ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP AND RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG, PETITIONERS, VS. and, not remotely, even their jobs.
and, not remotely, even their jobs. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity of the
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS SIMEON A. DATUMANONG AND THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Sections 1 and 15 of Article X mandate the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. R.A. 6734 (“An Act Providing for An Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) was enacted and signed into law on 1
August 1989. The law called for the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces and cities. Only
four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). E.O. 426, in accordance with R.A. 6734, was issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on 12 October 1990, entitled “Placing the Control and
Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and
for other purposes.” (created DPWH-ARMM) D.O. 119, 9 years later, on 20 May 1999, was
issued by then DPWH Sec. Vigilar which created the Marawi SubDistrict Engineering Office
which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the
DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999, almost 2 years
later, on 17 January 2001, was approved and signed into law by President Joseph E. Estrada.
(An Act Establishing An Engineering District In The First District Of The Province Of Lanao
Del Sur and Appropriating Funds therefor) R.A. 9054 was later passed by the Congress,
entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act
Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.” Like its
forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government. It was ratified
in a plebiscite held on 14 August 2001. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi also
voted to join ARMM on the same date. R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to
as the ARMM Organic Acts. Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang in their capacity as
OIC and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of the
DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur addressed a petition to then DPWH Secretary Datumanong,
seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No action,
however, was taken on the petition. Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang then filed
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction seeking the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside D.O.
119 (2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999
and releasing funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to
the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH; and
(3) to compel the Secretary of DBM to release all funds for public works projects intended for
Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering
District in Lanao del Sur only; and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-
ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects
within its jurisdictional area.
ISSUES:
1) Whether there is a justiciable controversy - YES
2) Whether the petitioners have legal standing - YES
3) Whether RA 8999 and DO 119 are constitutional and valid - NO
RULING:
1) JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the
scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty. In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive
department on the ground that they contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy.
2) LEGAL STANDING Both Disomangcop as Engineer IV/Officer-in-Charge and
Dimalotang as Engineer II of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur are charged with the duty and
responsibility of supervising and implementing all public works projects to be undertaken and
being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction. The creation of the
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office (D.O. 119) and the creation of First Engineering
District of Lanao del Sur (R.A. 8999) will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of
the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed
with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao
del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties
Autonomous Regional Government. The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the
enactments subject of the instant case.
3) On the Constitutionality Of R.A. 8999 And D.O. 119 A) R.A. 8999 NEVER BECAME
OPERATIVE AND WAS SUPERSEDED OR REPEALED BY A SUBSEQUENT
ENACTMENT. The ARMM Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy
affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary
statute, such as R.A. 8999 because it has to be submitted to a plebiscite. R.A. 6074, as
implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM to the
Regional Government. R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. Absent approval of
the people of the ARMM (thru plebiscite) R.A. 8999 has not even become operative. R.A.
8999 was also repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054. Where a statute of later date clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect. R.A. 9054 advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by
detailing the powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one
of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however,
ventures to reestablish the National Government’s jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in
Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter
law’s objective. Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both
ARMM Organic Acts, R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054. It contravenes true decentralization which is
the essence of regional autonomy. Regional Autonomy Under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.These cultures, as a matter of
right, must be allowed to flourish. Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness
of the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities.
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people
of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central government.
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. Decentralization is a decision by the
central government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or functionally
defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational
units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to delegate
certain authority to more local governments. Decentralization comes in two forms: A)
Deconcentration - administrative in nature, transfer of functions or the delegation of authority
and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices B) Devolution -
political decentralization, or the transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the
performance of certain functions from the central government to local government units, more
liberal since there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities grant greater autonomy
to local government units
In in Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, the creation of autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these
regions.”[ Article V of R.A. 6734 which enumerates the powers of the ARG, states: Except
for the areas of executive power mentioned therein, all other such areas shall be exercised by
the Autonomous Regional Government (“ARG”) of the ARMM. Programs relative to
infrastructure facilities, health, education, women in development, agricultural extension and
watershed management do not fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the abovequoted
provision of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that all these spheres of executive
responsibility have been transferred to the ARG. E.O. 426 which was issued to implement the
provisions of the first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6734 officially devolved the powers and
functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government and the
intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the national government to the
autonomous government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy. The Congress, itself
through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the administrative and fiscal management of
public works and funds for public works to the ARG. With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom
is taken away, and the National Government takes control again. The hands, once more, of the
autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up. The challenged law creates an office with
functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the
DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. The continued enforcement of
R.A. 8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of
powers which have previously been handed over. It bears stressing that national laws are
subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure the autonomy of
autonomous regions. Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states: Sec. 25. The State
shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. B) DEPARTMENT ORDER 119 WAS
ALSO RENDERED FUNCTUS OFFICIO D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. E.O. 426 sought to implement
the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the
same powers, is a duplication of the DPWHARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del
Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers
which have been previously devolved under the said executive order. Further, in its repealing
clause, R.A. 9054 states that “all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other
issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.” With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it
necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic
Acts. CONCLUSION a) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are GRANTED. The repeal of
R.A. 8999 and the functus officio state of D.O. 119 provide the necessary basis for the grant
of the sought by the petitioners. b) The issuance of a writ of mandamus is DENIED. There is
no basis to compel respondent DBM Secretary to release funds appropriated for public works
projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to allow the DPWH-ARMM, First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public works projects within its
jurisdictional area. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 clearly provides that “(f)unds for
infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the central government or national
government shall only be appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works Act”
passed by the Regional Assembly. There is no showing that such Regional Assembly Public
Works Act has been enacted.
BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810.
September 29, 2004]
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting
petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section
8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the
maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be
subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00
per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its
permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to
Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging
that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV
operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No.
xxx
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC
exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
xxx
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general
welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of
crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The
physical realities of constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of
regulation over CATV operators.
xxx
But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain
Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized
limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of
existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the
exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
JUDGE DADOLE VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
DOCTRINE: The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of
the President’s supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any
of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive
therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-
conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it
violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and
legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
FACTS: In 1986, petitioners as RTC and MTC judges stationed in Mandaue City received a
monthly allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to the yearly appropriation ordinance. Eventually,
in 1991, it was increased to P1,500 for each judge. However, on March 15, 1994, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC
55) which provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government
unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Acting on
the said DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein
petitioners in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus, petitioners filed with the
Office of the City Auditor a protest. However, it was treated as a motion for reconsideration
and was endorsed to the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the
COA Regional Office referred the said motion to their Head Office with recommendation that
the same should be denied. Accordingly, it was denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners filed
the instant petition. They argued, among others, that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the
local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit
can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed therein.  merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the
ISSUE: WON a local government unit may provide an allowance exceeding P 1,000.
HELD: YES. We recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local
government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by
Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides that: “Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. . . . “
The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or
she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s
supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her
alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts
within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the
President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the
principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations.
LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government
unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458,
par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55,
allows the grant of additional allowances to judges “when the finances of the city government
allow.” The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the
additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor the point that the finances
of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the
revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city
government with locally generated annual revenues of P40 million and expenditures of P35
million can afford to grant additional allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges
inasmuch as the finances of the city can afford it.
Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional
allowances of the judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown
of the expenses of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA
presented were the amounts expended, the locally generated revenues, the deficit, the surplus
and the IRA received each year. Aside from these items, no data or figures were presented to
show that Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just
because Mandaue City’s locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its
expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken
from the IRA and not from the city’s own revenue. 
The DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue City’s
appropriation ordinances, in accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327
of RA 7160[.] . . . Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance,
the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have
been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the
DBM did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of
Mandaue City and allowed the 90-day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of
the provisions in the said ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the
said city.
PIMENTEL vs. AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 132988 July 19, 2000
FACTS:
President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372 (Adoption of Economic Measures in
Government for Fiscal Year 1998). Section 1 provided that all government departments and
agencies, including state universities and colleges, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will replace total expenditures by at least 25% of
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items. Section 4 also provided that
pending assessment by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging
fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA to LGUs shall be withheld.
President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 by reducing to 5% the IRA to be
withheld.
ISSUES:
1. WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by
25% is valid
2. WON withholding a part of LGUs IRA is valid
HELD:
1. Yes. Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it “directs” LGUs to reduce expenditures by at least
25% is a valid exercise of the President’s power of general supervision over LGUs as it
is advisory only.  “Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.”
Under existing law, LGU, in addition to having administrative autonomy, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well.  Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released
by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities.  It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in
turn have to work within the constraints thereof.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals.  Significantly, the President, by constitutional
fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily
responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social
and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.  However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are
subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and
local government units."  The President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
"x x x In the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the
President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary
of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and
Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than
thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year   x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: 
(1) An unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;
(2) Consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
presidents of the various local leagues; and
(3) The corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management.  Furthermore, any adjustment in the
allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the
issuance and the implementation of AO 372.  At the very least, they did not even try to show
that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. 
Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local
governments.  Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to
reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by
the President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments.  It is intended
only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction
measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic
difficulties.  Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.  Being
President.  Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an
exercise of the power of control.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we
agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code
have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance  that  the 
directive  to  "identify and implement measures  x x x  that will reduce total expenditures  x x
x  by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and
does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy .  The
language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss
to a subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the
need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty.  Indeed, all concerned would do
well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. 
It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their
officials who do not follow such advice.  It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor
general's contention in regard to Section 1.
2. No. Section 4 is invalid because it interferes with local autonomy, particularly local fiscal
autonomy.  A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of
LGUs in the national internal revenue.  This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The
Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU
concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any
lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a
rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10
percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country.  Such
withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.   Although temporary, it is
equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily ."
Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter.   controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.
Any retention is prohibited.
Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local
governments to one of general supervision.  It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments.  x x x"
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.  In Mondano v. Silvosa,
the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with
that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government.  It was
emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent.  their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
The Court distinguished them as follows:
"x x x  In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.  If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.  Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than
that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the fundamental law and by statutes.  He cannot interfere with local governments,
so long as they act within the scope of their authority.   "Supervisory power, when contrasted
with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body," we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was
further delineated.  Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or
accomplishment of an act.  If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order
the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves.  On the
other hand, supervision does not cover such authority.  Supervising officials merely see to it
that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have
the discretion to modify or replace them.  If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules.  They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act.  They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that
the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos.  As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast,
the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people.  Their sovereign powers emanate
from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable.  By constitutional fiat, they are
subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised
within the sphere of their legitimate powers.  By the same token, the President may not
withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
Extent of Local Autonomy
Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments
is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.
In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."  The
grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments, x x x  not  x x x  to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local government units  x x x."  Constitution. And even if this case is already moot and academic because said provisions
Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the
purpose of enhancing self-government.
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments.  Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may
provide. The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was
explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. 
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,' and
'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but
only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous.  In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities.  According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency."
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions.  Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions.  The purpose
of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels.  In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and development.  But to enable the country
to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal.  Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still
lies in the President and Congress.  As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,
municipal governments are still agents of the national government.
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, ET AL., May 27, 2004
Local Autonomy; automatic release of  funds of Local Government Units, particularly
the IRA.
The petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of the General Appropriations Act of 1999,
2000 and 2001 insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each year the amount of P5B of the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund
(LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Likewise, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled
“Establishing a Program fro Devolution Adjustment and Equalization “ with the purpose of
facilitating the process of enhancing the capacities of LGU’s in the discharge of the functions
and services  devolved tot hem by the national government agencies concerned pursuant to
the Local Government Code.
Issue:
May the Congress or the President impose conditions for the use of the IRA by the different
local government units?
Held:
The provision of the GAA for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 are unconstitutional as they
encroach on the fiscal autonomy of the local government units in violation of the
have been implemented, there is a possibility that the same be incorporated in the future GAA
or it is capable of repetition and as such, it must be decided before another GAA is enacted. It
behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now to formulate
Likewise, the act of the President as embodied in EO No. 48 is unconstitutional because  it
amounts to control to local government units when the President’s power over local
government units is confined to general supervision, not power of control. The distinctions of
the two powers were enunciated in Drilon vs. Lim, 235 SCRA 135. Thus:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor merely sees
to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
any discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work
done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner of doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.
Section 286 of the Local Government Code is very clear since it provides that the share of
each local government unit shall be released without need of any further action, DIRECTLY
TO THE PROVINCIAL, CITY, MUNICIPAL OR BARANGAY TREASURER as the case
may be on a quarterly basis…and which may not be the subject to any lien or holdback that
may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.
Finally, Section 2, Art. X of the Constitution expressly mandates that the local government
units shall enjoy local autonomy as well as Section 25, Art. II of the Constitution.
2.  Section 3.. there shall be a LGC which shall provide a more responsive and accountable
local government with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum….
Read:
1)   1991 Local Government Code on Recall, requisites, grounds and procedures) and other
important aspects.
2. Exec. Order 249
ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND
DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Automatic release of IRA
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget
of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the
National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of
P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000.
It provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that
the IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided
that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned
above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original
revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly
assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it
appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of
Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the
condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with
this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for
Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then
National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the
constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED
FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully
reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under
“Unprogrammed funds”. Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this
Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being
impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional
mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether
revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President,
rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically
releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local
18, 2011 elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
DECISION
BRION, J.: In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and
I.      THE FACTS structure of the Constitution.
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the
ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional of elections, including the ARMM elections.
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular
elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional
elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted 2.    NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.  But on June 30, days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
HELD:
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court,
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
necessity in the following manner:
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release
of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally
submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents
counterargue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that
the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon
II.   THE ISSUES: of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
the release of the IRA.
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
branch of the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the legislature
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents,
1.    Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the approved.
“This essentially means that the President or any member of the Executive Department cannot
ARMM elections]?
unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of
2.    Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution? In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing
disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of
3.    Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?   the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling,
statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is
the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the
with the three separate readings requirement. 
release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution
would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments
is qualified by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain
III. THE RULING 3.    YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the
constitutional
automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic
release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA
…if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent
No. 10153 in toto.] [During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to
of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be
resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the
year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual
ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized
collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year.
1.    YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by
elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or
the laudable intent to “lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The
(3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those
pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that even
elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.” local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent 3.1.    1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the
the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND. officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission incumbent ARMM officials
exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution.  This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-
year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx.
                                                                      
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also
create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is
viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory
basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember
that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to
make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
3.2.    2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own,
has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may
be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress
and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a
body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to
ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August
2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized
with the presidential, congressional and other local elections.  By so doing, Congress itself
has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call
special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by
ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC.  This Court, particularly,
cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively
legislating.  To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null
and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening
act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress
itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. 
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3)
years that the Constitution itself commands.  This is what will happen – a term of less than
two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is
achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 
  
3.3.    3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim
is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and
the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-
synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that
Congress can make.  This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These
are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under
the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. 
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political
units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed
law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. 
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged  constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as
a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions.  RA No.
10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.  What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”  This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to
office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054.  RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail.  And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was
written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it
is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires. 
GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE v. JESSE M. ROBREDO, GR No. 195390,
2014-12-10
Facts:
In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the manner
the local government units (LGUs) utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the
calendar years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report, showing that a
substantial... portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized
for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of
R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known... as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
December 14, 1995, the DILG issued MC No. 95-216,[5] enumerating the policies and
guidelines on the utilization of the development fund component of the IRA. It likewise
carried a reminder to LGUs of the... strict mandate to ensure that public funds, like the 20%
development fund, "shall be spent judiciously and only for the very purpose or purposes for
which such funds are intended."
On September 20, 2005, then DILG Secretary Angelo T. Reyes and Department of Budget
and Management Secretary Romulo L. Neri issued Joint MC No. 1, series of 2005,[7]
pertaining to the guidelines on the appropriation and utilization of the 20% of the IRA for...
development projects, which aims to enhance accountability of the LGUs in undertaking
development projects. The said memorandum circular underscored that the 20% of the IRA
intended for development projects should be utilized for social development, economic
development and... environmental management.[8]
On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed
MC No. 2010-83,[9] entitled "Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and
Public Offerings," which aims to promote good governance through enhanced... transparency
and accountability of LGUs.
Issues:
Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal
autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.
Ruling:
The assailed memorandum circulars... do not transgress the local and fiscal... autonomy
granted to LGUs.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of LGUs.[35] To
highlight its significance, the entire Article X of the Constitution was devoted to laying down
the bedrock upon which this policy is anchored.
It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution of enhancing local autonomy that the
LGC was enacted. Section 2 thereof was a reiteration of the state policy. It reads, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant... communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization whereby local government units shall... be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from
the national government to the local government units.
Verily, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization.
In Limbona v. Mangelin,[37] the Court elaborated on the concept of decentralization,... thus:
[A]utonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power... and in
the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the...
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. x x x.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum...
intervention from central authorities. x x x.[38] (Citations omitted)
To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the
President over LGUs to mere supervision.[39] "The President exercises 'general supervision'
over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered... according to law.' He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own."[
At any rate, LGUs must be reminded that the local autonomy granted to them does not
completely severe them from the national government or turn them into impenetrable states.
Autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state.
Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under
the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of
existing laws. "Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline...
and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to
order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of
the public service so requires."
A scrutiny of the contents of the mentioned issuances shows that they do not, in any manner,
violate the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. To be clear, "[f]iscal autonomy means that local
governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable... share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the
power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the
preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints...
thereof."
It is inconceivable, however, how the publication of budgets, expenditures, contracts and
loans and procurement plans of LGUs required in the assailed issuances could have infringed
on the local fiscal autonomy of LGUs. Firstly, the issuances do not interfere with the...
discretion of the LGUs in the specification of their priority projects and the allocation of their
budgets. The posting requirements are mere transparency measures which do not at all hurt
the manner by which LGUs decide the utilization and allocation of their funds.
Principles:
Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under
the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of
existing laws. "Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline...
and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to
order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of
the public service so requires."
Mandanas v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 199802
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
NATURE OF PETITION:
A special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the manner the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) for FY 2012 computed the IRA for the LGUs.
RELEVANT LAWS: Section 284 of the LGC in relation to Section 6, Article X of the 1987
Constitution (if pwede, paste here the law in question or used, only the relevant part)
FACTS:
One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards decentralization of
government and local autonomy. Local autonomy has two facets, the administrative and the
fiscal. Implementing the constitutional mandate for decentralization and local autonomy,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
(LGC). The share of the LGUs, heretofore known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA),
has been regularly released to the LGUs. According to the implementing rules and regulations
of the LGC, the IRA is determined on the basis of the actual collections of the National
Internal Revenue Taxes (NIRTs) as certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Mandanas, et al. allege herein that certain collections of NIR Ts by the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) - specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs) and documentary stamp taxes
(DSTs) - have not been included in the base amounts for the computation of the IRA; that
such taxes, albeit collected by the BOC, should form part of the base from which the IRA
should be computed because they constituted NIRTs; that, consequently, the release of the
additional amount of ₱60,750,000,000.00 to the LGUs as their IRA for FY 2012 should be
ordered; and
that for the same reason the LGUs should also be released their unpaid IRA for FY 1992 to
FY 2011, inclusive, totaling ₱438,103,906,675.73.
Issues
 Is Section 284 of the LGC unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section YES 6, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution?
 Can the LGUs’ just share in the national taxes be automatically released without the need
of an appropriation? YES
RULING:
1. There is no issue as to what constitutes the LGUs' just share expressed in percentages of the
national taxes (i.e.,30%, 35% and 40% stipulated in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section
284 ). Yet, Section 6, supra, mentions national taxes as the source of the just share of the
LGUs while Section 284 ordains that the share of the LG Us be taken from national internal
revenue taxes instead. Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature,
congressional lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution.
The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more
restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually
departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base
from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis
non est recedendum (from the words of a statute there should be no departure). Equally
impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in
favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution. Although it has the primary discretion to
determine and fix the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes (e.g., Section 284 of the
LGC), Congress cannot disobey the express mandate of Section 6, Article X of the 1987
Constitution for the just share of the LGUs to be derived from the national taxes. The phrase
as determined by law in Section 6 follows and qualifies the phrase just share, and cannot be
construed as qualifying the succeeding phrase in the national taxes. The intent of the people in
respect of Section 6 is really that the base for reckoning the just share of the LGUs should
include all national taxes. To read Section 6 differently as requiring that the just share of
LGUs in the national taxes shall be determined by law is tantamount to the unauthorized
revision of the 1987 Constitution. 2. Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution commands
that the just share of the LGUs in national taxes shall be automatically released to them. The
term automatic connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory; and, in the
context of this case, the LGUs are not required to perform any act or thing in order to receive
their just share in the national taxes. Section 6 does not mention of appropriation as a
condition for the automatic release of the just share to the LGUs. This is because Congress
not only already determined the just share through the LGC's fixing the percentage of the
collections of the NIRTs to constitute such fair share subject to the power of the President to
adjust the same in order to manage public sector deficits subject to limitations on the
adjustments, but also explicitly authorized such just share to be "automatically released" to
the LGUs in the proportions and regularity set under Section 285 of the LGC without need of
annual appropriation. The 1987 Constitution is forthright and unequivocal in ordering that the
just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be automatically released to them. With
Congress having established the just share through the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that
the inclusion of the just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs is unnecessary, if not
superfluous. Hence,
the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be released to them without need of
yearly appropriation.
Zabal v. Duterte
G.R. No. 238467, EN BANC, February 12, 2019
Proclamation No. 475 does not pose an actual impairment on the right to travel. In fine, this
case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense contrary to what
petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to
travel is merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents
therefrom which were necessary incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no
showing that Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. The
questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose of rehabilitating Boracay and any
intention to directly restrict the right cannot, in any manner, be deduced from its import.
FACTS: Petitioners Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who, at
the time of the filing of the petition, were earning a living from the tourist activities therein.
While not a resident, Petitioner Bandiola, for his part, claims to occasionally visit Boracay for
business and pleasure. Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first
made public his plan to shut it down during a business forum held in Davao. President Duterte
ordered the shutting down of the island in a cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018. This was
confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson Roque, Jr. wherein he formally announced that
the total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26,
2018. Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about, fewer
tourists had been engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their earnings were
barely enough to feed their families. Hence, despite the fact that the government was then yet
to release a formal issuance on the matter, petitioners filed the Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and/or
Status Quo Ante Order on April 25, 2018. On May 18, 2018, petitioners filed a Supplemental
Petition stating that the day following the filing of their original petition or on April 26, 2018,
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 formally declaring a state of calamity in
Boracay and ordering its closure for six months from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. The
closure was implemented on even date. Thus, in addition to what they prayed for in their
original petition, petitioners implore the Court to declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No.
475 insofar as it orders the closure of Boracay and ban of tourists and nonresidents therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 475 constitute an impairment on the right to
travel. (NO)
RULING: Proclamation No. 475 does not pose an actual impairment on the
right to travel. Petitioners claim that Proclamation No. 475 impairs the right to travel based on
the following provisions: NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, do
hereby declare a State of Calamity in the barangays of Balabag, Manoc-Manoc and Yapak
(Island of Boracay) in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan. In this regard, the temporary closure
of the Island as a tourist destination for six (6) months starting 26 April 2018, or until 25
October 2018, is hereby ordered subject to applicable laws, rules, regulations and
jurisprudence. xxx xxx xxx The Municipality of Malay, Aklan is also hereby directed to
ensure that no tourist will be allowed entry to the island of Boracay until such time that the
closure has been lifted by the President. The activities proposed to be undertaken to
rehabilitate Boracay involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction.
These could not have been implemented freely and smoothly with tourists coming in and out
of the island not only because of the possible disruption that they may cause to the works
being undertaken, but primarily because their safety and convenience might be compromised.
Also, the contaminated waters in the island were not just confined to a small manageable area.
The excessive water pollutants were all over Bolabog beach and the numerous illegal
drainpipes connected to and discharging wastewater over it originate from different parts of
the island. Indeed, the activities occasioned by the necessary digging of these pipes and the
isolation of the contaminated beach waters to give way to treatment could not be done in the
presence of tourists. Aside from the dangers that these contaminated waters pose, hotels, inns,
and other accommodations may not be available as they would all be inspected and checked
to determine their compliance with environmental laws. Moreover, it bears to state that a
piece-meal closure of portions of the island would not suffice since as mentioned, illegal
drainpipes extend to the beach from various parts of Boracay. Also, most areas in the island
needed major structural rectifications because of numerous resorts and tourism facilities
which lie along easement areas, illegally reclaimed wetlands, and of forested areas that were
illegally cleared for construction purposes. Hence, the need to close the island in its entirety
and ban tourists therefrom. In fine, this case does not actually involve the right to travel in its
essential sense contrary to what petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation
No. 475 may have on the right to travel is merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the
ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom which were necessary incidents of the island's
rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant to
impair the right to travel. The questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose of
rehabilitating Boracay and any intention to directly restrict the right cannot, in any manner, be
deduced from its import. Also significant to note is that the closure of Boracay was only
temporary considering the categorical pronouncement that it was only for a definite period of
six months. Hence, if at all, the impact of Proclamation No. 475 on the right to travel is not
direct but merely consequential; and, the same is only for a reasonably short period of time or
merely temporary.
Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597, (2008)
 
FACTS:  On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued
Resolution 7902 renaming the legislative district combining the said provice with Cotabato as
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." Sema, here petitioner, questioned the
Resolution combining the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty into a single legislative
district.  enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the
ISSUE:  Whether or not the Congress can delegate to the Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces  However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a
DECISION:  Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power
to create provinces and cities. Thus, SC declares VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is VALID. 
RATIO DECIDENDI:  SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void. Only Congress can
create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes
the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution.   Second Issue:
G.R. No. 176951 : February 15, 2011
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National
President Jerry P. Treñas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S.
Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREÑAS, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
FACTS:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of
Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing
the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered
thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the
petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and
6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared
the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved
the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December
21, 2009.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws
First issue:
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power.  
Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.  Congress has the power
to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009.  Such power of amendment of
laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws.  When Congress
creation of local government units—income, population, and land area.
belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of
putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside
development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for
economic growth in their respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC.  But the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through
the exemption clauses found therein.  Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the
concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are,
therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.
 
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to
become component cities of their respective provinces.  Congress, by enacting the Cityhood
Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the
State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.
The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws
are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, (D)
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
FACTS:
October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government
Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With
the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the
Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on
technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355
for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the
people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue
Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was
passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only
106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461
of the LGC.
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress
amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when
the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is
applicable in the instant case.
July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground
that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and
not after the resolution of this case.
September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20,
2010 Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition
of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this
case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were
unaware of the proceedings in this case.
October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in
this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
HELD:
Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement,
which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in
the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh
and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law
when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average
annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of
P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its
constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the
plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot
operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective
that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
instrumental in stunting such capacity.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is
not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within
the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much
within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not
within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to
interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its
legislators.
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an
independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago
in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the
law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely
reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city.
It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued
that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over
said petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which
only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the
mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3
other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be
heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC.
Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law
as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instru-mentality of the Government.
MOISES S. SAMSON v. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, GR No. 133076, 1999-09-22
Facts:
President
President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535,... of Novaliches out of 15
barangays of Quezon City.
Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the
Court challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.
also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation of R.A. 8535,
the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches, and the
Department of Budget and Management from disbursing funds for said plebiscite.
prays for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, through a
motion we duly noted.
R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government Code...
as to the requirements of income, population and land area... seat of government;... no adverse
effect to being a city of Quezon
City, respectively... its Implementing Rules... as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City
Council of barangay resolution... law will in effect amend the Constitution.
certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to Congress during
the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. No. 8535... petitioner points out that there is
no certification attesting to the fact that the mother local government unit, Quezon City,
would not be adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of income,
population, and land area.
respondents... claimed he failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof.
argued that petitioner had the burden of proof... to overcome the legal presumption that
Congress considered all the legal requirements under the Local Government Code of 1991 in
passing R.A. 8535.
petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document supporting petitioner's claim that R.A.
8535 is unconstitutional.
Issues:
whether or not petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity
accorded R.A. No. 8535.
Ruling:
Petitioner did not present any proof, but only allegations, that no certifications were submitted
to the
House Committee on Local Government
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law
passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites...
therefor.
The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would
comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310... more than the 150,000
required by the Implementing Rules.
no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local Government
Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and population...
or land area.
Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may
also be taken that Novaliches is now highly... urbanized.
Principles:
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality... one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt;... courts are
not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of... the constitutionality of legislation should be
adopted."
Every statute is presumed valid.
Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7... creation of a local government
unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit
Income
Population
Land Area
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in Article 11
Requisites for creation A city
Income an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos... immediately
preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,... shall include the income
accruing to... the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and
nonrecurring income;
Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand...
inhabitants... territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or
more... islands.
creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements
ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA
G.R. No. 118303
Facts:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago
into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the
House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author.  The
enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive
on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13,
1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of
Santiago into a city.
Issue:
Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation
of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an
independent component city.
Ruling:
The court held that petitioners’ asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue
Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. Section 450 (c) of the Local
Government Code provides that "the average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income."
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify
the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all
its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from
special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled
corporations".
Juanito Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995
Re: Based on verifiable indicators of viability/projected capacity
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the
Municipality of Makati to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.
Petitioners contend that the special law did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with
technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction of Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart
the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials; that it increased the legislative
district of Makati only by special law; that the increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with the population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and the
LGC.
HELD:
(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati
by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials.
(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by
special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of
every census.
(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the
title of the bill.
(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not
in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides, inter alia, that
a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least
one representative.
HELD:
(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed
City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. In
language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that, the city's land area
"shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The court take judicial notice of the
fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land
areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary dispute.
(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied
with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would
be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory
relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty (250) members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time.
(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully
index, or completely catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.
(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met
the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has
increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.
AQUINO III VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 189793; APRIL 7, 2010)
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9716 was signed into law by President Arroyo on 12 October
2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. In substance, the said law created an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing
first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts.
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao,
and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and
Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul
of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard.
ISSUE: Is the population of 250,000 an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province?
HELD: Yes, it is an indispensable constitutional requirement. The second sentence of Section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province
is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province.

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a250,000 minimum population only for
a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. DISMISSED.

TAN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government
Code

Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a
New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador
Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for
January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the
B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code
because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute,
Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the
Consititution, which states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.

Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected”
must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will
necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros
Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first
would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of
the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people
of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial
alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic
effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.