Alan Patten Hegel

Glontoi Ionut-Alexandru RISE II , Gr 1

By focusing on Sittlichkeit, or ethical life, in Hegel's mature period (1817-31), Alan Patten offers an extensive interpretation of Hegelian freedom as self-actualization rather than as the limited fulfillment of social and political roles. Patten admits that there are obvious difficulties in seeing freedom at work in the Sittlichkeit thesis. For instance, Hegel attributes the individual's morality to the duties imposed on him by his social station (Stand). Increasing the difficulty in Patten's case for individual freedom, Hegel argues at length in the Philosophy of Right that the ethical norms that guide practical reason consist in the duties and virtues of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of three central institutions: the family, civil society, and the state. Patten sees the Sittlichkeit thesis as at once attractive and unsettling. Its attraction lies in its starting point of cultural "customs," which allows Hegel to claim a universal ethics--tacitly and tangibly. The objections to Sittlichkeit are more numerous: for example, it is "underdeterminate" because institutions cannot address the Sartrean dilemma of making choices in ambivalent circumstances. On a larger basis, it is underdeterminate because "the fact of pluralism" prevalent in modern socie-ties muddies Sittlichkeit's directives for individual practical reason. Additionally, Patten sees aspects of Hegel's thesis as unacceptably conservative because it presupposes that modern social institutions are not seriously illegitimate or unjust. Finally, Hegel's notion of freedom as determined through cultural acts stands in opposition to the contemporary definitions as freedom of choice. Patten's book is an engaging attempt to overcome these objections and to extend the boundaries of the usual understanding of Hegelian freedom. Having admitted the difficulties, Patten pursues the intersection of freedom and Sittlichkeit. Briefly, Hegel sees spirit as freedom, and Patten reminds us that for Hegel, "Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) is the idea of freedom." Thus, freedom is a central value in Hegel's system. With freedom at the center of the Hegelian project, Patten compares his interpretation of Hegel's idea of freedom--what he calls a civic humanist variant of self-actualization--against several better known views: the conventionalist, metaphysical, and historicist readings. After noting surface similarities between the Hegelian and conventionalist views, Patten disqualifies the conventionalist view because of its lack of acknowledgment of a rational basis in societal practices and institutions. The metaphysical and historicist readings prove to be more compatible with Patten's civic humanist reading. Developing the civic humanist view of rational self-determination, Patten cites Hegel's notion of freedom as subjective and objective, the two dimensions of concrete or absolute freedom. These two aspects of freedom merge in social practice: the subject enjoys objective freedom when his determinations contribute to the community, which fosters and protects subjective freedom. Social institutions, such as property and contract, mediate and sustain mutual

recognition. (Concerning the family, Patten adds that familial affections and sentiments are not directly generalizable to civil society and the state. In all three institutions, however, Hegel's free agents are not only persons and subjects but members.) For Patten, Hegel's basic claim about modern Sittlichkeit is that "it alone provides the dispositions that make possible a social world hospitable to subjective freedom" (p. 37). Patten also sees a more extensive type of Hegelian freedom as rational self-determination, citing an important tension between freedom and authority in Hegel's work. Sittlichkeit is not the blind following of authority. If one follows cultural instructions instead of consulting one's own conscience, one may hit on the right results (for example, patriotism and good citizenship), but this cannot be said to be free or self-determining. Obedience is reconcilable with freedom only when it is grounded in the rational insight of an autonomous agent. Patten also, and somewhat surprisingly, compares Hegel's view of freedom to that of Kant, although there are admitted differences. Kant seeks formal principles whereas Hegel develops a richer, more concrete account of the ends and duties prescribed by reason in the ethical life and customary morality that is Sittlichkeit. Hegel's difference from Kant is also apparent when Hegel attributes an ethical significance to various emotions and feelings, such as love and patriotism. Patten, however, sees that freedom for both thinkers involves autonomous agency, that is, abstracting from one's contingently given desires and inclinations and acting on thought and reason alone. In addition to examining the reciprocity of morality and freedom in Kant and Hegel, Patten devotes a chapter each to Hegel's philosophy of right (Recht) in contrast to social contract theory, and Hegel's justification of private property as Recht, which mediates mutual recognition. Patten concludes that by insisting on the need for a rational reconciliation to modern Sittlichkeit, Hegel recognized the problem of indeterminacy threatening his account of freedom. The social institutions of the family, state, and civil society represent the minimal self-sufficient form of social order hospitable to human subjectivity. In Patten's well-argued civic humanist reading, the subjective and objective elements of Hegel's concrete freedom are fostered and sustained by this social order in a stable, serf-perpetuating way .