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SCP0010.1177/00377686211012350Social CompassFinke and Mataic: Reconciling state promises and practices

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Social Compass
2021, Vol. 68(3) 301­–320
Reconciling state promises © The Author(s) 2021
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and practices: Constitutional sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00377686211012350
https://doi.org/10.1177/00377686211012350
promises and discrimination journals.sagepub.com/home/scp

against religious minorities

Roger FINKE
Pennsylvania State University, USA

Dane R MATAIC
North Dakota State University, USA

Abstract
Research on religious freedom has found a vast chasm between constitutional promises
and state practices, with constitutional promises being a poor predictor of the state’s
support of religious freedom. This research changes the focus from religious freedom
to religious equality. We propose that constitutional promises of religious equality
will be associated with less discrimination against minority religions and we explore
the relationships governance and the promises of religious equality hold with religious
discrimination. We find that promises of religious equality are associated with less
discrimination. When exploring the interactions between promises of equality and our
governance measures, we find constitutional promises of religious equality largely erase
the differences in religious discrimination between countries with and without free
elections and an independent judiciary. Yet, the reduced discrimination against minority
religions does not suggest that the state removes restrictions on minority religions,
only that they are equal with other religions.

Keywords
compliance gaps, constitutional promises, religious discrimination, religious equality,
religious freedom, religious minorities

Corresponding author:
Roger Finke, Department of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University, 211 Oswald Tower, University Park,
PA 16802, USA.
Email: rfinke@psu.edu
302 Social Compass 68(3)

Résumé
Les recherches sur la liberté de religion ont révélé un vaste fossé entre les promesses
constitutionnelles et les pratiques des États, les promesses constitutionnelles étant un
mauvais indicateur du soutien de l’État à la liberté de religion. Cette recherche change la
perspective en passant de la liberté religieuse à l’égalité religieuse. Nous suggérons que les
promesses constitutionnelles d’égalité religieuse sont associées à une moindre discrimination
à l’encontre des religions minoritaires et nous étudions les relations qu’entretiennent la
gouvernance et les promesses d’égalité religieuse avec la discrimination religieuse. Nous
constatons que les promesses d’égalité religieuse sont associées à moins de discrimination.
En explorant les interactions entre les promesses d’égalité et nos mesures de gouvernance,
nous constatons que les promesses constitutionnelles d’égalité religieuse effacent largement
les différences de discrimination religieuse entre les pays avec et sans élections libres et
un système judiciaire indépendant. Pourtant, la réduction de la discrimination à l’égard des
religions minoritaires ne signifie pas que l’État supprime les restrictions imposées à ces
dernières, mais seulement qu’elles sont égales aux autres religions.

Mots-clés
discrimination religieuse, écarts de conformité, égalité religieuse, liberté religieuse,
minorités religieuses, promesses constitutionnelles

By design, national constitutions are ‘precommitment devices’ serving to constrain the

actions of future politicians and the population as a whole. In the ideal, they commit a
nation to specific political structures and processes, as well as specific rights for the
citizenry and all humans (Ginsburg et al., 2008). Past research has found in the areas of
political structure and process, the de jure and de facto constitutional law are closely
related. In the area of human rights, however, the relationship between de jure and de
facto constitutional law is far more contested (Chilton and Versteeg, 2016; Elkins et al.,
2009: 53).
The divergence between promise and practice is especially striking in the area of
religion. Past research has documented the vast chasm between constitutional promises
of religious freedom and the state’s support of these freedoms. Although national
constitutions offer promises of religious freedom in more than 90% of all countries,
recent data collections have documented states routinely deny these freedoms (Fox,
2016; Grim and Finke, 2011; Pew Research Center, 2014). The same collections have
shown the chasm between promise and practice has widened over the past few decades.
Free elections, an independent judiciary and reduced societal discrimination against
religion are associated with a reduced chasm; yet, the gap between the state’s constitutional
promises of religious freedom and the actual practices remains (Mataic and Finke, 2018).
Past research on the gap between the state’s promises and practices, however, has
been limited in a couple key areas. First, previous studies have focused on all religions
in a nation. Yet, past research is clear that the state imposes the most severe restrictions
and discriminatory actions against minority religions. We address this limitation by
looking at constitutional promises and the state’s actions against minority religions.
Second, constitutional promises of religious freedom, which often draw on major
Finke and Mataic: Reconciling state promises and practices 303

international documents, are so common there is a little variation to explain. Rather than
looking at constitutional assurances of religious freedom, we look at assurances of
equality (Elkins et al., 2020). Along with offering more variation, promises of equality
are of great concern for religious minorities that might not receive the freedoms granted
to majority religions.
In short, this research focuses on constitutional promises of religious equality and the
relationship these promises hold to the treatment of minority religions. Building on the
general findings of past research, we address the following three research questions:
first, do constitutional clauses on religious equality reduce state discrimination against
minority religions? Second, does the relationship between the promise and practice of
religious equality vary for a religious minority’s institutions and for their individual
members? Finally, how does the political and social context of a nation influence the
state’s ability and desire to support constitutional clauses on religious equality?
Relying on data from the Religion and State collection (Fox, 2020), the Comparative
Constitutions Project (Elkins et al., 2020) and many other cross-national collections, we
find that unlike promises of religious freedom, constitutional promises of religious
equality are associated with reduced discrimination against religious minorities. The
relationship, however, is only significant for non-institutional forms of discrimination. In
addition, we find that promises of equality hold important interactions with our
governance measures when predicting reduced discrimination. Our findings suggest
constitutional promises serve to compensate for countries lacking free elections or an
independent judiciary.

Promise versus practice

Recent research on government restrictions on religion has reached a virtual consensus
in several areas directly relevant to our research. First, both qualitative and quantitative
research agree minority religious institutions and their members face the brunt of
government restrictions, discrimination, and persecution. Case studies from across
the globe offer detailed reviews of the discrimination faced by specific minorities
within specific countries; the quantitative collections have documented the
discrimination is both globally pervasive and temporally persistent (Fox, 2016; Grim
and Finke, 2011; Koesel, 2014; Richardson, 2004; Sarkissian, 2015). Likewise, UN
documents, government reports, and advocacy groups confirm religious minorities
are the most frequent targets for discriminatory laws, police actions, and inequitable
treatment by a host of government entities.1 Although governments place restrictions
on all religions, minority religions typically face the harshest and most hostile
discrimination from the state.
Another area of consensus is government restrictions on religion are increasing.
When the Pew Research Center summarized a decade of changes in government
restrictions on religion from 2007 to 2017, they reported increases in all four of the
major categories they studied, including a 44% increase in government limits on
religious activities and dress (Lipka and Majumdar, 2019). Summarizing the 25-year
span of the Religion and State collection (1990–2014), Fox and Finke (2020) report that
17 of 19 measures for institutional discrimination against minority religions increased
304 Social Compass 68(3)

and 10 of the increases were statistically significant. Yet, despite this increase in
government restrictions on religions over the past few decades, constitutional promises
of religious freedom remained high and even showed a slight increase (Mataic and
Finke, 2020). Consequently, the gap between what constitutions promise and what
governments practice continues to grow.
A third key finding is the motives for states discriminating against minority religions
vary, with some minority religions facing far more discrimination than others. Perhaps, the
most obvious motive is the dominant religions, with close ties to the state, perceive minority
religions as religious competitors (Finke, 2013; Finke et al., 2017; Gill, 2008; Stark and
Finke, 2000). For this reason, religious movements with high membership commitment
and supporting active outreach efforts, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, face increased
state monitoring, restrictions, and persecution.2 However, minority religions can pose more
than a religious threat. For some groups, religion is interwoven with ethnicity and language
posing a challenge to the dominant culture. Still other groups can pose a direct threat to the
state through political activity or by perceptions they are a security risk (Cesari, 2013;
Chebel d’Appollonia, 2015; Finke and Harris, 2011; Fox et al., 2019; Lausten and Wæver,
2003; Wald et al., 2005). Finally, religious minorities can threaten secular institutions and
ideologies. This is most evident in communist and former communist nations, but a milder
version of this political secularism holds that the state should confine religion to the private
realm (Fox, 2015; Kuru, 2009; Yang, 2012). For each of these motives, the research has
found that even small minority groups, such as Falun Gong in China (Richardson and
Edelman, 2004) or the ‘new heretic’ sects in France (Palmer, 2011; Wright and Palmer,
2016), can pose a threat resulting in state action.
Finally, although the text of constitutional promises typically focuses on individual
rights, recent research has demonstrated the importance of institutional rights (Zhang,
2020). There is an emerging awareness that the religious rights of individuals often
depend on the rights of institutions. For example, the individual’s right of religious
practice is dependent on the rights of the religious institutions making this practice
possible. Abrahamic religions, in particular, consider public worship and prayer with a
local gathering of fellow members an essential requirement for routine religious practice
and for special rites during the life-course. The gatherings, however, are dependent on
the rights of religious institutions.
These areas of consensus highlight the importance of studying minority religions and
understanding the growing gap between constitutional promises and actual state practices.
The diverse motives suggest the factors explaining religious discrimination also will be
diverse and often interrelated. Finally, recent research suggests it is important to
distinguish between discrimination enacted against the institutions and the membership
of the minority religions. Building on these insights, we return to our initial questions:
when do constitutional clauses on religious equality reduce discrimination against
minority religions and what conditions determine the strength of this relationship?

When do constitutions matter?

When studying constitutional clauses on human rights, Keith et al. (2009) borrowed
from James Madison to ask the question: ‘Is the law a mere parchment barrier to human
Finke and Mataic: Reconciling state promises and practices 305

rights abuse?’ (2009: 644). Like other research trying to understand the shortfall of
constitutional promises, they noted the importance of civil war, international war,
democracy, and the gross national product (GNP) of the nation. Yet, they cautiously
concluded constitutions have the ‘potential to reduce a nation’s level of state terror
substantially’ and noted constitutions were easier to change than building an effective
democracy or increasing wealth. We pose a similar question, but we limit our attention
to the relationships between constitutional promises granted to religious minorities and
the actual discrimination they face.
Previous work on the constitutional rights of religious groups and individuals has
focused on promises of religious freedom. Relying on three different data collections,
this research has found little evidence that constitutional assurances of religious freedoms
delivered the freedoms promised. The collection assembled by the Association of
Religion Data Archives found of the 130 nations promising religious freedoms in their
constitution, 86% had at least one law restricting religious freedoms and 38% had four or
more such laws (Grim and Finke, 2011). The Pew collection found 80% of all nations
had constitutional clauses or basic laws that ‘qualify or substantially contradict the
concept of “religious freedom”’.3 In a more detailed analysis of the Religion and State
collection, Jonathan Fox and Deborah Flores (2009) concluded that constitutional clauses
on religion ‘have at best a limited impact on government behavior . . . [and] clauses
protecting religious freedom have no predictive value for levels of religious discrimination’
(2009: 1499). The conclusions seemed to suggest the constitutional promises were a
‘mere parchment barrier’ that offered de jure promises with a few de facto outcomes.
Later research, attempting to explain the size of the ‘compliance gap’ between the
promise and practice of religious freedom, concluded governance and societal restrictions
contributed to the gap (Mataic and Finke, 2020). The governance measures of ‘free
elections’ and ‘independent judiciary’ were both significant predictors in explaining a
reduced gap between the state’s ‘religious freedom commitment and violations’ for all
religions. In contrast, the societal restrictions, which often reflect religious and cultural
competition, were significant predictors of an increased gap for minority religions.
Unlike research attempting to explain the compliance gap for other human rights
(Cingranelli and Richards, 2010; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988), however, economic
measures did not help to explain the ‘compliance gap’ between the promise and practice
of religious freedom (Mataic and Finke, 2020).
A significant limitation of the past research on constitutional promises of religious
freedom is that the vast majority of nations offer assurances of religious freedom. We
address this concern by looking at constitutional promises of religious equality. This
offers two important advantages. First, there is far more variation, with 74% of national
constitutions offering a promise of equality compared to more than 90% offering a
promise of religious freedom. Second, constitutional promises of equality address an
issue that is a central concern for religious minorities. As reviewed earlier, minority
religions often face restrictions and persecution not imposed on other religions.
Constitutions frequently group promises of religious equality with promises of equal
legal protections for other human rights. For instance, in Canada, the constitution states,
‘every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination, in particular, without
306 Social Compass 68(3)

discrimination based on . . . religion . . .’ (Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP),

2020). In turn, the Religion and State Project coded Canada as having no state restrictions
targeting religious minorities. Other countries from various regions are similar, such as
South Korea, Estonia, Cameroon, and Ecuador.
Relying on this new measure and building on the previous research, we offer a series
of predictions. First, we propose because religious equality is included in a few
international documents, nations feel less pressure to include such clauses in their
constitutions. The major international documents so often mimicked in national
constitutions give little attention to religious equality. Whereas, religious freedom was
prominently included in the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, neither document mentions
religious equality. Because the average age of a national constitution is 19 years (Elkins
et al., 2009: 2), both of these influential international documents have been important in
shaping the language used in constitutions. Indeed, national constitutions often borrow
the wording used in these documents.
In contrast to religious freedom, we suggest that because past documents and
international pressures have less influence on adopting constitutional clauses on religious
equity, the clauses will reflect a stronger commitment to the equality promised. Moreover,
promises of equity are easier to enact. Religious equality does not require the lifting of
all restrictions and the granting of freedoms, it promises the equal treatment of all
religions:

H1. Nations with constitutional clauses promising religious equality will have fewer
restrictions discriminating against religious minorities.

However, we expect the strength of this relationship to vary for institutions and
individuals. Previous research on human rights suggests that when constitutions grant
rights to organizations, such as unions, religions, and other associations, the organizations
become effective agents for ensuring the state supports these rights (Chilton and Versteeg,
2016). Chilton and Veersteeg argue that when organizations are given the ‘incentives and
means’ to protect their own rights, they will be effective in doing so.
We propose, however, that this is often not the case for religious minority institutions.
Whereas, unions and many human rights organizations organize at the national and
international level to support specific rights related to equality or quality of life, religious
minorities typically focus more on local services and missions. Often lacking in size,
power, and an effective organizational structure, the institutions of religious minorities
are unable to mobilize support for their own equality. When applied to Chilton and
Veersteeg’s argument earlier, the institutions of religious minorities lack the ‘means’ for
advocating effectively for greater equality even when they have the ‘incentives’ to do so.
Moreover, the religion rights granted in constitutions and international documents,
like most human rights, focus on individuals. For example, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights declares that ‘. . . the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in
the equal rights of men and women . . .’.4 Indeed, a legal scholar recently argued that in
Finke and Mataic: Reconciling state promises and practices 307

the area of religion ‘the supremacy of individual rights to group right ought to be the
interpretation of international law’ (Scolnicov, 2011: 2).
Numerous cases illustrate how the constitutional emphasis on the rights of individuals
rather than institutions is associated with different levels of discrimination against
religious minorities. For example, the Croatian constitution states, ‘everyone in the
Republic of Croatia shall enjoy rights and freedoms, regardless of . . . religion . . .’
(CCP, 2020). However, this emphasis on ‘everyone’ seems to apply only to individuals.
The state’s discrimination against individuals was nearly absent (a score of one for non-
institutions) but the state’s discrimination against the institutions of minority religions
was high (a score of 10).5
Because constitutions give greater attention to individual rights and because religious
minorities often lack effective means for defending their institutions, we expect the
relationship between promised equality and equal treatment to vary for institutions and
individuals:

H2. The relationship between constitutional promises of religious equality and reduced
discrimination will be stronger for the individual members of religious minorities
than for their institutions.

Understanding the relationship between promises of equality and actual discrimination

requires we also consider how the nation is governed. Research has often highlighted
two components of democracy that are important for reducing discrimination and
repression: an independent judicial system and open and free elections (Finke and
Martin, 2014; Hill and Jones, 2014). The independent judicial system more effectively
protects constitutional rights of minorities and holds other government branches more
accountable. The open and free elections serve to make governments more responsive to
the population as a whole:

H3. Both an independent judiciary and free and open elections will reduce the level of
state discrimination against religious minorities.

When we test the hypotheses earlier, we will explore how each of these governance
structures interacts with constitutional promises of equality and subsequent relationship
with levels of state discrimination.
Finally, our analysis will include other measures accounting for the larger social,
political, and economic context of a country. Past research has consistently shown non-
state actors as well as state actors have been active agents in enacting discrimination
against religious minorities (Fox, 2020; Grim and Finke, 2011). Thus, we will include a
measure of societal discrimination. Furthermore, we will add several measures that have
been predictors of support for multiple human rights: government effectiveness, gross
domestic product (GDP), a communist government and global region (Cole, 2016;
Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Poe and Tate, 1994). Each of these measures will be
included as controls in our final models.
308 Social Compass 68(3)

Data and methods

Our final analyses will include all nations with a constitution in 2013, a population of
500,000 or more, and no missing data (see Table 1 for summary statistics and brief
descriptions of each variable), resulting in 153 countries. The core of our analyses
requires multiple measures of state discrimination against religious minorities and a
measure for constitutional promises of religious equality. As reviewed below, we rely on
the Religion and State Project (RAS) for the first set of measures on discrimination and
on the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) for the measure on promised equality.
In addition, we turn to multiple other cross-national datasets for our remaining variables.

Dependent variables. We use the RAS index for ‘Religious Discrimination Against
Religious Minorities’ to measure our dependent variables (Fox, 2020). The index consists
of 36 items measuring state restrictions placed on the religious institutions and practices
of minorities that are not placed on the majority religion. Each item ranges from 0 (no
restrictions) to 3 (the religious activity is prohibited or the government engages in a
severe form of this activity). Hence, higher index values indicate increased levels of
discrimination.6
To test hypothesis 2, however, we divide the 36-item index into two distinct indexes.
One measures restrictions targeting minority institutions and the second measures non-
institutional restrictions typically targeting the members of the minority group. The
Institutional Index is composed of 19 items, which restrict the group’s ability to worship
and gather or to operate openly. The 17 items included in the Non-Institutional Index
place requirements (e.g. forced observance of religious laws of another group) or
restrictions (e.g. dress, practicing religious rites, or access to worship materials) on the
members of minority religions. As with the full index, each item in these two sub-indexes
ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values denoting more discrimination. We downloaded the
data from the Association of Religion Data Archives (www.theARDA.com).

Independent variables. Testing our hypotheses, as well as controlling for possible

competing arguments, requires us to draw on measures from diverse cross-national
sources. We begin with the measure central to our research questions: constitutional
promises of religious equality.
Constitutional promises of religious equality. We draw our binary measure for a
constitutional promise of religious equality from CCP (Elkins et al., 2020).7 The CCP
has collected data on written constitutions for most independent states since 1789 and
has coded the form and content of each document. Our measure will be limited to active
constitutions. We use their coding of whether the constitution ever makes a statement
about religious equality. The coding options were either ‘not present’ or ‘yes, present’.
The final breakdown of promises resulted in 40 countries (26%) without promises of
religious equality compared to 113 countries (74%) with promises.
Governance structure.  Consistent with past research on religious restrictions, we also
include two measures of governance structure: the presence of an independent judiciary
as well as free and open elections. These data are from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI)
Human Rights Data project (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). There are three possible
 Table 1.  Summary statistics and descriptions.

Mean Std. dev. Min Max Description

Total discrimination 14.2 16.0 0 80 Total discrimination of religious minorities
Institutional discrimination 8.18 9.07 0 44 Institutional discrimination of religious minorities
Non-institutional discrimination 6.07 7.85 0 39 Non-institutional discrimination of religious minorities
Promises of equality 0.74 0.44 0 1 Constitutional promises of religious equality (0 = no promises, 1 = promises)
Free elections 1.14 0.76 0 2 Free and open elections (0 = do not exist, 2 = exist in law and practice)
Independent judiciary 0.81 0.83 0 2 Independent judiciary (0 = not independent, 2 = generally independent)
Societal discrimination 8.79 10.5 0 62 Societal discrimination of religious minorities
Log GDP 8.59 1.51 5.75 12.1 Log of GDP in 2014
Communism 0.26 0.44 0 1 Whether a government is/was communist
Govt. effectiveness −0.04 0.99 −2.07 2.18 Quality of government in implementing and maintaining policies
GDP: gross domestic product.
Note: Dependent variables are italicized. There are 153 countries in our sample. Region distribution: Western Democracies (22), Former USSR (26), Asia (23),
Middle East and North Africa (17), Sub-Saharan Africa (43), Latin America (22).

309
310 Social Compass 68(3)

coding categories for each measure. Free and open elections include values ranging
from ‘0’, where open elections do not exist, to a ‘2’, where they exist in both law and
practice. Independent judiciary is similar, ranging from ‘0’, not independent, to a ‘2’,
where judiciaries are generally independent.
Societal discrimination. The societal discrimination index is from the RAS project,
where 27 items are used to measure non-state discrimination targeting religious
minorities (see Fox et al., 2018, for a detailed overview). The items within the index
address how minority religious groups are restricted in practice by non-state actors, such
as prevention of religious practice and instances of vandalism, attacks and other forms of
discrimination. Higher scores correspond with a greater level of societal discrimination.
Economic development.  To control for the level of economic development, we utilize
the log of each country’s GDP in current US dollars as reported by the World Bank
(2017). Previous research has found that support for human rights holds a strong positive
relationship with improved economic development (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004).
Communism. Past research routinely has found nations with a current or prior
communist government place more restrictions on religious minorities (Finke et al.,
2017). Drawing on the InfoPlease (2017) database, we identified whether a state had
a communist government at any time. This measure is a binary coding of whether a
country had a communist government, even if it is currently not active.
Governmental effectiveness. Past research on human rights, including research on
religious freedoms, has suggested government effectiveness is essential for supporting
government policies and constitutional promises (Englehart, 2009). We use the World
Bank’s (2014) measure of government effectiveness. The final scores ranged from −2.07
to 2.18, with higher scores indicating more effective governments.
Global region. Although nations in all global regions discriminate against religious
minorities, some regions have significantly higher levels of restrictions (Fox, 2008; Grim
and Finke, 2011; Mataic, 2018). We use a categorical measure of global regions as a
control. The regions were compiled as part of the RAS and include the following: Asia,
Former USSR, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and
Western Democracies.

Results
Our analyses proceed in three steps. First, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
to test the relationship between constitutional promises of religious equality and the full
index of discrimination against minority religions (Total Discrimination Index; Table 2).
This model also will include our governance measures and other measures of interest.
Together, they provide an initial test of Hypotheses 1 and 3.
Second, we utilize two additional regression models to test whether this relationship
holds for institutional and non-institutional discrimination against minority religions.
Rather than presenting the results separately, we compile these first three models (Total
Discrimination, Institutional Discrimination, and Non-Institutional Discrimination) into
a figure demonstrating the estimates and ranges for each of the independent variables
(Figure 1). This allows for a concise comparison and a visual presentation of the
Finke and Mataic: Reconciling state promises and practices 311

Table 2.  Regression modeling the association between restrictions on religious minorities in
2014 (Total Discrimination Index).

Coef. Std. err.

Promises of equality −4.57* 2.07
Free and open elections −8.11*** 1.56
Independent judiciary −3.10 1.65
Societal discrimination of 0.38*** 0.10
religious groups
Log of GDP 1.57 1.26
Communism 7.64* 3.11
Government effectiveness −0.91 2.02
Regiona  
Former USSR −2.93 4.55
Asia 2.62 4.13
Middle East and North Africa 6.98 4.29
Sub-Saharan Africa −9.35 4.80
Latin America −5.18 4.16
Constant −13.25 12.88
Observations 153  
GDP: gross domestic product; USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
a
Western Democracies are the reference category.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

relationships the three discrimination indexes hold with constitutional promises of

equality, governance measures, and our other measures of interest.
Finally, we conduct models with interactions between constitutional promises of
religious equality and the governance measures of free elections and an independent
judiciary. Rather than presenting the full results, we include two figures (Figures 2 and
3) which display how promises of equality interact with each governance measure to
predict the level of non-institutional discrimination against religious minorities. The
results shown in Figures 2 and 3 control for all of the variables from Figure 1 except for
the global region.8

Promises of equality and discrimination

Table 2 offers an initial test of Hypothesis 1. When using our index for all discrimination
against religious minorities, a constitutional promise of religious equality is a significant
predictor of reduced discrimination (coef. = −4.57, p = .029). This finding holds even
when we account for the regions of the globe. Table 2 offers partial support for Hypothesis
3. The coefficient for free and open elections is highly significant (coef. = −8.11, p <
.001), but the coefficient for an independent judiciary is not (coef. = −3.10, p = .063).
The remaining findings largely support past findings on religious discrimination. Societal
discrimination and a current or former communist government both significantly increase
the state’s discrimination against religious minorities (p < .000 and p = .015,
312 Social Compass 68(3)

Figure 1.  Predicting discrimination of religious minorities.

respectively). Also supportive of past research, increased GDP and government

effectiveness do not reduce discrimination despite their strong relationships with other
human rights.

Institutional versus non-institutional discrimination

Hypothesis 2, however, proposed the relationship between religious equality and
reduced discrimination existed for the individual members of religious minorities
rather than for their institutions. The results testing this hypothesis are presented in
Figure 1. This figure visually presents the results from Table 2, as well as the results
for the Institutional and Non-Institutional Indexes of discrimination. The independent
variables are listed along the y-axis, corresponding with the regression coefficients and
the range of confidence intervals. When reading Figure 1, the hollowed shapes
correspond with the estimated coefficients while the bars represent the confidence
intervals at the 95% level. Coefficients are significant when the bar does not cross the
vertical, dashed line.9 Effectively, Figure 1 presents the range of predicted coefficients
(confidence interval), or the predicted direction and strength, of each variable. In the
case of promises of equality, the predicted range is consistently negative for both the
Total Discrimination Index as well as the Non-institutional Index. Conversely, the
results for the Institutional Index are predicted to fall somewhere between –4.6 and
0.2. Thus, we cannot be confident promises of equality reduce the predicted level of
restrictions for religious minorities.
Finke and Mataic: Reconciling state promises and practices 313

Figure 2.  Predicted level non-institutional discrimination of religious minorities. By

constitutional promises of religious equality interacted with free and open elections.

Our results are therefore supportive of Hypothesis 2 when we separate the full
discrimination index into Institutional and Non-Institutional indexes. The relationship
between promises of equality and the level of restrictions directed at members of a
religious minority are consistently negative, with an expected decrease of about 2.4
points in countries with promises of equality when accounting for other country
characteristics (p = .022). As stated earlier, the predicted coefficient, or relationship,
between promises of equality and Institutional discrimination is not significant (p =
.077). The remaining findings are similar to those shown in Table 2. Supportive of
Hypothesis 3, free and open elections are a significant negative predictor for all three
indexes and the independent judiciary does have a significant, negative relationship for
non-institutional discrimination. Societal discrimination remains a strong predictor of
increased state discrimination for all three indexes, but current and former communist
governments fail to reach significance for the Non-Institutional Index.

Promises of equality and government structure

Table 2 and Figure 1 demonstrate that constitutional promises of equality and a
nation’s governance, especially open and free elections, are strongly associated with
reduced discrimination against minority religions. We propose, however, that
understanding the relationship between constitutional promises and governance is
important. How effective are constitutional promises when free elections or an
314 Social Compass 68(3)

Figure 3.  Predicted level of non-institutional discrimination of religious minorities. By

constitutional promises of religious equality interacted with independent judiciary.

independent judiciary are lacking? In short, how do the two interact to predict levels
of discrimination? To assess these interactions, we conducted additional models
presented in Figures 2 and 3.10
The interaction plotted in Figure 2 contrasts the strong relationship between free
elections and reduced religious discrimination for nations with no promise of equality to
the largely absent relationship for nations with a promise of equality. The differences are
striking and highly significant. Whereas, nations with no free elections have a
discrimination score of 21 when there is no constitutional promise of equality, the score
plummets to 9 for nations when there are constitutional promises but without free
elections. A similar, though less drastic, difference also occurs for countries with a
limited free and open election system. By contrast, countries with open and free elections
have a low score in countries with and without constitutional promises of religious
equality. Even when free and open election is absent, constitutional promises of equality
are associated with significantly reduced levels of discrimination.
We found similar patterns when we looked at the interaction between promises of
religious equality and an independent judiciary (Figure 3). For nations with no promises
of equality, the absence of an independent judiciary results in a predicted index score of
14. For nations with a promise of equality, however, the score drops to 6. While not as
strong as the interaction between promises of equality and election structure, the figure
demonstrates the importance of constitutional promises when an independent judiciary is
not present.
Finke and Mataic: Reconciling state promises and practices 315

Both Figures 2 and 3 find even when governance protections are absent, the
constitutional promises of equality offer protections for the minority religions. Countries
without free and open elections or an independent judiciary hold high levels of religious
discrimination when constitutional promise of equality is absent. When a country makes
a promise of equality, however, the differences are essentially erased between countries
with and without these key governance structures.11 Thus, unlike promises of religious
freedom, promises of religious equality are associated with practices of equality even in
the absence of governance structures to monitor these promises. This pattern further
suggests there is a clear difference between constitutional promises of religious equality
and promises of religious freedom.

Discussion and conclusion

Despite clear and convincing evidence that constitutional promises of religious freedom
hold only a weak or no relationship with the state’s support of religious freedom, we find
constitutional promises of religious equality do matter. Analyzing data on 153 countries
with a population of more than 500,000 and supporting a written constitution, we find
promises of religious equality are associated with reduced levels of state discrimination
against religious minorities. We suggest that because major international documents on
human rights stress religious freedom, countries face more international pressure to
borrow or mimic clauses from these documents in their own constitution. In contrast,
clauses on religious equality are not included in these documents. We also noted equal
treatment is often easier to support. The RAS discrimination indexes are measures of
equal treatment: restrictions the state imposes only on minority religions.
We proposed, however, the relationship between the promise and practice of equality
for religious minorities would be greater for individual members than for the religious
institutions. The findings were supportive, with constitutional promises holding a
significant relationship with reduced non-institutional discrimination and an insignificant
relationship with institutional discrimination. We concede the differences between the
coefficients appear small, yet for Institutional discrimination, a relationship is not
significant, unlike for non-institutional discrimination.
We also found promises of equality have important interactions with our governance
measures. The interactions indicate promises of equality help compensate for the absence
of both free elections and an independent judicial system in reducing the predicted levels
of discrimination against religious minorities. Our findings demonstrate regardless of the
type of discrimination (Total, Institutional, and Non-Institutional), the relationships
between governance structures and higher levels of discrimination were largely absent
when the constitution held a promise of religious equality. In other words, constitutional
promises of equality effectively erased the differences between countries with or without
these key governance structures.
The remaining measures included in our models reinforce some important past
findings. First, societal discrimination against religious minorities often goes hand in
hand with state discrimination. Like other state actions toward religion, social pressures
can fuel discrimination against religious minorities. Second, nations with a current or
prior communist government place more restrictions on religious minorities. For many
316 Social Compass 68(3)

countries, the communist government is two decades removed, yet higher rates of
discrimination against religious minorities linger. Third, unlike other human rights, GDP
and government effectiveness do not hold a strong relationship with reduced
discrimination in the area of religion. Although the correlation between the rights of
religion and other human rights remains strong, important differences occur in their
sources of support.
When reviewed in tandem with existing research, our findings raise a series of
additional questions and issues. First, we know a little about the consequences of equal
treatment. Recent work has found that ‘state support of religion and discrimination
against minorities encourages terrorism from majority religious groups’ (Henne et al.,
2020) in Muslim majority countries. How is equality related to other forms of violence
and in countries that are not Muslim majority? Second, our findings reviewed
discrimination against all religious minorities, but previous research has found that the
level and type of discrimination varies by the religious minority (Fox, 2020; Fox et al.,
2019). How do the size, religious tradition, and historical legacy influence the
discrimination a minority faces? Third, as noted earlier, equal treatment does not always
ensure favorable treatment. Questions remain on the relationship between the equal
treatment of religions and the level of restrictions the state imposes on all religious
groups. Fourth, earlier we noted the varied motives for discriminating against minority
religions. Do some motives supersede constitutional promises more than others? For
example, do states use perceived security risk as a justification for increased
discrimination? Finally, why do the significant predictors of religious discrimination and
religious freedom differ from other human rights? This research established that
differences occur, but fails to address ‘why’ they occur.
Yet, our research has taken us one-step closer to addressing and understanding the
questions and issues just reviewed. We have found that constitutional promises of
religious equality are associated with less discrimination against religious minorities;
religious institutions benefit less from the promises than the institutions’ members; and
that promises of religious equality help compensate for the lack of governance structures
(free and open elections as well as an independent judiciary) that protect religious
minorities. In short, the constitutional promises of equality are far more than a ‘mere
parchment barrier’, even when considering other political and social conditions.

Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

ORCID iD
Roger FINKE https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6158-4869

Notes
  1. The US Department of State’s (2020) annual International Religious Freedom Reports offers
the most detailed reports by country. However, numerous other sources offer detailed examples:
Human Rights Watch (https://www.hrw.org/#), Forum 18 (http://www.forum18.org/), Amnesty
Finke and Mataic: Reconciling state promises and practices 317

International (https://www.amnesty.org/en/), and the United Nations’ special rapporteur (e.g.

Jahangir, 2005, 2007; Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2011).
  2. For example, Forum 18, a site that documents violations of Article 18 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights throughout Europe and central Asia, offered 909
reports of Jehovah’s Witnesses having their rights violated between May 2011 and May 2020.
Most of the reports involved multiple cases.
  3. Go to question 7 of the Pew collection on theARDA.com: http://www.thearda.com/Archive/
Files/Codebooks/GRELREST_CB.asp.
  4. Copied from https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ on 7 April 2020.
  5. The scores are taken from the Religion and State project used for our analysis (https://www.
thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/RAS3MIN.asp).
  6. For a complete list of all measures in RAS and a brief description of how the data were
coded, download the codebook at: http://www.thearda.com/ras/downloads/. The full data set
and codebook can be downloaded at: http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/
RAS3COMP.asp
  7. A review of the research design and options for downloading the data can be found at: https://
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/research-design/
  8. Global region was removed from these models for simplicity of presenting the predicted
level of non-institutional discrimination against religious minorities as a function of promises
and structure. The results with and without region were not substantially different, thus not
warranting the region control for this additional analysis.
 9. It is important to note that the vertical, dashed line is equivalent to zero, thus when an
estimated range crosses the line, the potential values could be either positive or negative
negating the ability to determine accurately the direction of a potential relationship.
10. For space consideration, we only present and discuss the results for discrimination against
non-institutions; however, we note the significant patterns also occur for both the Total
Discrimination Index and the Institutional Index.
11. The overlap of predicted levels of discrimination is most apparent for the interaction with
an independent judiciary (Figure 3), but the predicted difference for free and open elections
(Figure 2) also is minimized.

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Author biographies
Roger FINKE is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at the Pennsylvania
State University. He is the founder of the Association of Religion Data Archives (www.theARDA.
com), and co-author of The price of freedom denied (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
Address: Department of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University, 211 Oswald Tower, University
Park, PA 16802, USA.
Email: rfinke@psu.edu
Dane R MATAIC is an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Community Development at North
Dakota State University. His research focuses on the intersection of international conflict,
mobilization, and social inequalities. Broadly he applies organizational and community theories to
address topics such as the spread of governmental policies that regulate religious organizations and
the spread of religious bias and discrimination.
Address: Sociology and Anthropology Department, North Dakota State University, Minard Hall
428, Fargo, ND 58102, USA.
Email: dane.mataic@ndsu.edu