THEORY AND JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the

REVIEW election protest filed by Ynsua.

ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Separation of Powers

LAUREL, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of
office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth
Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a
resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject
of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua

filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly. The following day,
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own
resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that
was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly,

the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The
Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its

jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its

constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election
protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests

relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of
that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex

necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other
is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS
before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its VINUYA VS SECRETARY ROMULO
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission. FACTS:
***In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during
(Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the the Second World War.
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a
claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals
relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951
and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine
government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare
support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these
were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations.
It is well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the
political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already
decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in
time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents
in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause
would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt
our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in
this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate
political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general
principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between
the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be
given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of
the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies
are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for
individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been
when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its
subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks
fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or
legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not
adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can
do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering
their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not
alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by
the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of
Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international
crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law
has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States
towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be
drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community
as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic
protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they
are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by
general international norms of equivalent authority.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which
directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”
Issues:

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint

constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment

adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions
of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of

Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope

of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly

unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly,
its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
OCAMPO VS ENRIQUEZ
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then
it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former

President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3
of Article XI of the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a

political crisis.

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to
do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly
political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect
of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other
hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.