare minimum needed to provoke such
an inquiry. At any rate, I will assume, without conceding, that it is sufficiently long for purposes of triggering a full analysis under the three (3) remaining factors.

The banner the litigants seek to capture is the second factor - the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here too, different weights should be assigned
to different reasons. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A more
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify
appropriate delay.33

I find it hard to accept that in the criminal cases against respondent the government is on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons
for delaying the prosecution of respondent. It simplistically and unrealistically assumes that the availability of witnesses Yu and Enad prior to 2001 renders the
seeming lethargy of the government unjustifiable. It completely disregards other considerations affecting the decision of the government to stay its entire
prosecutorial machinery.

The government may delay for a variety of reasons such as to gain time in which to strengthen and document its case. The government may also delay, not with the
view of ensuring conviction of the accused, but because the government lacks sufficient resources to move quickly. The species of governmental delay that are
anathema to the right to speedy disposition of cases are those which are purposely or negligently employed to harm or gain impermissible advantage over the
accused at the trial. The reason is that, in such circumstance, the fair administration of justice is imperiled.

In the present recourse, there is nothing to demonstrate that the delay in reviving the cases against respondent was deliberately availed of for an impermissible
purpose. It was not explained what improper tactical advantage was gained or sought by the government; nor can I discern any such advantage from the records. To
be sure, if as claimed by respondent this whole mess is nothing more than a pure and simple political vendetta, carried out by a possè bent on lynching him politically
and personally - which I am not inclined to acknowledge at this stage - the government could have moved against respondent with deliberate haste, for delay is not
exactly to its best interest.

Neither can we safely conclude that the public prosecutors are guilty of negligent omission. Insufficiency of evidence is a legitimate reason for delay. The government
is naturally not expected to go forward with the trial and incur costs unless it is convinced it has an iron-clad case to make a worthwhile indictment. Verily, it needs
time to gather evidence, track down and collect witnesses, as well as document its case. As to how much time it needs depends on such other factors as the
availability of witnesses and resources to enable it to move quickly. In U.S. v. Lovasco34 it was held -

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x x x x investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay under taken by the Government solely "to gain tactical advantage over the accused," precisely because
investigative delay is not so one-sided. Rather than deviating from elementary standards of "fair play and decency," a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek
indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute and will be able to promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Penalizing prosecutors
who defer action for these reasons would subordinate the goal of "orderly expedition" to that of "mere speed.

In no mean measure, the many constitutional and procedural safeguards provided an accused can also present obstacles. It is doubly difficult in this particular case
considering the recantation and disappearance of all available vital witnesses for the prosecution.

If we were to turn the tables against the respondent, we say that the unavailability of the witnesses for the prosecution may be attributed to the conventional tendency
of our people never to antagonize the powerful and the influential. We are not insinuating that respondent had a hand in the recantation or desistance of the
complainants, or the non-appearance or the shortage of witnesses for the prosecution; what we are simply saying is that accusing an individual of respondent's
stature naturally engenders fear of physical harm, real or imagined, and can intimidate even the most stout-hearted and temerarious individuals. This circumstance
should have been given weight in resolving the present controversy.

The third factor - the extent to which respondent has asserted his right to speedy disposition of his case - further weakens his position. When and how a defendant
asserts his right should be given strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the accused is being deprived of the right. The more serious the deprivation, the
more likely an accused is to complain. But the failure to invoke the right will make it difficult for an accused to prove that he was denied thereof.35

I do not think that the vigor with which respondent defended himself in the original cases against him, and the vigilance with which he assailed the filing of the new
Informations now subject of the instant petition, is the equivalent to an assertion of his right to speedy disposition. The trouble with this observation is that every
accused in a criminal case has the intense desire to seek acquittal, or at least to see the swift end of the accusation against him. To this end, it is natural for him to
exert every effort within his capacity to resist prosecution. But is it correct to assume that, in every instance, the accused in resisting his criminal prosecution is also
asserting his right to speedy disposition?

Respondent’s reliance on Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which some have said is based on the constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases, cannot be equated with a positive assertion of the right to speedy disposition. A perusal of the records would reveal that the issue of applicability
of Sec. 8, Rule 117, was raised by respondent for the first time before the Court of Appeals, in his Second Amended Petition - undoubtedly a mere afterthought. It
was not his original position before the trial court, which centered on the "lack of valid ‘complaints’ to justify a preliminary investigation of cases which had long been
dismissed." It was not even his initial position in the early stages of the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Within the context of the Balancing Test,
respondent’s tardy, inexplicit and vague invocation of this right makes it seriously difficult for him to prove the denial thereof.

Finally, the fourth factor is prejudice to the accused. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of accused which the speedy disposition
right as well as the speedy trial right are designed to protect. There are three (3) of such interests: (a) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (b) to minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused; and, (c) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.36 Of the three (3), the most significant is the last because the
inability of the defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.37

Needless to say, respondent was never arrested or taken into custody, or otherwise deprived of his liberty in any manner. These render the first criterion inapplicable.
Thus, the only conceivable harm to respondent from the lapse of time may arise from anxiety and the potential prejudice to his ability to defend his case. Even then,
the harm suffered by respondent occasioned by the filing of the criminal cases against him is too minimal and insubstantial to tip the scales in his favor.

Concededly, anxiety typically accompanies a criminal charge. But not every claim of anxiety affords the accused a ground to decry a violation of the rights to speedy
disposition of cases and to speedy trial. The anxiety must be of such nature and degree that it becomes oppressive, unnecessary and notoriously disproportionate to
the nature of the criminal charge. To illustrate, a prosecution for the serious crime of multiple murder naturally generates greater degree of anxiety, than an
indictment for, say, simple estafa. The anxiety and the tarnished "reputation and image of respondent who is, after all, presently and newly elected member of the
Senate," does not amount to that degree that would justify a nullification of the the appropriate and regular steps that must be taken to assure that while the innocent
should go unpunished, those guilty must expiate for their offense. Verily, they pale in importance to the gravity of the charges and the paramount considerations of
seeking justice for the victims as well as redeeming the sullied integrity and reputation of the Philippine National Police for their alleged involvement in the
perpetration of the ghastly crimes.

We cannot therefore hold, on the facts before us, that the delay in the reinvestigation and refiling of the criminal cases weighed sufficiently in support of the view that
respondent’s right to speedy disposition of his cases has been violated. The delay simply does not justify the severe remedy of dismissing the indictments.

Consistent with the views expressed above, I hold that no constitutional, statutory and procedural impediments exist against the subsequent re-indictment of
respondent. Although we are dealing here with alleged members of the notorious Kuratong Baleleng Gang, against whom society must be protected, we must bear in
mind that they too were human beings with human rights. Indeed, life is so precious that its loss cannot simply be consigned to oblivion in so short a time. Withal, the
seriousness of the accusations against respondent and other high-ranking officers of the PNP goes into the very foundation of our law enforcement institutions. We
must ferret out the truth: Is the Philippine National Police so contaminated to the core with corrupt and murderous police officers, worse than the criminal elements
they are trained to exterminate? Let us give the courts a chance to find out - and more importantly - to absolve respondent and erase any taint in his name, if
innocent. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.

I vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration.

Dissenting Opinion

PUNO, J.:

I
PRECIS

Our Resolution of May 28, 2002 was the result of a long and exhaustive, nay, exhausting discussion of the meaning of section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. As summed up in the new ponencia of Mr. Justice Callejo, the Court ruled that section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case at bar. Nonetheless
evidence has to be adduced by the parties to prove certain facts which shall determine whether said section can be beneficially invoked by respondent Lacson.
These vital facts, to quote the new ponencia, are (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether notices to
the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir, Jr.; (3) whether there were affidavits of desistance
executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (4) whether the 2-year period to revive the cases has already lapsed; (5) whether there is any justification for
the re-filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (6) whether the reckoning date of the 2-year bar shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule; and (7) if the cases were
revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. Thus, the case at bar was remanded to the RTC-Quezon City,
Branch 81 to enable the parties to adduce evidence on these factual issues. On the basis of the evidence to be presented, the trial court will rule on the applicability
of section 8, Rule 117 to respondent Lacson.

It is noteworthy that except for JJ Melo and Carpio, who inhibited themselves, the resolution was a unanimous one. The new ponencia now seeks to reverse the
unanimous resolution of this Court. The Court has four new members and the passage of time has put a mist on some of the themes and sub-themes considered in

80
the discussion of section 8, Rule 117. I wish therefore to restate my humble understanding of section 8, Rule 117, as chairman of the Committee on Revision of the
Rules of Court that drafted the said rule.

I start with the statement that the Committee was confronted with the following problem:

1. A complaint or information has been filed with a court of competent jurisdiction;

2. The prosecution after a number of settings cannot proceed with the case for some reasons but usually due to the unavailability of the complainant or witnesses to
testify;

3. The accused is ready to proceed but cannot move to dismiss the case and invoke his right to speedy trial because the delay of the prosecution is not yet
unreasonable;

4. As a half-way measure and to relieve himself of the heavy burden of a pending criminal case, the accused agrees to a provisional dismissal of the complaint or
information against him;

5. Under the rules and case-law prior to year 2000, the provisional dismissal of a criminal case is open-ended. The case can be revived by the prosecution without
any time limit except when it is already barred by prescription. It is not unusual for the case to be frozen for an unreasonable length of time. It remains in the docket of
the court and contributes to its clogging. Worse, it hangs like a sword of Damocles over the head of the accused. It can fall principally depending on the predilection
and prejudice of the prosecutor.

First. It was this undesirable situation that the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court addressed when it designed section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court en banc found no difficulty appreciating the rationale of the new rule for it approved the rule with but a minor amendment.
The amendment lengthened the time within which the prosecution can revive the provisionally dismissed case in offenses punishable by more than six (6) years of
imprisonment. The time to revive was stretched to two (2) years after a survey was made of offenses punishable by imprisonment of six (6) years or more and a
study of its probable adverse impact on the government campaign against crimes. In promulgating the new rule, the Court en banc struck a fine balance between the
sovereign right of the State to prosecute crimes and the inherent right of the accused to be protected from the unnecessary burdens of criminal litigation. The timeline
within which provisionally dismissed cases can be revived forms the crux of the delicate balance.

Second. Section 8, Rule 117 is a rule that gives an accused a new right that is distinct from, among others, the right to speedy trial and the right against double
jeopardy. The resistance to recognize this new right and the effort to unnecessarily link it with other rights of the accused are the main causes of its
misunderstanding. Thus, section 8, Rule 117 should not be confused with Rule 1191 which is the rule of procedure that implements the constitutional right of an
accused to speedy trial. The confusion can obliterate the difference in the time requirements in the two rules. The right to speedy trial is determined by a flexible time
standard. We resolve claims of denial of the right to speedy trial by balancing the following factors: (1) the duration of the delay, (2) the reason thereof, (3) the
assertion of the right or failure to assert it by the accused, and (4) the prejudice caused by such delay. On the other hand, the timeline that restricts the right of the
State to revive a case in a section 8, Rule 117 situation is inflexible if it is shown that it has slept on its right without reason. Section 8, Rule 117 should not also be
confused with section 3(i), Rule 117 which is the rule of procedure that protects the constitutional right of an accused against double jeopardy. Again, the two rules
are distinct, hence, it is not proper to require the element of prior plea in double jeopardy cases in a section 8, Rule 117 situation. In fine, section 8, Rule 117 is a new
rule that is complete by itself and should not be construed in light of rules implementing other rights of an accused.

Third. The provisional dismissal under section 8 of Rule 119 becomes permanent after the lapse of one or two years depending on the gravity of the offense involved.
There can be no hedging on the meaning of the word permanent for the new rule used the word without a bit of embroidery. To be emphatic, the lapse of the one (1)
or two (2) years time puts a period to the provisionally dismissed case and not a mere comma. It is true that during the deliberations of the Committee, the provision
was originally worded as follows: "The corresponding order shall state that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent and amount to acquittal one (1) year
after its issuance without the case having been revived." In the final version of the provision, however, the phrase "amount to acquittal" was deleted. The deletion was
dictated by the belief that the phrase was a redundancy in light of the clear and unequivocal import of the word "permanent." The deletion cannot be distorted to
mean that a case permanently dismissed can still be revived. For if that were the intent, the rule could have easily stated that the accused whose case has been
permanently dismissed could nevertheless be prosecuted for the same offense.

Fourth. The permanent dismissal of an unrevived case under section 8, Rule 117 does not unduly shorten the prescriptive period of offenses provided for in Articles
90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The new rule merely regulates the conduct of the prosecution of an offense once the case is filed in court. It cannot be
doubted that after a case is filed in court, its conduct by the prosecution can be regulated by rules of procedure which are within the exclusive power of this Court to
promulgate. More specifically, the new rule regulates the time when the State must complete the prosecution of a pending case after its provisional dismissal. It
provides the consequence when the State sleeps on its duty to revive a provisionally dismissed case. If the State loses the right to continue the prosecution of an
offense already filed in court, it is not because the rule has amended the prescriptive period of the crime provided by our substantive law. Rather, it is a simple case
where the State forfeited its right to prosecute by its own inaction, an inaction that unless justified cannot be allowed to further impair the rights of an accused.

Fifth. The permanent dismissal under section 8, Rule 117 precludes the prosecution of the accused for the same offense under a new information. Again, it is true
that we have rulings to the effect that a trial court may, in the interest of justice, dismiss a case provisionally but without prejudice to reinstating it before the order of
dismissal becomes final or without prejudice to the subsequent filing of a new information for the same offense. But note should be taken of the important fact that
these rulings were handed down before section 8, Rule 117 came into being. Section 8, Rule 117 changed the old rule that dismissals which are provisional in
character lack the imprimatur of finality, hence, they do not bar the revival of the offense charged or the filing of a new information for the same offense. The old rule
was precisely jettisoned by the Committee and by this Court because of its unfairness to the accused. Again, I respectfully submit that the new rule would be useless
if it would leave unfettered the discretion of the prosecutor in reviving the same offense under the fig leaf of a new information.

Sixth. I do not share the thesis that the re-filing of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 is not a revival of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. There cannot be any dispute on the meaning of the word revival in section 8, Rule 117. Revival means reanimating or renewing the case that has become
dormant because of its provisional dismissal. The cases that were provisionally dismissed for lack of probable cause refer to the eleven (11) Informations for murder
filed against the respondent, et al., allegedly for the summary execution of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. Without doubt, these are the same cases
re-filed against the respondent after another preliminary investigation with the principal difference that respondent is now charged as a principal and no longer as an
accessory.

I respectfully submit that the test to determine whether a case can be revived is not whether a new preliminary investigation has been conducted by the prosecution.
That test, if allowed, would torture out of context the intent of section 8, Rule 117. The new rule speaks of "case" and "offenses." It clearly prohibits the revival of the
case against an accused which has been provisionally dismissed for failure of the State to continue its prosecution without any justification. I like to underscore that
the prohibition against revival is not a free gift by the State to an accused. The right against revival is the result of a trade-off of valuable rights for the accused can
exercise it only if he surrenders his right to an early permanent dismissal of the case against him due to the inability of the State to prosecute. In so doing, the
accused suffers a detriment for he gives the State one to two years to revive a case which has already been frozen for failure to prosecute. During this waiting period,
the accused cannot move to dismiss the charge against him while the State can locate its missing witnesses, secure them if they are threatened and even gather
new evidence. In exchange for this period of grace given to the State, the rule sets a timeline for the prosecutors to revive the case against the accused. The timeline
is fixed for the accused has suffered an indubitable detriment and the trade-off for this detriment is the duty imposed on the prosecution either to continue or
discontinue with the case within the 1 or 2-year grace period. We cannot allow the undue extension of this detriment unless the State can show compelling reasons
to justify its failure to prosecute. The open-ended practice under the old rule which makes provisional dismissal permanently provisional is precisely the evil sought to
be extirpated by section 8, Rule 117.
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Seventh, I wish to stress the bigger reason for section 8, Rule 117. The new rule does enhance the constitutional rights of an accused to speedy trial and speedy
disposition of the case(s) against him but it is much more than that. More broadly, the new rule was designed to achieve one of the end-goals of the criminal process
- - - to minimize the burdens of accusation and litigation. This end-goal is well explained by La Fave and Israel, conceded authorities in Criminal Procedure, viz:2

"(d) Minimizing the Burdens of Accusation and Litigation. Even though eventually acquitted, an innocent person charged with a crime suffers substantial burdens. The
accusation casts a doubt on the person’s reputation that is not easily erased. Frequently, the public remembers the accusation and still suspects guilt even after an
acquittal. Moreover, even where an acquittal is accepted as fully vindicating the accused, it hardly remedies other costs suffered in the course of gaining that verdict.
The period spent by the accused awaiting trial commonly is filled with a substantial degree of anxiety and insecurity that disrupts the daily flow of his life. That
disruption is, of course, even greater if he is incarcerated pending trial. The accused also must bear the expense and ordeal of the litigation process itself."

This end-goal is by no means novel. We have various rules of criminal procedure to minimize the burdens of litigation. Our rules on bail, venue, double jeopardy,
speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases, etc., are among them. In fine, we have been promulgating rules to minimize the burdens of litigation for a long, long time.

Let me also underscore that section 8, Rule 117 was promulgated in the exercise of the expanded power of this Court to enact rules of procedure under section 5(5)
of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."

This provision3 expanded the rule making power of this Court for (1) it extended its power not only to cover pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar but also to encompass the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and legal assistance to the
underprivileged, and (2) it no longer contained the restriction that said rules "may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa."4 As
aforediscussed, section 8, Rule 117 was designed to diminish the burdens of litigation by fixing a timeline on provisional dismissal of cases beyond which they cannot
be revived. The regulation of the conduct of a criminal case once filed in court, including the time within which it must be terminated, is inherent in judicial power.
Section 8, Rule 117 is an exercise of this power, a power that this Court has exercised without any question since the 1935 Constitution.

II
The dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent

This Court did not err when it ruled "that the provisional dismissal of the case against respondent Lacson bears his express consent."

The records will show that respondent Lacson filed before then Judge Agnir, Jr. who was to try Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause. The motion contained the following prayer:

"x x x xxx xxx

(1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order
be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefore; and

(2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.

Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for."5

In ruling that the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson did not bear his consent, the ponencia states that "x x x respondent merely filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause x x x."6 It emphasizes that no motion for provisional dismissal of the cases was filed. With due respect, the effort to
distinguish the two motions is futile for it is seeking a distinction when there is no difference. The essence of both motions is the lack of probable cause of the
Informations. If the motions succeed, there is only one course of action for the judge to take --- to dismiss the Informations. For all intents and purposes, a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause can be treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. prefaced the resolution of
respondent Lacson’s motion in this wise:

"Before the Court are five (5) separate but identical motions filed thru their respective counsel by the twenty-six (26) accused in the above numbered cases, praying
the Court to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest, (2) to hold in abeyance the issuance of
warrants in the meantime, and (3) to dismiss the cases should the court find lack of probable cause."

Prescinding from this understanding, then Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his Resolution dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, viz:

"As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the recantation of the principal
prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are
probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine above-cited, there is no more reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose them to an open and public
accusation. It is time to write finis to these cases and lay to rest the ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved--- the accused, the prosecution
witnesses and the private complainants alike--- may get on with their lives.

The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of People vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999) where the Supreme Court said
that the general rule is that ‘if the Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the
public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial’, and that the ruling in
Allado vs. Diokno ‘is an exception to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist.’

This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly make an exception to the general rule.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused or to hold them for trial.
Accordingly, the Informations in the above-numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed."

SO ORDERED." (emphasis supplied)

To justify his ruling, the ponente insists that "respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the case."7 With due respect, the specific prayer demanded by the ponente is
unnecessary. Under Rule 112, section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge may "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
82
to establish probable cause." Likewise, the motion for judicial determination of probable cause prayed for "other equitable reliefs." Similarly, there need not be any
agreement on the provisional character of the dismissal of the said cases. The cases were dismissed not on the merits but for lack of probable cause and before the
arraignment of respondent Lacson. Their dismissal was provisional by operation of our rules.

The ponencia then cites certain judicial "admissions" by the counsel of respondent Lacson to the effect that they did not move to dismiss the Informations against
said respondent nor agree to their provisional dismissal. Again with due respect, these so called "admissions" should be taken in their proper context. These
"admissions" were made in the course of the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. The parties then were arguing that the re-filing of the cases will violate the rule
on double jeopardy. Naturally, respondent Lacson took the position that his right against double jeopardy would be violated, hence, he was insisting that the
dismissal of the cases was without his express consent. Naturally too, the petitioner took the opposite view that the rule on double jeopardy would not be breached
because respondent consented to their dismissal. If the ponencia will hold respondent Lacson to his "admission" that he did not consent to the dismissal of his cases,
it should similarly hold petitioner to its "admission" that respondent consented to the dismissal of the cases against him. In truth, the evidentiary rule on admission
governs the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact and should not be applied on arguments of parties. The issue in the case at bar is the nature
and effect of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause- - - i.e., whether or not it can be treated by a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of probable
cause. The issue is basically legal, and should be resolved in accordance with our laws and not on the basis of the arguments of parties which are often twisted to
serve their peculiar interests.

III
It is not clear whether the offended parties had knowledge of the dismissal
of their Informations against respondent Lacson

In our resolution under reconsideration, we explained why there is uncertainty on the factual issue of whether notices were sent to the offended parties, viz:

"x x x

The records of the case, however, do not reveal with conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent
Lacson were dismissed by Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing.
Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he
signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely:

a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora;

b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;

c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;

d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;

e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;

f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and

g. Rolando Siplon

From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims,
namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge
thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.

The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him.
The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether
or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants.

Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were
revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a
petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against
him.

This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent
Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did
not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases
against respondent Lacson and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the effect that "records show that the prosecution
and the private offended parties were notified of the hearing x x x." It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary
to Judge Agnir’s finding that only seven (7) of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance." (emphases supplied)

The ponencia will reverse this ruling on the following ratiocination:

"In the case at bar, even if the respondent’s motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce, as his
motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing
on said motion on May 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on May 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on May 22, 1999 or barely five
days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately given
to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of
Dipolog City or Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte. There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of
said motion or of the hearing thereof on May 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor, he did so only for some but not all the
close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who
(except for Rufino Siplon) executed their respective affidavits of desistance. There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr. and Meleubren
Sorronda. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of
the respondent’s motion and the hearing thereon. The said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondent’s motion and to protect their
interests." (emphasis supplied)

Again, I beg to disagree. The ponencia cites the records of the cases to justify its conclusion that notices were not sent to the offended parties. I cannot be as
dogmatic as the ponente. As stated in our Resolution, section 8, Rule 117 was not yet in existence when then Judge Agnir, Jr. resolved respondent Lacson’s motion
for judicial determination of probable cause. It is, therefore, unrealistic to look only at the records of the cases to determine compliance with yet an inexistent rule. To
my mind, what ought to be done is to determine whether the offended parties had knowledge of respondent Lacson’s motion for judicial determination of probable
cause. They may have such knowledge despite lack of formal notice from the court or notice from the public and private prosecutors. It ought to be beyond argument
83
that such a formal notice is only one source of knowledge of the offended parties. Moreover, there is the unresolved question of who are the "offended" parties in the
case at bar. It will be noted that in some of the criminal cases dismissed by then Judge Agnir, Jr., those who executed affidavits of desistance were the wives, or the
mothers of the victims. Are they the only "offended" parties or should the other "heirs" be included? Should all of them be notified? These and other questions should
first be resolved by the trial court, hence, our resolution to remand.

IV
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
applies retroactively

The ponencia correctly holds that section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is not a statute of limitations. As postulated in the précis, the one-year
or two-year bar is a special procedural rule qualifying the right of the State to prosecute cases already filed in court. The time-bar under the new rule does not curtail
the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. The State retains the full period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code within which to secure the
necessary evidence and file the appropriate criminal cases against the accused. But once the State files a criminal case and involves the courts, the constitutional
power of this Court to set the rules of procedure for the prosecution of cases cannot be doubted. The power belongs to this Court alone and there are no uncertain
umbras and penumbras in its parameters which other branches of the government can claim.

To emphasize, the time-bar for the revival of provisionally dismissed cases was adopted for the purpose, among others, of (1) discouraging hasty and baseless filing
of criminal cases; and (2) penalizing the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. The non-revival of provisionally dismissed cases
after the lapse of the one-year or two-year period creates a disputable presumption of inexcusable delay on the part of the State in prosecuting the case. But this
does not mean that the mere passage of the one-year or two-year period bars the State from reviving the provisionally dismissed cases. The State has the right to
present compelling reasons to justify the revival of the cases beyond the one-year or two-year time bar. The reservation of this right should remove any charge of
unfairness to the State.

Regrettably, the ponencia concedes that section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is a procedural rule but holds that it could not be applied
retroactively. It is unreasonably struck by the fear that its retroactive application would cause "injustice or hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration
of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular." It contends that the period from March 30, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation
of the two-year period because the new rule prescribing it was then not yet in effect.

Again, I beg to disagree. Jurisprudence that has resisted the tempest of time teaches us that statutes and rules should be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The unerring principle that ought to guide any attempt to construe them should be their intended scope and purpose.8
In the case at bar, it is crystal clear that the new rule is intended to apply to all provisionally dismissed cases before its passage. It is a remedial measure to check the
continuing inaction on the part of the State to prosecute pending cases in court. Its purpose is to press the State to act on cases it has inexcusably put in deep
slumber in our courts of justice. It provides relief to the accused who are prejudiced when the cases filed in court against them remain dormant for an unreasonable
length of time. In fine, the new rule is a remedial rule that looks back even as it looks forward. It reaches both the past and the future. It is both retrospective and
prospective.

To be sure, there is nothing novel in the new rule when it reaches the past. Under the ruling case law, statutes regulating the procedure of courts are applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.9 The retroactive application of procedural rules cannot be challenged as violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor give rise from, procedural laws.10

The only conceivable exception to this general rule is if the retroactive application of the procedural rule "would not be feasible or would work injustice."11 As amply
demonstrated, however, the new rule will not impair the right of the State to prosecute criminals. The State is not prejudiced by the time-bar if it can justify its delay in
the prosecution of cases. If it cannot justify its delay, it cannot complain of unfairness. No government can claim the right to prosecute at its perpetual pleasure. It
cannot file a criminal case and sleep on it. It is self-evident that inexcusable delays in the prosecution of a case deny an accused the right to a fair trial.

With due respect, I submit that the ponencia sends a wrong message in batting only for the prospective application of the new rule. To hold that the State could not
be faulted for not reviving the case within two years simply because the new rule was not yet in effect implies that this Court sanctions delays in the prosecution of
cases, however inexcusable the delays were. Pushed to the extreme, the majority in effect bars the application of the new rule to cases provisionally dismissed five
or ten years ago on the simple reason that during the interregnum, the new rule was not yet in effect. Let us not half pause in applying the new rule for it addresses
inexcusable delays in the prosecution of cases already filed in court. Devoid of legalese, it tells the State not to sleep on its job. If we cannot tell the prosecution to do
its job within a reasonable time frame, we might as well close shop.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DENY petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

Separate Opinion

VITUG, J.:

Petitioners argue that while Section 8, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure bars the revival of a case upon the lapse of the one-year period or the two-year
period, as the case may be, after its provisional dismissal, the rule, however, does not contain any proscription against the filing of a new information involving the
same incident so long as it is done within prescriptive period of the offense provided in Article 90 and Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code or such as may otherwise
be expressed by statute.

Prescription of crimes pertains to the loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law.1 It is the policy of the law that
prosecutions should be prompt and that statutes enforcing that promptitude should be maintained, these provisions being not merely acts of grace but checks
imposed by the State upon itself "to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained."2 Once a
criminal case is instituted, the issue on prescription is addressed and the rule on prescription as a substantive provision would have then so served its purpose.
Thenceforth, assuming the timely filing of the case, the rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court must govern. In fine, while Article 90 and Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code fix the period when the State must file a case against an accused after the discovery of the crime by the offended party, Section 8, Rule 117,
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, applies once an action has been instituted. The substantive provisions govern the institution of the case; the procedural
rules steps in thereafter. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to "promulgate rules concerning x x x pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts."3 The 1987 Charter not only has deleted the authority of the legislature to repeal, alter or supplement the rules promulgated by the Court but it also
expanded the Court’s rule-making power to cover the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.4 Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the Supreme
Court has incorporated Section 8, Rule 117, in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz:

"SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

"The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived."

In this regard, I share the conclusions reached by my esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato S. Puno, that there are yet a number of factors that must first be
established and considered mainly evidentiary, before this Court can appropriately rule on the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

84
Dissenting Opinion

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I find petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated May 28, 2002 bereft of merit. The cases filed against respondent Senator Panfilo M. Lacson
should be DISMISSED on the grounds that his constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases has been violated and that the filing of new
Informations against him constitutes persecution.

Also, I maintain that Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an implementing Rule of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of
cases, applies to respondent’s cases upon a showing before the trial court that its requirements have been complied with.

I. Respondent’s constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of his cases has been violated.

Statutes cannot be effective to place any limitation on a person’s constitutional right,1 and therefore they should not be regarded as a definition of the constitutional
provision.2 It is thus conceivable that the constitutional provision is violated although its implementing statute is not.3 This is because constitutions are not adopted to
control the rights and procedures of the moment but to establish broad principles of justice and fair play for all time.4

The present controversy brings into focus the novel provision, Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

"Sec. 8. Provisional Dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

"The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both shall become permanent one (1) year
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived."(Emphasis supplied)

In our Resolution now being challenged by petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration, we held that the above Rule is inapplicable to the cases of respondent
because the records fail to show that its requirements have been complied with. These requirements as applied to his cases are: the provisional dismissal by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Quezon City of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 against respondent must have been with his express consent and with notice
to the offended parties; and the reckoning date of the two-year period within which to revive the cases should have been properly determined. Consequently, in the
same Resolution, we remanded the case at bar to the trial court to enable the parties to adduce evidence on whether the said requirements have been complied with
on the basis of which the trial court should rule on whether the newly filed Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 against respondent should be dismissed or
not.

In petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, they contend that the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 117 violates the people’s right to due process; and that for
lack of express consent of respondent and prior notice to the offended parties, the Rule does not apply to his cases.

The novelty of Section 8, Rule 117 somehow shades the more important issue of whether respondent’s constitutional right to speedy trial and disposition of cases
has been violated.

Section 8 of Rule 117 was promulgated pursuant to the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. Clearly, there can be no automatic
inference that because Section 8 was found to be inapplicable, as claimed by petitioners, respondent’s right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of his cases was
not violated. Lest we miss the forest for the trees, extreme caution should be exercised so that the general terms of the constitutional guarantee would not be lost in
the specific and detailed provisions of the rules promulgated for its enforcement.

Speedy trial is said to constitute not a privilege,5 but a right, one that is recognized as fundamental. It is one of the most basic and inviolable rights.6 Thus, enshrined
in our Constitution is the mandate that "in all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial."7 To expedite not only the trial stage but also the
disposition of the case itself, the framers of our Constitution saw the need to further provide that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies."8

The crusade towards a speedy justice did not stop in the Constitution. To supplement it and to render its guarantee more effective, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) which aims to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. For its part, this Court promulgated Circular No. 39-98 for the purpose of implementing the provisions of RA 8493. And
when the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure was drafted, substantial portions of RA 8493 and Circular No. 39-98 were included therein, thus:

Section 1 (g) of Rule 116 – Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the
date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency or a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying
suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.

Section 1 of Rule 119 – After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.

Section 2 of Rule 119 -- Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of
time for good cause.

The Court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

And still, to achieve speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases, this Court promulgated Section 8, Rule 117.

The foregoing laws and rules are merely tools to enforce the constitutional guarantee. They do not constitute its "definition." It bears reiterating that just because
Section 8, Rule 117 is found to be inapplicable does not ipso facto indicate that there is no violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. The
laws and rules, which are just legislative construction or application of the pervasive constitutional guarantee must be construed fairly in view of the right they seek to
enforce. They cannot be considered to have a limiting effect on the constitutional guarantee. Significantly, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not silent
on the matter. Section 10, Rule 119 specifically states:

SEC. 10. Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the Constitution. – No provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall
be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by section 14 (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution.

Ultimately, whether the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial has been complied with is still a judicial question to be answered in the light of the circumstances of
each particular case and guided by the principle that the proceedings were free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.9 Our case law is rich with
doctrines setting the parameters of the right to speedy trial and the right to speedy disposition of cases. In the recent case of People vs. Leviste,10 we reiterated our
ruling that the right to speedy trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay without the participation or fault of the accused, or
when unjustified postponements are sought which prolong the trial for unreasonable length of time.
85
On the other hand, in Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr.11 we laid down the guidelines in determining the applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula. There, we held that
speedy disposition of cases is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights
nugatory.

Years of serious deliberation yield certain factors to be considered in the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases
has been violated. These are: 1) length of delay; 2) reason for the delay; 3) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and 4) prejudice caused by the delay.12 These
factors are effective in balancing the interest of the State and the accused.

Records show that the period between the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 and the refiling of the new Informations docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, is two (2) years and two (2) months. It may be recalled that Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 were dismissed on March 29,
1999.13 The Department of Justice (DOJ) re-investigated the cases only upon its receipt on March 29, 2001 of General Leandro Mendoza’s letter indorsing the
affidavits of P/S Ins. Abelardo Ramos and P/ Ins. Ysmael Yu. On June 6, 2001, new Informations were filed against respondent. Petitioners justify the belated re-
investigation on the ground that prior to the appearance of Ramos and Yu, the government had no evidence to sustain the refiling of the cases.14 They also claim
that due to respondent’s close association with Former President Joseph Estrada and his position then as PNP Chief, the witnesses were deterred from coming out
with the truth.15

The justifications raised by petitioners are contrary to the records. As early as July 1999, Yu executed an affidavit attesting to the very same facts contained in his
March 24, 2001 affidavit.16 Another witness, Mario Enad, also executed his affidavit as early as August 8, 1995.17 Petitioners have never claimed that these two
were unwilling to testify on earlier dates. Also, nowhere in their affidavits is a statement that they were afraid of testifying against respondent because he is a friend of
the Former President or was a PNP Chief. The two even mentioned the names of other witnesses whom petitioners could have utilized in an earlier re-investigation.
Clearly, what glares from the records is that from the time of the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89, there was an unjustified interval of inactivity of
more than two (2) years on the part of the prosecution.

Petitioners cannot argue that respondent failed to assert his right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. While we have ruled that if an accused wants to
exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case,18 however, the same cannot be expected of
respondent. It would be ludicrous for him to ask for the trial of his cases when the same had already been dismissed. During the interval, there were no incidents that
would prompt him to invoke the right. Indeed, the delay could only be attributed to the inaction on the part of the investigating officials.19

Neither can petitioners argue that the right to speedy trial is inapplicable since the charges have been dismissed. As explained by Justice Marshall, the anxiety
brought by public prosecution does not disappear simply because the initial charges are temporarily dismissed. After all, the government has revealed the
seriousness of its threat of prosecution by initially bringing charges.20 Consequently, when the government has already investigated and charged an accused, it is in
a much better position and properly shoulders a greater responsibility to reinvestigate and re-prosecute him with reasonable promptness. Sadly, this was not done in
this case. In Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan,21 we upheld the accused’s right to speedy disposition of his case notwithstanding his alleged failure to take any step to
assert his right, thus:

"We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor’s ratiocination. It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution,
regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable
to him."

Generally, the question of how much lapse of time is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases varies with the
particular circumstances. There is no constitutional basis for holding that the right to a speedy trial can be quantified into a specified number of days and months.22
The mere passage of time is not sufficient to establish a denial of a right to a speedy trial, but a lengthy delay, which is presumptively prejudicial, triggers the
examination of other factors to determine whether rights have been violated.23 In a case, it has been held that a delay of more than one (1) year is presumptively
prejudicial and shifts the burden to the government to justify the delay.24 Certainly, the two-year delay here is prejudicial to respondent and it should be taken against
petitioners, they having failed to show any good cause or reason for such delay.

Another factor to be considered in determining whether respondent’s right to a speedy trial and disposition of cases has been violated is the prejudice to him. In his
comment, he states:

"x x x (i) he had every reason to believe that the sword of Damocles which had hang atop his head by virtue of the filing of the original charges in 1995 had been
obliterated by their dismissal in 1999 as he has the right to Due Process and to be rid of the paranoia of being harassed for charges by the Republic and to indict him
for heinous offenses and subject him to a non-bailable action disenfranchises eight (8) Million or so voters who had put him in office as their representative, (ii) it
smacks of oppression as petitioner DOJ Secretary had filed or instigated new cases against him for an undisclosed political agenda, (iii) his detractors, including
petitioner DOJ Secretary, have the capacity to influence the litigation including the investigation and prosecution thereof, (iv) it is plainly a vindictive action
perpetrated by a PNP Senior Superintendent whom petitioner had accused of kidnapping for which he was punished and sent to the National Penitentiary until he
was recently released and re-assumed a post as Intelligence Chief under the current administration, and (v) respondent is now the subject of persecution and not
prosecution."25

There is no denying that the filing of new Informations against respondent had caused him undue prejudice. Almost eight (8) years have elapsed since November 21,
1995,26 the date the original Informations were filed, and more than three (3) years have passed since Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 were dismissed on
March 29, 1999. It is therefore reasonable for respondent to expect that by this time, petitioners would finally give him peace of mind. In Licaros vs.
Sandiganbayan,27 we ruled that the delay in the disposition of the case had caused "much prejudice, distress and anxiety to petitioner whose career as bank
executive and businessman has suffered the stigma of being shackled to an unresolved criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles’ sword over his head
for more than a decade." There, we stressed the consequences and problems inherent in protracted litigation which include, among others, the stagnant professional
growth, hampered travel opportunities and a besmirched reputation. It cannot be said that respondent does not suffer the same consequences now.

Prejudice does not only consist of impairment of the accused’s ability to defend himself, it may also include other sufferings, such as anxiety and stigma.28
Respondent is not an ordinary citizen. He is a Senator who has a reputation to protect. The publicity caused by the refiling of new Informations undoubtedly tainted
his name. Moreover, he has to defend himself constantly from the nagging accusations that interfere in the performance of his duties as a Senator.

I believe that the prosecution now of respondent is tantamount to persecution.

While it is the policy of this Court not to interfere in the exercise of the prosecutors’ discretion, however, it cannot tolerate a refiling of new Informations, as in this
case, at the impulse of the officials in command. The prosecution of an accused must not be made to depend on who is perceived as an enemy by those who sit in
power but on the sacrosanct duty of prosecutors to bring to justice those believed to be offenders of the law while ensuring that their rights under the Constitution
remain inviolable.

The sudden over-eagerness of petitioners to prosecute respondent, to my mind, is not really an indicum of competence, it is a clear example of persecution. This was
not overlooked by the Court of Appeals which held:

"x x x Apparently, hints of persecution are manifest in the case of petitioner. For one, though earlier accused as an accessory in the original multiple murder cases,
petitioner is now charged as a principal in the recent revival of the criminal cases – obviously to preclude any opportunity on his part to evade incarceration by
86
seeking bail. Persecution is likewise apparent in the hurried pace at which the preliminary investigation of the subject criminal cases was completed by respondent
prosecutors and in the immediate and abrupt filing of the Informations against petitioners in only a matter of days after the original petition had been filed in this
Court."29

Petitioners ought to be reminded of the caveat in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan30 that "prosecutors should not allow and should avoid giving the impression that their
noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of
serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty." Their undue
haste in conducting the preliminary investigation of the 26 accused and their inordinate interest to re-file the cases hurriedly raise a quizzical eyebrow.

Not to be glossed over is the fact that the preliminary investigation which resulted in the filing of new Informations was initiated only by the letter dated March 27,
2001 of PNP Chief General Mendoza to then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez. I do not think that the said letter could qualify as a complaint under Section 3, Rule
112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,31 the basis for a preliminary investigation. The procedure adopted is a departure from the usual mode. Again,
in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,32 we held:

"A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in
this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report."

Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the new Informations against respondent are indicative of persecution and not prosecution.

One thing for which this Court must guard itself against is to be used as an instrument of political manipulation. As the last bulwark of the defenseless and the
accused, our duty is to uphold the law and no other. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute,
and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former.33

II. Section 8, Rule 117 applies to respondent’s cases upon compliance with its requirements.

Going back to Section 8, Rule 117, the remand of this case to the trial court for the determination of whether or not the requirements of this provision have been
complied with is imperative.

I am not convinced that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 was without the consent of respondent and that the offended parties were not
notified. It appears from the Resolution34 dated March 29, 1999 of the trial court that respondent’s prayer was for that court to "(1) make a judicial determination of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants in the meantime; and (3) dismiss the cases
should the court find probable cause." Clearly, this third plea is a manifestation that the dismissal of the cases was with respondent’s consent. While it is true that
what he filed is a mere motion for the judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses, the same was anchored on the case of
Allado vs. Diokno.35 There, we ruled that "[I]f upon the filing of the information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the document attached
thereto, finds that no probable cause exists, he must either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to
hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists." With this as respondent’s premise, I
believe it is safe to conclude that the dismissal was with his express consent.

At any rate, considering the view that there is doubt on whether respondent gave his express consent to the dismissal of the cases, as expressed in our challenged
Resolution, this incident should be determined by the trial court. With respect to the requirement of notice to the offended parties, again the same should be
addressed to the trial court which can hear the parties thereon. We must maintain a hands-off stance on these matters for a different approach might lead us astray
into the field of factual conflict where our legal pronouncements would not rest on solid grounds. Time and again we have ruled that this Court is not a trier of facts.36

The petitioners maintain that Section 8, Rule 117 cannot be applied retroactively for to do so would work injustice to the People. Settled in our jurisprudence is the
principle that when a new law will be advantageous to the accused, the same may be given retroactive effect.37 This is more particularly so when the law is merely
procedural. In several cases, we applied the provisions of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure retroactively.38 We should take the same action on Section 8, Rule
117 considering that it is a reinforcement of a person’s constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases.

Moreover, it has been held that the constitutional provision barring the passage of retroactive laws protects only the rights of citizens. Hence, a state may
constitutionally pass a retroactive law that impairs its own rights.39 Only private, and not public, rights may become vested in a constitutional sense.40 Otherwise
stated, there is a distinction between the effect to be given a retroactive statute when it relates to private rights and when it relates to public rights. Public rights may
always be modified or annulled by subsequent legislation without contravening the Due Process Clause.41

While I concurred in our challenged Resolution that this case should be remanded to the trial court to enable it to determine whether the requirements of Section 8,
Rule 117 have been complied with, however, I still believe that we should settle now once and for all the most crucial issue, i.e., whether or not the provisional
dismissal contemplated in the Rule shall become permanent two years after the issuance of the order and thus constitutes a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense. To evade it now is to delay the day of reckoning and to put the legal community in a quandary.

The principle adhered to by petitioners is that the rule "prohibits only a revival of a criminal case after the lapse of the periods prescribed therein and does not
impinge on the right of the State to prosecute an offender for the same offense under a new Information."42 Thus, there arises the distinction between "revival" and
"filing of a new Information."

Section 8 of Rule 117 is a new provision. To reiterate, it draws its life from the constitutional guarantees of speedy trial43 and speedy disposition of cases. Its
mandate is explicit, i.e., a provisional dismissal of an offense becomes "permanent" if not revive within the prescribed periods (or two years in respondent’s cases).
To say that this "permanent" dismissal prohibits only the "revival" of the case but not the "filing" of new Information, is to render the provision ineffectual, providing
only lip service to the accused’s constitutional right it seeks to enforce. Indeed, what difference will the provision make if after the lapse of two years, the State can
still prosecute the accused for the same offense by merely "filing" a new Information? With the interpretation given, the dismissal cannot really be considered
"permanent." After two years, all the prosecution has to do is to file a new Information. Thus, whether by "revival" or by "filing a new Information," the effect is the
same, i.e., the prosecution of the accused for the same offense continues. What is overlooked is that, in the interim, he continues to suffer all the prejudices that
come with the failure of the prosecution to put a real end to his case. We might as well take heed of the warning against "allowing doctrinaire concepts… to submerge
the practical demands of the constitutional right to a speedy trial."44

What price does the State have to pay for its lethargy or negligence to prosecute? If I am to follow petitioners’ position, then I can say that the only sanction for the
violation of the periods prescribed in Section 8 is that the State should conduct the corresponding new preliminary investigation before it can file a new information. It
seems to me that the new preliminary investigation is the only difference between "filing a new information" and "revival." To my mind, conducting a preliminary
investigation is hardly a sanction for the prosecution’s negligence. While a new preliminary investigation causes intense inconvenience to the prosecution, the
accused suffers as well. Indeed, considering the additional delay the prosecution incurs in bringing the case to a conclusion as a result of the filing of a new
information and the anxiety on the part of the accused by a threat of a new prosecution, the interpretation accorded to Section 8, Rule 117 has not advanced its real
purpose.

87
Let it be stressed that Section 8 was introduced not so much for the interest of the State but precisely for the protection of the accused against protracted
prosecution. The measure of protection consistent with its language is the treatment of the "permanent" dismissal as a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense.

The discharge of an accused for failure of the prosecution to bring him to trial within the prescribed period is not an entirely new concept. Even prior to the
introduction of Section 8, there were already provisions of similar import in other jurisdictions. Under certain statutes implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to speedy trial, a discharge granted pursuant to the statute is held to be a bar to subsequent prosecution, whether under the same or new indictment. This
view has been defended on the ground that any other construction would open the way for complete evasion of the statute and that the constitutional provision can
only be given its legitimate effect by holding that a person once discharged is entitled to immunity from further prosecution for the same offense.45

In State vs. Crawford,46 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia entered a judgment forever discharging the accused from prosecution for the offense on the
basis of a rule requiring that "every person charged with felony, and remanded to a circuit court for trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the offense,
if there be three regular terms of such court, after the indictment is found against him without a trial." The discharge was decreed notwithstanding the fact that it was
within the third term that the State entered a nolle prosequi and at the same time reindict for the same offense. The court ratiocinated:

"When a prisoner has stood ready for trial through two full terms and substantially through the third one, and, no doubt, until the jury has been discharged and the
opportunity for trial at that term annihilated, he has substantially performed all the statutory conditions required to his right of discharge. Although such a discharge is
not the moral equivalent of an acquittal, and he may be guilty, his constitutional right to have his guilt or innocence determined by a trial within a reasonable time
cannot be frittered away upon purely technical and unsubstantial ground. Nor is the legislative act designed to enforce such right to be interpreted otherwise than in
accordance with the recognized rules of construction. To permit the state to enter a nolle prosequi within the third term and reindict for the same offense, and thus
deprive the prisoner of the terms fully elapsed as well as the term about to end, would make it possible to keep the prisoner in custody or under recognizance for an
indefinite period of time, on charges of a single offense, unless perhaps, he could enforce a trial by the writ of mandamus. Such a construction as substantially tends
to the defeat or undue limitation of the purpose of a statute is not permissible in any jurisdiction.

"4 That statutes shall be so construed as to effectuate the legislative purpose, not defeat it, is fundamental and all-pervasive in statutory construction. The remedy
given by law for failure to accord a prompt trial to one charged with felony is right to be discharged, not mandamus to obtain such trial. x x x."

In People vs. Allen,47 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a discharge of the accused for failure of the prosecution to try him within four months after written
demand, renders him immune from trial for the same offense whether under the same or a new indictment. In Newlin vs. People,48 the same court ruled that where a
defendant, indicted and committed for crime, is entitled, under the statute, to a discharge for delay in not bringing him to trial while being held under the indictment,
the fact that a second indictment is found for the same offense and a nolle prosequi entered as to the first indictment, does not defeat his right to be discharged.
Again, in People vs. Heider49 the same court held that an accused who has obtained his discharge owing to the failure of the People to bring his case to trial within
the time prescribed by the statute enacted to carry into effect the constitutional guaranty of the right to a speedy trial, cannot be committed or held for the same
offense under a new indictment.

Clearly, there is a catena of jurisprudence supporting the principle that the first discharge of the accused under a statute implementing the constitutional right to
speedy trial constitutes a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. I see no reason why we cannot adopt the same principle.

To reiterate, Section 8, Rule 117 seeks to implement the constitutional guarantees that a) in all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a
speedy trial,50 and b) that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.51 The
importance of these rights cannot be overemphasized. They are necessary and vital because a person should not have to face continued anxiety under a prolonged
threat of criminal prosecution. Postponement of trial for a long time will ordinarily handicap an accused through the disappearance of necessary witnesses and loss of
documentary evidence. Furthermore, after many months or years, the memory of those witnesses who are available will likely be impaired by the passage of time.
These rights are protections too against the harassment of being subjected to accusation, with its harmful effect on the accused’s reputation and business affairs.52
As aptly observed in a case, "unreasonable delay between formal accusation and trial threatens to produce more than one sort of harm, including ‘oppressive pre-
trial incarceration,’ ‘anxiety and concern of the accused,’ and the ‘possibility that the accused’s defense will be impaired’ by dimming memories and loss of
exculpatory evidence." Of these forms of prejudice, the most serious is the last because the inability of the accused to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
system.53

The high regard attributed by this Court to the accused’s right to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of his case is evident from the tradition established by our
case law that the dismissal of a criminal case based on the denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial amounts to an acquittal and constitutes a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. 54 It is on the same light that we should view Section 8.

A rule with the force of law should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed.55 It should be given such a
construction as will advance the object and secure the benefits intended.56 This Court’s Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court surely saw the prejudice to the
rights of the accused caused by a suspended provisional dismissal of his case. Apparently, Section 8 was introduced owing to the many instances where police
agencies have refused to issue clearances, for purposes of employment or travel abroad, to persons having pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of such
cases by the court was merely provisional, notwithstanding the fact that such provisional dismissal, more often than not, had been done five or ten years ago.57

In addition to the prejudice on the part of the accused, perceived by the Committee, we cannot disregard the anxiety that he suffers because of a public accusation.

Petitioners attempt to create a conflict between the law on prescription of crimes and the rule on provisional dismissal. They argue that substantive law should
override or prevail over procedural law. The conflict is non-existent. The law on prescription of crimes refers to the period during which criminal charges must be
filed.58 Section 8 of Rule 117 refers to the period when a provisional dismissal ceases to be temporary and becomes permanent, thus, no longer subject to be set
aside by the revival of criminal charges. This rule comes into play only after the State has commenced the prosecution.

The twenty-year prescriptive period for a case punishable by death under Section 90 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to give law enforcers ample time to
apprehend criminals who go into hiding. It also enables prosecutors to better prepare their cases, look for witnesses, and insure that correct procedure has been
followed. On the other hand, the two-year period under Section 8, Rule 117 is intended to warn the State that once it filed a case, it must have the readiness and
tenacity to bring it to a conclusion. The purpose of the period is to encourage promptness in prosecuting cases.

Prejudice to the rights of the accused intensifies over time. While it is true that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is insufficient to determine a
violation of an accused’s right to speedy trial, we cannot disregard the reality that after the lapse of a certain period, the reliability of a trial is compromised in ways
that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. It bears stressing that the mere passage of time impairs memories, causes evidence to be lost, deprives the
accused of witnesses, and interferes with his ability to defend himself. Now, these nuisances may be avoided if we are to give full effect to Section 8 and consider the
"permanent" dismissal contemplated therein as a bar to a subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Not only will it be in consonant with the
cardinal principle of justice and fairness, it will also provide force to the rule.

Let it be stated anew that this Court cannot and will not allow itself to be made an instrument of politics nor be privy to any attempt at the perpetration of injustice.59

In resumè, I reiterate that petitioners’ undue delay in conducting a new preliminary investigation and refiling of new Informations against respondent violated his
constitutional right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of his cases. Respondent correctly invoked the implementing Rule, Section 8, Rule 117. But as we held in
our questioned Resolution, it must first be shown before the trial court that its requirements have been complied with. And I venture to add that should the trial court

88
find that these requirements have been complied with, then the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 becomes permanent and thus
constitutes a bar to a subsequent prosecution of respondent for the same crimes.

As a final word, punishment should be imposed on the accused only if he violated the law. However, his constitutional privileges and immunities must be protected
against the State’s arbitrary assertions of power. Obviously, its filing of new Informations against respondent for the same crimes after the lapse of two years
contravenes no less than the universal principle of justice and fairness, the bedrock of every Constitution, law and rule.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. People vs Alberto G.R. No. 132374, Aug. 22, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUCIO ALBERTO y DANAO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Subject of this appeal, which we find meritorious, is the judgment 1 dated August 21, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City, convicting Lucio
Alberto of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, allegedly committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the 18th day of October 1993 at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening at Barangay Gandiangan, Municipality of Imelda, Province of Zamboanga del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain and by means of violence did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously take and rob one Teresa 2 Semic of cash money and by reason and on the occasion of said robbery, the above-named accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab said Teresa Semic thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her death
immediately thereafter. 3

During his arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits then followed.

The prosecution presented as its first witness VIRGILIO ALAP-AP, barangay captain of Barangay Israel, Imelda, Zamboanga del Sur. He testified that on the morning
of October 19, 1993, he was informed by members of his Bantay Bayan that there was a killing at Barangay Gandiangan. He was also informed of the suspicious
acts of Lucio Alberto, who would take out his bag from a sack whenever there was no one around but would place it back when people were around. On the basis of
this information, he brought Lucio Alberto and Titing Medel to the house of the barangay captain of Barangay Gandiangan, where they were investigated. He was
informed by Titing Medel that the slippers which were recovered near the body of Teresa Semic used to belong to him before he exchanged it for a necklace from
Alberto by way of barter. Alap-ap then accompanied Alberto to the PNP Police station of Imelda where he was turned over to SPO1 Francisco dela Cruz. He alleged
that he was present when the police conducted a physical examination on Alberto. They discovered blood-stained currency bills amounting to a total of P950,
believed to be stolen from the victim. 4

JOEL MEDEL @ TITING followed on the witness stand. He testified that on October 18, 1993, he saw appellant Lucio Alberto outside the store of Teresa "Isang"
Semic. Appellant stayed behind, said the witness, when he went home at around 6:00 P.M. He was at the house of the barangay captain of Gandiangan when he
found out that Aling "Isang" was already dead. He stated that the slippers found near the body of Aling "Isang" were originally his, but he bartered them to Alberto for
a necklace. He was present when the police recovered several bloodied bills in the amount of P950 from the shoes of appellant Lucio Alberto. 5

SPO1 FRANCISCO DELA CRUZ testified that he was in his house in the evening of October 18, 1993 when he received a report that there was a killing in Barangay
Gandiangan. He immediately went to the place of the incident and saw below the stairway of her kitchen outside her house the body of Teresa covered in her own
blood. He saw a pair of slippers about three meters away from the body. He brought the slippers to their station. The following day, October 19, 1993, he went back
to Barangay Gandiangan, talked with the barangay captain, and arrested appellant on the request of the barangay captain. Upon reaching the police station, he
asked appellant to open the bag which he brought with him. Inside was a pair of short pants with bloodstain near the zipper, a bandana, and a medallion necklace.
He then asked appellant to take off his shoes wherein an envelope was found containing P950 in different blood-stained denominations. Three days later, he also
recovered a knife from a certain Payna. Witness Dela Cruz admitted that he was not sure whether the slippers he recovered really belonged to the person who killed
Teresa. 6

On June 26, 1996, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for failure of the prosecution to submit its formal offer of exhibits. The said order was lifted after
the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on July 1, 1996. Thereafter, the prosecution continued to present its evidence.

ATTY. PACIFICO T. CIMAFRANCA, of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), testified that he assisted appellant at the time he executed his extrajudicial confession 7
on January 14, 1994. He identified said extrajudicial confession 8 which was placed into the record of the trial by the court.

The last witness for the prosecution, ERNESTO PAYNA, testified that he was informed of the death of his aunt, Santiaga Theresa 9 at around 7:00 P.M. of October
18, 1993. He saw the body of his aunt at the balcony near the stairs of her kitchen. He also saw a pair of slippers about one meter from the body of the victim. 10

On March 26, 1997, the defense orally asked for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On April 25, 1997, the demurrer was filed but it was denied on May 13, 1997. On
June 25, 1997, the trial court issued an order declaring that the accused should be deemed to have waived his right to present evidence for the defense, and that the
case be considered submitted for decision.

On August 21, 1997, the trial court promulgated its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He is hereby sentence (sic) to the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and to pay the private offended party as indemnity the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED. 11

Hence, this appeal. In his brief, appellant assigns the following as errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REINSTATING THE CASE AFTER JUNE 26, 1996 AFTER IT HAS DISMISSED THE CASE FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO SUBMIT ITS FORMAL OFFER OF EXHIBITS FOR ALMOST A YEAR WHEN REQUIRED TO BY THE TRIAL
COURT OVER THE OPPOSITION/OBJECTION OF THE ACCUSED AS THE SAME HAD PLACED THE ACCUSED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 12

89
Appellant contends that he was placed in double jeopardy when the trial court reconsidered its order dismissing the case against him. More importantly, he contends
that without the extrajudicial confession placed on record, 13 the evidence of the prosecution would not be able to meet the needed quantum of proof to establish his
guilt. He assails said extrajudicial confession on the ground that it was not duly established that it was he who signed it. He also argues that at the time said
confession was executed, he was not assisted by a competent counsel of his choice. 14

The Office of the Solicitor General, for the appellee, counters that there was no violation of the right of appellant not to be placed in double jeopardy. The OSG
argues that the order of the trial court dismissing the case was illegal and void for being issued with abuse of discretion. The trial court did not afford any opportunity
to the prosecution to be heard before it decided to dismiss the case, contrary to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. 15 It did not even consider that
even without the said formal offer of exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case on the basis of the testimonial evidence alone. Being void, the said order
cannot have the effect of terminating the trial and, hence, cannot serve as basis for the claim of double jeopardy.

On the claim of the defense that the needed quantum of proof to convict appellant has not been met, the OSG maintains that appellant’s extrajudicial confession and
the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are more than enough to convict Appellant.

However, the OSG recommends that the appellant should be convicted of two distinct crimes of homicide and theft, not robbery with homicide, because from the
tenor of the extrajudicial confession, it was clear that the appellant intended to kill the victim and that the taking of the P950.00 was a mere afterthought. 16

The pertinent issues for resolution in this case are: (1) whether or not appellant was placed in double jeopardy when the trial court reconsidered its order dismissing
the case; (2) whether or not the extrajudicial confession was admissible against appellant; and (3) whether or not the guilt of appellant has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

The three requisites before double jeopardy can be invoked are: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. 17 As to the first jeopardy, it only arises (1) upon a valid
indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the
case was dismissed.

In our view, it is clear that no double jeopardy has attached in this case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the dismissal order made by the trial court was not
valid and cannot be used as basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The said right cannot be grounded on an error of law. As held in People v. Navarro: 18

The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court has always
accorded this right to the prosecution, and where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court action. We have heretofore held that a purely
capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its day in court. For this reason, it is a
dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, and, therefore, null and void. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due
process, and, consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy. . .

We agree with the OSG’s contention that the trial court exceeded its authority when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence
there was a violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary
exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it
merely corrected itself.

On the second and third issues, appellant asks this Court to disregard the extrajudicial confession which he had allegedly executed before and with the assistance of
Atty. Cimafranca, but which confession he denies. If disregarded, he claims that the prosecution’s evidence would not be sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

A counsel-assisted and voluntary confession is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused especially when it is corroborated on material points by the prosecution
witnesses. 19 However, it is essential that the person making the confession must be assisted by a "competent" counsel. The meaning and standards of a
"competent counsel" were explained in People v. Deniega 20 as follows:

. . . [T]he lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the
lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would be merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, 21 this Court stressed that an accused’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel `contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.’

Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) ‘should be engaged by the accused (himself), or
by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to
file such petition.’ Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in
many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.

. . . The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose
to remain silent or terminate the interview.

On this score, we are constrained to hold that the standards of "competent counsel" elucidated in Deniega were not met in this case. In the first place, it is clear that
the appellant was not given the option to choose his own lawyer. On its face, the preliminary statement in the extrajudicial confession 22 executed on January 14,
1994, bears this out:

EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF LUCIO ALBERTO ASSISTED BY ATTY. PACIFICO T. CIMAFRANCA, THIS JANUARY 14, 1994 AT PAGADIAN CITY,
PHILIPPINES.

Preliminary Statement — I am informing you that you are under investigation in connection to (sic) the killing of one Teresa Semic, do you need the assistance of a
lawyer.

ANSWER: Yes.

Additional preliminary statement — Atty. Pacifico T. Cimafranca, is a Lawyer of the Public Assistance Office, do you need his legal services to assist you.

ANSWER: Yes.

(SGD.) Lucio Alberto

The appellant was not asked whether he wishes and can afford to retain his own lawyer. He was just told that Atty. Cimafranca was a lawyer and asked whether he
needs his services. He was not made aware that he could choose his own lawyer other than those assigned by the police or the prosecutor. To all intents and
90
purposes, Atty. Cimafranca can be described as a lawyer engaged by the police since PAO lawyers are generally assigned to police stations and prosecutor’s offices
as part of their regular duties. As such, it cannot be denied that the relationship of Atty. Cimafranca with the police and the prosecutor could be symbiotic. In fact, we
take note that the office of Atty. Cimafranca was even located at the provincial capitol where he was at the beck and call of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Aside from this, we are not satisfied that Atty. Cimafranca dutifully and faithfully assisted appellant during the course of the investigation. This is clear from his
testimony in court, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: While in the course of taking confession you did not even give advice to Lucio Alberto when not to answer the question and when to answer the question
propounded?

A: I did not give him anymore further advice before taking down the confession into writing because I have already warned the accused of the consequences of his
confession.

Q: You did not advice Lucio Alberto?

A: No, I have warned the accused.

Q: You did not tell the accused which question are incriminating to him?

A: No more. 23

It is clear from the above that Atty. Cimafranca was merely satisfied in just warning appellant of the consequences of his confession. He did not take an active part
during the actual taking of said confession. Further, it was evident that Atty. Cimafranca did not give appellant a complete picture of what may befall him once he
executed the confession:

Q: Did you tell him that the penalty impose (sic) would be death penalty?

A: I cannot remember unless it is included there in the affidavit. 24

In our view, the assistance rendered by Atty. Cimafranca during the custodial investigation failed to meet the exacting tests laid down in People v. Deniega, supra.
Thus, we must conclude that the so-called extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible as evidence for the prosecution.

Moreover, we find that the prosecution did not even take any effort to establish that the person who executed the said confession was the appellant. Atty. Cimafranca
was not made to identify appellant in court. Nor were the signatures or initials therein identified as appellant’s own.

Without said confession, the prosecution’s evidence is weak. It is insufficient to sustain the conviction of appellant.

First, the ownership of the slippers found near the body of the victim was not sufficiently established. The prosecution’s evidence seems to indicate that the owner of
the slippers was Joel Medel and not appellant. Medel testified that he bartered the slippers for a necklace. However, he was not able to satisfactorily explain why the
necklace was still in the possession of appellant and not with him at the time the former was apprehended. Second, even the money allegedly found in the
possession of appellant was not established by the prosecution as belonging to the victim. Third, the blood allegedly found on the money and the shorts of appellant
was not examined so that a comparison with the victim’s blood could be made. Fourth, the prosecution also failed to establish the time and cause of death of Teresa
Semic. All in all, the prosecution miserably failed to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of Appellant.

The fact that appellant was not able to use his turn to present evidence in his defense and rebut the prosecution’s evidence should not be the sole determinant of his
guilt. Moreover, whether the accused decided to present evidence on his behalf or not, the burden of the prosecution to prove its case remains. Among the
fundamental rights of an accused under the Bill of Rights is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, the prosecution
must establish his guilt with proof beyond reasonable doubt. 25 Even if the accused should choose to remain silent, if the prosecution failed in discharging its burden,
then it is not only the accused’s right to be freed; it is, even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him. 26 Where it was not properly and sufficiently
established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the one who killed the victim, as in this case, his conviction could not be lawfully sustained. His appeal
should be considered favorably, and his conviction annulled. Appellant should be freed forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellant LUCIO ALBERTO
is ACQUITTED on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His immediate release from New Bilibid Prison is hereby
ordered, unless there is another lawful cause for his continued detention. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, is directed to report compliance
with this order within five (5) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza and Corona, JJ., concur.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. People vs Judge Villarama 210 SCRA 246

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and the order of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Metro Manila dated February 25
and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y Ohide" for violation of Section 16, Article 111,
RA 6425, as amended.

Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section
is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. The information against him
reads:

That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Rollo)

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During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9,
1991, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months and one day
to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer,
wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug. That same day, the
respondent Judge issued an order (Annex "B," p. 17, Rollo) directing private respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the
promulgation of decision on January 30, 1991. On January 30, 1991, respondent Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to February 18, 1991 to give
private respondent another opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, the private respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense. On February 18, 1991, respondent Judge issued another order (Annex "D," p. 19, Rollo) postponing the promulgation of decision to February 25,
1991 to give private respondent further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request
to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex "E," p. 20, Rollo) on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on November 21, 1990; (2) the possibility
of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the
court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991, private respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex F, p. 21, Rollo), alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within
which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on February 25, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision granting the accused's
motion, to wit:

It may well be appropriate at this time to state that the accused is not availing of the "voluntary plea of guilt" as a mitigating circumstance envisioned under Article 13,
paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused simply wants to avail of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules. As pointed out by Atty. Fernando Fernandez of the
PAO, there is nothing in the said provision which requires that the same be availed of prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is conceded
though, as pointed out by the prosecution, that such is a waste of time on the part of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and of the Court, nonetheless, this Court,
having in mind Section 2 of Rule 1 which provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding and also for humanitarian considerations, hereby APPROVES and GRANTS the Motion at
bar.

Moreover, such an admission of guilt by the accused indicates his submission to the law and a moral disposition on his part to reform. (Vide: People vs. Coronel,
G.R. No. L-19091, June 30, 1966)

Let it be made of record however that the Court is not putting a premium on the change of heart of the accused in mid-stream.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused JAIME MANUEL Y CHIDE @ Manny guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Article III, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, he is hereby sentenced to a straight prison term of two (2) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.

Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, let the 0.08 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of this case
be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed of according to law.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 24-25)

Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforestated decision but the same was denied in the order of March 13, 1991, which states:

It is the considered view of this Court that Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules should not be interpreted to the letter in "victimless crimes" such as this case, possession
of regulated drugs, which is more of a "social disease" case so to speak and in the light of (the) provision itself that "with the consent of the offended party and the
fiscal." Is the fiscal the offended party?

Moreover as the records show, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal has not been very consistent on this "lesser offense plea" thing. It would perhaps be in consonance
with justice that a guideline be laid down by the said Office, if only to apprise the public, the Court and the accused on when said consent is to be given by the fiscal
as a matter of course and when it will be withheld. For to leave the same undefined is in the mind of this Court, not conducive to a "just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 41-42)

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE
BECAUSE THE REQUEST WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THE CONSENT THERETO OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT
OBTAINED.

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN CONVICTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE LESSER OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 17,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, AS AMENDED, INSTEAD OF THE OFFENSE ORIGINALLY CHARGED OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 16 OF THE SAME LAW, IN
VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A VALID CHANGE OF PLEA. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)

In the resolution of January 20, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing the questioned judgment in the
aforesaid criminal case (Rollo, p. 86).

The petition is meritorious.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1037). It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of
the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section
2 thereof, provides:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy.

However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a
matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court (Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991, En Banc Resolution).

92
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation,
jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice
Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale of the law:

. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to charge his former plea of
not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that
Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining.

As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change
plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. A
reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt
solely on only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable time already spent by the court and prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least
persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two grounds of objection were that the prosecution had already rested its case and that the possibility of conviction of
the private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence
in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.

The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because there is no
offended party to speak Of and that even the latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before the trial court could allow the accused to change his plea.

We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty
to a lesser offense (see Manuel v. Velasco, et al., supra, p. 6). The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions (Cinco,
et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15, 1991). Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver
one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former (see People v. Parohinog, supra, concurring opinion of then Justice Barredo, p. 377; also Vda. de
Bagatua, et al. v. Revilla, et al., 104 Phil. 393, 395-396).

It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in
themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is
malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but
also by their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore,
the offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The
Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person directly
injured by the offense (see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from
the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government.

Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section
17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.

Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the
fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this
privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. —

xxx xxx xxx

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former
complaint or information under any of the following instances:

(a) . . . ;

(b) . . . ;

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party;

xxx xxx xxx

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of
consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and
improper.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated
February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D (People v. Manuel y Ohide) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said criminal case is
hereby remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial on the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18. People vs Ferrer 43 SCRA 381

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO
alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.

Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.

Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.

CASTRO, J.:p

I. Statement of the Case

Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion

Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a  prima facie  case against Co, directed the Government
prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:

That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any
other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and
domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army,
the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.

That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:

(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;

(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.

(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After
preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:

The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial
Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA,
ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and
several JOHN DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion
Law, committed as follows:

That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as
offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that
BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a member
and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military
arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the
aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and
feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously
and take up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of
the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following:

1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered
speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution,
subversive and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist regime.

2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued
the above subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and
inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed
revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.

That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford
impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.

On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than
one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.

Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder
and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special
civil action for certiorari.

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II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?

Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto  law shall be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial
function.7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill
of attainder. 9

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo  as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the
Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'"
By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without
any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and
voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."

1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the
prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 10

This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs.
Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:

(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party ... shall serve —

(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other
employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization.

during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party....

(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto  disqualifies a
person from becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:

Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder.
Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate
commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the
authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits
certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes)
shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the
specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics  and therefore cannot
hold union office without incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party.

Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case
involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action organization," under
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action
organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:

[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives
of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)

A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups
upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board has
determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to be so
narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it:

In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the
activities in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it
is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)

Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice
to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign
power.

As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say
that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The
contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But
the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing  or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4
means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific
intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty
knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.

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2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners
or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned
would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder.  16 Similarly, a statute
requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society
which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17

In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to
the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. 19

Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the
Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further
compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in subversive activities,  23 or which made it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder.

But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules,
and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination. 25

In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman , 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty
to register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its
operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other
secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature
and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:

The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a
difference between the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the
part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and
public welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of
the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at
night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of the
other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are
oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others." Another
of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator is concededly a member
exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;"
and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders
Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them
beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing that "the
danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated," — meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and
college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."

We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available including the published report of a hearing, before a
committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it
was advised — putting aside controverted evidence — that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional
features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born, gentile,
protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution
of the United States; in another exacted of its member an oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared any
person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices;
that it was striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at
times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes. 27

In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the
Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle
and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China."  29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we
noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan
(KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a
sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of
the Philippines.

3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary
that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice
Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the historic explanation for uniting the
two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto  law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto  law. But if it is not an ex
post facto  law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31

Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:

... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or
department thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or
taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or
party which advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or
violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California.

In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:

... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period
to its effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's

96
 public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who
are or become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the
municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.

... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare
general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further
payment of compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the
statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.

Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill
of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive
Activities ControlAct of 1950:

Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct which it regulates is describedwith such particularity that,
in probability, few organizationswill come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the
public welfare,whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the
persons who engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own present
activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. 33

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts
committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members of the
Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party
or of any other subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and
under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability.  34 The penalties
prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.

III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process

1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in section
4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the
statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:

... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the
purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien dominationand control;

... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the
security of the Philippines;

... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope but international in direction,posed by the Communist
Party of the Philippines and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and
security of the country.

In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.

In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction between  legislative
fact  and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:

... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this
standard has a reasonable relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages
(assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that
beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we
mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.

A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment — will not be canvassed save to
determine whether there is a rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts — those which tie the legislative enactment to
the litigant — are to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36

The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders
a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this test.

With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are
controlledby the foreign government controlling the worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist
movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:

It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject them....They are the productof extensive investigation by
Committes of Congress over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them
as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich
Communist organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United States as asovereign, independent
Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is extensive. 39

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.

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That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society.
It surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be
protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41

Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without force where
the existing structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of governmental helplessness in the face
of preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the
power of Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and violence.

2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing  membership,as distinguished from nominal  membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing
membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been stated:

Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when membership is acceptedor retained with
knowledge that the organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes
himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44

3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved
by peaceful  means, misconceives the function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the
Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is
"overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more
to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.

Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow
ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is
hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government
under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly
imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood.
The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused
exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation
which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45

IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression

As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of
speechand freedom of association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so
insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.

The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:

Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the
overthrow or destruction of any such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group
or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof —

Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United
States or any department or agencythereof, for the five years next following his conviction.... 46

In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47

It was settled in Dennis  that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established
that a combination to promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is not such association as is
protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group
engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.

Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and
intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how
that threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first
instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween the
claims of the social order and individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step
removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law." 49

V. The Act and its Title

The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill." 50

What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:

And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the
government of any of its political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of placing such
Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any lien power, shallbe punished by  prision correccional  to prision
mayor  with allthe accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.

It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any
conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a

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democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe United States or
England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."

The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther
Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as the Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the
statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in
place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by Communistconspiracies..

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act.  51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear
termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read
fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement,
operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines  to be observed in any prosecution
under the Act.The Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the following elementsof the crime of joining the
Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the
presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined such
organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and

(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an
organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the
accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.

We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association:
weleave this matter to future determination.

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
Costs de oficio.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J.,  dissenting:

It is with regard that I find myself unable to join therest of my brethren in the decision reached upholding thevalidity of the Anti-Subversion Act. 1 It is to be admittedthat
the learned and scholarly opinbion of Justice Castro hasthe impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny ofthe constitutional issues raised. What is more, the
stressin the concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines thatwill assure in the trial of those prosecuted under suchAct respect for their constitutional rights is to be
commended.Nonetheless, my own reading of the decisionscited, interpreting the bill of attainder clause 2 coupled withthe fears, perhaps induced by a too-
latitudinarian constructionof the guarantees of freedom of belief and expression 3 as well as freedom of association 4 as to impermissible inroadsto which they may be
exposed, compels a differentconclusion. Hence this dissent.

1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that theequally pressing concern of state safety and security shouldbe ignored. The political branches of the
governmentwould lay themselves oepn to a justifiable indictment fornegligence had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the nation against its sworn
enemies. In a simplerera, where the overthrow of the government wasusually through the rising up in arms, with weapons farless sophisticated than those now in
existence, there wasno constitutional issue of the magnitude that now confrontsus. Force has to be met with force. It was as clearcutas that. Advances in science as
well as more subtlemethods of inducing disloyalty and weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced complexities in coping withsuch problems. There must be
then, and I am the firstto recognize it, a greater understanding for the governmentalresponde to situations of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the Anti-
Subversion Act isto be appraised. From ny standpoint, and I am not presumptuousenough to claim that it is the only perspectiveor that is the most realistic, I feel that
there was an insufficientappreciation of the compulsion of the constitutionalcommands against bills of attainder and abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the
thought that evenhad my view prevailed, all that it would mean is that anew legislation, more in comformity to my way of thinkingto what is ordained by the
fundamental law, wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be entertained thenthat a setback would be occasioned to legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of
subversive activities, in whateverform manifested.

2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof the bill of attainder clause is the meaning attachedto it by the Constitutional Convention of 1934 and by the
people who adopted it. As was explained by the then Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on November19, 1934 as Chairman of the Committee on
the Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of the Court: "A billof attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States,
4Wall. 277, 18 L ed 356). In England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of Parliament by which a man was tried, convictedand sentenced to death without a jury, without
ahearing in court, without hearing the witnesses againsthim and without regard to the rules of evidence. His bloodwas attainted or corrupted, rendering him devoid of
allheritable quality — of acquiring and disposing property bydescent. (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty imposed was less than death, the
act wasknown as a 'bill of pains and penalties.' Bills of attainder, like ex post facto  laws, were favorite methods of Stuartoppression. Once, the name of Thomas
Jefferson was includedin a bill of attainder presented to Parliament becauseof his reform activities." 5 Two American SupremeCourt decision were thus in the minds of
the framers.They are Cummings v. Missouri 6 and Ex parte Garland. 7 They speak unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form, that apply either to
named individuals or easilyascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflicton them punishment amounting to a deprivation ofany right, civil or political,
without judicial trial are billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution. 8

Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa Catholic priest for refusing to take the loyalty oath requiredby the state Constitution of Missouri of 1865.
Undersuch a provision, lawyers, doctors, ministers, and otherprofessionals must disavow that they had ever, "by act orword," manifested a "desire" for the success of
the nation'senemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the AmericanCivil War. If they swore falsely, they were guilty of perjury.If they engaged in their professions
without theoath, they were criminally liable. The United States Supreme Court condemned the provision as a bill of attainder,identified as any legislative act inflicting
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punishment withoutjudicial trial. The deprivation of any right, civil orpolitical, previously enjoyed, amounted to a punishment.Why such a conclusion was unavoidable
was explained inthe opinion of Justice Field thus: "A bill of attainder isa legislative act, which inflicts punishment without a judicialtrial. If the punishment be less than
death, the actis termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaningof the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills ofpains and penalties. In these cases the
legislative body, inaddition to its legitimate functions, exercises the powersand office of judge; it assumes, in the language of thetextbooks, judicial magistracy; it
pronounces upon theguilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguardsof trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced,whether conformable to the
rules of evidence orotherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordancewith its own notions of the enormity of the offense. ... If the clauses of the 2d article
of the Constitutionof Missouri, to which we have referred, had in termsdeclared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or should be heldguilty, of having been in armed
hostility to the UnitedStates, or of having entered that state to avoid beingenrolled or drafted into the military service of the UnitedStates, and, therefore, should be
deprived of the right topreach as a priest of the Catholic church, or to teach inany institution of learning, there could be no question thatthe clauses would constitute a
bill of attainder within themeaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, insteadof mentioning his name, had declared that all priestsand clergymen within the
state of Missouri were guiltyof these acts, or should be held guilty of them, and hencebe subjected to the like deprivation, the clause would beequally open to
objection. And further, it these clauseshad declared that all such priests and clergymen shouldbe so held guilty, and be thus deprived, provided they didnot, by a day
designated, do certain specified acts, theywould be no less within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution.In all these cases there would be the legislativeenactment
creating the deprivation, without any of theordinary forms and guards provided for the security ofthe citizen in the administration of justice by the
establishedtribunales." 10

On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings washanded down, Ex parte Garland 11 was also decided. Thatwas a motion for leave to practrice as an attorney
beforethe American Supreme Court. Petitioner Garland wasadmitted to such bar at the December term of 1860. Underthe previous rules of such Court, all that was
necessarywas that the applicant have three years practice in the statecourts to which he belonged. In March 1865, the rule waschanged by the addition of a clause
requiring that an oathbe taken under the Congressional acts of 1862 and 1865to the effect that such candidate for admission to the barhad never voluntarily borne
arms against the UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could not in conscience subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a presidentialpardon extended on July
15, 1865. With such actof clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue inpractice contending that the test oath requirement wasunconstitutional as a bill of
attainder and that at any rate,he was pardoned. The same ruling was announced by theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus: "In the exclusionwhich the statute
adjudges, it imposes a punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were not punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other of the actsit adds a new
punishment to that before prescribed, andit is thus brought within the further inhibition of the Consitutionagainst the passage of an ex post facto law. Inthe case
of Cummings v. Missouri, just decided, ... wehave had occasion to consider at length the meaning of abill of attainder and of an ex post facto law in the clauseof the
Constitution forbidding their passage by the states,and it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said.A like prohibition is contained in the Constitution
againstenactments of this kind by Congress; and the argumentpresented in that case against certain clauses of the Constitutionof Missouri is equally applicable to
the act ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12

There was a reiteration of the Cummings and Garlanddoctrine in United States v. Lovett, 13 decided in 1946.There it was shown that in 1943 the respondents,
Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for several yearsworking for the government. The government agencies,which had lawfully employed them, were fully
satisfiedwith the quality of their work and wished to keep thememployed on their jobs. Over their protest, Congress providedin Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency
AppropriationAct of 1943, by way of an amendment attached to theHouse Bill, that after November 15, 1943, no salary orcompensation should be paid respondent
out of any moneythen or thereafter appropriated except for services as jurorsor members of the armed forces, unless they wereprior to November 15, 1943, again
appointed to jobs bythe President with the advide and consent of the Senate.Notwithstanding such Congressional enactment, and thefailure of the President to
reappoint the respondents, theagencies, kept all the respondents at work on their jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943, but their compensationwas
discontinued after that date. Respondentsbrought this action in the Court of Claims for the salariesto which they felt entitled. The Ameican Supreme Courtstated that
its inquiry was thus confined to whether theaction in the light of proper construction of the Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so, whether Section304 is a
bill of attainder insofar as the respondents wereconcerned.

After holding that there was a juditiciable, view theAmerican Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section 304
fallsprecisely within the category of Congressional actionswhich the Constitution barred by providing that 'No Billof Attainder or ex post Law shall be passed.'
InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If the punishment be lessthan
death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties.Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainderinclude bills of pains and penalties.' ... On the sameday
the Cummings case was decided, the Court, in Exparte Garland, also held invalid on the same grounds anAct of Congress which required attorneys practicing
beforethis Court to take a similar oath. Neither of thesecases has ever been overruled. They stand for the propositionthat legislative acts, no matter what their
form,that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainablemembers of a group in such a way as to inflictpunishment on them without a judicial trial are
billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution. Adherenceto this principle requires invalidation of Section 304. Wedo adhere to it." 14

United States v. Brown 15 a 1965 decision was the firstcase to review a conviction under the Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, making it a
crimefor a member of the Communist Party to serve as anofficer ir, except in clerical or custodial positions, anemployee of a labor union. Respondent Brown, a
longshoremanon the San Francisco docks, and an open andavowed Communist, for more than a quarter of a centurywas elected to the Executive Board of Local 10
of theInternational Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Unionfor consecutive one-year terms in 1959, 1960, and 1961.On May 24, 1961, respondent was charged
in a one-countindictment returned in a district court of California withservicing as a member of an executive board of a labororganization while a member of the
Communist Party, inwillful violation of the above provision. The question ofits validity under the bill of attainder clause was thusproperly raised for adjudication. While
convicted in thelower court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuitreversed. It was sustained by the American SupremeCourt. As noted in the opinion by Chief
Justice Warren,"the wide variation in form, purpose and effect of ante-Constitutionbills of attainder indicates that the properscope of the Bill of Attainder Clause, and
its relevance tocontemporary problems, must ultimately be sought by attemptingto discern the reasons for its inclusion in theConstitution, and the evils it was
desinged to eliminate.The best available evidence, the writings of the architectsof our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill ofAttainder Clause was inteded not
as a narrow, technical(and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but ratheras an implementation of the separation of powers, ageneral safeguard against
legislative exercise of the judicialfunction, or more simply — trial by legislature." 16 Then after referring to Cummings, Garland, and Lovett,Chief Justice Warren
continued: "Under the line of casesjust outlined, Sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reportingand Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under theCommerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keepfrom positions affecting interstate commerce persons whomay use
such positions to bring about political strikes. In Sec. 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authoritygranted it by the Constitution. The statute does not setforth
a generally applicable rule decreeing that any personwho commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics whhich, in
Congress'view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shallnot hold union office, and leave to courts and juries thejob of deciding what persons have committed
the specifiedacts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead,it designates in no uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec characteristics and
therefore cannothold union office without incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party." 17

Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities ControlBoard, 18 where the provision of the Subversive ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the Communist Party
ofthe United States to register was sustained, the opinionof Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a five-manmajority, did indicate adherence to the
Cummingsprinciple. Had the American Communist Party been outlawed,the outcome certainly would have been different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It
attaches notto specified organizations but to described activities inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The singlingout of an individual for legislatively
prescribed punishmentconstitutes an attainder whether the individualis called by name or described in terms of conduct which,because it is past conduct, operates
only as a designationof particular persons. ... The Subversive Activities ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the registrationonly of organizations which, after the
date of the Act,are found to be under the direction, domination, or controlof certain foreign powers and to operate primarily toadvance certain objectives. This finding
must be madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial reviewwhich opens the record for the reviewing court'sdetermination whether the administrative
findings as tofact are supported by the preponderance of the evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element to whichthe statute attaches legal
consequences, not merely a pointof reference for the ascertainment of particularly personsineluctably designated by the legislature." 19

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The teaching of the above cases, which I find highlypersuasive considering what appeared to be in the mindsof the framers of the 1934 Constitutional
Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the Anti-SubversionAct falls within the ban of the bill of attainder clause. Itshould be noted that three subsequent cases
upholding theCummings and Garland doctrine were likewise cited in theopinion of the Court. The interpretation accorded to themby my brethren is, of course,
different but I am unable togo along with them especially in the light of the categoricallanguage appearing in Lovett. This is not to lose sightof the qualification that for
them could deprive such aholding of its explicit character as shown by this excerptfrom the opinion of the Court: "Indeed, were the Anti-SubversionAct a bill of
attainder it would be totally unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law alone,without more, would suffice to secure their conviction andpunishment. But
the fact is that their guilt still has to bejudicially estblished. The Government has yet to proveat the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Partyknowing its subversive character and with specific intentto further its objective,  i.e., to overthrow the existing Governmentby
force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the control and domination of a foreign power. 20While not implausible, I find difficulty in yielding
acceptance.In Cummings, there was a criminal prosecution ofthe Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.Again in Brown, there was an indictment of the
laborleader who, judging by his membership in the CommunistParty, did transgress the statutory provision subsequentlyfound offensive to the bill attainder clause. If
the constructionI would place on theoff-repeated pronouncementof the American Supreme Court is correct, then the merefact that a criminal case would have to be
instituted wouldnot save the statute. It does seem clear to me that fromthe very title of the Anti-Subversion Act, "to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and
similar associations,"not to mention other specific provisions, the taintof invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my inability to concurin the judgment reached as the statute
not suffering fromany fatal infirmity in view of the Constitutional prohibitionagainst bills of attainder.

3. This brings me to the question of the alleged repugnancyof the Anti-Subversion Act to the intellectual libertysafeguarded by the Constitution in terms of the free
speechand free assocition guarantees. 21 It is to be admitted thatat the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1700,the threat that Communism, the Russian
brand then, didpose was a painful reality for Congressional leaders andthe then President. Its shadow fell squarely across thelives of all. Subversion then could
neither be denied notdisparaged. There was, in the expert opinion of those conversantwith such mattes, a danger to out national existenceof no mean character.
Nonetheless, the remedies toward off such menace must not be repugnant to our Constitution.We are legally precluded from acting in anyother way. The
apprehension justly felt is no warrant forthrowing to the discard fundamental guarantees. Vigilantwe had to be, but not at the expense of constitutional ideals.

One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost significance,is the right to dissent. One can differ, evenobject; one can express dissatisfaction with things as
theyare. There are timew when one not only can but must.Such dissent can take the form of the most critical andthe most disparaging remarks. They may give
offense tothose in authority, to those who wield powe and influence.Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional protection.Insofar as the content of such dissent
is concerned, thelimits are hardly discernible. It cannot be confined totrivial matters or to such as are devoid of too much significance.It can reach the heart of things.
Such dissentmay, for those not so adventurous in the realm of ideas,possess a subversive tinge. Even those who oppose a democraticform of government cannot be
silenced. This is trueespecially in centers of learning where scholars competentin their line may, as a result of their studies, assert thata future is bleak for the system
of government now favoredby Western democracies. There may be doubts entertainedby some as to the lawfulness of their exercisingthis right to dissent to the point
of advocary of such adrastic change. Any citizen may do so without fear thatthereby he incurs the risk of a penal sanction. That ismerely to affirm the truth of this
ringing declaration fromJefferson: "If there be any among us who would wish todissolve this union or to change its republican form, letthem stand undisturbed as
monuments of the safety withwhich error of opinion may be tolerated where reason isleft free to combat it."  22 As was so well put by the philosopher,Sidney Hook:
"Without holding the right to theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be absolute — for even the right to non-heretical speech cannot beabsolute — it still
seems wise to tolerate the expression evenof Communist, fascist and other heresies, lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of heresies, and deprive
ourselvesof the opportunity to acquite possibly sounder ideasthan our own." 23

The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount to an incitement to commit the crime of seditionor rebellion. The state has been reached, to follow
theformulation of Cardozo, where thought merges into action.Thus is loyalty shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the Constitution. It does not bar the
expressionof views affecting the very life of the state, even ifopposed to its fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not require as a matter of fact, that
unorthodoxideas be freely ventilated and fully heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.

Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled constitutionalprinciple "that even though the governmental purposesbe legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursuedby means that broadly stifle fundamental personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an
areaso closely related to our most precious freedoms." 24 This is so for "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may notbe achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadlyand thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."  25 It isindispensable then that "an
over breadth" in the applicabilityof the statute be avoided. If such be the case, then theline dividing the valid from the constitutionally infirm hasbeen crossed. That for
me is the conclusion to be drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-Subversion Act.

There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe dissent of Justice Black in the Communist Party casediscussed above. What is to be kept in view is that a
legislativemeasure certainly less drastic in its treatment ofthe admittedly serious Communist problem was found inthe opinion of this noted jurist offensive to the
FirstAmendment of the American Constitution safeguardingfree speech. Thus: "If there is one thing certain aboutthe First Amendment it is that this Amendment was
designedto guarantee the freest interchange of ideas aboutall public matters and that, of course, means the interchangeof all  ideas, however such ideas may be
viewed inother countries and whatever change in the existing structureof government it may be hoped that these ideas willbring about. Now, when this country is
trying to spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world — ideals that are revolutionary in many countries — seems to be aparticularly inappropriate time to
stifle First Amendmentfreedoms in this country. The same arguments that areused to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas here couldbe used to justify an outlawry
of the ideas of democracyin other countries." 26 Further he stated: "I believe with theFramers of the First Amendment that the internal securityof a nation like ours
does not and cannot be made todepend upon the use of force by Government to make allthe beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a commonmold on any single
subject. Such enforced conformity ofthought would tend only to deprive our people of the boldspirit of adventure and progress which has brought thisNation to its
present greatness. The creation of publicopinion by groups, organizations, societies, clubs, and partieshas been and is a necessary part of our democraticsociety.
Such groups, like the Sons of Liberty and theAmerican Corresponding Societies, played a large part increating sentiment in this country that led the people ofthe
Colonies to want a nation of their own. The Father ofthe Constitution — James Madison — said, in speakingof the Sedition Act aimed at crushing the Jefferson
Party,that had that law been in effect during the period beforethe Revolution, the United States might well have continuedto be 'miserable colonies, groaning under a
foreign yoke.'In my judgment, this country's internal security can betterbe served by depending upon the affection of the peoplethan by attempting to instill them with
fear and dreadof the power of Government. The Communist Party hasnever been more than a small group in this country. Andits numbers had been dwindling even
before the Governmentbegan its campaign to destroy the Party by force oflaw. This was because a vast majority of the Americanpeople were against the Party's
policies and overwhelminglyrejected its candidates year after year. That is the trueAmerican way of securing this Nation against dangerousideas. Of course that is
not the way to protect the Nationagainst actions of violence and treason. The Foundersdrew a distinction in our Constitution which we would bewise to follow. They
gave the Government the fullest powerto prosecute overt actions in violation of valid lawsbut withheld any power to punish people for nothing morethan advocacy of
their views." 27

With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in mymind and congenial to my way of thinking, I cannot sharethe conclusion reached by my breathren as to the Anti-
Subversion Act successfully meeting the test of validity onfree speech and freedom of association grounds.

4. It could be that this approach to the constitutionalquestions involved arises from an appraisal of the challengedstatute which for me is susceptible of an
interpretationthat it does represent a defeatist attitude on thepart of those of us, who are devotees at the shrine of aliberal-democratic state. That certainly could not
havebeen the thought of its framers; nonetheless, such an assumptionis not devoid of plausibility for why resort tothis extreme measure susceptible as it is to what
apparentlyare not unfounded attacks on constitutional grounds?Is this not to ignore what previously was accepted as anobvious truth, namely that the light of
liberalism sendsits shafts in many directions? It can illuminate, and itcan win the hearts and minds of men. It if difficult forme to accept the view then that a resort to
outlawry isindispensable, that suppression is the only answer to whatis an admitted evil. There could have been a greater exposureof the undesirability of the
communist creed, itscontradictions and arbitrarines, its lack of fealty to reason,its inculcation of disloyalty, and its subservience tocentralized dictation that brooks no

101
opposition. It is thus,in a realistic sense, a manifestation of the fear of freethought and the will to suppress it. For better, of course,is the propaganda of the deed.
What the communists promise,this government can fulfill. It is up to it then to takeremedial measures to alleviate the condition of our countrymenwhose lives are in a
condition of destitution andmisery. It may not be able to change matters radically.At least, it should take earnest steps in that direction.What is important for those at
the bottom of the economicpyramid is that they are not denied the opportunity for abetter life. If they, or at least their children, cannot evenlook forward to that, then a
constitutional regime is nothingbut a mockery and a tragic illusion. Such a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit of thinning,if not completely
eliminating, the embattled ranksand outposts of ignorance, fanaticism and error. That forme would be more in accordance with the basic propositionof our polity. This
is not therefore to preach a doctrine of object surrender to the forces apparently bent on the adoption of a way of life so totally opposed to the deeply felt traditions of
our people. This is, for me at least, an affirmation of the vitality of the democratic creed, with an expression of regret that it could not have been more impressively set
forth in language worthy of the subject.

It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the ably-written opinion of Justice Castro for the Court sustaining the
validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J.,  dissenting:

It is with regard that I find myself unable to join therest of my brethren in the decision reached upholding thevalidity of the Anti-Subversion Act. 1 It is to be admittedthat
the learned and scholarly opinbion of Justice Castro hasthe impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny ofthe constitutional issues raised. What is more, the
stressin the concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines thatwill assure in the trial of those prosecuted under suchAct respect for their constitutional rights is to be
commended.Nonetheless, my own reading of the decisionscited, interpreting the bill of attainder clause 2 coupled withthe fears, perhaps induced by a too-
latitudinarian constructionof the guarantees of freedom of belief and expression 3 as well as freedom of association 4 as to impermissible inroadsto which they may be
exposed, compels a differentconclusion. Hence this dissent.

1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that theequally pressing concern of state safety and security shouldbe ignored. The political branches of the
governmentwould lay themselves oepn to a justifiable indictment fornegligence had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the nation against its sworn
enemies. In a simplerera, where the overthrow of the government wasusually through the rising up in arms, with weapons farless sophisticated than those now in
existence, there wasno constitutional issue of the magnitude that now confrontsus. Force has to be met with force. It was as clearcutas that. Advances in science as
well as more subtlemethods of inducing disloyalty and weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced complexities in coping withsuch problems. There must be
then, and I am the firstto recognize it, a greater understanding for the governmentalresponde to situations of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the Anti-
Subversion Act isto be appraised. From ny standpoint, and I am not presumptuousenough to claim that it is the only perspectiveor that is the most realistic, I feel that
there was an insufficientappreciation of the compulsion of the constitutionalcommands against bills of attainder and abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the
thought that evenhad my view prevailed, all that it would mean is that anew legislation, more in comformity to my way of thinkingto what is ordained by the
fundamental law, wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be entertained thenthat a setback would be occasioned to legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of
subversive activities, in whateverform manifested.

2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof the bill of attainder clause is the meaning attachedto it by the Constitutional Convention of 1934 and by the
people who adopted it. As was explained by the then Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on November19, 1934 as Chairman of the Committee on
the Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of the Court: "A billof attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States,
4Wall. 277, 18 L ed 356). In England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of Parliament by which a man was tried, convictedand sentenced to death without a jury, without
ahearing in court, without hearing the witnesses againsthim and without regard to the rules of evidence. His bloodwas attainted or corrupted, rendering him devoid of
allheritable quality — of acquiring and disposing property bydescent. (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty imposed was less than death, the
act wasknown as a 'bill of pains and penalties.' Bills of attainder, like ex post facto  laws, were favorite methods of Stuartoppression. Once, the name of Thomas
Jefferson was includedin a bill of attainder presented to Parliament becauseof his reform activities." 5 Two American SupremeCourt decision were thus in the minds of
the framers.They are Cummings v. Missouri 6 and Ex parte Garland. 7 They speak unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form, that apply either to
named individuals or easilyascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflicton them punishment amounting to a deprivation ofany right, civil or political,
without judicial trial are billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution. 8

Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa Catholic priest for refusing to take the loyalty oath requiredby the state Constitution of Missouri of 1865.
Undersuch a provision, lawyers, doctors, ministers, and otherprofessionals must disavow that they had ever, "by act orword," manifested a "desire" for the success of
the nation'senemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the AmericanCivil War. If they swore falsely, they were guilty of perjury.If they engaged in their professions
without theoath, they were criminally liable. The United States Supreme Court condemned the provision as a bill of attainder,identified as any legislative act inflicting
punishment withoutjudicial trial. The deprivation of any right, civil orpolitical, previously enjoyed, amounted to a punishment.Why such a conclusion was unavoidable
was explained inthe opinion of Justice Field thus: "A bill of attainder isa legislative act, which inflicts punishment without a judicialtrial. If the punishment be less than
death, the actis termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaningof the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills ofpains and penalties. In these cases the
legislative body, inaddition to its legitimate functions, exercises the powersand office of judge; it assumes, in the language of thetextbooks, judicial magistracy; it
pronounces upon theguilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguardsof trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced,whether conformable to the
rules of evidence orotherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordancewith its own notions of the enormity of the offense. ... If the clauses of the 2d article
of the Constitutionof Missouri, to which we have referred, had in termsdeclared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or should be heldguilty, of having been in armed
hostility to the UnitedStates, or of having entered that state to avoid beingenrolled or drafted into the military service of the UnitedStates, and, therefore, should be
deprived of the right topreach as a priest of the Catholic church, or to teach inany institution of learning, there could be no question thatthe clauses would constitute a
bill of attainder within themeaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, insteadof mentioning his name, had declared that all priestsand clergymen within the
state of Missouri were guiltyof these acts, or should be held guilty of them, and hencebe subjected to the like deprivation, the clause would beequally open to
objection. And further, it these clauseshad declared that all such priests and clergymen shouldbe so held guilty, and be thus deprived, provided they didnot, by a day
designated, do certain specified acts, theywould be no less within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution.In all these cases there would be the legislativeenactment
creating the deprivation, without any of theordinary forms and guards provided for the security ofthe citizen in the administration of justice by the
establishedtribunales." 10

On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings washanded down, Ex parte Garland 11 was also decided. Thatwas a motion for leave to practrice as an attorney
beforethe American Supreme Court. Petitioner Garland wasadmitted to such bar at the December term of 1860. Underthe previous rules of such Court, all that was
necessarywas that the applicant have three years practice in the statecourts to which he belonged. In March 1865, the rule waschanged by the addition of a clause
requiring that an oathbe taken under the Congressional acts of 1862 and 1865to the effect that such candidate for admission to the barhad never voluntarily borne
arms against the UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could not in conscience subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a presidentialpardon extended on July
15, 1865. With such actof clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue inpractice contending that the test oath requirement wasunconstitutional as a bill of
attainder and that at any rate,he was pardoned. The same ruling was announced by theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus: "In the exclusionwhich the statute
adjudges, it imposes a punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were not punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other of the actsit adds a new
punishment to that before prescribed, andit is thus brought within the further inhibition of the Consitutionagainst the passage of an ex post facto law. Inthe case
of Cummings v. Missouri, just decided, ... wehave had occasion to consider at length the meaning of abill of attainder and of an ex post facto law in the clauseof the
Constitution forbidding their passage by the states,and it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said.A like prohibition is contained in the Constitution
againstenactments of this kind by Congress; and the argumentpresented in that case against certain clauses of the Constitutionof Missouri is equally applicable to
the act ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12

102
There was a reiteration of the Cummings and Garlanddoctrine in United States v. Lovett, 13 decided in 1946.There it was shown that in 1943 the respondents,
Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for several yearsworking for the government. The government agencies,which had lawfully employed them, were fully
satisfiedwith the quality of their work and wished to keep thememployed on their jobs. Over their protest, Congress providedin Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency
AppropriationAct of 1943, by way of an amendment attached to theHouse Bill, that after November 15, 1943, no salary orcompensation should be paid respondent
out of any moneythen or thereafter appropriated except for services as jurorsor members of the armed forces, unless they wereprior to November 15, 1943, again
appointed to jobs bythe President with the advide and consent of the Senate.Notwithstanding such Congressional enactment, and thefailure of the President to
reappoint the respondents, theagencies, kept all the respondents at work on their jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943, but their compensationwas
discontinued after that date. Respondentsbrought this action in the Court of Claims for the salariesto which they felt entitled. The Ameican Supreme Courtstated that
its inquiry was thus confined to whether theaction in the light of proper construction of the Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so, whether Section304 is a
bill of attainder insofar as the respondents wereconcerned.

After holding that there was a juditiciable, view theAmerican Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section 304
fallsprecisely within the category of Congressional actionswhich the Constitution barred by providing that 'No Billof Attainder or ex post Law shall be passed.'
InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If the punishment be lessthan
death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties.Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainderinclude bills of pains and penalties.' ... On the sameday
the Cummings case was decided, the Court, in Exparte Garland, also held invalid on the same grounds anAct of Congress which required attorneys practicing
beforethis Court to take a similar oath. Neither of thesecases has ever been overruled. They stand for the propositionthat legislative acts, no matter what their
form,that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainablemembers of a group in such a way as to inflictpunishment on them without a judicial trial are
billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution. Adherenceto this principle requires invalidation of Section 304. Wedo adhere to it." 14

United States v. Brown 15 a 1965 decision was the firstcase to review a conviction under the Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, making it a
crimefor a member of the Communist Party to serve as anofficer ir, except in clerical or custodial positions, anemployee of a labor union. Respondent Brown, a
longshoremanon the San Francisco docks, and an open andavowed Communist, for more than a quarter of a centurywas elected to the Executive Board of Local 10
of theInternational Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Unionfor consecutive one-year terms in 1959, 1960, and 1961.On May 24, 1961, respondent was charged
in a one-countindictment returned in a district court of California withservicing as a member of an executive board of a labororganization while a member of the
Communist Party, inwillful violation of the above provision. The question ofits validity under the bill of attainder clause was thusproperly raised for adjudication. While
convicted in thelower court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuitreversed. It was sustained by the American SupremeCourt. As noted in the opinion by Chief
Justice Warren,"the wide variation in form, purpose and effect of ante-Constitutionbills of attainder indicates that the properscope of the Bill of Attainder Clause, and
its relevance tocontemporary problems, must ultimately be sought by attemptingto discern the reasons for its inclusion in theConstitution, and the evils it was
desinged to eliminate.The best available evidence, the writings of the architectsof our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill ofAttainder Clause was inteded not
as a narrow, technical(and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but ratheras an implementation of the separation of powers, ageneral safeguard against
legislative exercise of the judicialfunction, or more simply — trial by legislature." 16 Then after referring to Cummings, Garland, and Lovett,Chief Justice Warren
continued: "Under the line of casesjust outlined, Sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reportingand Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under theCommerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keepfrom positions affecting interstate commerce persons whomay use
such positions to bring about political strikes. In Sec. 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authoritygranted it by the Constitution. The statute does not setforth
a generally applicable rule decreeing that any personwho commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics whhich, in
Congress'view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shallnot hold union office, and leave to courts and juries thejob of deciding what persons have committed
the specifiedacts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead,it designates in no uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec characteristics and
therefore cannothold union office without incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party." 17

Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities ControlBoard, 18 where the provision of the Subversive ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the Communist Party
ofthe United States to register was sustained, the opinionof Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a five-manmajority, did indicate adherence to the
Cummingsprinciple. Had the American Communist Party been outlawed,the outcome certainly would have been different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It
attaches notto specified organizations but to described activities inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The singlingout of an individual for legislatively
prescribed punishmentconstitutes an attainder whether the individualis called by name or described in terms of conduct which,because it is past conduct, operates
only as a designationof particular persons. ... The Subversive Activities ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the registrationonly of organizations which, after the
date of the Act,are found to be under the direction, domination, or controlof certain foreign powers and to operate primarily toadvance certain objectives. This finding
must be madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial reviewwhich opens the record for the reviewing court'sdetermination whether the administrative
findings as tofact are supported by the preponderance of the evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element to whichthe statute attaches legal
consequences, not merely a pointof reference for the ascertainment of particularly personsineluctably designated by the legislature." 19

The teaching of the above cases, which I find highlypersuasive considering what appeared to be in the mindsof the framers of the 1934 Constitutional
Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the Anti-SubversionAct falls within the ban of the bill of attainder clause. Itshould be noted that three subsequent cases
upholding theCummings and Garland doctrine were likewise cited in theopinion of the Court. The interpretation accorded to themby my brethren is, of course,
different but I am unable togo along with them especially in the light of the categoricallanguage appearing in Lovett. This is not to lose sightof the qualification that for
them could deprive such aholding of its explicit character as shown by this excerptfrom the opinion of the Court: "Indeed, were the Anti-SubversionAct a bill of
attainder it would be totally unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law alone,without more, would suffice to secure their conviction andpunishment. But
the fact is that their guilt still has to bejudicially estblished. The Government has yet to proveat the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Partyknowing its subversive character and with specific intentto further its objective,  i.e., to overthrow the existing Governmentby
force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the control and domination of a foreign power. 20While not implausible, I find difficulty in yielding
acceptance.In Cummings, there was a criminal prosecution ofthe Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.Again in Brown, there was an indictment of the
laborleader who, judging by his membership in the CommunistParty, did transgress the statutory provision subsequentlyfound offensive to the bill attainder clause. If
the constructionI would place on theoff-repeated pronouncementof the American Supreme Court is correct, then the merefact that a criminal case would have to be
instituted wouldnot save the statute. It does seem clear to me that fromthe very title of the Anti-Subversion Act, "to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and
similar associations,"not to mention other specific provisions, the taintof invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my inability to concurin the judgment reached as the statute
not suffering fromany fatal infirmity in view of the Constitutional prohibitionagainst bills of attainder.

3. This brings me to the question of the alleged repugnancyof the Anti-Subversion Act to the intellectual libertysafeguarded by the Constitution in terms of the free
speechand free assocition guarantees. 21 It is to be admitted thatat the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1700,the threat that Communism, the Russian
brand then, didpose was a painful reality for Congressional leaders andthe then President. Its shadow fell squarely across thelives of all. Subversion then could
neither be denied notdisparaged. There was, in the expert opinion of those conversantwith such mattes, a danger to out national existenceof no mean character.
Nonetheless, the remedies toward off such menace must not be repugnant to our Constitution.We are legally precluded from acting in anyother way. The
apprehension justly felt is no warrant forthrowing to the discard fundamental guarantees. Vigilantwe had to be, but not at the expense of constitutional ideals.

One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost significance,is the right to dissent. One can differ, evenobject; one can express dissatisfaction with things as
theyare. There are timew when one not only can but must.Such dissent can take the form of the most critical andthe most disparaging remarks. They may give
offense tothose in authority, to those who wield powe and influence.Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional protection.Insofar as the content of such dissent
is concerned, thelimits are hardly discernible. It cannot be confined totrivial matters or to such as are devoid of too much significance.It can reach the heart of things.
Such dissentmay, for those not so adventurous in the realm of ideas,possess a subversive tinge. Even those who oppose a democraticform of government cannot be
silenced. This is trueespecially in centers of learning where scholars competentin their line may, as a result of their studies, assert thata future is bleak for the system
of government now favoredby Western democracies. There may be doubts entertainedby some as to the lawfulness of their exercisingthis right to dissent to the point
of advocary of such adrastic change. Any citizen may do so without fear thatthereby he incurs the risk of a penal sanction. That ismerely to affirm the truth of this
103
ringing declaration fromJefferson: "If there be any among us who would wish todissolve this union or to change its republican form, letthem stand undisturbed as
monuments of the safety withwhich error of opinion may be tolerated where reason isleft free to combat it."  22 As was so well put by the philosopher,Sidney Hook:
"Without holding the right to theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be absolute — for even the right to non-heretical speech cannot beabsolute — it still
seems wise to tolerate the expression evenof Communist, fascist and other heresies, lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of heresies, and deprive
ourselvesof the opportunity to acquite possibly sounder ideasthan our own." 23

The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount to an incitement to commit the crime of seditionor rebellion. The state has been reached, to follow
theformulation of Cardozo, where thought merges into action.Thus is loyalty shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the Constitution. It does not bar the
expressionof views affecting the very life of the state, even ifopposed to its fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not require as a matter of fact, that
unorthodoxideas be freely ventilated and fully heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.

Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled constitutionalprinciple "that even though the governmental purposesbe legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursuedby means that broadly stifle fundamental personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an
areaso closely related to our most precious freedoms." 24 This is so for "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may notbe achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadlyand thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."  25 It isindispensable then that "an
over breadth" in the applicabilityof the statute be avoided. If such be the case, then theline dividing the valid from the constitutionally infirm hasbeen crossed. That for
me is the conclusion to be drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-Subversion Act.

There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe dissent of Justice Black in the Communist Party casediscussed above. What is to be kept in view is that a
legislativemeasure certainly less drastic in its treatment ofthe admittedly serious Communist problem was found inthe opinion of this noted jurist offensive to the
FirstAmendment of the American Constitution safeguardingfree speech. Thus: "If there is one thing certain aboutthe First Amendment it is that this Amendment was
designedto guarantee the freest interchange of ideas aboutall public matters and that, of course, means the interchangeof all  ideas, however such ideas may be
viewed inother countries and whatever change in the existing structureof government it may be hoped that these ideas willbring about. Now, when this country is
trying to spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world — ideals that are revolutionary in many countries — seems to be aparticularly inappropriate time to
stifle First Amendmentfreedoms in this country. The same arguments that areused to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas here couldbe used to justify an outlawry
of the ideas of democracyin other countries." 26 Further he stated: "I believe with theFramers of the First Amendment that the internal securityof a nation like ours
does not and cannot be made todepend upon the use of force by Government to make allthe beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a commonmold on any single
subject. Such enforced conformity ofthought would tend only to deprive our people of the boldspirit of adventure and progress which has brought thisNation to its
present greatness. The creation of publicopinion by groups, organizations, societies, clubs, and partieshas been and is a necessary part of our democraticsociety.
Such groups, like the Sons of Liberty and theAmerican Corresponding Societies, played a large part increating sentiment in this country that led the people ofthe
Colonies to want a nation of their own. The Father ofthe Constitution — James Madison — said, in speakingof the Sedition Act aimed at crushing the Jefferson
Party,that had that law been in effect during the period beforethe Revolution, the United States might well have continuedto be 'miserable colonies, groaning under a
foreign yoke.'In my judgment, this country's internal security can betterbe served by depending upon the affection of the peoplethan by attempting to instill them with
fear and dreadof the power of Government. The Communist Party hasnever been more than a small group in this country. Andits numbers had been dwindling even
before the Governmentbegan its campaign to destroy the Party by force oflaw. This was because a vast majority of the Americanpeople were against the Party's
policies and overwhelminglyrejected its candidates year after year. That is the trueAmerican way of securing this Nation against dangerousideas. Of course that is
not the way to protect the Nationagainst actions of violence and treason. The Foundersdrew a distinction in our Constitution which we would bewise to follow. They
gave the Government the fullest powerto prosecute overt actions in violation of valid lawsbut withheld any power to punish people for nothing morethan advocacy of
their views." 27

With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in mymind and congenial to my way of thinking, I cannot sharethe conclusion reached by my breathren as to the Anti-
Subversion Act successfully meeting the test of validity onfree speech and freedom of association grounds.

4. It could be that this approach to the constitutionalquestions involved arises from an appraisal of the challengedstatute which for me is susceptible of an
interpretationthat it does represent a defeatist attitude on thepart of those of us, who are devotees at the shrine of aliberal-democratic state. That certainly could not
havebeen the thought of its framers; nonetheless, such an assumptionis not devoid of plausibility for why resort tothis extreme measure susceptible as it is to what
apparentlyare not unfounded attacks on constitutional grounds?Is this not to ignore what previously was accepted as anobvious truth, namely that the light of
liberalism sendsits shafts in many directions? It can illuminate, and itcan win the hearts and minds of men. It if difficult forme to accept the view then that a resort to
outlawry isindispensable, that suppression is the only answer to whatis an admitted evil. There could have been a greater exposureof the undesirability of the
communist creed, itscontradictions and arbitrarines, its lack of fealty to reason,its inculcation of disloyalty, and its subservience tocentralized dictation that brooks no
opposition. It is thus,in a realistic sense, a manifestation of the fear of freethought and the will to suppress it. For better, of course,is the propaganda of the deed.
What the communists promise,this government can fulfill. It is up to it then to takeremedial measures to alleviate the condition of our countrymenwhose lives are in a
condition of destitution andmisery. It may not be able to change matters radically.At least, it should take earnest steps in that direction.What is important for those at
the bottom of the economicpyramid is that they are not denied the opportunity for abetter life. If they, or at least their children, cannot evenlook forward to that, then a
constitutional regime is nothingbut a mockery and a tragic illusion. Such a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit of thinning,if not completely
eliminating, the embattled ranksand outposts of ignorance, fanaticism and error. That forme would be more in accordance with the basic propositionof our polity. This
is not therefore to preach a doctrine of object surrender to the forces apparently bent on the adoption of a way of life so totally opposed to the deeply felt traditions of
our people. This is, for me at least, an affirmation of the vitality of the democratic creed, with an expression of regret that it could not have been more impressively set
forth in language worthy of the subject.

It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the ably-written opinion of Justice Castro for the Court sustaining the
validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. People vs Sandiganbayan 211 SCRA 241

G.R. No 101724 July 3, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the resolution promulgated on August 1, 1991 by the Sandiganbayan which granted the
private respondent's motion to quash the information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) on the ground of prescription of the
crime charged.

Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and December 9, 1986, with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza,
wife of Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after the private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del
Sur in March 1986 (p. 235, Rollo). Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976, of a free
patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391 sq. m., more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.

104
On February 23, 1989, the tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of Butuan City who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was
served on, and received by, the Station Commander of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite the absence of notice to Paredes,
Deputized Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy conducted a preliminary investigation ex-parte. He recommended that an information be filed in court. His
recommendation was approved by the Tanodbayan who, on August 10, 1989, filed the following information in the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as TBP
Case No. 86-03368:

That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having been duly appointed and qualified as
such, taking advantage of his public position, did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully persuade, influence and induce the Land Inspector of the Bureau of Lands,
by the name of Armando L. Luison to violate an existing rule or regulation duly promulgated by competent authority by misrepresenting to the latter that the land
subject of an application filed by the accused with the Bureau of Lands is disposable by a free patent when the accused well knew that the said land had already
been reserved for a school site, thus by the accused's personal misrepresentation in his capacity as Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur and applicant for a free
patent, a report favorably recommending the issuance of a free patent was given by the said Armando L. Luison, land inspector, thereby paving the way to the
release of a decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur, an act committed by the accused, in outright prejudice of the public interest. (pp. 3-4, Rollo.)

Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the information and the warrant of arrest were null and void because he had been
denied his right to a preliminary investigation. Paredes refused to post bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus praying this Court to order his release (Paredes
vs. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464), but we denied her petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a bail bond of P20,000 fixed by the
Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move to quash the information before being arraigned.

On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest" alleging that:

1. he is charged for an offense which has prescribed:

2. the preliminary investigation, as well as the Information prepared by the Tanodbayan and the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan were invalid for lack
of notice to him of the preliminary investigation conducted by Deputized Tanodbayan Ernesto M. Brocoy and Tanodbayan Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez; and

3. his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.

After the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on August 1, 1991 granting the motion to quash on the ground of
prescription of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan's ratiocination of its resolution is quoted below:

The crime charged is alleged to have been committed "on or about January 21, 1976" when the accused allegedly misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the
Bureau of Lands that the land subject of the herein movant's Application for a Free Patent was disposable land. This misrepresentation allegedly resulted in the
issuance of a Torrens Title under a Free Patent to the herein accused-movant. This, the Information avers, was prejudicial to the public interest because the land in
question had been reserved for a school site and was, therefore, not disposable.

Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 because the accused had allegedly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public Lands Inspector
to violate existing law, rules and regulations by recommending approval of the free patent application.

The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime (January 21, 1976) the period of prescription was ten (10) years under Sec. 11 of
R.A. No. 3019, the crime should have prescribed in 1986. The prosecution seems to agree with the movant's statement as to the term of the prescriptive period with
the qualification that the period of prescription should have commenced to run from March 28, 1985, when the complaint was allegedly filed by the Republic for the
cancellation of the title.

xxx xxx xxx

The question then is this: when should the period of prescription have commenced to run as to the alleged misrepresentation which persuaded, influenced and
induced the Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands resulting in the approval of the application of the accused for a free patent?

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court has clearly stated that even in the case of falsification of public documents, prescription commences from its recording with the Registry of
Deeds when the existence of the document and the averments therein theoretically become a matter of public knowledge.

xxx xxx xxx

The matter of improper inducement, persuasion or influence upon the Lands Inspector allegedly applied by the accused through his misrepresentation may have
been unknown to others besides the two of them because their interaction would presumably have been private. The fact of the improper segregation of the piece of
land in question and the grant thereof to the accused, however, became, presumptively at least, a matter of public knowledge upon the issuance of a Torrens Title
over that parcel of non-disposable public land.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Notice to the whole world must be presumed at the very latest on May 28, 1976 when the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 8379 in the name of the accused as a result of the grant of the patent on the school site reservation;

5. The act of filing the approved free patent with the Registry of Deeds is notice duly given to the various offices and officials of the government, e.g., the Department
(Ministry) of Agriculture and the Bureau of Lands, who are affected thereby specially because it is the Bureau of Lands which files the approved patent application
with the Registry of Deeds. If the land in question was indeed reserved for as school site, then the Department (Ministry) of Education would also know or would be
presumed to know. (pp. 28-33, Rollo.)

The Sandiganbayan could not abide the fact that the Lands Inspector (Luison) who was supposedly induced by Paredes to violate the law, and who did violate it by
recommending approval of Paredes' free patent application was not charged with a crime. The Sandiganbayan concluded:

It would seriously strain credulity to say that while the violation of law, rules or regulation by the Lands Inspector was obvious and public (since the school site had
been titled in the name of the alleged inducer Pimentel **), the beneficiary thereof could not have been suspected of having induced the violation itself. It would be
grossly unfair and unjust to say that prescription would run in favor of the Lands Inspector who had actually violated the law but not to the public official who had
benefitted therefrom and who may have, therefore, instigated the favorable recommendation for the disposition of non-disposable land.

In view of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash the Information is granted. (p. 36, Rollo.)

The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is a special law, the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime of violating it is
governed by Section 29 of Act No. 3326 which provides as follows:
105
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.

The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for the commencement of the period of prescription" (p.
34, Rollo).

Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to recommend approval of his application for free patent (which both of them denied doing), the date of the
violation, for the purpose of computing the period of prescription, would be the date of filing his application on January 21, 1976.

The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the filing of Paredes' application because no one could have known about it
except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it is not only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the
disposability of public land . . . other public officials pass upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land and, therefore, the disposable
character thereof" (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands
inspector who inspected the land to ascertain its location and occupancy: (2) the surveyor who prepared its technical description: (3) the regional director who
assessed the application and determined the land classification: (4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free patent: and (5) the Department Secretary who
signed it, could not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the application was nondisposable public agricultural land.

The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes application for a free patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having
induced Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late.

The reason for the extinction of the State's right to prosecute a crime after the lapse of the statutory limitation period for filing the criminal action, is that:

Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of grace, and as a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion,
and they are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment
endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of accused have by sheer lapse of time passed
beyond availability. They serve, not only to bar prosecutions on aged and untrustworthy evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for crimes a reasonable time after
completion, when no further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity. (22 CJS 573-574.)

In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute of limitations begins to run on the commission of an offense and not from the time when the offense is
discovered or when the offender becomes known, or it normally begins to run when the crime is complete. (22 CJS 585; Emphasis supplied.)

Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the registration and issuance of the free patent title by the Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976,
registration being constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period would have fully run its course on May 28, 1986, or five (5) months before Gelacio
filed his complaint, and more than thirteen (13) years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by the filing of the
information therein.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period
for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be
prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an
essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it.

Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. Where the statute fixes a period of limitation as to a prosecution for a particular
offense, the limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that the indictment or
information be actually filed within the time prescribed. (22 CJS 574.)

Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional necessarily determined that a prosecution within the period specified is an essential element of the offense. (People
vs. Allen, 118 P 2d, 927, Emphasis supplied.)

Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not apply to crimes previously committed (22 CJS 576; People vs. Lurd, 12 Hun 282;
Martine vs. State, 24 Tex 61; Emphasis ours.)

To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime
that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. An ex post facto law is defined as:

A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By Art.
I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass "any ex post facto law". Most all state constitutions contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent;
a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the
deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)

Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that
Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new
prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offense which were committed after the approval of B.P. 195.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The resolution dated August 1, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 13800 is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

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20. Lacson vs Executive Secretary G.R. No. 128096, Jan. 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which
had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police
officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
— Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief
Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or
a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators
headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the
PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for
multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for
the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's
Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations5 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was
charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused6 was dropped from the case.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the
cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 They contend that the said law
limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or
PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of
only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and
Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was
opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.

While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on
March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 229910 and No. 109411 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as
well as Senate Bill No. 84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused"
in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 824913 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution14 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it
"stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."

On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law,
Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has
already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and
that trial has not yet begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of arrest has been issued — this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4
with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases16 (Empahasis supplied)

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
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a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases
were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to
the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)

b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely,
that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos.
23047-23057 to procedural due process.

c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution.17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to
apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they
acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in
question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.

This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional
memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused
therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to
say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.

The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:

Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 148621 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in
chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123,23 P.D. No. 1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No.
8249.27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.

(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
108
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military
and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their
own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not
be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate,
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of
the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department
heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or
PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.

xxx xxx xxx

109
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of
R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since
none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through
the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases,29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
pursuant to R.A. 8249.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth),
(c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986
(sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c)
and (e) is a public official or employee32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the
governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office.
"The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus,
under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public
officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to
the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress
simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law33 because its enactment was particularly
directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as
unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,35

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on
substantial distinction that makes real differences.36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject
to the constitutional limitations,37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to
privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under
the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section
7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the
Sandiganbaya38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against
those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further
contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the
word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted,
deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and,
finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient
justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before
the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative
powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.40

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law41 for
they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post facto law is one —

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
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(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to
convict the defendant.43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of a amnesty.45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature,
and provide dor their punishment.48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural
matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying
laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249,
is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in
nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.51
R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out
a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.53 It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law.55 On the removal of the intermediate review of
facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.56

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the
law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The
requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects
related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.59 The Congress, in employing
the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain
which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations,61
and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.62

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense
charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.63 This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the
public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.

In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of
the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of
official duties "must be alleged in the informations."66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts."67 The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69

The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the accused with such a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense
and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must
be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularly of time,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)

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It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense."70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of
specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.

In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations71 for murder reads:

AMENDED INFORMATIONS

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows

That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G.
ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the
acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein
above alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

CONTRARY LAW.

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however,
no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police
officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody.

Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is
vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no
arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The
sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the
victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro
Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the
allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do
not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by
the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the
close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.

In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.

In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged

Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special
policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . .
supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed
the authority to arrest and detain person without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said
Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.

Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims
and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of
P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only
signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that
would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.

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Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., CJ., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. Fajardo vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 128508, Feb. 1, 1999

DANIEL G. FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO P. PEDRONIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
31, Iloilo City; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and STATION COMMANDER OF ILOILO CITY, respondent.

PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari taken by petitioner from a decision of the Court of Appeals that denied due course to his motion for probation in Criminal Case
No. 14196 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Iloilo City, arising from his conviction of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, for which he was sentenced to
imprisonment of eight (8) months.

We deny the petition.

On May 26, 1988, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City, convicted petitioner of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of eight (8) months imprisonment and to pay the costs, in Criminal Case No. 14196. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. 1 By decision promulgated on
February 27, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

On August 20, 1990, the Supreme Court denied a petition for review on certiorari of the conviction. 2

Upon the remand of the record to the lower court, on June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for probation contending that he was eligible for probation because at the
time he committed the offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was still qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred an
application for probation of an accused who had interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application, and, hence, not applicable to him.

On January 5, 1996, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for probation.

On July 29, 1996, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the lower court's denial of his application for probation. 3 On November 12,
1996, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition. 4

Hence, this appeal. 5

At issue in this case is whether petitioner could qualify to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 since he had appealed from his conviction in 1988,
after Presidential Decree No. 1990 amending Presidential Decree No. 968, became effective in 1986, providing that "no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." 6 Petitioner maintains the view that Presidential Decree No. 1990, issued on
October 5, 1985, is null and void on the ground that at that time President Ferdinand E. Marcos could no longer exercise legislative powers as the Batasan
Pambansa was functioning and exercising sole legislative powers.

The contention is without merit. At that time, President Marcos was vested with legislative powers concurrently with the Batasan Pambansa. 7

Consequently, Presidential Decree No. 1990, is valid. Presidential Decree No. 1990, enacted on October 5, 1985, "was printed in Volume 81 of the Official Gazette
dated December 30, 1985 but said issue was released for circulation only on July 1, 1986; hence, P D 1990 became effective after fifteen (15) days from July 1,
1986, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, or on July 16, 1986." 8 It is not ex post facto in its application. The law applies only to accused convicted after its
effectivity. 9 An ex post facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its commission. 10 Presidential Decree No. 1990, like the
Probation Law that it amends, is not penal in character. 11 It may not be considered as an ex post facto law. 12

At the time of the commission of the offense charged—violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22—in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted and still availed
himself of probation. However, petitioner was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, petitioner no longer had the option to appeal and still apply
for probation if unsuccessful in the appeal. 13 Presidential Decree No. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence, he could no longer apply for probation since he had
appealed.

On October 13, 1997, the Solicitor General 14 submitted a manifestation positing the view that petitioner's application for probation may still be considered because
when petitioner committed the offense in 1981, he could avail himself of probation since the law as it stood at that time provided that an accused convicted of a crime
may apply for probation even if he had appealed the conviction. 15 We do not share his view. The case he cited is a Court of Appeals decision, and, hence, not a
precedent. What is more, it is inapplicable because there, the accused's conviction became final on October 14, 1985. Presidential Decree No. 1990 although
enacted on October 5, 1985, was published in the Official Gazette on December 30, 1985, 16 and, hence, was not yet applicable at the time the accused was finally
convicted. Regrettably, the Solicitor General has cited a Court of Appeals decision that is inapplicable to this case because the facts were not similar.

We find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues that petitioner has raised questioning the constitutionality and wisdom of Presidential Decree No. 1990, amending
the probation law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41447. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., took no part.

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