Law of Sales by Hector de Leon

1
Part I
SALES
(Title VI, Arts. 1458-1637)
INTRODUCTION
Governing law.
The provisions of the Code of Commerce relating to sales have
been repealed by the Civil Code. (Art.* 2270[2].) Today, sales are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on the subject. (Book
IV, Title VI, Arts. 1458-1637.) The distinction between the so-called
civil sales and commercial sales is eliminated.
The provisions of the Civil Code on Obligations (Title I, Arts.
1156-1304.) and Contracts (Title II, Arts. 1305-1422.) are applica-
ble to the contract of sale, but Articles 1458 to 1637 are special rules
which are peculiar to sales alone.
Sources of our law on sales.

(1) The Philippine law on sales, as it exists today, is an admix-
ture of civil law and common law principles. According to the
Code Commission:
“A majority of the provisions of the Uniform Sales Law
which is in force in 31 States and Territories of the American
Union have been adopted in the Civil Code with modifications
to suit the principles of Philippine Law.” (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 60.)
*Unless otherwise indicated, refers to article in the Civil Code.
1
2 SALES
In incorporating some provisions of the Uniform Sales Act of

the United States, the Commission states:
“This incorporation of a goodly number of American rules
on sale of goods has been prompted by these reasons:
(1) The present [old] Code does not solve questions aris-
ing from certain present-day business practices. Among them
are: the sale of “future goods” (Art. 1482.); sale of goods by
description or by sample (Art. 1501.); when goods are deliv-
ered “on sale or return” (Art. 1522.); sale of goods by negotia-
tion or transfer of a document of title (Arts. 1527 to 1540.); and
the rights of the unpaid seller of goods. (Arts. 1545 to 1555.)1
(2) The present Code fails to regulate many incidents and
aspects of delivery and acceptance of goods, of warranty of
title and against hidden defects, and of payment of the price.
(3) It is probable that a considerable portion of the foreign
trade of the Philippines will continue for many years with the
United States. In order to lessen misunderstanding between
the merchants on both sides of the Pacific, their transactions
should, as far as possible, be governed by the same rules. This
desirable condition will not only facilitate trade but will also
perpetuate sentiments of esteem and goodwill between the
two peoples. It is but a truism to say that fair and mutually
beneficial trade incalculably enhances international friend-
ship.” (Ibid., pp. 60-61.)
(2) In addition:
“The Title on ‘Sales’ has been enriched by the addition of new
provisions based on the opinions of commentators (Arts. 1479,
1480, 1481, 1485, 1490, 1491, 1497, 1498, 1512, 1516, 1558, 1561,
1569, 1570, 1571.2) and on judicial decisions (Arts. 1486, 1487.3) and
of new rules adopted with modifications to suit the philosophy
and framework of Philippine Law, from the Uniform Sales Act of
1
The articles mentioned are now Arts. 1462, 1481, 1502, 1507-1520, 1525-1935, re-
spectively, in the new Code.
2
Now, Arts. 1459, 1460, 1461, 1465, 1470, 1471, 1477, 1478, 1492, 1496, 1538, 1541,
1549, 1550, 1551, respectively.
3
Now, Arts. 1466, 1467, respectively.
INTRODUCTION 3
the United States, Arts. 1482 to 1484, 1494, 1496, 1501, 1503, 1514,
1522 to 1526, 1527 to 1540, 1541 to 1543, 1545 to 1555, 1565, 1566,
1567, 1582 to 1585, 1602 to 1608, 1614 to 1617, 1618 to 1619, 16574
x x x.”
Many of the original articles were also amended for clarifica-
tion or improvement.” (Ibid., p. 141.)
— oOo —
4
Now, Arts. 1462 to 1464, 1474, 1476, 1481, 1483, 1494, 1502-1506, 1507-1520, 1521-
1523, 1525-1535, 1545, 1546, 1547, 1562-1565, 1582-1586, 1594-1597, 1598-1599, 1637, re-
spectively.
4 SALES
Chapter 1
NATURE AND FORM OF THE

CONTRACT
ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the con-

tracting parties obligates himself to transfer the own-
ership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the
other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
(1445a)
Concept of contract of sale.

The contract of sale is an agreement whereby one of the parties
(called the seller or vendor) obligates himself to deliver something
to the other (called the buyer or purchaser or vendee) who, on
his part, binds himself to pay therefor a sum of money or its
equivalent (known as the price).
Under the Spanish Civil Code, the contract was referred to as
a contract of “purchase and sale.” As every “sale” necessarily
presupposes a “purchase,” this name was regarded as redundant.
Hence, the name of Title VI has been simplified by calling it “sales”
and the name of the contract has been changed for the same rea-
son to “contract of sale.” (Report of the Code Commission, p. 141.)
“It is required in the proposed Code that the seller trans-
fers the ownership of the thing sold. (Arts. 1458, 1459, 1495,
1547.) In the present Code (Art. 1445.), his obligation is merely
to deliver the thing, so that even if the seller is not the owner,
he may validly sell, subject to the warranty (Art. 1474.) to
maintain the buyer in the legal and peaceful possession of the
4
Art. 1458 NATURE AND FORM OF THE CONTRACT 5
thing sold. The Commission considers the theory of the

present law unsatisfactory from the moral point of view.”
(Ibid.)
Characteristics of a contract of sale.

The contract of sale is:
(1) Consensual, because it is perfected by mere consent with-
out any further act;
(2) Bilateral,1 because both the contracting parties are bound
to fulfill correlative obligations towards each other — the seller,
to deliver and transfer ownership of the thing sold and the buyer,
to pay the price;
(3) Onerous, because the thing sold is conveyed in considera-
tion of the price and vice versa (see Gaite vs. Fonacier, 2 SCRA 820
[1961].);
(4) Commutative, because the thing sold is considered the
equivalent of the price paid and vice versa. (see Ibid.) However,
the contract may be aleatory2 as in the case of the sale of a hope
(e.g., sweepstakes ticket);
(5) Nominate, because it is given a special name or designa-
tion in the Civil Code, namely, “sale”; and
(6) Principal, because it does not depend for its existence and
validity upon another contract.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Trial Court decided that there was no payment by buyer of
lumber covered by invoices of seller but Court of Appeals held that
1
Obligations are bilateral when both parties are mutually bound to each other. They
are reciprocal when the performance one is designed to be the equivalent and the condi-
tion for the performance of the other. In a contract of sale, in the absence of any stipula-
tion, the obligations of the seller and buyer are reciprocal, the obligation or promise of
each party is the cause or consideration for the obligation or promise by the other. The
reciprocal obligations would normally be, in the case of the buyer, the payment of the
agreed price and in the case of the seller, the fulfillment of certain express warranties.
2
Art. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind them-
selves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do
upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an indetermi-
nate time.
6 SALES Art. 1458
delivery of lumber was not duly proved because counter-receipts is-

sued by buyer merely certified to receipt of certain statement on claims
for the lumber allegedly delivered.
Facts: S filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against B for lumber purchased on credit and received by B. B
denied all the material allegations of the complaint. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of S. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment on the ground that the deliv-
ery of the lumber to B was not duly proved.
S asserts that the case having been tried and decided by
the trial court on the issue of whether or not there was pay-
ment by B of the lumber covered by invoices of S and counter-
receipts issued by B, it is alone on this issue that the Court of
Appeals should have decided the case and not on the issue of
whether or not there was delivery of the lumber in question.
The Court of Appeals found that the counter-receipts merely
certified the fact of having received from S certain statements
on claims for lumber allegedly delivered.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals decide the case on a new
issue not raised in the pleadings before the lower court?
Held: No. The issue of delivery is no issue at all. For deliv-
ery and payment in a contract of sale, or for that matter in quasi-
contracts, are so interrelated and interwined with each other
that without delivery of the goods there is no corresponding
obligation to pay. The two complement each other. (see Art.
1458, par. 1.) It is clear that the two elements cannot be dissoci-
ated, for the contract of purchase and sale is, essentially, a bi-
lateral contract, as it gives rise to reciprocal obligations. (Pio
Barretto Sons, Inc. vs. Compania Maritima, 62 SCRA 167 [1975].)
——— ———— ———-
2. To secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of

iron ore, buyer executed a surety bond in favor of seller, the buyer,
however, claiming that such payment was subject to a suspensive
condition — the sale of the iron ore by buyer.
Facts: B, owner of a mining claim, appointed S as attorney-
in-fact to enter into a contract with any individual or juridical
person for the exploration and development of said claim on a
royalty basis. S himself embarked upon the exploitation of the
claim.
Subsequently, B revoked the authority granted by him to S

who assented thereto subject to certain conditions. As a result,
a document was executed wherein S transferred to B all of S’s
rights and interests over the “24 tons of iron ore, more or less”
that S had already extracted from the mineral claims in consid-
eration of the sum of P75,000.00, P10,000.00 of which was paid
upon the signing of the agreement, and “the balance of
P65,000.00 will be paid from and out of the first letter of credit
covering the first shipment of iron ores and of the first amount
derived from the local sale of iron ore” from said claims.
To secure the payment of the balance, B executed in favor
of S a surety bond. No sale of approximately 24,000 tons of iron
ore had been made nor had the balance of P65,000.00 been paid
to S.
Issue: Is the shipment or local sale of the iron ore a condi-
tion precedent (or suspensive condition) to the payment of the
balance, or only a suspensive period or term?
Held: (1) Obligation of B one with a term. — The words of the
contract express no contingency in the buyer’s obligation to
pay. There is no uncertainty that the payment will have to be
made sooner or later; what is undetermined is merely the exact
date at which it will be made. By the very terms of the contract,
therefore, the existence of the obligation to pay is recognized;
only its maturity or demandability is deferred.
Furthermore, to subordinate B’s obligation to the sale or
shipment of the ore as a condition precedent would be tanta-
mount to leaving the payment at his discretion (Art. 1182.), for
the sale or shipment could not be made unless he took steps to
sell the ore.
(2) A contract of sale is normally commutative and onerous. —
In a contract of sale, not only does each one of the parties as-
sume a correlative obligation, but each party anticipates per-
formance by the other from the very start.
Nothing is found in the record to evidence that S desired
or assumed to run the risk of losing his right over the ore with-
out getting paid for it, or that B understood that S assumed any
such risk. This is proved by the fact that S insisted on a bond to
guarantee the payment of the P65,000.00 and the fact that B did
put such bond, indicated that he admitted the definite exist-
ence of his obligation to pay the balance of P65,000.00. The only
8 SALES Art. 1458
rational view that can be taken is that the sale of the ore to B
was a sale on credit, and not an aleatory contract, where the
transferor, S, would assume the risk of not being paid at all by
B. (Gaite vs. Fonacier, 2 SCRA 830 [1961].)
Essential requisites of a contract of sale.

The rules of law governing contracts in general are applica-
ble to sales. Like every contract, “sale” has the following requi-
sites or elements:
(1) Consent or meeting of the minds. — This refers to the con-
sent on the part of the seller to transfer and deliver and on the
part of the buyer to pay. (see Art. 1475.) The parties must have
legal capacity to give consent and to obligate themselves. (Arts.
1489, 1490, 1491.) The essence of consent is the conformity of the
parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the
offer made by the other. The contract to sell is a bilateral contract.
Where there is merely an offer by one party without the accept-
ance of the other, there is no consent. (Salonga vs. Farrales, 105
SCRA 359 [1981].) The acceptance of payment by a party is an
indication of his consent to a contract of sale, thereby precluding
him from rejecting its binding effect. (Clarin vs. Rulova, 127 SCRA
512 [1984].)
There may, however, be a sale against the will of the owner in
case of expropriation (see Art. 1488.) and the three different kinds
of sale under the law, namely: an ordinary execution sale (see
Rules of Court, Rule 39, Sec. 15.), judicial foreclosure sale (Ibid.,
Rule 68.), and extra-judicial foreclosure sale. (Act No. 3135,
as amended.) A different set of law applies to each class of sale
mentioned. (see Fiestan vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 751
[1990].)
The sale of conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders
the sale null and void (see Art. 124, Family Code.) while the vitia-
tion thereof (see Art. 1390.) makes it merely voidable. (Guiang vs.
Court of Appeals, 95 SCAD 264, 290 SCRA 372 [1998].)
(2) Object or subject matter. — This refers to the determinate thing
which is the object of the contract. (Art. 1460.) The thing must be
determinate or at least capable of being made determinate because

if the seller and the buyer differ in regard to the thing sold, there
is no meeting of the minds; therefore, there is no sale. The subject
matter may be personal or real property. The terms used in the
law are “thing” (e.g., Art. 1458), “article” (Art. 1467), “goods” (e.g.,
Art. 1462), “personal property” (e.g., Art. 1484), “property” (e.g.,
Art. 1490), “movable property” (e.g., Art. 1498), “real estate” (e.g.,
Art. 1539), “immovable” (e.g., Ibid.), “immovable property” (e.g.,
Art. 1544), and “real property.” (Art. 1607.)
A buyer can only claim right of ownership over the object of
the deed of sale and nothing else. Where the parcel of land de-
scribed in the transfer certificate of title is not in its entirety the
parcel sold, the court may decree that the certificate of title be
cancelled and a correct one be issued in favor of the buyer, with-
out having to require the seller to execute in favor of the buyer an
instrument to effect the sale and transfer of the property to the
true owner. (Veterans Federation of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 138 SCAD 50, 345 SCRA 348 [2000].)
The sale of credits and other incorporeal rights is covered by
Articles 1624 to 1635; and
(3) Cause or consideration. — This refers to the “price certain
in money or its equivalent” (Art. 1458.) such as a check or a prom-
issory note, which is the consideration for the thing sold. It does
not include goods or merchandise although they have their own
value in money. (see Arts. 1468, 1638.) However, the words “its
equivalent” have been interpreted to mean that payment need not
be in money, so that there can be a sale where the thing given as
token of payment has “been assessed and evaluated and [its] price
equivalent in terms of money [has] been determined.” (see Re-
public vs. Phil. Resources Dev. Corp., 102 Phil. 968 [1958].)
The price must be real, not fictitious; otherwise, the sale is void
although the transaction may be shown to have been in reality a
donation or some other contract. (Art. 1471.) A seller cannot render
invalid a perfected contract of sale by merely contradicting the
buyer’s allegation regarding the price and subsequently raising
the lack of agreement as to the price. (David vs. Tiongson, 111
SCAD 242, 313 SCRA 63 [1999].)
10 SALES Art. 1458
The absence of any of the above essential elements negates

the existence of a perfected contract of sale.3 Sale, being a consen-
sual contract (see Art. 1475.), he who alleges it must show its ex-
istence by competent proof. (Dizon vs. Court of Appeals, 302
SCRA 288 [1999].)
Natural and accidental elements.

The above are the essential elements of a contract of sale or
those without which no sale can validly exist. They are to be dis-
tinguished from:
(1) Natural elements or those which are deemed to exist in cer-
tain contracts, in the absence of any contrary stipulations, like
warranty against eviction (Art. 1548.) or hidden defects (Art.
1561.); and
(2) Accidental elements or those which may be present or ab-
sent depending on the stipulations of the parties, like conditions,
interest, penalty, time or place of payment, etc.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Supposed sale was evidenced by a receipt acknowledging re-
ceipt of P1,000.00.
Facts: B bought on a partial payment of P1,000.00, evidenced
by a receipt, a portion of a subdivision from S, administrator of
the testate estate of his deceased spouse. Subsequently, S was
authorized by the court to sell the subdivision. In the mean-
time, PT Co. became the new administrator. It sold the lot to
another which sale was judicially approved.
B files a complaint which seeks, among other things, for
the quieting of title over the lot in question.
Issue: Was there a valid and enforceable sale to B?
Held: No. An examination of the receipt reveals that the
same can neither be regarded as a contract of sale nor a prom-
3
When a contract of sale is void, the possessor is entitled to keep the fruits during
the period for which he held the property in good faith. Good faith of the possessor
ceases when an action to recover possession of the property is filed against him and he
is served summons therefor. (Development Bank of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals, 316
SCRA 650 [1999]; see Arts. 526, 528.)
ise to sell. There was merely an acknowledgment of the sum

P1,000.00. There was no agreement as to the total purchase price
of the land nor to the monthly installments to be paid by B. The
requisites for a valid contract of sale are lacking. (Leabres vs.
Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 158 [1986].)
———— ———— ————
2. Buyer did not sign draft of Contract to Sell because it cov-

ered seven (7) lots instead of six (6), but sent to seller five (5) checks
as down payment which the seller did not encash.
Facts: B Company and S, subdivision developer, agreed to
enter into a new Contract to Sell whereby S will sell seven (7)
lots at P423,250.00 with a down payment of P42,325.00 and the
balance payable in 48 monthly installments of P7,395.94. The
draft of the Contract to Sell prepared by S was sent to B Com-
pany but B’s president did not sign it although he sent five (5)
checks covering the down payment totalling P27,542.72. S re-
ceived the checks but did not encash it because B’s president
did not sign the draft contract, the reason given by the latter
was that the draft covered seven (7) lots instead of six (6).
Since no written contract was signed, S sued B to recover
possession of the lots still occupied by the latter.
Issues: (1) May the unsigned draft be deemed to embody
the agreement between the parties?
(2) May the receipt of the five (5) checks by S serve to pro-
duce the effect of tender of down payment by B?
Held: (1) Based on the facts, the parties had not arrived at a
definite agreement. The only agreement they arrived at was
the price indicated in the draft contract. The number of lots to
be sold was a material component of the Contract to Sell. With-
out an agreement on the matter, the parties may not in any way
be considered as having arrived at a contract under the law.
(2) Moreover, since the five (5) checks were not encashed,
B should have deposited the corresponding amount of the said
checks as well as the installments agreed upon. A contract to
sell, as in this case, involves the performance of an obligation,
not merely the exercise of a privilege or a right. Consequently,
performance or payment may be effected not by tender of pay-
ment alone but by both tender and consignation. It is consigna-
tion which is essential to extinguish B’s obligation to pay the
balance of the purchase price. (see Arts. 1256-1258.) B did not
12 SALES Art. 1458
even bother to tender and make consignation of the installments

or to amend the contract to reflect the true intention of the par-
ties as regards the number of lots to be sold. (People’s Industrial
Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 88 SCAD 559, G.R. No.
112733, Oct. 24, 1997.)
Effect of absence of price/non-

payment of price.
(1) There can be no sale without a price. (see Art. 1474.) Tech-
nically, the cause in sale is, as to the seller, the buyer’s promise to
pay the price, and as to the buyer, the seller’s promise to deliver
the thing sold. A contract of sale is void and produces no effect
whatsoever where the same is without cause or consideration (Art.
1409[3].) in that the purchase price, which appears thereon as paid,
has, in fact, never been paid by the buyer to the seller. Such sale is
nonexistent and cannot be considered consummated. (Mapalo vs.
Mapalo, 17 SCRA 116 [1966]; Ladanga vs. Court of Appeals, 31
SCRA 361 [1984]; Castillo vs. Galvan, 85 SCRA 526 [1978].)
Where the figures referred to by the buyer as prices are mere
estimates given them by the seller of the condominium units in
question, the transaction lacks an essential requisite for the per-
fection of the contract of sale. (Raet vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCAD
584, 295 SCRA 677 [1998].)
(2) Non-payment of the purchase price is a resolutory condi-
tion for which the remedy is either rescission or specific perform-
ance under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. It constitutes a very
good reason to rescind a sale, for it violates the very essence of
the contract of sale. (Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Bachara,
328 SCRA 807 [2000].)
But the failure to pay the price in full within a fixed period
does not, by itself, dissolve a contract of sale in the absence of any
agreement that payment on time is essential (Ocampo vs. Court
of Appeals, 52 SCAD 610, 233 SCRA 551 [1994]; see Art. 1592.), or
make it null and void for lack of consideration, but results at most
in default on the part of the vendee for which the vendor may
exercise his legal remedies. (Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 73
SCAD 660, 261 SCRA 128 [1996].) It is incumbent upon the party
challenging the recital of a notarized deed of sale that the vendor
has received the purchase price to prove his claim with clear and
convincing evidence. A notarized document is evidence of high
character. (Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 346 [1986].)
An action to declare a contract void or inexistent does not
prescribe. (Art. 1410.)
Transfer of title to property for a price,

essence of sale.
(1) Obligations to deliver and to pay. — The transfer of title to
property or agreement to transfer title for a price actually paid or
promised, not a mere physical transfer of the property, is the es-
sence of sale. (see Ker & Co., Ltd. vs. Lingad, 38 SCRA 524 [1971];
see Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 585 [1984]; Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 67 [2000].) But neither is the de-
livery of the thing bought nor the payment of the price necessary
for the perfection of the contract of sale. Being consensual, it is
perfected by mere consent. (See Art. 1475.) However, where the
seller can no longer deliver the object of the sale to the buyer be-
cause the latter has already acquired title and delivery thereof
from the rightful owner, such contract may be deemed to be in-
operative and may thus fall, by analogy, under Article 1409(5) of
the Civil Code: “those which contemplate an impossible service,’’
since delivery of ownership is no longer possible. (Nool vs. Court
of Appeals, 84 SCAD 941, 276 SCRA 149 [1997]; Heirs of San
Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 364 SCRA 523 [2001].)
It is only upon the existence of the contract of sale that the
seller is obligated to transfer ownership to the buyer and the buyer,
to pay the purchase price to the seller. (Chua vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 401 SCRA 54 [2003].) In defining the contract of sale, Arti-
cle 1458 merely specifies the obligations of the parties to transfer
ownership and to pay under the contract. The parties will have
these obligations even without Article 1458.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Spouses exchanged their properties for no par shares of a corpo-
ration as a result of which they gained control of the corporation.
Facts: Spouses H & W, stockholders of DT Corporation, con-
veyed to said DT a parcel of land leased to E, in exchange for
14 SALES Art. 1458
2,500 shares of stock equivalent to 55% majority in the corpora-

tion. E questioned the transaction on the ground that it was not
given the first option to buy the leased property pursuant to
the proviso in the lease agreement.
Issue: Is the “deed of exchange” a contract of sale which, in
effect, prejudiced E’s right of first refusal over the leased prop-
erty?
Held: No. In effect, DT Corporation is a business conduit of
H and W. What they really did was to invest their properties
and change the nature of their ownership from unincorporated
to incorporated form by organizing DT to take control of their
properties and at the same time save on inheritance taxes. The
deed of exchange cannot be considered a contract of sale. There
was no transfer of actual ownership interests by H and W to a
third party. They merely changed their ownership from one
form to another. The ownership remained in the same hands.
Hence, E has no basis for its claim of a right of first refusal un-
der the lease contract. (Delpher Trades Corporation vs. Intermedi-
ate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 349 [1988].)
(2) Where transfer of ownership not intended by the parties. —
A contract for the sale or purchase of goods/commodity to be
delivered at a future time, if entered into without the intention
of having any goods/commodity pass from one party to an-
other, but with an understanding that at the appointed time,
the purchaser is merely to receive or pay the difference between
the contract and the market prices, is illegal. Such contract falls
under the definition of what is called “futures” in which the
parties merely gamble on the rise or fall in prices and is de-
clared null and void by law.4 (Onapal Philippines Commodities,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 281 [1993].)
Kinds of contract of sale.

(1) As to presence or absence of conditions. — A sale may be
either:
4
Art. 2018. If a contract which purports to be for the delivery of goods, securities or
shares of stock is entered into with the intention that the difference between the price
stipulated and the exchange or market price at the time of the pretended delivery shall
be paid by the loser to the winner, the transaction is null and void. The loser may re-
cover what he has paid.
(a) Absolute. — where the sale is not subject to any condi-

tion whatsoever and where title passes to the buyer upon
delivery of the thing sold. Thus, it has been held that a deed
of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a “Deed
of Conditional Sale” in the absence of any stipulation that the
title to the property sold is reserved in the vendor until full
payment of the purchase price nor a stipulation giving the
vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract the mo-
ment the vendee fails to pay within a fixed period. (Dignos vs.
Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Pingol vs. Court of
Appeals, 44 SCAD 498, 226 SCRA 118 [1995]; People’s Indus-
trial and Commercial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 88
SCAD 559, 281 SCRA 206 [1997].) In such case, ownership of
the property sold passes to the vendee upon the actual or con-
structive delivery thereof. (see Art. 1497.)
Payment of the purchase price is not essential to the trans-
fer of ownership as long as the property sold has been deliv-
ered. Such delivery (see Art. 1497.) operates to divest the ven-
dor of title to the property which may not be regained or re-
covered until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded
in accordance with law (Philippine National Bank vs. Court
of Appeals, 82 SCAD 472, 272 SCRA 291 [1997].); or
(b) Conditional. — where the sale contemplates a contin-
gency (Arts. 1461, 1462, par. 2; Art. 1465.), and in general,
where the contract is subject to certain conditions (see Art.
1503, par. 1.), usually, in the case of the vendee, the full pay-
ment of the agreed purchase price (Art. 1478; see People’s
Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
777 [1984].) and in the case of the vendor, the fulfillment of
certain warranties, e.g., the timely eviction of squatters on the
property sold. (Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCAD 621,
250 SCRA 223 [1995].)
In sales with assumption of mortgage, the assumption of
mortgage is a condition to the seller-mortgagor’s consent to
the sale so that without approval by the mortgagee no sale is
perfected and the seller remains the owner and mortgagor of
the subject property with the right to redeem in the case of
foreclosure. (Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 87 SCAD 24, 279
SCRA 118 [1997].)
16 SALES Art. 1458
However, a sale denominated as a “Deed of Conditional

Sale’’ is still absolute where the contract is devoid of any pro-
viso that title is reserved or the right to unilaterally rescind is
stipulated, e.g., until or unless the price is paid. (Heirs of Juan
San Andres vs. Rodriguez, 332 SCRA 769 [2000].)
The delivery of the thing sold does not transfer title until
the condition is fulfilled. Where the condition is imposed, in-
stead, upon the perfection of the contract the failure of such
condition would prevent such perfection (Galang vs. Court of
Appeals, 43 SCAD 737, 225 SCRA 37 [1993]; Roque vs. Lapuz,
96 SCRA 741 [1980]; Babasa vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCAD 679,
290 SCRA 532 [1998].) or the juridical relation itself from com-
ing into existence.
If the condition is imposed on an obligation of a party (e.g.,
ejection by the vendor of squatters within a certain period
before delivery of property) not upon the perfection of the
contract itself, which is not complied with, the other party may
either refuse to proceed or waive said condition. (see Art. 1545;
Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCAD 621, 250 SCRA 223
[1995].) The stipulation that the “payment of the full consid-
eration [of a parcel of land] shall be due and payable in five
(5) years from the execution of a formal deed of sale’’ is not a
condition which affects the efficacy of the contract of sale. It
merely provides the manner by which the full consideration
is to be computed and the time within which the same is to be
paid. (Heirs of Juan San Andres vs. Rodriguez, supra.) Simi-
larly, the mere fact that the obligation of the buyer to pay
the balance of the purchase price was made subject to the
condition that the seller first deliver the reconstituted title of
the house and lot sold does not make the contract a contract
to sell for such condition is not inconsistent with a contract of
sale. (Laforteza vs. Machuca, 127 SCAD 798, 333 SCRA 643
[2000].)
(2) Other kinds. — There are, of course, other kinds of sale
depending on one’s point of view, e.g., as to the nature of the sub-
ject matter (real or personal, tangible or intangible), as to manner
of payment of the price (cash or installment), as to its validity
(valid, rescissible, unenforceable, void), etc.
Contract of sale and contract to sell

with reserved title distinguished.
At this stage, it would be desirable to point out that there are
distinctions between the two contracts.
(1) Transfer of title. — In a contract of sale, title passes to the
buyer upon delivery of the thing sold, while in a contract to sell
(or of “exclusive right and privilege to purchase”), where it is
stipulated that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the pur-
chaser until he has fully paid the price (Art. 1478.), ownership is
reserved in the seller and is not to pass until the full payment of
the purchase price. In the absence of such stipulation, especially
where the buyer took possession of the property upon execution
of the contract, indicates that what the parties contemplated is a
contract of absolute sale.
(2) Payment of price. — In the first case, non-payment of the
price is a negative resolutory condition (see Art. 1179.), and the
remedy of the seller is to exact fulfillment or to rescind the con-
tract (see Arts. 1191, 1592.), while in the second case, full payment
is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a
breach, casual or serious, of the contract but simply an event that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquir-
ing binding force. (Manvel vs. Rodriguez, 109 Phil. 1 [1960]; Roque
vs. Lapuz, 96 SCRA 741 [1980]; Jacinto vs. Kaparaz, 209 SCRA 246
[1992]; Adelfa Properties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 58 SCAD 462,
240 SCRA 565 [1995].) Where the seller promises to execute a deed
of absolute sale upon full payment of the purchase price, the agree-
ment is a contract to sell. (Rayos vs. Court of Appeals, 434 SCRA
365 [2004].)
(3) Ownership of vendor. — Being contraries, their effect in law
cannot be identical. In the first case, the vendor has lost and can-
not recover the ownership of the thing sold and delivered, actu-
ally or constructively (see Art. 1497.), until and unless the con-
tract of sale itself is resolved and set aside. In the second case,
however, the title remains in the vendor if the vendee does not
comply with the condition precedent of making payment at the
time specified in the contract. (see Heirs of P. Escanlar vs. Court
of Appeals, 88 SCAD 532, 281 SCRA 176 [1997]; People’s Indus-
trial and Commercial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA
18 SALES Art. 1458
206 [1997]; Luzon Brokerage Co. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc., 43
SCRA 93 [1972] and 86 SCRA 305 [1978]; Katigbak vs. Court of
Appeals, 4 SCRA 243 [1962]; Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA
564 [1990]; Tuazon vs. Garilao, 152 SCAD 699, 362 SCRA 654
[2001].) There is no actual sale until and unless full payment of
the price is made (see Bowe vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 158
[1993].) and a contract of sale is entered into to consummate the
sale. If the vendor should eject the vendee for failure to meet the
condition precedent he is enforcing the contract and not rescind-
ing it. Article 11915 is not applicable. A contract to sell is commonly
entered into so as to protect the seller against a buyer who intends
to buy a property in installments by withholding ownership over
the property until the buyer effects full payment therefore. (City
of Cebu vs. Heirs of C. Rubi, 106 SCAD 61, 306 SCRA 408 [1999].)
A stipulation in a contract providing for automatic rescission
upon non-payment of the purchase price within the stipulated
period is valid. (see Art. 1191.) It is in the nature of an agreement
granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case
of breach without need of going to court. (Pangilinan vs. Court
of Appeals, 87 SCAD 408, 279 SCRA 590 [1997].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Vendor “sells, transfers, and conveys” a land to the vendee
who may sell or assign the land prior to full payment of all
installments.
Facts: The dispositive part of a deed entitled “Deed of Sale
of Real Property” states: “for and in consideration of the sum
of P140,000, payable under the terms and conditions stated in
the foregoing premises, the VENDOR sells, transfers and con-
5
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case
one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission,
even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing
the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have
acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
(1124)
veys unto the VENDEE x x x” the property in question as of

December 22, 1971, the date of said document.”
In paragraph 5 thereof, it is provided that “should the
VENDEE prior to the full payment of all the amounts afore-
mentioned, decide to sell or to assign part or all of the afore-
mentioned parcel of land, the VENDOR shall be informed in
writing and shall have the option to repurchase the property x
x x. Should the VENDOR herein decide to repurchase and the
property is sold or transferred to a third person, the balance of
the consideration herein still due to the VENDOR shall consti-
tute automatically a prior lien on the consideration to be paid
by the third person to herein VENDEE.”
Issue: Is the above instrument a contract to sell?
Held: No. (1) Title to land transferred to vendee. — “It is a deed
of sale in which title to the subject land was transferred to the
vendee as of the date of the transaction, notwithstanding that
the purchase price had not yet been fully paid at that time.
Under the first-cited stipulation, what is deferred is not the
transfer of ownership but the full payment of the purchase price,
which is to be made in installments, on the dates indicated.
Under the second stipulation, it is recognized that the vendee
may sell the property even ‘prior to full payment of all the
amounts aforementioned,’ which simply means that although
the purchase price had not yet been completely paid, the vendee
had already become the owner of the land. As such, he could
sell the same subject to the right of repurchase reserved to the
vendor.”
(2) Right of vendor where land sold by vendee. — “In fact, the
contract also provides for the possibility of the vendee selling
the property to a third person, in which case the vendor, if she
wishes to repurchase the land, shall have a lien on any balance
of the consideration to be paid by the third person to the
vendee.” (Filoil Marketing Corp. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
169 SCRA 293 [1989].)
———— ———— ————
2. The sale of scrap iron is subject to the condition that the

buyer will open a letter of credit in favor of the seller for P250,000.00
on or before May 15, 1983.
Facts: In May 1, 1983, B (buyer) and S (seller) entered into a
contract entitled “Purchase and Sale of Scrap Iron” whereby S
20 SALES Art. 1458
bound itself to sell the scrap iron upon the fulfillment by B of

his obligation to make or indorse an irrevocable and uncondi-
tional letter of credit not later than May 15, 1983.
On May 17, 1983, B, through his men, started to dig and
gather scrap iron at S’s premises. S cancelled the contract be-
cause of B’s alleged non-compliance with the essential precon-
ditions among which is the opening of the letter of credit. It
appeared that the opening of the letter of credit was made on
May 26, 1983 by a corporation which was not a party to the
contract, with a bank not agreed upon, and was not irrevocable
and unconditional, for it was without recourse and stipulated
certain conditions.
In his complaint, B, private respondent, prayed for judg-
ment ordering S, petitioner corporation, to comply with the
contract and to pay damages.
Issue: Is the transaction between S and B a mere contract to
sell or promise to sell, and not a contract of sale?
Held: (1) The contract is not one of sale. — “The petitioner
corporation’s obligation to sell is unequivocally subject to a
positive suspensive condition, i.e., the private respondent’s
opening, making or indorsing of an irrevocable and uncondi-
tional letter of credit. The former agreed to deliver the scrap
iron only upon payment of the purchase price by means of an
irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit. Otherwise stated,
the contract is not one of sale where the buyer acquired owner-
ship over the property subject to the resolutory condition that
the purchase price would be paid after delivery. Thus, there
was to be no actual sale until the opening, making or indorsing
of the irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit. Since what
obtains in the case at bar is a mere promise to sell, the failure of
the private respondent to comply with the positive suspensive
condition cannot even be considered a breach — casual or seri-
ous — but simply an event that prevented the obligation of
petitioner corporation to convey title from acquiring binding
force.”
(2) The obligation of the petitioner corporation to sell did not
arise. — “Consequently, the obligation of the petitioner corpo-
ration to sell did not arise; it, therefore, cannot be compelled by
specific performance to comply with its prestation. In short,
Article 1191 of the Civil Code does not apply; on the contrary,
pursuant to Article 1597 of the Civil Code, the petitioner cor-
poration may totally rescind, as it did in this case, the contract.’’

Since the refusal of petitioner to deliver the scrap iron was
founded on the “non-fulfillment by the private respondent of a
suspensive condition,’’ it cannot be held liable for damages.
(Visayan Sawmill Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA
381 [1993].)
Romero, J., dissenting:

(1) The contract reached the stage of perfection. — “Evidently,
the distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale
is crucial in this case. Article 1458 has this definition: x x x. Ar-
ticle 1475 gives the significance of this mutual undertaking of
the parties, thus: x x x. Thus, when the parties entered into the
contract entitled “Purchase and Sale of Scrap Iron” on May 1,
1983, the contract reached the stage of perfection, there being a
meeting of the minds upon the object which is the subject mat-
ter of the contract and the price which is the consideration.
Applying Article 1475 from that moment, the parties may recip-
rocally demand performance of the obligations incumbent upon
them, i.e., delivery by the vendor and payment by the vendee.
(2) The seller has placed the goods in the control and possession
of the vendee. — From the time the seller gave access to the buyer
to enter his premises, manifesting no objection thereto but even
sending 18 or 20 people to start the operation, he has placed
the goods in the control and possession of the vendee and de-
livery is effected. For, according to Article 1497, “The thing sold
shall be understood as delivered when it is placed in the con-
trol and possession of the vendee.”
(3) That payment of the price in any form was not yet effected is
immaterial to the transfer of ownership. — “That payment of the
price in any form was not yet effected is immaterial to the trans-
fer of the right of ownership. In a contract of sale, the nonpay-
ment of the price is a resolutory condition which extinguishes
the transaction that, for a time, existed and discharges the obli-
gations created thereunder. x x x.
“Consequently, in a contract of sale, after delivery of the
object of the contract has been made, the seller loses ownership
and cannot recover the same, unless the contract is rescinded.
But in the contract to sell, the seller retains ownership and the
buyer’s failure to pay cannot even be considered a breach,
whether casual or substantial, but an event that prevented the
seller’s duty to transfer title to the object of the contract.”
22 SALES Art. 1458
(4) The transaction is an absolute contract of sale and not a con-

tract to sell. — “The phrase in the contract ‘on the following
terms and conditions’ is standard form which is not to be con-
strued as imposing a condition, whether suspensive or reso-
lutory, in the sense of the happening of a future and uncertain
event upon which an obligation is made to depend. There must
be a manifest understanding that the agreement is in what may
be referred to as “suspended animation” pending compliance
with provisions regarding payment. The reservation of title to
the object of the contract in the seller is one such manifestation.
Hence, it has been decided in the case of Dignos vs. Court of
Appeals (158 SCRA 375 [1988].) that, absent a proviso in the con-
tract that the title to the property is reserved in the vendor un-
til full payment of the purchase price or a stipulation giving
the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract the
moment the vendee fails to pay within the fixed period, the
transaction is an absolute contract of sale and not a contract to
sell.”
Contract to sell and conditional sale

distinguished.
A contract to sell may be defined as a bilateral contract
whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the
prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclu-
sively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition
agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
(1) Transfer of title to the buyer. — A contract to sell as defined
above may not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale
where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject
of the sale until the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, be-
cause in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of con-
sent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of
a contingent event which may or may not occur. If the suspensive
condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of sale is
completely abated. (cf. Homesite and Housing Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 133 SCRA 777 [1984].) However, if the suspensive con-
dition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such
that if there had already been previous delivery of the property
subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto automatically
transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act

having to be performed by the seller.
In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition which is the full payment of the purchase price, own-
ership will not automatically transfer to the buyer although the
property may have been previously delivered to him. The pro-
spective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by
entering into a contract of absolute sale to consummate the trans-
action.
(2) Sale of subject property to a third person. — It is essential to
distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract
of sale specially in cases where the subject property is sold by the
owner not to the party the seller contracted with, but to a third
person. In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the
property, a third person buying such property despite the
fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment
of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in
bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of re-
conveyance of the property. There is no double sale in such case.
Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after registration
because there is no defect in the owner-seller’s title per se, but the
latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the intending buyer.6
In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment
of the suspensive condition, the sale becomes absolute and this will
definitely affect the seller’s title thereto. In fact, if there had been
previous delivery of the subject property, the seller’s ownership
or title to the property is automatically transferred to the buyer,
such that the seller will no longer have any title to transfer to any
third person. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, such sec-
ond buyer of the property who may have had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of such defect in the seller’s title, or at least was
charged with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a
registrant in good faith. Such second buyer cannot defeat the first
buyer’s title. In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the first
6
A prior contract to sell made by a decedent during his lifetime prevails over a
subsequent sale made by an administrator without probate court approval. The estate is
bound to convey the property upon full payment of the consideration. (Liu vs. Loy, Jr.,
438 SCRA 244 [2004].)
24 SALES Art. 1458
buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the sale.

(Coronel vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCAD 141, 263 SCRA 15 [1996].)
Other cases of contract to sell.

(1) Where the subject matter is not determinate (Arts. 1458,
1460.) or the price is not certain (Art. 1458.), the agreement is
merely a contract to sell. (Yu Tek vs. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384 [1915];
Ong & Jang Chuan vs. Wise & Co., 33 Phil. 339 [1916].) For pur-
poses of the perfection of a contract of sale (see Art. 1475.), there
is already a price certain where the determination of the price is
left to the judgment of a specified person or persons (see Art. 1469,
par. 1.), and notwithstanding that such determination has yet to
be made.
(2) A sale of future goods (see Art. 1462.) even though the
contract is in the form of a present sale operates as a contract to
sell the goods.
(3) Where the stipulation of the parties is that the deed of sale
and corresponding certificate of sale would be issued only after
full payment of the purchase price, the contract entered into is a
contract to sell and not a contract of sale. (David vs. Tiongson,
111 SCAD 242, 313 SCRA 63 [1999].)
It has been held that the act of the vendor of delivering the
possession of the property (land) to the vendee contemporane-
ous with the contract (deed of sale in a private instrument) was
an indication that an absolute contract of sale was intended by
the parties and not a contract to sell. (Dignos vs. Court of Appeals,
158 SCRA 375 [1988].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Seller of interest in a business claims the profits derived by busi-
ness before the price thereof was fixed by appraisers designated by the
parties in the contract.
Facts: S sold to B his interest in a company, the price to be
ascertained by three (3) appraisers. After six (6) months, the
appraisers rendered their report at which time S signed a docu-
ment whereby he acknowledged receipt of the price arrived at
and relinquished any claim that he had in the business. The
report of the appraisers did not contain any segregation of the

assets of the business from the accumulated profits.
S is now claiming the profits from B from the time of the
execution of the sale to the time he acknowledged receipt of
the price on the ground that before the price was fixed by the
appraisers, the contract was not a sale but merely a contract to
sell.
Issue: Is this contention of S tenable?
Held: No. The contract of sale is perfected when the parties
agree upon the thing sold and upon the price (see Art. 1475.), it
being sufficient for the price to be certain that its determina-
tion be left to the judgment of a specified person. (Barretto vs.
Sta. Maria, 26 Phil. 200 [1913].)
ART. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor

must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at
the time it is delivered. (n)
Requisites concerning object.

(1) Things. — Aside from being (a) determinate (Arts. 1458,
1460.), the law requires that the subject matter must be (b) licit or
lawful, that is, it should not be contrary to law, morals, good cus-
toms, public order, or public policy (Arts. 1347, 1409[1, 4].), and
should (c) not be impossible. (Art. 1348.) In other words, like any
other object of a contract, the thing must be within the commerce of
men.
If the subject matter of the sale is illicit, the contract is void
and cannot, therefore, be ratified. (Art. 1409.) In such a case, the
rights and obligations of the parties are determined by applying
the following articles of the Civil Code:
“Art. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of
the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a crimi-
nal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreo-
ver, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of
effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things
or the price of contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is
26 SALES Art. 1459
guilty; but the innocent one may claim what he has given, and
shall not be bound to comply with his promise.”
“Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden
cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the fol-
lowing rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting par-
ties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the
contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertak-
ing;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he
cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or
ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The
other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he
has given without any obligation to comply with his promise.”
(2) Rights. — All rights which are not intransmissible or per-
sonal may also be the object of sale (Art. 1347.), like the right of
usufruct (Art. 572.), the right of conventional redemption (Art.
1601.), credit (Art. 1624.), etc.
Examples of intransmissible rights are the right to vote, right
to public office, marital and parental rights, etc.
No contract may be entered upon future inheritance except
in cases expressly authorized by law. (Art. 1347, par. 2.) While
services may be the object of a contract (Art. 1347, par. 3.), they
cannot be the object of a contract of sale. (Art. 1458; see Art. 1467.)
Kinds of illicit things.

The thing may be illicit per se (of its nature) or per accidens (be-
cause of some provisions of law declaring it illegal).
Article 1459 refers to both. Decayed food unfit for consump-
tion is illicit per se, while lottery tickets (Art. 195, Revised Penal
Code.) are illicit per accidens. Land sold to an alien is also per acci-
dens because the sale is prohibited by the Constitution.7 The rule
7
A sale of land in violation of the constitutional prohibition against the transfer of
lands to aliens (Art. XII, Sec. 7, Constitution.) is void (see Art. 1409[1, 7].) and the seller
or his heirs may recover the property. But where a land is sold to an alien, who later sold
it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be impugned. (Herrera vs. Tuy Kim Guan, 1
SCRA 406 [1961]; Godinez vs. Fong Pak Luen, 120 SCRA 223 [1983].)
is well-settled that the mortgagor (or pledgor) continues to be the

owner of the property mortgaged, and, therefore, has the power
to alienate the same; however, he is obliged, under pain of penal
liability, to secure the consent of the mortgagee. (Service Special-
ist, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 174 SCRA 80 [1989].)
Right to transfer ownership.

(1) Seller must be owner or authorized by owner of thing sold. —
It is essential in order for a sale to be valid that the vendor must
be able to transfer ownership (Art. 1458.) and, therefore, he must
be the owner or at least must be authorized by the owner of the
thing sold. This rule is in accord with a well-known principle of
law that one can not transmit or dispose of that which he does
not have — nemo dat quod non-habet. Accordingly, one can sell only
what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire
no more than what the seller can transfer legally. (Azcona vs.
Reyes & Larracas, 59 Phil. 446 [1934]; Manalo vs. Court of Appeals,
366 SCRA 752 [2001]; Tangalin vs. Court of Appeals, 159 SCAD
343, 371 SCRA 49 [2001]; for exceptions, see Art. 1505.)
Thus, a sale of paraphernal (separate) property of the deceased
wife by the husband who was neither an owner nor administra-
tor of the property at the time of sale is void ab initio. Such being
the case, the sale cannot be the subject of ratification by the ad-
ministrator or the probate court. (Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 149 SCRA 372 [1987].) Only so much of the share of
the vendor-co-owner can be validly acquired by the vendee even
if he acted in good faith in buying the shares of the other co-own-
ers. (Segura vs. Segura, 165 SCRA 368 [1988].) Where the sale from
one person to another was fictitious as there was no considera-
tion, and, therefore, void and inexistent, the latter has no title to
convey to third persons. (Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals,
80 SCAD 12, 269 SCRA 15 [1997].)
(2) Right must exist at time of delivery. — Article 1459, however,
does not require that the vendor must have the right to transfer
ownership of the property sold at the time of the perfection of the
contract. (Martin vs. Reyes, 91 Phil. 666 [1952].) Perfection per se
does not transfer ownership which occurs upon the actual or con-
structive delivery of the thing sold. Sale, being a consensual con-
28 SALES Art. 1459
tract, it is perfected by mere consent (see Art. 1475.), and owner-

ship by the seller of the thing sold is not an element for its perfec-
tion. It is sufficient if the seller has the “right to transfer the own-
ership thereof at the time it is delivered.” Thus, the seller is
deemed only to impliedly warrant that “he has a right to sell the
thing at the time when the ownership is to pass.” (Art. 1547[1].)
The reason for the rule is obvious. Since future goods (Arts.
1461, par. 1; 1462 par. 1.) or goods whose acquisition by the seller
depends upon a contingency (Art. 1462, par. 2.) may be the sub-
ject matter of sale, it would be inconsistent for the article to re-
quire that the thing sold must be owned by the seller at the time
of the sale inasmuch as it is not possible for a person to own a
thing or right not in existence. An agreement providing for the
sale of property yet to be adjudicated by a court is thus valid and
binding. (Republic vs. Lichauco, 46 SCRA 305 [1972].)
(3) Where property sold registered in name of seller who employed
fraud in securing his title. — Although generally a forged or fraudu-
lent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, there are instances when
such a document may become the root of a valid title. One such
instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred
from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it re-
mained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser for value. Where there is nothing in the certificate to
indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, or in the absence of any fact or circumstance
to excite suspicion, the purchaser is not required to explore fur-
ther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest
for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto.
If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of
the certificate of title which the Torrens System seeks to insure
would entirely be futile and nugatory. The established rule is that
the rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be respected
and protected, notwithstanding the fraud employed by the seller
in securing his title. The proper recourse of the true owner of the
property who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of
the same is to bring an action for damages against those who
caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an
action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for

recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund. (Fule vs. Legare,
7 SCRA 351 [1951]; Pino vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 434 [1991];
Phil. National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 735
[1990]; Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCAD 179, 256 SCRA 391
[1996].)
(4) Where properly sold in violation of a right of first refusal of
another person. — The prevailing doctrine is that a contract of sale
entered into in violation of a right of first refusal of another per-
son, while valid is rescissible. (Guzman, Bocaling and Co. vs.
Bonnevie, 206 SCRA 668 [1992]; Conculada vs. Court of Appeals,
156 SCAD 624, 367 SCRA 164 [2001].) A right of first refusal is
neither “amorphous nor merely preparatory’’ and can be executed
according to its terms. In contracts of sale, the basis of the right of
first refusal must be the current offer of the seller to sell or the
offer to purchase of the prospective buyer. Only after the grantee
fails to exercise his right under the same terms and within the
period contemplated can the owner validly offer to sell the prop-
erty to a third person, again, under the same terms as offered to
the grantee. (Polytechnic University of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, 368 SCRA 691 [2001]; Equatorial Realty Development,
Inc. vs. Mayfair, Inc., 76 SCAD 407, 264 SCRA 483 [1996];
Parañaque King’s Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 79 SCAD
936, 268 SCRA 727 [1997].) Where, however, there is no showing
of bad faith on the part of the vendee, the contract of sale may not
be rescinded (see Arts. 1380-1381[3].), and the remedy of the per-
son with the right of first refusal is an action for damages against
the vendor. (Rosencor Development Corporation vs. Inquing, 145
SCAD 484, 354 SCRA 119 [2001].)
(5) Where real property, subject of unrecorded sale, subsequently
mortgaged by seller which mortgage was registered. — The mortga-
gee’s registered mortgage right over the property is inferior to that
of the buyer’s unregistered right. The unrecorded sale between
the buyer and the seller is preferred for the reason that if the seller
the original owner, had parted with his ownership of the thing
sold then, he no longer had ownership and free disposal of that
thing so as to be able to mortgage it again. Registration of the
mortgage is of no moment since it is understood to be without
prejudice to the better right of third parties. (State Investment
30 SALES Art. 1460
House, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCAD 135, 254 SCRA 368
[1996]; Dela Merced vs. GSIS, 154 SCAD 816, 365 SCRA 1 [2001].)
ART. 1460. A thing is determinate when it is par-

ticularly designated or physically segregated from all
others of the same class.
The requisite that a thing be determinate is satis-
fied if at the time the contract is entered into, the thing
is capable of being made determinate without the ne-
cessity of a new or further agreement between the
parties. (n)
Subject matter must be determinate.

(1) When thing determinate. — A thing is determinate or spe-
cific (not generic) when it is particularly designated or physically
segregated from all others of the same class. (see Art. 1636[1].) This
requisite that the object of a contract of sale must be determinate
is in accordance with the general rule that the object of every con-
tract must be determinate as to its kind. (Art. 1349.) A determi-
nate thing is identified by its individuality, e.g., my car (if I have
only one); the watch I am wearing; the house located at the cor-
ner of Rizal and Del Pilar Streets, etc.;
(2) Sufficient if subject matter capable of being made determinate.
— It is not necessary that the thing sold must be in sight at the
time the contract is entered into. It is sufficient that the thing is
determinable or capable of being made determinate without the
necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties (Art.
460, par. 2; see Melliza vs. City of Iloilo, 23 SCRA 477 [1968].) to
ascertain its identity, quantity, or quality. The fact that such an
agreement is still necessary constitutes an obstacle to the exist-
ence of the contract (Art. 1349.) and renders it void. (Art. 1409[3].)
Thus, a person may validly sell all the cavans of rice in a par-
ticular bodega or a parcel of land located at a particular street but
if the bodega is not specified and the seller has more than one
bodega or owns more than one parcel of land at the particular
street, and it cannot be known what may have been sold, the con-
tract shall be null and void. (Arts. 1378, par. 2; 1409[6].) Similarly,
an obligation by a person to sell one of his cars is limited to the
cars owned by him. The subject matter is determinable; it becomes

determinate the moment it is delivered.
In a case, the respondent purchased a portion of a lot contain-
ing 345 square meters, which portion is located in the middle of
another lot with a total area 854 square meters, and referred to in
the receipt as the “previously paid lot.’’ held: “Since the lot subse-
quently sold to respondent is said to adjoin the ‘previously paid
lot’ on three sides thereof, the subject lot is capable of being de-
termined without the need of any new contract. The fact that the
exact area of these adjoining residential lots is subject to the re-
sult of a survey does not detract from the fact that they are deter-
minate or determinable.’’ (Heirs of Juino San Andres vs.
Rodriguez, 337 SCRA 769 [2000].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Tobacco factory sold was specifically pointed out. — A to-
bacco factory with its contents having been specifically pointed
out by the parties and distinguished from all other tobacco fac-
tories was held sold under a contract which did not provide for
the delivery of the price of the thing until a future time.
(McCullough vs. Aenille Co., 13 Phil. 284 [1909].)
——— ———— ———-
2. Payment of price was withheld pending proof by vendor of
his ownership. — A sale of a specific house was held perfected
between the vendor and the vendee, although the delivery of
the price was withheld until the necessary documents of own-
ership were prepared by the vendee. (Borromeo vs. Franco, 5 Phil.
49 [1905].)
———— ———— ————
3. Purchase price agreed upon had not yet been paid. — A quan-
tity of hemp delivered by the vendor into the warehouse of the
vendee and thus set apart and distinguished from all other
hemp was held sold, although the purchase price which had
been agreed upon had not yet been paid. (see Tan Leoncio vs. Go
Inqui, 8 Phil. 531 [1907].)
———— ———— ————
4. Subject matter is sugar of specified quantity and given qual-
ity. — A contract whereby a party obligates himself to sell for a
32 SALES Art. 1460
price certain (P3,000.00) a specified quantity of sugar (600 piculs)

of a given quality (of the first grade and second grade) without
designating a particular lot of sugar, is not perfected until the
quantity agreed upon has been selected and is capable of being
physically designated and distinguished from all other sugar.
(Yu Tek & Co. vs. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 348 [1915]; De Leon vs. Aquino,
87 Phil. 193 [1950].)
In this case, the contract is merely an executory contract to
sell, its subject matter being a generic or indeterminate thing. A
thing is generic when it is indicated only by its kind and cannot
be pointed out with particularity.
———— ———— ————
5. Subject matter is flour of a certain brand and specified quan-
tity. — Similarly, the undertaking of a party to sell 1,000 sacks
of “Mano” flour at P11.05 per barrel, 500 to be delivered in Sep-
tember and 500, in October, is a promise to deliver a generic
thing and not a determinate thing within the meaning of Arti-
cle 1460. Hence, there is no perfected sale. (Ong & Jang Chuan
vs. Wise & Co., 33 Phil. 339 [1916].)
———— ———— ————
6. Subject matter are palay grains produced in the farmland.
— Where S initially offered to sell palay grains in his farmland
to NFA and the latter accepted to buy 2,640 cavans, there was
already a meeting of the minds between the parties. The object
of the contract, being the palay grains produced in S’s farm-
land and the NFA was to pay the same depending upon its
quality. The fact that the exact number of cavans of palay to be
delivered has not been determined does not affect the perfec-
tion of the contract.
In this case, there was no need for NFA and S to enter into
a new contract to determine the exact number of cavans of palay
to be sold. S can deliver so much of his produce as long as it
does not exceed 2,640 cavans. (National Grains Authority vs. In-
termediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 131 [1989].)
———— ———— ————
7. Lots sold were described by their lot numbers and area and
as the ones needed according to a named development plan. — The
deed of sale describes the four parcels of land sold by their lot
numbers and area; and then it goes on to further describe not
only those lots already mentioned but the lots object of the sale,
by stating that said lots are the ones needed for the construc-
tion of the City Hall site, avenues and parks according to the
Arellano Plan, the development plan of the city, which was then
in existence.
It was held that the specific mention of some of the lots
plus the statement that the lots object of the sale are the ones
needed, etc., according to the aforementioned plan, sufficiently
provide a basis, as of the time of the execution of the contract,
for rendering determinate said lots without the need of a new
and further agreement of the parties. (Melliza vs. City of Iloilo,
23 SCRA 477 [1968].)
———— ———— ————
8. Receipt issued stated that the lot being purchased was the
one earlier earmarked for the buyer’s sister. — B presented the fol-
lowing receipt signed by S, seller, as evidence of payment: “Re-
ceived from B the sum of P500.00 as additional partial payment
for the lot which is the portion formerly earmarked for T
wherein she already paid the sum of P1,500; hence, by agree-
ment of B and T, who are sisters, the sum of P1,500.00 is ap-
plied as additional payment for and in behalf of B, thereby
making the total payments made by B to said lot in the sum of
P2,000.00.’’ The subject lot is adequately described in the re-
ceipt, or at least can be easily determinable. Any mistake in the
designation of the lot does not vitiate the consent of the parties
or affect the validity and binding effect of the contract of sale.
(David vs. Tiongson, 111 SCAD 242, 313 SCRA 63 [1999].)
———— ———— ————
9. Sugar quota of certain number of piculs sold without speci-
fication of the land to which it relates. — Section 4 of R.A. No. 1825
(An Act to Provide for the Allocation, Reallocation and Admin-
istration of the Absolute Quota of Sugar) reads: “The produc-
tion allowance or quota corresponding to each piece of land
under the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be an im-
provement attaching to the land entitled thereto.
The intangible property that is the sugar quota should be
considered as real property by destination, an improvement
attaching to the land entitled thereto.” Sugar quota allocations
do not have existence independently of any particular tract of
land. There can be no sale simply of sugar quota of a certain
number of piculs without specification of the land to which it
34 SALES Art. 1461
relates. Such a sale would be void for want of a determinate

subject matter. (Compania General De Tabacos De Filipinos vs. Court
of Appeals, 185 SCRA 284 [1990].)
ART. 1461. Things having a potential existence may

be the object of the contract of sale.
The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or expect-
ancy is deemed subject to the condition that the thing
will come into existence.
The sale of a vain hope or expectancy is void. (n)
Sale of things having potential existence.

Even a future thing (Arts. 1461, par. 1; 1347, par. 1.) not exist-
ing at the time the contract is entered into may be the object of
sale provided it has a potential or possible existence, that is, it is
reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment
or usual incident of something in existence already belonging to
the seller, and the title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing
comes into existence.
Thus, a valid sale may be made of “the wine a vine is ex-
pected to produce; or the grain a field may grow in a given time;
or the milk a cow may yield during the coming year; or the wool
that shall thereafter grow upon a sheep; or what may be taken at
the next cast of a fisherman’s net; or the goodwill of a trade, or
the like. The thing sold, however, must be specific and identified.
They must be also owned by the vendor at the time.” (Sibal vs.
Valdez, 50 Phil. 522 [1927]; Pichel vs. Alonzo, 111 SCRA 341 [1982];
see 46 Am. Jur. 223.)
Sale of a mere hope or expectancy.

The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or expectancy is deemed
subject to the condition that the thing contemplated or expected
will come into existence. (par. 2.)
The sale really refers to an “expected thing” which is not yet
in existence, and not to the hope or expectancy which already
exists, in view of the condition that the thing will come into exist-
ence. But the sale of a mere hope or expectancy is valid even if the
thing hoped or expected does not come into existence, unless the
hope or expectancy is vain in which case, the sale is void. (par. 3.)
A plan whereby prizes can be obtained without any additional
consideration (when a product is purchased at the usual price plus
the chance of winning a prize) is not a lottery. (Phil. Refining Co.
vs. Palomar, 148 SCRA 313 [1987].)
EXAMPLES:
(1) S binds himself to sell for a specified price to B a parcel
of land if he wins a case for the recovery of said land pending
in the Supreme Court.
Here, the obligation of S to sell will arise, if the “expected
thing,’’ the land, will come into existence, i.e., if he wins the
case.
Before a decision is rendered, there is only “the mere hope
or expectancy’’ that the thing will come into existence.
(2) B buys a sweepstakes ticket in the hope of winning a
prize. Here, the object of the contract is the hope itself. The sale
is valid even if B does not win a prize because it is not subject
to the condition that the hope will be fulfilled.
Sale of thing expected and sale of hope

itself distinguished.
Emptio rei speratae (sale of thing expected) is the sale of a thing
not yet in existence subject to the condition that the thing will exist
and on failure of the condition, the contract becomes ineffective
and hence, the buyer has no obligation to pay the price. On the
other hand, emptio spei is the sale of the hope itself that the thing
will come into existence, where it is agreed that the buyer will pay
the price even if the thing does not eventually exist.
(1) In emptio rei speratae, the future thing is certain as to itself
but uncertain as to its quantity and quality. Such sale is subject to
the condition that the thing will come into existence (see Art. 1545,
par. 2.), whatever its quantity or quality. In emptio spei (like the
sale of a sweepstake ticket), it is not certain that the thing itself
(winning a prize) will exist, much less its quantity and quality.
(2) In the first, the contract deals with a future thing, while in
36 SALES Art. 1461
the second, the contract relates to a thing which exists or is present

— the hope or expectancy.
(3) In the first, the sale is subject to the condition that the thing
should exist, so that if it does not, there will be no contract by
reason of the absence of an essential element. On the other hand,
the second produces effect even though the thing does not come
into existence because the object of the contract is the hope itself,
unless it is a vain hope or expectancy (like the sale of a falsified
sweepstake ticket which can never win).
Presumption in case of doubt.

In case of doubt, the presumption is in favor of emptio rei
speratae which is more in keeping with the commutative charac-
ter of the contract. (see 10 Manresa 29-30.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Buyer executed a surety bond in favor of seller to secure payment
of the balance of purchase price of iron ore, which balance shall be
paid out of amount derived from sale by buyer of the iron ore.
Facts: S embarked upon the exploration and development
of mining claims belonging to B. Later, they executed a docu-
ment wherein S transferred to B all of S’s rights and interest
over the 24,000 tons of iron ore, “more or less” that S had al-
ready extracted from the mineral claims in consideration of a
down payment of P10,000.00, and the balance of P65,000.00
which will be paid out of the “first shipment of iron ore and of
the first amount derived from the local sale of iron ore made”
from said claims, which amount was secured by a surety bond
executed by B in favor of S.
No sale of the approximately 24,000 tons of iron ore had
been made nor had the P65,000.00 been paid.
Issue: Is the obligation of B to pay the remaining P65,000.00
subordinated to the sale or shipment of the ore as a condition
precedent?
Held: No. A contract of sale is normally commutative and
onerous (see Art. 1458.): not only does each one of the parties
assume a correlative obligation (the seller to deliver and trans-
fer ownership of the thing sold and the buyer to pay the price),
but such party anticipates performance by the other from the

very start.
(1) Contingent character of obligation to pay must clearly ap-
pear. — Where in a sale, the obligation of one party can be law-
fully subordinated to an uncertain event, so that the other un-
derstands that he assumes that risk of receiving nothing for
what he gives as in the case of a sale of hopes or expectations
(emptio spei), it is not in the usual course of business to do so,
hence, the contingent character of the obligation must clearly
appear.
(2) Surety bond negates such contingent character. — In the
case at bar, nothing is found in the record to evidence that S
desired or assumed to run the risk of losing his rights over the
ore without getting paid for it, or that B understood that S as-
sumed any such risk. This is proven by the fact that S insisted
on a bond by a surety company to guarantee payment of the
P65,000.00; and the fact that B did put up such bond indicates
that he admitted the definite existence of his obligation to pay
the balance of P65,000.00. (Gaite vs. Fonacier, 2 SCRA 830 [1961].)
ART. 1462. The goods which form the subject of a

contract of sale may be either existing goods, owned
or possessed by the seller, or goods to be manufac-
tured, raised, or acquired by the seller after the per-
fection of the contract of sale, in this Title called “fu-
ture goods.”
There may be a contract of sale of goods, whose
acquisition by the seller depends upon a contingency
which may or may not happen. (n)
Goods which may be the object of sale.

Goods which form the subject of a contract of sale may be ei-
ther:
(1) Existing goods or goods owned or possessed by the seller;
or
(2) Future goods or goods to be manufactured (like the sale of
milk bottles to be manufactured with the name of the buyer
pressed in the glass), raised (like the sale of the future harvest of
38 SALES Art. 1462
palay from a ricefield), or acquired (like the sale of a definite par-

cel of land the seller expects to buy).8 (Art. 1460.)
Future goods as object of sale.

A sale of future goods, even though the contract is in the form
of a present sale, is valid only as an executory contract to be ful-
filled by the acquisition and delivery of the goods specified.
In other words, “property or goods which at the time of the
sale are not owned by the seller but which thereafter are to be
acquired by him, cannot be the subject of an executed sale but may
be the subject of a contract for the future sale and delivery thereof,”
even though the acquisition of the goods depends upon a contin-
gency which may or may not happen. In such case, the vendor
assumes the risk of acquiring the title and making the convey-
ance, or responding in damages for the vendee’s loss of his bar-
gain. (Martin vs. Reyes, 91 Phil. 666 [1952]; 77 C.J.S. 604.)
Paragraph 1 of Article 1462 does not apply if the goods are to
be manufactured especially for the buyer and not readily saleable
to others in the manufacturer’s regular course of business. The
contract, in such case, must be considered as one for a piece of
work. (Art. 1467.)
Article 1462 contemplates a contract of sale of specific goods
where one of the contracting parties binds himself to transfer the
ownership of and deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. The said article
requires that there be delivery of goods, actual or constructive, to
be applicable. It does not apply to a transaction where there was
no such delivery; neither was there any intention to deliver a de-
terminate thing. Thus, a “futures” contract where the parties
merely speculate on the rise and fall on the price of the goods
subject matter of the transaction is a form of gambling was de-
clared null and void by Article 2018 of the Civil Code. (see note 2.)
8
Art. 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property. By future property is un-
derstood anything which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation. (635)
Art. 1347. x x x No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law. x x x.
Arts. 1463-1464 NATURE AND FORM OF THE CONTRACT 39
ART. 1463. The sole owner of a thing may sell an

undivided interest therein. (n)
Sale of undivided interest in a thing.

The sole owner of a thing may sell the entire thing; or only a
specific portion thereof; or an undivided interest therein and such
interest may be designated as an aliquot part of the whole.
The legal effect of the sale of an undivided interest in a thing
is to make the buyer a co-owner in the thing sold. As co-owner,
the buyer acquires full ownership of his part and he may, there-
fore, sell it. Such sale is, of course, limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division of the thing upon the ter-
mination of the co-ownership. (Article 493.)9 This rule operates
similarly with respect to ownership of fungible goods. (Art. 1464.)
Article 1463 covers only the sale by a sole owner of a thing of
an undivided share or interest thereof.
EXAMPLE:
S is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,000 square
meters. As the sole owner, S can sell to B the entire portion; or
only 500 square meters of the land by metes and bounds in
which case he becomes the sole owner of the remaining 500
meters and B the portion sold; or he may sell an undivided half
of the land without specially designating or identifying the
portion sold, in which case they become co-owners.
As a co-owner, S or B can convey or transfer only the title
pertaining to the undivided half of the land, for vital to the
validity of a contract of sale is that the vendor be the owner of
the thing sold. (Art. 1459.)
ART. 1464. In the case of fungible goods, there may

be a sale of an undivided share of a specific mass,
though the seller purports to sell and the buyer to buy
9
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. (399)
40 SALES Art. 1464
a definite number, weight or measure of the goods in

the mass, and though the number, weight or measure
of the goods in the mass is undetermined. By such a
sale the buyer becomes owner in common of such a
share of the mass as the number, weight or measure
bought bears to the number, weight or measure of the
mass. If the mass contains less than the number,
weight or measure bought, the buyer becomes the
owner of the whole mass and the seller is bound to
make good the deficiency from goods of the same kind
and quality, unless a contrary intent appears. (n)
Sale of an undivided share of a specific mass.

The Civil Code classifies movable goods into consumable or
non-consumable (Art. 418.), thereby discarding the old classifi-
cation (Art. 334, old Civil Code.) into fungible and non-fungible.
This change of classification seems to be in name only as the defi-
nition of fungible goods as those which cannot be used without
being consumed under the old Civil Code is precisely that of con-
sumable goods. Article 1464, however, still speaks of fungible
goods.
(1) Meaning of fungible goods. — It means goods of which any
unit is, from its nature or by mercantile usage, treated as the
equivalent of any other unit (Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 76.), such as
grain, oil, wine, gasoline, etc.
(2) Effect of sale. — The owner of a mass of goods may sell only
an undivided share thereof, provided the mass is specific or ca-
pable of being made determinate. (Art. 1460.)
(a) By such sale, the buyer becomes a co-owner with the
seller of the whole mass in the proportion in which the defi-
nite share bought bears to the mass.
(b) It must follow that the aliquot share of each owner can
be determined only by the measurement of the entire mass. If
later on it be discovered that the mass of fungible goods con-
tains less than what was sold, the buyer becomes the owner
of the whole mass and furthermore, the seller shall supply
whatever is lacking from goods of the same kind and quality,

subject to any stipulation to the contrary.
(3) Risk of loss. — If the buyer becomes a co-owner, with the
seller, or other owners of the remainder of the mass, it follows that
the whole mass is at the risk of all the parties interested in it, in
proportion to their various holdings.
(4) Subject matter. — Take note that in the sale of an undivided
share, either of a thing (Art. 1463.) or of that of mass of goods (Art.
1464.), the subject matter is an incorporeal right. (Art. 1501.) Here,
ownership passes to the buyer by the intention of the parties.
EXAMPLE:
S owns 1,000 cavans of palay stored in his warehouse. If S
sells to B 250 cavans of such palay which cavans are not segre-
gated from the whole mass, B becomes a co-owner of the said
mass to the extent of 1/4. If the warehouse happens to contain
only 200 cavans, S must deliver the whole 200 cavans and sup-
ply the deficiency of 50 cavans of palay of the same kind and
quality.
In the same example, the number of cavans in the ware-
house may be unknown or undetermined and S may sell only
1/4 share of the contents. The legal effect of such a sale is to
make B a co-owner in that proportion. It is obvious that in such
case, the obligation of the seller “to make good the deficiency”
will not arise.
(5) Applicability of Article 1464 to non-fungible goods. — Al-

though Article 1464 speaks of “fungible goods,” nevertheless it
may also apply to goods not strictly fungible in nature. “Indeed,
the earliest case in which the doctrine was applied related to bar-
rels of flour. Though flour of the same grade is fungible in the
strictest sense, barrels of flour are necessarily so. Other cases also
have applied the doctrine to goods in barrels. So it has been ap-
plied to bales of cotton and even to cattle or sheep. It is obvious
that all cattle are not alike and that some cattle in a herd are more
valuable than the others. But in the cases under consideration, the
parties had virtually agreed to act on the assumption that all were
alike and it can be seen that this is really the essential thing.” (1
Williston on Sales, 3rd ed., pp. 421-423.)
42 SALES Arts. 1465-1466
ART. 1465. Things subject to a resolutory condi-

tion may be the object of the contract of sale. (n)
Sale of thing subject to a resolutory condition.

A resolutory condition is an uncertain event upon the happen-
ing of which the obligation (or right) subject to it is extinguished.
Hence, the right acquired in virtue of the obligation is also extin-
guished. (see Arts. 1179, 1181.)
EXAMPLES:
(1) S (vendor a retro) sold a parcel of land to B (vendee a
retro) subject to the condition that S can repurchase the prop-
erty within two years from the date of sale. If S exercises the
right to repurchase, then the sale made by B to C before the
lapse of the two (2)-year period falls.
The rule, however, that a vendor cannot transfer to his
vendee a better right than he had himself, suffers an exception
in case of property with Torrens title. (see Hernandez vs.
Katigbak Vda. de Salas, 69 Phil. 748 [1940].)
(2) For failure to pay his debt, the land of S (mortgagor)
was sold to B, the highest bidder and purchaser in an extra-
judicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage.
Under the law (Act No. 3135, as amended.), the mortgagor
may redeem the property at any time within one year from and
after the date of the registration of the sale. If S redeems the
property, then the sale made to B is extinguished.
One of the obligations of the vendor is to transfer the owner-

ship of the thing object of the contract. (Art. 1458.) If the reso-
lutory condition attaching to the object of the contract, which
object may include things as well as rights (Arts. 1427, 1347, par.
1.), should happen, then the vendor cannot transfer the owner-
ship of what he sold since there is no object.
ART. 1466. In construing a contract containing pro-

visions characteristic of both the contract of sale and
of the contract of agency to sell, the essential clauses
of the whole instrument shall be considered. (n)
Sale distinguished from agency to sell.

By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some
service or to do something in representation or on behalf of an-
other, with the consent or authority of the latter. (Art. 1868.)
In order to classify a contract, due regard must be given to its
essential clauses. A contract is what the law defines it to be, and
not what it is called by the contracting parties. (Quiroga vs. Par-
son Hardware Co., 38 Phil. 501 [1918]; Baluran vs. Navarro, 79
SCRA 309 [1977].) Sale may be distinguished from an agency to
sell, as follows:
(1) In a sale, the buyer receives the goods as owner; in an
agency to sell, the agent receives the goods as the goods of the
principal who retains his ownership over them and has the right
to fix the price and the terms of the sale and receive the proceeds
less the agent’s commission upon the sales made;
(2) In a sale, the buyer has to pay the price; in an agency to
sell, the agent has simply to account for the proceeds of the sale
he may make on the principal’s behalf;
(3) In a sale, the buyer, as a general rule, cannot return the
object sold; in an agency to sell, the agent can return the object in
case he is unable to sell the same to a third person;
(4) In a sale, the seller warrants the thing sold (see Arts. 1547,
1548, 1561.); in an agency to sell, the agent makes no warranty
for which he assumes personal liability as long as he acts within
his authority and in the name of the seller; and
(5) In a sale, the buyer can deal with the thing sold as he
pleases being the owner; in an agency to sell, the agent in dealing
with the thing received, must act and is bound according to the
instructions of his principal.10
10
An agreement that the buyer shall deal exclusively with the products of the seller
— a well-known practice in the business world — is not inconsistent with the contract
of sale, much less convert it into one of agency; and where the entire control and direc-
tion of the business operation remains with the dealer, the latter cannot be considered a
mere alter ego of the manufacturer. (Asbestos Integrated Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Peralta,
155 SCRA 213 [1987].)
44 SALES Art. 1466
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. One given exclusive right to sell beds furnished by manu-
facturer, agreed to pay discounted invoice price at a certain period.
Facts: S granted B the exclusive right to sell the former’s
beds in Visayas. S was to furnish B with the beds which the
latter might order. The price agreed upon was the invoice price
of the beds in Manila with a discount of from 20% to 25%. Pay-
ment was to be made at the end of sixty days.
Issue: S claimed that the contract was an agency to sell while
B maintained that it was a sale.
Held: The stipulations are precisely the essential features of
a contract of purchase and sale. There was the obligation on
the part of S to supply the beds and on the part of B, to pay
their price.
These features exclude the legal conception of an agency
or order to sell whereby the mandatory or agent receives the
thing to sell it and does not pay its price but delivers to the
principal the price he obtains from the sale of the thing to a
third person, and if he does not succeed in selling, he returns it.
By virtue of the contract between S and B, the latter, on receiv-
ing the beds was necessarily obliged to pay their price within
the terms fixed without any other consideration and regard-
less as to whether he had sold the beds. (Quiroga vs. Parson
Hardware Co., 38 Phil. 501 [1918].)
———— ———— ————
2. Partial payments were made without mention of goods un-
sold and without stipulation for their return.
Facts: B received from S 350 pairs of shoes, the price of which
is stated as P2,450.00 or P7.00 per pair. B made partial payments
on account thereof.
Issue: On the issue of the nature of the transaction, S claimed
that it was an absolute sale and not a consignment.
Held: The transaction was an absolute sale. In making
said partial payments, B made no mention whatsoever of the
number of shoes sold by him and the number of shoes re-
maining unsold which he should have done had the sale been
on the consignment basis. He merely mentioned the balance
of the purchase price after deducting the several payments
made by him.
Furthermore, if the sale had been on consignment, a stipu-

lation as to the period of time for the return of the unsold shoes
should have been made but that had not been done and B kept
the shoes unsold more or less indefinitely. (Royal Shirt Factory,
Inc. vs. Co Bon Tic, 94 Phil. 994 [1954].) It has been held that
where a foreign company has an agent here selling its goods
and merchandise, the same agent could not very well act as
agent for local buyers because the interests of his foreign prin-
cipal and those of the buyers would be in direct conflict. He
could not serve two masters at the same time. (G. Puyat & Sons,
Inc. vs. Arco Amusement, 72 Phil. 402 [1941]; see Far Eastern Ex-
port & Import Co. vs. Lim Teck Suan, 97 Phil. 171 [1955].)
Contract creating both a sale and an agency

relationship.
The transfer of title or agreement to transfer it for a price paid
or promised is the essence of sale. If such transfer puts the trans-
feree in the position of an owner and makes him liable for the
agreed price, the transaction is a sale. On the other hand, the es-
sence of an agency to sell is the delivery to an agent, not as his
property, but as the property of his principal, who remains the
owner and has the right to control sales, fix the price and terms,
demand and receive the proceeds less the agent’s commission
upon sales made. (Ker & Co., Inc. vs. Lingad, 38 SCRA 524 [1971];
Schmid and Oberly, Inc. vs. RJL Martinez Fishing Corp., 166 SCRA
493 [1988].)
In some circumstances, however, a contract can create both a
sale and an agency relationship. For example: An automobile
dealer receives title to the cars he orders from the manufacturer
and that transaction is a sale; but he is an agent to the extent that
he is authorized to pass on to the ultimate purchaser the limited
warranty of the manufacturer. In any event, the courts must look
at the entire transaction to determine if it is a principal-agent re-
lationship or a buyer-seller relationship. (1 Williston on Sales, 4th
ed., pp. 16-17.)
ART. 1467. A contract for the delivery at a certain

price of an article which the vendor in the ordinary
course of his business manufactures or procures for
46 SALES Art. 1467
the general market, whether the same is on hand at

the time or not, is a contract of sale, but if the goods
are to be manufactured specially for the customer and
upon his special order, and not for the general mar-
ket, it is a contract for a piece of work. (n)
Sale distinguished from contract

for a piece of work.
By the contract for a piece of work the contractor binds himself
to execute a piece of work for the employer, in consideration of a
certain price or compensation. The contractor may either employ
his labor or skill, or also furnish the material. (Art. 1713.)
The distinction between a contract of sale and one for work,
labor or materials or for a piece of work is tested by the inquiry
whether the thing transferred is one not in existence and which
never would have existed but for the order of the party desiring
to acquire it, or a thing which would have existed and been the
subject of sale to some other person, even if the order had not been
given.
(1) In the first case, the contract is one for work, labor and
materials and in the second, one of sale. (Inchausti & Co. vs.
Cromwell, 20 Phil. 345 [1911]; see Celestino Co. & Co. vs. Coll., 99
Phil. 841 [1956]; Comm. vs. Engineering Equipment and Supply
Co., 64 SCRA 590 [1975]; Comm. vs. Arnoldus Carpentry Shop,
Inc., 159 SCRA 199 [1988]; Engineering & Machinery Corp. vs.
(2) In the first case, the risk of loss before delivery is borne by
the worker or contractor, not by the employer (the person who
ordered). (Arts. 1717, 1718.) A contract is for a piece of work if
services dominate that contract even though there is a sale of
goods involved. Where the primary objective of a contract is a sale
of a manufactured item, it is a sale of goods even though the item
is manufactured by labor furnished by the seller and upon previ-
ous order of the customer. (see 1 Williston, 4th ed., p. 23.)
(3) The importance of marking the line that divides contracts
for a piece of work from contracts of sale arises from the fact that
the former is not within the Statute of Frauds. (see Art. 1483.)
EXAMPLE:
If B is buying a pair of shoes of a particular style and size
from S which the latter ordinarily manufactures or procures
for the general market but the same is not available, an order
for one would be a contract of sale, since the article would have
existed and been the subject of sale to some other person even
if the order had not been given.
On the other hand, if B places an order for a pair of shoes of
a particular shape because his feet are deformed, the fact that
such kind of shoes is not suitable for sale to others in the ordi-
nary course of the seller’s business and is to be manufactured
especially for B and upon his special order, makes the contract
one for a piece of work.
ART. 1468. If the consideration of the contract con-

sists partly in money, and partly in another thing, the
transaction shall be characterized by the manifest in-
tention of the parties. If such intention does not clearly
appear, it shall be considered a barter if the value of
the thing given as a part of the consideration exceeds
the amount of the money or its equivalent; otherwise,
it is a sale. (1446a)
Sale distinguished from barter.

By the contract of barter or exchange, one of the parties binds
himself to give one thing in consideration of the other’s promise
to give another thing. (Art. 1638.) On the other hand, in a con-
tract of sale, the vendor gives a thing in consideration for a price
in money. (Art. 1458.)
(1) The above distinction is not always adequate to distin-
guish one from the other. Hence, the rule in Article 1468 for those
cases in which the thing given in exchange consists partly in
money and partly in another thing.
(a) In such cases, the manifest intention of the parties is
paramount in determining whether it is one of barter or of sale
and such intention may be ascertained by taking into account
the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. (Art.
1371.)
48 SALES Art. 1468
(b) If this intention cannot be ascertained, then the last sen-

tence of the article applies. But if the intention is that the con-
tract shall be one of sale, then such intention must be followed
even though the value of the thing given as a part considera-
tion is more than the amount of the money given.
(2) The only point of difference between the two contracts is
in the element which is present in sale but not in barter, namely:
“price certain in money or its equivalent.” (see Art. 1641.)
EXAMPLES:
(1) S, a sugar miller, and B, a manufacturer and dealer of
whisky, entered into an agreement whereby S was to deliver
sugar worth P20,000.00 to B who was to give 100 bottles of
whisky worth also P20,000.00. This is a contract of barter.
(2) Suppose at the date of delivery, B had only 25 bottles
of whisky. With the consent of S, S paid the difference of P15,000
in cash. In this case, the contract is still barter. The considera-
tion for the sugar is not cash but the whisky, and the amount of
P15,000.00 paid by B is in consideration for the 75 bottles of
liquor.
(3) Suppose, in the same example, B had no whisky at the
stipulated date of delivery and he paid S P20,000.00 instead of
giving whisky. Did the contract become one of sale? No, be-
cause the payment is in consideration of the value of the whisky,
and not of the sugar. The manifest intention of the parties was
to enter into a contract of barter. But if B had whisky at the date
of delivery and he paid P20,000.00 with the consent of S, the
contract would become one of sale.
(4) Assume now that the contract between S and B was for
S to deliver sugar to B who agreed to give 100 bottles of whisky
or to pay P20,000.00 cash. If B, instead of whisky, paid P20,000.00
cash, it is clear that the resulting contract is that of sale, and not
barter.
(5) If the obligation of B is to deliver 50 bottles of whisky
and pay P10,000.00 cash, or 75 bottles of whisky and P5,000.00
cash, or 25 bottles of whisky and P15,000.00 cash, the transac-
tion shall be considered a barter or sale depending on the mani-
fest intention of the parties. Under Article 1468, if such inten-
tion does not clearly appear, the contract shall be considered a
barter, where the cash involved is P5,000.00, or a sale, in case it

is P15,000.00, or either in case it is P10,000.00.
Sale distinguished from lease.

In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to
another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain and for
a period which may be definite or indefinite. (Art. 1643.) In other
words, in a lease, the landlord or lessor transfers merely the tem-
porary possession and enjoyment of the thing leased. In a sale,
the seller transfers ownership of the thing sold.
Sale distinguished from dation in payment.

Dation in payment (or dacion en pago) is the alienation of prop-
erty to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money. (see Art.
1619.) It is governed by the law on sales. (Art. 1245.) As such the
essential elements of a contract of sales, namely, consent: object
certain, and cause or considerations, must be present.
The distinctions are the following:
(1) In sale, there is no preexisting credit, while in dation in
payment, there is;
(2) In sale, obligations are created, while in dation in payment,
obligations are extinguished;
(3) In sale, the cause is the price paid, from the viewpoint of
the seller, or the thing sold, from the viewpoint of the buyer, while
in dation in payment, the extinguishment of the debt, from the
viewpoint of the debtor, or the object acquired in lieu of the credit,
from the viewpoint of the creditor;11
(4) In sale, there is more freedom in fixing the price than in
dation in payment; and
(5) In sale, the buyer has still to pay the price, while in dation
in payment, the payment is received by the debtor before the con-
tract is perfected. (see 10 Manresa 16-17.)
11
What actually takes place in dation in payment is an objective novation of the
obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an
obligation is considered as the purchase price. (see Art. 1291[1], Civil Code.)
50 SALES Art. 1469
EXAMPLE:
S owes B P10,000.00. To pay his debt, S, with the consent of
B, delivers a specific television set. If the value of the television
set, however, is only P8,000.00, S is still liable for P2,000.00 un-
less the parties have considered the conveyance as full pay-
ment.
ART. 1469. In order that the price may be consid-

ered certain, it shall be sufficient that it be so with
reference to another thing certain, or that the deter-
mination thereof be left to the judgment of a specified
person or persons.
Should such person or persons be unable or
unwilling to fix it, the contract shall be inefficacious,
unless the parties subsequently agree upon the price.
If the third person or persons acted in bad faith or
by mistake, the courts may fix the price.
Where such third person or persons are prevented
from fixing the price or terms by fault of the seller or
the buyer, the party not in fault may have such rem-
edies against the party in fault as are allowed the seller
or the buyer, as the case may be. (1447a)
When price considered certain.

The price in a contract of sale ought to be settled for there can
be no sale without a price. (see Borromeo vs. Borromeo, 98 Phil.
432 [1955].) It must be certain or capable of being ascertained in
money or its equivalent; and money is to be understood as cur-
rency, and its equivalent means promissory notes, checks and
other mercantile instruments generally accepted as representing
money.
The fact that the exact amount to be paid for the thing sold is
not precisely fixed, is no bar to an action to recover such compen-
sation, provided the contract, by its terms furnishes a basis or
measure for ascertaining the amount agreed upon. (Majarabas vs.
Leonardo, 11 Phil. 272 [1908]; Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 78
SCAD 484, 267 SCRA 89 [1997].)
Under the above article, the price is certain if:

(1) The parties have fixed or agreed upon a definite amount;
or
(2) It be certain with reference to another thing certain (see
Art. 1472; Majarabas vs. Leonardo, 11 Phil. 272 [1908].); or
(3) The determination of the price is left to the judgment of a
specified person or persons and even before such determina-
tion. (see Barretto vs. Sta. Maria, 26 Phil. 200 [1913], under Art.
1458.)
It must be understood that the last two cases are applicable
only when no specific amount has been stipulated by the parties.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Price was fixed at 10% below the price in the inventory, at
the invoice price, and in accordance with the price list less 20% dis-
count.
Facts: S sold to B a tobacco and cigarette factory together
with the trademark “La Maria Cristina,” the stocks of tobacco,
machinery, labels, wrappers, etc. for a sum subject to modifica-
tion, in accordance with the result shown by the inventory to
be drawn up. In this inventory the value of each individual
price of furniture was fixed at 10% below the price in the part-
nership inventory. The value of the tobacco, both in leaf and in
process of manufacture, was fixed at the invoice price.
The value of tobacco made up into cigars was fixed in ac-
cordance with the price list of the company less 20% discount.
Issue: Under the terms of the agreement, may the price of
the property sold be considered certain within the meaning of
the law?
Held: The price may be considered certain. The articles
which were the subject of the sale were definitely and finally
agreed upon. The price for each article was fixed. It is true that
the price of the tobacco, for example, was not stated in pesos
and centavos. But by its terms B agreed to pay therefor the
amount named in the invoices then in existence. The price could
be made certain by a mere reference to these invoices.
(McCullough vs. Aenille & Co., 13 Phil. 258 [1909].)
———— ———— ————
52 SALES Art. 1469
2. Price was fixed at a certain amount subject to modifications

based on known factors.
Facts: S contracted to sell large quantity of coal to B. The
basic price fixed in the contract was P9.45 per long ton but it
was stipulated that the price was subject to modifications “in
proportion to variations in calories and ash content and not
otherwise.”
Issue: Is the price certain within the meaning of the law?
Held: By stipulation, the price could be made certain by the
application of known factors (Art. 1469.), and for the purposes
of this case, it may be assumed that the price was fixed at P9.45
per long ton. (Mitsui Bussan Kaisha vs. Manila B.R.R. and L. Co.,
39 Phil. 624 [1919].)
———— ———— ————
3. Price (compensation) promised was the cost of maintenance.
Facts: X rendered services as wet nurse and governess to
Y’s infant daughter. Y promised to compensate X for the serv-
ices, providing for the maintenance of X, her husband and her
children during all the time that the services were required.
Y contends that there was no valid contract of lease of serv-
ices because the price thereof was not fixed.
Issue: Does the contract furnish a basis or measure by which
the amount of compensation may be ascertained?
Held: Yes. In this case, the cost of maintenance determines
the compensation according to the agreement of the parties.
(Majarabas vs. Leonardo, supra.)
———— ———— ————
4. Price was fixed at “not greater than P210.00 per square me-
ter.”
Facts: Under the contract of lease with option to buy en-
tered into in 1975, the lessee was given the option to purchase
the parcel of land lease within a period of 10 years from the
date of signing of the contract “at a price not greater than P210.00
per square meter.”
Issue: Is the price certain or definite?
Held: Yes, given the circumstances of the case. “Contracts
are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the
terms which the parties themselves have used. In the present
dispute, there is evidence to show that the intention of the par-

ties is to peg the price of P210 per square meter. This was con-
firmed by the petitioner [lessor] himself in his testimony as fol-
lows. x x x
Moreover by his subsequent acts of having the land titled
under the Torrens System, and in pursuing the back [lessee]
manager to effect the sale immediately means that he under-
stood perfectly well the terms of the contract. He even had the
same property mortgaged to the respondent back sometime in
1979, without the slightest hint of wanting to abandon his offer
to sell the property at the agreed price of P210 per square me-
ter.’’ (Serra vs. Court of Appeals, 47 SCAD 55, 229 SCRA 60 [1994].)
Effect where price fixed by third person

designated.
As a general rule, the price fixed by a third person designated
by the parties is binding upon them. There are, however, excep-
tions such as:
(1) When the third person acts in bad faith or by mistake as
when the third person fixed the price having in mind not the thing
which is the object of the sale, but another analogous or similar
thing in which case the court may fix the price. But mere error in
judgment cannot serve as a basis for impugning the price fixed;
and
(2) When the third person disregards specific instructions or
the procedure marked out by the parties or the data given him,
thereby fixing an arbitrary price. (see 10 Manresa 53-54.)
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B a diamond ring. The determination of the price
was left to C whom the parties thought was a jeweler.
If C acted by mistake, as when he is incompetent to know
the price of the diamond ring, or in bad faith, as when he con-
nived with S, the court may fix the price.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Price was fixed on the basis of a certain proportion of total net
value of business to be ascertained by appraisers.
54 SALES Art. 1470
Facts: S executed a document whereby he agreed to trans-

fer to B “the whole of the right, title, and interest” in a business.
This whole was 4/173 of the entire net value of the business.
The parties agreed that the price should be 4/173 of the total
net value. The ascertainment of such net value was left unre-
servedly to the judgment of the appraisers.
Issue: Is the price certain?
Held: Yes, for the minds of the parties have met on the thing
and the price. Nothing was left unfinished and all questions
relating thereto were settled. This is an example of a perfected
sale. (Barretto vs. Santa Maria, 26 Phil. 200 [1913].)
Effect where price not fixed by third

person designated.
(1) If the third person designated by the parties to fix the price
refuses or cannot fix it (without fault of the seller and the buyer),
the contract shall become ineffective, as if no price had been agreed
upon unless, of course, the parties subsequently agree upon the
price. (par. 2.)
(2) If such third person is prevented from fixing the price by
the fault of the seller or the buyer, the party not in fault may ob-
tain redress against the party in fault (par. 2.) which consists of a
choice between rescission or fulfillment, with damages in either
case. (Art. 1191, par. 2; see Art. 1594.) If the innocent party chooses
fulfillment, the court shall fix the price.
ART. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not

affect a contract of sale, except as it may indicate a
defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended
a donation or some other act or contract. (n)
Effect of gross inadequacy of price

in voluntary sales.
(1) General rule. — While a contract of sale is commutative,
mere inadequacy of the price or alleged hardness of the bargain
generally does not affect its validity when both parties are in a
position to form an independent judgment concerning the trans-
action. (Askav vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 79 [1924]; Ereñeta vs. Bezore,
54 SCRA 13 [1973]; Auyong Hian vs. Court of Appeals, 59 SCRA

110 [1974]; see Ong vs. Ong, 139 SCRA 133 [1985].) This rule holds
true in voluntary contracts of sale otherwise free from invalidat-
ing defects. A valuable consideration, however small or nominal,
if given or stipulated in good faith is, in the absence of fraud,
sufficient. (Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 553 [1992].)
In determining whether the price is adequate or not, the price
obtaining at the date of the execution of the contract, not those
obtaining a number of years later, should be considered.
(Siopongco vs. Castro, [C.A.] No. 12448-R, Jan. 18, 1957.)
(2) Where low price indicates a defect in the consent. — The inad-
equacy of price, however, may indicate a defect in the consent such
as when fraud, mistake, or undue influence is present (Art. 1355.)
in which case the contract may be annulled not because of the
inadequacy of the price but because the consent is vitiated. Con-
tracts of sale entered into by guardians or representatives of ab-
sentees are rescissible whenever the wards or absentees whom
they represent suffer lesion by more than 1/4 of the value of the
things which are the object thereof. (Art. 1381[1, 2].)
The unsupported claim that the sale of property was made
for an inadequate price is a mere speculation which has no place
in our judicial system. Since every claim must be substantiated
by sufficient evidence, such a conjectural pretension cannot be
entertained. Allegation of inadequacy of price must be proven.
(Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng Diong, 1 SCRA 275 [1961].)
(3) Where price so low as to be “shocking to conscience”. — While
it is true that mere inadequacy of price is not a sufficient ground
for the cancellation of a voluntary contract of sale, it has been held
that where the price is so low that “a man in his senses and not
under a delusion” would not accept it, the sale may be set aside
and declared an equitable mortgage to secure a loan. (Aguilar vs.
Rubiato, 40 Phil. 570 [1919]; De Leon vs. Salvador, 36 SCRA 507
[1970]; Art. 1602[1].) But where the price paid is much higher than
the assessed value of the property and the sale is effected by a
father to his daughter in which filial love must be taken into ac-
count, the price is not to be construed “as so inadequate to shock
the court’s conscience.” (Alsua-Bett vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA
332 [1979]; Jocson vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 333 [1989].)
56 SALES Art. 1470
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Selling price is 1/26 of value of property.
Facts: S sold to B with pacto de retro (right to repurchase) a
land valued at P26,000 for only P1,000.00.
Issue: May the contract be construed as an equitable mort-
gage? (see Arts. 1602, 1603.)
Held: As the price is so grossly inadequate, the contract will
be interpreted to be one of loan with equitable mortgage with
the price paid as principal of said loan and the land given merely
as security. (Aguilar vs. Rubiato, 40 Phil. 570 [1919].)
———— ———— ————
2. Purchaser of property earned greater profit by its subsequent
resale than that earned by seller by the sale to such purchaser.
Facts: S bought a land for P870.00. One year later, he sold
the same land to B for P1,125.00. Subsequently, B sold 1/20 of
the land for P681.00. S brought action to have the sale annulled,
claiming that the price of the land was “so inadequate as to
shock the conscience of men’’ as shown by B’s sale of 1/20 of
the land for more than half of what was paid to S.
Issue: Is the price of P870.00 grossly inadequate?
Held: Having sold the land to B for the sum of P1,125.00
one year after he had purchased it for P870.00 at a profit of
about 28%, S had no ground for complaint. A sale may not be
annulled simply because the purchaser subsequently resold the
property or a part of it at a greater profit than that earned by
his vendor. (Alarcon vs. Kasilag, [C.A.] 40 O.G. [Supp. 11] 203.)
———— ———— ————
3. Conveyance of property is for P1.00 and other valuable con-
siderations.
Fact: S, for and in consideration of P1.00 and other valu-
able considerations, executed in favor of B then a minor, a
Quitclaim Deed whereby she transferred to B all her rights and
interests in the 1/2 undivided portion of a parcel of land. Later,
S claimed that the deed is null and void as it is equivalent to a
Deed of Donation, acceptance of which by the donee is neces-
sary to give it validity.
lssue: Is the Quitclaim Deed a conveyance of property with
a valid cause or consideration?
Held: Yes. The cause or consideration is not the P1.00 alone

but also other valuable considerations. Although the cause is
not stated in the contract it is presumed that it is existing un-
less the debtor proves the contrary. (Art. 1354.) This presump-
tion cannot be overcome by a simple assertion of lack of con-
sideration especially when the contract itself states that con-
sideration was given, and the same has been reduced into a
public instrument with all due formalities and solemnities.
Moreover, even granting that the Quitclaim Deed is a do-
nation, Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that the require-
ment of the acceptance of the donation in favor of a minor by
parents or legal representatives applies only to onerous and
conditional donations where the donee may have to assume
certain charges or burdens. (Ong vs. Ong, 139 SCRA 133 [1985].)
Effect of gross inadequacy of price

in involuntary sales.
(1) General rule. — A judicial or execution sale is one made by
a court with respect to the property of a debtor for the satisfac-
tion of his indebtedness.12
Like in a voluntary sale, mere inadequacy of price is not a
sufficient ground for the cancellation of an execution sale if there
is no showing that in the event of a resale, a better price can be
obtained. It has been held that the public sale of a lot valued at
P40,500.00 for P12,000.00 cash “does not appear to be inadequate.”
(see Cu Bie vs. Court of Appeals, 15 SCRA 306 [1965]; Pascua vs.
Heirs of Segundo Simeon, 161 SCRA 1 [1988].)
(2) Where price so low as to be “shocking to the conscience.” — If
the “price is so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the Court”,
“such that the mind revolts at it and such that a reasonable mind
would neither directly or indirectly be likely to consent to it,’’ a
judicial sale, say, of real property, will be set aside. (National Bank
vs. Gonzales, 45 Phil. 693 [1923]; Warnes, Barnes & Co. vs. Santos,
12
There are three (3) types of sale arising from failure to pay a mortgage debt, namely,
the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, the judicial foreclosure sale, and the ordinary execu-
tion sale. They are governed by three (3) different laws which are, respectively, Act No.
3135, Rule 68, and Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. (Abaca Corporation of the Phils. vs.
58 SALES Art. 1471
15 Phil. 446 [1910]; Paras vs. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 389 [1952];
Cometa vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCAD 90, 351 SCRA 294 [2001].)
Thus, where a land with an assessed value of more than P60,000.00
was sold for only P867.00, the sale was set aside. (Director of Lands
vs. Abarca, 61 Phil. 70 [1934]; Jalandoni vs. Ledesma, 64 Phil. 1058
[1937].)
Similarly, an execution sale whereby 33 hectares of land were
ceded to the judgment creditor to satisfy a liability for 146 cavans
of palay was held void for inadequacy of price. (Singson vs.
Babida, 79 SCRA 111 [1977].) So, also the price of the sale of prop-
erties at around 10% of their value was held to be grossly inad-
equate. (Provincial Sheriff of Rizal vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA
329 [1975].)
(3) Where seller is given the right to repurchase. — The validity
of the sale is not necessarily affected where the law gives to the
owner the right to redeem, as when a sale is made at public auc-
tion, upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for
the owner to effect the redemption. (De Leon vs. Salvador, 36
SCRA 567 [1970]; Ravanera vs. Imperial, 93 SCRA 589 [1979];
Ramos vs. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986]; Francia vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 753 [1988]; Abaca Corporation of the
Phils. vs. Garcia, 81 SCAD 635, 272 SCRA 475 [1997].) He may
reacquire the property or also sell his right to redeem and thus
recover the loss he claims he suffered by reason of the price ob-
tained at the execution sale. (Tolentino vs. Agcaoli, [unrep.] 91 Phil.
917 [1952]; Barrozo vs. Macaraeg, 83 Phil. 378 [1949]; Velasquez
vs. Coronel, 5 SCRA 985 [1962]; Dev. Bank of the Phils. vs. Moll,
43 SCRA 82 [1972].)
ART. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void,

but the act may be shown to have been in reality a
donation, or some other act or contract. (n)
Effect where price is simulated.

(1) If the price is simulated or false such as when the vendor
really intended to transfer the thing gratuitously, then the sale is
void but the contract shall be valid as a donation. (Arts. 1471, 1345,
1353.)
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B a parcel of land worth P50,000.00 for only
P30,000.00. This contract of sale is valid although the price is
grossly inadequate. However, if it is shown that B induced S to
sell the land through fraud, mistake, or undue influence, the
contract may be annulled on that ground.
If the price is simulated, B may prove another considera-
tion like the liberality of S and if such liberality is proved, then
the contract is valid as a donation; or B may prove that the act
is in reality some other contract, like barter and, therefore, the
transfer of ownership is unaffected.
(2) If the contract is not shown to be a donation or any other

act or contract transferring ownership because the parties do not
intend to be bound at all (Art. 1345, ibid.), the ownership of the
thing is not transferred. The contract is void and inexistent. (Art.
1409[2].) The action or defense for the declaration of the inexist-
ence of a contract does not prescribe. (Art. 1410; see Catindig vs.
Heirs of Catalina Roque, 74 SCRA 83 [1976].)
(3) Simulation occurs when an apparent contract is a decla-
ration of a fictitious will deliberately made by agreement of the
parties, in order to produce, for the purpose of deception, the
appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different
from that which was really executed. Its requisites are (a) an out-
ward declaration of will different from the will of the parties; (b)
the false appearance must have been intended by mutual agree-
ment; and (c) the purpose is to deceive third persons. (Tongoy vs.
Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 99 [1983]; Bayongayong vs. Court of
Appeals, 430 SCRA 210 [2004].)
The fact that the seller continues to pay realty taxes on the land
sold even after the execution of the contract to sell does not nec-
essarily prove ownership, much less simulation of said contract.
The non-payment of the price does not prove simulation; at most,
it gives the seller the right to sue for collection. Generally, in a
contract of sale, payment of the price is a resolutory condition and
the remedy of the seller is to exact fulfillment or, in case of a sub-
stantial breach, to rescind the contract. (Villaflor vs. Court of
Appeals, 87 SCAD 778, 280 SCRA 297 [1997].) The non-payment
of the price by the supposed buyer, a minor, when taken into ac-
60 SALES Arts. 1472-1473
count together with the many intrinsic defects of the deed of sale,
may, however, show that the price is simulated, making the sale
void. (Lebagela vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360 [2001].)
ART. 1472. The price of securities, grain, liquids,

and other things shall also be considered certain,
when the price fixed is that which the thing sold would
have on a definite day, or in a particular exchange or
market, or when an amount is fixed above or below
the price on such day, or in such exchange or market,
provided said amount be certain. (1448)
Price on a given day at particular market.

The above provision follows the principle in Article 1469 that
a price is considered certain if it could be determined with refer-
ence to another thing certain.
Note the last phrase of the above article: “provided said
amount be certain.” When an amount is fixed above or below the
price on a given day or in a particular exchange or market, the
said amount must be certain; otherwise, the sale is inefficacious
(Art. 1474.) because the price cannot be determined.
This article is especially applicable to fungible things like se-
curities, grain, liquids, etc. the price of which are subject to fluc-
tuations of the market.
ART. 1473. The fixing of the price can never be left

to the discretion of one of the contracting parties.
However, if the price fixed by one of the parties is ac-
cepted by the other, the sale is perfected. (1449a)
Fixing of price by one of the contracting

parties, not allowed.
The reason for the rule is obvious.
(1) If consent is essential to a contract of sale, the determina-
tion of the price cannot be left to the discretion of one of the con-
tracting parties; otherwise, it cannot be said that the other con-
sented to a price he did not and could not previously know. (see
10 Manresa 6061.) The validity or compliance of the contract can-

not be made to depend upon the will of one party. (Art. 1308.)
(2) Moreover, to be just, the price must be determined impar-
tially by both parties (Art. 1458.) or left to the judgment of a speci-
fied person or persons. (Art. 1469.)
However, where the price fixed by one party is accepted by
the other, the contract is deemed perfected because in this case,
there exists a true meeting of minds upon the price. (Art. 1475.)
ART. 1474. Where the price cannot be determined

in accordance with the preceding articles, or in any
other manner, the contract is inefficacious. However,
if the thing or any part thereof has been delivered to
and appropriated by the buyer, he must pay a reason-
able price therefor. What is a reasonable price is a
question of fact dependent on the circumstances of
each particular case. (n)
Effect of failure to determine price.

(1) Where contract executory. — If the price cannot be deter-
mined in accordance with Articles 1469 and 1472, or in any other
manner, and the bargain is still executory, the contract is without
effect. Price certain is an essential element of the contract of sale.
(Art. 1458.) Consequently, there is no obligation on the part of the
vendor to deliver the thing and on the part of the vendee to pay.
(2) Where delivery has been made. — If the thing or any part
thereof has already been delivered and appropriated by the buyer,
the latter must pay a reasonable price therefor. This obligation of
the buyer is sometimes contractual (if the agreement omits any
reference to price), and sometimes, quasi-contractual (if the agree-
ment provides that the parties are thereafter to agree on the price).
(see Art. 2142.)
(a) If a buyer, for example, orders a cavan of rice from a
store, nothing being said as to the price, the parties intend and
understand that a reasonable price shall be paid. The obliga-
tion here is contractual. The law merely enforces the intention
of the parties.
62 SALES Art. 1474
(b) Article 1474 applies only where the means contem-

plated by the parties for fixing the price have, for any reason,
proved ineffectual. In this case, the obligation of the buyer to
pay a reasonable price is an obligation imposed by law as dis-
tinguished from a contractual obligation. It is based on the
fundamental principle that no one should enrich himself at the
expense of another. (Ibid.) In case, however, the parties do not
intend to be bound until after the price is settled, the buyer
must return any goods already received or if unable to do so,
must pay their reasonable value at the time of delivery, and
the seller must return any portion of the amount received.
Concept of reasonable price.

The reasonable price or value of goods is generally the mar-
ket price at the time and place fixed by the contract or by law for
the delivery of the goods. Under special circumstances of unnatu-
ral conditions in the market, the market price does not furnish
the only test. In the leading case upon this point, the court said:
“A reasonable price may or may not agree with the cur-
rent price of the commodity at the port of shipment when such
shipment is made. The current price of the day may be highly
unreasonable from accidental circumstances, as on account of
the commodity having been purposely kept back by the ven-
dor himself, or with reference to the price at the other ports in
the immediate vicinity, or from various other causes. This
doctrine has been applied in cases where the market has been
monopolized.” (1 Williston,13 op. cit., p. 447.)
Determination of fair market value.

Offers to sell are not competent evidence of the fair market
value of a property, because they are no better than offers to buy,
which have been held to be inadmissible as proof of said values.
(City of Manila vs. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208 [1913]; Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Aguilar, 35 Phil. 118 [1913].)
“In discussing the term ‘market value’, the author of a well-
known treatise on the subject of damages observes that to make a
13
If not indicated, the 3rd edition thereof.
market there must be both buying and selling; and the ‘market
value’ is that ‘reasonable’ sum which property would bring on a
fair sale by a man willing but not obliged to sell to a man willing
but not obliged to buy.” (Sedgewick on Damages, Sec. 245, cited
in Compagnie Franco-Indo Chinoise vs. Deutsch-Australiache, 39
Phil. 474 [1919]; Perez vs. Araneta, 6 SCRA 457 [1962].)
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the

moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing
which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally
demand performance, subject to the provisions of the
law governing the form of contracts. (1450a)
Perfection of contract of sale.

This article follows the general rule that contracts are perfected
by mere consent. (Art. 1315.) The contract of sale being consen-
sual, it is perfected at the moment of consent without the neces-
sity of any other circumstances. From the moment there is a meet-
ing of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract
and upon the price (see Art. 1624.), the reciprocal obligations of
the parties arise even when neither has been delivered. (see Pa-
cific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, 37 SCRA 685
[1971]; Villongco Realty Co. vs. Bormacheco, Inc., 65 SCRA 352
[1975]; Vargas Plow Factory, Inc. vs. Central Bank, 27 SCRA 84
[1969]; Xentrex Automotive, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCAD
923, 290 SCRA 66 [1998].) The essence of consent is the conform-
ity of the parties on the term of the contract, the acceptance by
one of the offer made by the other. (Salonga vs. Farrales, 105 SCRA
359 [1981]; Firme vs. Buklod Enterprises and Dev. Corp., 414 SCRA
190 [2003].)
(1) Conduct of the parties. — Appropriate conduct by the par-
ties may be sufficient to establish an agreement. While there may
be instances where interchanged correspondence does not disclose
the exact point at which the deal was closed, the actions of the
parties may indicate that a binding obligation has been under-
taken. (Maharlika Publishing Corp. vs. Tagle, 142 SCRA 553
[1986].) There is, however, no perfected sale where it is conditional
64 SALES Art. 1475
(e.g., approval by higher authorities) and the condition is not ful-

filled. (see People’s Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 133 SCRA 777 [1984].)
(2) Transfer of ownership. — The ownership is not transferred
until the delivery of the thing. (Arts. 1496, 1164.14) The parties,
however, may stipulate that the ownership in the thing, notwith-
standing its delivery, shall not pass to the purchaser until after he
has fully paid the purchase price thereof. (Arts. 1478, 1306.)
(3) Form of contract. — Generally, a contract of sale is binding
regardless of its form. (Art. 1356.) However, in case the contract
of sale should fall within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds
(Art. 1403[2].) or of any other applicable statute which requires a
certain form for its enforceability or validity (Art. 1356.), then that
form must be complied with. (Art. 1483.) A contract of sale may
be in a private instrument; the contract is valid and binding be-
tween the parties upon its perfection and a party may compel the
other to execute a public instrument embodying the contract. (see
Arts. 1357, 1358.)
A sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a private trans-
action or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally effec-
tive against third persons only from the date of its registration.
(Campillo vs. Phil. National Bank, 28 SCRA 720 [1969].)
In a case, a letter-offer to buy a particular property for a speci-
fied price was received by the offeree who annotated on the copy
the phrase “Received original, 9-4-89’’ beside which appears his
signature. Held: The receipt can neither be regarded as a contract
of sale nor a promise to sell. Such an annotation by the offeree
amounts to neither a written nor an implied acceptance of the
offer. It is merely a memorandum of the receipt by him of the of-
fer. The requisites of a valid contract of sale are lacking in said
receipt. (Jovan Land, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 79 SCAD 428, 268
SCRA 160 [1997].)
(4) Consent reluctantly given. — There is no difference in law
where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his
14
Art. 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing from the time the
obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall acquire no real right over it until the
same has been delivered to him.
good sense and judgment as when he acts voluntarily and freely.

(Acasio vs. Corp. de los PP. Dominicos de Filipinas, 100 Phil. 253
[1956].)
(5) Notarized deed of sale states receipt of price. — The unsup-
ported verbal claim of the seller that the sale of a motor vehicle
was not consummated for failure of the purchaser to pay the pur-
chase was held insufficient to overthrow a notarized deed of sale
wherein it is recited that the seller “sold, transferred and con-
veyed” the motor vehicle to the purchaser “for and in considera-
tion of the amount of P10,000 and other valuable considerations,
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.”
To overcome a public document solemnly executed before a
notary public, the evidence to the contrary must be clear, strong,
and convincing. Parol evidence will not suffice to negate the clear
and positive recitals of a public document not otherwise tainted
with fraud or falsification. (Regalario vs. Northwest Finance Cor-
poration, 117 SCRA 45 [1982].)
(6) Applicant’s qualification to buy still subject for investigation.
— In a case, the agreement denominated as “contract of sale” was
considered by the court as a mere application to buy the land in
question, and not a perfected contract of sale. Although it embod-
ied all the essential elements of a contract of sale by installment,
it appearing that “after the approval of such application it was
still necessary to have the [applicant’s] qualifications investigated
as well as whether or not he has complied with the provisions of
the law regarding the disposition of lands by the Board of Liqui-
dators,” the application was subject to revocation in case the ap-
plicant was found not to possess the qualifications necessary.
(Alvarez vs. Board of Liquidators, 4 SCRA 95 [1962]; Galvez vs.
Tagle Vda. de Kangleon, 6 SCRA 162 [1962].)
(7) Chattel mortgage of car by mortgagor-buyer prior to transfer of
title to his name. — The fact that the chattel mortgage of a car by
the buyers in favor of the seller was executed on a date earlier
than the transfer of the registration certificate thereof in the name
of the buyers does not render the said mortgage made by the
buyers invalid, because the mortgagors were already the owner
of the car when the mortgage was executed, inasmuch as at the
time of the sale wherein the parties agreed over the car and the
66 SALES Art. 1475
price, the contract became perfected, and when part of the pur-
chase price was paid and the car was delivered, upon the execu-
tion of the promissory note and the mortgage by the mortgagors,
the sale became consummated. The registration of the transfer of
automobiles and of the certificates of license for their use in the
Bureau of Land Transportation merely constitutes an administra-
tive proceeding which does not bear any essential relation to the
contract of sale entered into between the parties. (Montano vs. Lim
Ang, 7 SCRA 250 [1963].)
Registration of motor vehicles is required not because it is the
operative act that transfers ownership in vehicles (as in land reg-
istration cases), but because it is the means to identify the owner
thereof in case of accident so that responsibility for the same can
be fixed. (De Peralta vs. Mangusang, 11 SCRA 598 [1964].)
(8) Non-fulfillment by one party of his obligation. — In case one
of the contracting parties should not comply with what is incum-
bent upon him, the injured party may sue for fulfillment or re-
scission with the payment of damages in either case. (Art. 1191,
pars. 1 and 2.) This right is predicated on the violation of the reci-
procity between the parties brought about by a breach of obliga-
tion by one of them.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Purchase order form directed to seller asking delivery of a
piano carries the address of purchaser in Dipolog City while delivery
receipt form directed to purchaser carries address of seller in Cagayan
de Oro City.
Facts: B, an appliance center of Dipolog City, issued a pur-
chase order to S, an appliance center of Cagayan de Oro City,
directing the latter to furnish the former a Weinstein Accousticon
Piano. The order was honored by S, which issued a delivery
receipt for the item. B’s representative received the piano, and
signed the delivery receipt at Cagayan de Oro, and assumed
the responsibility and expenses of bringing it to Dipolog City.
Upon the refusal of B to pay, S filed a complaint for collec-
tion with the City Court of Cagayan de Oro. B filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that there being no written agreement between
the parties specifying where the action arising out of the con-
tract should be filed, the venue of the case properly falls in

Dipolog City under Section 1(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Where is the place of the execution of the contract or
the place where there was meeting of the minds of the parties?
Held: The meeting of minds took place in Cagayan de Oro
City when S received the purchase order, agreed to its terms,
and acted upon it. As a matter of fact, it was not the meeting of
minds alone but also the consummation of the contract which
happened in Cagayan de Oro City.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documents evi-
dencing the contract show the place of execution to be Cagayan
de Oro City. The purchase order is the contract sued upon. By
itself, it was only an offer to buy directed to S with address at
Cagayan de Oro City. It was brought to said city to be acted
upon at that place. The delivery receipt indicates the accept-
ance of the offer and the delivery of the piano also at Cagayan
de Oro City. The entry on the delivery receipt showing that the
purchased item was delivered to B of Dipolog City merely in-
dicates the name and address of the buyer but not the place of
the execution of the contract. (Raza Appliance Center vs. Villaraza,
117 SCRA 576 [1982].)
———— ———— ————
2. A co-owner sold 10 hectares portion of a land owned in com-
mon which portion was to be surveyed, with acknowledgment of the
receipt of an initial payment.
Facts: S executed two documents: in the first, S agreed to
sell and B agreed to buy, for P2,500.00, 10 hectares of land, which
is part and parcel of a bigger lot owned in common by S and
his sister although the boundaries of the 10 hectares would be
delineated at a later date and in the second, S acknowledged
receipt as initial payment of P800.
Additional payments of P300 were made. B filed a com-
plaint for specific performance after S returned the amounts
paid.
Issue: Was there a perfected contract of sale between the
parties?
Held: Yes. While it is true that the two documents are in
themselves not contracts of sale, there are, however, clear evi-
dence that a contract of sale was perfected. S’s acceptance of
68 SALES Art. 1475
the initial payment of P800.00 clearly showed his consent to

the contract thereby precluding him from rejecting its binding
effect. With the contract being partially executed, the same is
no longer covered by the requirements of the Statute of Frauds
in order to be enforceable. As co-owner, S cannot dispose of a
specific portion of the land, but his share shall be bound by the
effect of the sale under Article 493 of the Civil Code. (Clarin vs.
Rulona, 127 SCRA 512 [1984].)
When definite agreement on manner

of payment essential.
As a consensual contract, a contract of sale becomes a bind-
ing and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds of the par-
ties as to the price, despite the manner of payment, or even the
breach of that manner of payment. It is not the act of payment of
price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. (Buena-
ventura vs. Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 263 [2003].)
Where the parties, however, still have to meet and agree on
how and when the downpayment and installment payments are
to be made, it cannot be said that a contract of sale has been per-
fected.
Thus, in a case where the buyer is “to give a down-payment
of P10,000 to be followed by P20,000 and the balance of P70,000
would be paid in installments, the equal monthly amortization
of which has to be determined as soon as the P30,000 had been
completed,” it was held that the fact that the buyer delivered the
sum of P1,000 as part of the downpayment cannot be considered
as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agree-
ment between the parties under Article 1482. In this case, a defi-
nite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price
is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforce-
able contract of sale. (Velasco vs. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 439
[1973]; Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCAD
976, 255 SCRA 626 [1996]; see Navarro vs. Sugar Producers Corp.
Mktg. Assoc., 1 SCRA 1180 [1961]; Co vs. Court of Appeals, 286
SCRA 76 [1998].)
It appears, however, that the parties in the Velasco case agreed
on the purchase price of P100,000. It is believed that upon the
meeting of the minds of the parties on the thing which is the ob-
ject of the contract and the price (P100,000), the contract of sale
must be deemed to have been perfected. (Art. 1475.) The terms
and conditions of payment are merely accidental, not essential,
elements of the contract of sale except where the parties them-
selves clearly stipulate that in addition to the subject matter and
the price, they are essential or material to the contract. (see A.
Magsaysay, Inc. vs. Cebu Portland Cement Co., 100 Phil. 351
[1956].) A disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount
to a failure to agree on the price. (Swedish Match, AB vs. Court of
Appeals, 441 SCRA 1 [2004].)
Article 119715 of our Civil Code authorizes courts to fix the
period or periods of payment where there is lack of agreement
regarding the same.
In Uraca vs. Court of Appeals (86 SCAD 734, 278 SCRA 702
[1997].), S sent a letter to B, offering to sell a lot and commercial
building for P1,050,000. B sent a reply-letter within the 3-day pe-
riod contained in the offer accepting the aforesaid offer. Later, B
was told by S that the price was P1,400,000 in cash or manager’s
check and not P1,050,000 as erroneously dated in the letter-offer.
B agreed to the price of P1,400,000 but counter-proposed that
payment be paid in installments, with a downpayment of
P1,000,000 and the balance of P400,000 to be paid in 30 days. It
was held that a contract of sale was perfected at the original price
of P1,050,000 but there was no agreement in the sale at the in-
creased price of P1,400,000. The qualified acceptance by B consti-
tutes a counter-offer and, in effect, a rejection of S’s offer. (Art.
1319.) Since there was no definite agreement on the manner of the
payment of the purchase price of P1,400,000, the first sale for
P1,050,000 remained valid and existing.
Although the law does not expressly state that the minds of
the parties must also meet on the terms or manner of payment of
15
Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the cir-
cumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the dura-
tion thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will
of the debtor.
In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the circum-
stances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the
period cannot be changed by them. (1128a)
70 SALES Art. 1475
the price, the same is needed. Agreement on the manner of pay-

ment goes into the price such that a disagreement on the manner
of payment is tantamount to failure to agree on the price. (Toyota
Shaw, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 61 SCAD 310, 244 SCRA 320
[1995]; San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. vs. Huang, 130
SCAD 713, 336 SCRA 737 [2000].) An agreement on the price but
a disagreement on the manner of its payment will not result in
consent. This lack of consent is separate and distinct from lack of
consideration where the contract states that the price has been paid
when in fact it has never been paid. (Montecillo vs. Reyes, 170
SCAD 440, 385 SCRA 244 [2002], infra.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
The buyer, having failed to open a letter of credit as required by
the seller, claimed that there was no perfected contract of sale between
the parties.
Facts: B (buyer) established contact with S (seller) through
the Philippine Consulate General in Hamburg, West Germany,
because he wanted to purchase MAN bus spare parts from Ger-
many.
On October 16, 1981, B submitted to S a list of the parts he
wanted to purchase, with specific parts number and descrip-
tion. On December 17, 1971, S submitted its formal offer con-
taining the item number, quantity, part number, description,
unit price and total to B. On December 24, 1981, B informed S
of his desire to avail of the prices of the parts at that time and
enclosed its Purchase Order containing the item number, part
number and description. On December 29, 1981, B personally
submitted the quantities he wanted to the General Manager of
S in the Philippines. H, trading partner of S, sent a pro forma
invoice to be used by B in applying for a letter of credit; said
invoice required that said letter be opened in favor of J.
On February 16, 1982, S reminded B to open the letter of
credit to avoid delay in the shipment and payment of interest.
On October 18, 1982, S again reminded B of his order and ad-
vised that the case may be endorsed to its lawyers. B replied that
he did not make any valid Purchase Order and that there was
no definite contract between him and S. Subsequently, S filed a
complaint for recovery of actual or compensatory damages,
unearned profits, interest, attorney’s fees and costs against B.
Issue: The issue posed for resolution is whether or not a

contract of sale has been perfected between the parties.
Held: (1) A meeting of the minds has occurred. — “The offer by
petitioner [S] was manifested on December 17, 1981 when peti-
tioner submitted its proposal containing the item number, quan-
tity, part number, description, the unit price and total to pri-
vate respondent [B]. On December 24, 1981, private respond-
ent informed petitioner of his desire to avail of the prices of the
parts at that time and simultaneously enclosed its Purchase
Order No. 0101 dated December 14, 1981. At this stage, a meet-
ing of the minds between vendor and vendee has occurred, the
object of the contract being the spare parts and the considera-
tion, the price stated in petitioner’s offer dated December 17,
1981 and accepted by the respondent on December 24, 1981.
Although said purchase order did not contain the quantity
he wanted to order, private respondent made good his prom-
ise to communicate the same on December 29, 1981. At this junc-
ture, it should be pointed out that private respondent was al-
ready in the process of executing the agreement previously
reached between the parties.’’
(2) B has accepted S’s offer. — “There appears this statement
made by private respondent: “Note above P.O. will include a
3% discount. The above will serve as our initial P.O.” This no-
tation on the purchase order was another indication of accept-
ance on the part of the vendee, for by requesting a 3% discount,
he implicitly accepted the price as first offered by the vendor.
The immediate acceptance by the vendee of the offer was im-
pelled by the fact that on January 1, 1982, prices would go up,
as in fact, the petitioner informed him that there would be a 7%
increase effective January 1982. On the other hand, concurrence
by the vendor with the said discount requested by the vendee
was manifested when petitioner immediately ordered the items
needed by private respondent from Schuback Hamburg which
in turn ordered from NDK, a supplier of MAN spare parts in
West Germany.”
(3) Contract was perfected on December 24, 1981. — “While
we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that indeed a perfec-
tion of the contract was reached between the parties, we differ
as to the exact date when it occurred, for perfection took place,
not on December 29, 1981, but rather on December 24, 1981.
Although the quantity to be ordered was made determinate on
72 SALES Art. 1475
only December 24, 1991, quantity is immaterial in the perfec-

tion of sales contract. What is of importance is the meeting of
the minds as to the object and cause, which from the facts dis-
closed, show that as of December 24, 1981, these essential ele-
ments had already concurred.”
(4) Opening of letter was not intended as a suspensive condi-
tion. — “On the part of the buyer, the situation reveals that pri-
vate respondent failed to open an irrevocable letter of credit
without recourse in favor of Johannes Schuback of Hamburg,
Germany. This omission, however, does not prevent the per-
fection of the contract between the parties, for the opening of a
letter of credit is not to be deemed a suspensive condition. The
facts herein do not show that petitioner reserved title to the
goods until private respondent had opened a letter of credit.
Petitioner, in the course of its dealings with private respond-
ent, did not incorporate any provision declaring their contract
of sale without effect until after the fulfillment of the act of open-
ing a letter of credit. The opening of a letter of credit in favor of
vendor in only a mode of payment. It is not among the essen-
tial requirements of a contract of sale enumerated in Articles of
day of which will prevent the perfection of the contract from
taking place.” (Johannes Schuback & Sons Phil. Trading Corp. vs.
Effect of failure to pay price.

Failure to pay the consideration of contract is different from
lack of consideration; the former results in a right to demand
fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid
contract, while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.
(Montecillo vs. Reyes, 170 SCAD 440, 385 SCRA 244 [2002].)
(1) The failure to pay the stipulated price after the execution
of the contract does not convert the contract into one without cause
or consideration as to vitiate the validity of the contract, it not
being essential for the existence of cause that payment or full
payment be made at the time of the contract. (Puato vs. Mendoza,
64 Phil. 417 [1937].) Non-payment of the purchase price is not
among the instances where the law declares a contract of sale to
be null and void. (Peñalosa vs. Santos, 153 SCAD 531, 363 SCRA
545 [2001].) Such failure does not ipso facto resolve the contract in
the absence of any agreement to that effect. (De la Cruz vs.
Legaspi, 98 Phil. 43 [1955]; Ocampo vs. Court of Appeals, 52 SCAD

610, 233 SCRA 551 [1994].)
The situation is rather one in which there is failure to pay the
consideration, with its resultant consequences. The vendor’s rem-
edy in such case is generally to demand specific performance or
rescission with damages in either case under Article 1191. (De la
Cruz vs. Legaspi, supra; Chua Hai vs. Kapunan, Jr., 103 Phil. 110
[1958]; Lebrilla vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 180 SCRA 188
[1989].)
(2) But a contract of sale is null and void where the purchase
price, which appears thereon as paid, has, in fact, never been paid
by the buyer to the seller. In such case, the sale is without cause or
consideration. (Art. 1409[3].) Such sale is non-existent or cannot
be considered consummated. It produces no effect whatsoever.
(Mapalo vs. Mapalo, 17 SCRA 114 [1966]; Yu Bun Guan vs. Ong,
157 SCAD 38, 367 SCRA 559 [2001]; Montecillo vs. Reyes, supra.)
If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract
is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the
minds of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated
in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. Article 1471
states that if the price is simulated, the sale is void. (Buenaventura
vs. Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 263 [2003].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Seller is authorized by the contract, in case of buyer’s de-
fault, to recover interest sold in property which was subsequently
damaged, and buyer defaulted.
Facts: S and B were the co-owners in equal shares of a mo-
tor boat. By written contract, S sold her undivided interest in
the boat to B payable in three (3) equal installments. In case of
default “the buyer authorizes the seller to recover her one-half
participation of ownership of the boat without obligation to
reimburse the payments made by the buyer.” B defaulted after
P750.00 was paid. Later, the boat was damaged by a typhoon.
S filed action to recover the balance of the purchase price.
B answered that he had notified S to take over her half interest
in the boat, which she refused to do.
Issue: Under the contract, is B relieved of the obligation to
pay the purchase price?
74 SALES Art. 1475
Held: No. The sole fact that the contract of sale between the
parties only provides that in case of default “the buyer author-
izes xxx,” and is silent on the seller’s right to exact payment of
the outstanding balance, there being no other stipulations in-
compatible therewith, does not import that the seller has thereby
lost the alternative right to demand full payment. (see Cui vs.
Sun Chuan, 41 Phil. 523.) This becomes more apparent from the
circumstance that the contract as written confers upon the seller
the right (“buyer authorizes the seller”) to rescind the sale and
recover her half interest, but does not obligate her to do so.
Since S chose to collect full payment as she is entitled to
do, the loss of the boat without fault of the buyer (B) is irrel-
evant to the case. The generic obligation to pay monthly is not
excused by fortuitous loss of any specific property of the debtor.
(Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 98 Phil. 225 [1956].)
———— ———— ————
2. Subject matter of sale is “24,000 tons of iron ore, more or
less” already extracted, for a lump sum, and buyer, refusing to pay,
claims short-delivery and asks for damages.
Facts: S embarked upon the exploration and development
of mining claims belonging to B. Later, they executed a docu-
ment wherein S transferred to B all of S’s rights and interest
over the “24,000 tons of iron ore, more or less” that S had al-
ready extracted from the mineral claims in consideration of a
downpayment of P10,000.00 and the balance of P65,000.00
which will be paid out of the “first shipment of iron ore and of
the first amount derived from the local sale of iron ore made”
from said claims, which amount was secured by a surety bond
executed by B in favor of S.
No sale of the approximately 24,000 tons of iron ore had
been made nor had the P65,000.00 been paid. S brought suit for
the recovery of the balance of the purchase price. B claims a
short delivery, and asks for damages. There is no charge that S
did not deliver to B all the ore found in the stockpiles in the
mining claims in question.
Issue: If there had been short delivery, as claimed by B, is
he entitled to the payment of damages?
Held: No. (1) Contract is sale of specific mass of tangible goods.
— “The sale between the parties is a sale of specific mass of
fungible goods because no provision was made in their con-
tract for the measuring or weighing of the ore sold in order to

complete or perfect the sale nor was the price of P75,000.00
agreed upon based upon any such measurement. (Art. 1480,
par. 2.) The subject matter of sale is a determinate object, the
mass, for a single price or lump sum (the quantity ‘24,000 tons
of iron ore, more or less,’ being a mere estimate by the parties
of the total tonnage weight of the mass), and not the actual
number of units or tons contained therein so that all that was
required of S was to deliver in good faith to B all the ore found
in the mass, notwithstanding that the quantity delivered is less
than the amount estimated by them.’’
(2) Reasonable percentage of error considered. — “Even grant-
ing the estimate of 21,889.7 tons made by B is correct, consider-
ing that the actual weighing of each unit of the mass was prac-
tically impossible, a reasonable percentage of error should be
allowed anyone making an estimate of the exact quantity in
tons found in the mass. In this case, both parties predicated
their respective claims only upon an estimated number of cu-
bic meters of ore multiplied by the average tonnage factor per
cubic meter. Furthermore, the contract expressly stated the
amount to be 24,000 tons more or less.’’ (Gaite vs. Fonacier, 2
SCRA 830 [1961].)
Right of owner to fix his own price.

(1) The owner of a thing has the right to quote his own price,
reasonable or unreasonable. It is up to the prospective buyer to
accept or reject it. He may even impose a condition hard to fulfill
and name a price quite out of proportion to the real value of the
thing offered for sale. (Cornejo vs. Calupitan, 87 Phil. 555 [1950].)
(2) He is also well within his right to quote a small or nomi-
nal consideration (see Arts. 1470-1471.) and such consideration is
just as effectual and valuable a consideration as a larger sum stipu-
lated or paid. (see Pelacio vs. Adiosola, [C.A.] No. 7572-R, Sept.
10, 1952.)
ART. 1476. In the case of a sale by auction:

(1) Where goods are put up for sale by auction in
lots, each lot is the subject of a separate contract of
sale.
76 SALES Art. 1476
(2) A sale by auction is perfected when the auc-

tioneer announces its perfection by the fall of the ham-
mer, or in other customary manner. Until such an-
nouncement is made, any bidder may retract his bid;
and the auctioneer may withdraw the goods from the
sale unless the auction has been announced to be
without reserve.
(3) A right to bid may be reserved expressly by or
on behalf of the seller, unless otherwise provided by
law or by stipulation.
(4) Where notice has not been given that a sale by
auction is subject to a right to bid on behalf of the
seller, it shall not be lawful for the seller to bid him-
self or to employ or induce any person to bid at such
sale on his behalf or for the auctioneer, to employ or
induce any person to bid at such sale on behalf of the
seller or knowingly to take any bid from the seller or
any person employed by him. Any sale contravening
this rule may be treated as fraudulent by the buyer. (n)
Rules governing auction sales.

(1) Sales of separate lots by auction are separate sales. — Where
separate lots are the subject of separate biddings and are sepa-
rately knocked down, there is a separate contract in regard to each
lot. As soon as the hammer falls on the first lot, the purchaser of
that lot has a complete and separate bargain. He need not make
another. When a second lot is put up and knocked down to the
highest bidder, there is a separate complete contract as to the said
lot whether the bidder who secured the first lot or whether an-
other person happens to be the highest bidder. Such is the rule in
No. (1) though no doubt the parties may subsequently consoli-
date all the purchases into one transaction — as by giving a sin-
gle note — for the aggregate price. (see 2 Williston on Sales [1948
Rev. Ed.], pp. 199-200.)
(2) Sale perfected by the fall of the hammer. — In putting up the
goods for sale, the seller is merely making an invitation to those
present to make offers which they do by making bids (Art. 1326.),
one of which is ultimately accepted. Each bid is an offer and the
contract is perfected only by the fall of the hammer or in other

customary manner. It follows that the bidder may retract his bid
and the auctioneer may withdraw the goods from sale any time
before the hammer falls. However, if the sale has been announced
to be without reserve, the auctioneer cannot withdraw the goods
from sale once a bid has been made and the highest bidder has a
right to enforce his bid. (see 2 Williston, op. cit., pp. 200-201, 204-
205.)
(3) Right of seller to bid in the auction. — The seller or his agent
may bid in an auction sale provided: (a) such right was reserved;
(b) notice was given that the sale is subject to a right to bid on
behalf of the seller; and (c) the right to bid by the seller is not pro-
hibited by law or by stipulation.16
(a) Where no notice given of right to bid. — Where there is no
notice that the sale is subject to seller’s right to bid, it shall be
unlawful for the seller to bid either directly or indirectly or for
the auctioneer to employ or induce any person to bid on be-
half of the seller. (No. 4.) The purpose of the notice is to pre-
vent puffing or secret bidding by or on behalf of the seller by
people who are not themselves bound. The employment of a
puffer or by bidder to enhance or inflate the price of the goods
sold is a fraud upon the purchaser and a sufficient ground for
relieving him from his bid and avoiding the sale. (see Fisher
vs. Hersey, 17 Hun. [N.Y.] 370.) This is true although the em-
ployment of the puffer by the auctioneer was without the
owner’s knowledge, since the auctioneer is the owner’s agent.
(b) Where notice of right to bid given. — Though bidding by
the seller or his agent is fraudulent, a right to bid may be ex-
pressly reserved by or on behalf of the seller. (No. 3.) It is,
therefore, the secrecy of puffing which renders it a fraud upon
bidding. (2 Williston, op. cit., p. 208.) Where there is notice of
the intention to bid by the seller, the bidding in such a case
would not operate as a fraud.
16
Art. 2113. At the public auction, the pledgor or owner may bid. He shall, moreo-
ver, have a better right if he should offer the same terms as the highest bidder.
The pledgee may also bid, but his offer shall not be valid if he is the only bidder.
Art. 2114. All bids at the public auction shall offer to pay the purchase price at once.
If any other bid is accepted, the pledgee is deemed to have received the purchase price,
as far as the pledgor or owner is concerned.
78 SALES Arts. 1477-1478
(4) Contract not to bid. — A sale may be fraudulent not only

because of conduct of the seller, but because of conduct of the
buyer. It is not permissible for intending buyers at auction or other
competitive sales to make an agreement for a consideration that
only one of them shall bid, in order that the property may be
knocked down at a low price. The bargain is fraudulent as regards
the seller though the agreement is without consideration, if it is
actually carried out, for the fraud against the seller is the same as
if there were considerations. (Ibid., pp. 209-219.)
(5) Advertisements for bidders. — They are simply invitations
to make proposals, and the advertiser is not bound to accept the
highest or lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears. (Art. 1326.)
Right of owner to prescribe terms

of public auction.
The owner of property which is offered for sale, either at public
or private auction, has the right to prescribe the manner, condi-
tions, and terms of such sale. He may provide that all of the pur-
chase price or any portion thereof should be paid at the time of
the sale, or that time will be given for that payment, or that any
or all bids may be rejected.
The conditions of a public sale announced by an auctioneer
or by the owner of the property at the time and place of the sale
are binding upon all bidders, whether they knew of such condi-
tions or not. (Leoquinco vs. Postal Savings Bank, 47 Phil. 772
[1925].)
ART. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall

be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or con-
structive delivery thereof. (n)
ART. 1478. The parties may stipulate that owner-
ship in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until
he has fully paid the price. (n)
Ownership of thing transferred

by delivery.
The delivery of the thing sold is essential in a contract of sale.
Without it, the purchaser may not enjoy the thing sold to him. It
Arts. 1477-1478 NATURE AND FORM OF THE CONTRACT 79
is only after the delivery of the thing sold that the purchaser ac-
quires a real right or ownership over it. (Arts. 1164, 1496-1497.)
In the absence of stipulation to the contrary, the ownership of
the thing sold passes on to the vendee upon delivery thereof. (see
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 12 SCRA 276 [1964]; Boy vs.
Court of Appeals, 427 SCRA 196 [2004].) This is true even if the
purchase has been made on credit. Payment of the purchase price
is not essential to the transfer of ownership, as long as the prop-
erty sold has been delivered. (Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. vs.
Jalwindor Manufacturers, Inc., 93 SCRA 420 [1979].) Non-payment
only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract,
or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. (EDCA
Publishing and Distributing Corp. vs. Santos, 184 SCRA 614
[1990].)
The delivery may be actual (Art. 1497.) or constructive. (Arts.
1498-1501.) The contract is consummated by the delivery of the
thing sold and of the purchase money.
In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of delivery,
whether actual or constructive, should be coupled with the inten-
tion of delivering the thing sold. The act without the intention is
insufficient; there is no tradition. (Union Motor Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 151 SCAD 714, 361 SCRA 506 [2001].) It has been
held that the issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer
of ownership of the thing sold to the buyer, an invoice being noth-
ing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity, and
cost of the thing sold, and considered not a bill of sale. (Ibid., cit-
ing P.T. Cerna Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19
[1993]; Norkis Distributor’s, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA
694 [1991].)
Exceptions to the rule.

(1) Contrary stipulation. — The ownership of things is trans-
ferred by delivery, and not by mere payment. However, the par-
ties may stipulate that despite the delivery, the ownership of the
thing shall remain with the seller until the purchaser has fully paid
the price. (see Art. 1503.) In other words, non-payment of the price,
after the thing has been delivered, prevents the transfer of own-
ership only if such is the stipulation of the parties. This stipula-
80 SALES Arts. 1477-1478
tion is usually known as pactum reservati dominii or contractual

reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan.
(Jovellanos vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 126 [1992].) A con-
tract which contains this kind of stipulation is considered a con-
tract to sell. The agreement may be implied. (Adelfa Properties,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 58 SCAD 462, 240 SCRA 565 [1995].)
(a) Where in a contract of sale the seller agreed that the
ownership of the goods shall remain with the seller until the
purchase price shall have been fully paid, merely to secure the
performance by the buyer of his obligation, such stipulation
cannot make the seller liable in case of loss of the goods. (see
Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. vs. Tabora, 13 SCRA 762
[1965]; see Art. 1503, par. 2.)
(b) If there is doubt by the wording of the contract whether
the parties intended a suspensive condition (Art. 1478.) or a
suspensive period (Art. 1193, par. 1.) for the payment of the
stipulated price, the doubt shall be resolved in favor of the
greatest reciprocity of interests. (see Art. 1378.) There can be
no question that greater reciprocity will be obtained if the
buyer’s obligation is deemed to be actually existing, with only
its maturity (due date) postponed or deferred. Sale is essen-
tially onerous. (Gaite vs. Fonacier, 2 SCRA 830 [1961].)
(c) A stipulation that ownership in the thing sold shall not
pass to the purchaser until after he has fully paid the price
thereof could only be binding upon the contracting parties,
their assigns, and heirs (see Art. 1311, par. 1.) but not upon third
persons without notice. Such a stipulation is only a kind of
security for the benefit of the vendor who has not been fully
paid.
(2) Contract to sell. — In contracts to sell, where ownership is
retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full payment of
the price, such payment is a positive suspensive condition, the fail-
ure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event
that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring binding force. To say that there is only a casual breach
is to proceed from the assumption that the contract is one of ab-
solute sale, where non-payment is a resolutory condition, which
is not the case. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co.
Inc., 43 SCRA 93 [1972] and 86 SCRA 305 [1978]; Manuel vs.

Rodriguez, 109 Phil. 1 [1960]; Roque vs. Lapuz, 96 SCRA 741
[1980]; see Art. 1184.)
(3) Contract of insurance. — A perfected contract of sale even
without delivery vests in the vendee an equitable title, an existing
interest over the goods sufficient to be the subject of insurance.
(see Sec. 14[a], Insurance Code.) Thus, a perfected contract of sale
between the vendee-consignee and the shipper of goods operates
to vest in the former an equitable title even before delivery or
before he performed the conditions of the sale, the contract of
shipment, whether under F.O.B., or C.I.F., or C & F, being imma-
terial in the determination of whether the vendee has an insur-
able interest or not in the goods. (Filipino Merchants Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 638 [1989].)
ART. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determi-

nate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demand-
able.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a
determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon
the promissor if the promise is supported by a con-
sideration distinct from the price. (1451a)
Kinds of promise treated in Article 1479.

The above article refers to three kinds of promises, namely:
(1) An accepted unilateral promise to sell in which the prom-
isee (acceptor) elects to buy;
(2) An accepted unilateral promise to buy in which the prom-
isee (acceptor) elects to sell; and
(3) A bilateral promise to buy and sell reciprocally accepted
in which either of the parties chooses to exact fulfillment. (see 10
Manresa 71.)
Effect of unaccepted unilateral promise.

A unilateral promise or offer to sell or to buy a thing which is
not accepted creates no juridical effect or legal bond. Such
unaccepted imperfect promise or offer is called policitacion. A pe-
82 SALES Art. 1479
riod may be given to the offeree within which to accept the offer.
(infra.)
EXAMPLE:
S offers or promises to sell to B his car at a stated price and
B just let the promise go by without accepting it. Neither S nor
B is bound by any contract. Obviously, this is not the one con-
templated in Article 1479.
Meaning of option.
An option is a privilege existing in one person for which he
has paid a consideration which gives him the right to buy/sell,
for example, certain merchandise or certain specified property,
from/to another person, if he chooses, at any time within the
agreed period at a fixed price, or under, or in compliance with
certain terms and conditions.
Nature of option contract.

(1) An option is a contract. It is a preparatory contract, sepa-
rate and distinct from the main contract itself (subject matter of
the option) which the parties may enter into upon the consum-
mation of the option.
(2) It gives the party granted the option the right to decide,
whether or not to enter into a principal contract, while it binds
the party who has given the option, not to enter into the princi-
pal contract with any other person during the agreed time and
within that period, to enter into such contract with the one to
whom the option was granted if the latter should decide to use
the option.17 (see Carceller vs. Court of Appeals, 103 SCAD 258,
302 SCRA 718 [1999]; Litonjua vs. L & R Corporation, 328 SCRA
796 [2000].)
(3) An option must be supported by a consideration distinct
from the price. (Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 528 [1999];
Laforteza vs. Machuca, 127 SCAD 798, 333 SCRA 643 [2000];
17
In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise
of the right would be dependent not only on the grantor’s eventual intention to enter
into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that
are yet to be firmed up. (Vasquez vs. Ayala Corporaton, 443 SCRA 218 [2004].)
Abalos vs. Macatangay, Jr., 439 SCRA 649 [2004].) The promisee
has the burden of proving such consideration. (see Vasquez vs.
(4) A consideration of an option contract is just as important
as the consideration for any other kind of contract. (see Enriquez
de la Cavada vs. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982 [1918].) An option without
consideration is void; the effect is the same as if there was no
option.
Effect of accepted unilateral promise.

The second paragraph of Article 1479 refers to what is called
as “option” in the commercial world.
A unilateral promise to sell or to buy a determinate thing for
a price certain does not bind the promissor even if accepted and
may be withdrawn at any time. It is only if the promise is sup-
ported by a consideration distinct and separate from the price that
its acceptance will give rise to a perfected contract.
The optionee (holder of the option), after accepting the option
and before he exercises it, has the right, but not the obligation, to
buy or sell, as the case may be. Once the option is exercised, i.e.,
offer is accepted before a breach of the option, a bilateral promise
to sell and to buy ensues and both parties are then reciprocally
bound to comply with their respective undertakings. It would be
a breach of the option for the optioner-offeror to withdraw the offer
during the agreed period. If in fact, he withdraws the offer before
its acceptance (exercise of the option) by the optionee-offeree, the
latter may not sue for specific performance on the proposed con-
tract since it has failed to reach its own stage of perfection. The
offeror, however, renders himself liable for damages for breach of
the option.18 (Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, 56 SCAD 163, 238
SCRA 602 [1994].)
18
An option imposes no binding obligation on the optionee, aside from the consid-
eration for the offer. Until accepted, it is not, properly speaking, treated as a contract.
(Tayag vs. Lacson, 426 SCRA 282 [2004]; Adelfa Properties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
240 SCRA 565 [1995].) When the consideration given, for what otherwise would have
been an option, partakes the nature in reality of a part payment of the purchase price
(termed as earnest money [Art. 1482.] and considered as an initial payment thereof), an
actual contract of sale is deemed entered into and enforceable as such. (Asuncion vs.
Court of Appeals, supra.)
84 SALES Art. 1479
Consideration in an option contract may be anything of value,

unlike in sale where it must be the price certain in money or its
equivalent. Lacking any proof of such consideration, the option
is unenforceable. (San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. vs.
Huang, 130 SCAD 713, 336 SCRA 737 [2000].) A contract of op-
tion to buy is separate from the contract to sell, and both contracts
need separate and distinct considerations for validity. (Dijamco
EXAMPLE:
In the preceding example, even if B accepts the promise of
S (this is a case of an accepted unilateral promise to sell), S is
not bound to sell his car to B because there is no promise, in
turn, on the part of B to buy.
However, if the promise is covered by a consideration dis-
tinct from the price of the car, as when B paid or promised to
pay a sum of money to S for giving him the right to buy the car
if he chooses within an agreed period at a fixed price, its accept-
ance produces consent or meeting of the minds. A legally bind-
ing and independent contract of option is deemed perfected.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Stipulation in mortgage deed gives mortgagees option to pur-
chase mortgaged property within a certain period at an agreed price.
Facts: A provision in a mortgage deed states: “That it has
likewise been agreed that if the financial condition of the mort-
gagees will permit, they may purchase said land absolutely on
any date within the two-year term of this mortgage at the agreed
price of P3,900.” The mortgagors contend that as such, they
cannot be deprived of the right to redeem the mortgaged prop-
erty because such right is inherent in and inseparable from this
kind of contract.
Issue: Having reasonably advised the mortgagors that they
had decided to buy the land in question pursuant to the
aforequoted provision, are the mortgagees entitled to specific
performance consisting of the execution by the mortgagors of
the corresponding deed of sale?
Held: Yes. The added special provision renders the mortga-
gors’ right to redeem defeasible at the election of the mortga-
gees. There is nothing illegal or immoral in this. It is simply an
option to buy sanctioned by Article 1479. In this case, the mort-

gagors’ promise to sell is supported by the same consideration
as that as the mortgage itself, which is distinct from that which
would support the sale, an additional amount having been
agreed upon, to make up the entire price of P3,900, should the
option be exercised. The mortgagors’ promise was in the na-
ture of a continuing offer, non-withdrawable during a period
of two years which, upon acceptance by the mortgagees, gave
rise to a perfected contract of purchase and sale. (Soriano vs.
Bautista, 6 SCRA 946 [1962]; see Direct Funders Holdings Corp.
vs. Laviña, 373 SCRA 645 [2002].)
Full payment of price not necessary

for exercise of option to buy.
The obligations under an option to buy are reciprocal obliga-
tions — the performance of one obligation is conditioned upon
the simultaneous fulfillment of the other obligation. (Art. 1169.)
In an option to buy, the party who has an option may validly
and effectively exercise his right by merely notifying the owner
of the former’s decision to buy and expressing his readiness to
pay the stipulated price.
The notice need not be coupled with actual payment of the
purchase price so long as this is delivered to the owner of the
property upon the execution and delivery by him of the deed of
sale. The payment of the price is contingent upon the delivery of
the deed of sale. Unless and until the owner shall have done this,
the buyer who has the option is not and cannot be held in default
in the discharge of his obligation to pay. (Nietes vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 46 SCRA 654 [1972].) Consequently, since the obligation to
pay is not yet due, consignation19 in court of the purchase price is
not required. (Heirs of Luis Bacus vs. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA
2295 [2003].)
An option to buy is not, of course, a contract of purchase and
sale. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, 63 SCAD 97, 246 SCRA 540
[1995].)
19
Consignation is the act of depositing the thing or sum due with the proper court
whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment. It generally requires
a prior tender of payment. Where no debt is due and owing, consignation is not proper.
(see Arts. 1256, 1257, 1258; Legaspi vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 82 [1986].)
86 SALES Art. 1479
Article 1479 and Article 1324 compared.

Article 1324 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
“When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period
to accept, the offer may be withdrawn at any time before ac-
ceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except when
the option is founded upon a consideration, as something paid
or promised.”
Under the above-quoted article, the general rule regarding
offer and acceptance (see Art. 1319.) is that, when the offerer has
allowed the offeree a certain period within which to accept the
offer, the offer may be withdrawn as a matter of right at any time
before acceptance. But if the option is founded upon a separate
consideration, the offerer cannot withdraw his offer, even if the
same has not yet been accepted, before the expiration of the stipu-
lated period. Regardless of whether it is supported by a consid-
eration or not, the offer, of course, cannot be withdrawn after ac-
ceptance of the offer.
This general rule as embodied in Article 1324 was interpreted
as modified by the provision of Article 1479 which applies spe-
cifically to a promise “to buy or to sell.” As already stated, this
rule requires that for a promise to sell to be valid, it must be sup-
ported by a consideration distinct from the price. American au-
thorities which hold that an offer, once accepted, cannot be with-
drawn, regardless of whether or not it is supported by a consid-
eration (62 Am. Jur. 528.), uphold the general rule applicable to
offer and acceptance as contained in our Civil Code. (Art. 1319;
see Southern Sugar & Mollasses Co. vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific
Co., 97 Phil. 249 [1955]; Mendoza vs. Comple, 15 SCRA 162 [1965].)
In a later case (Sanchez vs. Rigos, 45 SCRA 368 [1972], infra.),
the Supreme Court abandoned the view adhered to in Southwest-
ern Sugar (supra.) which holds that an option to sell can still be
withdrawn, even if accepted, if the same is not supported by any
consideration, and reaffirmed the doctrine in Atkins, Kroll & Co.,
Inc. vs. Cua Hian Tek (102 Phil. 948 [1958], infra.), holding that it
could no longer be withdrawn after acceptance. In other words,
if acceptance is made before withdrawal, it constitutes a binding
contract of sale although the option is given without considera-
tion. Before acceptance, the offer may be withdrawn as a matter

of right.20 Be that as it may, the offerer cannot revoke, before the
period has expired, in an arbitrary or capricious manner the offer
without being liable for damages which the offeree may suffer
under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Promissor withdrew an option to sell, which is not supported
by any consideration, after its acceptance by promisee.
Facts: S and B executed an instrument, entitled “Option to
Purchase,” whereby S agreed, promised, and committed “x x x
to sell” to B for a certain sum a parcel of land within two (2)
years with the understanding that said option shall be deemed
“terminated and elapsed” if B shall fail to exercise the right to
buy the property “within the stipulated period.’’
Inasmuch as several tenders of payment made by B were
rejected by S, the former commenced an action for specific per-
formance.
Issue: Can the promissor withdraw an option to sell, after
acceptance, if the option is not supported by any considera-
tion?
20
Article 1324 may be interpreted to refer to a bilateral promise (e.g., to buy and
sell). Hence, the offer (to sell or buy) may not be withdrawn after acceptance of the offer.
The offer may be withdrawn before acceptance since there is no meeting of minds yet,
unless an option supported by a consideration has been granted. A unilateral promise to
sell or buy does not bind the offerer even after acceptance except where the promise is
supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
In Rural Bank of Parañaque vs. Remolado (135 SCRA 409 [1985].), the commitment by
a bank to resell a property within a specified period, although accepted by the party in
whose favor it was made, was considered an option not supported by a consideration
distinct from the price and, therefore, not binding upon the promissor. Lacking such
consideration, the option was held void pursuant to Southwestern Sugar and Molasses Co.
case.
To the same effect is the recent case of Natno vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. (179
SCRA 323 [1991].) Citing Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. case, the Supreme Court held that
the promise made by the President of a bank to allow the petitioners to buy (or to re-sell
to them) the foreclosed property (not redeemed since the offer took place after the expi-
ration of the redemption period) at any time they have money is not binding on the
bank because it was a promise unsupported by a consideration distinct from the re-
purchase price.
In Diamante vs. Court of Appeals (206 SCRA 52 [1992].), the Option to Repurchase
executed by the vendee after the sale in favor of the vendor was held merely a promise
to sell governed by Article 1479, sale in the absence of a separate consideration was not
binding upon the promissor (vendee) even if the promise was accepted.
88 SALES Art. 1479
Held: No. (1) Acceptance resulted in perfected contract of sale.

— “Since there may be no valid contract without cause or con-
sideration, the promissor (S) is not bound by his promise and
may accordingly withdraw it. Pending notice of its withdrawal,
his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an
offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of
sale. This view has the advantage of avoiding a conflict between
Article 1324 (on the general principles on contracts) and Arti-
cle 1479 (on sales) of the Civil Code, in line with the cardinal
rule of statutory construction that, in construing different pro-
visions of one and the same law or code, such interpretation
should be favored as will reconcile or harmonize said provi-
sions and avoid a conflict between the same.’’
(2) Exceptions not favored. — “Moreover, the decision in the
Southwestern case (supra.), in effect, considers Article 1479 as an
exception to Article 1324, and exceptions are not favored un-
less the intention to the contrary is clear, and it is not so insofar
as said two (2) articles are concerned. What is more, the refer-
ence, in both the second paragraph of Article 1479 and Article
1324, to an option or promise supported by or founded upon a
consideration, strongly suggests that the two (2) provisions in-
tended to enforce or implement the same principle.
The doctrine laid down in the Atkins case (supra.) is reaf-
firmed, and, insofar as inconsistent therewith, the view adhered
to in Southwestern case should be deemed abandoned or modi-
fied.21 (Sanchez vs. Rigos, supra.)
———— ———— ————
21
In the case of Cronico vs. J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. (78 SCRA 331 [1977].), the Supreme
Court said: “In order that a unilateral promise may be binding upon a promissor, Article
1479 . . . requires the concurrence of the condition that the promise be supported by a
consideration distinct from the price.” To the same effect is Montilla vs. Court of Appeals
(161 SCRA 167 [1988].) and Salame vs. Court of Appeals, 57 SCAD 631, 239 SCRA 356
(1994).
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court, in rejecting the holding of the Court of Ap-
peals, “that Isabel Ariolas’ promise (to sell) does not bind Rowena Teodoro (petitioner)
because it is not supported by a consideration distinct from the price pursuant to Article
1479, held: “That consideration is expressed in Exhibit ‘A’ under which the petitioners
shouldered all rental expenses payable by Ariola for her occupation of the property
(leased and subsequently sold to her by the former owner). This should be distinguished
from a sublease arrangement in which the sublessee’s responsibility as and for rents
due the lessor is subsidiary. But here, the petitioners bound themselves primarily to
answer for the rents. That is enough consideration to support Ariola’s promise.” (Teodoro
2. The Deed of Option which was in the same document does

not provide for the period within which the parties may demand the
performance of their respective undertakings.
Facts: R, owner of a 600-meter lot, sold a portion of 300
square meters of the lot to spouses V, for P21,000.00 or P70.00
per square meter. Subsequently, R, with the consent of her hus-
band, executed a Deed of Option in favor of V in which the
remaining 300 square meters portion of the property would be
sold to V under the conditions stated therein. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the Deed of Option was void for lack of
consideration.
Issue: The pivotal issue to be resolved is the validity of the
Deed of Option whereby the private respondents (R and her
husband) agreed to sell their lot to petitioners (spouses V)
“whenever the need of such sale arises” on the part of either
parties.
Held: (1) Option supported by a consideration. — “As expressed
in Gonzales vs. Trinidad (67 Phil. 682 [1939].), consideration is
‘the why of the contract, the essential reason which moves the
contracting parties to enter into the contract’. The cause or the
impelling reason on the part of private respondent in execut-
ing the deed of option as appearing in the deed itself is the
petitioners’ having agreed to buy the 300 square meters of pri-
vate respondents’ land at P70.00 per square meter portion
‘which was greatly higher than the actual reasonable prevail-
ing price’. This cause or consideration is clear from the deed
which stated: ‘That the only reason why the spouses-vendees
Julio Villamor and Marina V. Villamor agreed to buy the said
one-half portion at the above-stated price of about P70.00 per
square meter, is because I, and my husband Roberto Reyes, have
agreed to sell and convey to them the remaining one-half por-
tion still owned by me x x x.’
The respondent appellate court failed to give due consid-
eration to petitioners’ evidence which shows that in 1969 the
Villamor spouses bought an adjacent lot from the brother of
Macaria Labing-isa for only P18.00 per square meter which the
private respondents did not rebut. Thus, expressed in terms of
money, the consideration for the deed of option is the differ-
ence between the purchase price of the 300-square meter por-
tion of the lot in 1971 (P70.00 per sq.m.) and the prevailing rea-
sonable price of the same lot in 1971. Whatever it is (P25.00 or
P18.00), though not specifically stated in the deed of option,
90 SALES Art. 1479
was ascertainable. Petitioners’ allegedly paying P52.00 per

square meter for the option may, as opined by the appellate
court, be improbable but improbabilities do not invalidate a
contract freely entered into by the parties.”
(2) Private respondents as well were granted an option to sell.
— “The ‘deed of option’ entered into by the parties in this case
had unique features. Ordinarily, an optional contract is a privi-
lege existing in one person, for which he had paid a considera-
tion and which gives him the right to buy, for example, certain
merchandise or certain specified property, from another person,
if he chooses, at any time within the agreed period at a fixed
price. (Enriquez de la Cavada vs. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982 [1918].) If
we look closely at the ‘deed of option’ signed by the parties, we
will notice that the first part covered the statement on the sale
of the 300-square-meter portion of the lot to Spouses Villamor
at the price of P70.00 per square meter ‘which was higher than
the actual reasonable prevailing value of the lands in that place
at that time (of sale).’
The second part stated that the only reason why the
Villamor spouses agreed to buy the said lot at a much higher
price is because the vendor (Reyeses) also agreed to sell to the
Villamors the other half-portion of 300 square meters of the land.
Had the deed stopped there, there would be no dispute that the
deed is really an ordinary deed of option granting the Villamors
the other half-portion of 300 square meters of the lot in consid-
eration of their having agreed to buy the other half of the land
for a much higher price. But, the ‘deed of option’ went on and
stated that the sale arises, either on our (Reyeses) part or on the
part of the Spouses Julio Villamor and Marina V. Villamor. It
appears that while the option to buy was granted to the
Villamors, the Reyeses were likewise granted an option to sell.
In other words, it was not only the Villamors who were granted
an option to buy for which they paid a consideration. The
Reyeses as well were granted an option to sell should the need
for such sale on their part arises.”
(3) Offer to sell had been accepted. — “In the instant case, the
option offered by private respondents had been accepted by
the petitioner, the promisee, in the same document. The accept-
ance of an order to sell for a price certain created a bilateral
contract to sell and buy and upon acceptance, the offeree ipso
facto assumes obligations of a vendee. (see Atkins, Kroll & Co.
vs. Cua Hian Tek, 102 Phil. 948 [1958].) Deman dability may be
exercised at any time after the execution of the deed. In Sanchez
vs. Rigos (45 SCRA 368 [1972].), We held: ‘In other words, since
there may be no valid contract without a cause of considera-
tion, the promissor is not bound by this promise and may ac-
cordingly withdraw it. Pending notice of its withdrawal, his ac-
cepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which,
if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale.”
(4) Acceptance created a perfected contract of sale. — A con-
tract of sale is, under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, perfected
at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which
is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that mo-
ment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, sub-
ject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
Since there was, between the parties, a meeting of minds upon
the object and the price, there was already a perfected contract
of sale. What was, however, left to be done was for either party
to demand from the other their respective undertakings under
the contract. It may be demanded at any time either by the pri-
vate respondents, who may compel the petitioners to pay for
the property or the petitioners, who may compel the private
respondents to deliver the property.”
(5) Action to enforce contract had prescribed. — “However,
the Deed of Option did not provide for the period within which
the parties may demand the performance of their respective
undertakings in the instrument. The parties could not have con-
templated that the delivery of the property and the payment
thereof could be made indefinitely and render uncertain the
status of the land. The failure of either parties to demand per-
formance of the obligation of the other for an unreasonable
length of time renders the contract ineffective.
Under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, actions upon a writ-
ten contract must be brought within ten (10) years. The Deed of
Option was executed on November 11, 1971. The acceptance,
as already mentioned, was also accepted in the same instru-
ment. The complaint in this case was filed by the petitioners on
July 13, 1987, seventeen (17) years from the time of the execu-
tion of the contract. Hence, the right of action had prescribed.’’
(Villamor vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 607 [1991].)
———— ———— ————
3. The contract of lease gives the lessee 30-day exclusive option
to purchase the leased premises
Facts: A contract of lease in paragraph 8 provides: “x x x
that if the lessor [R] should desire to sell the leased premises,
92 SALES Art. 1479
the LESSEE [E] shall be given 30 days exclusive option to the

same. In the event, however, that the leased premises is sold to
someone other than the LESSEE, the LESSOR is bound and
obligated, as it hereby binds and obligates itself, to stipulate in
the Deed of Sale thereof that the purchaser shall recognize this
lease and be bound by all the terms and conditions thereof.’’
The lessor later sold his property including the leased
premises located thereon to petitioner (P).
Rereading the law on the matter of sales and option con-
tracts, respondent Court of Appeals differentiated between
Article 1324 and Article 1479 of the Civil Code, analyzed their
application to the facts of this case, and concluded that since
paragraph 8 of the two lease contracts does not state a fixed
price for the purchase of the leased premises, which is an es-
sential element for a contract of sale to be perfected, what para-
graph 8 is, must be a right of first refusal and not an option
contract. Besides the ruling that paragraph 8 vests in E the right
of first refusal as to which the requirement of distinct consid-
eration indispensable in an option contract has no application,
respondent appellate court also addressed the claim of R that
assuming arguendo that the option is valid and effective, it is
impossible of performance because it covered only the leased
premises and not the entire property of R whose offer to sell
pertained to the entire property in question.
Issue: Does the contractual stipulation provide for an op-
tion clause or an option contract?
Held: (1) Contractual stipulation is an option clause. — “We
agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that the aforecited
contractual stipulation provides for a right of first refusal in
favor of Mayfair [E]. It is not an option clause or an option con-
tract. It is a contract of a right of first refusal.
As early as 1916, in the case of Beaumont vs. Prieto (41 Phil.
670.), unequivocal was our characterization of an option con-
tract as one necessarily involving the choice granted to another
for a distinct and separate consideration as to whether or not
to purchase a determinate thing at a predetermined fixed price.
xxx
The rule so early established in this jurisdiction is that the
deed of option or the option clause in a contract, in order to be
valid and enforceable, must, among other things, indicate the
definite price at which the person granting the option is will-

ing to sell.
Notably, in one case we held that the lessee loses his right
to buy the leased property for a named price per square meter
upon failure to make the purchase within the time specified
(Tuazon, Jr. vs. De Asis, 107 Phil. 131 [1960].); in one other case
we freed the landowner from her promise to sell her land if the
prospective buyer could raise P4,500.00 in three weeks because
such option was not supported by a distinct consideration
(Mendoza vs. Comple, 15 SCRA 162 [1965].); in the same vein
in yet one other case, we also invalidated an instrument enti-
tled, “Option to Purchase’’ a parcel of land for the sum of
P1,510.00 because of lack of consideration (Sanchez vs. Rigor,
45 SCRA 368 [1972].); and as an exception to the doctrine enu-
merated in the two preceding cases, in another case, we ruled
that the option to buy the leased premises for P12,000.00 as
stipulated in the lease contract, is not without consideration
for in reciprocal contracts, like lease, the obligation or promise
of each party is the consideration for that of the other. (Vda. de
Quirino vs. Palanca, 29 SCRA 1 [1969].) In all these cases, the
selling price of the object thereof is always predetermined and
specified in the option clause in the contract or in the separate
deed of option. x x x.
In the light of the foregoing disquisition and in view of the
wording of the questioned provision in the instant case, we so
hold that no option to purchase in contemplation of the second
paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code, has been granted
to E under the lease contract.
Respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the said
paragraph 8 grants the right of first refusal to E and is not an
option contract. It also correctly reasoned that as such, the re-
quirement of a separate consideration for the option has no ap-
plicability in the instant case.’’
(2) Right of first refusal is an integral part of the contract of
lease. — “An option is a contract granting a privilege to buy or
sell within an agreed time and at a determined price. It is a
separate and distinct contract from that which the parties may
enter into upon the consummation of the option. It must be
supported by consideration. In the instant case, the right of first
refusal is an integral part of the contract of lease. The consid-
eration is built into the reciprocal obligations of the parties.
94 SALES Art. 1479
To rule that a contractual stipulation such as that found in

paragraph 8 of the contract is governed by Article 1324 on with-
drawal of the offer or Article 1479 on promise to buy and sell
would render ineffectual or “inutile’’ the provisions on right of
first refusal so commonly inserted in leases of real estate nowa-
days. The Court of Appeals is correct in stating that paragraph
8 was incorporated into the contract of lease for the benefit of E
which wanted to be assured that it shall be given the first crack
or the first option to buy the property at the price which R is
willing to accept. It is not also correct to say that there is no
consideration in an agreement of right of first refusal. The stipu-
lation is part and parcel of the entire contract of lease. The con-
sideration for the lease includes the consideration for the right
of first refusal. Thus, E is in effect stating that it consents to
lease the premises and to pay the price agreed upon provided
the lessor also consents that, should it sell the leased property,
then, E shall be given the right to match the offered purchase
price and to buy the property at that price.’’
(3) Consequential rights, obligations and liabilities of R, E, and
P. — “It is undisputed that R did recognize this right of E, for it
informed the latter of its intention to sell the said property in
1974. There was an exchange of letters evidencing the offer and
counter-offers made by both parties. R, however, did not pur-
sue the exercise to its logical end. While it initially recognized
E’s right of first refusal, R violated such right when without
affording its negotiation with E the full process to ripen to at
least an interface of a definite offer and a possible correspond-
ing acceptance within the “30-day exclusive option’’ time
granted E, R abandoned negotiations, kept a low profile for
some time, and then sold, without prior notice to E, the entire
Claro M. Recto property to Equatorial (P).
Since P is a buyer in bad faith, this finding renders the sale
to it of the property in question rescissible. We agree with re-
spondent Appellate Court that the records bear out the fact that
P was aware of the lease contract because its lawyers had, prior
to the sale, studied the said contract. As such, P cannot tenably
claim to be a purchaser in good faith, and, therefore, rescission
lies.
xxx xxx
Since E has a right of first refusal, it can execise the right
only if the fraudulent sale is first set aside or rescinded. All of
these matters are now before us and so there should be no piece-
meal determination of this case and leave festering sores to

deteriorate into endless litigation. The facts of the case and con-
siderations of justice and equity require that we order rescis-
sion here and now.
xxx xxx
This Court has always been against multiplicity of suits
where all remedies according to the facts and the law can be
included. Since R sold the property for P11,300,000.00 to P, the
price at which E could have purchased the property is, there-
fore, fixed. It can neither be more nor less. There is no dispute
over it. The damages which E suffered are in terms of actual
injury and lost opportunities. The fairest solution would be to
allow E to exercise its right of first refusal at the price which it
was entitled to accept or reject which is P11,300,000.00.
xxx xxx
Under the Ang Yu Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals (57 SCAD
163, 238 SCRA 602 [1994].) decision, the Court stated that there
was nothing to execute because a contract over the right of first
refusal belongs to a class of preparatory juridical relations gov-
erned not by the law on contracts but by the codal provisions
on human relations. This may apply here if the contract is lim-
ited to the buying and selling of the real property. However,
the obligation of R to first offer the property to E is embodied
in a contract. It is Paragraph 8 on the right of first refusal which
created the obligation. It should be enforced according to the
law on contracts instead of the panoramic and indefinite rule
on human relations. The latter remedy encourages multiplicity
of suits. There is something to execute and that is for R to com-
ply with its obligation to the property under the right of the
first refusal according to the terms at which they should have
been offered then to E, at the price when that offer should have
been made. Also, E has to accept the offer. This juridical rela-
tion is not amorphous nor it is merely preparatory.
On the question of interest payments on the principal
amount of P11,300,000.00, it must be borne in mind that both R
and P acted in bad faith. R knowingly and deliberately broke a
contract entered into with E. x x x On the part of P, it cannot be
a buyer in good faith because it bought the property with no-
tice and full knowledge that E had a right to or interest in the
property superior to its own. R and P took unconscientious
advantage of E.
96 SALES Art. 1479
Neither may R and P avail of considerations based on eq-

uity which might warrant the grant of interests. The vendor
received as payment from the vendee what, at the time, was a
full and fair price for the property. It has used the P11,300,000.00
all these years earning income or interest from the amount. P,
on the other hand, has received rents and otherwise profited
from the use of the property turned over to it by R. In fact,
during all the years that this controversy was being litigated, E
paid rentals regularly to the buyer who had an inferior right to
purchase the property. E is under no obligation to pay any in-
terest arising from the judgment to either R and P.’’ (Equatorial
Realty Development, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc., 76 SCAD 407,
264 SCRA 483 [1996].)
———— ———— ————
4. Lessee with right of first refusal, offered to buy leased prop-
erty at P5.000 per square meter, which property was sold by the les-
sor-owner to another for P5,300 per sq. meter.
Facts: Under the contract of lease executed by defendant
Reyes (lessor) with plaintiff Riviera (lessee), the “Lessee shall
have the right of first refusal should the lessor decide to sell the
property during the term of the lease.’’
Since the beginning of the negotiation between the plain-
tiff and defendant Reyes for the purchase of the property, in
question, the plaintiff was firm and steadfast in its position,
expressed in writing by its President Vicente Angeles, that it
was not willing to buy the said property higher than P5,000.00,
per square meter, which was far lower than the asking price of
defendant Reyes for P6,000.00, per square meter, undoubtedly,
because, in its perception, it would be difficult for other parties
to buy the property, at a higher price than what it was offering,
since it is in occupation of the property, as lessee, the term of
which was to expire after about four (4) years more.
In the petition at bar, Riviera posits the view that its right
of first refusal was totally disregarded or violated by Reyes by
the latter’s sale of the subject property to Cypress and Cornhill
at P5,300 per square meter. It contends that the right of first
refusal principally amounts to a right to match in the sense that
it needs another offer for the right to be exercised.
Issue: Has Riviera lost its right of first refusal?
Held: Yes. (1) Concept and interpretation of the right of first
refusal. — “The concept and interpretation of the right of first
refusal and the consequences of a breach thereof evolved in

Philippine juristic sphere only within the last decade. It all
started in 1992 with Guzman, Bocaling & Co. vs. Bonnevie (206
SCRA 668 [1992].), where the Court held that a lease with a
proviso granting the lessee the right of first priority ‘all things
and conditions being equal’ meant that there should be iden-
tity of the terms and conditions to be offered to the lessee and
all other prospective buyers, with the lessee to enjoy the right
of first priority. A deed of sale executed in favor of a third party
who cannot be deemed a purchaser in good faith, and which is
in violation of a right of first refusal granted to the lessee is not
voidable under the Statute of Frauds but rescissible under Ar-
ticles 1380 to 1381(3) of the New Civil Code.
Subsequently in 1994, in the case of Ang Yu Asuncion vs.
Court of Appeals (238 SCRA 602 [1994].), the Court en banc de-
parted from the doctrine laid down in Guzman, Bocaling & Co.
vs. Bonnevie and refused to rescind a contract of sale which vio-
lated the right of first refusal. The Court held that the so-called
“right of first refusal” cannot be deemed a perfected contract
of sale under Article 1458 of the new Civil Code and, as such, a
breach thereof decreed under a final judgment does not entitle
the aggrieved party to a writ of execution of the judgment but
to an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.
In the 1996 case of Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs.
Mayfair Theater, Inc. (264 SCRA 483 [1996].), the Court en banc
reverted back to the doctrine in Guzman Bocaling & Co. vs.
Bonnevie stating that rescission is a relief allowed for the pro-
tection of one of the contracting parties and even third persons
from all injury and damage the contract may cause or to pro-
tect some incompatible and preferred right by the contract.
Thereafter in 1997, in Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 727 [1997].), the Court affirmed the
nature of and the concomitant rights and obligations of parties
under a right of first refusal. The Court, summarizing the rul-
ings in Guzman, Bocaling & Co. vs. Bonnevie and Equatorial Re-
alty Development, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc., held that in order
to have full compliance with the contractual right granting pe-
titioner the first option to purchase, the sale of the properties
for the price for which they were finally sold to a third person
should have likewise been first offered to the former. Further,
there should be identity of terms and conditions to be offered
to the buyer holding a right of first refusal if such right is not to
98 SALES Art. 1479
be rendered illusory. Lastly, the basis of the right of first refusal

must be the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to purchase
of any prospective buyer.’’
(2) Prevailing doctrine. — “Thus, the prevailing doctrine is
that a right of first refusal means identity of terms and condi-
tions to be offered to the lessee and all other prospective buy-
ers and a contract of sale entered into in violation of a right of
first refusal of another person, while valid, is rescissible. How-
ever, we must remember that general propositions do not de-
cide specific cases. Rather, laws are interpreted in the context
of the peculiar factual situation of each proceeding. Each case
has its own flesh and blood and cannot be ruled upon on the
basis of isolated clinical classroom principles. Analysis and con-
struction should not be limited to the words used in the con-
tract, as they may not accurately reflect the parties’ true intent.
The court must read a contract as the average person would
read it and should not give it a strained or forced construc-
tion.’’
(3) Riviera intractable in its position. — “As clearly shown
by the records and transcripts of the case, the actions of the
parties to the contract of lease, Reyes and Riviera, shaped their
understanding and interpretation of the lease provision ‘right
of first refusal’ to mean simply that should the lessor Reyes
decide to sell the leased property during the term of the lease,
such sale should first be offered to the lessee Riviera. And that
is what exactly ensued between Reyes and Riviera, a series of
negotiations on the price per square meter of the subject prop-
erty with neither party, especially Riviera, unwilling to budge
from his offer, as evidenced by the exchange of letters between
the two contenders.
It can clearly be discerned from Riviera’s letters dated De-
cember 2, 1988 and February 4, 1989 that Riviera was so intrac-
table in its position and took obvious advantage of the knowl-
edge of the time element in its negotiations with Reyes as the
redemption period of the subject foreclosed property drew near.
Riviera strongly exhibited a ‘take-it or leave-it’ attitude in its ne-
gotiations with Reyes. It quoted its ‘fixed and final’ price as Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and not any peso more. It voiced out
that it had other properties to consider so Reyes should decide
and make known its decision ‘within fifteen days.’ x x x.”
(4) Reyes under no obligation to Riviera to disclose his offer to
another. — “Nary a howl of protest or shout of defiance spewed
forth from Riviera’s lips, as it were, but a seemingly whimper

of acceptance when the counsel of Reyes strongly expressed in
a letter dated December 5, 1989 that Riviera had lost its right of
first refusal. Riviera cannot now be heard that had it been in-
formed of the offer of Five Thousand Three Hundred Pesos
(P5,300.00) of Cypress and Cornhill it would have matched said
price. Its stubborn approach in its negotiations with Reyes
showed crystal-clear that there was never any need to disclose
such information and doing so would be just a futile effort on
the part of Reyes. Reyes was under no obligation to disclose
the same. Pursuant to Article 1339 of the New Civil Code, si-
lence or concealment, by itself, does not constitute fraud, un-
less there is a special duty to disclose certain facts, or unless
according to good faith and the usages of commerce the com-
munication should be made. We apply the general rule in the
case at bar since Riviera failed to convincingly show that either
of the exceptions are (sic) relevant to the case at bar.’’ (Riviera
Filipina, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 380 SCRA 245 [2002].)
———— ———— ————
5. Petitioner claims that there was a perfected contract to sell
while respondents argue that what was perfected between them was a
mere option.
Facts: The Receipt that contains the contract between peti-
tioner L and respondent spouses H and W, provides substan-
tially as follows:
“Received from L the sum of P20,000 as earnest money with
option to purchase a parcel of land owned by H located at x x x
with an area of x x x. Should the transaction not materialize
without the fault of the buyer [L], I [H] obligate myself to re-
turn the P20,000; if through the fault of the buyer the said
amount shall be forfeited. I guarantee to notify L or her repre-
sentative and get her conformity should I sell or encumber the
property to a third person. The option to buy is good within 10
days x x x.
Issue: Is the agreement between the parties a contract of
option or a contract to sell?
Held: (1) Contract of option. — “The above Receipt really
shows that respondent spouses and petitioner only entered into
a contract of option; a contract by which respondent spouses
agreed with petitioner that the latter shall have the right to buy
the former’s property at a fixed price of P34.00 per square me-
100 SALES Art. 1479
ter within ten (10) days from 31 July 1978. Respondent spouses
did not sell their property; they did not also agree to sell it; but
they sold something, i.e., the privilege to buy at the election or
option of petitioner. The agreement imposed no binding obli-
gation on petitioner, aside from the consideration for the of-
fer.’’
(2) Option money. — “The consideration of P20,000.00 paid
by petitioner to respondent spouses was referred to as ‘earnest
money.’ However, a careful examination of the words used in-
dicates that the money is not earnest money but option money.
‘Earnest money’ and ‘option money’ are not the same but dis-
tinguished thus: (a) earnest money is part of the purchase price,
while option money is the money given as a distinct considera-
tion for an option contract; (b) earnest money is given only
where there is already a sale, while option money applies to a
sale not yet perfected; and (c) when earnest money is given,
the buyer is bound to pay the balance, while when the would-
be buyer gives option money, he is not required to buy (De Leon,
Comments and Cases on Sales, 1986 Rev. Ed., p. 67.), but may
even forfeit it depending on the terms of the option.
(3) Contents of Receipt. — “There is nothing in the Receipt
which indicates that the P20,000.00 was part of the purchase
price. Moreover, it was not shown that there was a perfected
sale between the parties where earnest money was given. Fi-
nally, when petitioner gave the ‘earnest money,’ the Receipt did
not reveal that she was bound to pay the balance of the pur-
chase price. In fact, she could even forfeit the money given if
the terms of the option were not met. Thus, the P20,000.00 could
only be money given as consideration for the option contract.
That the contract between the parties is one of option is but-
tressed by the provision therein that should the transaction of
the property not materialize without fault of petitioner as buyer,
respondent Lorenzo de Vera obligates himself to return the full
amount of P20,000.00 “earnest money” with option to buy or
forfeit the same on the fault of petitioner. It is further bolstered
by the provision therein that guarantees petitioner that she or
her representative would be notified in case the subject prop-
erty was sold or encumbered to a third person. Finally, the Re-
ceipt provided for a period within which the option to buy was
to be exercised, i.e., ‘within ten (10) days’ from 31 July 1978.
(4) Absence of acceptance by L. — “Doubtless, the agreement
between respondent spouses and petitioner was an ‘option con-
tract’ or what is sometimes called an ‘unaccepted offer.’ Dur-

ing the option period the agreement was not converted into a
bilateral promise to sell and to buy where both respondent
spouses and petitioner were then reciprocally bound to com-
ply with their respective undertakings as petitioner did not
timely, affirmatively and clearly accept the offer of respondent
spouses. x x x But there is nothing in the acts, conduct or words
of petitioner that clearly manifest a present intention or deter-
mination to accept the offer to buy the property of respondent
spouses within the 10-day option period. The only occasion
within the option period when petitioner could have demon-
strated her acceptance was on 5 August 1978 when, according
to her, she agreed to meet respondent spouses and the Ramoses
at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Makati. Petitioner’s
agreement to meet with respondent spouses presupposes an
invitation from the latter, which only emphasizes their persist-
ence in offering the property to the former. But whether that
showed acceptance by petitioner of the offer is hazy and dubi-
ous. On or before 10 August 1978, the last day of the option
period, no affirmative or clear manifestation was made by pe-
titioner to accept the offer. Certainly, there was no concurrence
of private respondent spouses’ offer and petitioner’s accept-
ance thereof within the option period. Consequently, there was
no perfected contract to sell between the parties.
xxx xxx
The option period having expired and acceptance was not
effectively made by petitioner, the purchase of subject prop-
erty by respondent SUNVAR was perfectly valid and entered
into in good faith.” (Limson vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCAD 887,
357 SCRA 209 [2001].)
———— ———— ————
6. Under a contract to sell a parcel of land, full payment was
not made by the vendee because of the non-fulfillment of a suspensive
condition, which property was later sold absolutely by the vendor to
another.
Facts: S and B entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land
evidenced by a memorandum of agreement which stipules, in-
ter alia, that S, vendor, reserves to herself ownership and pos-
session of the property until full payment of the purchase price
by B and that the balance thereof was payable within six (6)
months from the date S would notify B that the certificate of
102 SALES Art. 1479
title of the property could be transferred to B. Subsequently, S

executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of T.
It appeared that S exerted efforts to register the property
and B had no intention to buy the property and was only inter-
ested in dealing with other buyers to make a profit. S even
pleaded with him several times to purchase the property, less
the expenses of registration, as there were other interested buy-
ers.
Issue: Is the memorandum of agreement contract of sale, an
option to purchase, or a contract to sell?
Held: (1) Contract to Sell. — “An examination of said Memo-
randum of Agreement shows that it is neither a contract of sale
nor an option to purchase, but it is a contract to sell. An option
is a contract granting a privilege to buy or sell at a determined
price within an agreed time, the specific length or duration of
which is not present in the Memorandum of Agreement. In a
contract to sell, the title over the subject property is transferred
to the vendee only upon the full payment of the stipulated con-
sideration. Unlike in a contract of sale, the title in a contract to
sell does not pass to the vendee upon the execution of the agree-
ment or the Delivery of the thing sold. x x x
The agreement was in the nature of a contract to sell as the
vendor, Encarnacion Diaz Vda. de Reston, clearly reserved to
herself ownership and possession of the property until full pay-
ment of the purchase price by the vendees, such payment be-
ing a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not
considered a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event
which prevented the obligation from acquiring obligatory
force.’’
(2) No perfected sale. — “Petitioners, however, argue that
their obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price had
not arisen as the Memorandum of Agreement stipulated that
the balance of P18,042.00 was payable within six (6) months
from the date the vendor would notify them that the certificate
of title of the property could already be transferred in their
names. Said argument, however, does not change the nature of
the contract they entered into, being a contract to sell, so that
there was no actual sale until full payment was made by the
vendees, and that on the part of the vendees, no full payment
would be made until a certificate of title was ready for transfer
in their names.’’ (Buot vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCAD 615, 357
SCRA 846 [2001].)
Effect of bilateral promise to buy

and sell.
When the promise is bilateral, that is, one party accepts the
other’s promise to buy and the latter, the former’s promise to sell
a determinate thing for a price certain, it has practically the same
effect as a perfected contract of sale since it is reciprocally demand-
able.
EXAMPLE:
S promised to sell his car to B and B promised to buy the
said car for P100,000.00. The parties are bound by their con-
tract so that in case one of them should not comply with what
is incumbent upon him, the other has the right to choose be-
tween the fulfillment and the recission of the obligation, with
the payment of damages in either case. (Art. 1191, par. 2.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Promissor withdrew an option to sell which is not supported by
any consideration, after its acceptance by promisee.
Facts: S wrote B making a “firm offer for the sale” at a defi-
nite price of a determinate quantity of sardines. B accepted the
offer unconditionally.
Issue: Is there a perfected contract of sale?
Held: Yes, as the promise is bilateral, i.e., a promise to buy
and sell. Before accepting the promise of S and before exercis-
ing his option, B is not bound to buy. Upon accepting S’s offer,
a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues; B assumes ipso
facto the obligations of a purchaser, and not merely the right
subsequently to buy or not to buy. The concurrence of both acts
— the offer and the acceptance — generates a binding contract
of sale. (see Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc. vs. Cua Hian Tek, 102 Phil.
948 [1958].)
ART. 1480. Any injury to or benefit from the thing

sold, after the contract has been perfected, from the
moment of the perfection of the contract to the time
of delivery, shall be governed by articles 1163 to 1165,
and 1262.
104 SALES Art. 1480
This rule shall apply to the sale of fungible things,

made independently and for a single price, or without
consideration of their weight, number, or measure.
Should fungible things be sold for a price fixed
according to weight, number, or measure, the risk shall
not be imputed to the vendee until they have been
weighed, counted, or measured, and delivered, un-
less the latter has incurred in delay. (1452a)
Risk of loss or deterioration.

Four rules may be given regarding risk of loss:
(1) If the thing is lost before perfection, the seller and not the
one who intends to purchase it bears the loss (see Roman vs.
Grimalt, 6 Phil. 96 [1906].) in accordance with the principle that
the thing perishes with the owner (res perit domino);
(2) If the thing is lost at the time of perfection, the contract is
void or inexistent. (Art. 1409[3].) The legal effect is the same as
when the object is lost before the perfection of the contract of sale
(see Art. 1493.);
(3) If the thing is lost after perfection but before its delivery, that
is, even before the ownership is transferred to the buyer, the risk
of loss is shifted to the buyer as an exception to the rule of res perit
domino (Arts. 1480, pars. 1 and 2, 1538, 1189, and 1269.); and
(4) If the thing is lost after delivery, the buyer bears the risk of
loss following the general rule of res perit domino.
Scope of Article 1480.

Article 1480 contemplates two rules:
(1) The first rule — where the thing is lost after perfection but
before its delivery (see Rule No. 3, supra.) — applies to non-fun-
gible things (par. 1.) and fungible things sold independently and
for a single price or for a price fixed without consideration of their
weight, number, or measure. (par. 2.)
Under this rule, which follows the Roman Rule, the risk of the
thing sold passes to the buyer, even though the thing has not yet
been delivered to him. Therefore, if a house (sold) be destroyed
wholly or partly by fire the loss falls upon the buyer who must
pay the price, even though he has not received the thing. For the
seller is not liable for anything which happens without his fraud
or negligence. But if after the sale any alluvion has accrued to the
land, the benefit goes to the buyer for the benefit ought to belong
to him who has the risk. (Sherman, Inchiridion Romani Juris, Sec.
296.) In other words, the buyer assumes the risk of loss caused by
fortuitous event (Art. 1174.) without the fault of the seller (Art.
1262.), that is, in spite of the exercise of due diligence on his part
(Art. 1163.) and before he has incurred in delay (Arts. 165, 1170,
1262.) after the perfection of the contract to the time of delivery.
(Art. 1480, par. 1.) With respect to the fruits, the buyer has a right
to the same from the time the obligation to deliver the thing arises.
(Art. 1164.) If the risk ought to belong to the buyer before deliv-
ery, the benefit ought to belong to him who has the risk. (see Arts.
1538, 1189[5].)
Article 1480, paragraph 1 is applicable only where the thing
is determinate. (Art. 1460.) It also applies to fungible things sold
for a price not fixed in relation to weight, number, or measure
because in such case the fungible things have been “particularly
designated or physically segregated.” (Ibid., par. 2.)
Is Article 1480 above in conflict with Article 1504 (infra.)?
(2) The second rule relates to fungible things sold for a price
fixed in relation to weight, number, or measure. Under the third
paragraph, “the risk shall not be imputed to the vendee until they
have been weighed, counted, or measured, and delivered.” (see U.S.
vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1001 [1922].) Paragraph 3 is an exception to
the rule that the vendee bears the loss after the perfection of the
contract and before delivery. However, the vendee assumes the
risk if he has incurred in delay in receiving the goods sold. (North
Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Compania General Tabacos de Filipinas,
100 Phil. 1103 [1957].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. The sugar which the seller intended to deliver was destroyed
by flood.
Facts: B advanced P3,000 to S in payment of 600 piculs of
sugar. The written contract did not specify that the sugar was
106 SALES Art. 1480
to come from the crop on S’s land which was destroyed by a

flood.
Issue: S claimed that the fortuitous cause excused non-per-
formance by him of the contract.
Held: S promised to deliver a generic thing. Any sugar of
the quality stipulated, regardless of origin or however acquired,
(lawfully) would be obligatory on the part of B to receive and
would discharge the obligation. It seems, therefore, plain that
the sugar to be sold not having been segregated, the sale was
not perfected and the loss of the crop even through force ma-
jeure, did not extinguish S’s obligation to deliver the sugar.
Flood, like other catastrophes, was a contingency, a collat-
eral incident, which S should have provided for by proper stipu-
lations. Genus nunquam perit (genus never perishes). (Yu Tek &
Co. vs. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384 [1915]; De Leon vs. Soriano, 87 Phil.
193 [1950]; Bunge Corp. vs. Camenforte & Co., 91 Phil. 861
[1954].)
———— ———— ————
2. Buyer denies liability for price of tobacco delivered to its agent
by seller for inspection, grading and weighing, because it was burned
before it could be inspected, graded, and weighed.
Facts: S (vendor) delivered the tobacco in question to the
redrying plant of A, trading agent of B (vendee). The tobacco
was burned while awaiting inspection, grading, and weighing.
It appeared that S directed, supervised, and controlled A in
receiving shipments of tobacco and in the performance of its
activities, and that shipments, once received from trading enti-
ties like S, were under B’s control, and not subject to withdrawal
without its authority.
Issue: Should B be considered as having accepted the to-
bacco shipments as of the fire and, therefore, should bear the
loss?
Held: Yes. The contract of sale has been perfected at the time
of the loss (see Art. 1475.) and the shipment was placed in the
control and possession of B. The technical defect that the to-
bacco in question “were still to be inspected, graded and
weighed” cannot suffice to overturn the decision. Aside from
raising an issue of fact (for B’s own fieldmen had the responsi-
bility of such tobacco being graded, weighed, baled and loaded
on trucks duly sealed for transportation to its redrying plant
and that responsibility was fulfilled according to the trial court),

the delay was traceable to the fault of B and A and that A was
negligent in causing the fire, whereas S had done everything
that was required of him by B’s regulations in order to have the
tobacco inspected and paid for.
Furthermore, for sometime after the conflagration, there
was no question raised by B as to its liability. It would, there-
fore, be the height of injustice to deny S’s claim for payment.
(Phil.-Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. De Los Angeles, 87 SCRA 9 [1978].)
Dissenting opinion by R.C. Aquino, J.: The judgment is erro-
neous. The sale was not consummated because there was no
tradition or delivery to B of the tobacco which was lost when it
was still owned by S. A was merely an agent of B. Even as agent,
A had not yet accepted delivery of the tobacco before it was
lost during the fire. There was no acceptance of delivery be-
cause the tobacco, at the time it was lost, had not yet been prop-
erly inspected, graded and weighed. Under the contract be-
tween B and A, the latter’s responsibility as agent of the former
begins from the moment the tobacco had been delivered, re-
ceived and accepted from the trading entities (like S) and the
same had been properly graded and weighed.
These requirements had not yet been satisfied at the time
the tobacco was lost in A’s redrying plant. Inasmuch as B did
not become the owner of the lost tobacco and as S was still the
owner thereof, the loss should be borne by S, not by B. Res perit
domino. Hence, B was not obligated to pay for the tobacco. S’s
cause of action was really against A. S did not appeal from the
lower court’s judgment absolving A. Under the contract be-
tween B and A, the latter was supposed to advance to the trad-
ing entities the payment for the tobacco delivered to A, and B
would then reimburse A for its advances. No such advances
were made by A, a circumstance which may signify that the
sale was not consummated.
Author’s Note: The buyer assumes the risk of loss caused by
fortuitous event after the perfection of the contract even before
the delivery of the thing sold. (see Rule 3 under “Risk of loss or
deterioration.”) In the mind of the author, the opinion of Jus-
tice Aquino is that no contract of sale was perfected between S
and B; neither was there delivery of the tobacco to B before it
was lost. The opinion expresses its conformity to the following
excerpts, among others, from the brief of the Solicitor General
for PVTA (B):
108 SALES Art. 1480
“Viewed thus, the conclusion is inescapable that the

tobacco shipments brought to the redrying plant to be in-
spected, graded, and weighed are considered not delivered
and sold in legal contemplation, until after grading and
weighing where the ‘meeting of minds’ takes place because
the price or consideration is determined by the grade and
weight thereof. And without agreement as to price, the sale
is not perfected. It is worth emphasizing that before the to-
bacco shipments were graded and weighed, they remained
properties of the respondent trading entities (S and others)
subject to their control and possession, and at their risk;
consequently, respondents shall bear the loss which oc-
curred prior to the grading and weighing of the tobaccos.”
———— ———— ————
3. Bales of tobacco were lost while in the control and possession

of buyers’ agent before they were graded and weighed.
Facts: PVTA, a government corporation, entered into a con-
tract of procuring, redrying and servicing with FVTR for the
1963 tobacco trading operation. Petitioners ATC shipped to
FVTR bales of tobacco. Not all the bales of tobacco were graded
and weighed because some officers and employees in the
premises of FVTR asked for money to have the remaining bales
graded and weighed. The remaining ungraded and unweighed
bales were lost while they were in the possession of FVTR.
Having learned of such loss, ATC demanded for their value
and the application of the same to ATC’s merchandising loan
with PVTA but both the latter and the FVTR refused to heed
said demands.
Issue: Was the contract of sale between ATC and PVTA per-
fected by ATC’s delivery of all bales of tobacco to FVTR, a
contractee of PVTA, so as to hold PVTA liable for the loss of
said bales while in the possession of FVTR?
Held: (1) Delivery to buyer’s agent (FVTR) proven. — “Under
the Santiago Virginia Tobacco Planters Assoc. vs. PVTA (31 SCRA
528 [1970].) case, shipping documents and checklists which are
accomplished prior to delivery do not prove actual delivery. To
prove such delivery, documents such as the weigher’s tally sheet
and the warehouse receipts which are accomplished when the
actual delivery is made, are necessary. The factual circumstances
extant in this case are different from those in the Santiago case.
In said case, there was a need to prove actual delivery because

the petitioner therein demanded for the payment of tobacco
shipments which were allegedly delivered to the FVTR. In other
words, the actual physical delivery of the shipments was not
proven. On the other hand, in this case, the lower court estab-
lished from the testimonies of witnesses the fact that petitioner
entrusted to the FVTR a total of 263 bales of tobacco, 89 bales of
which were even actually weighed and graded in the redrying
plant. However, for reason beyond the control of the petitioner,
the FVTR refused to weigh and grade the remaining 174 bales.
On top of this, the FVTR also refused to grant petitioner’s re-
quest to withdraw the unweighed and ungraded shipments.
As it turned out later, said shipments were lost while in the
custody of FVTR, thereby placing the petitioner in a ‘no win’
situation.’’
(2) Seller (ATC) lost possession and control over shipment. —
“The Civil Code provides that ownership of the thing sold shall
be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery thereof. (Art. 1477.) There is delivery when the thing
sold is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. (Art.
1497.) Indeed, in tobacco trading, actual delivery plays a piv-
otal role. The peculiar procedure undergone in trading, which
procedure was set out at length in both the Santiago and the
PVTA vs. De los Angeles (87 SCRA 197 [1978].) cases, reveals that
delivery seals the contract of sale because the trader loses not
only possession but also control over the shipment. Outlined
by the PVTA pursuant to its power ‘to take over and assume,
and, therefore, exclusively direct, supervise and control, all func-
tions and operations with respect to the processing, warehous-
ing, and trading of Virginia tobacco, the provisions of any ex-
isting law to the contrary notwithstanding, the procedure is
observed by everyone involved in the trade.’”
(3) Tobacco traders placed at a disadvantage. — “Verily, the
tobacco trading procedure conceived and formulated by the
PVTA is akin to a contract of adhesion wherein only one party
has a hand in the determination of the terms. But observance
of the procedure more often than not renders a trader at a dis-
advantage. The moment the shipment is placed in the hands of
the PVTA or its representative and it is lost, the trader is left
empty-handed. While the flaw may not really be in the proce-
dure itself, the same way may be found in the persons charged
with the implementation of the procedure. Some personnel
110 SALES Art. 1481
mishandle the shipment to the detriment of the trader. Some

demand grease money to facilitate the trading process. Sadly,
this is what happened in this case.”
(4) Delivery considered effective delivery to seller (PVTA). —
“Hence, while under an ideal situation, there would have been
merit in respondent PVTA’s contention that the contract of sale
could not have been perfected pursuant to Article 1475 because
to determine the price of the tobacco traded, the shipment
should first be inspected, graded and weighed, a strict inter-
pretation of the provision may result in adverse effects to small
planters who would not be paid for the lost products of their
toil. Such situation was what the ruling in PVTA vs. De los An-
geles sought to avoid.
Equity and fair dealing, the anchor of said case, must once
more prevail. Since PVTA had virtual control over the lost
tobacco bales, delivery thereof to the FVTR should also
be considered effective delivery to the PVTA.” (Alliance To-
bacco, Inc. vs. Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration, 179 SCRA 336
[1989].)
ART. 1481. In the contract of sale of goods by de-

scription or by sample, the contract may be rescinded
if the bulk of the goods delivered do not correspond
with the description or the sample, and if the contract
be by sample as well as by description, it is not suffi-
cient that the bulk of goods correspond with the sam-
ple if they do not also correspond with the descrip-
tion.
The buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of
comparing the bulk with the description or the sam-
ple. (n)
Sale of goods by description

and/or sample.
The above article covers a sale of goods by description, by
sample, and by sample as well as by description. It provides a
cause for rescission distinct from those stated in Article 1597.
(1) Sale by description. — Sale by description occurs where a
seller sells things as being of a particular kind, the buyer not know-
ing whether the seller’s representations are true or false, but re-
lying on them as true; or, as otherwise stated, where the purchaser
has not seen the article sold and relies on the description given
him by the vendor, or has seen the goods but the want of identity
is not apparent on inspection. (77 C.J.S. 1170.)
The reason for the rule is that a dealer who sells an article
describing it as the kind of an article of commerce the identity of
which is not known to the purchaser, must understand that such
purchaser relies upon the description as a representation by the
seller that it is the thing described. (55 C.J. 739.) If the bulk of the
goods delivered do not correspond with the description, the con-
tract may be rescinded. (Art. 1481.) But if the thing delivered is as
described, the fact that the buyer cannot use the thing sold for the
purpose for which it was intended without the seller’s fault does
not exempt the buyer from paying the purchase price agreed
upon. (see Pacific Commercial Co. vs. Ermita Market & Cold
Stores, 55 Phil. 617 [1931].)
(2) Sale by sample. — To constitute a sale by sample, it must
appear that the parties contracted solely with reference to the
sample, with the understanding that the bulk was like it. But a
mere exhibition of a sample by the seller in the absence of any
showing that it was an inducement of the sale or formed the sole
basis thereof, does not amount to a sale by sample as where the
quality of the articles to be furnished is expressly described in the
contract without reference to the sample or the parties agree that
the goods ordered shall differ from the sample in some particu-
lar matter. Whether a sale is by sample is determined by the in-
tent of the parties as shown by the terms of the contract and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. (77 C.J.S. 925.) In a sale
by sample, the vendor warrants that the thing sold and to be de-
livered by him shall conform with the sample in kind, character,
and quality. (77 C.J.S. 1169; see Art. 1565.)
A sale by sample is really a species of sale by description. The
sample is employed instead of words to communicate to the buyer
the characteristics of the goods being sold. It is itself a tacit asser-
tion of the qualities of the bulk it represents.
(3) Sale by description and sample. — When a sale is made both
by sample and by description, the goods must satisfy all the
112 SALES Art. 1482
warranties (see Art. 1565.) appropriate to either kind of sale, and

it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods correspond with the
sample if they do not also correspond with the description, and
vice versa. (77 C.J.S. 1172.)
Meaning of bulk of goods.

In this article, the term “bulk of goods” is not used to desig-
nate the greater portion of the goods. Rather, it is used to denote
the goods as distinguished from the sample with which they must
correspond. The word “goods” in the phrase is an oppositional
genitive defining “bulk.” In other words “bulk of goods” mean
the same as “goods” which, as a whole body, must correspond
substantially with the sample and description. (see 77 C.J.S. 1172.)
The buyer is given a reasonable opportunity of comparing the
bulk with the description or the example. (Art. 1481, par. 2.)
ART. 1482. Whenever earnest money is given in a

contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the
price and as proof of the perfection of the contract.
(1454a)
Meaning of earnest money.

Earnest money is something of value given by the buyer to the
seller to show that the buyer is really in earnest, and to bind the
bargain. It is actually a partial payment of the purchase price and
is considered as proof of the perfection of the contract. (see
Villongco Realty vs. Bormaecheco, 65 SCRA 352 [1975]; Topacio
vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 291 [1992]; see Laforteza vs.
Machuca, 127 SCAD 798, 333 SCRA 643 [2000].) Since earnest
money constitutes an advance payment, it must be deducted from
the total price.22
22
Hence, it cannot be forfeited in case the buyer should fail to pay the balance of the
price, especially in the absence of a clear and express agreement thereon. In a case, by
reason of its failure to make payment, petitioner, through its agent, informed private
respondents that it would no longer push through with the sale. In other words, peti-
tioner resorted to extra-judicial rescission of the contract with private respondents who
did not interpose any objection to the rescission. (Golden, Ltd., Inc. vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 299 SCRA 141 [1998].)
Note: By agreement of the parties, the amount given may be

merely a deposit of what would eventually become earnest money
or downpayment should a contract of sale be made by them, not
as a part of the purchase price and as proof of the perfection of
the contract of sale but only as a guarantee that the buyer would
not back out of the sale. Thus, it is not really the giving of earnest
money but the proof of the concurrence of all the essential ele-
ments of a contract which establishes the existence of the perfected
contract. There is no sale where the parties still have to agree on
the acceptable terms of payment. (San Miguel Properties Philip-
pines, Inc. vs. Huang, 130 SCAD 713, 336 SCRA 737 [2000].) The
earnest money forms part of the consideration only if the sale is
consummated upon full payment of the purchase price. (Chua vs.
Under Article 145423 of the old Civil Code, it has been held
that the delivery of part of the purchase price should not be un-
derstood as constituting earnest money to bind the agreement in
the absence of something in the contract showing that such was
the intention of the parties. (Salas Rodriguez vs. Leuterio, 47 Phil.
818 [1925].)
Earnest money and option money

distinguished.
They may be distinguished as follows:
(1) Earnest money is part of the purchase price, while option
money (see Art. 1479, par. 2.) is the money given as distinct con-
sideration for an option contract;
(2) Earnest money is given only where there is already a sale,
while option money applies to a sale not yet perfected; and
(3) When earnest money is given, the buyer is bound to pay
the balance, while the would-be buyer who gives option money
is not required to buy. (Adelfa Properties, Inc. vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 58 SCAD 962, 240 SCRA 565 [1995] and Limson vs. Court
23
In this article, it is declared that “When earnest money or a pledge had been given
to bind a contract of purchase and sale, the contract may be rescinded if the vendee
should be willing to forfeit the earnest money or pledge or the vendor to return double
the amount.”
114 SALES Art. 1483
of Appeals, 357 SCRA 209 [2001], quoting De Leon, Comments and

Cases on Sales, 1986 rev. ed., p. 67.)
But option money may become earnest money if the parties
so agree.
ART. 1483. Subject to the provisions of the Stat-

ute of Frauds and of any other applicable statute, a
contract of sale may be made in writing, or by word of
mouth, or partly in writing and partly by word of mouth,
or may be inferred from the conduct of the parties. (n)
Form of contract of sale.

(1) General rule. — The form of a contract refers to the manner
in which it is executed or manifested. As a general rule, a con-
tract may be entered into in any form provided all the essential
requisites for its validity are present. (Art. 1356.) It may be in
writing; it may be oral; it may be partly in writing and partly oral.
It may even be inferred from the conduct of the parties. Sale is a
consensual contract and is perfected by mere consent. (Art. 1475.)
(2) Where form is required in order that a contract may be enforce-
able. — In case the contract of sale should be covered by the Stat-
ute of Frauds, the law requires that the agreement (or some note
or memorandum thereof) be in writing subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; otherwise, the contract cannot be en-
forced by action. (see Art. 1403[2].)
Under the Statute of Frauds (Art. 1403[2, a, d, e].) of the Civil
Code, the following contracts must be in writing; otherwise, they
shall be unenforceable by action:
(a) Sale of personal property at a price not less than
P500.00;
(b) Sale of real property or an interest therein regardless
of the price involved; and
(c) Sale of property not to be performed within a year
from the date thereof regardless of the nature of the property
and the price involved.
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud and
perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for their
evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring

certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced in
writing. (Claudel vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 113 [1991], cit-
ing 4 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phils., p. 580 [1973].) Contracts
infringing the Statute of Frauds are ratified when the defense fails
to object to the introduction of parol evidence, or asks questions
on cross-examination, which elicits evidence proving the exist-
ence of a perfected contract of sale. (Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 66 SCAD 136, 250 SCRA 523 [1995].)
The Statute of Frauds refers to specific kinds of transactions
and cannot apply to any other transaction that is not enumerated
therein. The application of the Statute presupposes the existence
of a perfected contract. A right of first refusal is not among those
listed as unenforceable under the statute. At best, it is a contrac-
tual grant not of the sale of the property involved, but of the right
of first refusal over the property sought to be sold. Hence, a right
of first refusal need not be written to be enforceable and may be
proven by oral evidence. (Rosencor Development Corporation vs.
Inquing, 145 SCAD 484, 354 SCRA 119 [2001].)
(3) Where form is required in order that a contract may be valid. —
Where the “applicable statute” requires that the contract of sale
be in a certain form for its validity, the required form must be
observed in order that the contract may be both valid and enforce-
able. (see Art. 1356.)
(4) Where form is required only for the convenience of the parties.
— In certain cases, a certain form (e.g., public instrument) is re-
quired for the convenience of the parties in order that the sale may
be registered in the Registry of Deeds to make effective as against
third persons the right acquired under such sale. As between the
contracting parties, the form is not indispensable since they are
allowed by law to compel each other to observe that form. (Arts.
1357, 1358[1].) Hence, the fact that the deed of sale of a parcel of
land still had to be signed and notarized does not mean that no
contract had already been perfected. A sale of land is valid regard-
less of the form it may have been entered into as long as the req-
uisites for a valid contract of sale are present.
On the other hand, the fact that a deed of sale is a notarized
document does not necessarily justify the conclusion that the said
116 SALES Art. 1483
sale is a true conveyance to which the parties thereto are irrevo-

cably bound. Though its notarization vests in its favor the pre-
sumption of regularity and due execution (Manzano vs. Perez, 152
SCAD 473, 362 SCRA 430 [2001].), it is not the function of the
notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never
intended by the parties to have any binding legal effect upon them.
The intention of the parties still and always is the primary con-
sideration in determining the true nature of the contract. (Suntay
vs. Court of Appeals, 66 SCAD 711, 251 SCRA 430 [1995];
Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 637 [2000].) Where the
vendor did not personally appear before the notary public, such
fact raises doubt regarding the vendor’s consent to the sale not-
withstanding that the deed states the contrary. (Tan vs. Mandap,
429 SCRA 711 [2004].)
An invalidly notarized deed of sale must be considered merely
as a private document. Even if validly notarized, the deed would
still be classified as a private document if it is merely subscribed
and sworn to by way of jurat but was not properly acknowledged.
(Tigno vs. Aquino, 444 SCRA 61 [2004].)
Sale of real property or an interest

therein.
(1) A sale of a piece of land or interest therein when made
through an agent is void unless the agent’s authority is in writing.
(Art. 1874; see Copon vs. Umali, 87 Phil. 91 [1950].)
(2) For the sale of real property to be effective against third
persons, the sale must be registered in the Registry of Deeds (or Prop-
erty) of the province or city where the property is located. The
sale must be in a public document (e.g., acknowledged before a
notary public or any public officer authorized by law to adminis-
ter oath) for otherwise, the registration will be refused.
(3) The real purpose of registration of a contract of sale being
to give notice to third persons and to protect the buyer against
claims of third persons arising from subsequent alienations by the
vendor, it is certainly not necessary to give efficacy to the deed of
sale, as between the parties to the contract (Phil. Suburban Dev.
Corp. vs. The Auditor General, 63 SCRA 397 [1975].) and their
privies because actual notice is equivalent to registration. It is set-
tled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

(Bollozo vs. Yu Tieng Su, 155 SCRA 50 [1987].)
(4) The sale of land in a private instrument is valid and bind-
ing upon the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a ver-
bal contract of sale of real estate produces legal effects between the
parties (Bucton vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 499 [1974]; Gallar vs. Husain,
20 SCRA 186 [1967].), since sale is a consensual contract and is
perfected by mere consent. (Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69
SCRA 99 [1976].)
(5) The fact that the notarization of a deed of sale of real prop-
erty is false is of no consequence, for it need not be notarized; it is
enough that it be in writing. (Heirs of Amparo del Rosario vs.
Santos, 108 SCRA 43 [1981].)
EXAMPLES:
(1) S orally sold to B a parcel of land. The sale is valid (Art.
1356; Lopez vs. Alvarez, 9 Phil. 28 [1907]; Guerrero vs. Raquel,
10 Phil. 52 [1908].) but it is unenforceable because the law re-
quires that it be in writing to be enforceable. (Art. 1403[e].)
(2) If the contract of sale above is in private writing, then
it is valid and binding but only as between the parties and their
privies (Soriano vs. Latoño, 87 Phil. 757 [1950]; Gallar vs.
Husain, supra.) and not as against third persons without notice
until the sale is registered in the Registry of Property. B has the
right to compel S to put the contract in a public instrument so
that it can be registered to affect third persons. (Art. 1357; see
Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Mahilum vs. Court of
Appeals, 17 SCRA 482 [1966].)
Modes of satisfaction of the Statute

of Frauds.
The statute specifies three ways in which contracts of sales of
goods within its terms may be made binding, namely:
(1) the giving of a memorandum;
(2) acceptance and receipt of part of the goods (or things in
action) sold and actual receipt of the same (see Art. 1585.); and
(3) payment or acceptance at the time some part of the pur-
chase price.
118 SALES Art. 1483
The requirement of a memorandum is obviously suitable ei-

ther for a contract to sell or a sale. The other two modes of satis-
faction seem more naturally to apply to sales than to executory
contracts. (Williston, op. cit., Sec. 73.)
The Statute of Frauds applies not only to goods but to things
in action as well. (see Art. 1403[2, d].) Thus, an assignment of credit
(Art. 1624.) at a price not less than P500.00 is within the operation
of the Statute.
Statute of Frauds applicable only

to executory contracts.
The Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory contracts
(where no performance, i.e., delivery and payment, has as yet been
made by both parties) and not to contracts which are totally (con-
summated) or partially performed. (see Vda. de Espiritu vs. CFI
of Cavite, 47 SCRA 354 [1972].) It does not forbid oral evidence to
prove a consummated sale. (Diama vs. Macalebo, 74 Phil. 70
[1942].)
(1) Reason for the rule. — The reason is that partial perform-
ance like the writing, furnishes reliable evidence of the intention
of the parties or the existence of the contract. A contrary rule
would result in injustice or unfairness to the party who has per-
formed his obligation, and would promote fraud or bad faith on
the part of the party who has not performed his obligation, for it
would enable him to keep the benefits already derived by him
from the transaction and at the same time, evade the responsi-
bilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him. (Carbonnel vs.
Poncio, 103 Phil. 655 [1958]; Art. 1405.)
Thus, where a parol contract of sale is adduced not for the
purpose of enforcing it, but as a basis of the possession of the
person claiming to be the owner, the Statute of Frauds is not ap-
plicable, in the same way that it does not apply to contracts which
are either totally or partially performed upon the theory that there
is a wide field for the commission of frauds in executory contracts
which can only be prevented by requiring them to be in writing,
a fact which is reduced to a minimum in executed contracts be-
cause the intention of the parties become apparent by their ex-
ecution. (Pascual vs. Realty Invest., Inc., 91 Phil. 257 [1952].)
(2) Circumstances indicating partial performance. — Where there

is partial performance of a parol contract of sale of realty, the prin-
ciple excluding evidence of such contract does not apply.
Other circumstances indicating partial performance of an oral
contract of sale of realty are relinquishment of rights, continued
possession by a purchaser who is already in possession, building
of improvements, tender of payment, rendition of services, pay-
ment of taxes, surveying of the land at the vendee’s expense
(Ortega vs. Leonardo, 103 Phil. 870 [1958]; see 49 Am. Jur. 44, 755-
756, 772.), and acceptance of initial payment. (Clarin vs. Rulona,
127 SCRA 512 [1984].)
The application of the Statute of Frauds presupposes the ex-
istence of a perfected contract and requires only that a note or
memorandum subscribed by the party charged or by his agent
be executed in order to compel judicial enforcement. Where there
is no perfected contract, there is no basis for the application of
the Statute. (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCAD 484, 267
SCRA 89 [1997].) Thus, the annotation on the letter-offer of the
phrase “Received original, 9-4-89,’’ beside which appears the sig-
nature of the addressee, can neither be regarded as a contract of
sale nor a promise to sell. It is merely a memorandum of the re-
ceipt of the offer. Hence, the alleged transaction is unenforceable
as the requirements under the Statute of Frauds have not been
complied with. (Jovan Land, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 79 SCAD
428, 268 SCRA 160 [1997].)
Legal recognition of electronic data messages

and electronic documents.
The following are the pertinent provisions of the implement-
ing rules and regulations of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as
the “Electronic Commerce Act.’’
(1) Validity and enforceability. — Information shall not be de-
nied validity or enforceability solely on the ground that it is in
the form of an electronic data message or electronic document,
purporting to give rise to such legal effect. Electronic data mes-
sages or electronic documents shall have the legal effect, validity
or enforceability as any other document or legal writing. In par-
ticular, subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 and the Rules:
120 SALES Art. 1483
(a) A requirement under law that information is in writ-

ing is satisfied if the information is in the form of an electronic
data message or electronic document.
(b) A requirement under law for a person to provide in-
formation in writing to another person is satisfied by the pro-
vision of the information in an electronic data message or elec-
tronic document.
(c) A requirement under law for a person to provide in-
formation to another person in a specified non-electronic form
is satisfied by the provision of the information in an electronic
data message or electronic document if the information is
provided in the same or substantially the same form.
(d) Nothing limits the operation of any requirement un-
der law for information to be posted or displayed in specified
manner, time or location; or for any information or document
to be communicated by a specified method unless and until a
functional equivalent shall have been developed, installed,
and implemented. (Sec. 7, Rules.)
(2) Incorporation by reference. — Information shall not be de-
nied validity or enforceability solely on the ground that it is not
contained in an electronic data message or electronic document
but is merely incorporated by reference therein. (Sec. 8, Ibid.)
(3) Writing. — Where the law requires a document to be in
writing, or obliges the parties to conform to a writing, or provides
consequences in the event information is not presented or retained
in its original form, an electronic document or electronic data
message will be sufficient if the latter:
(a) maintains its integrity and reliability; and
(b) can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent
reference, in that:
1) It has remained complete and unaltered, apart
from the addition of any endorsement and any author-
ized change, or any change which arises in the normal
course of communication, storage and display; and
2) It is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it
was generated and in the light of all relevant circum-
stances. (Sec. 10, Ibid.)
(4) Original. — Where the law requires that a document be

presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met
by an electronic document or electronic data message if:
(a) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of
the electronic document or electronic data message from the
time when it was first generated in its final form and such
integrity is shown by evidence aliunde (that is, evidence other
than the electronic data message itself) or otherwise; and
(b) The electronic document or electronic data message is
capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be
presented.
(c) For the purposes of No. (1) above:
1) The criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether
the information has remained complete and unaltered,
apart from the addition of any endorsement and any
change which arises in the normal course of communica-
tion, storage and display; and
2) The standard of reliability required shall be as-
sessed in the light of the purpose for which the informa-
tion was generated and in the light of all relevant circum-
stances.
An electronic data message or electronic document meeting
and complying with the requirements of Section 6 or 7 of R.A. No.
8792 shall be the best evidence of the agreement and transaction
contained therein. (Sec. 11, Ibid.)
(5) Solemn contracts. — No provision of the R.A. No. 8792 shall
apply to vary any and all requirements of existing laws and rel-
evant judicial pronouncements respecting formalities required in
the execution of documents for their validity. Hence, when the
law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may
be valid or enforceable, or that a contract is proved in a certain
way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable. (Sec. 12, Ibid.)
Legal recognition of electronic signatures.

ing rules and regulations:
122 SALES Art. 1483
An electronic signature relating to an electronic document or

electronic data message shall be equivalent to the signature of a
person on a written document if the signature:
(1) is an electronic signature as defined in Section 6(g) of the
Rules; and
(2) is proved by showing that a prescribed procedure, not
alterable by the parties interested in the electronic document or
electronic data message, existed under which:
(a) A method is used to identify the party sought to be
bound and to indicate said party’s access to the electronic
document or electronic data message necessary for his consent
or approval through the electronic signature;
(b) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the pur-
pose for which the electronic document or electronic data
message was generated or communicated, in the light of all
circumstances, including any relevant agreement;
(c) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in
order to proceed further with the transaction, to have executed
or provided the electronic signature; and
(d) The other party is authorized and enabled to verify the
electronic signature and to make the decision to proceed with
the transaction authenticated by the same.
The parties may agree to adopt supplementary or alterna-
tive procedures provided that the requirements of paragraph
(b) are complied with. (Sec. 13, Rules.)
Communication of electronic data messages

and electronic documents.
ing rules and regulations:
(1) Formation and validity of electronic contracts. — Except as
otherwise agreed by the parties, an offer, the acceptance of an offer
and such other elements required under existing laws for the for-
mation and perfection of contracts may be expressed in, demon-
strated and proved by means of electronic data message or elec-
tronic documents and no contract shall be denied validity or en-
forceability on the sole ground that it is in the form of an elec-

tronic data message or electronic document, or that any or all of
the elements required under existing laws for the formation of the
contracts is expressed, demonstrated and proved by means of
electronic documents. (Sec. 21, Rules.)
(2) Consummation of electronic transactions with banks. — Elec-
tronic transactions made through networking among banks, or
linkages thereof with other entities or networks, and vice versa,
shall be deemed consummated under rules and regulations issued
by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the actual dispensing of
cash or the debit of one account and the corresponding credit to
another, whether such transaction is initiated by the depositor or
by an authorized collecting party. The obligation of one bank,
entity, or person similarly situated to another arising therefrom
shall be considered absolute and shall not be subjected to the proc-
ess of preference of credits. The foregoing shall apply only to trans-
actions utilizing the Automated Teller Machine switching network.
Without prejudice to the foregoing, all electronic transactions
involving banks, quasi-banks, trust entities, and other institutions
which under special laws are subject to the supervision of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas shall be covered by the rules and regu-
lations issued by the same pursuant to its authority under Sec-
tion 59 of R.A. No. 8791 (The General Banking Act), R.A. No. 7653
(the Charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and Section 20,
Article XII of the Constitution. (Sec. 22, Ibid.)
(3) Recognition by parties of electronic data message. — As be-
tween the originator and the addressee of an electronic data mes-
sage or electronic document, a declaration of will or other state-
ment shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability
solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic data
message or electronic document. (Sec. 23, Ibid.)
ART. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal prop-

erty the price of which is payable in installments, the
vendor may exercise any of the following remedies:
(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the
vendee fail to pay;
124 SALES Art. 1484
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee’s failure to

pay cover two or more installments;
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing
sold; if one has been constituted, should the vendee’s
failure to pay cover two or more installments. In this
case, he shall have no further action against the pur-
chaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price.
Any agreement to the contrary shall be void. (1454-A-
a)
Remedies of vendor in sale of personal

property payable in installments.
The vendor of personal property payable in installments may
exercise any of the following remedies:
(1) elect fulfillment upon the vendee’s failure to pay; or
(2) cancel the sale, if the vendee shall have failed to pay two
or more installments; or
(3) foreclose the chattel mortgage, if one has been constituted,
if the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more installments.
Remedies alternative.
These remedies are alternative and are not to be exercised
cumulatively or successively and the election of one is a waiver
of the right to resort to the others. (Pacific Commercial Co. vs. De
la Rama, 62 Phil. 380 [1935]; Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Flor,
[C.A.] 57 O.G. 482; Cruz vs. Filipinas Invest. & Finance Corp., 23
SCRA 791 [1968]; Filipinas Invest. & Finance Corp. vs. Ridad, 30
SCRA 564 [1969]; Industrial Finance Corp. vs. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28
[1977]; Nonato vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 255
[1985].)
Thus, where from the prayer of the vendor in its brief, it asks
the appellate court to order the vendee to pay the remaining un-
paid sum under the promissory note, it thereby waives the other
remedies. (Servicewide Specialists, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appel-
late Court, 174 SCRA 80 [1989].) To file an action containing the
three remedies: to collect the purchase price; to seize the prop-
erty purchased by suing for replevin; and to foreclose the mort-
gage executed thereon, is not only irregular but is a flagrant cir-

cumvention of the prohibition of the law. (Luneta Motor Co. vs.
Dimagiba, 3 SCRA 884 [1961].)
Applicability of Article 1484.

The law is aimed at those sales of personal property where
the price is payable in several installments.
(1) Sale of personal property not payable in installments. — Arti-
cle 1484 does not apply to a sale of personal property on straight
term or partly in cash and partly in term. Where the balance, af-
ter payment of the initial sum, should be paid in its totality at the
time specified, the transaction is not by installment as contem-
plated in Article 1484. (Levi Hermanos, Inc. vs. Gervacio, 69 Phil.
52 [1939].)
(2) Sale or mortgage of real estate. — Neither does the article
apply to sale of immovable property nor to real estate mortgage.
Under Article 1484, the creditor is given the right or option to seize
the chattel and dispose of the same in accordance with the Chat-
tel Mortgage Law, while the mortgage on real property may only
be foreclosed in conformity with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, or those of Act No. 3135, if a special power to sell is granted
to the creditor under the contract. (Pacific Commercial Co. vs.
Jocson, [C.A.] 39 O.G. 1859.)
(3) Action of replevin. — It does not also apply to an action of
replevin. (Universal Motors Corp. vs. Dy Hian Tat, 28 SCRA 161
[1969].) An action by the mortgagee for recovery of possession of
personal property with replevin as a provisional remedy is not
an action for collection much less for foreclosure (extra-judicial)
of chattel mortgage. It is a preliminary step to foreclosure which
should be conducted in accordance with Section 14 of Act No.
1508. (Universal Motors Corp. vs. Velasco, 98 SCRA 545 [1980];
PAMECA Wood Treatment Plant, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 109
SCAD 7, 310 SCRA 281 [1999].)
Right of vendor to recover unpaid balance

of purchase price.
(1) Remedy of specific performance. — The vendor who has cho-
sen to exact the fulfillment of the obligation is not limited to the
126 SALES Art. 1484
proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged goods. He may still recover

from the purchaser the unpaid balance of the price, if any (see
Tajanlangit vs. Southern Motors, Inc., 101 Phil. 606 [1957]; Vda.
de Quimba vs. Manila Motor Co., Inc., 3 SCRA 444 [1961].), on
the real and personal properties of the purchaser not exempt by
law from attachment or execution. (Southern Motors, Inc. vs.
Magbanua, 101 Phil. 155 [1957].) The mere fact that the seller se-
cures possession of the personal property through an attachment
after filing an action for collection of the unpaid balance, with a
prayer for an issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment does
not necessarily mean that he intends to resort to a foreclosure of
the mortgage. Unlike in a judicial foreclosure sale, there is no need
for the court to confirm the sale on execution. (Palma vs. Court of
(2) Remedy of cancellation. — If the vendor chooses rescission
or cancellation of the contract upon the vendee’s failure to pay
two or more installments, the latter can demand the return of
payments already made unless there is a stipulation about forfei-
ture. (see Art. 1486.) In a case, for failure of the buyer to pay two
or more installments, the vendor-mortgagee (or his assignee) re-
possessed the car. The receipt issued by the vendor’s assignee to
the vendee when it took possession of the vehicle states that the
vehicle could be redeemed within 15 days, meaning that should
the vendee fail to redeem within the said period by paying the
balance of the purchase price, the assignee would retain perma-
nent possession of the vehicle as it did in fact. It was held that by
this act, the vendor exercised its option to cancel the contract of
sale, barring it from exacting payment of the balance of the pur-
chase price. “It cannot have its cake and eat it too.” (Nonato vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 255 [1985].)
(3) Remedy of foreclosure. — If the vendor has chosen the third
remedy of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage if one has been given
on the property, he is not obliged to return to the vendee the
amount of the installments already paid should there be an agree-
ment to that effect. (Ibid.) But he shall have no further action
against the vendee for the recovery of any unpaid balance of the
price remaining after the foreclosure and actual sale of the mort-
gaged chattel, and any agreement to the contrary is void. (Zayas,
Jr. vs. Luneta Motor Company, 117 SCRA 726 [1982]; PAMECA
Wood Treatment Plant, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 281
[1999].)
(a) Recovery by mortgagee of other than unpaid balance of pur-
chase price. — Article 1484(3) is inapplicable where the amounts
adjudged in favor of the vendor-mortgagee were not part of
the unpaid balance of the purchase price or in the concept of
a deficiency judgment but were expenses of the suit. (Univer-
sal Motors Corp. vs. Velasco, 98 SCRA 545 [1980], infra.) Where
the mortgagor plainly refuses to deliver the chattel subject of
the mortgage upon his failure to pay two or more installments
or if he conceals the chattel to place it beyond the reach of the
mortgagee it logically follows as a matter of common sense,
that the necessary expenses incurred in the prosecution by the
mortgagee in the prosecution of the action for replevin so that
he can regain possession of the chattel, should be borne by the
mortgagor. Recoverable expenses would include expenses
properly incurred in effecting seizure of the chattel and attor-
ney’s fees in prosecuting the action for replevin. (Agustin vs.
(b) Recourse of mortgagee against guarantor of vendee. — Nei-
ther can the vendor after the foreclosure of the chattel mort-
gage proceed against any third party who may have guaran-
teed the vendee’s performance of his obligation, for “if the
guarantor should be compelled to pay the balance of the pur-
chase price, the guarantor will, in turn, be entitled to recover
what he has paid from the debtor-vendee (Art. 2066.); so that
ultimately, it will be the vendee who will be made to bear the
payment of the balance of the price, despite the earlier fore-
closure of the chattel mortgage given by him. Thus, the pro-
tection given by Article 1484 (to the unpaid vendor) would be
indirectly subverted, and public policy overturned.” (Cruz vs.
Filipinas Invest. & Finance Corp., 23 SCRA 791 [1968]; Pascual
vs. Universal Corporation, 61 SCRA 121 [1974].)
(c) Recourse of assignee against mortgagee. — When the ven-
dor assigns his credit to another person, the latter is likewise
bound by the same law. Accordingly, when the assignee fore-
closes on the mortgage, there can be no further recovery of the
128 SALES Art. 1484
deficiency and the seller-mortgagee is deemed to have re-

nounced any right thereto. (Borbon II vs. Servicewide Special-
ists, Inc., 72 SCAD 111, 258 SCRA 634 [1996].) Article 1484(3),
however, does not bar one to whom the seller-mortgagee has
assigned on a with-recourse basis his credit against the buyer
from recovering from the seller the assigned credit in full al-
though the seller may have no right of recovery against the
buyer for the deficiency. (Filipinas Invest. & Finance Corp. vs.
Vitug, Jr., 28 SCRA 658 [1969].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Seller-mortgagee assigned on a recourse basis a promissory note
covering purchase price of motor vehicle executed by buyer-mortga-
gor who defaulted, and assignee seeks to recover from assignor un-
paid balance remaining after foreclosure.
Facts: B delivered to S a promissory note covering the pur-
chase price of a motor vehicle bought by B from S, secured by a
chattel mortgage over such automobile. S negotiated the note
to C, assigning all S’s rights to the same, the assignment in-
cluding the right of recourse against S.
B defaulted. The car was sold at public auction but the pro-
ceeds still left a deficiency.
Issue: After the foreclosure and sale by C, could it hold S
liable for the payment of the outstanding balance, plus attor-
ney’s fees and costs?
Held: Yes. Article 1483 is not applicable. The transaction be-
tween S and C was purely an ordinary discounting transaction.
The remedy sought by C is not against the buyer (B) of the car
but against the seller (S), independent of whether or not S may
have a right of recovery against B, which in this case, he does
not have. What Article 1484(3) seeks to protect are only the
buyers on installment. Surely, Congress could not have intended
to impair and much less to do away with the right of the seller
to make commercial use of his credit against the buyer, provided
said buyer is not burdened beyond what the law allows.
The contention by S that since what were assigned to C
were only whatever rights it had against B (the buyer), it should
follow that inasmuch as S has no right to recover from B be-
yond the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, C, as assignee, should
have also no right to recover any deficiency is untenable. The

very fact that C was given the right of recourse against S ne-
gates the idea that the parties contemplated to limit the recov-
ery of C to only the proceeds of the mortgage sale. (Ibid.)
Note: In the case of Cruz vs. Filipinas Invest. & Finance Corp.
(supra.), the Supreme Court broadened the scope of the Recto
Law (now Art. 1484.) beyond its letter and held that within its
spirit, a seller of goods on installments does not have any right
of action against a third party who, in addition to the buyer’s
mortgage of the goods sold, furnishes additional security for
the payment of said installment or the purchase price of said
goods. That case is entirely different from the one at bar. In that
case, the corporation was trying to recover from the guarantor
of the buyer, whereas in the present case, it is precisely stipu-
lated, in effect, that C had a right of recourse against the seller
should the buyer failed to pay the assigned credit in full. (Ibid.)
Meaning of certain terms as used

in Article 1484.
(1) “Exercise.” — In a case, the issue was “whether the plain-
tiff (mortgagee) is precluded to press for collection of an account
secured by a chattel mortgage, after it shall have informed the
defendant (mortgagor) of its intention to foreclose on the same
mortgage and the voluntary acceptance of such step (foreclosure)
by the defendants.”
The Supreme Court held that such desistance of the plaintiff,
on its own initiative, from proceeding with the auction sale with-
out gaining any advantage or benefit, and without causing any
disadvantage or harm to the defendant-mortgagor, rendered use-
less its previous choice to foreclose, and for this reason, it could
not be considered as having “exercised” (the Code uses the word
“exercise”) the remedy of foreclosure because of its incomplete
implementation. Therefore, the plaintiff was not barred from su-
ing on the unpaid account. In desisting from a foreclosure of chat-
tel mortgage, and suing instead for the unpaid balance, the credi-
tor does not assume really inconsistent positions, nor is he
estopped considering that detriment to the opposing party is a
prerequisite to the operation of estoppel. (Radiowealth, Inc. vs.
Lavin, 7 SCRA 804 [1963].)
130 SALES Art. 1484
(2) “Action.” — Considering the purpose for which the pro-

hibition contained in Article 1484 was intended, the word “action”
used therein may be construed as referring to any judicial or ex-
tra-judicial proceeding by virtue of which the vendor may law-
fully be enabled to exact recovery of the supposed unsatisfied
balance of the purchase price from the purchaser or his privy.
(Cruz vs. Filipinas Investment and Finance Corp., 23 SCRA 791
[1968].)
(3) “Any unpaid balance.” — The phrase should be interpreted
as having reference to the deficiency judgment to which the mort-
gagee may be entitled where, after the mortgaged chattel is sold
at public auction, the proceeds obtained therefrom are insufficient
to cover the full amount of the secured obligation. It includes all
other claims that may likewise be called for such as interest on
the principal, attorney’s fees, expenses of collection, and the costs.
Were it the intention of the legislature to limit its meaning to the
unpaid balance of the principal, it would have so stated.
(Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 446 [1937].) Thus,
where the mortgagor unjustifiably refused to surrender the chat-
tel subject of the mortgage upon failure of two or more
installments, or if he concealed the chattel to place it beyond the
reach of the mortgagee, that thereby constrained the latter to seek
court relief, the expenses incurred for the prosecution of the case,
such as attorney’s fees, could rightly be awarded. (Borbon II vs.
Servicewide Specialists, Inc., 72 SCAD 111, 258 SCRA 634 [1996].)
(4) “Foreclosure.” — Article 1484(3), in referring to foreclosure
of a chattel mortgage given to secure payments in installments of
the purchase price of the thing sold, means foreclosure by the
usual methods including sale of the thing at public auction.
(a) Where there is no sale because the sheriff released the
property without proceeding to sell the same and the sale was
not rescinded by the vendor, the latter was not precluded from
suing the vendee for the balance of the purchase price. (Pa-
cific Commercial Co. vs. De La Rama, 72 Phil. 380 [1941].)
(b) Similarly, where the action instituted is for specific per-
formance and the mortgaged property is subsequently at-
tached and sold by virtue of an execution, the sale thereof does
not amount to a foreclosure of the mortgage; hence, the seller-
creditor is entitled to deficiency judgment (Southern Motors,

Inc. vs. Moscoso, 2 SCRA 168 [1961].) and for an alias writ of
execution for the portion of the judgment that has not been
satisfied. (Industrial Finance Corp. vs. Ramirez, 77 SCRA 152
[1977].)
(c) Under the law, the delivery by the mortgagor of the
possession of the mortgaged chattel to the mortgagee prepara-
tory for its foreclosure sale can only operate to extinguish the
mortgagor’s liability if the mortgagee had actually caused the
foreclosure of the property when it recovered possession
thereof. It is the fact of foreclosure and actual sale of the mort-
gaged chattel that bars the recovery by the vendor of the bal-
ance of the vendee’s outstanding obligation not satisfied by
the sale. Accordingly, if the vendor desisted, on his own ini-
tiative, from consummating the auction sale when it discov-
ered that foreclosure would be impractical, such desistance
would operate as a timely disavowal of the remedy of fore-
closure, and the vendor can still sue for specific performance.
The mortgagee who accepted delivery of the mortgaged prop-
erty is not estopped from demanding payment of the unpaid
obligation in the absence of clear consent on his part to accept
the delivery in full satisfaction of the mortgaged debt in the
concept of dacion en pago.24 (Filinvest Credit Corp. vs. Phil.
Acetylene Co., Inc., 111 SCRA 421 [1982]; see De la Cruz vs.
Asian Consumer & Industrial Finance Corp., 214 SCRA 103
[1992].)
(d) In ordinary alternative obligations, a mere choice cat-
egorically and unequivocally made and then communicated
by the person entitled to exercise the option concludes the
parties. The creditor may not thereafter exercise any other
option, unless the chosen alternative proves to be ineffectual
or unavailing due to no fault on his part. This rule, in essence,
is the difference between alternative obligations, on the one
hand, and alternative remedies, upon the other hand, where,
in the latter case, the choice generally becomes conclusive only
24
Art. 1245. Dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to the creditor in
satisfaction of debt in money, shall be governed by the law on sales.
132 SALES Art. 1484
upon the exercise of the remedy. For instance, in one of the

remedies expressed in Article 1484 of the Civil Code, it is only
when there has been a foreclosure of the chattel mortgage that
the vendee-mortgagor would be permitted to escape from a
deficiency liability. Thus, if the case is one for specific perform-
ance, even when this action is selected after the vendee has
refused to surrender the mortgaged property to permit an
extrajudicial foreclosure, that property may still be levied on
execution and an alias writ may be issued if the proceeds
thereof are insufficient to satisfy the judgment credit. So, also,
a mere demand to surrender the object which is not heeded by
the mortgagor will not amount to a foreclosure, but the repos-
session thereof by the vendor-mortgagee would have the ef-
fect of foreclosure. (Borbon II vs. Servicewide Specialists, Inc.,
supra.)
(e) Actual sale in accordance with the Chattel Mortgage
Law (Act No. 1508, Sec. 14.) resulting in a deficiency of the
mortgaged chattel is the foreclosure contemplated by law.
(Manila Motor Co. vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 782 [1956]; North-
ern Motors, Inc. vs. Sapinoso, 33 SCRA 356 [1970]; Industrial
Finance Corp. vs. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 [1977]; see Vda. de
Quiambao vs. Manila Motor Co., 3 SCRA 444 [1961].) But the
taking by the mortgagee of the mortgaged chattel without
proceeding to the sale of the same at public auction is not law-
ful. The express purpose of taking the mortgaged property is
to sell the same and/or foreclose the mortgage constituted
thereon either judicially or extra-judicially and thereby liqui-
date the indebtedness in accordance with law. (Esguerra vs.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Defaulting buyer-mortgagor was given by assignee the op-
tion to pay unpaid balance of truck brought on installments or to
surrender the same, and the assignee, having learned after buyer ex-
ercised the second option that the truck had met an accident, filed suit
for recovery of unpaid balance of price.
Facts: B bought a truck on installments from S. Payment
was secured by a chattel mortgage. The promissory note and
the mortgage was assigned by S to C. B defaulted on the
installment payments. As a consequence, C demanded payment

of the entire unpaid balance of the price or surrender of the
truck. B replied that he was voluntarily surrendering the truck
to C. He said the truck was being repaired at the shop of S as it
had met with an accident, that there was too much delay in the
repair, and that he was not satisfied with the repair of the fin-
ished portions.
C decided not to get the truck. It filed a suit for the recov-
ery of the balance of the obligation.
Issue: Is C estopped to insist on its claim on the balance of
the promissory note when it demanded the return or surren-
der of the truck?
Held: No. C did not know about the accident. Even B can-
not expect C to accept the term of surrender because aside from
the fact that the truck being surrendered met an accident, C
was not satisfied with the repair of the finished portions of the
truck in question. C, therefore, was justified in refusing to ac-
cept such surrender and in bringing suit to recover the balance
of the purchase price.
Since the case involves the sale of personal property on
installments, Article 1484 of the Civil Code should apply. The
remedies provided for in Article 1484 are considered alterna-
tive, not cumulative such that the exercise of one would bar the
exercise of the others. Here, C has not cancelled the sale, nor
has it exercised the remedy of foreclosure. Foreclosure, judicial
or extrajudicial, presupposes something more than a mere de-
mand to surrender possession of the object of the mortgage.
Since C has not availed itself of the remedy of cancelling the
sale of the truck in question or of foreclosing the chattel
mortgage on said truck, C is still free to avail of the remedy of
exacting fulfillment of the obligation of B, the vendee of the
truck in question. (Industrial Finance Corp. vs. Tobias, 78 SCRA
28 [1977].)
———— ———— ————
2. In a suit for recovery of unpaid balance of purchase price of
mortgaged truck sold on installments, seller caused the attachment
and subsequent sale of the vehicle.
Facts: B bought from S a truck on installment basis. Upon
making a downpayment, B executed a promissory note for the
unpaid balance of the purchase price to secure the payment of
which a chattel mortgage was constituted on the truck in favor
134 SALES Art. 1484
of S. B failed to pay S installments on the balance. S filed a com-

plaint for recovery of the unpaid balance. Pursuant to a writ of
attachment, the truck and other properties of A were attached.
B contends that S had availed of the third remedy provided
in Article 1484, viz., the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on
the truck. On the other hand, S claims that in filing the com-
plaint, it availed of the first remedy, i.e., to exact fulfillment of
the obligation (specific performance).
Issue: Do the attachment and subsequent sale of the mort-
gaged truck amount to a foreclosure of the mortgage, hence, S
(seller-creditor) is not entitled to deficiency judgment?
Held: No. There is nothing unlawful or irregular in B’s act
of attaching the mortgaged truck. Since S has chosen to exact
the fulfillment of B’s obligation, it may enforce execution of the
judgment that may be favorably rendered thereon, on all per-
sonal and real properties of B not exempt from execution suffi-
cient to satisfy such judgment. (Southern Motors, Inc. vs. Moscoso,
2 SCRA 168 [1961].)
Note: There is a substantial difference between the effect of
foreclosing a chattel mortgage and attaching the mortgaged
chattel. The variance lies in the ability of the debtor to retain
possession of the property attached by giving a counterbond
and thereby discharging the attachment. This remedy the debtor
does not have in the event of foreclosure. (Reyes, J.B.L., J., con-
curring.)
———— ———— ————
3. Seller brought suit to recover mortgaged truck sold on
installment basis preparatory to foreclosure, and lower court held that
expenses of suit adjudged in his favor may be enforced only against
proceeds of the vehicle.
Facts: B brought from S a truck on installment basis. To se-
cure the balance of the purchase price B executed a promissory
note and a chattel mortgage. B defaulted in his payments. S
asked him to surrender the vehicle in accordance with the chat-
tel mortgage contract, but B failed to surrender the truck. S filed
an action to recover the truck preparatory to foreclosure of the
mortgage. By virtue of a writ of replevin, S was able to repos-
sess the truck. The parties submitted a stipulation of facts which
mentioned, among other things, the expenses incurred by S in
securing possession of the vehicle.
On the basis of the stipulation, the lower court rendered a

decision which said, among other things, that the sums ad-
judged in S’s favor may be enforced only against the proceeds
of the vehicle mortgaged.
Issue: Is the third paragraph of Article 1484 applicable to
the case at bar?
Held: No. First, the action instituted in the court a quo was
not for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage but for replevin; and
second, the amounts adjudged in favor of the plaintiff were
not part of the unpaid balance of the purchase price or in
the concept of deficiency judgment but were for the expenses
of the suit. (Universal Motors Corp. vs. Velasco, 98 SCRA 545
[1980].)
———— ———— ————
4. Chattel mortgage covers not only the personal property sold
on installment payments but other personal property of the vendee-
mortgagor.
Facts: B purchased from S two Ford sedans payable in
installments. B executed a promissory note and a deed of chat-
tel mortgage covering not only the two new cars but also an
old car and his certificate of public convenience for the opera-
tion of a taxicab fleet. With the conformity of B, S assigned its
rights to the note and the mortgage to F. Due to the failure of B
to pay the installments, F foreclosed the chattel mortgage ex-
tra-judicially. At the public auction, F was the purchaser. An-
other auction sale was held because B’s obligation was not fully
satisfied by the sale of the vehicles. At the second sale, the fran-
chise to operate the taxicab service was sold to F. B filed an
action for annulment of the contract of mortgage. The trial court
held the chattel mortgage was null and void insofar as the taxi-
cab franchise and the old car were concerned.
Issue: Is the chattel mortgage valid insofar as the franchise
and the subsequent sale thereof are concerned?
Held: The resolution of said issue is unquestionably gov-
erned by the provisions of Article 1484 of the Civil Code. Un-
der the article, the vendor of personal property the purchase
price of which is payable in installments, has the right, should
the vendee default in the payment of two or more of the agreed
installments, to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the obli-
gation, or to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the
136 SALES Art. 1484
purchased personal property, if one was constituted. Which-

ever right the vendor elects, he cannot avail of the other, these
remedies being alternative, not cumulative. Furthermore, if the
vendor avails himself of the right to foreclose his mortgage,
the law prohibits him from further bringing an action against
the vendee for the purpose of recovering whatever balance of
the debt secured not satisfied by the foreclosure sale.
Consequently, the lower court rightly declared the nullity
of the chattel mortgage in question insofar as the taxicab fran-
chise and the used car of B are concerned. F has to content him-
self with the proceeds of the sale at the public auction of the
two cars which were sold on installment and mortgaged to S,
his assignor. To allow the sale of other properties would be
equivalent to obtaining a writ of execution against B concern-
ing said properties which are separate and distinct from those
which were sold on installment. This would be contrary to pub-
lic policy and the very spirit and purpose of the law limiting
the vendor’s right to foreclose the chattel mortgage only on the
thing sold. (Ridad vs. Filipinas Investment and Finance Corp., 120
SCRA 246 [1983]; see Levi Hermanos, Inc. vs. Pacific Commer-
cial, 71 Phil. 587 [1941].)
Recovery of deficiency after foreclosure

prohibited.
(1) Purpose of prohibition. — The principal object of Article 1484
(3) is to remedy the abuses committed in connection with foreclos-
ure of chattel mortgages. This amendment prevents mortgagees
from seizing the mortgaged property, buying it at foreclosure sale
for a low price and then bringing suit against the mortgagor for a
deficiency judgment. The almost invariable result of this procedure
was that the mortgagor found himself minus the property and still
owing practically the full amount of his original indebtedness. In
other words, in all proceedings for the foreclosure of chattel mort-
gages, the mortgagee is limited to the property included in the
mortgage. (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Milan, 61 Phil. 409 [1935];
Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461 [1935].) He has
no more cause of action against the purchaser or his guarantor.
(Luneta Motor Co. vs. Salvador, 108 Phil. 1057 [1960].) “Although,
of course, the purchaser must suffer the consequences of his im-
prudence and lack of foresight, the chastisement must not be to the
extent of ruining him completely and, on the other hand, enrich-

ing the vendor in a manner which shocks the conscience.” (Manila
Trading and Supply Co. vs. Reyes, supra.)
(2) Prohibition not affected by assignment by vendor of his rights.
— The assignment by the vendor of his rights to the sale of per-
sonal property on installment basis covered by Article 1484 of the
Civil Code does not change the nature of the transaction between
the parties — the vendor and the vendee. It remains the same.
Hence, the assignee can have no better rights than the assignor.
Accordingly, where the obligation of the vendee had already been
discharged by sale at public auction of the property subject of the
chattel mortgage, no deficiency amount can be recovered by the
assignee. To rule otherwise would pave the way for subverting
the policy underlying Article 1484 on the foreclosure of chattel
mortgages over personal property sold on installment basis.
(Zayas, Jr. vs. Luneta Motor Company, 117 SCRA 726 [1982].)
Sale or financing of real estate

on installment payments.
(1) Rights of buyer. — In transactions or contracts involving the
sale or financing of real estate on installment payments (see Ap-
pendix “B.”), including residential condominium apartments, the
following are the rights given to the buyer who has paid at least
two (2) years of installments in case he defaults in the payment of
succeeding payments:
(a) To pay without additional interest, the unpaid
installments due within the total grace period earned by him
fixed at the rate of one (1)-month grace period for every one
(1) year of installment payments made. This right however,
shall be exercised by him only once in every five (5) years of
the life of the contract and its extension, if any; and
(b) If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the
buyer the cash surrender value of the payments on the prop-
erty equivalent to 50% of the total payments made and, after
five (5) years of installments, an additional 5% every year but
not to exceed 90% of the total payments made. (Sec. 3, R.A. No.
6552 [Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act]; see Layug vs.
138 SALES Art. 1484
(c) The buyer has the right to sell his right or assign the
same before actual cancellation of the contract (see Sec. 5, R.A.
No. 6552.) and to pay in advance any unpaid installment
anytime without interest and to have such full payment of the
purchase price annotated in the certificate of title covering the
property. (see Sec. 6, ibid.)
(2) Conditions for cancellation of sale by seller. — The actual can-
cellation shall take place after 30 days from receipt by the buyer
of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission by a
notarial act and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to
the buyer. Down payments, deposits or options on the contract
shall be included in the computation of the total number of
installment payments made. (Sec. 3, Ibid.; see McLaughlin vs.
In case the defaulting buyer has paid less than two (2) years
of installments, the seller shall give him a grace period of not less
than 60 days from the date the installment became due. If he fails
to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period,
the seller may cancel the contract after 30 days from receipt by
the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescis-
sion of the contract by a notarial act. (Sec. 4, R.A. No. 6552.)
(3) Installment sales not covered. — The Act excludes from its
operation sales on installments of industrial lots, commercial
buildings, and sales to tenants under the Code of Agrarian Re-
forms.25 (Ibid.) In other words, in the case of such kind of prop-
erty, the Act recognizes the vendor’s right unqualifiedly to can-
cel the sale upon the buyer’s default. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc.
vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305 [1978]; see Art. 1592.)
(4) Purpose of the law. — The purpose is to protect buyers of
real estate on installment payments against onerous and oppres-
sive conditions. (Sec. 2, R.A. No. 6552.)
In a case, the petitioner claims that he is entitled to a convey-
ance of at least eight (8) of the 12 lots subject of the conditional
sale, on the theory that since the total price of the 12 lots was
P120,000, each lot then had a value of P10,000 and, therefore, with
25
R.A. No. 3844, as amended; now, R.A. No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988.
his P80,000.00, he had paid in full the price for the 8 lots. In sup-
port of his claim, he invokes earlier rulings in Legarda Hermanos
vs. Saldaña (55 SCRA 324 [1978].) and Calasanz vs. Angeles. (135
SCRA 323 [1985].)
In the first case, the contract of sale provided for payment of
the price of two (2) subdivision lots at P1,500.00 each, exclusive
of interest, in 120 monthly installments and at time of default, the
buyer had already paid P3,582.00, inclusive of interest; and in the
second, the agreement had a price of P3,720.00 with interest at 7%
per annum, and at time of default, the buyer had paid installments
totaling P4,533.38, inclusive of interest. Upon considerations of
justice and equity and in the light of the general provisions of the
civil law, the Supreme Court resolved in the first case to direct
the conveyance of one of the lots to the buyer since he had already
paid more than the value thereof, and in the second, to disallow
cancellation by the seller and direct transfer of title to the buyer
upon payment of the first installments yet unpaid.
In both cases, the Supreme Court equitably allocated the ben-
efits and losses between the parties to preclude undue enrichment
by one at the expense of the other. It was held that the cited prec-
edents are not applicable. The petitioner cannot be permitted to
claim that all his payments should be credited to him in their
entirety, without regard whatever, to the damages his default
might have caused to the seller. In any event, it is no longer pos-
sible to apply the rulings in the said cases to the case at bar, i.e., to
resort to principles of equity and the general provisions of the Civil
Code in the resolution of the present controversy, because at the
time of the execution of the contract in question and the breach
thereof, R.A. No. 6552 was already in force and applicable thereto.
It precludes resort to equity and analogous provisions of the Civil
Code, it being axiomatic that where there is an adequate remedy
at law available to the parties, equity should not come into play.
(Layug vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 627 [1988].)
ART. 1485. The preceding article shall be applied

to contracts purporting to be leases of personal prop-
erty with option to buy, when the lessor has deprived
the lessee of the possession or enjoyment of the thing.
(1454-A-a)
140 SALES Art. 1485
Lease of personal property

with option to buy.
(1) Nature of transaction. — Leases of personal property with
option to buy on the part of the lessee who takes possession or
enjoyment of the property leased are really sales of personalty
payable in installments. Accordingly, the rules provided in Arti-
cle 1484 are equally applicable to the so-called leases of personal
property. Sellers desirous of making conditional sales of their
goods but do not wish openly to make a bargain in that form, for
one reason or another, have frequently resorted to the device of
making contracts in the form of leases either with option to the
buyer to purchase for small consideration at the end of the term
provided the so-called rent has been duly paid, or with the stipu-
lation that if the rent throughout the term is paid, the title shall
thereupon vest on in the lessee. (Filinvest Credit Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals, 178 SCRA 188 [1989].)
(2) Purpose of provision. — The evident purpose of Article 1485
is to prevent vendors from resorting to this form of contract which
usually is in reality contract of sale of personal property payable
in installments in contravention of the provisions of Article 1484.
Through the set-up, the vendor by retaining ownership over the
property in the guise of being the lessor, retains likewise the right
to repossess the same, without going through the process of fore-
closure, in the event the vendee-lessee defaults in the payment of
the installments. There arises, therefore, no need to constitute a
chattel mortgage over the movable sold. More important, the
vendor, after repossessing the property and, in effect, cancelling
the contract of sale, gets to keep all the installments-cumrental
already paid. (Filinvest Credit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 178
SCRA 188 [1989].)
EXAMPLE:
B entered into a contract called “contract of lease” with S
whereby B leased the car of S. It is stipulated that B, the al-
leged lessee, shall pay P10,000.00, upon signing the contract,
and on or before the 5th day of every month, P2,000.00 by
way of rental.
The contract fixed the value of the vehicle to be
P100,000.00. It also provided that B has the option to pur-
chase the car for the said amount and the payment made by
way of rentals shall be deducted from the amount agreed in
the option and upon the full value fixed being paid, the lease
would terminate and title to the leased property would be
transferred to B; and S would have the right to terminate the
contract and repossess the vehicle should B fail to make pay-
ments on the dates specified, and in such event, the payments
theretofore made should remain the property of S and not
be recoverable by B.
There can hardly be any question that the contract in this
case is one of sale on installments and not lease, with the so-
called monthly rentals being in truth monthly amortizations
on the price of the car, and is, therefore, subject to the provision
that “when the lessor had deprived the lessee of the enjoyment
or possession” of the personal property, he shall have no fur-
ther action against the lessee “to recover any unpaid balance”
owing by the latter, “any agreement to the contrary being void.”
In choosing the alternative remedy of depriving the lessee of
the enjoyment of the leased property, the lessor, in such case,
waives the right to bring an action for unpaid rentals on the
said vehicle. (see U.S. Commercial vs. Halili, 93 Phil. 271 [1953];
Manila Gas Corporation vs. Calupitan, 66 Phil. 646 [1938]; see
Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 307 SCRA
731 [1999].)
(3) Repossession by lessor need not be through court action. —
Even where the lessee voluntarily delivers the property to the
lessor, the case is not taken out of the purview of Article 1485 if
he does so in obedience to the lessor’s demands. The article
does not require that the deprivation of the enjoyment of the
property be brought about through court action. Specially where
the contract specifically authorizes the lessor to repossess the
property whenever the lessee defaults in the payment of rent,
court action for such purpose is not essential. (U.S. Commer-
cial Co. vs. Halili, supra.)
ART. 1486. In the cases referred to in the two pre-

ceding articles, a stipulation that the installments or
rents paid shall not be returned to the vendee or les-
see shall be valid insofar as the same may not be un-
conscionable under the circumstances. (n)
142 SALES Art. 1487
Stipulation authorizing the forfeiture

of installments or rents paid.
In sales of personal property by installments or leases of per-
sonal property with option to buy, the parties may stipulate that
the installments or rents paid are not to be returned. Such a stipu-
lation is valid “insofar as the same may not be unconscionable
under the circumstances’’; otherwise, the court has the power to
order the return of a portion of the total amount paid in
installments or rents. (Zaragosa vs. Dimayuga, [C.A.] 62 O.G. 7028;
see Art. 1229.)
Thus, in a case, where the monthly installment payable by
defendants (buyers) was P774.00 and the P5,655.92 installment
payments corresponded only to seven (7) monthly installments,
the treatment of the installment as rentals as stipulated in the
contract of sale for failure of the defendants to comply with the
terms thereof, was held not unconscionable, since they admitted
having used the air-conditioners sold for 22 months, meaning they
did not pay 15 monthly installments on the said air-conditioners
and were thus using the same free for said period to the preju-
dice of the plaintiff (seller). (Delta Motor Sales Corp. vs. Nui Kim
Duan, 213 SCRA 259 [1992].) In another case, the forfeiture of the
installments paid as rentals, was applied only to the purchase
price of P3,556 which was considered as fair and reasonable rental
for the period in which the property was under the control of the
awardee of the homelot but not to the overpayment of the amount
of P8,244.00 for “a contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the ven-
dor to the prejudice of the vendee.’’ (Gomez vs. Court of Appeals,
134 SCAD 206, 340 SCRA 720 [2000].)
ART. 1487. The expenses for the execution and

registration of the sale shall be borne by the vendor,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. (1455a)
Expenses for execution and registration.

Under this article, the vendor has the duty to pay not only the
expenses for the execution of the sale but also for the registration
of the same in the absence of any agreement between the parties
to the contrary.
Expenses incurred subsequent to the transfer of title are to be

borne by the buyer, unless caused by the fault of the seller.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
(1) Vendee assumed liability for taxes and other expenses.
Facts: In the Deed of Absolute Sale, B, buyer, assumed li-
ability for taxes and other expenses “relative to the execution
and/or implementation” of the Deed “including, among oth-
ers, documentation, documentary and service stamps, expenses
for registration and transfer of titles.’’
Issue: Is B liable for overdue real estate taxes?
Held: No. The interpretation that B assumed a liability in
overdue real estate taxes for the years prior to the contract of
sale when he was neither the owner nor the beneficial owner of
the property is incongruent to the tax policy that the user of the
property bears the tax, because there was no immediate trans-
fer of possession of the property previous to the full payment
of the purchase price. If he intended to assume liability, the con-
tract should have specifically stated “real estate taxes” due for
the previous years. The payments made under protest cannot
be construed to be an admission of liability. Hence, the tax as-
sessed and collected should be refunded. (Estate of C.T. Lim vs.
City of Manila, 182 SCRA 482 [1990].)
———— ———— ————
2. The Decision commands the petitioner (seller) to “execute a
Deed of Absolute Sate in favor of private respondents (buyers) and
deliver the corresponding certificate of title to them.”
Facts: See above.
Issue: Can it be inferred from these directives that petitioner
should also pay for the expenses in notarizing the deed and
obtaining a new certificate of title?
Held: No. “The obligation to pay for such expenses is un-
connected with and distinct from the obligations to execute and
deliver the deed of absolute and the certificate of title. Since
there is no qualification that the duties to execute and to de-
liver shall also compel petitioner to assume the expenses for
transferring the pertinent title in favor of private respondents,
the ordinary and literal meaning of the words ‘execute’ and
144 SALES Art. 1488
‘deliver’ should prevail, that is, for petitioner to perform all

necessary formalities of the deed of sale and give or cede the
res of the certificate of title (that certificate which naturally must
be in their possession since petitioner cannot give what it does
not have) to the actual or constructive control of private re-
spondents. Needless to stress, petitioner can actually discharge
these obligations without settling for its own account the ex-
penses which private respondents are demanding. In this re-
gard, petitioner can appear before the notary public for
notarization of the deed of absolute sale and assist in the can-
cellation of the certificate of title in its name by giving this cer-
tificate together with the deed of absolute sale to private re-
spondents for presentation at the Registry of Deeds, which it
has several times expressed willingness to do so.’’ (Jose Clavano,
Inc. vs. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, 378 SCRA 172
[2002].)
ART. 1488. The expropriation of property for pub-

lic use is governed by special laws. (1456)
Expropriation of property for public use.

The procedure for the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main is provided for in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Expropria-
tion must be decreed by competent authority and for public use
and always upon payment of just compensation. (Art. 435, par. 1,
Civil Code; Art. III, Sec. 9, Constitution.)
— oOo —
145
Chapter 2
CAPACITY TO BUY OR SELL
ART. 1489. All persons who are authorized in this

Code to obligate themselves, may enter into a con-
tract of sale, saving the modifications contained in
the following articles.
Where necessaries are sold and delivered to a
minor or other person without capacity to act, he must
pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries are those
referred to in article 290. (1457)
Person who may enter into a contract

of sale.
As a general rule, all persons, whether natural or juridical, who
can bind themselves have also legal capacity to buy and sell. There
are exceptions to this rule in those cases when the law determines
that a party suffers from either absolute or relative incapacity.
Kinds of incapacity.
Such incapacity is absolute in the case of persons who cannot
bind themselves; and relative where it exists only with reference
to certain persons or a certain class of property. (Wolfson vs. Es-
tate of Martinez, 20 Phil. 340 [1911].) Persons who are merely rela-
tively incapacitated are mentioned in Articles 1490-1491.
There are no incapacities except those provided by law and
such incapacities cannot be extended to other cases by implica-
tion for the reason that such construction would be in conflict with
the very nature of Article 1489. (Ibid.)
145
146 SALES Art. 1490
Liability for necessaries of minor or other

person without capacity to act.
Necessaries are those things which are needed for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transpor-
tation according to the financial capacity of the family of the in-
capacitated person. (see Art. 194, Family Code.) Whether the na-
ture of the contract is such that it can under any circumstances,
be regarded as a contract for necessaries, is a question which de-
pends upon the facts of the particular case.
Generally, the contracts entered into by a minor and other
incapacitated persons (e.g., insane or demented persons, deaf-
mutes who do not know how to write), are voidable. (Arts. 1327,
1390.) However, where necessaries are sold and delivered to him
(without the intervention of the parent or guardian), he must pay
a reasonable price therefor. (Art. 1489, par. 2.) The contract is, there-
fore, valid but the minor has the right to recover any excess above
a reasonable value paid by him.
Sale by minors.
The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate
effected by minors who have already passed the ages of puberty
and adolescence and are now in the adult age, when they pre-
tended to have already reached their majority, while in fact they
have not, is valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to
excuse themselves from compliance with the obligations assumed
by them or to seek their annulment. (see Mercado and Mercado
vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 265 [1917].)
The doctrine is entirely in accord with the provisions of the
Rules of Court (see Rule 131, Sec. 1.) and the Civil Code (see Art.
1431.) which determine cases of estoppel.
ART. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell

property to each other, except:
(1) When a separation of property was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements; or
Art. 1490 CAPACITY TO BUY OR SELL 147
(2) When there has been a judicial separation of

property under article 191.* (1458a)
Relative incapacity of husband

and wife.
(1) The husband and the wife are prohibited by the above
article from selling property to each other. A sale between husband
and wife in violation of Article 1490 is inexistent and void from
the beginning because such contract is expressly prohibited by law.
(Art. 1409[7]; Uy Siu Pin vs. Chua Hue vs. Cantollas, 70 Phil. 55
[1940]; Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano, 63 Phil. 629 [1936];
Medina vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 1 SCRA 302 [1961].)
(2) They are also prohibited from making donations to each
other during the marriage except moderate gifts on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. (Art. 87, Family Code.) However, if there
has been a separation of property agreed upon in the marriage
settlements, or when there has been a judicial separation of prop-
erty decreed between them by the court, the sales between hus-
band and wife are allowed. They have, therefore, in the two cases
mentioned, capacity to buy from or to sell to each other.
Incidentally, a marriage settlement (also called “ante-nuptial
contract”) is an agreement entered into by persons who are about
to be united in marriage, and in consideration thereof, for the
purpose of fixing the property relations that would be followed
by them for the duration of the marriage. (see Arts. 74-80, Ibid.)
Reason for prohibition under Article 1490.

The reason for the law is not based so much on the union of
the personality of the husband and wife nor on the weakness of
the sex and on the possibility that the husband will induce his wife
to engage in ruinous operations, but primarily, for the protection
of third persons1 who, relying upon supposed property of either
*Now, Art. 135, Family Code.

1
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal part-
nership without the wife’s consent. (Art. 166.) An action to annul the questioned trans-
action may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within 10 years from the
transaction. (Art. 173.) The lack of consent makes the transaction merely voidable. The
148 SALES Art. 1491
spouse, enters into a contract with either of them only to find out
that the property relied upon was transferred to the other spouse.
(see 10 Manresa 95-96.)
Persons permitted to question sale.

(1) Although certain transfers between husband and wife are
prohibited under Article 1490, such prohibition can be taken ad-
vantage of only by persons who bear such relation to the parties
making the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer
interferes with their rights or interests. Unless such a relationship
appears, the transfer cannot be attacked. Thus, the heirs of either
spouse, as well as creditors at the time of the transfer, can attack
the validity of the sale but not creditors who became such only
after the transaction. (Cook vs. McMicking, 27 Phil. 10 [1914].)
(2) The government is always an interested party in all mat-
ters involving taxable transactions. It is competent to question
their validity or legitimacy whenever necessary to block tax eva-
sion. It can impugn sales between husband and wife. (Medina vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue, supra.)
ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire

by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, ei-
ther in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or
persons who may be under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or
sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the
consent of the principal has been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of
the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of
the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any gov-
legal prohibition against the disposition of conjugal property by one spouse without the
consent of the other has been established for the benefit, not of third persons, but only of
the other spouse for whom the law desires to save the conjugal partnership from dam-
ages that might be caused. (Villaranda vs. Villaranda, 423 SCRA 571 [2004]; Papa vs.
Montenegro, 54 Phil. 331 [1930].)
ernment owned or controlled corporation, or institu-

tion, the administration of which has been entrusted
to them; this provision shall apply to judges and gov-
ernment experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take
part in the sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks
of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of jus-
tice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon
an execution before the court within whose jurisdic-
tion or territory they exercise their respective func-
tions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring
by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession;
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.
(1459a)
Incapacity by reason of relation

to property.
The above article enumerates the persons who, by reason of
the relation of trust with the persons under their charge or their
peculiar control over the property, are prohibited from acquiring
said property either directly or indirectly and whether in private
or public sale. They are the: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) execu-
tors and administrators; (4) public officers and employees; (5)
judicial officers, employees and lawyers; and (6) others especially
disqualified by law. (Rubias vs. Batiller, 51 SCRA 120 [1973].)
The persons disqualified to buy referred to in Articles 1490
and 1491 are also disqualified to become lessees of the things
mentioned thereon. (Art. 1646.)
Reason for prohibitions under

Article 1491.
The disqualifications imposed by Article 1491 on the person
enumerated is grounded on public policy considerations which
disallow the transactions entered into by them, whether directly
150 SALES Art. 1491
or indirectly, in view of the fiduciary relationship involved or the

peculiar control exercised by these individuals over the proper-
ties or rights covered. (Mananquil vs. Villegas, 189 SCRA 335
[1990].)
The prohibitions seek to prevent frauds on the part of such
persons and minimize temptations to the exertion of undue and
improper influence. The fear that greed might get the better of
the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness is the reason un-
derlying Article 1491. The law does not trust human nature to
resist the temptations likely to arise out of antagonism between
the interest of the seller and buyer. (23 Scaevola 403; Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. vs. Tuazon de Paterno, 91 Phil. 786 [1952].)
Prohibition with respect to guardians.

The relation between guardian and ward is so intimate, the
dependence so complete and the influence so great that any trans-
action between the two parties entered while the relationship
exists are, in the highest sense, suspicious and presumptively
fraudulent. This influence is presumed to last while the guardi-
an’s functions are to any extent still unperformed, while the prop-
erty is still under his control and until the accounts have been fi-
nally settled. (39 Am. Jur. 2d 160.)
Prohibition with respect to agents.

The agent’s incapacity to buy his principal’s property rests on
the fact that the agent and the principal form one juridical per-
son. Like the guardian, the agent stands in a fiduciary relation with
his principal. A sale made by an agent to himself, directly or indi-
rectly, without the permission of the principal is ineffectual. (see
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. vs. Tuazon de Paterno, supra; Barton vs.
Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Co., 46 Phil. 938 [1924].) The consent
of the principal removes the transaction out of the prohibition
contained in Article 1491(2). (Distajo vs. Court of Appeals, 132
SCAD 577, 339 SCRA 52 [2000].)
(1) The incapacity of the agent is only against buying the prop-
erty he is required to sell during the existence of the relationship.
Therefore, an agent can buy for himself the property after the ter-
mination of the agency (Valera vs. Velasco, 51 Phil. 695 [1928].) or

other properties different from those he has been commissioned
to sell. (Moreno vs. Villonea, [C.A.] 40 O.G. 2322.)
(2) Of course, the agent may buy property placed in his hands
for sale or administration if the principal gives his consent thereto.
(Cui vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 913 [1957].)
(3) The prohibition does not apply where the sale of the prop-
erty in dispute was made under a special power inserted in or
attached to the real estate mortgage pursuant to Section 5 of Act
No. 3135, as amended, a special law which governs extra-judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The power to foreclose is not an
ordinary agency that contemplates exclusively the representation
of the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority con-
ferred upon the mortgagee for the latter’s own protection. By vir-
tue of the exception, the title of the mortgagee-creditor over the
property cannot be impeached or defeated on the ground that the
mortgagee cannot be a purchaser at his own sale. (Fiestan vs.
Prohibition with respect to executors

and administrators.
The prohibition refers only to properties under the adminis-
tration of the executor or administrator at the time of the acquisi-
tion and does not extend, therefore, to property not falling within
this class.
Executors do not administer the hereditary rights of any heir.
Such rights do not form part of the property delivered to the ex-
ecutor for administration. Consequently, the prohibition in No.
(3) of Article 1491 does not apply to a purchase by an executor of
such hereditary rights (e.g., 1/10 interest in the estate), even in
those cases in which the executor administers the property per-
taining to the estate. (Naval vs. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 669 [1904]; see
Garcia vs. Rivera, 95 Phil. 831 [1954].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Administrator sold certain properties of the estate to his son for a
grossly low price.
152 SALES Art. 1491
Facts: S, administrator of the estate of his deceased mother,

was authorized by the court to sell certain described properties
of the estate to settle its outstanding obligations at the best price
obtainable. The sale was made to B, S’s son, for P75,000. On the
same date, B executed a deed of sale of the same property for
P80,000 in favor of C. Z, etc., heirs of X, filed an action for the
annulment/revocation of the two sales. C claimed that the ac-
tual consideration was P225,000 and being a purchaser in good
faith and for value, his title to the property is indefeasible pur-
suant to law. It appears that S entered into a “mutual agree-
ment of promise to sell’’ to spouses H and W the property al-
ready sold to C for P220,000 for which they paid P70,000 as
earnest money.
H and W alleged that both sales to B and C were simulated
and fictitious, made to defraud the estate and other heirs, and
that C supplied the consideration of the sale to B who was not
gainfully employed. After several hearings, the court allowed
all the interested parties to bid for the property. C offered to
buy for P280,000. H and W counter-offered at P282,000, spot
cash, which was increased to P300,000. Later all the parties,
except H and W and B, submitted an amicable settlement seek-
ing approval of the two sales and accepting the offer of C. H
and W questioned the court’s approval of the amicable settle-
ment and the non-acceptance of their offer.
Issue: Did the assent of practically all the heirs to the com-
promise agreement justify its approval by the court?
Held: No. (1) Sale is illegal, irregular and fictitious. — As ad-
ministrator, S occupies a position of the highest trust and confi-
dence. In the discharge of his functions, an administrator should
act with utmost circumspection to preserve the estate and guard
against its dissipation so as not to prejudice its creditors and
the heirs of the decedent who are entitled to the net residue
thereof. In the case at bar, the sale was made necessary “in or-
der to settle other existing obligations of the estate, but it was
made, of all people, to his son B, and for a grossly low price of
only P75,000. B had no income whatsoever, was, in fact, still a
dependent of his father, and not a single centavo of the consid-
eration was ever accounted for nor reported by B to the pro-
bate court. It was only after the sales were questioned in court
by H and W that B was compelled to admit that the actual con-
sideration of the sale to C was P200,000.
The sale to B was not submitted to the probate court for

approval as mandated by the order authorizing S to sell. The
sale was indubitably illegal, irregular, and fictitious, and the
court’s approval of the assailed compromise agreement violated
Article 1409 and “cannot work to ratify a fictitious contract
which is non-existent and void from the very beginning.”
(2) Consent of heirs not a ground for court’s approval of sale. —
The assent of the parties-signatories “to such an illegal scheme
does not legalize the same nor does it impose an obligation upon
the court to approve the same to the prejudice not only of the
creditors of the estate, and of the government by the non-pay-
ment of the correct amount of taxes legally due from the estate.”
(3) Offer of H and W more advantageous. — The offer of H
and W “is decidedly more beneficial and advantageous not only
to the estate, the heirs of the decedent, but more importantly, to
its creditors for whose account and benefit the sale was made.
No satisfactory and convincing reason appeared given for the
rejection and non-acceptance of said offer, thus giving rise to a
well-grounded suspicion that a collusion of some sort exists
between the administrator and the heirs to defraud the credi-
tors and the government.” (Lao vs. Genato, 137 SCRA 77 [1985].)
Prohibition with respect to public officials

and employees.
The prohibition refers only to properties: (1) belonging to the
State, or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government-owned
or -controlled corporation or institution, (2) the administration of
which has been entrusted to the public officials or employees.
Thus, a provincial governor or treasurer entrusted with the ad-
ministration of property belonging to a province cannot buy said
property while the school superintendent who has no charge of
the same is not within the scope of the prohibition.
Note that the prohibition includes judges and government
experts who, in any manner, take part in the sale.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Land foreclosed by GSIS was sold by it at public auction to the
wife of a GSIS official.
Facts: For failure to comply with the conditions of sale, GSIS
cancelled the sale of a parcel of land to MPC and later sold the
154 SALES Art. 1491
property at public auction to T (as the highest bidder), the wife

of the Chief, Retirement Division, GSIS. MPC questioned the
validity of the sale to T.
Issue: Does the sale fall under the prohibited transactions
under Article 1491?
Held: Yes. (1) GSIS official with influence or authority. — “Pub-
lic officers who hold positions of trust may not bid directly or
indirectly to acquire properties foreclosed by their offices and
sold at public auction. A division chief of the GSIS is not an
ordinary employee without influence or authority. The mere
fact that the husband of T exercises ample authority with re-
spect to a particular activity, i.e., retirement, shows that his in-
fluence cannot be lightly regarded. The point is that he is a
public officer and his wife acts for and in his name in any trans-
action with the GSIS.
(2) Sale is void. — If he is allowed to participate in the pub-
lic bidding of properties foreclosed or confiscated by the GSIS
there will always be the suspicion among other bidders and
the general public that the insider official has access to infor-
mation and connections with his fellow GSIS officials as to al-
low him to eventually acquire the property. It is precisely the
need to forestall such suspicions and to restore confidence in
the public service that the Civil Code declares such transac-
tions to be void from the beginning and not merely voidable.
(3) Reasons for prohibition. — The reasons are grounded on
public order and public policy.2 Assuming the transaction to be
fair and not tainted with irregularity, it is still looked upon with
disfavor because it places the officer in a position which might
become antagonistic to his public duty. (Maharlika Broadcasting
Corp. vs. Tagle, 142 SCRA 553 [1986].)
Note: Here, the GSIS official was not entrusted with the ad-
ministration of the property in question.
Prohibition with respect to judges, etc.,

and lawyers.
The prohibition in Article 1491(5) applies only to the sale or
assignment of property which is the subject of litigation to the
2
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: (1)
those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy; x x x.
persons disqualified therein. For the prohibition to operate, the

sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property. (Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86
SCRA 641 [1978]; Valencia vs. Cabanteng, 196 SCRA 302 [1991].)
The prohibition applies when, for example, a lawyer has not paid
for the property and it was merely assigned to him in considera-
tion of legal services rendered at a time when the property is still
subject of a pending case. (Ordonio vs. Eduarte, 207 SCRA 229
[1992].) The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include
not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial
sales. (Ramos vs. Ngaseo, 445 SCRA 529 [2004].)
(1) When property considered “in litigation.” — For property to
be considered “in litigation,” it is not required that some contest
or litigation over the property should have been tried by the judge.
Such property is “in litigation” from the moment it became sub-
ject to the judicial action of the judge who afterwards purchased
it. Hence, a purchase made by judge at a public auction of a prop-
erty pursuant to an order of execution issued by said judge is
within the prohibition whether or not the property had been the
subject of litigation in his court. (Gontingco vs. Pobinguit, 35 Phil.
81 [1911].)
There is no violation of the prohibition (although it may be
improper under the Canons of Judicial Ethics) where the judge
purchased the property in question after the decision involving
the property had already become final because none of the par-
ties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence,
the same was no longer in litigation. (Macariola vs. Asuncion, 114
SCRA 77 [1982].)
(2) Where property acquired by lawyer in foreclosure sale after ter-
mination of case. — A lawyer cannot purchase, directly or indirectly,
the property or rights which are the subject of litigation in which
he takes part by virtue of his profession. (see Rubias vs. Satiller,
51 SCRA 120 [1973].) The fact that the property in question was
first mortgaged by the client to his lawyer and only subsequently
acquired by the latter in a foreclosure sale long after the termina-
tion of the case will not remove it from the scope of the prohibi-
tion for at the time the mortgage was executed the relationship of
lawyer and client still existed, the very relation of trust and confi-
dence sought to be protected by the prohibition, when a lawyer
156 SALES Art. 1491
occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate terms to a

harassed client. To rule otherwise would be to countenance indi-
rectly what cannot be done directly. (Fornilda vs. Regional Trial
Court, 166 SCRA 281 [1988].)
(3) Liability of lawyer for violation of prohibition. — A violation
of the prohibition constitutes a breach of professional ethics and
malpractice for which the lawyer may be reprimanded, suspended
or disbarred from the practice of the legal profession. Good faith
is not a defense. (In re Attorney Melchor E. Ruste, 70 Phil. 243
[1940]; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775 [1920]; Mananquil
vs. Villegas, 189 SCRA 335 [1990].)
(4) Where lawyer member of law firm involved. — Contracts of
sale or lease where the vendee or lessee is a partnership, of which
a lawyer is a member, over a property involved in a litigation in
which he takes by virtue of his profession are covered by the pro-
hibition.
(5) Cases not covered. — The prohibition does not include sale
of the property of the client effected before it became involved in
the action (Gregorio Araneta, Inc. vs. Tuazon de Paterno, 91 Phil.
786 [1952].); nor does it apply to an assignment of the amount of
a judgment made by a person to his attorney in payment of pro-
fessional services in other cases (Municipal Council of Iloilo vs.
Evangelista, 55 Phil. 290 [1930].); nor to the sale of a parcel of
land, acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor, to his
attorney as long as the property was not the subject of the litiga-
tion. (Daroy vs. Abecia, 100 SCAD 376, 298 SCRA 239 [1998].) It
has also been held that the law does not prohibit a lawyer from
charging a contingent fee (to be given in a case the suit is won)
based on a certain percentage of the value of the property in liti-
gation (Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1954].), because the pay-
ment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litiga-
tion but only after judgment has been rendered in the case han-
dled by the lawyer. In fact, under the 1988 Code of Professional
Responsibility (Rule 16.03, Canon 10 thereof.), a lawyer may have
a lien over funds and property of his client and may apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements. (Fabillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195
SCRA 28 [1991].)
Other persons especially disqualified.

Examples of persons especially disqualified by law are:
(1) aliens who are disqualified to purchase private agricul-
tural lands (Art. XII, Secs. 3, 7, Constitution; see Krivenko vs.
Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 [1947].);
(2) an unpaid seller having a right of lien or having estopped
the goods in transitu, who is prohibited from buying the goods
either directly or indirectly in the resale of the same at a public or
private sale which he may make (Art. 1533, par. 5; Art. 1476[4].);
and
(3) The officer conducting the execution sale or his deputies
cannot become a purchaser, or be interested directly or indirectly
in any purchase at an execution sale. (Sec. 19, Rule 39, Rules of
Court.)
In the case of aliens, the disqualification is founded on express
provision of the Constitution and not by reason of any fiduciary
relationship. It has been held, however, that where a land is sold
to an alien who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter can-
not be impugned. In such case, there would be no more public
policy to be served in allowing the Filipino seller or his heirs to
recover the land as the same is already owned by a qualified per-
son. (Herrera vs. Tuy Kim Guan, 1 SCRA 406 [1961]; Godinez vs.
Fong Pak Luen, 120 SCRA 223 [1983].)
Effect of sale in violation of prohibition.

If the sale is made, would the transaction be void or merely
voidable?
(1) With respect to Nos. 1 to 3, the sale shall only be voidable
because in such cases only private interests are affected. (see
Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez, 20 Phil. 340 [1911].) The defect can
be cured by ratification of the seller. (see Arts. 1392-1396.)
(2) With respect to Nos. 4 to 6, the sale shall be null and void,
public interests being involved therein. (see Art. 1409[1]; Rubias
vs. Batiller, 51 SCRA 120 [1973].)
In a case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a lower
court declaring invalid the sale made by the client in favor of his
158 SALES Art. 1492
attorney. (Director of Lands vs. Abragat, 53 Phil. 147 [1929]; see

Fornilda vs. Regional Trial Court, 166 SCRA 281 [1988].)
Nullity of prohibited contracts

differentiated.
(1) Public officers, etc., justices, etc., and lawyers. — The nullity
of such prohibited contracts, i.e., by public officers and employ-
ees of government property entrusted to them and by justices,
judges, fiscals, and lawyers of property and rights in litigations
submitted to or handled by them, under paragraphs (4) and (5) is
definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The
public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not
permit of compromise or ratification. In this aspect, their disquali-
fication is grounded on public policy.
(2) Guardian, agents, and administrators. — The disqualification
of public officers differs from the first three cases of guardians,
agents, and administrators, as to whose transactions, it has been
opined that they may be “ratified” by means of and in the form
of a new contract, in which case its validity shall be determined
only by the circumstances at the time of execution of such new
contract.
(a) The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist can-
not impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object
which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have
already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second
contract; or the service which was impossible may have be-
come possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained
may have been clarified by the parties.
(b) The ratification or second contract could then be valid
from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of
the first contract. (Director of Lands vs. Abragat, supra.)
ART. 1492. The prohibitions in the two preceding

articles are applicable to sales by virtue of legal re-
demption, compromises and renunciations. (n)
Prohibition extends to sales in legal

redemption, etc.
(1) The relative incapacity provided in Articles 1490 and 1491
applies also to sales by virtue of legal redemption (see Art. 1619.),
compromises, and renunciations.
(a) Compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by recip-
rocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one al-
ready commenced. (Art. 2028.) It is the amicable settlement of
a controversy.
(b) By renunciation, a creditor gratuitously abandons his
right against his creditor. The other terms used by the law are
condonation and remission. (see Art. 1270.)
(2) The persons disqualified to buy referred to in Articles 1490
and 1491 are also disqualified to become lessees of the things
mentioned therein. (Art. 1646.)
— oOo —
160 SALES
Chapter 3
EFFECTS OF THE CONTRACT WHEN

THE THING SOLD HAS BEEN LOST
ART. 1493. If at the time the contract of sale is per-

fected, the thing which is the object of the contract
has been entirely lost, the contract shall be without
any effect.
But if the thing should have been lost in part only,
the vendee may choose between withdrawing from
the contract and demanding the remaining part, pay-
ing its price in proportion to the total sum agreed upon.
(1460a)
Effect of loss of thing at the time

of sale.
The loss or injury referred to in this article is one which has
taken place before or at the time the contract of sale is perfected.
It must be distinguished from the loss or injury mentioned in
Articles 1480 and 1504 which occurs after the contract is perfected
but prior to the time of delivery.
(1) Thing entirely lost. — Where the thing is entirely lost at the
time of perfection, the contract is inexistent and void (Art. 1409[3].)
because there is no object. (Art. 1318, par. 2.) There being no con-
tract, there is no necessity to bring an action for annulment.
(2) Thing only partially lost. — If the subject matter is only
partially lost, the vendee may elect between withdrawing from
the contract and demanding the remaining part, paying its pro-
portionate price. (Art. 1493, par. 2.)
160
Art. 1494 EFFECTS OF THE CONTRACT WHEN THE THING 161
SOLD HAS BEEN LOST
EXAMPLES:
(1) S sold his car to B. Unknown to both of them, the car
has been totally destroyed before they agreed on the sale. In
this case, there is no valid contract of sale for lack of object. S,
as owner, bears the loss and B does not have to pay for the
price.
(2) If the car sold is only partially destroyed, there still re-
mains of the object. However, since it is not of the character or
in the condition contemplated by the parties, the buyer may
withdraw from the contract or demand the delivery of the car,
paying its proportionate price.
When a thing considered lost.

The thing is lost when it perishes or goes out of commerce or
disappears in such a way that its existence is unknown or it can-
not be recovered. (Art. 1189[2].)
The word “perishes” is sufficiently inclusive as to cover a case
where there has been material deterioration or complete change
in the nature of the thing in such a manner that it loses its former
utility taking into consideration the time the contract was entered
into. (see 10 Manresa 129.)
ART. 1494. Where the parties purport a sale of spe-

cific goods, and the goods without the knowledge of
the seller have perished in part or have wholly or in a
material part so deteriorated in quality as to be sub-
stantially changed in character, the buyer may at his
option treat the sale:
(1) as avoided; or
(2) as valid in all of the existing goods or in so
much thereof as have not deteriorated, and as bind-
ing the buyer to pay the agreed price for the goods in
which the ownership will pass, if the sale was divis-
ible. (n)
Effect of loss in case of specific goods.

Article 1493 applies to a sale of specific thing. Article 1494, on
the other hand, applies to sales of goods, that is, the object of the
162 SALES Art. 1494
sale consists of a mass of “specific goods” which means “goods

identified and agreed upon at the time a contract of sale is made.”
(Art. 1636.)
Both articles have actually the same essence providing two
alternative remedies to the buyer in case of deterioration or par-
tial loss of the object prior to the sale, namely: to rescind or with-
draw from the contract or to give it legal effect, paying the pro-
portionate price of the remaining object.
(1) Sale divisible. — The second option is available only if the
sale is divisible. (Art. 1494, par. 2.) A contract is divisible when its
consideration is made up of several parts. (see Art. 1420.) When
the consideration is entire and single, the contract is indivisible.
(2) Sale indivisible. — Suppose the sale is not divisible, what
price is the buyer to pay for the remaining goods if he elects to
continue with the sale? It is believed that the buyer should be
made to pay only the proportionate price of the remaining goods
as provided for in paragraph 2 of the preceding article. If the sale
is indivisible, the object thereof may be considered as a specific
thing.
EXAMPLE:
Suppose the subject matter sold was 100 cavans of rice in
the warehouse of S at P1,000.00 per cavan or for a total price of
P100,000.00. If 60 cavans of rice were lost, B may, at his option,
withdraw from the contract without the obligation to pay for
the rice; or demand the delivery of the 40 cavans, but binding
him to pay the agreed price thereof which is P40,000.00.
If the contract is indivisible, that is, the 100 cavans of rice
were sold for P100,000.00 fixed without consideration of the
number of cavans, B should be made to pay only the propor-
tionate price of 40 cavans which is also P40,000.00.
— oOo —
163
Chapter 4
OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR
SECTION 1. — General Provisions
ART. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the

ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant the thing
which is the object of the sale. (1461a)
Principal obligations of the vendor.

The principal obligations of a vendor are:
(1) to transfer the ownership of the determinate thing sold;
(2) to deliver the thing, with its accessions and accessories, if
any, in the condition in which they were upon the perfection of
the contract (Art. 1537.);
(3) to warrant against eviction and against hidden defects
(Arts. 1495, 1547.);
(4) to take care of the thing, pending delivery, with proper
diligence (see Art. 1163.); and
(5) to pay for the expenses of the deed of sale, unless there is
a stipulation to the contrary. (Art. 1487.)
Obligation to transfer ownership and deliver.

(1) Ownership by vendor at time of perfection of contract not es-
sential. — The vendor need not be the owner of the thing at the
time of perfection of the contract; it is sufficient that he has “a right
to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered.” (Art.
1459.) The obligation to transfer ownership and to deliver is re-
ally implied in every contract of sale. (see Arts. 1458, 1459, 1547.)
163
164 SALES Art. 1495
One who sells something he does not yet own is bound by the
sale when he acquires it later. (Bucton vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 499
[1974].)
When a property belonging to a person is unlawfully taken
by another, the former has the right of action against the latter for
the recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred by the
sale or assignment of the property and the transferee can main-
tain such action against the wrongdoer. (Heirs of Q. Seraspi vs.
Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 293 [2000]; Waite vs. Peterson, 8 Phil.
235 [1907].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Goods which seller warranted as already on the way did not ar-
rive.
Facts: B, vendee, gave his consent to the purchase and sale
of certain goods on the assertion of S, vendor, stated in the con-
tract, that the goods were already on the way. The goods did
not arrive.
Issue: Has S the right to demand from B the payment of the
price?
Held: No. The assertion made by S is a warranty (see Arts.
1545, 1546.), the non-fulfillment of which constitutes a breach
of contract and deprives him the right to demand of B the pay-
ment of the price of the sale. Having elected to bind himself in
that way, S, as vendor, is responsible, even if the prompt trans-
portation of the goods does not depend upon him but upon the
importers, for he who contracts and assumes an obligation is
presumed to know the circumstances under which it can be
complied with. (Soler vs. Chesley, 43 Phil. 529 [1922].)
(2) Transfer not essential to perfection of contract. — The trans-

fer of ownership and the delivery of the thing sold are not essen-
tial to the perfection of the contract. But if the seller does not de-
liver at the time stipulated, the buyer may ask for the rescission
of the contract or fulfillment with the right to damages in either
case. (Art. 1191.)
(3) No obligation to make delivery during period of redemption. —
The purchaser in execution sales (see Rules of Court, Rule 39, Secs.
30, 35.), however, is not entitled to immediate possession of the
Art. 1495 OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR 165
General Provisions
property sold. The effective conveyance of the land is accom-

plished by the deed which is issued only after the period of re-
demption has expired. (Flores vs. Lim, 50 Phil. 738 [1927];
Gonzales vs. Calimbas and Poblete, 51 Phil. 355 [1927].) In other
words, the debtor is not obliged to make delivery during the pe-
riod of redemption. In all cases of extra-judicial foreclosure sale,
the mortgagor may redeem the real property sold within one year
from the date of registration of the sale. (see Act No. 3155, Sec. 6.)
In judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, the general rule is
that the mortgagor cannot exercise his right of redemption after
the sale is confirmed by the court. (see Rules of Court, Rule 68,
Sec. 3.)
(4) Right of vendee to transfer of certificate of title. — In a sale of
registered land, the vendee has a right to receive and the vendor
the corresponding obligation to transfer to him, not only the pos-
session and employment of the land but also the certificate of ti-
tle. (Gabila vs. Perez, 169 SCRA 517 [1989].)
(5) Right of buyer to recover the price paid. — The right of a party
to recover the amount given as a consideration has been passed
upon in a case where it was held that: “Whenever money is paid
upon the representation of the receiver that he has either a cer-
tain title in property transferred in consideration of the payment
or a certain authority to receive the money paid, when in fact he
has no such title or authority, then, although there be no fraud or
intentional misrepresentation on his part, yet there is no consid-
eration for the payment. The money remains, in equity and good
conscience, the property of the payer and may be recovered by
him. (Development Bank of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals, 65
SCAD 82, 249 SCRA 331 [1995], citing Leather Manufacturers
National Bank vs. Merchants National Bank, 128 U.S. 26; 9 S. C.T.
5; 32 L. ed., 362.) Therefore, the purchaser is entitled to recover
the money paid by him where the contract is set aside by reason
of the mutual material mistake of the parties as to the identity or
quantity of the land sold. And where the purchaser recovers the
purchase price from a vendor who fails or refuses to deliver the
title, he is entitled, as a general rule, to interest on the money paid
from the time of payment. (Ibid., citing Wolfinger vs. Thomas, 22
SD 57; 115 NW 100; Robinson vs. Bresslor, 122 Neb. 461; 240 NW
564.)
166 SALES Art. 1496
ART. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is ac-

quired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered
to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to
1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement
that the possession is transferred from the vendor to
the vendee. (n)
Ways of effecting delivery.

The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the
vendee upon the delivery thereof (see Art. 1477.) which may be
effected in any of the following ways or modes:
(1) by actual or real delivery (Art. 1497.);
(2) by constructive or legal delivery (Arts. 1498-1501.); or
(3) by delivery in any other manner signifying an agreement
that the possession is transferred to the vendee. (Arts. 1496-1499.)
In all the different modes of delivery, the critical factor which
gives legal effect to the act is the actual intention of the vendor to
deliver, and its acceptance by the vendee. The act, without the
intention, is insufficient. There is no tradition. (Norkis Distribu-
tors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 694 [1991]; Santos vs.
Santos, 156 SCAD 97, 366 SCRA 395 [2001].) Although transfer of
ownership is the primary purpose of sale, delivery remains an
indispensable requisite as our law does not admit the doctrine of
transfer of ownership of property by mere consent. (People’s In-
dustrial & Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 88 SCAD 559,
274 SCRA 597 [1997].) The delivery must be made to the vendee
or his authorized representative. Where the vendee did not name
any person to whom the delivery shall be made in his behalf, the
vendor is bound to deliver exclusively to him. (Lagon vs. Hooven
Comalco Industries, Inc., 141 SCAD 353, 349 SCRA 363 [2001].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
For rice sold, vendor was not paid by vendee who sold it to an-
other, the second vendee, the latter refusing to return the rice after he
was repaid by first vendee.
Facts: S agreed to sell 170 cavans of rice to B at the price of
P37.25 per cavan, delivery to be made at T’s store. After the
General Provisions
goods were unloaded at T’s store, S’s driver tried to collect the
purchase price from T as B was nowhere to be found, but T
refused, stating that he had purchased the goods from B at
P33.00 per cavan and the price had already been paid to him.
This is a simple case of swindling perpetrated by B at the
expense of S and T. However, three days after delivery, T was
repaid by B.
Issue: Is T duty bound to return the 170 cavans of rice to S
or to pay its value?
Held: Yes. (1) Sale between B and T voluntarily rescinded by the
repayment. — There was a perfected sale. (Art. 1475.) Owner-
ship of the rice, too, was transferred to the vendee, B, upon its
delivery at the place stipulated (Art. 1521.), and pursuant to
Articles 1477 and 1496. At the very least, B had a rescissible
title to the goods for non-payment of the purchase price but
which had not been rescinded at the time of the sale to T. Hav-
ing been repaid the purchase price by B, the sale, as between B
and T, had been voluntarily rescinded, and T was thereby di-
vested of any claim to the rice. Technically, therefore, he should
return the rice to B.
(2) Rule against unjust enrichment applies. — Since the rice
had not been returned to B who was ready to return the rice to
S, it follows that T should return the rice to S. T cannot be al-
lowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another by
holding on to property no longer belonging to him. (Art. 22.) In
law and in equity, therefore, S is entitled to recover the rice, or
the value thereof since he was not paid the price therefor. (Obaña
Ways of effecting constructive delivery.

(1) Equivalent to actual delivery. — Constructive delivery is a
general term comprehending all those acts which, although not
conferring physical possession of the thing, have been held by
construction of law equivalent to acts of real delivery. (Banawa
vs. Mirano, 97 SCRA 517 [1980]; Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, 129
SCAD 274, 335 SCRA 308 [2000].) It may be effected in any of the
following ways:
(a) by the execution of a public instrument (Art. 1498,
par. 1.);
168 SALES Art. 1496
(b) by symbolical tradition or traditio symbolica (ibid., par.

2.);
(c) by traditio longa manu (Art. 1499.);
(d) by traditio brevi manu (Ibid.);
(e) by traditio constitutum possessorium (Art. 1500.); or
(f) by quasi-delivery or quasi-traditio. (Art. 1501.)
As a specie of constructive delivery, the execution of a public
document is also considered a form of symbolic delivery.
(2) Contrary may be stipulated. — The parties, however, may
stipulate that ownership in the thing shall pass to the purchaser
only after he has fully paid the price (Art. 1478.) or fulfilled cer-
tain conditions. In a contract of absolute sale, ownership is trans-
ferred simultaneously with the delivery of the thing sold. (Joseph
& Sons Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 663
[1986].)
— oOo —
169
SECTION 2. — Delivery of the Thing Sold
ART. 1497. The thing sold shall be understood as

delivered, when it is placed in the control and pos-
session of the vendee. (1462a)
Concept of tradition or delivery.

Tradition is a derivative mode of acquiring ownership by vir-
tue of which one who has the right and intention to alienate a
corporeal thing, transmits it by virtue of a just title to one who ac-
cepts the same. (10 Manresa 122.)
Importance of tradition.
(1) Transfer of ownership. — Article 1496 emphasizes the ne-
cessity of tradition for the transfer of ownership of the thing sold.
Our law does not admit the doctrine of transfer of property by
mere consent. (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 54 [2003].)
(a) The ownership over it is not transferred by contract
merely but by delivery, actual or constructive. The critical fac-
tor in all the different modes of effecting delivery which gives
legal effect to the act, is the actual intention of the creditor to
deliver, and its acceptance by the vendee. (Norkis Distributors,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 494 [1991].)
(b) Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the trans-
fer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is
the method of accomplishing the same, the title and the
method of acquiring it being different in our law. (Gonzales
vs. Roxas, 16 Phil. 51 [1910].) But, there is no delivery as to
transfer ownership where the vendee takes possession of the
personal property subject matter of the contract of sale by
169
170 SALES Art. 1497
stealing the same while in the custody of the vendor or his

agent. (see Aznar vs. Yapdiangco, 13 SCRA 486 [1965].)
(c) It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller
to have the right to transfer ownership of the thing sold. In
general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on
the ground of the seller’s non-ownership of the thing sold at
the time of the perfection of the contract. (Alcantara-Daus vs.
De Leon, 404 SCRA 74 [2003].)
(2) Liability in case of loss. — When the thing subject of the sale
is placed in the control and possession of the vendee (Art. 1497.)
or his agent, the delivery is complete and the vendee cannot avoid
liability in case the thing is subsequently lost without the fault of
the vendor. (La Fuerza, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 23 SCRA 1217
[1968]; Phil. Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. Delos Angeles, 87 SCRA
197 [1987]; see Chrysler Phils. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133
SCRA 507 [1984].)
(3) Right of vendor to claim payment. — Delivery produces its
natural effects in law, the principal and most important of which
being the transfer of ownership without prejudice to the right of
the vendor to claim payment of the price. (Ocejo Perez & Co. vs.
International Banking Corp., 37 Phil. 631 [1918]; Municipality of
Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 32 [1987].)
Where the buyer has not become the owner for lack of deliv-
ery, his action is not accion reinvidicatoria but one against the ven-
dor for specific performance or rescission, with damages in either
case. (Art. 1191.)
(4) Consummation of contract. — Delivery of the thing together
with the payment of the price, marks the consummation of the
contract of sale.1 (Phil. National Bank vs. Ling, 69 Phil. 611 [1940];
1
In a deed of sale of a parcel of land with a deed of mortgage to secure payment of
the balance of the purchase price, where title has been transferred to the buyer, the rela-
tionship between the parties is no longer one of buyer and seller because the contract of
sale has been perfected and consummated. It is already one of a mortgagor and a mort-
gagee. In consideration of the buyer’s promise to pay on installment basis the balance of
the purchase price, the seller has accepted the mortgage as security for the obligation,
thereby becoming the mortgagee. The buyer’s (mortgagor’s) breach of the obligation
will not be with respect to the perfected contract of sale but the obligations created by
the mortgage contract. (Suria vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 661 [1987].)
Delivery of the Thing Sold
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 12 SCRA 276 [1964]; La

Fuerza, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 23 SCRA 1217 [1968].) Perfec-
tion of the contract, on the other hand, relates to the moment when
the meeting of minds between the parties takes place. (Art. 1475.)
(5) Enjoyment of thing sold. — Delivery is also necessary to
enable the vendee to enjoy and make use of the property pur-
chased.
Actual delivery of the thing sold.

(1) When deemed made. — There is actual delivery when the
thing sold is placed in the control and possession of the vendee
(Art. 1497.) or his agent. (see Alliance Tobacco Corp., Inc. vs. Phil.
Virginia Tobacco Administration, 179 SCRA 336 [1989].) This in-
volves the physical delivery of the thing and is usually done by
the passing of a movable thing from hand to hand.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Bank (pledgee) took possession, as security, of the sugar sold and
delivered by unpaid seller to buyer (pledgor) who subsequently be-
came insolvent.
Facts: S sold sugar to B. The sugar was delivered by S into
B’s warehouse, leaving it entirely subject to his control. B, how-
ever, failed to make payment after completion of delivery as
per agreement. C, a bank, took possession of the sugar pursu-
ant to a contract of pledge entered into between the bank and B
to secure the latter’s indebtedness of P20,000. Subsequently, B
became insolvent.
Issue: Is S still the owner of the sugar as to entitle him to
recovery of its possession?
Held: No. When S delivered the sugar into B’s warehouse,
leaving it entirely subject to his control, it is difficult to see how
S could have divested himself more completely of the posses-
sion of the sugar, or how he could have placed it more com-
pletely under the control of the buyer. The fact that the price
has not yet been paid, in the absence of stipulation, was not,
nor could it be an obstacle to the acquisition of ownership by B,
without prejudice, of course, to the right of S to claim payment
of the sum due. (Ocejo Perez & Co. vs. International Bank, 37 Phil.
631 [1918].)
172 SALES Art. 1498
(2) Not always essential to passing of title. — Actual or manual

delivery of an article sold is not always essential to the passing of
title thereto. (Art. 1475.) The parties to the contract may agree
when and on what conditions the ownership in the subject of the
contract shall pass to the buyer. As for example, the parties may
stipulate that ownership in the thing sold shall pass to the vendee
only after he has fully paid the price. (Art. 1478.)
ART. 1498. When the sale is made through a pub-

lic instrument, the execution thereof shall be equiva-
lent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of
the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not
appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
With regard to movable property, its delivery may
also be made by the delivery of the keys of the place
or depository where it is stored or kept. (1463)
Execution of a public instrument

or document.
(1) Possession transferred to buyer by notarized deed of conveyance.
— The execution of a public instrument (i.e., an instrument or
document attested and certified by a public officer authorized to
administer oath, such as a notary public) as a manner of delivery
applies to movable as well as immovable property since the law
does not make any distinction and it can be clearly inferred by
the use of the word “also” in paragraph 2 of Article 1498. This
manner of delivery is symbolic. The buyer may use the document
as proof of his ownership of the property sold (Florendo vs. Foz,
20 Phil. 388 [1911]; Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals,
149 SCRA 32 [1987]; see Dy, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA
826 [1991].), for purposes, for example, of mortgaging the same.
(Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 180 [1999].) Under Arti-
cle 1498, possession is transferred to the vendee (or lessee) by
virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance (Ong Ching Po vs.
Court of Appeals, 57 SCAD 619, 239 SCRA 341 [1994].) (or lease)
including the incorporeal rights appurtenant thereto, e.g., right
to eject tenants or squatters from the property in question. Since
the execution of the deed of conveyance is deemed equivalent to
delivery, prior physical delivery or possession is not legally re-

quired. Thus, notwithstanding the presence of illegal occupants
on the subject property, transfer of ownership by symbolic deliv-
ery under Article 1498 can still be effected through the execution
of the deed of conveyance. The key word is “control,’’ not pos-
session, of the property. (Sabio vs. International Corporate Bank,
154 SCAD 377, 364 SCRA 385 [2001].)
(2) Delivery presumptive only. — Under Article 1498, the mere
execution of the deed of sale in a public document is equivalent
to the delivery of the property “if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.” Therefore, prior physi-
cal delivery or possession is not required. (M.R. Dulay Enterprises,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCAD 297, 225 SCRA 678 [1993].)
Article 1498, however, lays down the general rule. It confines it-
self to providing that “the execution thereof shall be equivalent”
to delivery, which means that there is only a presumptive (not
conclusive) delivery which can be rebutted by evidence to the
contrary. (Montenegro vs. Roxas Gomez, 58 Phil. 723 [1932].) Such
presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected be-
cause of a legal impediment. Nowhere in the Civil Code is it pro-
vided that the execution of a deed of sale is a conclusive presump-
tion of delivery of the object of the sale. (Ten Realty and Develop-
ment Corp. vs. Cruz, 410 SCRA 484 [2003].)
(a) If it appears from the document or it can be inferred
therefrom that it was not the intention of the parties to make
delivery, no tradition can be deemed to have taken place. Such
would be the case, for instance, where a certain date is fixed
when the purchaser should take possession of the thing, or
where the vendor reserves the right to use and enjoy the prop-
erty until a certain period, or where it is stipulated that until
payment of the last installment is made, the title to the prop-
erty should not be deemed to have been transmitted, or where
the vendor has no control over the thing sold at the moment
of the sale, and, therefore, its material delivery could not have
been made. (Phil. Suburban Dev. Corp. vs. The Auditor Gen-
eral, 63 SCRA 397 [1975]; see 10 Manresa 129; Aviles vs. Arcega,
44 Phil. 924 [1923]; Addison vs. Felix, 38 Phil. 404 [1918];
Masallo vs. Gaspar, 39 Phil. 134 [1918].)
174 SALES Art. 1498
(b) Presumptive delivery by execution of public instru-

ment can also be negated by failure of the vendee to take
material possession of the land subject of the sale in the con-
cept of purchaser-owner. (Danguilan vs. Intermediate Appel-
late Court, 158 SCRA 22 [1988]; Pasaqui vs. Villablanca, 68
SCRA 18 [1975].) The continued possession by the vendor of
the property sold may make dubious the contract of sale be-
tween the parties. (Santos vs. Santos, 156 SCAD 47, 366 SCRA
395 [2001]; Alcos vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA
823 [1988].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. After delivery of possession coupled with execution of the
deed of sale of real property embodied in a public instrument but be-
fore its registration and payment of the price, buyer is being made
responsible for the payment of the realty tax.
Facts: S (PSDC) and B (PHHC, a government corporation)
entered into a contract of sale embodied in a public instrument
whereby S conveyed unto B two parcels of land subject to cer-
tain terms and conditions among which that S should register
the deed of absolute sale and secure a new title in the name of
B before the latter can be compelled to pay the purchase price.
Prior to the signing of the deed, B had acquired possession
of the property with the consent of S. The provincial treasurer
requested B to withhold the amount of P30,000.00 from the pur-
chase price to be paid by it to S representing the realty tax due
on the property involved.
Issue: Who is liable to the payment of the real property tax,
S or B?
Held: B. When the sale of real property is made in a public
instrument the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery
of the thing object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
(1) Vendee actually placed in possession. — In the case at bar,
there is no question that the vendor (S) had actually placed the
vendee (B) in possession and control over the property sold,
even before the date of the sale.
(2) Payment of price not essential to transfer of ownership. —
The condition that S should first register the deed of sale and
secure a new title in the name of B before the latter shall pay
the purchase price, did not preclude the transmission of own-
ership. In the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary,
the payment of the purchase price of the goods is not a condi-
tion precedent to the transfer of title to the buyer, but title passes
by the delivery of the goods.
(3) Title transferred to vendee. — Since the delivery of pos-
session coupled with the execution of the deed of absolute sale,
had consummated the sale and transferred title to B, the pay-
ment of the real estate tax after such transfer is the responsibil-
ity of the purchaser.2 (Phil. Suburban Dev. Corp. vs. The Auditor
General, 63 SCRA 397 [1975].)
———— ———— ————
2. Lessor sold property leased to a third party in violation of
the “exclusive option to purchase the same,’’ given to lessee who filed
a suit for specific performance and annulment of the sale.
Facts: Respondent MT, Inc. leased portions of a commer-
cial building together with the land owned by CB, lessor, which
it used as a movie theater. Under two contracts of lease, inter
alia, MT, Inc. “shall be given 30-days exclusive option to pur-
chase the same,’’ if CB should desire to sell the leased premises.
CB sold the building to ERD, petitioner, which received
rents from MT, Inc. for sometime.
Subsequently, MT, Inc., claiming it had been denied its right
to purchase the leased property in accordance with the lease
contracts with CB, filed a suit for specific performance and an-
nulment of sale with prayer to enforce its “exclusive option to
purchase’’ the property.
The dispute between MT, Inc., CB and ERD reached the
Supreme Court (referred to as “Mother case’’) which rescinded
the absolute sale to ERD, ordered CB to return to ERD the pur-
chase price, directed ERD to execute the documents necessary
to return ownership of the disputed lots to CB, and ordered CB
to allow MT, Inc. to buy the said lots for P11,300,000. This deci-
sion became final and executory on March 17, 1997.
MT, Inc. filed with the trial court a motion for execution
which was granted. Subsequently, the Clerk of Court of the
2
Under Republic Act No. 1322 (Sec. 7 thereof.), however, the PHHC (now National
Housing Authority) was not subject to real property tax.
176 SALES Art. 1498
Manila Regional Trial Court, as Sheriff, executed a deed of con-

veyance in favor of CB and a deed of sale in favor of MT, Inc.
On the basis of these documents, the Registry of Deeds of Ma-
nila cancelled ERD’s titles and issued new certificates of title in
the name of MT, Inc.
On September 18, 1997, or after the execution of the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court, ERD filed with the Regional Trial
Court an action for collection of a sum of money against MT, to
wit: (1) the sum of P11,548,941.76 plus legal interest, represent-
ing the total amount of unpaid monthly rentals/reasonable
compensation from June 1, 1987 to July 31, 1997; (2) the sums of
P849,567.12 and P458,853.44 a month, plus legal interest as
rental/reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the property from August 1, 1997 to May 1, 1997; and (3) the
sum of P500,000 as and for attorney’s fees, plus other expenses
of litigation, and the costs of the suit.
Issue: Is ERD entitled to back rentals?
Held: No. (1) Rental, a civil fruit of ownership. — “Rent is a
civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing
it by right of accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals
that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to peti-
tioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to
the owner of the property during that period.’’
(2) Ownership transferred by delivery. — “Ownership of the
thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon de-
livery of the thing to him ‘in any of the ways specified in articles
1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement
that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.’
This right is transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition
or delivery. Non nudis pactis sed traditione dominia rerum
transferantur. And there is said to be delivery if and when the
thing sold ‘is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.’
Thus, it has been held that while the execution of a public in-
strument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the de-
livery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery,
being merely presumptive, is deemed negated by the failure of
the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.’’
(3) Concept of delivery. — “Delivery has been described as
a composite act, a thing in which both parties must join and the
minds of both parties concur. It is an act by which one party
parts with the title to and the possession of the property, and
the other acquires the right to and the possession of the same.
In its natural sense, delivery means something in addition to
the delivery of property or title; it means transfer of posses-
sion. In the Law on Sales, delivery may be either actual or con-
structive, but both forms of delivery contemplate ‘the absolute
giving up of the control and custody of the property on the
part of the vendor, and the assumption of the same by the
vendee.’’’
(4) ERD never took actual control and possession of the prop-
erty sold to it. — “From the peculiar facts of this case, it is clear
that petitioner never took actual control and possession of the
property sold, in view of respondent’s timely objection to the
sale and the continued actual possession of the property. The
objection took the form of a court action impugning the sale
which, as we know, was rescinded by a judgment rendered by
this Court in the mother case. It has been held that the execu-
tion of a contract of sale as a form of constructive delivery is a
legal fiction. It holds true only when there is no impediment
that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of
the vendor into those of the vendee. When there is such im-
pediment, ‘fiction yields to reality — the delivery has not been
effected.’
Hence, respondent’s opposition to the transfer of the prop-
erty by way of sale to ERD’s was a legally sufficient impedi-
ment that effectively prevented the passing of the property into
the latter’s hands.’’
(5) Presumption of delivery by execution of public instrument
is only prima facie. — “The execution of a public instrument gives
rise, therefore, only to a prima facie presumption of delivery.
Such presumption is destroyed when the instrument itself ex-
presses or implies that delivery was not intended; or when by
other means it is shown that such delivery was not effected, because a
third person was actually in possession of the thing. In the latter
case, the sale cannot be considered consummated.’’
(6) ERD did not acquire rights to fruits of property. — “How-
ever, the point may be raised that under Article 1164 of the Civil
Code, ERD, as buyer, acquired a right to the fruits of the thing
sold from the time the obligation to deliver the property to pe-
titioner arose. That time arose upon the perfection of the Con-
tract of Sale on July 30, 1978, from which moment the laws pro-
vide that the parties to a sale may reciprocally demand per-
178 SALES Art. 1498
formance. Does this mean that despite the judgment rescind-

ing the sale, the right to the fruits belonged to, and remained
enforceable by, ERD?
Article 1385 of the Civil Code answers this question in the
negative, because ‘[r]escission creates the obligation to return
the things which were the object of the contract, together with
their fruits, and the price with its interest; x x x.’ Not only the
land and building sold, but also the rental payments paid, if
any, had to be returned by the buyer.’’
(7) Rental payments by MT, Inc. did not mean recognition of
ERD’s title. — “The fact that MT, Inc. paid rentals to ERD’s dur-
ing the litigation should not be interpreted to mean either ac-
tual delivery or ipso facto recognition of ERD’s title. ERD as al-
leged buyer of the disputed properties and as alleged succes-
sor-in-interest of CB rights as lessor — submitted two ejectment
suits against MT, Inc. Filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, the first was docketed as Civil Case No. 121570 on July
9, 1987; and the second, as Civil Case No. 131944 on May 28,
1990. MT, Inc. eventually won them both. However, to be able
to maintain physical possession of the premises while await-
ing the outcome of the mother case, it had no choice but to pay
the rentals. The rental payments made by MT, Inc., should not
be construed as a recognition of ERD as the new owner. They
were made merely to avoid imminent eviction.’’
(8) General principle that rescissible contract is valid until re-
scinded not applicable. — “At bottom, it may be conceded that,
theoretically, a rescissible contract is valid until rescinded. How-
ever, this general principle is not decisive to the issue of whether
ERD ever acquired the right to collect rentals. What is decisive
is the civil law rule that ownership is acquired, not by mere
agreement, but by tradition or delivery. Under the factual envi-
ronment of this controversy as found by this Court in the mother
case, ERD was never put in actual and effective control or pos-
session of the property because of MT, Inc. timely objection.
As pointed out by Justice Holmes, general propositions do
not decide specific cases. Rather, ‘laws are interpreted in the
context of the peculiar factual situation of each case. Each case
has its own flesh and blood and cannot be decided on the basis
of isolated clinical classroom principles.’ ”
(9) Sale of ERD not consummated. — “In short, the sale to
ERD may have been valid from inception, but it was judicially
rescinded before it could be consummated. Petitioner never ac-

quired ownership, not because the sale was void, as errone-
ously claimed by the trial court, but because the sale was not
consummated by a legally effective delivery of the property sold.’’
(10) Benefits precluded by ERD’s bad faith. — “Furthermore,
assuming for the sake of argument that there was valid deliv-
ery, petitioner is not entitled to any benefits from the ‘rescinded’
Deed of Absolute Sale because of its bad faith. This being the
law of the mother case decided in 1996, it may no longer be
changed because it has long become final and executory. x x x.’’
(Equatorial and Realty Development, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc.,
158 SCAD 783, 370 SCRA 56 [2001].)
(3) Sale of thing not subject to control of vendor. — Symbolic

delivery by the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to
actual delivery only where the thing is subject to the control of
the vendor and there is no impediment that may prevent the pass-
ing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the
vendee. Hence, the vendor who executes said public instrument
fails in his obligation to deliver it, if the vendee cannot enjoy its
material possession because of the opposition or resistance of a
third person (e.g., squatter) who is in actual possession. The legal
fiction yields to reality. It is not enough to confer upon the pur-
chaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must
be placed in his control in order that it can be said that delivery
has been effected. (Addison vs. Felix Tioco, 38 Phil. 404 [1918];
Power Commercial & Industrial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 84
SCAD 67, 274 SCRA 597 [1997].)
In other words, a seller cannot deliver constructively if he
cannot actually deliver even if he wants to. Of course, if the sale
had been made under the express agreement of imposing upon
the vendee the obligation to take the necessary steps to obtain the
material possession of the thing sold and if it were proven that
he knew that the thing was in the possession of a third person
claiming to have property rights thereon, such agreement would
be perfectly valid. (Ibid.)
(4) Sale of registered land. — The provisions of Article 1498 re-
garding passing of title upon delivery by execution of a public
instrument must be deemed modified by the provisions of the
180 SALES Art. 1499
Property Registration Decree (Pres. Decree No. 1529.) insofar as

registered land is concerned. Section 51 of the decree is very clear
that no deed purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land (as against third per-
sons) until its registration. In accordance with this section, no act
of the parties can transfer the ownership of real estate under the
Torrens System. That is done by the act of registration of the con-
veyance which the parties have made. (see Tuazon vs. Raymundo,
28 Phil. 635 [1914]; Manuel vs. Rodriguez, 109 Phil. 1 [1960].)
(5) Possession of a part as constructive possession of whole. —
Where apart from the delivery de jure of a land sold by symbolic
tradition resulting from the execution of a public instrument of
sale, the evidence shows that the purchaser took actual posses-
sion of the considerable portion of the land sold by the exercise
of possessory acts of clearing the area of trees and of cultivating
the same through tenants, such possession and cultivation of a
part is logically and legally constructive possession of the whole.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918].)
Symbolic tradition.
Constructive delivery is symbolic when to effect the delivery,
the parties make use of a token symbol to represent the thing
delivered.
The delivery of the key where the thing sold is stored or kept
is equivalent to the delivery of the thing (par. 2.) because the key
represents the thing. Similarly, there is symbolic delivery of goods
to vendee upon delivery to him of delivery orders (see Art.
1636[1].) which would authorize him to withdraw the goods from
a warehouse. Upon withdrawal, there is actual delivery (supra.)
which consummates the sale. (Lim Yhi Luya vs. Court of Appeals,
99 SCRA 668 [1980].)
ART. 1499. The delivery of movable property may

likewise be made by the mere consent or agreement
of the contracting parties, if the thing sold cannot be
transferred to the possession of the vendee at the time
of the sale, or if the latter already had it in his posses-
sion for any other reason. (1463a)
Arts. 1500-1501 OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR 181
Traditio longa manu.

The first part of Article 1499 refers to traditio longa manu.
This mode of delivery takes place by the mere consent or
agreement of the contracting parties as when the vendor merely
points to the thing sold which shall thereafter be at the control
and disposal of the vendee.
It should be noted that delivery “by the mere consent or agree-
ment of the contracting parties” is qualified by the phrase “if the
thing sold cannot be transferred to the possession of the vendee
at the time of the sale.”
Traditio brevi manu.

This mode of legal delivery happens when the vendee has
already the possession of the thing sold by virtue of another title
as when the lessor sells the thing leased to the lessee. Instead of
turning over the thing to the vendor so that the latter may, in turn,
deliver it, all these are considered done by action of law.
ART. 1500. There may also be tradition constitutum

possessorium. (n)
Traditio constitutum possessorium.

This mode of delivery is the opposite of traditio brevi manu.
It takes place when the vendor continues in possession of the
property sold not as owner but in some other capacity, as for ex-
ample, when the vendor stays as a tenant of the vendee. In this
case, instead of the vendor delivering the thing to the vendee so
that the latter may, in turn, deliver it back to the vendor, the law
considers that all these have taken place by mere consent or agree-
ment of the parties. (see Amig vs. Teves, 96 Phil. 252 [1954];
Bautista vs. Sioson, 39 Phil. 615 [1919]; Carbonell vs. Court of
Appeals, 69 SCRA 99 [1970]; see 10 Manresa 124.)
ART. 1501. With respect to incorporeal property,

the provisions of the first paragraph of article 1498
shall govern. In any other case wherein said provi-
sions are not applicable, the placing of the titles of
182 SALES Art. 1501
ownership in the possession of the vendee or the use

by the vendee of his rights, with the vendor’s con-
sent, shall be understood as a delivery. (1464)
Quasi-traditio.
Tradition can only be made with respect to corporeal things.
In the case of incorporeal things, delivery is effected:
(1) by the execution of a public instrument; or
(2) when that mode of delivery is not applicable, by the plac-
ing of the titles of ownership in the possession of the vendee; or
(3) by allowing the vendee to use his rights as new owner with
the consent of the vendor.
This mode of delivery of incorporeal things or rights is known
as quasi-traditio. Thus, the delivery to a person of a negotiable
document of title in which it is stated that the goods referred to
therein will be delivered to the bearer amounts to delivery of the
goods to such person. (Arts. 1507, 1508.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Property, title papers to which were delivered by debtor to
creditor as security for a debt, was included in the inventory of the
estate of debtor upon his death.
Facts: S owed B money and as security therefor delivered
to B the title papers over four parcels of land. It was orally agreed
that since S had no money, B was to have the land, permitting S
to cultivate upon condition that, after deducting expenses, 1/2
of the products was to go to B.
Then S died and the four parcels were included in the in-
ventory of the estate of S. B brought action to exclude them
from the inventory.
Issue: Is there delivery of the property in contemplation of
law?
Held: Yes. The land should have been excluded in the in-
ventory. The contract made between S and B although not in
writing, was valid and the delivery of the title deeds of the prop-
erty was equivalent in its effect to a delivery of the property
itself. (Marella vs. Reyes & Paterno, 12 Phil. 1 [1908].)
———— ———— ————

2. Before the sale at public auction, the property in question
was sold by the owner who merely delivered the title deeds thereof to
the first purchaser.
Facts: The lot and warehouse standing thereon belonging
to S were sold at public auction by the sheriff to B. D claimed
that the property was sold by S long before the auction sale to
C who, in turn, sold it to D. S merely delivered the title deeds
to C but remained in possession as lessee. C also delivered the
title deeds to D. D brought action for the recovery of the lot
and warehouse.
Issue: Is there delivery of the property in contemplation of
law?
Held: Yes. Although there was no material delivery of the
property, “the placing of the titles of ownership in the posses-
sion of the vendee or the use which he may make of his right
with the consent of the vendor shall be considered as deliv-
ery.” (Tablante vs. Aquino, 28 Phil. 35 [1914].)
Note: The Supreme Court in both cases cited Article 1464 of
the Spanish Civil Code. (Art. 1501 of our Civil Code.) It is sub-
mitted that Article 1501 refers to delivery merely of incorpo-
real rights. The result arrived at, however, may be sustained in
that the delivery of the title deeds may be considered a sym-
bolical delivery, as the delivery of the key to a house consti-
tutes a delivery of said house.
Intention to deliver and to accept

a transfer of possession.
(1) In all the forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act be
coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. For instance,
there is no constructive delivery, where the keys to the place where
the thing is deposited are delivered to the vendee in order only
that he may examine it or the titles of ownership of property are
placed in the possession of the vendee for his study or inspection
but not with the intention of making the delivery. The act, with-
out the intention to deliver, is insufficient. (see 10 Manresa 132.)
Similarly, the issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer
of ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. An invoice is nothing
more than a detailed statement of the nature, quality and cost of
184 SALES Art. 1502
the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale. (Norkis
Distributors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 694 [1991]; P.T.
Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993].)
(2) For the same reason, any act, although not provided for
in the preceding articles, but accompanied by the evident inten-
tion of the vendor to deliver or of the vendee to receive the thing
sold, will be considered as constituting tradition. It is the inten-
tion which is essential. (ibid.) It is a well-established rule that a
mere contract for the sale of goods, where nothing remains to be
made by the vendor, as when the parties agreed that the delivery
of the logs should be made alongside a vessel of the vendee and
that was done by the vendor, transfers the right of property al-
though the price has not been paid, nor the thing sold actually
delivered to the vendee whose employees attempted to load them
in the vessel but failed to do so for want of the proper loading
equipment. (Bean Admir vs. Cadwallader Co., 10 Phil. 606 [1908].)
In other words, in all the different modes of effecting deliv-
ery, it is the real intention of the parties, to deliver on the part of
the vendor, and to accept on the part of the vendee, which gives
legal effect to the act. Without such intention, there is no tradi-
tion. (see Abuan vs. Garcia, 14 SCRA 759 [1965]; Norkis Distribu-
tors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)
ART. 1502. When goods are delivered to the buyer

“on sale or return” to give the buyer an option to
return the goods instead of paying the price, the own-
ership passes to the buyer on delivery, but he may
revest the ownership in the seller by returning or ten-
dering the goods within the time fixed in the contract,
or, if no time has been fixed, within a reasonable time.
(n)
When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval
or on trial or on satisfaction, or other similar terms,
the ownership therein passes to the buyer.
(1) When he signifies his approval or acceptance
to the seller or does any other act adopting the trans-
action;
(2) If he does not signify his approval or accept-

ance to the seller, but retains the goods without giv-
ing notice of rejection, then if a time has been fixed
for the return of the goods, on the expiration of such
time, and, if no time has been fixed, on the expiration
of a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is a
question of fact. (n)
Contract of sale or return, and of sale on

trial or approval or satisfaction.
(1) In general. — It is evidently possible for the parties to agree
that the buyer shall temporarily take the goods into his posses-
sion to see whether they are satisfactory to him and that if they
are not, he may refuse to become owner. It is clear also that the
same object may be attained by an agreement that the property
shall pass to the buyer on delivery but that he may return the
goods if they are unsatisfactory. The question is one of fact in every
case whether the parties intend to make approval a condition,
without which the ownership shall not pass, or whether their in-
tent is that the ownership shall pass at once with the right to re-
turn the goods.3 (see 2 Williston, op. cit., pp. 30-33.)
The question of what is a reasonable time for the return of the
property is one of fact to be determined upon the particular cir-
cumstances of the case. The duty of the buyer with regard to the
return of the goods requires, ordinarily, that they be returned in
the same or substantially the same condition in which they were
when the contract was made. Undoubtedly, if they are injured or
damaged substantially through negligence or misuse of the buyer,
his right to return is lost and the sale becomes absolute. (Ray vs.
Thompson, 12 Cush [Mass.] 281, 59 Am. Dec. 187.)
3
“The provision in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code from
which Article 1502 was taken, clearly requires an express written agreement to make a
sales contract either a “sale or return” or a “sale on approval.” Parol or extrinsic testi-
mony could not be admitted for the purpose of showing that an invoice or bill of sale
that was complete in every aspect and purporting to embody a sale without a condition
or restriction constituted a contract of sale or return. If the purchaser desired to incorpo-
rate a stipulation securing to him the right of return, he should have done so at the time
the contract was made. (Industrial Textile Manufacturing Co. vs. LPJ Enterprises, Inc.,
217 SCRA 322 [1993], citing 67 Am. Jur. 2d 733.)
186 SALES Art. 1502
(2) Sale or return. — It is a contract by which property is sold

but the buyer, who becomes the owner of the property on deliv-
ery, has the option to return the same to the seller instead of pay-
ing the price.
(a) Under this contract, the option to purchase or return
the goods rests entirely on the buyer without reference to the
quality of the goods. The buyer may revest the ownership in
the seller by returning or tendering the goods within the time
fixed in the contract, or, if no time has been fixed, within a
reasonable time (Art. 1502, par. 1.); otherwise, the sale becomes
absolute and the buyer is liable for the price. The seller can-
not, in this type of sale, prevent the revesting of title by refus-
ing to accept the return of the property.
(b) Since title passes to the buyer on delivery, the loss or
destruction of the property prior to the exercise of the buyer’s
option to return falls upon him and renders him responsible
to the seller for the purchase price or such part thereof as re-
mains unpaid. (Art. 1504; 46 Am. Jur. 647.) The word “return”
itself implies a previous transfer of title.
(3) Sale on trial or approval. — It is a contract in the nature of
an option to purchase if the goods prove satisfactory, the approval
of the buyer being a condition precedent. (77 C.J.S. 938.)
(a) In this kind of contract, the title shall continue in the
seller until the sale has become absolute either by the buyer’s
approval of the goods, or by his failing to comply with the
express or implied conditions of the contract as to giving no-
tice of dissatisfaction or as to returning the goods (Ibid., 655;
Art. 1502, Nos. 1 and 2.), or by his doing any other act adopt-
ing the transaction such as mortgaging the property or sell-
ing it to a third person.
(b) For the reason that the title to the goods does not pass
and the relationship between the seller and the purchaser is
that of bailor and bailee, the risk of loss or injury to the article
pending the exercise by the buyer of his option to purchase
or return it, is upon the seller except as the buyer may be at
fault in respect of the care and condition of the article, or may
have agreed to stand the loss. (see 67 Am. Jur. 2d 430-431.)
(c) The buyer cannot accept part and reject the rest of the
goods since this falls outside the normal intent of the parties.
(Industrial Textile Manufacturing Co. vs. LPJ Enterprises, Inc.,
supra.)
“Sale or return” distinguished from sale on trial.

The distinctions are the following:
(1) “Sale or return” is a sale subject to a resolutory condition,
while sale on trial is subject to a suspensive condition;
(2) “Sale or return” depends entirely on the will of the buyer,
while sale on trial depends on the character or quality of the goods;
(3) In “sale or return,” the ownership of the goods passes to
the buyer on delivery and subsequent return of the goods reverts
ownership in the seller, while in sale on trial, the ownership re-
mains in the seller until the buyer signifies his approval or accept-
ance to the seller; and
(4) In “sale or return,” the risk of loss or injury rests upon the
buyer, while in sale on trial, the risk still remains with the seller.
Note: Article 1502 uses the phrase “on sale or return.” If the
contract uses instead the phrase “for sale or return,” the inten-
tion may be to enter into a contract of agency.
ART. 1503. Where there is a contract of sale of

specific goods, the seller may, by the terms of the
contract, reserve the right of possession or owner-
ship in the goods until certain conditions have been
fulfilled. The right of possession or ownership may
be thus reserved notwithstanding the delivery of the
goods to the buyer or to a carrier or other bailee for
the purpose of transmission to the buyer.
Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of lad-
ing the goods are deliverable to the seller or his agent,
or to the order of the seller or of his agent, the seller
thereby reserves the ownership in the goods. But if,
except for the form of the bill of lading, the ownership
would have passed to the buyer on shipment of the
188 SALES Art. 1503
goods, the seller’s property in the goods shall be

deemed to be only for the purpose of securing per-
formance by the buyer of his obligations under the
contract.
Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of lad-
ing the goods are deliverable to the order of the buyer
or of his agent, but possession of the bill of lading is
retained by the seller or his agent, the seller thereby
reserves a right to the possession of the goods as
against the buyer.
Where the seller of goods draws on the buyer for
the price and transmits the bill of exchange and bill of
lading together to the buyer to secure acceptance or
payment of the bill of exchange, the buyer is bound
to return the bill of lading if he does not honor the bill
of exchange, and if he wrongfully retains the bill of
lading he acquires no added right thereby. If, how-
ever, the bill of lading provides that the goods are
deliverable to the buyer or to the order of the buyer,
or is indorsed in blank, or to the buyer by the con-
signee named therein, on who purchases in good faith,
for value, the bill of lading, or goods from the buyer
will obtain the ownership in the goods, although the
bill of exchange has not been honored, provided that
such purchaser has received delivery of the bill of lad-
ing indorsed by the consignee named therein, or of
the goods, without notice of the facts making the
transfer wrongful. (n)
When ownership not transferred

upon delivery.
This article relates to a sale of specific goods. (see Arts. 1494,
1636.) As a general rule, the ownership in the goods sold passes
to the buyer upon their delivery to the carrier. There are, how-
ever, certain exceptions and they are:
(1) if a contrary intention appears by the terms of the contract
(Arts. 1523, par. 1; 1503, par. 1; see Art. 1478.);
(2) in the cases provided in the second and third paragraphs

of Article 1523; and
(3) in the cases provided in the first, second, and third para-
graphs of Article 1503.
Transfer of ownership where goods sold

delivered to carrier.
(1) General rule. — As stated above, the general rule is that
delivery, be it only constructive, passes title in the thing sold (see
Art. 1496.); and delivery to the carrier is deemed to be a delivery
to the buyer. (Art. 1523, par. 1.) The risk of loss, therefore, as be-
tween the buyer and the seller, falls upon the buyer. The theory
upon which the law is based is perfectly simple. If a seller con-
signs goods to another specified person it indicates an intention
to deliver to the carrier as bailee for the person named, and, if such
shipment was authorized by that person as a buyer, the owner-
ship vests in him. The same result follows it, after the goods have
been shipped without a named consignee, the carrier at the con-
signor’s request, agrees to deliver to a specified person.
(2) Where right of possession or ownership of specific goods sold
reserved. — On the other hand, if the seller directs the carrier to
redeliver the goods at their destination to the seller himself, or to
his order, it indicates an intention that the carrier shall be the bailee
for the seller and the ownership will remain in the latter. (see 2
Williston, op. cit., p. 147.) The seller may, by the terms of the con-
tract, reserve the right of possession or ownership in the goods
until certain conditions are fulfilled. (Art. 1505, par. 1.)
Where seller or his agent is consignee.

(1) Carrier becomes bailee for seller. — Where goods are shipped
and by the bill of lading4 (see Art. 1507.), the goods are deliver-
4
Logically, since a bill of lading acknowledges receipt of goods to be transported,
delivery of the goods to the carrier normally precedes the issuance of the bill; or to some
extent, delivery of the goods and issuance of the bill are regarded in commercial prac-
tice as simultaneous acts. However, except as may be prohibited by law, there is nothing
to prevent an inverse order of events, that is, the execution of the bill even prior to actual
possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be transported. There is no such
law. (Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 198 [1992].)
190 SALES Art. 1503
able to the seller or his agent or to the order of the seller or his
agent, the seller thereby reserves the ownership in the goods (par.
2.) and the carrier is a bailee for him and not the buyer. This prin-
ciple is applicable even though the goods are shipped on the buy-
er’s vessel.
(2) Rights of seller. — The seller may not only retain the goods
until the buyer performs his obligation under the contract, but
he may, even in violation of the contract, dispose of them to third
persons. If the seller does this, of course, he is liable for damages
to the buyer but the second purchaser from the seller acquires a
better right. (see 2 Williston, op. cit., pp. 152-153.)
Where seller’s title only for purpose

of security.
(1) Form of bill of lading not conclusive. — The form in which
the bill of lading is taken is not always conclusive. The specifica-
tion in the bill of lading to the effect that the goods are deliver-
able to the order of the seller or his agent does not necessarily
negate the passing of title to the goods upon delivery to the car-
rier. (Butuan Sawmill, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 16 SCRA 715
[1966].)
(2) Where ownership would have passed but for the form of bill of
lading. — The circumstances may be such that were it not for the
form of the bill of lading, the ownership would have passed to
the buyer or shipment of the goods. (par. 2, 2nd sentence.) This is
true when the object of the seller in reserving ownership is sim-
ply to secure himself in regard to the performance by the buyer
of the latter’s obligation. By shipping the goods, the seller has
definitely lost all use of them to the buyer. If the shipper could be
perfectly sure that the buyer would fulfill his obligation, it can
hardly be doubted that he would have made a straight consign-
ment to the latter. (see 2 Williston, op. cit., pp. 155-156.)
Significance where title held

merely as security.
The importance of distinguishing between a title held merely
for the purpose of security and the ordinary case where the seller
retains ownership are two-fold:
(1) Risk of loss on buyer. — In the first place, the beneficial

owner (buyer), not the one who holds for security (seller), will be
subject to the risk of loss or deterioration (see Lawyers Coopera-
tive Publishing Co. vs. Tabora, 13 SCRA 762 [1965].) from the time
the goods are delivered to the carrier even though the legal title
remains in the seller. That the risk should be borne by the buyer
if the seller retains title merely to secure performance by the buyer
of his obligations under the contract is a consequence of the theory
that such a bargain is, in effect, although not in form, a sale to the
buyer and a mortgage back by him of the goods to secure the price.
The title does not pass to the buyer until he receives the order bill
of lading properly indorsed. (2 Williston, op. cit., p. 219.)
(2) Buyer’s right of action based on ownership. — In the second
place, the buyer has more than a mere contract right in regards to
the goods. (Ibid., p. 157.) As beneficial owner, he may, as against
any one except an innocent purchaser for value of the bill of lad-
ing from the consignee, bring an action based on ownership on
making tender of the price.
Where buyer or his agent is consignee

but seller retains order bill of lading.
Where goods are shipped and by the bill of lading the goods
are deliverable to the order of the buyer or of his agent, but pos-
session of the bill of lading is retained by the seller or his agent,
the seller thereby retains a right to the possession of the goods as
against the buyer. (par. 3.)
(1) Effect of retention. — Although the property in the goods
will ordinarily pass to the buyer on delivery, the latter is unable
to obtain the goods without the bill. The effect of the retention of
the bill of lading, under such circumstances, controlling as it does
the possession of the goods, is, therefore, closely analogous to the
retention of a lien by the seller after the property has passed to
the buyer. (Ibid., p. 163.)
(2) Surrender of order bill necessary. — The carrier cannot be
compelled to surrender possession of the goods until the order
bill (properly indorsed) has been surrendered. In an order bill, it
cannot with certainty be determined who is the person named to
192 SALES Art. 1503
whose order the goods are deliverable unless the bill of lading
itself is presented.
(3) Identification of consignee sufficient in case of straight bill. —
On the other hand, the shipper who issues a straight bill of lad-
ing (goods are by its terms deliverable not to the order of the con-
signee but to the consignee only) ordinarily does not require the
surrender of the bill by the consignee in order for the latter to get
the goods. The consignee need only to identify himself. Hence,
where the buyer is the consignee, the seller must use an order bill
of lading. (see Ibid., pp. 162-163.)
Where a third person who retains

the bill is consignee.
Two devices have already been considered by which the seller
of goods retains a hold upon them by means of the bill of lading
after he has shipped them; first, by consigning the goods to him-
self, either by an order bill or a straight bill and second, by con-
signing the goods to the order of the buyer and retaining posses-
sion of the bill of lading.
A third method also in common use is to consign the goods
to a third person (usually a banker) requesting the latter to retain
the bill of lading or goods until payment of the price. When the
price is paid, the consignee of the goods indorses the bill or de-
livers the goods to the buyer.
(1) Immaterial whether bill an order or straight bill. — For the
success of this third device, it is immaterial, so far as the protec-
tion of the seller is concerned, whether the bill is a straight bill or
an order bill.
(a) If it is an order bill, the carrier will not deliver the goods
until the bill is surrendered and the buyer cannot get it so as
to make the necessary surrender except from the holder, the
consignee.
(b) Even if it is not an order bill, the carrier, though it may
not require the surrender of the bill of lading, will deliver only
to the consignee. Accordingly, the buyer in either event, is
unable to get them except by obtaining an order from the
holder of the bill of lading.
(2) Legal title vested in third person. — By naming a third per-

son as consignee of the bill of lading, the seller vests a legal title
in the third person. This title is held merely for the benefit of the
seller if the third person is the seller’s agent only and has not
advanced money of his own to the seller. Frequently, however,
the third person is a banker and by discounting a draft drawn on
the buyer by the shipper, or under an arrangement with the buyer
by paying or accepting a draft drawn on himself, has acquired a
personal interest in the goods. (Ibid., pp. 164-165.)
(3) Risk of loss on buyer. — The buyer as is true where the seller
consigns the goods to himself, or his agent, or to a third person,
bears the risk of loss.
Where bill of lading sent forward

with draft attached.
Where the seller draws on the buyer for the price and trans-
mits the bill of exchange and the bill of lading together to the buyer
to secure acceptance or payment of the bill of exchange (par. 4.),
the title is regarded as retained in the seller until the bill of ex-
change is paid. The fact that the bill of lading and a bill of exchange
are attached together indicates that the seller intends to make the
delivery of the goods conditional upon the payment or accept-
ance of the draft.
(1) Duty of buyer if draft not paid. — The buyer is bound to re-
turn the bill of lading if he does not honor the bill of exchange. If
he wrongfully retains the bill of lading, he acquires no additional
right thereby. In carrying out the device in question, it is custom-
ary to send the bill of lading with the draft attached thereto to
some person other than the buyer, for if the bill of lading and the
draft are sent directly to the buyer, the latter may obtain the goods
without paying the draft and the seller, even if he has a good right
of action against the buyer on this account, is compelled to enter
upon litigation in order to enforce his rights, whereas if the bill of
lading and draft are sent through the third person, ordinarily a
bank, the buyer is unable to obtain the goods without paying the
price. (see Ibid., pp. 178-180.)
(2) Effect of buyer obtaining possession of bill of lading without
honoring draft. — As regard third persons, however, if the bill of
194 SALES Art. 1504
lading provides that the goods are deliverable to the buyer or to

the order of the buyer (Art. 1507.), or is indorsed in blank (Art.
1508[2].), or is indorsed to the buyer by the consignee named
therein (Art. 1509.), a purchaser in good faith for value of the bill
of lading or goods from the buyer will obtain the ownership in
the goods although the bill of exchange has not been honored.
Distinctions in regard to the form

of the bill of lading.
They must here be observed:
(1) If the seller has named the buyer as consignee, the prop-
erty has passed to the consignee or at least it seems to have been
so to one who inspects the document;
(2) If the bill of lading, though naming the seller as consignee,
is indorsed by him to the buyer or in blank, the possession of the
document by the buyer gives him, if not the actual title, at least
an apparent ownership; and
(3) If the bill of lading names the seller or a third person as
consignee and no indorsement of the document had been made,
possession by the buyer would not indicate that the buyer had
title.
Where the document gives the buyer apparent ownership and
a third person purchases the goods relying thereon, it seems clear
on broad principles of justice that since one of two innocent par-
ties must suffer, he should suffer whose act has brought about the
loss. Consequently, the seller ought not to be allowed to recover
the goods from the third person. (see Ibid., pp. 191-192.)
ART. 1504. Unless otherwise agreed, the goods

remain at the seller’s risk until the ownership therein
is transferred to the buyer, but when the ownership
therein is transferred to the buyer, the goods are at
the buyer’s risk whether actual delivery has been made
or not, except that:
(1) Where delivery of the goods has been made to
the buyer or to a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of
the contract and the ownership in the goods has been
retained by the seller merely to secure performance

by the buyer of his obligations under the contract,
the goods are at the buyer’s risk from the time of such
delivery;
(2) Where actual delivery has been delayed
through the fault of either the buyer or seller the goods
are at the risk of the party in fault. (n)
Risk of loss generally attends title.

As a general rule, if the thing is lost by fortuitous event, the
risk is borne by the owner of the thing at the time of the loss un-
der the principle of res perit domino. (see Chrysler Phils. Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 567 [1984].) Article 1504 above states
the exceptions.
(1) Where the seller reserves the ownership of the goods
merely to secure the performance by the buyer of his obligations
under the contract, the ownership is considered transferred to the
buyer who, therefore, assumes the risk from the time of delivery.
(see Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. vs. Tabora, 13 SCRA 762
[1965].)
(2) Where actual delivery had been delayed through the fault
of either the buyer or seller, the goods are at the risk of the party
at fault with respect to any loss which might not have occurred
but for such fault. In this case, the law punishes the party at fault.
Risk of loss by fortuitous event after

perfection but before delivery.
(1) Conflict between Article 1480 and Article 1504. — Under
Article 1480, if the thing sold is lost after perfection of the con-
tract but before its delivery, that is, even before the ownership is
transferred to the buyer, the risk of loss by fortuitous event with-
out the seller’s fault is borne by the buyer as an exception to the
rule of res perit domino. Consequently, the buyer’s obligation to
pay the price subsists if he has not yet paid the same or if he had,
he cannot recover it from the seller although the latter’s obliga-
tion to deliver the thing is extinguished by its loss.
196 SALES Art. 1504
However, the first paragraph of Article 1504 which has been

inserted in our Civil Code presents a contrary rule. Taken from
the American law on sales (Sec. 22 of the Uniform Sales Act.), it
provides that: “Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the
seller’s risk until the ownership therein is transferred to the
buyer.” By Article 1480, as already pointed out, the risk of loss of
the thing after perfection is shifted from the seller to the buyer
even though the buyer has not yet acquired ownership thereof.
(2) Solution suggested to avoid conflict. — A solution has been
suggested to avoid the conflict, to wit: Article 1504 should be re-
stricted in its application to sale of “goods” as this term is defined
in Article 1636, and Article 1480, to sales of “things” which can-
not be called “goods,” as for the example, to sales of real estate.
This would make Article 1480 the general rule on risk of loss and
Article 1504, the exception. By this conclusion, it is claimed, the
cardinal rule of statutory construction that all provisions of a law
should, as much as possible, be given effect is satisfied; for to say
that there is an irreconcilable conflict between Article 1480 and
Article 1504 is to render either of them useless.
(3) Article 1480 states the correct rule. — It is submitted that
Article 1480 is the correct rule governing loss of thing sold after
the perfection of the contract in view of the following:
(a) The opinion of Manresa (an eminent Spanish commen-
tator on the Spanish Civil Code upon which our Civil Code is
based) that the obligation of the buyer to pay the price is not
extinguished by the loss of the thing before delivery is the set-
tled construction of Article 1452 (now Art. 1480.) and this opin-
ion is well known to the Code Commission which prepared
the draft of the Civil Code. It is to be presumed that Congress,
which passed the Civil Code, a majority of whose members
were lawyers, was likewise familiar with Manresa’s opinion.
Aside from Manresa, “many writers on the Spanish Civil Code
including Castan, Fabres, Von Tuhr, Bonet, and De Buen, be-
lieve that the buyer bears the loss and he must pay the price”
(A.M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol.
V, p. 22.);
(b) Article 1480 follows the Roman Law rule “that risk of
the thing sold passes to the buyer even though the thing has
not yet been delivered to the buyer”;
(c) A reading of Article 1189 in relation to Article 1538 (in-

fra.), shows that Article 1480 is in consonance with Article 1189
(see Art. 1538.);
(d) Article 1504 cannot be reconciled with Articles 1480
and 1189, unless Article 1504 is applied only to sale of “goods.”
It must be noted, however, that Article 1480 applies also to sale
of fungible goods. (par. 2.) Furthermore, there is nothing to
justify the exclusion of “goods” from the sales of “things” as
the latter term is used in Article 1480 and several scattered
provisions of our present law on sales;
(e) In case of improvement, the rule is that it should per-
tain to the buyer. (Art. 1189[5].) This is a counterpart of the risk
which the buyer assumes for the loss of the thing;
(f) Furthermore, under Article 1537 (infra.), the fruits per-
tain to the vendee from the perfection of the contract. The same
right is given to the vendee under Article 1164 which together
with Articles 1165 and 1262, is referred to in Article 1480 as
governing the question being discussed;
(g) Article 1165, paragraph 3, states:
“If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same
thing to two or more persons who do not have the same in-
terest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until he
has effected the delivery.”
Arguing a contrario, if the obligor (seller) is not guilty of delay
and has not promised to deliver the thing sold to two or more
persons, he shall not be responsible for loss due to a fortuitous
event;
(h) Article 1262, paragraph 1, provides:
“An obligation which consists in the delivery of a deter-
minate thing shall be extinguished if it should be lost or de-
stroyed without the fault of the debtor and before he has in-
curred in delay;
In this connection, Article 1269 (Civil Code) says:
“The obligation having been extinguished by the loss of
the thing, the creditor shall have the rights of action which the
debtor may have against third persons by reason of the loss.”
198 SALES Art. 1504
It is very clear that the creditor (buyer) may not have a right
of action against third persons unless he suffers a loss which is
the price he has paid or the price the law requires him to pay the
debtor (seller) if he has not paid the same.
(4) Contrary view. — On this question, a recognized authority
on Civil Law supports the contrary view as follows:
“A contrary view to that expressed above, is held by other
writers on the Spanish Civil Code, like Perez and Alguer, who say:
This solution is not absolutely certain and perhaps the contrary
view is more in harmony with equity and with the nature of re-
ciprocal obligations.”
To our mind, the latter view is really more logical: the vendor
in the case given, should bear the loss and the vendee should not
be bound to pay the price. The following arguments may be ad-
vanced to support this view:
(a) It is fundamental in the Civil Code, expressed in Arti-
cles 1477 and 1496, that ownership is transferred by delivery;
hence, before delivery, the vendor owns the thing and should
suffer its loss: res perit domino. If he is allowed to recover the
price, he suffers no loss, which is imposed upon the vendee
who has not yet acquired ownership;
(b) The obligations of vendor and vendee are reciprocal,
and, therefore, one depends upon the other. If the obligation
of the vendor to deliver is extinguished, the correlative obli-
gation of the vendee to pay, which depends upon it, cannot
remain subsisting;
(c) Article 1480, paragraph 3, is not an exception but is an
expression of the general rule that the risk is not imputed to
the vendee until after delivery. That paragraph considers the
delivery completed only when the fungibles have been
weighed, counted, or measured because it is only then that the
thing becomes determinate. Before such completion of deliv-
ery, the vendor bears the risk; and
(d) Purchase and sale is an onerous contract, where the
cause, with respect to the vendee, is the thing. If he cannot have
the thing, it is juridically illogical and unjust to make him pay
its price.
In the French code, the risk of loss is upon the buyer from the
perfection of the contract, because ownership in that code is trans-
ferred by mere contract, without need for delivery. Res perit domino.
The vendee suffers the loss and must pay the price of the thing
even if he does not receive it. But where the ownership is trans-
ferred by delivery, as in our Code, the application of the axiom
res perit domino, imposes the risk of loss upon the vendor; hence,
if the thing is lost by fortuitous event before delivery, the vendor
suffers the loss and cannot recover the price from the vendee.
(A.M. Tolentino, op. cit., pp. 23-27.)
(5) Legislation necessary to avoid irreconcilable conflict. — The
contrary view is really “more in harmony with equity” consider-
ing that, while the vendee has a mere contract right to the thing
sold, the vendor has not only the ownership but also the posses-
sion or control of it and even the power to dispose of it to the
prejudice of the vendee; and having in mind also the reciprocal
character of the contract of sale, the vendor should, therefore, be
the one to shoulder the loss and not the vendee. But until the law-
making body adopts the contrary view, the correct rule, it is be-
lieved, is that contained in Article 1480 under which the vendee
bears the risk of loss, and he is bound to pay the price which rule
has already been shown, is sustained and confirmed by other
provisions of the Civil Code.
ART. 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title,

where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner
thereof, and who does not sell them under authority
or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires
no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless
the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded
from denying the seller’s authority to sell.
Nothing in this title, however, shall affect:
(1) The provisions of any factors’ acts, recording
laws, or any other provision of law enabling the ap-
parent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he
were the true owner thereof;
(2) The validity of any contract of sale under statu-
200 SALES Art. 1505
tory power of sale or under the order of a court of

competent jurisdiction;
(3) Purchases made in a merchant’s store, or in
fairs, or markets, in accordance with the Code of Com-
merce and special laws. (n)
Sale by a person not the owner.

It is a fundamental doctrine of law that no one can give what
he has not or transfer a greater right to another than he himself
has. Sale is a derivative mode of acquiring ownership and the
buyer gets only such rights as the seller had. (see Arts. 1458-1459.)
A derivative right cannot exist higher than its source.5 (Reyes vs.
Sierra, 73 SCRA 472 [1979].) The exceptions to the rule are given
below.
(1) Where the owner of the goods is, by his conduct, precluded from
denying the seller’s authority to sell. — Thus, where a parcel of land
is sold by one not the owner or the agent of the owner, but the
real owner thereof upon being questioned in a criminal case in-
stituted against the vendor states that he authorized such sales
so that the vendor was acquitted of the charge against him, a
purchaser in good faith acquires a valid title to the property as it
is not lawful nor permissible for said owner to deny or retract his
former sworn statement that he had consented to said sale.
(Gutierrez Hermanos vs. Orense, 28 Phil. 571 [1914]; see Arts. 1437,
1438.)
(2) Where the law enables the apparent owner to dispose of the goods
as if he were the true owner thereof. — The Philippines, unlike other
jurisdictions as England and several states of the United States,
has no such law as the Factors’ Act. The law referred to here, there-
fore, must be found in the provisions of our Civil Code on agency.
(C. Alvendia, Law on Sales, 1950 ed., p. 153.)
5
What the law requires is that the seller has the right to transfer ownership at the
time the thing sold is delivered. A perfected contract of sale (which is a consensual con-
tract perfected by mere consent) cannot be challenged on the ground of non-ownership
on the pact of the seller at the time of its perfection, hence the sale is still valid. (Quijada
(a) Factors Acts are designed to protect third persons who

(under specified conditions) deal with an agent (e.g., a person
to whom the owner delivered goods for sale or as security, or
entrusted documentary evidence of title thereto) believing him
to be the owner of goods. (Babb & Martin, Business Law, 1952
ed., p. 117.)
(b) Examples of the recording laws which may have a bear-
ing on the validity of a sale made by a person who is not the
owner or the agent of the owner are: P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), R.A. No. 4136 (Land Transportation and
Traffic Code), and the Revised Administrative Code with re-
gards to the sale of large cattle (Sec. 529.) and sale of vessels.
(Sec. 1171.) Examples of “any other provision of law” referred
to in No. (1) are Act No. 2031 (Negotiable Instruments Law)
and Act No. 2137. (Warehouse Receipts Law) (see Arts. 1507-
1520.)
(c) In a case, the car in question which was acquired by
the respondent by purchase from its registered owner for a
valuable consideration under a notarial deed of absolute sale
was seized and impounded by land transportation agents as
stolen property. It was held that the acquirer or the purchaser
in good faith of a chattel or movable property is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true
owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. In the
meantime, he cannot be compelled to surrender possession
nor to be required to institute an action for the recovery of the
chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his
favor. The filing of an information charging that the chattel
was illegally obtained through estafa from its true owner by
the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant dis-
turbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the
possessor. Finally, under Section 60 of R.A. No. 4136, the right
of the Land Transportation Commission to impound motor
vehicles is only good for the proper enforcement of lien upon
motor vehicles of unpaid fees for registration, re-registration,
or delinquent registration of motor vehicles. (Edu vs. Gomez,
129 SCRA 601 [1984].)
(d) With respect to real property, it has been ruled that a
“fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root
202 SALES Art. 1505
of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been trans-

ferred from the name of the true owner to the name indicated
by the forger.” Every person dealing in good faith and for
valuable consideration with registered land may safely rely
upon what appears in the certificate of title and does not have
to inquire further. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and
conclusiveness of Torrens Certificates of Titles would be fu-
tile and nugatory.” (Duran vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
138 SCRA 489 [1985].) The remedy of the person prejudiced is
to bring an action for damages against those who employed
the fraud, within four (4) years after the discovery of the de-
ception (see Art. 1391.), and if the latter are insolvent, an ac-
tion against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for
recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund. (Veloso vs.
Court of Appeals, 73 SCAD 303, 260 SCRA 593 [1996]; Delos
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 81 [1998].)
(3) Where the sale is sanctioned by statutory or judicial authority.
— According to Article 559 of the Civil Code, “the possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable, or has been unlaw-
fully deprived therefor, may recover it from the person in pos-
session of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which
the owner has unlawfully been deprived has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.” (see Art. 1537, par. 2.)
Different laws apply to different types of forced or involuntary
sales under our jurisdiction, namely: (a) an ordinary execution sale,
which is governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments;
(b) judicial foreclosure sales, which are governed by Rule 68 of the
Rules of Court, captioned “Foreclosure of Mortgage’’; and (c) ex-
tra-judicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, which are
governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise
known as “An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special
Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages.’’ (Supena
vs. De la Rosa, 78 SCAD 409, 267 SCRA 1 [1997].)
The government, however, does not warrant the title to prop-
erties sold by the sheriff at public auction or judicial sales. (see
Art. 1570.)
(4) Where the sale is made at merchant’s stores, fairs or markets.

— No. 3 of Article 1505 is a case of an imperfect or void title rip-
ening into a valid one as a result of some intervening due causes.
The sale is necessary not only to facilitate commercial sales on
movables but also to give stability to business transactions espe-
cially in a country like the Philippines, where free enterprise pre-
vails, for a buyer cannot be reasonably expected to look behind
the title of every article when he buys at a store. (Sun Brothers
Co. vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 54 O.G. 5103.)
(5) Where the seller has a voidable title which has not been avoided
at the time of the sale. — See Article 1506.
(6) Where seller subsequently acquires title. — When a person
conveys property to another of which at the time he is not the
owner, his subsequent acquisition of title validates his previous
conveyance. (Llacer vs. Munoz, 12 Phil. 328 [1908]; Abella vs.
Gonzaga, 56 Phil. 132 [1931]; see Art. 1434.) This doctrine is equally
applicable to conveyance of usufructs as well as to transfers of
full ownership. (Feria vs. Silva, [C.A.] No. 6151-R, Aug. 10, 1951.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Unpaid books were sold by the impostor-buyer to another who
acted in good faith and with proper care.
Facts: X, identifying himself as Professor JC, placed an or-
der by telephone with petitioner EDCA for 406 books payable
on delivery. EDCA, petitioner, prepared the corresponding in-
voice and delivered the books for which X issued a personal
check covering the purchase price, which was dishonored. X
sold the books to Y who, after verifying the seller’s ownership
from the invoice X showed her, paid X.
Petitioner argues that the impostor acquired no title to the
books that he could have validly transferred to Y, the private
respondent. Its reason is that as the payment check bounced
for lack of funds, there was a failure of consideration that nul-
lified the contract of sale between it and X.
Issue: Has EDCA been unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor X in payment therefor
was dishonored?
Held: No. (1) Contract of sale is consensual. — “The contract
of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached
204 SALES Art. 1505
between the parties on the subject matter and the considera-

tion. According to the Civil Code:
‘ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment
there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object
of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand
performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the
form of contracts.
xxx
ART. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be trans-
ferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery
thereof.
ART. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the
thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the
price.’”
(2) Ownership of thing sold is transferred upon delivery. — “It
is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one
quoted, that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the
buyer until full payment of the purchase price only if there is a
stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such own-
ership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the ac-
tual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the pur-
chase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or
to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of
bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, de-
livery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to
the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.”
(3) There is no unlawful deprivation of personal property. —
“In Asiatic Commercial Corporation vs. Ang (40 O.G.S. No. 15, p.
102.), the plaintiff sold some cosmetics to Francisco Ang, who,
in turn, sold them to Tan Sit Bin. Asiatic, not having been paid
by Ang, sued for the recovery of the articles from Tan, who
claimed he had validly bought them from Ang, paying for the
same in cash. Finding that there was no conspiracy between
Tan and Ang to deceive Asiatic, the Court of Appeals declared:
‘Yet the defendant invoked Article 464 (now Art. 559.) of
the Civil Code providing among other things that ‘one who
has been unlawfully deprived of personal property may recover
it from any person possessing it. We do not believe that the
plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived of the cartons of Gloco

Tonic within the scope of this legal provision. It has voluntarily
parted with them pursuant to a contract of purchase and sale.
The circumstance that the price was not subsequently paid did
not render illegal a transaction which was valid and legal at
the beginning.
In Tagatac vs. Jimenez (53 O.G. No. 12, p. 3792.), the plaintiff
sold her car to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez, who sold it to
Jimenez. When the payment check issued to Tagatac by Feist
was dishonored, the plaintiff sued to recover the vehicle from
Jimenez on the ground that she had been unlawfully deprived
of it by reason of Feist’s deception. In ruling for Jimenez, the
Court of Appeals held:
‘The point of inquiry is whether plaintiff-appellant Trini-
dad C. Tagatac has been unlawfully deprived of her car. At first
blush, it would seem that she was unlawfully deprived thereof,
considering that she was induced to part with it by reason of
the chicanery practiced on her by Warner L. Feist. Certainly,
swindling, like robbery, is an illegal method of deprivation of
property. In a manner of speaking, plaintiff-appellant was “il-
legally deprived” of her car, for the way by which Warner L.
Feist induced her to part with it is illegal and is punished by
law. But does this unlawful deprivation come within the scope
of Article 559 of the New Civil Code?
x x x The fraud and deceit practiced by Warner L. Feist ear-
marks this sale as a voidable contract. (Article 1390, N.C.C.)
Being a voidable contract, it is susceptible of either ratification
or annulment. If the contract is ratified, the action to annul it is
extinguished (Article 1392, N.C.C.) and the contract is cleansed
from all its defects (Article 1396, N.C.C.); if the contract is an-
nulled, the contracting parties are restored to their respective
situation before the contract and mutual restitution follows as
a consequence. (Article 1398, N.C.C.)
However, as long as no action is taken by the party enti-
tled, either that of annulment or of ratification, the contract of
sale remains valid and binding. When plaintiff-appellant Trini-
dad C. Tagatac delivered the car to Feist by virtue of said void-
able contract of sale, the title to the car passed to Feist. Of course,
the title that Feist acquired was defective and voidable. Never-
theless, at the time he sold the car to Felix Sanchez, his title on
the latter, provided he brought the car in good faith, for value
and without notice of the defect in Feist’s title. (Article 1506,
206 SALES Art. 1505
N.C.C.) There being no proof on record that Felix Sanchez acted

in bad faith, it is safe to assume that he acted in good faith.’
(4) JC acquired ownership over the books sold. — Actual de-
livery of the books having been made, JC acquired ownership
over the books which could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA
was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the
title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the
phrase “unlawfully deprived” were to be interpreted in the
manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the
seller’s title who buys a movable property from him would have
to surrender it to another person claiming to be the original
owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor.
The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so
to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing bought
by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement
of the amount he had paid for it.”
(5) EDCA was negligent. — “It bears repeating that in the
case before us, Y took care to ascertain first that the books be-
longed to X before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA
invoice X showed her assured her that the books had been paid
for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in
fact, too trusting — in dealing with the impostor. Although it
had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the
books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted
his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity
although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear
the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the
sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms thereon, that
the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting own-
ership in the buyer.”
(6) Private respondent acted in good faith and with proper care.
— “Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond
that invoice to satisfy herself that the books being offered for
sale by X belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of X
was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the
books, these being movable property, Y nevertheless demanded
more proof before deciding to buy them.
It would certainly be unfair now to make the private re-
spondents bear the prejudice sustained by EDCA as a result of
its own negligence. We cannot see the justice in transferring

EDCA’s loss to Y who had acted in good faith, and with proper
care, when they bought the books from X.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is
clear that its remedy is not against the private respondent but
against X, who has apparently caused all this trouble.” (EDCA
Publishing & Distributing Corp. vs. Santos, 184 SCRA 614 [1990].)
ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a void-

able title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at
the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to
the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for
value, and without notice of the seller’s defect of title.
(n)
Sale by one having a voidable title.

(1) Requisites for acquisition of good title by buyer. — If the seller
has only a voidable title to the goods, the buyer acquires a good
title to the goods provided he buys them: (a) before the title of
the seller has been avoided; (b) in good faith for value; and (c)
without notice of the seller’s defect of title. (see Arts. 1385, 1388.)
(2) Basis of rule. — Article 1506 seems to be predicated on the
principle that where loss has happened which must fall on one of
two innocent persons, it should be borne by him who is the occa-
sion of the loss. It is similar to the rule in P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) referring to an innocent purchaser for value
in good faith (Sec. 51 thereof.) and to the rule in Act No. 2031
(Negotiable Instruments Law) referring to a holder in due course
to whom a negotiable instrument is negotiated for value and in
good faith. (see Sec. 57 thereof.)
EXAMPLES:
(1) S, a minor, sold his television set to B, a person of ma-
jority age. Under the law (see Art. 1390, Civil Code.), the con-
tract is voidable or annullable because a minor is incapable of
giving consent to a contract. B, in turn, sold the television set to
C who acted in good faith.
208 SALES Art. 1507
In this case, C acquires a valid title to the television set af-

ter its delivery if the contract had not yet been annulled by a
proper action in court.
(2) B bought in good faith for value a car which was stolen
from C, the lawful owner. As against B, C has a better right to
the car. Article 1506 is clearly inapplicable where the seller had
no title at all. (Aznar vs. Yapdiangco, 13 SCRA [1965].)
C may recover the car without paying any indemnity, ex-
cept when B acquired it in a public sale. (Art. 559, supra.)
ART. 1507. A document of title in which it is stated

that the goods referred to therein will be delivered to
the bearer, or to the order of any person named in
such document is a negotiable document of title. (n)
Definition of terms.
(1) Document of title to goods. — Includes any bill of lading,
dock warrant, “quedan,” or warehouse receipt or order for the
delivery of goods, or any other document used in the ordinary
course of business in the sale or transfer of goods, as proof of the
possession or control of the goods, or authorizing or purporting
to authorize the possessor of the document to transfer or receive,
either by indorsement or by delivery, goods represented by such
document. (Art. 1636[1].)
(2) Goods. — Included all chattels personal but not things in
action or money of legal tender in the Philippines. The term in-
cludes growing fruits or crops. (ibid.)
(3) Order. — Relating to documents of title means an order
by indorsement on the documents. (ibid.)
Nature and function of documents of title.

(1) Receipts of, or orders upon, a bailee of goods represented. —
Documents of title refer to goods and not to money. They all have
this in common: that they are receipts of a bailee, or orders upon
a bailee. A different name is given in popular speech to the docu-
ment when it is issued by a carrier and when it is issued by a
warehouseman, but in substance the nature of the document is
the same in both cases. (see 2 Williston, op. cit., p. 505.)
(2) Evidence of transfer of title and possession of the goods and con-
tract between the parties. — A document of title is symbol of the
goods covered by it, serving as evidence of (a) transfer of title and
(b) transfer of possession. It also serves as an evidence of the (c)
contract between the parties who are bound by its terms. So far
as concerns the transfer of property between the parties, their
intention would be effectual without the document, but where
third parties’ rights are involved, the form of the document (i.e.,
negotiable or non-negotiable) becomes important.
Most common forms of documents

of title.
There are three most common forms or documents of title,
namely:
(1) Bill of lading. — It is a contract and a receipt for the trans-
port of goods and their delivery to the person named therein, to
order, or to bearer. It usually involves three persons — the car-
rier, the shipper, and the consignee. The shipper and the consignee
may be one and the same person. Its acceptance generally consti-
tutes the contract of carriage even though not signed.
Such instrument may be called a shipping receipt, a forward-
er’s receipt, or receipt for transportation. The designation, how-
ever, is immaterial (Saludo, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA
498 [1992].);
(2) Dock warrant. — It is an instrument given by dock owners
to an importer of goods warehoused on the dock as a recognition
of the importer’s title to the said goods, upon production of the
bill of lading (see Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 911.); and
(3) Warehouse receipt. — a contract or receipt for goods depos-
ited with a warehouseman containing the latter’s undertaking to
hold and deliver the said goods to a specified person, to order, or
to bearer. Quedan is a warehouse receipt usually for sugar received
by a warehouseman.
Laws governing documents of title.

The following laws govern documents of title:
(1) The Civil Code (in Arts. 1507 to 1520, 1532 [2nd par.], 1535
210 SALES Art. 1508
[2nd par.], and 1749.) primarily governs documents of title other

than warehouse receipts;
(2) The Warehouse Receipts Law (Act No. 2137.) primarily
governs warehouse receipts; and
(3) The Code of Commerce subsidiarily governs bills of lad-
ing issued by common carriers (in Arts. 350 to 354 for land carri-
ers and in Arts. 706 to 718 for maritime carriers).
The provisions in the Civil Code on documents of title are
reproduced practically verbatim from the Uniform Sales Act which
is in force in many states in the United States.
Classes of documents of titles.

Documents of title may be either:
(1) Negotiable documents of title or those by the terms of which
the bailee undertakes to deliver the goods to the bearer and those
by the terms of which the bailee undertakes to deliver the goods
to the order of a specified person (Art. 1508.); or
(2) Non-negotiable documents of title or those by the terms of
which the goods covered are deliverable to a specified person.
(Art. 1511.)
ART. 1508. A negotiable document of title may be

negotiated by delivery:
(1) Where by the terms of the document the car-
rier, warehouseman or other bailee issuing the same
undertakes to deliver the goods to the bearer; or
(2) Where by the terms of the document the car-
rier, warehouseman or other bailee issuing the same
undertakes to deliver the goods to the order of a speci-
fied person, and such person or a subsequent
indorsee of the document has indorsed it in blank or
to the bearer.
Where by the terms of a negotiable document of
title the goods are deliverable to bearer or where a
negotiable document of title has been indorsed in
blank or to bearer, any holder may indorse the same
to himself or to any specified person, and in such case

the document shall thereafter be negotiated only by
the indorsement of such indorsee. (n)
Negotiation of negotiable document

by delivery.
A negotiable document of title is negotiable by delivery if the
goods are deliverable to the bearer, or when it is indorsed in blank
or to the bearer by the person to whose order the goods are deliv-
erable or by a subsequent indorsee. An indorsement is in blank
when the holder merely signs his name at the back of the receipt
without specifying to whom the goods are to be delivered.
If the document is specially indorsed, it becomes an order
document of title and negotiation can only be effected by the in-
dorsement of the indorsee. A special indorsement specifies the
person to whom or to whose order the goods are to be delivered.
Article 1508 is similar to Section 37 of the Warehouse Receipts
Law (Act No. 2137.) except that the latter treats only of a negoti-
able receipt which may be issued by a warehouseman.

negotiated by the indorsement of the person to whose
order the goods are by the terms of the document
deliverable. Such indorsement may be in blank, to
bearer or to a specified person. If indorsed to a speci-
fied person, it may be again negotiated by the indorse-
ment of such person in blank, to bearer or to another
specified person. Subsequent negotiations may be
made in like manner. (n)
Negotiation of negotiable document

by indorsement.
A negotiable document of title by the terms of which the goods
are deliverable to a person specified therein may be negotiated
only by the indorsement of such person.
(1) If indorsed in blank or to bearer, the document becomes
negotiable by delivery. (Art. 1508.)
212 SALES Art. 1510
(2) If indorsed to a specified person, it may be again negoti-

ated by the indorsement of such person in blank, to bearer, or to
another specified person. Delivery alone is not sufficient.
A party is liable only as guarantor and not as indorser if his
indorsement is made for the purpose of identification only. (see
American Bank vs. Macondray & Co., 4 Phil. 695 [1905].)
Law.
ART. 1510. If a document of title which contains

an undertaking by a carrier, warehouseman or other
bailee to deliver the goods to bearer, to a specified
person or order of a specified person or which con-
tains words of like import, has placed upon it the
words “not negotiable” “non-negotiable,” or the like,
such document may nevertheless be negotiated by
the holder and is a negotiable document of title within
the meaning of this Title. But nothing in this Title con-
tained shall be construed as limiting or defining the
effect upon the obligations of the carrier, warehouse-
man, or other bailee issuing a document of title or
placing thereon the words “not negotiable,” “non-
negotiable,” or the like. (n)
Negotiable documents of title marked

“non-negotiable.”
Under Article 1510, the words “not negotiable,” “non-negoti-
able” and the like when placed upon a document of title in which
the goods are to be delivered to “order” or to “bearer” have no
effect and the document continues to be negotiable. (Roman vs.
Asia Banking Corp., 46 Phil. 705 [1924].)
Under the Warehouse Receipts Law, any provision inserted
in a negotiable receipt that it is non-negotiable is declared void.
(Sec. 5, par. 2.)
When the document of title is to order, the bailee is obliged to
take it up before delivering the goods. Accordingly, he is liable to
the holder of an order document if the goods are delivered to the
consignee without surrender of the document even though the

latter was marked “not negotiable.”
Note: The first sentence of Article 1510 should read “to a speci-
fied person or order or to the order of a specified person.” This is
how Section 30 of the Uniform Sales Act, from which Article 1510
was adopted, is worded.
ART. 1511. A document of title which is not in such

form that it can be negotiated by delivery may be trans-
ferred by the holder by delivery to a purchaser or
donee. A non-negotiable document cannot be negoti-
ated and the indorsement of such a document gives
the transferee no additional right. (n)
Transfer of non-negotiable documents.

A non-negotiable document of title cannot be negotiated.
Nevertheless, it can be transferred or assigned by delivery. In such
a case, the transferee or assignee acquires only the rights stated
in Article 1514. Even if the document is indorsed, the transferee
acquires no additional right.
Article 1511 is exactly the same as Section 39 of the Warehouse
Receipts Law.

negotiated:
(1) By the owner thereof; or
(2) By any person to whom the possession or cus-
tody of the document has been entrusted by the owner,
if, by the terms of the document the bailee issuing the
document undertakes to deliver the goods to the or-
der of the person to whom the possession or custody
of the document has been entrusted, or if at the time
of such entrusting the document is in such form that
it may be negotiated by delivery. (n)
Persons who may negotiate a document.

It will be noticed that the provision does not give a power to
negotiate documents of title equal to that allowed under the Ne-
214 SALES Art. 1513
gotiable Instruments Law (Act No. 2031.) in the case of bills of

exchange and promissory notes inasmuch as neither a thief nor a
finder is within the terms of the article. (but see Art. 1518.) How-
ever, if the owner of the goods permits another to have the pos-
session or custody of negotiable receipts running to the order of
the latter or to bearer, it is a representation of title upon which
bona fide purchasers for virtue are entitled to rely despite breaches
of trust or violations of agreement on the part of the apparent
owner. As between two innocent persons, the loss must fall upon
him whose misplaced confidence made the loss possible. (Siy
Cong Bieng & Co. vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 56
Phil. 598 [1932].)
Law. Compare this article with Article 1518.
ART. 1513. A person to whom a negotiable docu-

ment of title has been duly negotiated acquires
thereby:
(1) Such title to the goods as the person negotiat-
ing the document to him had or had ability to convey
to a purchaser in good faith for value and also such
title to the goods as the person to whose order the
goods were to be delivered by the terms of the docu-
ment had or had ability to convey to a purchaser in
good faith for value; and
(2) The direct obligation of the bailee issuing the
document to hold possession of the goods for him
according to the terms of the document as fully as if
such bailee had contracted directly with him. (n)
Rights of person to whom document

has been negotiated.
This article specifies the rights of a person to whom a negoti-
able document of title has been duly negotiated, either by deliv-
ery, in the case of a document of title to bearer, or by indorsement
and delivery, in the case of a document of title to order. Such per-
son acquires:
(1) The title of the person negotiating the document, over the
goods covered by the document;
(2) The title of the person (depositor or owner) to whose or-
der by the terms of the document the goods were to be delivered,
over such goods; and
(3) The direct obligation of the bailee (warehouseman or car-
rier) to hold possession of the goods for him, as if the bailee had
contracted directly with him.
One who purchases, therefore, a negotiable document of title
issued to a thief acquires no right over the goods as the thief has
no right to transfer, notwithstanding that such purchaser is inno-
cent. But the purchaser acquires a good title where the owner, by
his conduct, is estopped from asserting his title.
A provision similar to Article 1513 is found in Section 41 of
the Warehouse Receipts Law.
ART. 1514. A person to whom a document of title

has been transferred, but not negotiated, acquires
thereby, as against the transferor, the title to the
goods, subject to the terms of any agreement with
the transferor.
If the document is non-negotiable, such person
also acquires the right to notify the bailee who issued
the document of the transfer thereof, and thereby to
acquire the direct obligation of such bailee to hold
possession of the goods for him according to the
terms of the document.
Prior to the notification to such bailee by the
transferor or transferee of a non-negotiable document
of title, the title of the transferee to the goods and the
right to acquire the obligation of such bailee may be
defeated by the levy of an attachment of execution
upon the goods by a creditor of the transferor, or by a
notification to such bailee by the transferor or a sub-
sequent purchaser from the transferor of a subse-
quent sale of the goods by the transferor. (n)
216 SALES Art. 1515
Rights of person to whom document

has been transferred.
This article refers to the rights of a person to whom a negoti-
able document of title (not duly negotiated) has been transferred
(par. 1.) or of the transferee of a non-negotiable document. (pars.
2 and 3.) Such person acquires:
(1) The title to the goods as against the transferor;
(2) The right to notify the bailee of the transfer thereof; and
(3) The right, thereafter, to acquire the obligation of the bailee
to hold the goods for him.
The right of the transferee is not absolute as it is subject to the
terms of any agreement with the transferor. He merely steps into
the shoes of the transferor.
Attachment of goods covered

by document transferred.
(1) The transfer of a non-negotiable document of title does not
effect the delivery of the goods covered by it. Accordingly, before
notification, the bailee is not bound to the transferee whose right
may be defeated by a levy of an attachment or execution upon
the goods by the creditor of the transferor or by a notification to
such bailee of the subsequent sale of the goods.
(2) If the document is negotiable, the goods cannot be attached
or be levied under an execution unless the document be first sur-
rendered to the bailee or its negotiation enjoined. (Art. 1519.)
Law.
Note: The word “of” between “attachment” and “execution”
in the third paragraph should more properly read “or”. This is
how Section 34 of the Uniform Sales Act, from which Article 1514
was adopted, is worded.
ART. 1515. Where a negotiable document of title

is transferred for value by delivery, and the indorse-
ment of the transferor is essential for negotiation, the
transferee acquires a right against the transferor to
compel him to indorse the document unless a con-

trary intention appears. The negotiation shall take ef-
fect as of the time when the indorsement is actually
made. (n)
Transfer of order document without

indorsement.
This article specifies the rights of a person to whom an order
document of title, which may not properly be negotiated by mere
delivery, has been delivered, without indorsement. They are:
(1) The right to the goods as against the transferor (Art. 1514.);
and
(2) The right to compel the transferor to indorse the indorse-
ment. (see Art. 1357.)
If the intention of the parties is that the document should be
merely transferred, the transferee has no right to require the
transferor to indorse the document.
Rule where document subsequently

indorsed.
For the purpose of determining whether the transferee is a
purchaser for value in good faith without notice (see Arts. 1506,
1513.), the negotiation shall take effect as of the time when the
indorsement is actually made, not at the time the document is
delivered. The reason is that the negotiation becomes complete
only at the time of indorsement. So, if by that time the purchaser
already had notice that the title of the seller was defective, he can-
not be considered a purchaser in good faith though he had no such
notice when he bought the document.
A provision similar to Article 1515 is found in Section 43 of
the Warehouse Receipts Law. (Sec. 49 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law is to the same effect.)
ART. 1516. A person who for value negotiates or

transfers a document of title by indorsement or deliv-
ery, including one who assigns for value a claim se-
cured by a document of title unless contrary inten-
tion appears, warrants:
218 SALES Art. 1516
(1) That the document is genuine;

(2) That he has a legal right to negotiate or trans-
fer it;
(3) That he has knowledge of no fact which would
impair the validity or worth of the document; and
(4) That he has a right to transfer the title to the
goods and that the goods are merchantable or fit for
a particular purpose, whenever such warranties would
have been implied if the contract of the parties had
been to transfer without a document of title the goods
represented thereby. (n)
Warranties on sale of documents.

This article treats of the warranties or liabilities of a person
negotiating or transferring a document. They are similar to those
of a person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a quali-
fied indorsement under the Negotiable Instruments Law. (see Sec.
65 thereof.) The liability is limited only to a violation of the four
warranties set forth in Article 1516. (see Art. 1517.) Thus, the per-
son negotiating or transferring a document could be held liable
as when, for example, the document was a forgery, or he had sto-
len it, or he had knowledge that the document was invalid for
want of consideration, or that the goods had been damaged.
One who assigns for value a claim secured by a document of
title is also liable for the violation of the four warranties enumer-
ated unless a contrary intention appears.
It is the duty of every indorsee to know that all previous in-
dorsements are genuine; otherwise, he will not acquire a valid title
to the instrument. (Great Eastern Life Ins. Co. vs. Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation, 43 Phil. 678 [1922].) Under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, the last indorser warrants that all
previous indorsements are genuine. (see Secs. 65, 66 thereof.)
Law. (see Sec. 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which is also
similar.)
ART. 1517. The indorsement of a document of title

shall not make the indorser liable for any failure on
the part of the bailee who issued the document or pre-
vious indorsers thereof to fulfill their respective obli-
gations. (n)
Indorser not a guarantor.

The indorsement of a negotiable instrument has a double ef-
fect. It is at the same time a conveyance of the instrument and a
contract of the indorser with the indorsee that on certain condi-
tions the indorser will pay the instrument if the party primarily
liable fails to do so.
The indorsement of a document of title amounts merely to a
conveyance by the indorser, not a contract of guaranty. (see 2
Williston, op. cit., pp. 627-628.) Accordingly, an indorser of a docu-
ment of title shall not be liable to the holder if, for example, the
bailee fails to deliver the goods because they were lost due to his
fault or negligence.
Law.
ART. 1518. The validity of the negotiation of a ne-

gotiable document of title is not impaired by the fact
that the negotiation was a breach of duty on the part
of the person making the negotiation, or by the fact
that the owner of the document was deprived of the
possession of the same by loss, theft, fraud, accident,
mistake, duress, or conversion, if the person to whom
the document was negotiated or a person to whom
the document was subsequently negotiated paid value
therefor in good faith without notice of the breach of
duty, or loss, theft, fraud, accident, mistaken, duress
or conversion. (n)
When negotiation not impaired by fraud,

mistake, duress, etc.
Under this article, a negotiable document may be negotiated
by any person in possession of the same, however such posses-
220 SALES Art. 1519
sion may have been acquired. (see National Bank vs. Producers’
Warehouse Association, 42 Phil. 608 [1922]; Hill vs. Veloso, 31 Phil.
160 [1915].) In other words, it may be negotiated even by a thief
or finder and the holder thereof would acquire a good title thereto
if he paid value therefor in good faith without notice of the sell-
er’s defect of title. (see Art. 1506.) It will be remembered that un-
der Article 1512, neither a thief nor a finder may negotiate a ne-
gotiable document of title. The two provisions thus appear con-
tradictory to each other.
Under the Warehouse Receipts Law, it is provided:
“Sec. 47. When negotiation not impaired by fraud, mistake or
duress. — The validity of the negotiation of a receipt is not
impaired by the fact that such negotiation was a breach of duty
on the part of the person making the negotiation or by the fact
that the owner of the document was induced by fraud, mistake
or duress to entrust the possession or custody thereof to such per-
son, if the person to whom the document was negotiated or a
person to whom the document was subsequently negotiated
paid value therefor, without notice of the breach of duty or
fraud, mistake or duress.”
Clearly, under Section 40 (see Art. 1512.) and Section 47 of the
Warehouse Receipts Law, the negotiation is invalidated by the fact
that the owner of the document was deprived of its possession
by loss or theft.
It should be noted that Article 1518 speaks of theft of the docu-
ment and not of the goods covered by such document. In the latter
case, it needs no argument to show that even a bona fide holder of
a document issued over such stolen goods cannot acquire title.
(see Art. 1513.)
ART. 1519. If goods are delivered to a bailee by

the owner or by a person whose act in conveying the
title to them to a purchaser in good faith for value
would bind the owner and a negotiable document of
title is issued for them they cannot thereafter, while
in possession of such bailee, be attached by garnish-
ment or otherwise or be levied under an execution
unless the document be first surrendered to the bailee

or its negotiation enjoined. The bailee shall in no case
be compelled to deliver up the actual possession of
the goods until the document is surrendered to him
or impounded by the court.
Attachment or levy upon goods covered

by a negotiable document.
The bailee has the direct obligation to hold possession of the
goods for the original owner or to the person to whom the nego-
tiable document of title has been duly negotiated. (see Art. 1513.)
While in the possession of such bailee, the goods cannot be at-
tached or levied under an execution unless the document be first
surrendered, or its negotiation prohibited by the court.
The bailee cannot be compelled to deliver up the possession
of the goods until the document is surrendered to him or im-
pounded by the court. This prohibition is for the protection of the
bailee since he could be made liable to a subsequent purchaser
for value in good faith.
Where depositor not owner.

The provisions of Article 1519 do not apply if the person de-
positing is not the owner of the goods (like a thief) or one who
has no right to convey title to the goods binding upon the owner.
Neither does it apply to actions for recovery or manual delivery
of goods by the real owner nor to cases where the attachment is
made before the issuance of the negotiable document of title.
The rights acquired by attaching creditors cannot be defeated
by the issuance of a negotiable document of title thereafter. (see
International vs. Terminal Warehouse Co., 126 Atl. 902.)
A similar provision in the Warehouse Receipts Law is Section
25. (see also Sec. 54.)
ART. 1520. A creditor whose debtor is the owner

of a negotiable document of title shall be entitled to
such aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction by
injunction and otherwise in attaching such document
222 SALES Art. 1521
or in satisfying the claim by means thereof as is al-

lowed at law or in equity in regard to property which
cannot readily be attached or levied upon by ordinary
legal process. (n)
Creditor’s remedies to reach negotiable

documents.
Inasmuch as the goods themselves cannot readily be attached
or levied upon by ordinary legal process, as limited by the pre-
ceding article, this article expressly gives the court full power to
aid by injunction and otherwise a creditor seeking to get a nego-
tiable document covering such goods. However, if an injunction
is issued but the negotiable document of title is negotiated to an
innocent person, the transfer is nevertheless effectual.
Law.
ART. 1521. Whether it is for the buyer to take pos-

session of the goods or for the seller to send them to
the buyer is a question depending in each case on
the contract, express or implied, between the parties.
Apart from any such contract, express or implied, or
usage of trade to the contrary, the place of delivery is
the seller’s place of business if he has one, and if not,
his residence; but in case of a contract of sale of spe-
cific goods, which to the knowledge of the parties
when the contract or the sale was made were in some
other place, then that place is the place of delivery.
Where by a contract of sale the seller is bound to
send the goods to the buyer, but no time for sending
them is fixed, the seller is bound to send them within
a reasonable time.
Where the goods at the time of sale are in the pos-
session of a third person, the seller has not fulfilled
his obligation to deliver to the buyer unless and until
such third person acknowledges to the buyer that he
holds the goods on the buyer’s behalf.
Demand or tender of delivery may be treated as

ineffectual unless made at a reasonable hour. What is
a reasonable hour is a question of fact.
Unless otherwise agreed, the expenses of and in-
cidental to putting the goods into a deliverable state
must be borne by the seller. (n)
Place of delivery of goods sold.

Should the buyer take possession of the goods or should the
seller send them? In other words, where is the place of delivery?
The following are the rules:
(1) Where there is an agreement, express or implied, the place
of delivery is that agreed upon;
(2) Where there is no agreement, the place of delivery is that
determined by usage of trade;
(3) Where there is no agreement and there is also no preva-
lent usage, the place of delivery is the seller’s place of business;
(4) In any other case, the place of delivery is the seller’s resi-
dence; and
(5) In case of specific goods, which to the knowledge of the
parties at the time the contract was made were in some other place,
that place is the place of delivery, in the absence of any agreement
or usage of trade to the contrary. (see Art. 1251.)
From the above, it can be seen that the presumption is that
the buyer must take the goods from the seller’s place of business
or residence rather than the seller to deliver them to the buyer.
Wherever the proper place of delivery may be, either party
acquires a right of action by being ready and willing at that place
to perform his legal duty, if the other party is not there present or
even if present, is not prepared to perform in a proper manner
with what is incumbent upon him. (see Art. 1169, par. 3.) Where,
however, the delivery was not effected at the place specified in
the contract but the buyer accepted the goods nevertheless with-
out complaint, the buyer would be deemed to have waived the
seller’s failure to deliver according to the terms of the contract,
and would be liable to pay the price agreed upon. (Sullivan vs.
Gird, 22 Ariz. 332.)
224 SALES Art. 1521
Time of delivery of goods sold.

The time of delivery is also determined by the agreement of
the parties or, in the absence thereof, by the usage of trade.
(1) If no time is fixed by the contract, then the seller is bound to
send the goods to the buyer within a reasonable time. (par. 2.)
What is a reasonable time is properly a question of fact as it is
dependent upon the circumstances attending the particular trans-
action, such as the character of the goods, the purpose for which
they are intended, the ability of the seller to produce the goods if
they are to be manufactured, the facilities available for transpor-
tation and distance the goods must be carried, and the usual
course of business in the particular trade. (Smith Bell & Co. vs.
Sotelo Matti, 44 Phil. 874 [1923].) Thus, where the goods are to be
manufactured, the time reasonably necessary to manufacture and
deliver them furnishes the test. Where the goods are at the time
of the bargain in a deliverable state (see Art. 1636[3].) and perish-
able in nature, a reasonable time for delivery would be a very short
time.
(2) If the contract provides a fixed time for performance, the ques-
tion is whether time is of the essence, and if so, whether correct
performance was offered within that time. (see Art. 1169, par. 2;
see Soler vs. Chesley, 43 Phil. 529 [1922].) If time is not of the es-
sence, the question is whether correct performance was offered
within a reasonable time. (2 Williston, op. cit., p. 714.)
(3) Where the contract does not specify the time for delivery so that
delivery is to be made within a reasonable time, time is not of the
essence. (MC Cutcheon vs. Kimbal, 135 Misc. 299, 238 N.Y.S. 192.)
In such case, the buyer cannot make time the essence of the con-
tract without giving the seller notice of his intention to cancel
unless delivery is made on or before a fixed time. (Robinson Day
Products Co. vs. Thatcher, 150 N.Y.S. 658.)
Delivery of goods in possession

of a third person.
It is important to observe a distinction between the delivery
which will satisfy the seller’s duty to the buyer and the delivery
which is necessary to protect the buyer against third persons.
The seller can hardly be discharged from his obligation where

the goods are in the possession of a third person by simply tell-
ing the buyer that they are there or by notifying the bailee to de-
liver to the buyer. It is not enough to discharge the seller that the
bailee has become by operation of law the agent for the buyer. (2
Williston, op. cit., pp. 706-707.) To affect third persons, the person
holding the goods must acknowledge being the bailee for the
buyer.
Hour of delivery of goods sold.

The demand or tender of delivery to be effectual must be made
at a reasonable hour of the day. (par. 4.)
(1) What is a reasonable hour is a question of fact largely de-
pendent upon the circumstances. Generally, however, where all
that is required of the other party is to receive a payment or per-
formance which can readily be accepted, it seems probable that
any hour when the debtor could find the creditor would be rea-
sonable for that purpose.
(2) In case of goods which are bulky or needed special care,
an hour might be unreasonable which would not be so in an or-
dinary payment of a small sum of money.
(3) Where the question is not merely one of tender but also of
demand, reasonableness will depend on the justifiable expecta-
tion that the hour is reasonable for giving as well as receiving.
(Ibid., op. cit., pp. 711-712.)
Duty of seller to put goods in deliverable

condition.
Unless otherwise agreed, the seller bears the expenses to place
the thing in a deliverable state (par. 5.), that is, in such a state that
the buyer would, under the contract, be bound to take delivery
of them. (Art. 1636[2].) This provision is a necessary consequence
of the duty of the seller to deliver the goods bargained for. (see
Art. 1247.)
The buyer is not bound to make tender of payment until the
seller has complied with his obligations.
226 SALES Art. 1522
ART. 1522. Where the seller delivers to the buyer a

quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, the
buyer may reject them, but if the buyer accepts or re-
tains the goods so delivered, knowing that the seller
is not going to perform the contract in full, he must
pay for them at the contract rate. If, however, the buyer
has used or disposed of the goods delivered before
he knows that the seller is not going to perform
his contract in full, the buyer shall not be liable for
more than the fair value to him of the goods so re-
ceived.
Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity
of goods larger than he contracted to sell, the buyer
may accept the goods included in the contract and
reject the rest. If the buyer accepts the whole of the
goods so delivered he must pay for them at the con-
tract rate.
Where the seller delivers to the buyer the goods
he contracted to sell mixed with goods of a different
description not included in the contract, the buyer may
accept the goods which are in accordance with the
contract and reject the rest.
In the preceding two paragraphs, if the subject
matter is indivisible, the buyer may reject the whole
of the goods.
The provisions of this article are subject to any
usage of trade, special agreement, or course of deal-
ing between the parties. (n)
Delivery of goods less than quantity

contracted.
Where the seller is under a contract to deliver a specific quan-
tity of goods and he delivers a smaller quantity as full perform-
ance of his obligation, the buyer may reject the goods so deliv-
ered. (see Art. 1233.) The buyer may, however, accept the goods
in which case he must pay for their (1) price at the contract rate if
he knew that no more were to be delivered or (2) the fair value to
him of the goods, if he did not know that the seller is going to be
guilty of a breach of contract. (par. 1.)
“Fair value to him” should be interpreted to mean the benefit
which the buyer may have received from the goods. It is not nec-
essarily the market value. Since the defaulting seller is the wrong-
doer, the buyer is not required to pay the contract price if such
price for the goods is more than fair value to him of the goods.
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B 200 cavans of rice at P1,000.00 per cavan or for a
total price of P200,000.00, delivery to be made at the place of
business of B.
If S delivers only 120 cavans, B can refuse to accept them. If
he accepts them knowing that B is not going to perform the
contract in full, he is liable to pay at the rate agreed upon for
the 120 cavans or P120,000. But if B was not aware that full
delivery would not be made, he would be liable only for the
fair value to him of the goods at the time of delivery even if it
should be less than the contract price.
Of course, B cannot be liable, in any case, for more than the
contract price of P120,000.00 with respect to the 120 cavans ac-
tually received by him.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Some of the goods contracted to be sold were missing through
fault of carrier.
Facts: S, a domestic corporation, alleges that B, a general
partnership, refused to pay the price of various automotive
products, with the latter claiming that it had not received the
merchandise. It appears that upon receipt of the Bill of Lading,
B initiated, but did not pursue, steps to take delivery as it was
advised by NN Company, owner of the vessel on which the
spare parts were loaded by S’s forwarding agent, that because
some parts were missing, they would just be informed as soon
as the missing parts were located.
It was only four years later when a warehouseman of NN
found in its bodega, parts of the shipment in question, but al-
ready deteriorated and valueless.
228 SALES Art. 1522
Issue: Under the circumstances, can B be faulted for not ac-

cepting or refusing to accept the shipment from NN four years
after shipment?
Held: No. NN could not produce the merchandise nor as-
certain its whereabouts at the time B was ready to take deliv-
ery. From the evidentiary record, NN was the party negligent
in failing to deliver the complete shipment to B who was never
placed in the control and possession of the same. Where the
seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he
contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them. (Chrysler Phils.
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 567 [1984].)
Delivery of goods more than quantity

contracted.
Where the seller delivers a quantity larger than that contracted
for, the buyer may accept the quantity contracted for and reject
the excess. However, if he accepts all the goods delivered, he
makes himself liable for the price of all of them. (par. 2; see Art.
1540 re sale of immovable property.)
The offer of a quantity not contracted for is a manifestation of
the seller’s willingness to sell that quantity; and the act of the
buyer in knowingly taking them is sufficient evidence of assent.
If by the terms of the original contract, the price of the goods was
based on their number, weight, or measure, the same must be paid
for the larger quantity.
EXAMPLE:
In the preceding example, if S delivered 250 cavans of rice,
B may accept only 200 and reject the rest. If he accepts the en-
tire delivery, he may pay for them at the same contract rate of
P1,000.00 per cavan or P250,000.00 for the 250 cavans.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
See facts.
Facts: The contract calls for the delivery of a quantity of
almaciga (mastic) of less than 500 piculs.
Issue: Is the delivery of 500 piculs sufficient compliance with
the contract?
Held: Yes. As the law takes no account of trifles (de minimis

non curat les), it is obvious that the discrepancy may be disre-
garded, and, therefore, the buyer cannot escape liability on ac-
count of such trifling difference. (Matute vs. Cheong Boo, 67 Phil.
373 [1939].)
Delivery of goods mixed with others.

Where the goods delivered are mixed with goods of different
description not included in the contract, the buyer may accept
those which are in accordance with the contract and reject the rest.
The buyer, of course, may accept them all if he so desires.
This case is analogous to the preceding topic and the discus-
sion there suffices.
Effect of indivisibility of subject matter.

If the subject matter of the sale is indivisible, in case of deliv-
ery of a larger quantity of goods (par. 2.) or of mixed goods (par.
3.), the buyer may reject the whole of the goods. (par. 4.)
It can be inferred from our law that the buyer has the right of
rejecting the whole of the goods delivered in the last two cases
mentioned only if the subject matter is indivisible.
EXAMPLES:
(1) S agreed to sell to B a live carabao with a weight of not
less than 100 kilos but not more than 120 kilos. S delivered a
carabao weighing 130 kilos. B may reject the carabao.
(2) If the agreement is for S to deliver “wagwag” rice mixed
with corn of a particular variety and the rice or corn delivered
is of a different variety, B may reject the whole of the goods.
Application of usage of trade, special

agreement, or course of dealing.
The provision of the 5th paragraph of Article 1522 permitting
evidence of usage of trade special agreement or course of dealing
between the parties is but a special application of the general rules
concerning contracts.
(1) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing hav-
ing such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as
230 SALES Art. 1523
to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to

the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such a
usage are to be proved as facts. (Uniform Commercial Code, Sec.
205[2].)
(2) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct be-
tween the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be
regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for
interpreting their expressions and other conduct. (Ibid., Sec.
205[1].)
Under modern methods of doing business especially in regard
to such fungible goods as grains and oil, and other commodities
which are dealt in the same way, it is very common to mingle
goods of different owners and to constitute a co-ownership in a
whole mass of a specified quantity. Where such method of busi-
ness prevails, it would be a natural consequence that a tender of
a right in the mass would be a good delivery. (see 2 Williston, op.
cit., p. 732.)
ART. 1523. Where, in pursuance of a contract of

sale, the seller is authorized or required to send the
goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier,
whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose
of transmission to the buyer is deemed to be a deliv-
ery of the goods to the buyer, except in the cases pro-
vided for in article 1503, first, second and third para-
graphs, or unless a contrary intent appears.
Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the
seller must make such contract with the carrier on
behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable, having re-
gard to the nature of the goods and the other circum-
stances of the case. If the seller omits so to do, and
the goods are lost or damaged in course of transit,
the buyer may decline to treat the delivery to the car-
rier as a delivery to himself, or may hold the seller
responsible in damages.
Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent
by the seller to the buyer under circumstances in
which the seller knows or ought to know that it is usual
to insure, the seller must give such notice to the buyer

as may enable him to insure them during their transit,
and, if the seller fails to do so, the goods shall be
deemed to be at his risk during such transit. (n)
Delivery to carrier on behalf of buyer.

(1) General rule. — Where the seller is authorized or required
to send the goods to the buyer (Art. 1521, par. 1.), the general rule
is that delivery of such goods to the carrier6 constitutes delivery
to the buyer, whether the carrier is named by the buyer or not.
(see Behn, Meyer & Co., [Ltd.] vs. Yangco, 38 Phil. 602 [1918].) In
such case, the delivery of the goods on board the carrying vessel
partakes the nature of actual delivery since from that time, the
buyer assumes the risk of loss of the goods. (Filipino Merchant
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 638 [1989].)
(2) Exceptions. — They are those provided for in paragraphs
1, 2, and 3 of Article 1503 and when a contrary intent appears,
that is, the parties did not intend the delivery of the goods to the
buyer through the carrier. The seller is not responsible for misde-
livery by the carrier where the carrier was chosen and authorized
by the buyer to make the delivery. (Smith Bell and Co. [Phils.],
Inc. vs. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 407 [1963].)
Paragraphs 2 and 3 are in accordance with mercantile usages.
Seller’s duty after delivery to carrier.

The fact that the ownership in the goods may have passed to
the buyer does not mean that the seller has already fulfilled his
duty to the buyer.
(1) To enter on behalf of buyer into such contract reasonable under
the circumstances. — The seller must make such contract with the
6
There is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed
in the exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their
immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted them. Where such delivery has
thus been accepted by the carrier, its liability commences eo instanti. Ordinarily, a receipt
is not essential to a complete delivery of goods to the carrier for transportation but,
when issued is competent and prima facie but not conclusive evidence of delivery to the
carrier. (Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 498 [1992].)
232 SALES Art. 1523
carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable under the cir-

cumstances. If he omits to do so, the buyer may decline to treat
the delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself in case the goods
are lost or damaged in course of transit, or the buyer may hold
the seller responsible in damages. (par. 2.) If the buyer exercises
the first right, the transfer of ownership will be deemed not to have
taken place.
The law does not make a carrier for all purposes the agent of
the buyer to whom goods are consigned. The agency relates to
the transmission of the merchandise only.
(2) To give notice to buyer regarding necessity to insure goods. —
The seller must give notice to the buyer as may enable him to in-
sure the goods during their transit if under the circumstances it
is usual to insure them. If the seller fails to do so, the risk will be
borne by him. But the seller who had failed to give notice is not
liable for loss of goods, if the buyer had all the information nec-
essary to insure.
The two preceding obligations of the seller are respectively
subject to specific instructions of the buyer or any agreement to
the contrary.
Definition of shipping terms.

Three commonly used terms are, namely:
(1) C.O.D. — The initials stand for the words, “collect on de-
livery.” If the goods are marked C.O.D., the carrier acts for the
seller in collecting the purchase price. The buyer must pay for the
goods before he can obtain possession. C.O.D. terms do not pre-
vent title from passing to the buyer on delivery to the carrier where
they are solely intended as security for the purchase price (see Art.
1503.);
(2) F.O.B. — The initials stand for the words, “free on board”.
They mean that the goods are to be delivered free of expense to
the buyer to the point where they are F.O.B. In general, the point
of F.O.B., either the point of shipment or the point of destination,
determines when the ownership passes. (Behn, Meyer & Co. [Ltd.]
vs. Yangco, 38 Phil. 602 [1918].) Here, title presumably passes
when the goods are so delivered F.O.B.; and
(3) C.I.F. — The initials stand for the words, “cost, insurance
and freight.” They signify that the price fixed covers not only the
cost of the goods, but the expense of freight and insurance to be
paid by the seller (ibid.) up to the point of destination. Title passes
to the buyer at the moment of delivery to the point especially
named.
Presumption arising from payment

of freight.
Both the terms “F.O.B.” and “C.I.F.” merely make rules of
presumption which yield to proof of contrary intention.
If the buyer is to pay the freight, it is reasonable to suppose
that he does so because the goods become his at the point of ship-
ment. On the other hand, if the seller is to pay the freight, the in-
ference is equally strong that the duty of the seller is to have the
goods transported to their ultimate destination and that title to
property does not pass until the goods have reached their desti-
nation. (Ibid.; see General Foods Corp. vs. National Coconut Corp.,
100 Phil. 337 [1956].)
ART. 1524. The vendor shall not be bound to de-

liver the thing sold, if the vendee has not paid him the
price, or if no period for the payment has been fixed
in the contract. (1466)
Delivery, simultaneous with payment

of price.
As a general rule, the obligation to deliver the thing subject
matter of a contract arises from the moment of its perfection and
from that time the obligation may be enforced. (see Art. 1315.) But
the contract of purchase and sale is bilateral and from it arises not
only the obligation to deliver the thing but also that of paying the
price. The obligations are reciprocal.
Consequently, if the vendor is bound to deliver the thing sold,
it is no less certain that the vendee must pay the price. If the vendee
does not pay the price, the consideration for the obligation of the
vendor is absent and if the consideration is absent, the obligation
234 SALES Art. 1524
likewise does not exist or at least is suspended. (10 Manresa 138;

see Lafont vs. Pascacio, 5 Phil. 391 [1905].) The vendor is not also
obliged to make delivery if no period has been fixed in the con-
tract and the vendee has not paid the price.
A vendor who continued to effect sales and deliveries to the
vendee even without promptly getting paid is considered for all
intents and purposes, to have sold on credit. (Castro vs. Mendoza,
44 SCAD 995, 226 SCRA 611 [1993].)
When delivery must be made before

payment of price.
The provisions of Article 1524 contain a rule and an excep-
tion: the rule is that the thing shall not be delivered unless the price
be paid; and the exception is that the thing must be delivered
though the price be not first paid, if time for such payment has
been fixed in the contract. (see Warner, Barnes & Co. vs. Inza, 43
Phil. 505 [1922]; Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs. International Bank, 37 Phil.
631 [1918]; Lafont vs. Pascasio, supra.)
If this period was fixed, the vendor notwithstanding such
period has not terminated, nor, consequently, that he has not col-
lected the price, is obliged to deliver the thing sold. The vendor’s
obligation to convey the thing arises from the force and validity
of the contract. (Florendo vs. Foz, 20 Phil. 388 [1911]; 10 Manresa
131-134.) But even if a period has been fixed for the payment of
the price, the vendor is not bound to deliver in case the vendee
has lost the right to make use of the period and still has not paid
the price. (Art. 1536.)
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B the former’s horse for P10,000.00. No date is
fixed by the parties for performance of their respective obliga-
tions.
In this case, S is not bound to deliver the horse, if B himself
does not pay the price. But if a time of payment has been fixed
in the contract, say, within two (2) months, then S is obliged to
deliver the horse where the term of credit has not expired al-
though B has not paid the price.
ART. 1525. The seller of goods is deemed to be an

unpaid seller within the meaning of this Title:
(1) When the whole of the price has not been paid
or tendered;
(2) When a bill of exchange or other negotiable
instrument has been received as conditional payment,
and the condition on which it was received has been
broken by reason of the dishonor of the instrument,
the insolvency of the buyer, or otherwise.
In articles 1525 and 1535 the term “seller” includes
an agent of the seller to whom the bill of lading has
been indorsed, or a consignor or agent who has him-
self paid, or is directly responsible for the price, or
any other person who is in the position of a seller. (n)
Meaning of unpaid seller.

An unpaid seller is one who has not been paid or tendered the
whole price or who has received a bill of exchange or other nego-
tiable instrument as conditional payment and the condition on
which it was received has been broken by reason of the dishonor
of the instrument.
The term “unpaid seller” within the scope of Articles 1525 up
to 1535 includes: (1) an agent of the seller; (2) a consignor or agent
who has himself paid or is directly responsible for the price; or
(3) any other person in the position of the seller. A seller is un-
paid within the definition whether title has or has not passed. (see
Art. 1526.)
Where whole of price has not been paid.

(1) Tender of payment by buyer. — Although tender of payment
is not the same as performance, and a seller to whom the price of
goods has been tendered is strictly unpaid, and can, therefore,
bring an action subsequently for the price, which he has refused,
yet tender destroys the seller’s lien. Accordingly, so far as con-
cerns his rights against the goods, he is not an unpaid seller after
the tender of the price.
236 SALES Art. 1526
(2) Payment of part of price. — Payment of a part only of the

price does not destroy a seller’s lien. (2 Williston, op. cit., pp. 96-
97.) The seller remains an unpaid seller even if title has passed to
the buyer.
(3) Payment by negotiable instrument. — According to para-
graph 2 of Article 1249 (Civil Code), “the delivery of promissory
notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile
documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they
have been cashed or when through the fault of the creditor they
have been impaired.”

notwithstanding that the ownership in the goods may
have passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller of goods,
as such, has:
(1) A lien on the goods or right to retain them for
the price while he is in possession of them;
(2) In case of the insolvency of the buyer, a right
of stopping the goods in transitu after he has parted
with the possession of them;
(3) A right of resale as limited by this Title;
(4) A right to rescind the sale as likewise limited
by this Title.
Where the ownership in the goods has not passed
to the buyer, the unpaid seller has, in addition to his
other remedies, a right of withholding delivery simi-
lar to and co-extensive with his rights of lien and stop-
page in transitu where the ownership has passed to
the buyer. (n)
Special remedies of an unpaid seller

of goods.
Article 1526 gives the unpaid seller of goods certain remedies
but they do not cover an action for the purchase price. (see Art.
1595.) Even if the ownership in the goods has already passed to
the buyer, the unpaid seller may exercise the following rights:
(1) A lien on the goods or right to retain them for the price
while in his possession (Arts. 1527-1529.);
(2) A right of stopping the goods in transitu in case of insol-
vency of the buyer (Art. 1530.);
(3) A right of resale (Art. 1533.); and
(4) A right to rescind the sale. (Art. 1534.)
If the unpaid seller still retains ownership in the goods, he
cannot be said to have a lien (on his goods). But he does have, in
addition to his other remedies, right of withholding delivery. (Art.
1526, par. 2.)
Nature of unpaid seller’s possessory

lien on the goods.
The right given by this article though denominated as a lien,
is in truth greater than a lien.
The seller’s position is very nearly that of a pledgee (see Art.
2112.) with power to sell at private sale in case of default, and the
power survives till payment of the price. An action for the price
is not inconsistent with the later enforcement of the lien though
the buyer must be credited with any payment of the price in re-
duction of the lien. (D’Oprile vs. TurnerLooker Co., 147 N.E. 15;
see Art. 1529, par. 2.)
Unpaid seller’s lien on the price.

The possessory lien referred to in Articles 1527 to 1529 should
be distinguished from the preferred claim or lien as provided for
in Article 2241(3) of the Civil Code.
The possessory lien entitles the seller to retain possession of the
goods as security for the purchase price. Where the goods are in
the possession of the buyer (see Art. 1529[2].), the seller has no
more possessory lien but his claim for the unpaid price is a prefer-
red claim or lien. Simply stated, upon delivery, the seller’s posse-
ssory lien on the goods is lost, but his lien on the price remains.
Basis of rights of unpaid seller.

The ground upon which an unpaid seller is allowed a lien and
kindred remedies is the inherent injustice of depriving him of
238 SALES Art. 1527
goods with which he has not finally parted where it is evident

that he has not been or will not be paid the price for them when it
is due.
The same principle of justice is applicable in every case where
a possessor of goods is entitled to receive a price on the surren-
der of the goods. Accordingly, the term “unpaid seller’’ has a
wider meaning than the literal language would import. (Art. 1525,
par. 2; 3 Williston, op. cit., p. 99.)

the unpaid seller of goods who is in possession of
them is entitled to retain possession of them until
payment or tender of the price in the following cases,
namely:
(1) Where the goods have been sold without any
stipulation as to credit;
(2) Where the goods have been sold on credit, but
the term of credit has expired;
(3) Where the buyer becomes insolvent.
The seller may exercise his right of lien notwith-
standing that he is in possession of the goods as
agent or bailee for the buyer. (n)
When unpaid seller’s possessory lien

may be exercised.
(1) Sale without stipulation as to credit. — In a credit sale, the
seller binds himself to give the goods over to the buyer without
receiving at that time payment for them. Where there is a “stipu-
lation as to credit” (No. 1.), a period for payment of the price has
been fixed in the contract. (see Art. 1193.)
In the absence of any stipulation as to the credit, the seller is
entitled to the payment of the price at the same time that he trans-
fers the possession of the goods. (Art. 1524; see Distributors, Inc.
vs. Flores, 92 Phil. 145 [1952].) Accordingly, the seller has always
a lien upon the goods which he sells until payment or tender of
the entire price. (3 Williston, op. cit., pp. 103-104.)
(2) Expiration of term of credit. — Even where the parties agree

upon a sale on credit, the seller’s right of lien may be exercised.
By the nature of a credit sale, the buyer is entitled to possession
of the goods without paying the price; but if he fails to exercise
his right until the term of credit has expired and the price becomes
due, he loses the right which he theretofore had. (Ibid., p. 104.) In
this case, the obligation of the buyer to pay will also be governed
by Article 1524.
(3) Insolvency of the buyer. — The insolvency of the buyer is
another situation where the lien of the seller in possession is re-
vived even though the time for payment of the price has not yet
arrived. This doctrine is only an application of a general princi-
ple in the law of contracts that when one party to a bilateral con-
tract is incapacitated from performing his part of the agreement,
the other party also is excused from performing. It should be
noticed that insolvency does not dissolve the bargain; it merely
revives the seller’s lien. (Ibid., p. 105.)
The insolvency of the debtor is one of the grounds for the loss
of the right to make use of the period fixed in an obligation. (Art.
1198[1].) A person is “insolvent” who either has ceased to pay his
debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts
as they become due, whether insolvency proceedings have been
commenced or not. (Art. 1636[2].)
Unpaid seller as bailee for the buyer.

It is immaterial that the seller holds the goods as bailee for
the buyer. Indeed, this always is the situation where the seller’s
lien is in question: for the property having passed, the seller is
necessarily holding the buyer’s goods and, therefore, acting as
bailee for him. And though he has charged the buyer storage for
the goods, the lien may still be asserted.
ART. 1528. Where an unpaid seller has made part

delivery of the goods, he may exercise his right of
lien on the remainder, unless such part delivery has
been made under such circumstances as to show an
intent to waive the lien or right of retention. (n)
240 SALES Art. 1529
Lien generally not lost by part

delivery.
When part of the goods are delivered, the unpaid seller has a
lien upon the remainder for the proportion of the price which is
due on account of the goods so retained. However, if the delivery
of the part is intended as symbolical delivery of the whole, and,
therefore, a waiver of any right of retention as to the remainder,
the lien is lost. (Art. 1529[3].)
The intent to make such waiver may be inferred from the cir-
cumstances.
ART. 1529. The unpaid seller of goods loses his

lien thereon:
(1) When he delivers the goods to a carrier or other
bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer
without reserving the ownership in the goods or the
right to the possession thereof;
(2) When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains
possession of the goods;
(3) By waiver thereof.
The unpaid seller of goods, having a lien thereon,
does not lose his lien by reason only that he has ob-
tained judgment or decree for the price of the goods.
(n)
When unpaid seller loses possessory lien.

(1) Delivery to agent or bailee of buyer. — An unconditional de-
livery to an agent or bailee for the buyer is, so far as the seller’s
lien is concerned, the same as delivery to the buyer himself. It is
true that the seller may stop the goods while on their way to the
buyer after delivery to a bailee for the buyer but it cannot be said
that the seller has still any lien upon them.
(2) Possession by buyer or his agent. — If the goods are already
in the possession of the buyer at the time of the bargain, it is plain
that when the ownership is transferred, the seller has no lien sim-
ply because he has no possession necessary for a lien. The wrong-
ful taking, however, of the goods by the buyer without the sell-
er’s consent does not destroy the lien. Thus, if the goods are put
into the possession of the buyer merely for the purpose of allow-
ing the latter to examine them, this would not amount to an as-
sent to a surrender of the lien. (3 Williston on Sales, op. cit., p. 111.)
(3) Waiver of the lien. — The seller may lose his lien either by
express agreement to surrender it. Thus, it has been held that
where the buyer was allowed to alter the character of the goods
and make them much more valuable, the seller could no longer
assert a lien. (Ibid., p. 115.)
Note that mere judgment by a court obtained by the unpaid
seller for the price of the goods is not a ground for the loss of his
lien. (Art. 1529, par. 2.)
Revival of lien after delivery.

(1) If the buyer refuses to receive the goods after they have
been delivered to a carrier or other bailee on his behalf, though
the seller has parted with both the ownership and the possession,
he may reclaim the goods and revest himself with his lien. (see
Art. 1531, par. 1[2].)
(2) Likewise, if the buyer returns the goods in wrongful re-
pudiation of the sale, the lien is revived.

when the buyer of goods is or becomes insolvent, the
unpaid seller who has parted with the possession of
the goods has the right of stopping them in transitu,
that is to say, he may resume possession of the goods
at any time while they are in transit, and he will then
become entitled to the same rights in regard to the
goods as he would have had if he had never parted
with the possession. (n)
Right of seller to stop goods in transitu.

If the unpaid seller has already parted with the possession of
the goods, he may still exercise the second right of stoppage in
transitu (Art. 1520[2].), that is, he may resume possession of the
242 SALES Art. 1530
goods while they are in transit, when the buyer is or becomes

insolvent. The right is exercised either by obtaining actual pos-
session of the goods or by giving notice of his claim to the carrier
or other bailee in possession. (Art. 1532.) The unpaid seller exer-
cising his right of stoppage in transitu becomes entitled to the same
rights to the goods as if he had never parted with the possession
thereof.
Take note that the buyer’s insolvency need not be judicially
declared. (see Art. 1636[2].) An insolvent debtor forfeits his rights
to the period stipulated for payment. (see Art. 1536.)
Requisites for the exercise of right

of stoppage in transitu.
The following are the requisites for the existence of the right:
(1) The seller must be unpaid (Art. 1525.);
(2) The buyer must be insolvent;
(3) The goods must be in transit (Art. 1531.);
(4) The seller must either actually take possession of the goods
sold or give notice of his claim to the carrier or other person in
possession (Art. 1532, par. 1.);
(5) The seller must surrender the negotiable document of ti-
tle, if any, issued by the carrier or bailee (Ibid., par. 2.); and
(6) The seller must bear the expenses of delivery of the goods
after the exercise of the right. (Ibid.)
Basis and nature of right of stoppage

in transitu.
(1) The essential basis of the right of stoppage in transitu is
clearly the injustice of allowing the buyer to acquire ownership
and possession of the goods when he has not paid and, owing to
his insolvency, cannot pay the price which was to be given in re-
turn for the goods. In other words, the fundamental basis of the
right is the far-reaching principle allowing rescission and restitu-
tion where there is actual or prospective failure of consideration.
(3 Williston, op. cit., p. 122.)
(2) This right does not proceed from any agreement of the
parties but is independently conferred by law. It may be regarded
as a legal extension of the unpaid seller’s lien.
ART. 1531. Goods are in transit within the mean-

ing of the preceding article:
(1) From the time when they are delivered to a car-
rier by land, water, or air, or other bailee for the pur-
pose of transmission to the buyer, until the buyer, or
his agent in that behalf, takes delivery of them from
such carrier or other bailee;
(2) If the goods are rejected by the buyer, and the
carrier or other bailee continues in possession of
them, even if the seller has refused to receive them
back;
Goods are no longer in transit within the meaning
of the preceding article:
(1) If the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, obtains
delivery of the goods before their arrival at the ap-
pointed destination;
(2) If, after the arrival of the goods at the appointed
destination, the carrier or other bailee acknowledges
to the buyer or his agent that he holds the goods on
his behalf and continues in possession of them as
bailee for the buyer or his agent; and it is immaterial
that further destination for the goods may have been
indicated by the buyer;
(3) If the carrier or other bailee wrongfully refuses
to deliver the goods to the buyer or his agent in that
behalf.
If the goods are delivered to a ship, freight train,
truck, or airplane chartered by the buyer, it is a ques-
tion depending on the circumstances of the particu-
lar case, whether they are in the possession of the
carrier as such or as agent of the buyer.
244 SALES Art. 1531
If part delivery of the goods has been made to the

buyer, or his agent in that behalf, the remainder of the
goods may be stopped in transitu, unless such part
delivery has been under such circumstances as to
show an agreement with the buyer to give up posses-
sion of the whole of the goods. (n)
When goods are in transit.

The goods are not yet in transit until they are delivered to a
carrier or other bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer.
The goods are in transit —
(1) after delivery to a carrier or other bailee and before the
buyer or his agent takes delivery of them; and
(2) if the goods are rejected by the buyer, and the carrier or
other bailee continues in possession of them. (par. 1.)
When goods considered no longer

in transit.
The right of stoppage in transitu arises solely when an unpaid
seller has shipped goods to an insolvent buyer. The right to re-
take continues only while the goods are in transit. The goods are
no longer in transit in the following cases:
(1) After delivery to the buyer or his agent in that behalf;
(2) If the buyer or his agent obtains possession of the goods
at a point before the destination originally fixed;
(3) If the carrier or bailee acknowledges to hold the goods on
behalf of the buyer; and
(4) If the carrier or bailee wrongfully refuses to deliver the
goods to the buyer. (par. 2.)
Attornment by the bailee.

The right to stop the goods may be terminated not simply by
delivery to the buyer, but by attornment of the bailee to the buyer.
(Art. 1531, par. 2[2].)
At the time when a carrier first receives goods consigned to
the buyer, the carrier is agent for the seller for the purpose of car-
rying out the transit between the seller and the buyer. In order to
terminate the seller’s right to stop, the carrier must enter into a
new relation, distinct from the original contract of carriage, to hold
the goods for the buyer as his agent not for the purpose of expe-
diting them to the place of original destination, pursuant to that
contract, but in a new character for the purpose of custody on the
buyer’s account. (see 3 Williston, op. cit., pp. 134-135.)
Effect of refusal of carrier to attorn

or deliver the goods.
The carrier is not allowed to enlarge the seller’s right by
wrongfully refusing to deliver or attorn as the buyer’s agent. (Art.
1531, par. 2[3].) But a rightful refusal by the carrier, based for in-
stance, on the refusal of the buyer or his agent to pay the freight
will not terminate the right to stop. (Ibid., pp. 135-136.)
Delivery to a ship, etc., chartered

or owned by buyer.
(1) Chartered by the buyer. — The mere fact that the carrier is
chartered by the buyer does not make a delivery to the carrier a
delivery to the buyer. Whether delivery to a carrier chartered by
the buyer means possession by the carrier as such or possession
by the carrier as agent of the buyer, in which case, the goods are
no longer in transit, is a question depending on the circumstances
of the particular case. (par. 3.)
(2) Owned by the buyer. — As delivery to an agent, other than
one whose only duty is to forward the goods, is a delivery to the
principal, delivery to the buyer’s servant who is under a general
duty to obey his master’s order, is necessarily a delivery to the
buyer. Hence, delivery to a vessel belonging to the buyer is deliv-
ery to the buyer. (see Ibid., p. 145.)
Effect of partial delivery.

The mere fact that part of the goods has been delivered does
not deprive the seller of the right to stop with respect to the re-
mainder (par. 4.) just as the seller may still exercise his right of
lien on the remainder after part of the goods had been delivered.
246 SALES Art. 1532
(Art. 1528.) However, it may be shown that the seller has an agree-
ment with the buyer to give up possession of the whole of the
goods.
ART. 1532. The unpaid seller may exercise his right

of stoppage in transitu either by obtaining actual pos-
session of the goods or by giving notice of his claim
to the carrier or other bailee in whose possession the
goods are. Such notice may be given either to the
person in actual possession of the goods or to his
principal. In the latter case, the notice, to be effectual,
must be given at such time and under such circum-
stances that the principal, by the exercise of reason-
able diligence, may prevent a delivery to the buyer.
When notice of stoppage in transitu is given by
the seller to the carrier, or other bailee in possession
of the goods, he must redeliver the goods to, or ac-
cording to the directions of, the seller. The expenses
of such delivery must be borne by the seller. If, how-
ever, a negotiable document of title representing the
goods has been issued by the carrier or other bailee,
he shall not be obliged to deliver or justified in deliv-
ering the goods to the seller unless such document
is first surrendered for cancellation. (n)
Ways of exercising the right to stop.

The seller may exercise the right of stoppage in transitu either:
(1) by taking actual possession of the goods. — The seller’s power
to stop in transitu includes not only the power to counter delivery
to the buyer but to order redelivery to himself. (par. 2, 1st and 2nd
sentences.) The duty imposed on the carrier by the exercise of the
power is, however, qualified by the existence of a lien of the car-
rier on the goods for charges due for their carriage. The seller has
the obligation to pay the freight on them and other necessary ex-
penses of the delivery (3 Williston, op. cit., pp. 156-157.); or
(2) by giving notice of his claim to the carrier or bailee. — To make
a notice effective as a stoppage in transitu, it must be given at such
time, and under such circumstances that the principal, by the

exercise of reasonable diligence, may communicate it to his agent
to prevent the delivery to the buyer. There is no form of notice
which is essential; it is only necessary that the goods be sufficiently
described for identification.
Effect of outstanding bill of lading.

If the goods are covered by a negotiable document of title, the
carrier or bailee has no obligation to deliver the goods to the seller
unless such document is first surrendered for cancellation. (par.
2, 3rd sentence; see Art. 1519.)
Should the carrier surrender the goods to the seller and after-
wards the bill of lading be negotiated to an innocent purchaser
for value, the latter would be entitled to demand delivery of the
goods. (Art. 1518.) The only way in which the carrier can be as-
sured that no subsequent purchaser can arise is by requiring a
surrender of the document of title. The right of the purchaser for
value in good faith to whom such document has been negotiated
is superior to the seller’s unpaid lien or stoppage in transitu even
when such purchaser acquired the same after notice of stoppage
was given by the seller to the carrier. (see Art. 1535, par. 2.)
ART. 1533. Where the goods are of perishable na-

ture, or where the seller expressly reserves the right
of resale in case the buyer should make default, or
where the buyer has been in default in the payment of
the price for an unreasonable time, an unpaid seller
having a right of lien or having stopped the goods in
transitu may resell the goods. He shall not thereafter
be liable to the original buyer upon the contract of
sale for any profit made by such resale, but may re-
cover from the buyer damages for any loss occa-
sioned by the breach of the contract of sale.
Where a resale is made, as authorized in this arti-
cle, the buyer acquires a good title as against the origi-
nal buyer.
It is not essential to the validity of a resale that
notice of an intention to resell the goods be given by
248 SALES Art. 1533
the seller to the original buyer. But where the right to

resell is not based on the perishable nature of the
goods or upon an express provision of the contract
of sale, the giving or failure to give such notice shall
be relevant in any issue involving the question
whether the buyer had been in default for an unrea-
sonable time before the resale was made.
It is not essential to the validity of a resale that
notice of the time and place of such resale should be
given by the seller to the original buyer.
The seller is bound to exercise reasonable care
and judgment in making a resale, and subject to this
requirement may make a resale either by public or
private sale. He cannot, however, directly or indirectly
buy the goods. (n)
Unpaid seller’s right of resale.

(1) When resale allowable. — The third right of an unpaid seller
is the right of resale. (Art. 1526[3].) An unpaid seller can exercise
the right to resell only when he has either a right of lien (Ibid., [1].)
or a right to stop the goods in transitu (Ibid., [2].) and under any
of the three following cases:
(a) where the goods are perishable in nature;
(b) where the right to resell is expressly reserved in case
the buyer should make a default; and
(c) where the buyer delays in the payment of the price for
an unreasonable time. (see Hanlon vs. Haussermann and
Beam, 40 Phil. 796 [1920].)
Article 1533 provides that the seller having the right “may
resell the goods.” The language is permissive in nature rather than
mandatory.
(2) Effect of resale. — In case of resale, the seller is not liable
for any profit made by such resale; but if he sells for less than the
price, he has a right to sue for the balance. (par. 1.) As against the
original buyer, the new buyer acquires a good title to the goods.
(par. 2.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Seller resold tractor for failure of buyer to take delivery and pay
the price.
Facts: S sold to B a tractor, payable at P5,000.00 upon deliv-
ery and the balance of P7,000.00 within 60 days. B failed to take
delivery of the tractor and pay the purchase price. S was forced
to sell the same to a third person for only P10,000.00.
Issue: Is B liable for the difference of P2,000.00?
Held: Yes. In a contract of sale which is executory as to both
parties, the vendor is entitled to resell the goods if the purchaser
fails to take delivery and pay the purchase price. If he is obliged
to sell for less than the contract price, he holds the buyer for the
difference; if he sells for as much as or more than the contract
price, the breach of contract by the original buyer is damnum
absque injuria.
There is no need of an action for rescission to authorize the
vendor, who is still in possession, to dispose of the property
where the buyer fails to pay the price and take delivery. (Katigbak
vs. Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA 243 [1962], citing Hanlon vs.
Hausserman, supra.)
(3) Notice of resale not essential. — The seller’s right to resell

the goods for the buyer’s account may depend to some extent upon
the length of time the buyer has been in default. A notice by the
seller of his intention to resell may operate to fix the time within
which it is reasonable that the buyer should perform his obliga-
tions. It is, therefore, provided in paragraph 3, that except in the
case of perishable goods, which it is obvious may require an ex-
peditious sale, and where the right to resell is reserved, the fail-
ure to give notice shall be relevant upon the question whether the
buyer has been in default for an unreasonable time. What is rea-
sonable time will vary according to the circumstances of the case.
Though the seller is not bound to give notice of his intention
to resell and of the time and place where the resale will be held
(par. 4.), it is however, prudent to give the buyer such notice, as
the giving or failure to give it may be important evidence in re-
gard to the fairness of the sale. (3 Williston, op. cit., p. 172.)
(4) Manner of resale. — Any absolute rule requiring the formal-
ity of an auction sale might bear harshly on the seller in case where
250 SALES Art. 1534
the goods are of small value and the buyer is financially irrespon-
sible. The law “is satisfied with a fair sale made in good faith ac-
cording to the established business methods with no attempt to
take advantage of the vendee.” (Ibid., pp. 168-169.) The seller is
only required to exercise reasonable care and judgment in mak-
ing a resale. He cannot, however, directly or indirectly, buy the
goods. (see Art. 1491[6].)
ART. 1534. An unpaid seller having the right of lien

or having stopped the goods in transitu, may rescind
the transfer of title and resume the ownership in the
goods, where he expressly reserved the right to do
so in case the buyer should make default, or where
the buyer has been in default in the payment of the
price for an unreasonable time. The seller shall not
thereafter be liable to the buyer upon the contract of
sale, but may recover from the buyer damages for any
loss occasioned by the breach of the contract.
The transfer of title shall not be held to have been
rescinded by an unpaid seller until he has manifested
by notice to the buyer or by some other overt act an
intention to rescind. It is not necessary that such overt
act should be communicated to the buyer, but the giv-
ing or failure to give notice to the buyer of the inten-
tion to rescind shall be relevant in any issue involv-
ing the question whether the buyer had been in de-
fault for an unreasonable time before the right of re-
scission was asserted. (n)
Unpaid seller’s right of rescission.

(1) When seller may rescind. — The fourth right of an unpaid
seller is the right to rescind the sale. (Art. 1526[4].) An unpaid seller
has a right to rescind only if he has either a right of lien (Ibid., No.
1.) or a right to stop the goods in transitu (Ibid., No. 2.) and under
either of two situations:
(a) where the right to rescind is expressly reserved in case
the buyer should make a default; or
(b) where the buyer delays in the payment of the price for
an unreasonable time. (see Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs. International
Bank, 37 Phil. 631 [1918].)
(2) Effect of rescission. — In the case of rescission, the seller
resumes ownership in the goods. While the seller shall not be li-
able to the buyer upon the contract of sale, the latter, however,
may be made liable to the seller for damages for any loss occa-
sioned by the breach of contract. (par. 1; see Art. 1533, par. 1.)
(3) Manner of rescission. — An election by the seller to rescind
may be manifested by notice to the buyer or by some other overt
act showing an intention to rescind. Communication of such elec-
tion to the buyer is not necessary. But, as in regard to resale (Art.
1533, par. 3.), the giving or failure to give notice is relevant in
determining the reasonableness of the time given the buyer to
make good his obligations under the contract. (par. 2.)
ART. 1535. Subject to the provision of this Title,

the unpaid seller’s right of lien or stoppage in tran-
situ is not affected by any sale, or other disposition
of the goods which the buyer may have made, unless
the seller has assented thereto.
If, however, a negotiable document of title has been
issued for goods, no seller’s lien or right of stoppage
in transitu shall defeat the right of any purchaser for
value in good faith to whom such document has been
negotiated, whether such negotiation be prior or sub-
sequent to the notification to the carrier, or other bailee
who issued such document, of the seller’s claim to a
lien or right of stoppage in transitu. (n)
Effect of sale of goods subject to lien

or stoppage in transitu.
(1) Where goods not covered by negotiable document of title. — It
is fundamental, as a general rule, that a seller can give no larger
right than he has. When, therefore, goods are subject to a legal
lien, as they are when an unpaid seller is in possession of them, a
purchaser from the original buyer can acquire only such right as
the buyer then had. (3 Williston, op. cit., pp. 188-189.)
252 SALES Art. 1536
(2) Where goods covered by negotiable document of title. — If,

however, the goods are covered by a negotiable document of ti-
tle, the seller’s lien cannot prevail against the rights of a purchaser
for value in good faith to whom the document has been indorsed.
(see Arts. 1506, 1518, 1532 [2nd par.].) The reason for this provi-
sion rests upon the nature of a negotiable document of title which
in legal fiction operates as a delivery of the goods described
therein when indorsed. The rule protects a purchaser without
notice after the seller had stopped the goods either by virtue of
his right of lien or stoppage in transitu.
The term “purchaser,” as used in Article 1534, includes mort-
gagee and pledgee. (Roman vs. Asia Banking Corporation, 46 Phil.
705 [1924].)
ART. 1536. The vendor is not bound to deliver the

thing sold in case the vendee should lose the right to
make use of the term as provided in article 1198.
(1467a)
Right of vendor to withhold delivery

in sale on credit.
In a contract of sale, the obligation to pay the price is correla-
tive to the obligation to deliver the thing sold. Accordingly, the
vendor is not bound to make delivery if the vendee has not paid
him the price. (Art. 1524.) If, however, a period has been fixed for
payment, the vendor must deliver the thing sold though the price
be not first paid. (see Art. 1527[1].) But even if the vendee was
given the benefit of a period, the vendor may not be compelled
to make delivery, in case the vendee should lose the right to make
use of the term as provided in Article 1198 of the Civil Code and
such vendee has not yet paid the price. Said article states:
“The debtor [vendee] shall lose every right to make use of
the period:
(1) When after the obligation has been contracted, he be-
comes insolvent, unless he gives a guaranty or security for the
debt [price];
(2) When he does not furnish to the creditor [vendor] the
guaranties or securities which he has promised;
(3) When by his own acts he has impaired said guaran-ties

or securities after their establishment, and when through a for-
tuitous event they disappear, unless he immediately gives new
ones equally satisfactory;
(4) When the debtor [vendee] violates any undertaking,
in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period;
(5) When the debtor [vendee] attempts to abscond.”
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B a car on credit. S has a right to withhold deliv-
ery in any of the following situations:
(1) B becomes insolvent, unless B gives sufficient guaranty
or security; or
(2) B promised to mortgage his house to secure the pur-
chase price and he failed to furnish said security as promised;
or
(3) If the payment of the purchase price is secured by a
mortgage on the house of B, but the house was partially burned
because of B’s fault; or was totally destroyed without B’s fault,
unless B gives a new security, equally satisfactory; or
(4) Where in consideration of the sale on credit, B obliged
himself, say, to repair the piano of S, and B failed to comply
with such undertaking; or
(5) Where B shows an intent not to pay the price after the
car is delivered to him.
ART. 1537. The vendor is bound to deliver the thing

sold and its accessions and accessories in the con-
dition in which they were upon the perfection of the
contract.
All the fruits shall pertain to the vendee from the
day on which the contract was perfected. (1468a)
Condition of thing to be delivered.

In entering into a contract of sale, the parties take into con-
sideration not only the particular thing which is the subject mat-
ter of the contract, but also its condition at the time such contract
254 SALES Art. 1537
was perfected. The vendor is, therefore, obliged to preserve the

thing pending delivery (see Arts. 1163, 1164.) because the thing
sold and its accessions and the accessories must be in the condi-
tion in which they were upon the perfection of the contract. (Art.
1537, par. 1.)
It is the seller’s duty to deliver the thing sold in a condition
suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer for the purposes contem-
plated. Thus, a subdivision lot seller should not shift to the buyer
the burden of providing access to and from the subdivision. It is
seller’s duty to construct the necessary roads in the subdivision
that could serve as outlets. Proper access to the residence is es-
sential to its enjoyment. (Consing vs. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA
14 [1989].)
While a sale of a determinate thing (e.g., land) includes all its
accessions (e.g., house) and accessories even though they may not
have been mentioned (see Art. 1166.), a sale of the latter is not
sufficient to convey title or right to the former. (see Pornellosa vs.
Land Tenure Administration, 1 SCRA 375 [1961].)
Note: Accessions are the fruits of a thing; or additions to, or
improvements upon, a thing such as the young of animals, house
or trees on a land, etc.
Accessories are anything attached to a principal thing for its
completion, ornament, or better use such as picture frame, key of
a house, etc.
Right of vendee to the fruits.

(1) When vendee entitled. — The vendee has a right to the fruits
of the thing sold from the time the obligation to deliver it arises.
(Art. 1164.) The obligation to deliver arises upon the perfection
of the contract of sale. (see Art. 1475.)
EXAMPLE:
S sold his horse to B for P8,000.00. No date or condition
was stipulated for the delivery of the horse. While still in the
possession of S, the horse gave birth to a colt. Who has a right
to the colt?
(1) B is entitled to the colt which was born after the perfec-
tion of the contract. This holds true even if the delivery is sub-
ject to a suspensive period (e.g., next month) or a suspensive

condition (e.g., upon demand) if B has paid the purchase price.
(2) But S has a right to the colt if it was born before his
obligation to deliver the horse has arisen (Art. 1164.) and B has
not yet paid the purchase price. In this case, upon the fulfillment
of the condition or the arrival of the period, S does not have to
give the colt and B is not obliged to pay legal interests since the
colt and the interests are deemed to have been mutually com-
pensated. (see Art. 1187.)
(2) When vendee not entitled. — In the following cases, the

vendee is not entitled to the fruits:
(a) When the rule provided in Article 1537 (par. 2.) is
modified by agreement of the parties, their agreement shall,
of course, govern;
(b) If the vendee rescinds the contract of sale instead of ex-
acting the fulfillment thereof, he is entitled only to damages
like interest, attorney’s fees and costs but he may not also claim
the fruits of the thing sold (Hodges vs. Granada, 59 Phil. 429
[1934]; see Art. 1385.); and
(c) In a contract of promise to sell, the vendee is not enti-
tled to the fruits. The only right of the contracting parties is to
reciprocally demand the fulfillment of the contract. Prior to the
sale and conveyance of the subject matter of the contract, the
promisee or would-be vendee acquires no right to the fruits
thereof. (De Vera vs. De Vera, [C.A.] O.G. 3318, Sept., 1948.)
ART. 1538. In case of loss, deterioration or im-

provement of the thing before its delivery, the rules in
article 1189 shall be observed, the vendor being con-
sidered the debtor. (n)
Rules in case of loss, deterioration, or improve-

ment of thing before delivery.
Article 1189 of the Civil Code states:
“When the conditions have been imposed with the inten-
tion of suspending the efficacy of an obligation to give, the
following rules shall be observed in case of the improvement,
256 SALES Art. 1538
loss or deterioration of the thing during the pendency of the

condition:
(1) If the thing is lost without the fault of the debtor, the
obligation shall be extinguished;
(2) If the thing is lost through the fault of the debtor, he
shall be obliged to pay damages; it is understood that the thing
is lost when it perishes, or goes out of commerce, or disappears
in such a way that its existence is unknown or it cannot be
recovered;
(3) When the thing deteriorates without the fault of the
debtor, the impairment is to be borne by the creditor;
(4) If it deteriorates through the fault of the debtor, the
creditor may choose between the rescission of the obligation
and its fulfillment, with indemnity for damages in either case;
(5) If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the
improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor;
(6) If it is improved at the expense of the debtor, he shall
have no other right than that granted to the usufructuary.”
A reading of the above article shows that it is in consonance
with Article 1480 (supra.) which provides for the rules governing
injury to, or benefit from, the thing sold after the contract has been
perfected but before its delivery. Both under Articles 1480 (pars. 1
and 2.) and 1538, the loss shall be at the risk of the vendee pend-
ing delivery. As heretofore pointed out, Article 1504 (supra.), which
has been taken from the American law on sales, provides another
rule governing risk of loss which is contrary to Articles 1480 and
1538.
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B his car. If before delivery —
(1) the car is lost or destroyed without the fault of S (as-
suming S is not guilty of delay and there is no contrary stipula-
tion that he shall be liable), the obligation to deliver is extin-
guished and B shall be obliged to pay the price if he has not
paid the same;
(2) if the loss is through S’s fault, he shall be liable to pay
damages to B;
(3) if the car suffers damages without the fault of S, B shall

have to suffer the impairment;
(4) if the damage was due to S’s fault, B may choose, be-
tween the rescission (cancellation) of the contract with dam-
ages or the delivery of the car also with damages;
(5) if the market value of the car increased, the increase
shall inure to the benefit of B inasmuch as he suffers the dete-
rioration in case of a fortuitous event;
(6) if S had the car painted and its seat cover changed at
his expense, he shall have the rights of a usufructuary with re-
spect to the improvements.7
ART. 1539. The obligation to deliver the thing sold

includes that of placing in the control of the vendee
all that is mentioned in the contract, in conformity with
the following rules:
If the sale of real estate should be made with a
statement of its area, at the rate of a certain price for
a unit of measure or number, the vendor shall be
obliged to deliver to the vendee, if the latter should
demand it, all that may have been stated in the con-
tract; but, should this be not possible, the vendee may
choose between a proportional reduction of the price
and the rescission of the contract, provided that, in
the latter case, the lack in the area be not less than
one-tenth of that stated.
The same shall be done, even when the area is the
same, if any part of the immovable is not of the qual-
ity specified in the contract.
The rescission, in this case, shall only take place
at the will of the vendee, when the inferior value of
7
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful
improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does
not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He
may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without dam-
age to the property.
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the
property against any damage to the same.
258 SALES Art. 1539
the thing sold exceeds one-tenth of the price agreed

upon.
Nevertheless, if the vendee would not have bought
the immovable had he known of its smaller area or
inferior quality, he may rescind the sale. (1469a)
Sale of real property by unit

of measure or number.
(1) Entire area stated in contract must be delivered. — If the sale
of real estate should be made with a statement of its area, at the
rate of a certain price per unit of measure or number, the cause of
the contract with respect to the vendee is the number of such units
or, if you wish, the thing purchased as determined by the stipu-
lated number of units. The vendor must deliver the entire prop-
erty agreed upon. (pars. 1 and 2.) Thus, if the parcel of land is
stated in the contract as having an area of 500 square meters and
sold at P1,000.00 per square meter, the vendor must deliver the
entire area as stated. (see Santa Ana, Jr. vs. Hernandez, 18 SCRA
973 [1966].) Furthermore, the immovable must be of the quality
specified in the contract. (par. 3.)
(2) Where entire area could not be delivered. — If all that is in-
cluded within the stipulated boundaries is not delivered, then the
object of the contract, its cause as far as the vendee is concerned,
is not delivered. Hence, he is entitled to rescind it. He may, how-
ever, enforce the contract with the corresponding decrease in price.
(Teran vs. Villanueva Viuda de Riosa, 56 Phil. 677 [1932].)
When vendee entitled to rescind

sale of real property.
Under the above article, the right of rescission is available to
the vendee in the following cases:
(1) If the lack in area is at least 1/10th than that stated or stipu-
lated. (par. 2.) The 1/10th mentioned must be based on the area
stipulated in the contract, and not on the real area which the thing
may actually have (see 10 Manresa 149-154.);
(2) If the deficiency in the quality specified in the contract
exceeds 1/10th of the price agreed upon (par. 3.); and
(3) If the vendee would not have brought the immovable had
he known of its smaller area or inferior quality irrespective of the
extent of the lack in area or quality. (pars. 4 and 5.)
The above remedies are also available under the second para-
graph of Article 1542.
Note that in case of fulfillment, the vendee is entitled only to
a proportionate reduction of the price where there is a deficiency
in area or number. (par. 2; see Azarraga vs. Gray, 52 Phil. 599
[1928].) The rule is different where there is a violation of the war-
ranty against hidden defects. (Art. 1571.) The vendor is also li-
able for damages. (Art. 1567; see Art. 1191, par. 2.)
ART. 1540. If, in the case of the preceding article,

there is a greater area or number in the immovable
than that stated in the contract, the vendee may ac-
cept the area included in the contract and reject the
rest. If he accepts the whole area, he must pay for the
same at the contract rate. (1470a)
Where immovable of a greater area

or number.
If the area or number in the immovable is greater than that
stipulated in the contract, the vendee may accept the area included
in the contract and reject the rest. If he accepts the whole, he makes
himself liable for the price of the same at the contract rate. (see
comments under Article 1522, par. 2.)
The vendee may not withdraw from the contract.
ART. 1541. The provisions of the two preceding

articles shall apply to judicial sales. (n)
Application of Articles 1539 and 1540

to judicial sales.
The provisions of Articles 1539 and 1540 are applicable to both
private (voluntary) and judicial sales when the immovable sold
is lacking in area or is of inferior quality or is greater in area than
stated in the contract. (see Arts. 1552 and 1570.) The reason is that
260 SALES Art. 1542
the rules they contain are derived from the very nature of the
contract of sale.
The rules, however, may be varied or suppressed by agree-
ment between the contracting parties. (10 Manresa 138.)
ART. 1542. In the sale of real estate, made for a

lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a
unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase
or decrease of the price, although there be a greater
or less area or number than that stated in the con-
tract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more
immovables are sold for a single price; but if, besides
mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable
in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number
should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall
be bound to deliver all that is included within said
boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number
specified in the contract; and should he not be able
to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in
proportion to what is lacking in the area or number,
unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee
does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been
stipulated. (1471)
Sale of real estate made

for a lump sum.
(1) Mistake in area stated in contract immaterial. — If the sale is
made for a lump sum, and not so much per unit of measure or
number, the cause of the contract is the thing sold independent
and irrespective of its number or measure. (see 10 Manresa 145.)
In this case, the law presumes that the purchaser had in mind a
determinate price for the real estate and that he ascertained its
area and quality before the contract was perfected. (Teran vs.
Villanueva, 56 Phil. 677 [1932].)
In other words, it is presumed that the purchaser intended to
buy a determinate object in its entirety and not just any unit of
measure or number, and the price is determined with relation to
it; hence, its greater or lesser area cannot influence the increase or
decrease of the price agreed upon, whether the object be single
realty or whether they are two or more immovables. The bounda-
ries of the land stated in the contract determine the effects and
scope of the sale, not the area thereof. (Semira vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 49 SCAD 93, 230 SCRA 577 [1994]; 10 Manresa 156-157.)
Hence, the vendor is obligated to deliver all the land included
within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should
be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed (Balantakbo vs.
Court of Appeals, 65 SCAD 74, 249 SCRA 323 [1995].) inasmuch
as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate ob-
ject. (Roble vs. Arbasa, 152 SCAD 115, 362 SCRA 69 [2001], citing
Tolentino Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1992 ed., p. 94.)
The possibility of error is a hazard which the parties must be
presumed to have assumed. This hazard is not one-sided but
works both ways. (Gonzales-Mondragon vs. Santos, 87 Phil. 471
[1950].) The rule in Article 1542, however, admits of exceptions.
(infra.)
(2) Where area or number stated together with boundaries. — If
the vendor cannot deliver to the vendee all that is included within
the boundaries mentioned in the contract, the latter has the op-
tion to reduce the price in proportion to the deficiency or to set
aside the contract. (Art. 1542, par. 2.) The phrase “should he not
be able to do so” refers to a situation when the vendor, either be-
cause a part or parcel of the real estate does not belong to him,
cannot deliver all that is included within the boundaries. (see 10
Manresa 145-154.)
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B a parcel of land for the lump sum (or a cuerpo
cierto) of P300,000.00. The contract states that the area is 500
square meters. Subsequently, it was ascertained that the area
included within the boundaries is really 600 square meters.
In this case, S is bound to deliver all the 600 square meters
which are included within said boundaries without increase in
price. If S does not deliver also the extra 100 square meters, B
has the right to rescind the contract or pay a proportionately
reduced price, namely: 5/6 of the original price or P250,000.00.
262 SALES Art. 1542
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. The area of land sold for a lump sum is less than that stated
in the contract.
Facts: S sold to B lot No. 20, Calle San Jose, Ermita, Manila
for the sum of P3,200.00. The document recites that the tract
contains 152.46 square meters. On the date assigned for the
execution of the final deed of sale, B refused to pay the agreed
price claiming that the land was actually less in area than that
stated in the contract.
B claimed a proportional reduction of the price or else he
would not buy. So S brought action for specific performance.
Issue: Is B relieved from the obligation of paying the price?
Held: No. The fact that the specified parcel of land bought
by B at the price of P3,200.00 is not as large as he thought, does
not relieve him from the obligation of paying its price. If he
intended to buy by the meter, he should have so stated in the
contract. (Goyena vs. Tambunting, 1 Phil. 490.) In the matter of
sales of land made for a lump sum and not so much a unit of
measure or number, the boundaries of said land stated in the
contract, not the area thereof, are the determining factor of the
effects, scope, or meaning of said contract. The real and true
area of the land must prevail over that given in the document.
(Pacia vs. Lagman, 68 Phil. 351 [1939]; see Gov’t. vs. Abaya, 52
Phil. 261 [1928]; Gov’t. vs. Abad, 47 Phil. 573.)
———— ———— ————
2. In a sale of land for a lump sum, the deficiency in the stated
area to which the parties paid particular attention when they entered
into that contract was almost 1/3.
Facts: S sold to B the hacienda Maria which, according to S,
contained an area of 25 hectares more or less, the standing crop
thereon capable of yielding not less than 2,000 piculs of sugar.
During the negotiations, B always doubted the correctness of
the area and the amount of crop given by S who always as-
sured B that they were correct.
In short, the parties made the sale with particular attention
to the area.
It turned out that the land contained only 18 hectares and
the crop yielded only 800 piculs of sugar.
Issue: Has B the right to ask for rescission of the sale or the
proportionate reduction of the price?
Held: Yes. While it is true that in a sale of land for a lump

sum, the vendee may not ask for the rescission of the sale or
the proportional reduction in the price if the area delivered be
less than that stated in the contract, the rule does not apply if
the deficiency is so material as to go to the essence of the con-
tract for, under such circumstances, gross mistake may be in-
ferred which is the duty of a court of equity to correct. In the
case at bar, the parties paid particular attention to the area of
the land when they made the contract. The use of “more or
less” or similar words in designating quantity covers only a
reasonable excess or deficiency. The vendee does not thereby
ipso facto take all risks of quantity in the land. (Asian vs. Jalandoni,
45 Phil. 296 [1923].)
———— ———— ————
3. In a sale for a lump sum of a fishpond of which buyer had
been in possession as a lessee for two years, the deficiency is about 1/
4 of the stated area.
Facts: S sold to B a fishpond for the lump sum of P14,000.00.
The deed of sale recited that the area of the fishpond was “11
hectares, 38 ares, and 77 centares, more or less.” It was subse-
quently discovered that its area was only 8 hectares or about
1/4 less than that stated in the contract. B had been leasing the
fishpond for about two years.
S brought action to recover the purchase price.
Issue: Is B relieved from paying the price?
Held: Although the shortage amounts to practically 1/4 of
the total area, B clearly intended to take the risk of quantity
and that the area has been mentioned in the contract merely for
the purpose of description, considering that B had been in pos-
session of the fishpond as a lessee for two years and, therefore,
can rightly be presumed to have acquired a good estimate of
its value and area. (Garcia vs. Velasco, 72 Phil. 248 [1941].)
Note: In other words, the parties in this case did not take
into consideration the area of the fishpond in question when
they made the contract.
(3) Where there is conflict between area stipulated and title to prop-
erty. — In case of conflict between the area included within the
stipulated boundaries and that which the title shows, the former
shall prevail when the boundaries are certain and no alteration
264 SALES Art. 1542
thereof has been proven. (Government vs. Abaya, 52 Phil. 261

[1928].) That which really defines a piece of ground is not the area,
calculated with more or less certainty mentioned in its descrip-
tion, but the boundaries therein laid down as enclosing the land
and indicating its limits. It is not of vital consequence that a con-
tract on sale of land should disclose the area with mathematical
accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively indicated with
sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error as to the
superficial area is immaterial. (Erico vs. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA
575 [1980]; Dichoso vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 169 [1990].)
(4) Where identity of erroneously designated property clearly es-
tablished. — Where the identity of the disputed property has been
clearly established by both parties’ pleadings, the mistake in des-
ignating the property in the deed of sale “does not vitiate con-
sent of the parties or affect the validity and binding effect of the
contract. The reason is that when one sells or buys real property
— a piece of land, for example — one sells or buys the property
as he sees it in its actual setting and by its physical metes and
bounds, and not by the mere lot number assigned to it in the cer-
tificate of title.” (Dihiansen vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 712
[1987]; Atilano vs. Atilano, 28 SCRA 231 [1969].) The remedy for
such a situation is to have the document reformed. (Art. 1359, et
seq.)
(5) Where words “about,’’ “more or less,” etc. are used. — The
words when used in connection with quantity or distance, are
words of safety and caution, intended to cover some slight or
unimportant inaccuracy, and, while enabling an adjustment to the
imperative demands of fixed monuments, they do not weaken or
destroy the statements of distance and quantity when no other
guides are furnished. The rule in measuring distances is that
words of qualification (e.g., “50 feet, more or less’’) should be dis-
regarded and the exact distance adopted. The words “about,’’
“approximately,” and “more or less’’ in connection with courses
and distances may be disregarded if not controlled or explained
by monuments, boundaries and other expressions of intention.
In a case, the petitioner insists that there should have been an al-
lowance of around 300 meters since the technical description of
the land in question states that the boundary line should be for
around 16,000 meters more or less; held: The disputed gap of 300
meters is not an insignificant distance. Thus, the petitioner can-

not capitalize on the phrase “around 16,000 meters more or less’’
for the words “more or less’’ only cover an incidental and insub-
stantial inaccuracy. (Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corp. vs.
Macaraig, Jr., 299 SCRA 491 [1998].)
In another case, an area of “644 square meters more’’ was held
not a reasonable excess or deficiency, to be deemed included in
the deed of sale relating to a piece of land with an “approximate
area of 240 square meters more or less.’’ A vendee of land when
sold in gross or with the description “more or less’’ with refer-
ence to its area, does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity
in the land for such description or similar words in designating
quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. (Roble vs.
Arbasa, 152 SCAD 115, 362 SCRA 69 [2001].)
Conflict between area stated and boundaries.

(1) Where boundaries given are sufficiently certain. — The propo-
sition of law is to the effect that “where it appears that the land is
so described by boundaries as to put its identification beyond
doubt,” an erroneous statement relative to the area of the ques-
tioned parcel may be disregarded because what really defines a
piece of ground is not the area mentioned in its description but
the boundaries therein laid down as enclosing the land and indi-
cating its limits. (Vda. De Tan vs. Intermediate Apppellate Court,
213 SCRA 95 [1992]; Loyola vs. Bartolome, 39 Phil. 546 [1919].) This
proposition, however, holds true only where the boundaries given
are sufficiently certain, and the identity of the land proved by the
boundaries clearly indicates that an erroneous statement concern-
ing the area can be disregarded or ignored. (Paterno vs. Salud, 9
SCRA 81 [1963].)
(2) Where boundaries do not identify land or overlapping of bounda-
ries exists. — The above rule is not applicable where the bounda-
ries relied upon do not identify the land beyond doubt. (Buiser
vs. Cabrera, 81 Phil. 669 [1948].) In such case, the area stated in
the document should be followed. (Paterno vs. Salud, supra.)
In a case, the deed of sale did not even indicate with particu-
larity the area of the land covered thereby. The parties merely
pointed at boundaries which were even beyond what could have
266 SALES Art. 1543
been bought by the vendee. An area delimited by boundaries

properly identifies a parcel of land. However, in controversial
cases, where there appeared to be an overlapping of boundaries,
the actual size of the property gains importance. It is well-settled
that anyone who claims that he has a better right to a property
must prove both ownership and identity of the said property.
(Oclarit vs. Court of Appeals, 52 SCAD 337, 238 SCRA 239 [1994].)
(3) Where discrepancy in measurement is so great. — In a case
where petitioner claimed in his application to be entitled for reg-
istration of a parcel of land whose area after the survey turned
out to be 626 hectares while the grant given to him only mentions
92 hectares, the court rejected the claim ruling that “when the land
sought to be registered is almost seven times as much as that de-
scribed in the deed, the evidence as to natural boundaries must be
very clear and convincing before that rule (that natural boundaries
will prevail over area) can be applied.” (Pamintuan vs. Insular
Gov‘t., 8 Phil. 512 [1907]; see also Paras vs. Insular Gov‘t., 11 Phil.
378 [1908]; Carillo vs. Insular Gov‘t., 11 Phil. 379 [1908]; Waldorf
vs. Castañeda, 25 Phil. 50 [1913]; Sales vs. Director of Lands, 61
Phil. 759 [1935].)
In another case, the court properly rejected the contention of
the plaintiff that the property sought to be recovered was origi-
nally a portion of a bigger portion of land belonging to him, it
appearing that “it is only on the north and south sides of the prop-
erty in question where the natural boundaries are identical be-
cause on the east and west sides there are no natural boundaries.
. . The discrepancy in the measurement . . . is so great that there
could hardly be any room to suppose that a 30-hectare land area
might have been wrongly or inaccurately estimated to be only
1,200 square meters.” (Paterno vs. Salud, supra.)
ART. 1543. The actions arising from articles 1539

and 1542 shall prescribe in six months, counted from
the day of delivery. (1472a)
Prescription of actions.
The actions based on Articles 1539 and 1542 for either res-
cission of the contract or proportionate reduction of the price
must be brought within six months counted from the day of de-
livery.
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold

to different vendees, the ownership shall be trans-
ferred to the person who may have first taken pos-
session thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person, who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith. (1473)
Rules as to preference of ownership

in case of a double sale.
If the same property is sold by the same vendor to different
vendees, the conflicting rights of said vendees shall be resolved
in accordance with the following rules:
(1) If the property sold is movable, the ownership shall be
acquired by the vendee who first takes possession in good faith
(see Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 861 [1968].);
(2) If the property sold is immovable, the ownership shall
belong, in the order hereunder stated, to:
(a) The vendee who first registers the sale in good faith in
the Registry of Property (Registry of Deeds) has a preferred
right over another vendee who has not registered his title even
if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.
More credit is given to registration than to actual possession.
(see Paylago vs. Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247 [1968]; Beatriz vs.
Cedeña, 4 SCRA 617 [1962]; Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals,
69 SCRA 99 [1976]; Barretto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771 [1956];
Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 213 [1989]; Tañedo vs.
268 SALES Art. 1544
Court of Appeals, 67 SCAD 57, 252 SCRA 80 [1996]; Balatbat

When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such
record is constructive notice to the whole world of its contents
and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Because
of this principle of constructive notice, one who deals with
registered property which is the subject of an annotated levy
or attachment cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good
faith. (Biñan Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 391 SCRA
90 [2002].) However, the mere registration is not enough; good
faith must concur with the registration. To be entitled to pri-
ority, the second purchaser must have also acted in good faith,
without knowledge of the previous alienation by the vendor
to another. (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, 48 SCAD 629, 230
SCRA 446 [1994].) The defense of indefeasibility of torrens ti-
tle does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of
title in bad faith with notice of its flaw. (Occeña vs. Esponilla,
431 SCRA 116 [2004].)
The requirement of the law then is two-fold: acquisition
in good faith and registration in good faith. (Gabriel vs.
Mabanta, 399 SCRA 73 [2003]; San Lorenzo Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 449 SCRA 99 [2005].) The
rule applies to the annotation of an adverse claim in double
sales. (Bucad vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 423 [1992].)
The governing principle is prius tempore, patior jure (first
in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the
second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s right except when
the second first registers in good faith the second sale.
(Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33 [1988].) Conversely,
knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats
his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge
taints his registration with bad faith. (Astorga vs. Court of
Appeals, 133 SCRA 748 [1984]; Santiago vs. Court of Appeals,
63 SCAD 636, 247 SCRA 336 [1995].)
(b) In the absence of registration, the vendee who first
takes possession in good faith; and
(c) In the absence of both registration and possession, the
vendee who presents the oldest title (who first bought the
property) in good faith.
Article 1544 has no application to lands not registered with
the Torrens system. If the sale is not registered, it is binding only
as between the seller and the buyer; it does not affect innocent
third persons.
Possession of property sold.

The taking of possession of the property sold may be in any
of the ways provided in Articles 1497 to 1501.
The phrase “who first took possession” is equivalent to tradi-
tion, real or symbolic, such as that which is acquired by the ex-
ecution of a public instrument. Thus, after the sale of realty by
means of a public instrument, the vendor, who resells it to another
does not transmit anything to the second vendee, and if the lat-
ter, by virtue of this second sale, takes material possession of the
thing, he does it as mere detainer, and it would be unjust to pro-
tect this detention as against the rights to the thing lawfully ac-
quired by the first vendee. (Quimson vs. Rosete, 89 Phil. 159 [1950];
Navera vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 584 [1990].)
Registration of immovable sold.

(1) Sale merely presented for registration. — The mere presenta-
tion to the office of the register of deeds of a document on which
acknowledgment of receipts is written is not equivalent to regis-
tration. Registration in its juridical aspect must be understood as
the entry made in a book or public registry of deeds. (Po Sun Tun
vs. Price Prov. Gov’t. of Leyte, 54 Phil. 192 [1912].)
(2) Sale registered in bad faith. — Article 1544 does not declare
void a deed of sale registered in bad faith. It does not mean, how-
ever, that said contract is not void. Article 1544 specifically pro-
vides who shall be the owner in case of a double sale of an im-
movable property. To give full effect to this provision, the status
of the two contracts must be determined and clarified. One con-
tract must be declared valid so that one vendee may exercise all
the rights of an owner, while the other contract must be declared
void to cut off all rights which may arise from said contract.
(Caram, Jr. vs. Laureta, 102 SCRA 7 [1981].)
270 SALES Art. 1544
Accordingly, where the second purchaser had knowledge of

the other sale, prior to or at the time of the sale to him, his knowl-
edge taints his purchase with bad faith. The applicable rule in this
case would be that the ownership shall pertain to the person who,
in good faith, first entered into possession of the property or in
the absence of possession, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith. (Gatmaitan vs. Court of Appeals,
200 SCRA 37 [1992]; Berico vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCAD 84, 225
SCRA 469 [1993].)
(3) Issuance of transfer certificate of title noted/not noted on origi-
nal certificate of title. — In a case, it appears that the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title to the first buyers was never noted on
the original certificate of title which was not cancelled at all,
whereas the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to the second
buyers was noted in the original certificate of title which was can-
celled by virtue of said issuance. It was held that the second buy-
ers acquired ownership over the disputed lot since they were the
first to register in good faith their sale in the registry of property.
(Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 748 [1984].)
(4) Immovable registered/not registered. — Article 1544 (2nd and
3rd pars.) covers all kinds of immovables, including land, and
makes no distinction as to whether the immovable is registered
or not. But insofar as registered land is concerned, the rule is in
perfect accord with Section 508 of the Land Registration Law (Act
No. 496.) which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other
voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to convey or af-
fect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the
land until its registration. (Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480
[1960].) One who buys from a person who is not the registered
owner of property is not a purchaser in good faith. (Liu vs. Lay,
Jr., 405 SCRA 316 [2003].)
The peculiar force of a title under Act No. 496 is exhibited only
when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land
described in the conveyance. (Medina vs. Imaz and Warner Barnes
Co., 27 Phil. 314 [1914].) With respect to banks, the rule that per-
sons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certifi-
8
Now Section 51 of the Property Registration Decree. (Pres. Decree No. 1529.)
cate of title does not apply to banks because their business is one
affected with public interest keeping in trust money belonging to
their depositors. They are expected to exercise greater case and
prudence before entering into a contract involving registered
lands. (Navarro vs. Second Laguna Development Bank, 398 SCRA
227 [2003].)
Note: The defense of indefeasibility of torrens title refers to sale
of lands, and not to sale of properties situated therein. Thus, the
mere fact that the lot where a factory and disputed properties
stand is in a person’s name does not automatically make such
person the owner of everything found therein. (Tsai vs. Court of
(5) Property attached while still registered in the name of judgment
debtor. — A sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a pri-
vate transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes
legally effective against third persons only from the date of its
registration. Consequently, where the property was actually at-
tached and levied upon at a time when said properties stood in
the official records of the Registry of Deeds as still owned by and
registered in the name of the judgment debtor, the attachment,
levy and subsequent execution sale made in favor of the judgment
creditor transferred to him all the rights of the judgment debtor
in the said property, unaffected by any prior transfer or
unencumbrance not so recorded therein.
While purchasers at execution sales should bear in mind that
the rule of caveat emptor applies to such sales (see Art. 1566.), that
the sheriff does not warrant the title to real property sold by him
as sheriff, and that it is not incumbent upon him to place the pur-
chaser in possession of such property, still the rule applies that a
person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind
the register to determine the condition of the property and he is
merely charged with notice of the burdens on the property which
are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title.
(Campillo vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 513 [1984].) Accord-
ingly, in case of a conflict between a vendee and an attaching credi-
tor who registers the order of attachment and the sale of the prop-
erty to him as the highest bidder, the latter acquire a valid title to
the property as against the former who had previously bought
272 SALES Art. 1544
the same property from the registered owner but who failed to
register his deed of sale, but where the attaching creditor has
knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at a
time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that
prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him.
(Ruiz, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 152 SCAD 86, 362 SCRA 40 [2001].)
(6) Unregistered property sold at execution sale was previously sold
by judgment debtor. — A sale of unregistered land which sale has
not been registered in the office of the register of deeds is valid
and binding as between the parties themselves. (Galasicao vs.
Austria, 97 Phil. 83 [1955].) The rule in Article 1544 applies to lands
covered by Torrens title, where the prior sale is neither recorded
nor known to the execution purchaser prior to the levy.
But where the land is not registered under the Torrens Sys-
tem, the rule is different. While under Article 1544, registration
in good faith prevails over possession in the event of a double sale
by the vendor of the same piece of land to different vendees, said
article is of no application even if the latter vendee, at a sheriff’s
execution sale which was registered, was ignorant of the prior sale
made by his judgment debtor in favor of another vendee. The
reason is that the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s
execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor,
and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the property sold as of
the time the property was levied upon. This is specifically pro-
vided by Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. (Carumba
vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558 [1970]; see Hernandez vs.
Katigbak, 69 Phil. 744 [1940]; Executive Commission vs. Abadilla,
74 Phil. 68 [1943].)
(7) Notice of adverse claim was registered previous to sale to pos-
sessor. — Since the owner’s copy of the certificate of title was not
delivered in due time to the first buyer despite the promise by
the seller (attorney-in-fact) to deliver the same in a few days, the
buyer registered with the Register of Deeds on September 6, 1982
his notice of adverse claim as vendee over the property sold. The
second sale was registered only on November 11, 1982 whereby
a new title was issued in favor of the second buyer. The first buyer
has a superior right to the property in question. Article 1544 is
clear that a prior right is accorded to the vendee who first recorded
his right in good faith over an immovable property. (Valdez vs.

(8) Sale was registered before the execution sale but after its levy.
— The doctrine is that a levy on execution duly registered takes
preference over a prior unregistered sale, and that even if the prior
unregistered sale is subsequently registered before the sale on
execution but after the levy was duly made, the validity of the
execution sale should be maintained because it retroacted to the
date of the levy. This rule applies by analogy as regards encum-
brances made after the registration of the levy on execution. The
reason therefor is that if the rule were otherwise, the preference
enjoyed by the levy on execution in a case would be meaningless
and illusory.
In short, the priority enjoyed by the levy on execution extends
with full force and affect to the buyer at the auction sale conducted
by virtue of such levy. (First Integrated Bonding & Insurance Co.
vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCAD 731, 261 SCRA 203 [1996]; Biñan
Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 391 SCRA 90 [2002]; Du
vs. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., 432 SCRA 43 [2004].)
Requirement of good faith.

The fundamental premise of the preferential rights established
by Article 1544 is good faith (Bernas vs. Bolo, 81 Phil. 16 [1948];
see Manacop vs. Cansino, 1 SCRA 572 [1961]; Paylago vs. Jarabe,
22 SCRA 247 [1968].), that is to say, ignorance of the rights of the
first vendee. (Gallardo vs. Gallardo, [CA] 46 O.G. 5568.) He is
deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
(Art. 526.)
(1) Mere registration of sale not enough. — Good faith is an es-
sential requisite of registration to acquire new title because “public
records cannot be converted into instruments of fraud and oppres-
sion by one who secures an inscription thereon in bad faith.”
(Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644 [1918];
Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581 [1922]; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan,
43 Phil. 554 [1922].) Bad faith renders the registration nothing but
an exercise in futility. (Cardente vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
155 SCRA 685 [1987].)
274 SALES Art. 1544
It does not vest title to an immovable property, it is merely

evidence of such title. (Berico vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCAD 84,
225 SCRA 469 [1993].) The law will not protect anything done in
bad faith. (Palanca vs. Director of Lands, 43 Phil. 149 [1922].)
It is presumed, however, that the registration of sale was made
in good faith.
(2) Purchase must be for valuable consideration. — And it is not
only required that the purchaser of real property who has regis-
tered the same should have done so in good faith, but also for a
valuable consideration. (Arcenas vs. Del Rosario, 67 Phil. 238
[1939].) Thus, a “purchaser in good faith” is defined as one who
buys property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the prop-
erty. (Cui vs. Henson, 57 Phil. 696 [1932]; David vs. Malay, 115
SCAD 820, 318 SCRA 711 [1999]; Tanongon vs. Samson, 167 SCAD
455, 382 SCRA 130 [2002]; Castro vs. Miat, 397 SCRA 271 [2003].)
One cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable
person on guard and still claim to have acted in good faith. Thus,
a person engaged in business would be wary of buying from a
company that is closing shop because it may be dissipating its
assets to defraud its creditors. (Tanongon vs. Samson, supra.)
(3) Continuation of good faith. — The mere fact that the second
contract of sale was perfected in good faith is not sufficient if,
before title passes, the second vendee acquires knowledge of the
first transaction. The good faith or innocence of the posterior
vendee needs to continue until his contract ripens into ownership
by tradition or registration. (Gallardo vs. Gallardo, supra; Palanca
vs. Director of Lands, 46 Phil. 149, supra.) The second buyer must
show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e., ignorance of the
first sale and the first buyer’s right) — from the time of acquisi-
tion until the title is transferred to him or registration or, failing
registration, by delivery of possession. (Cruz vs. Cabana, 129
SCRA 656 [1984]; Uraca vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCAD 734, 278
SCRA 702 [1997]; Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, 118 SCAD 327,
322 SCRA 365 [2000]; Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 369 SCRA 255
[2001]; Consolidated Rural Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 448
SCRA 347 [2005].) In other words, where title to the property is
recorded in the Register of Deeds, the requirement of the law, as

mentioned before, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and re-
cording in good faith. (Martin vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 38
[2001].)
(4) Burden of proof. — Good faith is always presumed. It is
upon those who allege the bad faith on the part of the possessor
rests the burden of proof. But the burden of proving the status of
one as a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who
asserts that status where the seller had none to transmit to the
purchaser and the other claimant is himself a purchaser in good
faith from the successor-in-interest of the original title holder. In
discharging that burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary
or legal presumption of good faith, i.e., that every one is presumed
to act in good faith. The good faith that is essential here is an in-
tegral part with the very status which must be proved. (Baltazar
vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 354 [1988]; see Mathay vs. Court
of Appeals, 98 SCAD 489, 295 SCRA 556 [1998]; Aguirre vs. Court
of Appeals, 421 SCRA 310 [2004].) Insinuations and inferences will
not overcome the presumption that a sale was concluded in all
good faith, for value, and without secret reservations. (see Naguit
vs. Deang, [C.A.] No. 6319-R, August 13, 1952.)
In a case, the first buyer failed to prove that the second buyer
knew of the prior sale to the former. Since the second buyer was
considered to have registered his deed of sale in good faith, it was
held that the ownership of the disputed property should belong
to them. (Bucad vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 423 [1992].)
(5) Good faith/bad faith, a question of intention. — “Good faith
or the want of it is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or
touched but rather a state or condition of mind which can only
be judged by actual or fancied tokens or signs.” (Leung Yee vs.
F.L. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644 [1918]; Manacop, Jr. vs.
Cansino, 1 SCRA 572 [1961].) It consists in an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another.
It is the opposite of fraud and bad faith and its non-existence may
be established by competent proof. (Cui vs. Henson, 57 Phil. 696
[1932]; Fule vs. De Legare, 7 SCRA 351 [1963]; Lizardo vs. Herrera,
98 Phil. 603 [1956].) Bad faith does not simply connote bad judg-
ment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose, some moral
276 SALES Art. 1544
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It partakes of the na-

ture of fraud. (Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 92 SCAD 418, 287
SCRA 382 [1998].)
In ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated on a
given occasion, the courts are necessarily controlled by the evi-
dence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone, the
inward motive may, with safety, be determined. (Dayao vs. Diaz,
91 Phil. 919 [1952].) The purchaser is obligated to make a reason-
able investigation as to the identity of the thing sold and the sell-
er’s title thereto. He cannot close his eyes to facts which should
put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted
in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor. (see J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
93 SCRA 146 [1979]; Vital vs. Anore, 90 Phil. 855 [1952]; Cruz vs.
Pahati, 98 Phil. 788 [1956]; Conspecto vs. Fruto, 51 Phil. 144 [1927];
Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co., supra; Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480 [1987]; Cardente vs. Intermediate Ap-
pellate Court, 155 SCRA 685 [1987].)
(6) Property purchased already peaceably possessed by another. —
A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a rea-
sonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good
faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor. Thus, the vendee who purchased property which was
already peaceably possessed by another, without inquiring into
the status of the property or the vendor’s title thereto, takes the
risks and losses consequential to such failure. He is required to
go beyond the certificate of title and make inquiries concerning
the rights of the actual possessor. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA
349 [1978]; Lucena vs. Court of Appeals, 111 SCAD 227, 313 SCRA
47 [1999]; see also Caram, Jr. vs. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7 [1981]; Heirs
of T. de Leon Vda. de Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 422 SCRA 101
[2004].) The absence of such inquiry will remove him from the
realm of bona fide acquisition. (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, 48
SCAD 629, 230 SCRA 446 [1994]; Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr. vs.
Sps. Uy, 137 SCAD 111, 344 SCRA 238 [2000].)
A cautious and prudent purchaser would usually make an
ocular inspection of the premises, this being standard practice in
the real estate industry. Should such prospective buyer find out
that the land he intends to buy is being occupied by anybody other

than the seller, who is not in actual possession, it would then be
incumbent upon him to verify the extent of the occupant’s
possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such
precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and
would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights
of a purchaser in good faith. (Dela Merced vs. GSIS, 365 SCRA 11
[2001]; Heirs of Amado Celestial vs. Heirs of Editha Celestial, 408
SCRA 293 [2003]; Occeña vs. Esponilla, 431 SCRA 116 [2004].)
(7) Purchaser with notice of right of repurchase which has already
elapsed. — Similarly, one who buys property with notice that it is
subject to right of repurchase from his vendor (the vendee a retro
in a previous sale of the property), although such right has already
elapsed and there is no annotation of any repurchase by the ven-
dor a retro but the title has not yet been cleared of the encumbrance,
without looking into the right of redemption inscribed on the ti-
tle, cannot be said to be a purchaser in good faith for he has no-
tice that some other person could have a right or interest in the
property. (Conde vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 245 [1982].)
Actual notice is equivalent to, and indeed more binding than,
presumed notice by registration. (Guzman, Bocaling & Co. vs.
Bonnevie, 206 SCRA 668 [1992].)
(8) Adverse claim previously annotated on title of property sold. —
A subsequent sale of land cannot prevail over an annotated ad-
verse claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of
title of the property. A prior judicial determination of the validity
of the adverse claim before it can flaw the title of subsequent trans-
ferees is not required. A contrary rule contradicts the very essence
of adverse claims. The annotation of an adverse claim is a meas-
ure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real
property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties deal-
ing with said property that someone is claiming an interest in the
same or has a better right than the registered owner thereof.
(Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 585 [1984].)
It has been held, however, that a buyer cannot be considered
as being aware of a flaw which invalidates his acquisition where
the alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens, was already being or-
dered cancelled at the time of the purchase. (Po Lam vs. Court of
Appeals, 347 SCRA 86 [2000].)
278 SALES Art. 1544
(9) Purchaser examined only the latest certificate of title. — In

order that a purchaser may be considered as a purchaser in good
faith, it is enough that he examines the latest certificate of title.
He is not bound by the original certificate of title but only by the
certificate of title of the person from whom he purchased the prop-
erty. (Cangas and Basco vs. Tan Chuan Leung, 110 Phil. 168 [1960].)
Good faith is presumed. (Art. 527.) Under the established princi-
ples of land registration law, the presumption is that the trans-
feree of registered land is not aware of any defect in the title of
the property he purchased. (Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA
271 [1989].) He may rely on the Torrens title of the seller. In the
absence of anything to excite suspicion, the buyer is not obligated
to look beyond the certificate to investigate the title of the seller
appearing on the face of the certificate. (Republic vs. Intermedi-
ate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90 [1992]; Heirs of Spouses B.
Gavino and J. Euste vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCAD 358, 291 SCRA
495 [1998]; AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 122 SCAD 389, 327 SCRA 203 [2000].) Where the seller
is not the registered owner himself, the law requires a higher de-
gree of prudence, even if the land object of the transaction is reg-
istered. (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, supra.) The principle un-
der the torrens system does not apply where the vendee has ac-
tual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make an inquiry with respect to the
title in his vendor. (Domingo vs. Rocos, 401 SCRA 197 [2003].)
EXAMPLES:
(1) S sold to B a cash register. The register, however, was
allowed to remain in the hands of S. Subsequently, S sold the
same register to C who bought it in good faith and took posses-
sion thereof. Under the first paragraph of Article 1544, C should
be considered as the owner of the property sold. (see Olsen vs.
Yearsly, 11 Phil. 178 [1908].)
(2) S sold a parcel of land to B. Later, S sold the same land to C
who, in good faith, first registered the deed of sale. In case of
double registration, the title should remain in the name of the
person first securing registration in good faith. (see Legarda
and Prieto vs. Laleeby, 31 Phil. 500 [1915]; Reyes & Nadres vs.
Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791 [1927]; Granados vs. Monton, 86
Phil. 429 [1950].)
The ownership belongs to C even if B is in actual posses-

sion of the land. (see Paylago vs. Jarabe [1968].) The remedy of
B is to sue S for breach of warranty against eviction. (Art. 1548.)
If C had knowledge of the previous unregistered sale to B,
such knowledge is equivalent to registration. C is not a buyer
in good faith. (Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery, 37 Phil.
644 [1918]; Winkleman vs. Veluz, 43 Phil. 604 [1922]; Bernas vs.
Bolo, 81 Phil. 16 [1948]; Cruz vs. Cabana, 129 SCRA 656 [1984].)
To be considered a purchaser in bad faith, it is not required that
C had actual knowledge of the sale to B. It is sufficient that he
has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry
and investigation as to possible defects of title of S and he fails
to make such inquiry and investigation. (Paylago vs. Jarabe,
supra.)
If neither sale was registered and C first took possession of
the land, in good faith, the ownership shall also belong to him.
In the absence of registration and possession by B and C,
the ownership shall pertain to B, his title being older than that
of C.
(3) Suppose in the same example, S sold the parcel of land
to B and then to C, who both acted in good faith. After acquir-
ing knowledge of the second sale to C, B registered the sale. In
this case, B, as the first vendee, has still a better right. His good
faith when he purchased the land subsisted and continued to
exist when he registered the sale. (Carbonell vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 49 SCRA 99 [1976], infra.)
Assume now that it is C who registered the sale to him, but
after he has acquired knowledge of the previous sale to B. As
second vendee, good faith at the time of purchase is not suffi-
cient. He must have also acted in good faith in recording his
sale. Here, the rule of caveat emptor applies. (see Art. 1566.)
Hence, the registration by C is considered registration in bad
faith and will not confer upon him any right. (Salvoro vs.
Tañega, 87 SCRA 349 [1978].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Sale of land to vendee a retro who never took material pos-
session was executed in a public instrument which was not recorded,
while sale to second buyer who took material possession was made by
means of a private document after lapse of period for repurchase.
280 SALES Art. 1544
Facts: S sold a parcel of land to B under pacto de retro. The

sale was executed in a public instrument but was not recorded
in the registry of deeds. B never took material possession of the
land. The period for repurchase elapsed without S making use
of it. Later on, S sold the same land by means of a private docu-
ment to C, who immediately took material possession thereof.
B brought action for recovery of the land.
Issue: Who has a better right to the land, B or C?
Held: B. He was the first to take possession of the land, and
consequently, the sale executed in his favor is preferable. The
possession mentioned in Article 1544 includes not only mate-
rial but also the symbolic possession, which is acquired by the
execution of a public instrument. (Sanchez vs. Ramos, 40 Phil.
614 [1919].)
Note: In case of double sale, symbolical tradition is equiva-
lent to physical possession. (see Bautista vs. Sioson, 39 Phil.
615; Olsen vs. Yearsly, 11 Phil. 187 [1908]; Williams vs.
McMicking, 16 Phil. 412 [1910].) An unrecorded public instru-
ment transfers symbolic possession to the vendee. (Quimzon
vs. Rosete, 87 Phil. 159 [1950].) However, the execution of a
public instrument does not have the effect of symbolic delivery
where it contains a stipulation that the vendor is to continue in
possession. (Aviles and Villafuerte vs. Arcega and de Leon, 44 Phil.
924 [1923], infra.)
———— ———— ————
2. Second purchaser who first registered sale to him executed a
quitclaim and subsequently “cancelled” it.
Facts: S sold a parcel of land to two persons, first to B, and
then to C, who registered the sale to him ahead of B. Later, C
executed a quitclaim deed relinquishing his rights to the prop-
erty.
Issue: Does the subsequent “cancelling” of the quitclaim re-
vive C’s preferential right as against B?
Held: No. C’s preferential right is extinguished and this is
true even if the quitclaim is not recorded in the registry of prop-
erty. (Casica vs. Villaseca, [Unrep.], 101 Phil. 1205 [1957].)
———— ———— ————
3. First buyer of land in a private document registered her ad-
verse claim such after learning of the second sale in a public instru-
ment of same land to another but before registration of the second

sale.
Facts: S executed on January 27 a private memorandum of
sale of a land in favor of B who assumed and paid the mort-
gage indebtedness of S with a bank, out of the purchase price.
On February 2, S sold the same property for a higher price to C,
this time executing a formal registerable deed of sale in favor
of the latter. When B saw S on January 31, bringing the formal
deed of sale for S’s signature and the balance of the agreed cash
payment, S told B that he could not proceed anymore with the
sale because had already formalized the sale of the lot to C.
On February 5, B saw C erecting a wall around the lot with
a gate. On the advice of a lawyer, B registered on February 8
her adverse claim as first buyer entitled to the property. C reg-
istered the deed of sale in her favor ten days later on February
12, and, therefore, the transfer certificate of title issued in her
favor carried the duly annotated adverse claim of B as the first
buyer.
Issue: Who is legally entitled to the property, B or C?
Held: B. Under the first and third paragraphs of Article 1544,
good faith must characterize the prior possession. Under the
second paragraph, good faith must characterize the act of ante-
rior registration. If there is no inscription, what is decisive is
prior possession. If there is inscription, prior registration in good
faith is a precondition to superior title.
When B bought the lot in question from S on January 27,
she was the only buyer thereof and the title of S was still in his
name, solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated
thereon. B was not aware — and she could not have been aware
— of any sale to C as there was no such sale to C. Hence, B’s
prior purchase of the land was made in good faith. Her good
faith subsisted and continued to exist when she recorded her
adverse claim four (4) days prior to registration of C’s deed of
sale. B’s good faith did not cease after S told her on January 31
of his second sale of the same lot to C. Because of that informa-
tion, B wanted an audience with C who refused to see her. So B
did the next best thing to protect her right — she registered her
adverse claim. Under the circumstances, this recording of her
adverse claim should be deemed to have been done in good
faith and should emphasize C’s bad faith when she registered
282 SALES Art. 1544
her deed of sale four (4) days later, on February 12. (Carbonell
vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)
Teehankee, J., concurring: Both these registrations were in
good faith.9 As the first registrant, B is legally entitled to the
property. The fact that she registered only an adverse claim is
of no moment. B had to register such claim as first buyer other-
wise the subsequent registration of C’s deed of sale would have
obliterated her legal rights and enable S to achieve his fraudu-
lent act of selling the property a second time for a better price
in derogation of her prior right thereto. The fact that S informed
B that the former had sold the property to C did not convert B’s
prior registration of her adverse claim into one of bad faith.
The fraudulent act of S of informing B that he has wrongfully
sold his property for a second time cannot work out to his own
advantage and to the detriment of the first buyer (by being con-
sidered as an “automatic registration” of the second sale) and
defeat the first buyer’s right of priority, in time, in right, and in
registration.
Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale can-
not defeat the first buyer’s rights except only as provided in
Article 1544 and that is where the second buyer first registers
in good faith the second sale ahead of the first. Such knowledge
of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights
under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as
against the second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained by
the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is
first to register the second sale since such knowledge taints his
prior registration with bad faith.
This is the price exacted by Article 1544 for the second buyer
being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second
buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he
acted in good faith throughout (i.e., in ignorance of the first sale
and of the first buyer’s rights) — from the time of acquisition
until the title is transferred to him by registration or, failing
registration, by delivery of possession. The second buyer must
show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowl-
edge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full owner-
ship through prior registration as provided by law.
9
The majority opinion ruled that C was a buyer in bad faith in view of other cir-
cumstances indicated in the decision.
Muñoz-Palma, J., dissenting: The two purchasers, B and C,

are both purchasers in good faith. That C is likewise a buyer in
good faith is supported by express findings of fact of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals which findings are generally
binding and conclusive. The question to be resolved is who of
the two first registered her purchase or title in good faith. This
requirement of good faith is not only applicable to the second
or subsequent purchaser but to the first as well.
The notation of B’s adverse claim was not accomplished in
good faith as she was cognizant of facts which impaired her
title to the property in question, to wit: that S informed her that
S had already given the lot to C; that B saw C erecting a wall
around the lot with a gate; that she consulted a lawyer who
advised her to present her adverse claim, and that being in-
formed that the sale in favor of C had not yet been registered,
the said lawyer prepared the notice of adverse claim which was
signed and sworn to and registered by B. The annotation of the
adverse claim did not produce any legal effects as to place her
in a preferential situation to that of C, for the simple reason
that a registration made in bad faith is equivalent to no regis-
tration at all.
The act of registration of C’s deed of sale on February 12
was but a formality, in the sense that it simply formalized what
had already been accomplished earlier, that is, the registration
of C’s purchase as against B when the latter acquired knowl-
edge of the second sale on January 31. The long-accepted rule
is that knowledge is equivalent to registration. What would be
the purpose of registration other than to give notice to inter-
ested parties and to the whole world of the existence of rights
or liens against the property under question?
———— ———— ————
4. Both first and second sales were made by means of a public

document but second buyer was first to take material possession, be-
cause by virtue of stipulation in the first sale, vendor continued in
possession.
Facts: S sold the same house erected on a leasehold land
to B and subsequently, to C, in public documents. None of
the sales is registered. In the sale to B, it is stipulated that S
shall continue in possession of the house for four (4) months.
284 SALES Art. 1544
C took possession of the property immediately after the

sale to him, B never having taken possession thereof. Both sales
were not registered.
Issue: Who has a better right to the house?
Held: C. The execution of the public document in favor of B
does not have the effect of the symbolic delivery of the house
sold. (see Art. 1498.) In view of the stipulation in his document
of sale, B does not acquire any title to the property, unless he
should have taken possession of the same after the lapse of the
four (4)-month period. This being so, C, the second purchaser,
to whom the property was sold after the said period, acquired
title thereto, either by taking physical possession thereof, or by
virtue of the symbolic delivery which ordinarily takes place
upon the execution of the public document. (Aviles vs. Arcega,
44 Phil. 924 [1923]; Note: This is a 5 to 4 decision.)
———— ———— ————
5. First sale was made before registration of land under the Tor-
rens System in the name of the seller, while subsequent execution sale
in favor of seller’s judgment creditor took place after registration.
Facts: While his application for the registration of a parcel
of land under the Torrens System was pending, S sold the prop-
erty to B who thereafter took possession thereof and made sub-
stantial improvements therein. A month later, an original cer-
tificate of title covering the land was issued in the name of S
free from all liens and encumbrances. The following year, a levy
was made upon the land in favor of C, judgment creditor of S.
S did not exercise his right of redemption.
The corresponding notice of levy, certificate of sale, and the
sheriff’s certificate of final sale in favor of C were duly regis-
tered. C sold all its rights and title to the property to DTC.
Issue: Who has a better right to the land, B or DTC?
Held: B. (1) Judgment creditor merely acquired right and inter-
est of judgment debtor. — If the property covered by the conflict-
ing sales were unregistered land, B would have a better right. If
duly registered land, DTC would have a better right because in
case of conveyance of registered real estate, the registration of
the deed of sale is the operative act that gives validity to the
transfer. The present case, however, does not fall within either
situation. Here, the sale in favor of B was executed before the
land was originally registered, while the conflicting sale in favor
of DTC was executed after the same property had been regis-
tered. What should determine the issue are the provisions of

the last paragraph of Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
to the effect that upon execution and delivery of the final cer-
tificate of sale in favor of the purchaser of land sold in execu-
tion sale, which purchaser “shall be substituted to and acquire
all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to
the property as of the time of the levy.” S had no more interest
and claim on the property at the time of the levy which he had
already conveyed for a considerable time prior thereto to B
“fully and irretrievably.”
(2) Unregistered sale, not cancelled by subsequent issuance of
Torrens title. — The unregistered sale and the consequent con-
veyance of title in favor of B could not have been cancelled and
rendered of no effect upon the subsequent issuance of the Tor-
rens title over the land. “In the inevitable conflict between a right
of ownership already fixed and established under the Civil Law
— which cannot be affected by any subsequent levy or attach-
ment or execution — and a new law or system which would
make possible the overthrowing of such ownership on admit-
tedly artificial and technical grounds, the former must be up-
held and applied.” (Dagupan Trading Co. vs. Macam, 14 SCRA
179 [1965].)
———— ———— ————
6. Purchaser bought registered land from seller who is not the
registered owner and could not show any title or capacity to make the
transfer.
Facts: Pursuant to a free patent issued to S in 1956, an origi-
nal certificate of title was entered under her name. X entered
the land and cultivated it. In 1962, S sold the land to B. Subse-
quently, X sold his rights to Y. When Y bought the land from X,
the latter could not and did not, at any time, produce any title
or application to said land.
Issue: Is Y a purchaser in good faith?
Held: No. Well settled is the rule that, “The law protects to
a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered
owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of pru-
dence from one who buys from a person who is not the regis-
tered owner, although the land object of the transaction is reg-
istered. x x x.”
If such degree of prudence is required of a purchaser of
registered land from one who shows a certificate of title but
286 SALES Art. 1544
who appears not to be the registered owner, more so should

the law require the utmost caution from a purchaser of regis-
tered land from one who could not show any title nor any evi-
dence of his capacity to transfer the land. Failing to exercise
caution of any kind whatsoever, as in the case of Y, is tanta-
mount to bad faith. (Barrios vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 477
[1977].)
Other rulings on application of rules.

(1) Contract to sell/promise to sell. — Article 1544 is applicable
not only to a contract of sale but also to a contract to sell because
in the Civil Law, where tradition is necessary for the transfer of
ownership, there is no real distinction between a contract of sale
and a contract to sell. (Alterado vs. Jimenez, [C.A.] 57 O.G. 9213;
see Dela Merced vs. GSIS, 154 SCAD 816, 365 SCRA 1 [2001].) It
has been held, however, that the provision does not apply to a
case where there was a sale to one party of the land itself while
the other contract was a mere promise to sell the land or at most
an actual assignment of the right to repurchase the same land.
There is no double sale of the same land in this case. (Dichoso vs.
Roxas, 11 Phil. 768 [1908]; San Lorenzo Development Corp. vs.
(2) Donation. — It applies to donations. A deed of donation
executed with all the formalities of the law is on the same footing
as a deed of sale in the form of a public instrument. (Cagaoan vs.
Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554 [1922]; Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil.
46 [1955]; see Art. 744.)
(3) Subsequent mortgage registered under Act No. 3344. — An
unrecorded sale of a house of a prior date is preferred to a recorded
mortgage of the same house of a later date for the reason that, if
the original owner had parted with his ownership of the thing
sold, then he no longer had the ownership and full disposal of
that thing so as to be able to mortgage it. The registration of a
mortgage under Act No. 3344 is without prejudice to the better
right of third parties. (Lanuza vs. De Leon, 20 SCRA 361 [1967].)
(4) Subsequent mortgage of land registered under the torrens sys-
tem, registered by mortgagee. — In a case, Z, after selling his land to
M (under a contract to sell) which sale was not registered, mort-
gaged the same property to GSIS which registered the mortgage

and acquired the property as the highest bidder in the extrajudi-
cial foreclosure sale. The registered right of GSIS as mortgagee of
the property was held inferior to the unregistered right of M, the
previous buyer, the unrecorded sale between M as the vendee,
and Z, the original owner, is preferred for the reason that if Z had
parted with his ownership of the land sold, then he no longer had
ownership and free disposal of the same so as to be able to mort-
gage it.10 (Dela Merced vs. GSIS, supra.)
(5) Sale of unregistered land. — A bona fide purchaser of a regis-
tered land at an execution sale acquires a good title as against a
prior transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded. However, if the
land is unregistered, a different rule applies. Under Act No. 3344,
registration of documents affecting unregistered land is “without
prejudice to a third party with a better right.” The quoted phrase
has been held to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s
favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was
not anymore the owner of the land, having previously sold the
same to somebody else, even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
Article 1544 has no application to land not registered under the
land registration law. (Pres. Decree No. 1529, formerly Act No.
496.) Thus, it cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the
execution sale, though the latter was a buyer in good faith and
even if the second sale was registered. (Radiowealth Finance
Company vs. Palileo, 197 SCRA 245 [1991]; Carumba vs. Court of
Appeals, 31 SCRA 558 [1970].)
10
“Respondents cannot even assert that as mortgagee of land registered under the
Torrens System, GSIS was not required to do more than rely upon the certificate of title.
As a general rule, where there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud
or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is
not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in
quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto. This rule, however, admits of an exception as where the purchaser or mortga-
gee has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in the vendor, or that he was aware of
sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
property in litigation. (Ibid., citing State Investment House, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
254 SCRA 368 [1996].) When the purchaser or mortgagee is a bank or financing institu-
tion, the general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of land is not required to look fur-
ther than what appears on the face of the title does not apply. (Sunshine Finance and
Investment, Corp. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 203 SCRA 210 [1991]; Philippine
National Bank vs. Office of the President, 252 SCRA 52 [1996].)
288 SALES Art. 1544
Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act No. 3344

can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that
can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709;
Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480 [1960]; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132
SCRA 700 [1984]; Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCAD 636,
247 SCRA 336 [1995], citing Vitug, supra.) On account of the reg-
istration under Act No. 3344 by the first buyer, necessarily there
is absent good faith in the subsequent registration of the second
sale by the second buyer for said registration has the effect of
constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right
as such buyer. (Bayoca vs. Nogales, 340 SCRA 154 [2000].)
If the property in dispute is already registered under the Tor-
rens system, the registration of the sale under Act No. 3344 is not
effective for purposes of Article 1544. (Abrigo vs. De Vera, 432
SCRA 544 [2004].)
(6) Sale to different vendees. — Clearly, Article 1544 applies to
a situation where the same property is sold to different vendees.
There must be at least two (2) deeds of sale over the same prop-
erty. It is not applicable where there is only one sale. (Remalente
vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988].) Thus, in a case, although the deed
of extra-judicial partition which merely mentioned the alleged sale
in favor of petitioners of the subject property was registered while
the pacto de retro sale in favor of private respondents was not, but
the alleged deed of sale was never offered in evidence by the pe-
titioners, it was held that such registration did not operate as a
registration of the deed of sale because insofar as third persons
are concerned, what could validly transfer or convey the vendee’s
right to the property to petitioners was the deed of sale and not
the deed of extra-judicial partition which only mentioned the
former. (Vda. de Alcantara vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCAD 347,
252 SCRA 457 [1996].) There is, of course, no double sale where
after the sale of the property in favor of a person, the vendor did
not anymore execute another sale over the same property in favor
of another. (Land Authority vs. De Leon, 120 SCRA 128 [1983].)
Article 1544 cannot be involved when two different contracts
of sale are made to two different persons, one of them not being
the owner of the property sold, and even if the sale was made by
the same person, if the second sale was made when such person
was no longer the owner of the property. (Consolidated Rural

Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 449 SCRA 347 [2005].)
(7) Pacto de retro sale. — It is not applicable to a case which
involves an earlier pacto de retro sale of an unregistered land and
the subsequent donation thereof by the vendor a retro to another
who, in turn, sold it to a third party while the property was still
in the possession of the vendee a retro who had already acquired
title before the donation because of the failure of the vendor a retro
to repurchase the same. There being no title to the property which
the vendor a retro could convey to the supposed donee, since he
was no longer the owner thereof, no title could be conveyed by
the donee by the sale of the property. (De Guzman, Jr. vs. Court
of Appeals, 156 SCRA 701 [1987].)
(8) Contract of sale fictitious or forged, or seller without right to
sell. — It does not apply if the contract of sale first registered is
fictitious or forged or if the vendor is not the owner of the prop-
erty sold and had no right to sell the same. (see Espiritu vs. Valerio,
9 SCRA 761 [1963]; Cruzado vs. Bustos & Escolar, 34 Phil. 17
[1917].)
But a forged deed of sale of registered land can legally be the
root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value inter-
venes. A deed of sale executed by an impostor without authority
of the owner of the land sold is a nullity, and registration will not
validate what otherwise is an invalid document. However, the
certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the
true owner to the forger, and, while it remains that way, the land
is subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the vendee has the
right to rely upon what appears in the certificate and, in the ab-
sence of anything to excite suspicion, is under no obligation to
look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor
appearing on the face of said certificate. The remedy of the true
owner is to bring an action for damages against the one who
caused or employed the fraud and if the latter is insolvent, an
action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for
recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund. (Tenio-
Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals, 49 SCAD 68, 230 SCRA 550 [1994].)
(9) Sale of property to one party and assignment of right to the prop-
erty to another. — The provisions of paragraph 3, Article 1544 do
290 SALES Art. 1544
not apply to a case where the sale in favor of one party was the
property itself, while the transaction in favor of another was a mere
promise to assign or, at most, an actual assignment of the right to
repurchase the same property. (Dichoso vs. Roxas, 5 SCRA 781
[1962].)
(10) Sale of property subject of contract to sell/conditional sale to a
third person. — In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale
of the property, a third person buying such property despite the
fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment
of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in
bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of re-
conveyance of the property. There is no double sale in such case.
Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after registration
because there is no defect in the owner-seller’s title per se, but the
latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the intending buyer.
In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment
of the suspensive condition, the sale becomes absolute and this
will definitely affect the seller’s title thereto. In fact, if there had
been previous delivery of the subject property, the seller’s own-
ership or title to the property is automatically transferred to the
buyer such that, the seller will no longer have any title to transfer
to any third person. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, such
second buyer of the property who may have had actual or con-
structive knowledge of such defect in the seller’s title, or at least
was charged with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot
be a registrant in good faith. Such second buyer cannot defeat the
first buyer’s title. In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the
first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the
sale. (Coronel vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCAD 141, 263 SCRA 15
[1996].)
— oOo —
291
SECTION 3. — Conditions and Warranties
ART. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to

a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is
not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with
the contract or he may waive performance of the con-
dition. If the other party has promised that the condi-
tion should happen or be performed, such first men-
tioned party may also treat the non-performance of
the condition as a breach of warranty.
Where the ownership in the thing has not passed,
the buyer may treat the fulfillment by the seller of his
obligation to deliver the same as described and as
warranted expressly or by implication in the contract
of sale as a condition of the obligation of the buyer to
perform his promise to accept and pay for the thing.
(n)
Meaning of condition.
A condition, as used in Article 1545, means an uncertain event
or contingency on the happening of which the obligation (or right)
of the contract depends. In such a case, the obligation of the con-
tract does not attach until the condition is performed. (see Art.
1462, par. 2.)
(1) The term, in the context of a perfected contract of sale, per-
tains, in reality, to the compliance by one party of an undertak-
ing, the fulfillment of which would beckon, in turn, the
demandability of the reciprocal prestation of the other party.
(Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCAD 621, 250 SCRA 223 [1995].)
291
292 SALES Art. 1545
(2) The term is not used in the sense of a “promise” with the
possible exception of the buyer’s promise to accept and pay for
the thing sold which is conditioned on the seller’s performance
of his promise to deliver the thing as described and warranted.
(Art. 1545, par. 2.)
Effect of non-fulfillment of condition.

A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional. (Art. 1458.)
(1) If the obligation1 of either party is subject to any condition
and such condition is not fulfilled, such party may either:
(a) refuse to proceed with the contract; or
(b) proceed with the contract, waiving the performance of
the condition.
(2) If the condition is in the nature of a promise that it should
happen, the non-performance of such condition may be treated
by the other party as a breach of warranty. (see Art. 1546.)
EXAMPLES:
(1) B (buyer) entered into a contract with S for the pur-
chase of certain machinery. The arrival of the goods to be
shipped from Japan is made a condition of the bargain, there
being no promise by S that the goods will arrive. If the machin-
ery does not arrive, S is not guilty of breach of contract.
But if S promises or warrants that the machinery will be
shipped or that it was already on its way, the non-arrival con-
1
A distinction must be made between a condition imposed on the perfection of a
contract and a condition imposed merely on the performance of an obligation. The fail-
ure to comply with the first condition would prevent the juridical relation itself from
coming into existence, while failure to comply with the second merely gives the option
either to refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition. (Romero vs. Court of
Appeals, 65 SCAD 621, 250 SCRA 223 [1995]; Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCAD 574,
263 SCRA 560 [1996]; Babasa vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCAD 679, 290 SCRA 532 [1998];
see Art. 1458.)
It has been held that a subdivision developer can rightly seek to ensure that the
property continues to meet the conditions and requirements, like building specifica-
tions and easement provisions stipulated in, and made part of the individual contracts
which its buyers. As developer of the property, it has its own agreed undertakings in
favor of the buyers which could well survive the transfer of ownerships and provide it
with such genuine stake in the controversy as would sufficiently clothe it with personal-
ity. (Fajardo, Jr. vs. Freedom to Build, Inc., 347 SCRA 474 [2000].)
Conditions and Warranties
stitutes a breach of contract. B is entitled to claim damages. (see

McCullough vs. Berger, 43 Phil. 828 [1922]; Soler vs. Chesley,
43 Phil. 529 [1922].)
(2) S promised to sell his parcel of land to B, should S win
a case pending in the Supreme Court. S lost the case. S may
either refuse to sell the parcel of land or he may waive the per-
formance of the condition and sell the parcel of land.
(3) S sold to B certain subdivision lots, with S promising
to construct the necessary roads that would serve as outlets for
entrance and egress to and from the lots in accordance with the
requirements of existing laws and regulations. B may treat the
non-performance of S’s promise as a breach of warranty. It is
the seller’s duty to deliver the thing sold in a condition suit-
able for its enjoyment by the buyer for the purposes contem-
plated. In this case, proper access to his residence is essential to
the enjoyment by B of the lots purchased. (see Limus vs. De los
Santos, 8 SCRA 798 [1963].)
(4) S agrees to sell to B a parcel of land, subject to the con-
dition that the balance of the purchase price shall be paid by B
10 days after the removal of all squatters from the property by S
within 45 days after the signing of the contract. If after 45 days
from the signing of the contract, S shall not be able to remove
the squatters, the down payment made by B shall be returned
by S.
May S demand the rescission of the contract for the sale of
the land for his own failure to have the squatters evicted within
the stipulated period?
No. The ejectment of the squatters is a condition, the opera-
tive act which sets into motion the period of compliance by B
of his own obligation. S’s failure to comply with the condition
does not result in the failure of the contract; it only gives B the
option either to refuse to proceed with the agreement or waive
that condition. This option clearly belongs to B and not to S
who is not the injured party.2
It would be the height of inequity for S to invoke the con-
tinued occupation by the squatters of the property as a justifi-
cation to ignore his obligation to evict them. The performance
of his obligation should not be made subject to the will and
2
The right of a party to rescind an obligation under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is
predicated on the non-compliance by the other party with what is incumbent upon him
that violates the reciprocity between them.
294 SALES Art. 1546
caprices of the occupants. (see Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 65

SCAD 621, 250 SCRA 223 [1995]; Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 75
SCAD 574, 263 SCRA 560 [1996]; Adalin vs. Court of Appeals,
88 SCAD 55, 280 SCRA 536 [1997].)
ART. 1546. Any affirmation of fact or any promise

by the seller relating to the thing is an express war-
ranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or
promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the same,
and if the buyer purchases the thing relying thereon.
No affirmation of the value of the thing, nor any state-
ment purporting to be a statement of the seller’s opin-
ion only, shall be construed as a warranty, unless the
seller made such affirmation or statement as an ex-
pert and it was relied upon by the buyer. (n)
Meaning of warranty.
A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller
of goods, contemporaneously and as a part of the contract of sale,
having reference to the character, quality, or title of the goods, and
by which he promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts
are or shall be as he then represents them. (see Black L.D. vs. Estes,
122 Ga. 807.)
Terminology used by parties not controlling.

It is not necessary that the word “warranty” or “warrant” be
used by the seller to constitute a warranty. Any word is sufficient
to show the intention of the parties to consider the representation
or promise as an express warranty; and the fact that a stipulation
in the contract of sale is specially called a “warranty” does not of
itself establish that the agreement thus referred to is a warranty.
Kinds of warranty.
Warranties by the seller may be express, as in the above arti-
cle, or implied, as in Article 1547.
The seller is liable for his express warranties (Art. 1546.) and
for the implied warranties of title (Art. 1547.), absence of hidden
defects (Ibid.), fitness or merchantability (Art. 1562.), description
(Arts. 1481, 1562.), and sample. (Arts. 1481, 1565.)
Meaning of express warranty.

An express warranty is any affirmation of fact or any promise
by the seller relating to the thing, the natural tendency of which
is to induce the buyer to purchase the thing and the buyer thus
induced, does purchase the same.
Effect of express warranty.

Under the definition, statements not only relating to quality
or title of the thing but relating to other incidents to it may be
warranties.
A warranty being a part of the contract of sale, it is immate-
rial whether the seller did not know that it was true or false. No
intent is necessary to make the seller liable for his warranty. It is
the natural consequences of what the seller says and the reliance
thereon by the buyer that alone are important. (see 1 Williston,
op. cit., pp. 498-501.) Accordingly, where the seller (importer-as-
sembler) expressly intimated to the buyer that the taxes and cus-
toms duties on two (2) assembled trucks were already paid, such
representation shall be considered, as a seller’s warranty under
Article 1546 which covers any affirmation of fact or any promise
by the seller which induces the buyer to purchase the object of
sale and actually purchases it relying on the affirmation or prom-
ise. (Harrison Motors Corporation vs. Navarro, 125 SCAD 673,
331 SCRA 202 [2000].)
It has been held that where there is no dispute that the de-
fendant (seller), in bad faith and with gross negligence, infringed
the express warranty made by it to the general public with respect
to its products sold to and installed in the house of the plaintiff
(buyer), who relied on the warranty, the identity of the individual
who actually dealt with the defendant and asked the latter to make
the delivery and installation by its workers is pointless. (Del
Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCAD 542, 267 SCRA 158 [1997].)
EXAMPLE:
S sells to B an automobile for P90,000.00, telling the latter
that it is a 1977 model and that it is worth about P100,000.00. B
sees the automobile and after a test run, expresses satisfaction
296 SALES Art. 1546
over its condition. The automobile is really of 1976 vintage and

is only worth about P80,000.00.
In this case, B has no right of action for breach of warranty
because the inducing cause of the purchase is not the errone-
ous statement as to its model and value, but B’s reliance on its
appearance and demonstrated condition. But the statement that
the automobile is in excellent running condition constitutes a
violation of warranty if such is not the fact.
Effect of expression of opinion.

A mere expression of opinion, no matter how positively as-
serted, does not import a warranty unless the seller is an expert
and his opinion was relied upon by the buyer. Thus, assertions
that things are fine or valuable or better than products of rival
manufacturers are in their nature so dependent on individual
opinion that no matter how positive the seller’s assertion may be,
they are not held to create a warranty.
The tendency of the courts, however, is in the direction of
greater strictness against the seller’s untruthful puffing of his
wares. (see Ibid., pp. 517-518.)
The following provisions of law are pertinent:
“The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party
had an opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves
fraudulent.” (Art. 1340.)
“A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud
unless made by an expert and the other party has relied on the
former’s special knowledge.” (Art. 1341.)
“Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent
but may constitute error.” (Art. 1343.)
EXAMPLES:
(1) Expressions or advertisements like: “the cigarette that
will give you utmost smoking pleasure”, “the most effective
pain reliever”; “you like it, it likes you”, etc. are mere “sales
talk” or “seller’s puffing.”
They are not construed as warranties because the buyer
knows that they are mere exaggerations.
(2) S, a farmer, found a ring which he sold to B, honestly

believing and representing to B that it was a diamond ring. It
turned out that the ring was ordinary glass.
Here, S merely expressed an opinion. Since the misrepre-
sentation was made in good faith, it is considered a mere error
or mistake. But if S is an expert, and his statement was relied
upon by B, the same shall be construed as a warranty even if
expressed in the form of an opinion.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. The number of coconut trees is less than that stated in the
contract but it appeared that buyer inspected land and estimated
number of trees thereon.
Facts: B exchanged his property in Pasay City with S’s co-
conut plantation. In the deed of exchange, S stated that there
were no less than 6,000 coconut trees in his plantation.
Issue: Is S liable for breach of warranty?
Held: No. Where it does not appear that defendant (S) de-
liberately violated the truth when he stated his belief that there
were no less than 6,000 coconut trees on the land, and it ap-
pears that the plaintiff (B) inspected said land and estimated
the number of trees thereon before the exchange, no action will
lie for the rescission of the contract or for damages. (Gochingco
vs. Dean, 47 Phil. 687 [1925].)
———— ———— ————
2. Sugar cane crops sold yielded less than that represented but
seller made no guarantee of yield.
Facts: S sold his sugar cane crop to B for P12,000.00. Previ-
ous to the sale, S represented that the crop would yield 3,000
piculs. It yielded only 2,017 piculs instead. It was shown, how-
ever, that S did not and in fact refused to guarantee the quan-
tity of sugar which would be produced.
S bought action for the balance of the purchase price.
Issue: Is S guilty of misrepresentation?
Held: No. The law allows considerable latitude to seller’s
statements, or dealer’s talk; and experience teaches that it is
exceedingly risky to accept it at its face value. The refusal of
the seller to warrant his estimate indicated that it was put forth
298 SALES Art. 1547
as a mere opinion. It is elementary that a misrepresentation upon

a mere matter of opinion is not an actionable deceit, nor is it a
sufficient ground for avoiding a contract as fraudulent. (Songco
vs. Sellner, 37 Phil. 254 [1917].)
ART. 1547. In a contract of a sale, unless a con-

trary intention appears, there is:
(1) An implied warranty on the part of the seller
that he has a right to sell the thing at the time when
the ownership is to pass, and that the buyer shall from
that time have and enjoy the legal and peaceful pos-
session of the thing;
(2) An implied warranty that the thing shall be free
from any hidden faults or defects, or any charge or
encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer.
This article shall not, however, be held to render
liable a sheriff, auctioneer, mortgagee, pledgee, or
other person professing to sell by virtue of authority
in fact or law, for the sale of a thing in which a third
person has a legal or equitable interest. (n)
Meaning of implied warranty.

An implied warranty is that which the law derives by implica-
tion or inference from the nature of the transaction or the relative
situation or circumstances of the parties (Black L.D. vs. Estes, 122
Ga. 807.), irrespective of any intention of the seller to create it.
Implied warranties in sale.

The term implied warranty is reserved for cases where the law
attaches an obligation to the seller which is not expressed in any
words. (1 Williston, op. cit., p. 498.) Implied warranties under
Articles 1547 and 1562 are:
(1) Implied warranty as to seller’s title. — that the seller guaran-
tees that he has a right to sell the thing sold and to transfer own-
ership to the buyer who shall not be disturbed in his legal and
peaceful possession thereof (Art. 1548.);
(2) Implied warranty against hidden defects or unknown encum-

brance. — that the seller guarantees that the thing sold is free from
any hidden faults or defects or any charge or encumbrance not
declared or known to the buyer (Art. 1561.); and
(3) Implied warranty as to fitness or merchantability. — that the
seller guarantees that the thing sold is reasonably fit for the known
particular purpose for which it was acquired by the buyer or,
where it was bought by description, that it is of merchantable
quality. (Art. 1562.)
The right of the seller to sell the thing need not reside in him
at the time the contract is perfected. It is sufficient that the ven-
dor has a right “at the time when the ownership is to pass.” (Art.
1547[1].) This complements Article 1459 that “the vendor must
have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is
delivered” and Article 1562 which allows the sale of “future
goods” or of goods the acquisition of which depends upon a con-
tingency.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Seller of agricultural land warranted as “free from all liens and
encumbrances” was occupied by a tenant.
Facts: G sold a parcel of agricultural land to ID, Inc. war-
ranting that the land was “free from all liens and encum-
brances.” ID, Inc., in turn, sold the land to AA, Inc. to which
ID, Inc. warranted that the land was “free from all liens, ad-
verse claims, encumbrances, claims of any tenant and/or agri-
cultural workers, whether arising as compensation for distur-
bance or from improvements.” When G bought the land from
the original owner, it was forced to stop cultivating the land
because of the bulldozing caused by AA, Inc.
G filed a complaint against ID, Inc., AA, Inc. for disturbance
compensation under the land reform law. ID, Inc. in return, filed
a cross-claim against G in case of a judgment adverse to it while
AA, Inc. filed a cross-claim against ID, Inc.
Issue: Did G violate his warranty to ID, Inc.?
Held: No. The term “hidden faults or defects” in Article 1547
pertains only to those that make the object of the sale unfit for
the use for which it was intended at the time of the sale. Since
300 SALES Art. 1547
the object of the sale by G to ID, Inc. is an agricultural land, the

existing tenancy relationship with respect to the land cannot
be a “hidden fault or defect.” It is not a lien or encumbrance
that the vendor warranted did not exist at the time of the sale.
It is a relationship which any buyer of agricultural land should
reasonably expect to be present and which it is his duty to spe-
cifically look into and provide for. AA, Inc. saw to it that the
warranty was specific when it, in turn, purchased the land. The
difference in the phraseology of the two warranties is not an
idle one. (Investment & Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
162 SCRA 636 [1988].)
Nature of implied warranty.

An implied warranty is a natural, not an essential, element of
a contract, because it is presumed to exist even though nothing
has been said in the contract on the subject. It is, therefore, deemed
as incorporated in the contract of sale.
An implied warranty may, however, be waived or modified
by express stipulation. (see Arts. 1548, 1566.)
When implied warranty not applicable.

(1) “As is and where is” sale. — The phrase “as is and where
is” (which has been adopted from dispositions of army surplus
property) means nothing more than that the vendor makes no
warranty as to the quality or workable condition of the goods, and
that the vendee takes them in the conditions in which that they
are found and from the place where they are located. It does not
extend to liens or encumbrances unknown to the vendee and
could not be disclosed by a physical examination of the goods
sold. (Monfort vs. Willis, [C.A.] No. 6963-R, Oct. 15, 1951.)
The term “as is” in public auction of (imported) goods refers
to the physical condition of the merchandise and not to the legal
situation in which it was at the time of the sale. It has no bearing
at all on the obligation of the seller (Bureau of Customs) under
Article 1495 “to transfer the ownership and deliver, as well as
warrant the thing which is the object of sale.” This warranty is as
to the right to sell and capacity to deliver. (Auyong Hian vs. Court
of Tax Appeals, 109 SCRA 470 [1981].)
(2) Sale of second-hand articles. — There is no implied warranty

as to the condition, adaptation, fitness or suitability for the pur-
pose for which made, or the quality of an article sold as and for a
second-hand article. But such articles might be sold under such
circumstances as to raise an implied warranty. A certification is-
sued by the vendor that a second-hand machine was in A-1 con-
dition is an express warranty binding on the vendor. (Moles vs.
(3) Sale by virtue of authority in fact or law. — No warranty of
title is implied in a sale by one not professing to be the owner.
Accordingly, the rule on implied warranty does not apply to a
sheriff, auctioneer, mortgagee, pledgee or other person who sells
by virtue of authority in fact or law. (see Art. 1570.) In other words,
they are not liable to a person with a legal or equitable interest in
the thing sold. (Art. 1547, par. 2.) They do not warrant the title of
the person who is supposed to own the thing sold. (see Art. 1552.)
The risk of defective title here is on the purchaser, the circum-
stances surrounding such sales being sufficient to put him on
notice as to interests of third persons in the thing sold. (Babb &
Martin, op. cit., p. 94.) The persons enumerated are, however, liable for
actual representations, fraud or negligence in the exercise of their du-
ties. (1 Williston, op. cit., p. 567.)
(a) The purchaser of a property sold at public auction for
tax delinquency takes all the chances. There is no warranty on
the part of the state. (Government vs. Adriano, 41 Phil. 112
[1920].) The purchaser of real estate at a tax sale obtains only
such title as that held by the taxpayer. (Serfino vs. Court of
Appeals, 154 SCRA 19 [1987].)
(b) The rule of caveat emptor (buyer beware) applies to ex-
ecution sales. (see Art. 1570.) The sheriff does not guarantee
the title to real property sold by him as sheriff and it is not
incumbent upon him to place the purchaser in possession of
such property. (Pabico vs. Ong Pauco, 43 Phil. 572 [1922]; Juan
Lim vs. Laag, 51 Phil. 930 [1928].) It is elementary that a pur-
chaser at a sheriff’s sale acquires no better title or greater right
than the judgment debtor has. (Villegas vs. Tan, 57 Phil. 656
[1932]; Laxamana vs. Carlos, 57 Phil. 722 [1932]; Ruiz vs.
Fieldman’s Insurance Co., 9 C.A. Rep. 2d, 105 [1966].)
302 SALES Art. 1548
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Lessor who, by virtue of stipulation in a contract of lease with
lessee, acquired ownership over jalousies sold on credit and delivered
to buyer (lessee) by seller, seeks nullification of sheriff’s sale of said
items levied upon by seller who was the highest bidder.
Facts: P leased to B a building with a stipulation in the lease
contract that all permanent improvements made by B on the
leased premises shall belong to P and as part of the considera-
tion of the monthly rental. Subsequently, B purchased on credit
from S glass and wooden jalousies which were delivered and
installed in the leased premises by S, replacing the existing win-
dows.
For failure of B to pay for the items purchased, the same
was levied upon and sold at public auction with S as the high-
est bidder. P filed an action to nullify the sheriff’s sale.
Issue: Will the action prosper?
Held: Yes. When the items in question were delivered and
installed in the leased premises, B became the owner thereof
even if the purchase price has been made on credit (see Arts.
1477, 1496, 1497.), and by virtue of the lease contract when levy
was made, B, the judgment debtor, was no longer the owner
thereof. The power of the court in execution of judgment ex-
tends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judg-
ment debtor only, and the purchaser acquires only the right as
the debtor has at the time of the auction sale. (Sampaguita Pic-
tures, Inc. vs. Jalwindor Manufactures, Inc., 93 SCRA 419 [1979].)
SUBSECTION 1. — Warranty in Case of Eviction
ART. 1548. Eviction shall take place whenever by

a final judgment based on a right prior to the sale or
an act imputable to the vendor, the vendee is deprived
of the whole or of a part of the thing purchased.
The vendor shall answer for the eviction even
though nothing has been said in the contract on the
subject.
The contracting parties, however, may increase,
diminish, or suppress this legal obligation of the ven-
dor. (1475a)
Meaning of eviction.
Eviction may be defined as the judicial process, whereby the
vendee is deprived of the whole or part of the thing purchased
by virtue of a final judgment based on a right prior to the sale or
an act imputable to the vendor.
Essential elements of warranty

against eviction.
The essential elements are:
(1) The vendee is deprived in whole or in part of the thing
purchased;
(2) He is so deprived by virtue of a final judgment (Art. 1557.);
(3) The judgment is based on a right prior to the sale or an
act imputable to the vendor;
(4) The vendor was summoned in the suit for eviction at the
instance of the vendee (Art. 1558.); and
(5) There is no waiver on the part of the vendee.
EXAMPLES:
(1) S sells a parcel of land to B. Subsequently, C files an
action for the recovery of possession, claiming that he is the
owner of the land. At the instance of B, S was summoned to
defend his title. The court renders final judgment, declaring
that C has a better right. Accordingly, B is evicted.
In this case, S is liable to B for failure to comply with his
warranty against eviction. Here, the judgment is based on a
right of a third person prior to the sale.
(2) In the same example, suppose S was really the owner
of the parcel of land. However, B did not have the sale regis-
tered. Immediately, S sold the same land to C who, in good
faith, registered the sale.
Here, the right upon which C based his claim is posterior
to the sale. Nevertheless, B can sue S for damages because of
the breach of warranty against eviction, the act giving rise to
C’s right being imputable to the vendor.
304 SALES Art. 1549
Trespass contemplated by warranty

against eviction.
Mere trespass in fact does not give rise to the application of the
doctrine of eviction. (see Art. 1590.) In such case, the vendee has
a direct action against the trespasser in the same way as the les-
see has such right. (Art. 1664.)
The disturbance referred to in the case of eviction is a distur-
bance in law which requires that a person go to the courts of jus-
tice claiming the thing sold, or part thereof, and invoking reasons.
If final judgment is rendered depriving the vendee of the thing
sold or any part thereof, the doctrine of eviction becomes appli-
cable. (10 Manresa 184.)
Vendor’s liability is waivable.

Warranty is not an essential element of a contract of sale and
may, therefore, be increased, diminished, or suppressed by agree-
ment of the parties. (Art. 1548, par. 3.)
Any stipulation, however, exempting the vendor from the
obligation to answer for eviction shall be void if he acted in bad
faith. (Art. 1553.)
ART. 1549. The vendee need not appeal from the

decision in order that the vendor may become liable
for eviction.
Vendee has no duty to appeal

from judgment.
The vendee’s right against the vendor is not lost because he,
the vendee, did not appeal. With a judgment becoming final
whatever be the cause of finality, the requirement of the law is
deemed satisfied.
Furthermore, the vendor, having been notified of the action,
could have very well followed up the case and made use of all
possible remedies. If he did not do that, he should suffer for his
omission. In reality, he does not have the right to demand of the
vendee such diligence that he himself did not have and which he
was more obliged to observe, especially if the cause of eviction

was anterior to the sale. (Canizares Tiana vs. Torrejon, 21 Phil. 127
[1912].)
ART. 1550. When adverse possession had been

commenced before the sale but the prescriptive pe-
riod is completed after the transfer, the vendor shall
not be liable for eviction. (n)
Effect of prescription.
By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions
prescribed by law. In the same way, rights and actions are lost by
prescription. (Art. 1106.)
(1) Completed before sale. — The vendee may lose the thing
purchased to a third person who has acquired title thereto by
prescription. When prescription has commenced to run against
the vendor and was already complete before the sale, the vendee
can enforce the warranty against eviction. In this case, the depri-
vation is based on a right prior to the sale and an act imputable to
the vendor.
(2) Completed after sale. — Even if prescription has started
before the sale but has reached the limit prescribed by law after
the sale, the vendor is not liable for eviction. The reason is that
the vendee could easily interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period by bringing the necessary action.
If the property sold, however, is land registered under the
Torrens system, Article 1550 will have no application. Under the
Torrens system, ownership of land is not subject to prescription.
EXAMPLES:
(1) S sold to B a parcel of land which is claimed by C, who
has been in possession of the property in the concept of owner
publicly and continuously for 30 years. Under the law, C is
deemed to have acquired ownership over the land by prescrip-
tion without need of title or of good faith. (see Art. 1137.)
In this case, S shall be liable to B in case of eviction.
306 SALES Arts. 1551-1552
(2) If, in the same example, C was in adverse possession

of the land for only 25 years at the time of the sale, and the
prescriptive period is completed after the sale, S shall not be
liable to B in case of eviction as B could have brought action
against C during the remaining five-year period to recover the
property.
ART. 1551. If the property is sold for nonpayment

of taxes due and not made known to the vendee be-
fore the sale, the vendor is liable for eviction. (n)
Deprivation for nonpayment of taxes.

If the vendee is deprived of the ownership of the property
because it is sold at public for nonpayment of taxes due from the
vendor, the latter is liable for eviction for an act imputable to him.
It is required, however, that at the time of the sale, the non-pay-
ment of taxes was not known to the vendee.
ART. 1552. The judgment debtor is also responsi-

ble for eviction in judicial sales, unless it is otherwise
decreed in the judgment. (n)
Liability of judgment debtor.

While the rule on implied warranty does not apply to a sher-
iff who sells by virtue of authority in law (Art. 1549, par. 2.), the
judgment debtor is responsible for eviction (Art. 1552.) and hid-
den defects (Art. 1570.) even in judicial sales, unless otherwise
decreed in the judgment.
Article 1552 is based on the general principle that a person
may not enrich himself at the expense of another. Thus, if the
purchaser of real property sold on execution be evicted therefrom
because the judgment debtor had no right to the property sold,
the purchaser is entitled to recover the price paid with interest
from the judgment debtor. If the sale was effected by the judg-
ment creditor, the latter should not be permitted to retain the pro-
ceeds of the sale, at the expense of the purchaser. (Bonzon vs.
Standard, Bill Co. & Osorio, 27 Phil. 142 [1942].)
ART. 1553. Any stipulation exempting the vendor

from the obligation to answer for eviction shall be void,
if he acted in bad faith. (1476)
Stipulation waiving warranty.

(1) Effect of vendor’s bad faith. — The vendor’s bad faith under
Article 1553 consists in his knowing beforehand at the time of the
sale, of the presence of the fact giving rise to eviction, and its pos-
sible consequence. (10 Manresa 194; Angelo vs. Pacheco, 56 Phil.
29 [1931].) Thus, if the vendor after selling his property to another,
sold it again to another purchaser, he cannot even by stipulation,
be exempt from warranty against eviction, because he acted in
bad faith.
(2) Effect of vendee’s bad faith. — It is a requisite, however, that
the vendee is not himself guilty of bad faith in the execution of
the sale. If he knew the defect of title at the time of sale, or had
knowledge of the facts which should have put him upon inquiry
and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the
defects of the title of the vendor, he cannot claim that the vendor
has warranted his legal and peaceful possession of the property
sold on the theory that he proceeded with the sale with the as-
sumption of the danger of eviction. He is not, therefore, entitled
to the warranty against eviction, nor is he entitled to recover dam-
ages. (J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 413
[1979]; Aspiras vs. Dalon, [C.A.] 53 O.G. 8854.)
ART. 1554. If the vendee has renounced the right

to warranty in case of eviction, and eviction should
take place, the vendor shall only pay the value which
the thing sold had at the time of the eviction. Should
the vendee have made the waiver with knowledge of
the risks of eviction and assumed its consequences,
the vendor shall not be liable. (1477)
Kinds of waiver of eviction.

Article 1554 treats of two kinds of waiver, namely:
(1) Consciente, that is, the waiver is voluntarily made by the
308 SALES Art. 1555
vendee without the knowledge and assumption of the risks of

eviction; and
(2) Intencionada, that is, the waiver is made by the vendee with
knowledge of the risks of eviction and assumption of its conse-
quences.
Effect of waiver by vendee.

(1) If the waiver was only conscious, the vendor shall pay only
the value which the thing sold had at the time of eviction. This is
a case of solutio indebiti. The sole effect of a waiver unaccompanied
by the knowledge and assumption of the danger of eviction is to
deprive the purchaser of the benefits mentioned in Nos. 2, 3, 4, and
5 of Article 1555. (Ibid.; Lavina vs. Veloso, [C.A.] 40 O.G. 2331.)
(2) In the second kind of waiver, the vendor is exempted from
the obligation to answer for eviction, provided he did not act in
bad faith. (Art. 1553; see Andaya vs. Manansala, 107 Phil. 1151
[1960].)
Presumption as to kind of waiver.

From the terms of Article 1554, every waiver is presumed to
be consciente while the contrary is not proven, but to consider it
intencionada, it is necessary besides the act of waiver that it be
accompanied by some circumstance which reveals the vendee’s
knowledge of the risks of eviction and his intention to submit to
its consequences. (10 Manresa 180-181; Phil. National Bank vs.
Silo, 72 Phil. 141 [1941].)
ART. 1555. When the warranty has been agreed

upon or nothing has been stipulated on this point, in
case eviction occurs, the vendee shall have the right
to demand of the vendor:
(1) The return of the value which the thing sold
had at the time of the eviction, be it greater or less
than the price of the sale;
(2) The income or fruits, if he has been ordered to
deliver them to the party who won the suit against
him;
(3) The costs of the suit which caused the evic-

tion and, in a proper case, those of the suit brought
against the vendor for the warranty;
(4) The expenses of the contract, if the vendee has
paid them;
(5) The damages and interests and ornamental
expenses, if the sale was made in bad faith. (1478)
Rights and liabilities in case eviction

occurs.
The provisions of the above article specify in detail the rights
and liabilities of the vendor and the vendee in the event eviction
takes place “when the warranty has been agreed upon or noth-
ing has been stipulated on this point,” that is, in the absence of
waiver of eviction by the vendee. (Art. 1554.)
(1) Return of value of thing. — If at the time of the eviction the
value of the property is really more or less than its value at the
time of the sale, by reason of improvements or deterioration, it is
but just that the vendor should pay the excess or not suffer the
damage. (see Sta. Romana vs. Imperio, 12 SCRA 625 [1965].) All
kinds of improvements whether useful or necessary or even rec-
reational expense voluntarily incurred by the vendee (Arts. 546-
548.) or caused by nature or time (Art. 551, ibid.) insofar as they
may affect the value of property, are taken into account in deter-
mining the increase in value. (10 Manresa 199-200.) Note that the
law does not speak of interest. Undoubtedly, the law had intended
that the interest on the price shall be set off against the fruits re-
ceived by the vendee from the thing while in his possession. (Ibid.)
(2) Income or fruits of thing. — The vendee is liable to the party
who won the suit against him for the income or fruits received
only if so decreed by the court. The obvious inference from this
provision is that to the vendee belongs the use, free of any liabil-
ity, of the subject matter of the sale. And this benefit is not by any
means gratuitous. It is offset by the use without interest of the
money of the vendee by the vendor. (Ibid., 207; Lovina vs. Veloso,
[C.A.] 40 O.G. 2331.)
(3) Costs of the suit. — The vendee is also entitled to recover
310 SALES Art. 1555
the expense of litigation (see Rules of Court, Rule 142, Sec. 1.) re-
sulting in eviction, including the costs of the action brought
against the vendor to enforce his warranty. “Costs of the suit”
mentioned in No. (3) does not include travelling expenses incurred
by the vendee in defending himself in the action. (see Orense vs.
Jaucian, 18 Phil. 553 [1911].) He is not entitled to recover damages
unless the sale was made by the vendor in bad faith. (No. 5.)
(4) Expenses of the contract. — In the absence of any stipula-
tion to the contrary, the expenses in the execution and registra-
tion of the sale are borne by the vendor. However, if the vendee
should have paid for such expenses, he shall have the right to
demand the same from the vendor.
(5) Damages and interests. — The right of the vendee to demand
“damages and interests and ornamental expenses” is qualified by
the condition that the sale was made in bad faith. If good faith is
presumed, the vendee is not entitled to recover damages unless
bad faith on the part of the vendor is shown in making the sale.
(see Pascual vs. Lesaca, 91 Phil. 920 [1952].) The word “interests”
does not cover interest on the purchase price as in lieu thereof the
vendee is entitled to the fruits of the thing, and in cases he has
been ordered by a court to deliver the fruits to the successful party,
the vendor must indemnify him. (see No. 2.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Buyer purchased land after having been informed of prior right
of another to purchase the same based on prior occupancy.
Facts: In 1952, S executed in favor of B a contract to sell a
lot. At the time of the execution of the contract, the parties knew
that a portion of the lot was occupied by T. It was the under-
standing of the parties that T would be ejected by S from the
premises. After the installments were paid, the deed of sale was
executed. In 1958, S filed a complaint for ejectment against T,
but the court ruled against S, owing to a compromise agree-
ment in another case between S and D.
B filed an action against S to enforce the vendor’s warranty
against eviction or recover the value of the land. It appears that
the compromise agreement with D was sanctioned by the court
and the prior right of T to purchase the lot in question was
based more on his prior occupancy of the same since 1949 about
which B was informed by S. The execution of the compromise

agreement merely recognized this prior right of T.
Issue: Is B entitled to the vendor’s warranty against evic-
tion and damages under Article 1555?
Held: No. One who purchases real estate with knowledge
of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has
acquired title thereto in good faith, as against the true owner of
the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be
applied to one who has knowledge of the facts which should
have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his
vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should
put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he
acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in
the title of the vendor. Without being shown to be a vendee in
good faith, B is not entitled to the warranty against eviction,
nor is he entitled to recover damages.
“However, for justice’s sake, and in consonance with the
salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, S
should compensate B in the total sum of P126,000, representing
the aggregate value of the 1,050 square meters (which S was ju-
dicially ordered to sell to T at the year 1958 at the prevailing rate
of P60 per sq.m.) at the value of P120 per square meter, doubling
the price, due to the reduced purchasing power of the peso with
the legal rate of interest from the date B filed his complaint.” (J.M.
Tuazon, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 413 [1979].)
Right of second purchaser to whom

warranty assigned.
Where a warranty against eviction was expressly agreed upon
in a contract of sale and the vendee sold the same land to another
expressly assigning to him the right to warranty, the second pur-
chaser has a right of action against the first vendor to make good
the warranty against eviction.
The rule that a contract binds only the parties, their assigns
and heirs (see Art. 1311, par. 2.) is not applicable to this case. The
basis of the second purchaser’s action is the first vendee’s trans-
fer to him of the right to the warranty, a right which the latter had
against the seller and which the former exercises by virtue of the
transfer. (De la Riva vs. Escobar, 51 Phil. 243 [1927].)
312 SALES Art. 1556
ART. 1556. Should the vendee lose, by reason of

the eviction, a part of thing sold of such importance,
in relation to the whole, that he would not have bought
it without said part, he may demand the rescission of
the contract; but with the obligation to return the thing
without other encumbrances than those which it had
when he acquired it.
He may exercise this right of action, instead of
enforcing the vendor’s liability for eviction.
The same rule shall be observed when two or more
things have been jointly sold for a lump sum, or for a
separate price for each of them, if it should clearly
appear that the vendee would not have purchased one
without the other. (1479a)
Alternative rights of vendee in case

of partial eviction.
This article contemplates of partial eviction, while Article 1554
treats of total eviction. It states the rule that if there is partial evic-
tion, the vendee has the option either to enforce the vendor’s liabil-
ity for eviction (Art. 1555.) or to demand rescission of the contract.
The above rule is applicable —
(1) When the vendee is deprived of a part of the thing sold if
such part is of such importance to the whole that he would not
have bought the thing without said part (par. 1.); or
(2) When two or more things are jointly sold whether for a
lump sum or for a separate price for each, and the vendee would
not have purchased one without the other. (par. 2.)
EXAMPLE:
S sells to B a parcel of land, represented by S as containing
500 square meters, at the rate of P200.00 per square meter. B
needs a lot of at least 500 square meters on which to build a fac-
tory. B is evicted from a 20-square-meter portion of the land. B
would not have bought the land had he known of its smaller area.
Under the facts, B can either sue for damages for breach of
warranty or demand rescission of the contract. He can also ex-
ercise his alternative rights if these were two parcels of land

sold and he should lose one of them by reason of eviction.
Remedy of rescission not available

in case of total eviction.
In case the vendee is totally evicted from the thing sold, he
cannot avail of the remedy of rescission, because this remedy con-
templates that the one demanding it is able to return whatever
he has received under the contract. (Art. 1385.) This is not so when
the vendee loses only a part of the thing sold because there still
remains a portion of the thing.
In case of rescission, the vendee can return the thing but it must
not be subject to “other encumbrances than those which it had
when he acquired it.” (see Art. 1556.)
ART. 1557. The warranty cannot be enforced until

a final judgment has been rendered, whereby the
vendee loses the thing acquired or a part thereof.
(1480)
Final judgment of eviction

essential.
The above article merely reiterates two of the essential ele-
ments for the enforcement of warranty in case of eviction, namely:
(1) deprivation of the whole or of a part of the thing sold; and (2)
existence of a final judgment. (Art. 1548.)
Eviction may take place by virtue of a final judgment of
an administrative office or board, and it is not indispensable
that it be rendered by a court, provided it was rendered by com-
petent authority and in conformity with the procedure prescribed
by law. (Bonzon vs. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 27 Phil. 141
[1914].)
ART. 1558. The vendor shall not be obliged to make

good the proper warranty, unless he is summoned in
the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee.
(1481a)
314 SALES Art. 1558
Formal summons to vendor essential.

Another essential requisite before a vendor may be legally li-
able for eviction is that, he should be summoned in the suit for
eviction at the instance of the vendee. (see Jovellano vs. Lualhati,
47 Phil. 371 [1975]; City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil. 324 [1911].)
(1) Vendor to be made party in suit for eviction. — The phrase
“unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction” means that the
vendor should be made a party to the suit either by way of ask-
ing that the former be made a co-defendant (Art. 1559.) or by the
filing of a third-party complaint against said vendor.
(a) Furnishing the vendor by registered mail with a copy
of the opposition the vendee filed in the eviction suit is not the
kind of notice prescribed by Articles 1558 and 1559. (Escaler
(b) It is evident that the notification must be given in the
action brought by the third party against the vendee, because
it is there that the vendor must defend the vendee’s peaceful
and legal possession, for which he is responsible, and not in
the action to enforce the warranty itself which already sup-
poses the eviction. (De la Riva vs. Escobar & Bank of P.I., 51
Phil. 243 [1928].)
(2) Object of the law. — The object is to give the vendor an
opportunity to intervene and defend the title that he has trans-
ferred, for, after all, he alone would know the circumstances or
reasons behind the claim of the plaintiff and be in a position to
defend the validity of his title. (10 Manresa 219-220; De la Riva
vs. Escobar & Bank of P.I., supra.) In the absence of such opportu-
nity, the vendor is not bound to his warranty. (Jovellano vs.
Lualhati, supra; Angelo vs. Pacheco, 56 Phil. 70 [1931].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
In the eviction suit which was a mere incident in a land registra-
tion proceedings for the cancellation of title, the vendee merely fur-
nished the vendor with a copy of the former’s opposition to the peti-
tion for cancellation.
Facts: B, vendee, bought from S, vendor, 24 hectares of land
which S had purchased from R. At the time of the sale, the prop-
erty was still covered by OCT in the name of R. Subsequently,
the Register of Deeds filed a petition for the cancellation of the

OCT in the name of R on the ground that the land in question
had been previously registered in the name of T.
B filed an opposition to the petition for cancellation furnish-
ing S and R by registered mail with copies of said opposition.
The lower court declared void the title of R and those derived
therefrom like the titles of S and B. B sued S to enforce the war-
ranty against eviction contained in the deed of sale executed by
S.
Issue: Could B enforce the warranty against S?
Held: No. The requisite — that of the vendor being sum-
moned in the suit for eviction (case for cancellation) at the in-
stance of the vendee — is not present. Furnishing the vendor S,
by registered mail, with a copy of the opposition the vendee B
filed in the eviction suit is not the kind of notice prescribed by
Articles 1558 and 1559.
R. Aquino, C.J., dissenting: It was not possible for B to com-
ply strictly with Articles 1558 and 1559. The eviction took place,
not in an ordinary suit wherein the vendor can be made a co-
defendant, but as an incident in the cancellation of title in a
land registration proceeding. In such a case, the furnishing of
the vendor with a copy of the opposition was a substantial com-
pliance with Articles 1558 and 1559. It was notice to the ven-
dor. S’s vendor, R, was first notified of the cancellation pro-
ceeding. It was not the fault of B that the eviction case assumed
the shape of a mere incident in the land registration proceed-
ing and not an ordinary contentious civil action. S could not be
made a co-defendant in that incident for cancellation of title, a
summary proceeding. A contrary view would enable S to en-
rich himself unjustly at the expense of B. (Escaler vs. Court of
Appeals, 138 SCRA 1 [1985].)
ART. 1559. The defendant vendee shall ask, within

the time fixed in the Rules of Court for answering the
complaint, that the vendor be made a co-defendant.
(1482a)
Vendor to be made co-defendant.

As previously stated, the notification required by Article 1559
refers to a case where the vendee is the defendant in a suit insti-
tuted to deprive him of the thing purchased.
316 SALES Art. 1560
The defendant vendee threatened with eviction who wishes

to preserve his right of warranty, should call in the vendor to
defend the action which has been instituted against him.
(Jovellano vs. Lualhati, 47 Phil. 371 [1925].) He should ask the
court within the time allowed him to answer (Rules of Court, Rule
11, Sec. 1.), that the vendor be made a co-defendant to answer the
complaint of the plaintiff who seeks to deprive him (the vendee)
of the property purchased.
ART. 1560. If the immovable sold should be en-

cumbered with any non-apparent burden or servitude,
not mentioned in the agreement, of such a nature that
it must be presumed that the vendee would not have
acquired it had he been aware thereof, he may ask for
the rescission of the contract, unless he should pre-
fer the appropriate indemnity. Neither right can be
exercised if the non-apparent burden or servitude is
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless there is
an express warranty that the thing is free from all bur-
dens and encumbrances.
Within one year, to be computed from the execu-
tion of the deed, the vendee may bring the action for
rescission, or sue for damages.
One year having elapsed, he may only bring an
action for damages within an equal period, to be
counted from the date on which he discovered the
burden or servitude. (1483a)
Where immovable sold encumbered

with non-apparent burden.
(1) Right of vendee. — Although the vendee is not deprived of
the thing sold, totally or partially, the vendee may still rescind the
contract or ask for indemnity, if the thing sold should be encum-
bered with any non-apparent burden or servitude, not mentioned
in the agreement of such a nature that the vendee would not have
acquired it had he been aware thereof.
The lack of knowledge on the part of the vendor is not a
defense. The contract can still be invalidated on the ground of
mistake. (Art. 1331; see Arts. 1556, 1566; see Pineda vs. Santos, 56
Phil. 583 [1982].)
Note: A servitude (or easement) is an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belong-
ing to a different owner. (Art. 615.) An example of an apparent
servitude is a right of way establishing a permanent passage (Art.
649, par. 2.), which is continually kept in view by external sign.
An example of a non-apparent easement is a party wall (Art. 659.)
which has no exterior sign. (Art. 660.)
(2) When right cannot be exercised. — The alternative rights
granted by Article 1560 cannot be exercised in the following cases:
(a) If the burden or servitude is apparent, that is, “made
known and is continually kept in view by external signs that
reveal the use and enjoyment of the same’’ (Art. 615, par. 4.);
(b) If the non-apparent burden or servitude is registered;
and
(c) If the vendee had knowledge of the encumbrance,
whether it is registered or not.
The registration of the non-apparent burden or servitude in
the Registry of Property operates as a constructive notice to the
vendee. Hence, the vendor is relieved from liability unless there
is an express warranty that the immovable is free from any such
burden or encumbrance. If the burden is known to the vendee,
there is no warranty. (par. 1.)
(3) When action must be brought. — The action for rescission or
damages must be brought within one year from the execution of
the deed of sale. If the period has already elapsed, the vendee may
only bring an action for damages within one year from the date of
the discovery of the non-apparent burden or servitude. (pars. 2 and
3.)
SUBSECTION 2. — Warranty Against Hidden Defects

of, or Encumbrances Upon, the Thing Sold
ART. 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for
warranty against the hidden defects which the thing
sold may have, should they render it unfit for the use
for which it is intended, or should they diminish its
318 SALES Art. 1561
fitness for such use to such an extent that, had the

vendee been aware thereof, he would not have ac-
quired it or would have given a lower price for it; but
said vendor shall not be answerable for patent defects
or those which may be visible, or for those which are
not visible if the vendee is an expert who, by reason
of his trade or profession, should have known them.
(1484a)
(1) Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account of some
vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders its use impossible,
or so inconvenient and imperfect that it must be supposed that
the buyer would not have purchased it had he known of the vice.
(Civil Code La., Art. 2406.)
(2) Redhibitory action is an action instituted to avoid a sale on
account of some vice or defect in the thing sold which renders its
use impossible, or so inconvenient and imperfect that it must be
supposed that the buyer would not have purchased it had he
known of the vice. (Cyc., Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 945.) The ob-
ject is the rescission of the contract. If the object is to procure the
return of a part of the purchase price paid by the vendee, the rem-
edy is known as accion quanti minoris or estimatoris. (10 Manresa
226-227; see Art. 1567.)
(3) Redhibitory vice or defect is a defect in the article sold against
which defect the seller is bound to warrant. (see Cyc., Law Dic-
tionary, 3rd ed., 1945.) The vice or defect must constitute an im-
perfection, a defect in its nature, of certain importance; and a
minor defect does not give rise to redhibition. The mere absence
of a certain quality in the thing sold which the vendee thought it
to contain is not necessarily a redhibitory defect. One thing is that
the thing lacks certain qualities and another thing is that it posi-
tively suffers from certain defects. (10 Manresa 227-228.)
Requisites for warranty against

hidden defects.
The following requisites must concur for the existence of the
warranty against hidden defects:
(1) The defect must be important or serious;

(2) It must be hidden;
(3) It must exist at the time of the sale;
(4) The vendee must give notice of the defect to the vendor
within a reasonable time (Art. 1586.);
(5) The action for rescission or reduction of the price must be
brought within the proper period — 6 months from the delivery
of the thing sold (Art. 1571.) or within 40 days from the date of
the delivery in case of animals (Art. 1577, par. 1.); and
(6) There must be no waiver of warranty on the part of the
vendee. (Art. 1548, par. 3.)
When defect important.

The defect is important if: (1) it renders the thing sold unfit for
the use for which it is intended; or (2) if it diminishes its fitness
for such use to such an extent that the vendee would not have
acquired it had he been aware thereof or would have given a lower
price for it. (see Bryan vs. Hankins, 44 Phil. 87 [1922]; Gochangco
vs. Dean, 47 Phil. 687 [1925].)
The use contemplated must be that stipulated, and in the ab-
sence of stipulation, that which is adopted to the nature of the
thing and to the business of the purchaser. (see 10 Manresa 227-
280.)
An imperfection or defect of little consequence does not come
within the category of being redhibitory. But where an expert
witness categorically established that a printing machine sold is
in A-1 condition, required major repairs before it could be used,
plus the fact that the buyer never made appropriate use of the
machine from the time of purchase until an action was filed, at-
test to the major defects in said machine justifying rescission of
the contract. (Moles vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA
777 [1989].)
When defect hidden.

The defect is hidden (or latent) if it was not known and could
not have been known to the vendee. (see McCullough vs. Aenille
320 SALES Art. 1561
& Co., 3 Phil. 284 [1904].) It is one which is hidden to the eyes and
cannot be discovered by ordinarily careful inspection or exami-
nation. Hence, there is no warranty if the defect is patent or vis-
ible. For the same reason, the vendor’s liability for warranty can-
not be enforced although the defect is hidden if the vendee is an
expert who, by reason of his trade or profession, should have
known it.
The same defect, therefore, may be hidden with respect to one
person, but not hidden with respect to another.
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B a house. After the sale, B discovered that the
main posts of the house and other interior parts had been de-
stroyed by “anay” and “bukbok” and as a result, many parts of
the house were in danger of collapsing. The defects of the house
were hidden and concealed and were unknown to B until a
closer inspection was made by him.
Under the circumstances, S is liable for the defects even
though he was not aware thereof (Art. 1566.) and B may elect
between the rescission of the contract and a proportionate re-
duction of the price, with damages in either case. (Art. 1567.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Buyer refused, three years after acceptance, to pay balance of pur-
chase price of tobacco claiming it was not of good quality.
Facts: S sold to B at a fixed price certain quantity of tobacco
without specification as to quality. After receiving the merchan-
dise, B fully examined the same by opening many of the bun-
dles and examining the contents thereof and admitted the quan-
tity and the price.
Without making any allegation of fraud, B made a partial
payment. After a lapse of three years, B refused to pay the bal-
ance, claiming that the tobacco was not of good quality.
Issue: Is B liable for the balance of the purchase price?
Held: Yes. In the absence of an express warranty, the ven-
dor only impliedly warrants the legal and peaceful possession
of the thing sold and that there are no hidden defects. (see Art.
1547.) B is, therefore, liable for the balance of the purchase price.
(Chong Yong Tek vs. Santos, 13 Phil. 52 [1909]; see Phil. Manufac-
turing Co. vs. Go Juco, 48 Phil. 621 [1925].)
Where defect patent or made known.

(1) A warranty, in general terms, does not cover defects which
the buyer must have observed. Thus, if the seller of a horse which
is obviously blind and which both parties know to be blind, says
it is sound, the meaning of “sound” as used in that connection
must be sound except as to its eyes.
(2) The same rule is applicable to a defect which is not obvi-
ous but of which the seller tells the buyer, or which the buyer
knows or should have known. A well-recognized limitation on
any doctrine freeing the seller from liability for statements or
promises in regard to obvious defects is that, if the seller success-
fully uses art to conceal the defects, the seller is liable. (see 1
Williston, op. cit., Sec. 207.)
(3) As a general rule, there is no implied warranty against
hidden defects in the sale of second-hand goods. Again, as an
exception, the seller shall be liable if he has been shown to have
made misrepresentation or acted in bad faith. (see Peralta vs.
Jornada Enterprises, Inc., 7 C.A. Rep. 2d, 270 [1965].)
(4) The seller may bind himself against patent or obvious
defects (manifest upon casual inspection) if the intent to do so is
clearly evident. In such a case, the seller cannot allege as a defense
that inspection (which the buyer failed to make) would have dis-
closed the defect or that the buyer relied on his own judgment.
(Babb & Martin, op. cit., pp. 92-93.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Buyer refused to pay balance of purchase price of a steel door on
ground of hidden defects.
Facts: Under a contract, S manufactured and installed a steel
door on B’s building. B complained of defects on the door and
repairs were made by S’s employees. Subsequently, S made a
new door but B refused to accept the same. B claimed that the
defect of the steel door in question was hidden within the con-
templation of Article 1561, and, therefore, he was not liable to
pay the balance of the purchase price.
322 SALES Art. 1562
The steel door has transparent glass frames, with no hid-

den parts nor intricate mechanism that could not have been
seen by B by means of cursory examination at the time of its
delivery.
Issue: Is B’s claim tenable?
Held: No. If the steel door had any defect, it could not be
hidden within the contemplation of implied warranty against
hidden defects, but rather patent and visible for which S is not
answerable pursuant to Article 1561. It appeared that the first
complaint of defect was due to the fact that the door was used
before the cement placed to secure its anchor clips had hard-
ened, thereby completely loosening the steel frame and subse-
quently, the breakage of the glass panels was due to extraordi-
nary force occasionally applied in closing the door or to the
hard blow of the wind. There was no showing that the proxi-
mate cause of the glass breakage was defect in the steel door
itself. (Hahn vs. Hercules Steel Works, 5 C.A. Rep. 2d 118 [1964].)
ART. 1562. In a sale of goods, there is an implied

warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness of
the goods, as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for
which the goods are acquired, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller’s skill of judgment (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably
fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description
from a seller who deals in goods of that description
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of
merchantable quality. (n)
Implied warranties of quality.

Quality of goods includes their state or condition. (Art. 1636.)
The purpose of holding the seller on his implied warranties is to
promote high standard in business and to discourage sharp deal-
ings. They are based on the principle that “honesty is the best
policy.” (see Bekkevold vs. Potts, 216 N.W. 790.)
(1) Implied warranty of fitness. — There is no implied warranty
as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods
under a contract of sale, except as follows: where: (a) the buyer,
expressly or by implication, manifests to the seller the particular
purpose for which the goods are required, and (b) the buyer re-
lies upon the seller’s skill or judgment. Then, whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not — there is an implied warranty
that the goods are reasonably fit for such purpose. (Babb & Mar-
tin, op. cit., p. 94.)
(a) Particular purpose of goods. — It is not some purpose
necessarily distinct from a general purpose. For example, the
general purpose for which all food is bought is to be eaten, and
this would also be the particular purpose in a specific instance.
It is, in fact, the purpose expressly or impliedly communicated
to the seller for which the buyer buys the goods; and it may
appear from the very description of the article as, for exam-
ple, “coatings” or a “hot water bottle.” But where an article is
capable of being applied to a variety of purpose, the buyer
must particularize the specific purpose he has in view. (1
Williston, op. cit., p. 661.)
(b) Test. — It is whether the buyer justifiably relied upon
the seller’s judgment that the goods furnished would fulfill
the desired purpose, or whether relying on his own judgment,
the buyer ordered or bought what is frequently called “a
known, described, and definite article.” (Ibid., p. 607; see Art.
1563; Co Cho Chit vs. Henson, Oath & Stevenson, Inc., 103
Phil. 956 [1958].) The occupation of the seller is important
evidence of the justifiableness of the buyer’s reliance. And
where the buyer has had no opportunity for previous inspec-
tion, he is entitled to rely, and will naturally be presumed to
have relied, upon the seller’s skill and judgment.
(2) Implied warranty of merchantability. — Where goods are
bought by description, the seller impliedly warrants that the goods
are of merchantable quality.
(a) Merchantability. — It is not a warranty of quality in the
sense of requiring a particular grade, but it does require iden-
324 SALES Art. 1562
tity between what is described in the contract and what is ten-

dered, in the sense that the latter is of such quality to have
some value. Judicial synonyms for “merchantability” include
“salable’’ (or “saleable,”) “standard,” or “average quality” of
goods sold under a particular description. (Babb & Martin, op.
cit., p. 95.)
(b) Causes of unmerchantability. — Goods may be unmer-
chantable not because of any defect in their physical condition
but because of some other circumstances, e.g., their infringe-
ment of trademarks of others renders them unsalable. Other
goods than food may be unmerchantable because the use of
them is dangerous or injurious in ways not to be expected from
the goods of the kind. Thus, if an ingredient of a face powder
is such as to cause irritation of the skin, the goods are not
merchantable. Cases of this sort may often involve the ques-
tion whether the difficulty is due to peculiar sensitiveness of
the buyer and if so, whether there is ground for a right of ac-
tion when goods would not be injurious to most persons.
(c) Saleability in a particular market. — The requirement of
merchantable quality carries with it no implication that the
goods shall be saleable in a particular market. (1 Williston, op.
cit., pp. 641-643.)
(d) Applicability to goods in that description. — It must be
made clear that the warranty that the goods are of
merchantable quality applies to all goods bought from a seller
who deals in goods in that description, whether they are sold
under a patent or trade name or otherwise. (Ibid., p. 611.)
Warranty of merchantability distinguished

from warranty of fitness.
A warranty of merchantability is a warranty that goods are rea-
sonably fit for the general purpose for which they are sold. On
the other hand, a warranty of fitness is a warranty that the goods
are suitable for the special purpose of the buyer which will not
be satisfied by mere fitness for general purposes. (Dunfor Bros.
Co. vs. Consolidated Iron-Steel Mfg. Co., C.C.A. Comm. 1928, 23
F. 2nd 461.)
Fitness for a particular purpose

and merchantability.
It should be noticed that fitness for a particular purpose may
be merely the equivalent of merchantability. Thus, the particular
purpose for which a reaping machine is generally designed is
reaping. If it will not fulfill this purpose, it is not merchantable.
The particular purpose, however, may be narrower. Thus, a
machine may be desired for operation on rough ground and
though it may be a good reaping machine, it may yet be impossi-
ble to make it work satisfactorily in the place where the buyer
wishes to use it. (1 Williston, op. cit., p. 467.)
Note: The word “of” before “judgment” in Article 1562(1)
should read “or.”
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Machine purchased was in accordance with specifications in con-
tract but did not give the result expected by buyer.
Facts: Under a contract of sale, S delivered and installed in
B’s establishment a refrigerating machine. The machine was in
perfect accord with the description made in the contract but it
did not give the result expected by B. S brought action to re-
cover the balance of the purchase price.
Issue: Is B’s action in refusing to pay such balance justifi-
able considering that he could not use the machine satisfacto-
rily in his establishment?
Held: No. The inability of B to use the machine satisfacto-
rily cannot be attributed to any defect in the machine nor to S’s
fault since the machine was strictly in accordance with the speci-
fications in the written contract of sale. (Pacific Commercial Co.
vs. Ermita Market & Cold Stores, 56 Phil. 617 [1932].)
ART. 1563. In the case of contract of sale of a speci-

fied article under its patent or other trade name, there
is no warranty as to its fitness for any particular pur-
pose, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. (n)
Sale under a patent or trade name.

Under Article 1562(1), the buyer makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are desired. Article
326 SALES Art. 1564
1563 is naturally a provision limiting the application of Article

1562.
(1) By exactly defining what he wants, the buyer has exercised
his own judgment instead of relying upon that of the seller. This
definition may be given by means of a trade name or in any other
way. The description must be the buyer’s choice, or the goods
must not only be described and definite but known, in order to
preclude warranty of fitness. (Williston, op. cit., p. 612.)
(2) Article 1563 provides an exception in case of “a stipula-
tion to the contrary.” Thus, there is still an implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose where the buyer relied upon the
seller’s judgment rather than the patent or trade name. “Particu-
lar purpose,” as used in Article 1563, means a usage different from
the ordinary uses the article was made to meet. (Grant Mfg. Co.
vs. Yates American Machine Co., 111 F. 2d. 360.)
(3) The provision does not preclude an implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness for a purpose for which such specified
article is ordinarily or generally sold. Thus, if the seller is a dealer
in food, and the buyer is buying for immediate consumption and
relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, there is an implied war-
ranty that the article sold is fit for human consumption. (Babb &
Martin, op. cit., p. 93.)
EXAMPLE:
B went to Western Motors, Inc. to buy a car. After he was
shown cars of different models and makes, he chose a Cougar
car model 1982. B intended to enter the car in a race but this
fact was not made known to the seller.
If the car should not run as fast as B had expected, Western
Motors, Inc. is not liable because in buying the Cougar car, B
relied upon his own judgment. But if the seller was informed
of the purpose of B and B was assured that the car had a maxi-
mum speed of, say, 150 kilometers per hour, there is an express
warranty for a particular purpose and Western Motors is liable
if the car should not be fit for such purpose.
ART. 1564. An implied warranty or condition as to

the quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be
annexed by the usage of trade. (n)
Effect of usage of trade.

A warranty as to the quality or fitness for a particular purpose
may be attached by usage to a contract containing no express
provision in regard to warranty, though in the absence of usage
no warranty would be implied. The usage is relied on for the
purpose of showing the intention of the parties. If there is no us-
age, the parties would naturally express their intention.
A usage in order to bind both parties must be known to both
or, if unknown to one, the other must be justified in assuming
knowledge on the part of the person with whom he is dealing.
(see 1 Williston, op. cit., pp. 566-655; see Art. 1522.) The presump-
tion is that the parties are aware of the usage of trade.
ART. 1565. In the case of a contract of sale by sam-

ple, if the seller is a dealer in goods of that kind, there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be free
from any defect rendering them unmerchantable
which would not be apparent on reasonable exami-
nation of the sample. (n)
Merchantability of goods sold

by sample.
(1) Where sample not merchantable. — As a general rule, all the
buyer is entitled to, in case of a sale or contract to sell by sample,
is that the goods be like the sample, so he has no right to have the
goods merchantable if the sample which he has inspected is not.
The reason upon which this rule is based is identical with that
which generally denies an implied warranty to a buyer who has
inspected the goods which he buys. (see PMC vs. Go Juco, 48 Phil.
621 [1926]; Chang Yong Tek vs. Santos, 31 Phil. 152 [1915].)
(2) Where sample subject to latent defect. — Where the defect in
the goods is of such a character that inspection will not reveal it,
so in the case of a sale by sample, if the sample is subject to a la-
tent defect, and the buyer reasonably relies on the seller’s skill or
judgment, the buyer is entitled not simply to goods like the sam-
ple, but to goods like those which the sample seems to represent,
that is, merchantable goods of that kind and character. (1 Williston,
op. cit., pp. 678-679.)
328 SALES Art. 1566
Under Article 1481, the contract may be rescinded where the

bulk of the goods delivered do not correspond with the sample.
ART. 1566. The vendor is responsible to the vendee

for any hidden faults or defects in the thing sold, even
though he was not aware thereof.
This provision shall not apply if the contrary has
been stipulated, and the vendor was not aware of the
hidden faults or defects in the thing sold. (1485)
Responsibility of vendor for hidden defects.

(1) Effect of ignorance of vendor. — The ignorance of the ven-
dor does not relieve him from liability to the vendee for any hid-
den faults or defects in the thing sold. (see Bryan vs. Hankins, 44
Phil. 87 [1922].) In other words, good faith cannot be availed of as
a defense by the vendor.
(2) Exception. — The parties, however, may provide otherwise
in their contract (see Art. 1581, par. 3.) provided the vendor acted
in good faith, that is, he was unaware of the existence of the hid-
den fault or defect. (Arts. 1566, par. 2; 1553.)
(3) Where vendee aware of the defect. — If the vendee is aware
of the defect in the thing he buys or lack of title in the vendor, he
cannot later complain thereof. He is deemed to have wilfully and
voluntarily assumed the risk attendant to the sale. (Martinez vs.
Doctrines of “caveat venditor”

and “caveat emptor.”
At early common law, the implied warranty of quality was
not recognized and the rule was then caveat emptor3 (let the buyer
beware). The seller’s liability for defects of the goods sold was
then confined to cases of express promise to warrant the quality
of such goods and to those in which the seller had knowledge of
3
A basic premise of this doctrine is that there be no misrepresentation by the seller.
This ancient defense of caveat emptor belongs to a by-gone age, and has no place in con-
temporary business ethics. (Erquiaga vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCAD 810, 367 SCRA
357 [2001].)
the hidden defects and the sale was made without the seller re-
vealing them, but in the latter cases, the basis of the seller’s liabil-
ity was for fraud. The Roman Law, like the English law, started
with the doctrine of caveat emptor.
(1) The old Civil Code, following the Roman Law, rejected the
maxim caveat emptor. (see Art. 1547.) The doctrine of caveat vendi-
tor (let the seller beware) was adopted in accordance with which
“the vendor is liable to the vendee for any hidden faults or de-
fects in the thing sold, even though he was not aware thereof.” (Art.
1585, now Art. 1566 of our new Civil Code.) The doctrine is based
on the principle that a sound price warrants a sound article.
A manufacturer or seller of a product cannot be held liable
for any damage allegedly caused by the product in the absence
of any proof that the product in question was defective. The de-
fect must be present upon delivery or manufacture of the prod-
uct, or when the product left the seller’s or manufacturer’s con-
trol; or when the product was sold to the purchaser; or the prod-
uct must have reached the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition it was sold. Tracing the defect to the seller
or manufacturer requires some evidence that there was no tam-
pering with, or changing of the product. (Nutrimix Feeds Corpo-
ration vs. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA 357 [2004].)
(2) The maxim caveat emptor is still applicable, however, in
sheriff’s sales (Pabico vs. Ong Pauco, 43 Phil. 57 [1922]; Allure
Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 285 [1991].),
sales of animals under Article 1574, and tax sales (see Art. 1547,
last par.) for there is no warranty of title or quality on the part of
the seller in such sales. It also applies in double sales of property
where the issue is who between two vendees has a better right to
the property. (see Art. 1544.)
The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware
of the supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without
checking the vendor’s title takes all the risks and losses consequent
to such failure. (Salvoso vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349 [1978].) But a
person dealing with registered land is merely charged with no-
tice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of
the register or the certificate of title. (Campillo vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 129 SCRA 513 [1984].)
330 SALES Arts. 1567-1568
ART. 1567. In the cases of articles 1561, 1562, 1564,

1565, and 1566, the vendee may elect between with-
drawing from the contract and demanding a propor-
tionate reduction of the price, with damages in either
case. (1486a)
Alternative remedies of the buyer

to enforce warranty.
Under this article, the vendee has the option either: (1) to with-
draw from the contract, or (2) demand a proportionate reduction
of the price, with a right to damages in either case. This first is
known as accion redhibitoria (action for rescission), while the sec-
ond is known as accion quanti minoris. The remedies are alterna-
tive as they are incompatible with each other.
The same right is given to the vendee in the sale of animals
with redhibitory defects. (Art. 1580.)
The vendee must present proof that he suffered damage as a
result of the breach of the vendor’s warranty to be entitled to ac-
tual damages. (De Vera, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCAD 14,
367 SCRA 534 [2001].)
Note: The word “and” before “demanding” in Article 1567
should read “or.”
ART. 1568. If the thing sold should be lost in con-

sequence of the hidden faults, and the vendor was
aware of them, he shall bear the loss, and shall be
obliged to return the price and refund the expenses
of the contract, with damages. If he was not aware of
them, he shall only return the price and interest
thereon, and reimburse the expenses of the contract
which the vendee might have paid. (1487a)
Effect of loss of thing sold on account

of hidden defects.
(1) Vendor aware of hidden defects. — If the vendor was aware
of the hidden defects in consequence of which the thing sold was
lost, he shall bear the loss because he acted in bad faith. In such
case, the vendee has the right to recover:
(a) the price paid;
(b) the expenses of the contract; and
(c) damages.
(2) Vendor not aware of hidden defects. — If the vendor was not
aware of them, he shall be obliged only to return:
(a) the price paid;
(b) interest thereon; and
(c) expenses of the contract if paid by the vendee. He is
not made liable for damages because he is not guilty of bad
faith.
ART. 1569. If the thing sold had any hidden fault

at the time of the sale, and should thereafter be lost
by a fortuitous event or through the fault of the vendee,
the latter may demand of the vendor the price which
he paid, less the value which the thing had when it
was lost.
If the vendor acted in bad faith, he shall pay dam-
ages to the vendee. (1488a)
Effect of loss of defective thing sold.

If the thing sold had no hidden defects, its loss through a for-
tuitous event or through the fault of the vendee is, of course, to
be borne by the vendee. However, the vendor is obliged to return
the price paid less the value of the thing at the time of its loss in
case where hidden defects existed. In other words, under Article
1569, the vendor is still made liable on his warranty.
The difference between the price paid for the thing and the
value at the time of the loss, represents the damage suffered by
the vendee and is at the same time the amount with which the
vendor enriched himself at the expense of the vendee. (10 Manresa
238.) If the vendor acted in bad faith, he shall also be liable for
damages.
332 SALES Art. 1570
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B a vessel for P5,000,000.00. The defects of the
construction of the vessel were hidden and concealed and were
unknown to B until an official inspection was made. To make
the vessel seaworthy, an investment of P500,000.00 for repairs
was necessary.
If through the fault of B, the vessel was burned, S is never-
theless bound to return the purchase price of P5,000,000.00 paid
by B less P4,500,000.00 the value of the vessel at the time of the
loss.
ART. 1570. The preceding articles of this Subsec-

tion shall be applicable to judicial sales, except that
the judgment debtor shall not be liable for damages.
(1489a)
Warranty in judicial sales.

(1) As to judgment debtor. — In a judicial sale, it is not really
the sheriff who sells but the judgment debtor. Hence, the provi-
sions regarding warranty are also applicable to judicial sales. (see
Art. 1574.) The buyer can avail either of the alternative remedies
to enforce the warranty and the provisions of Articles 1568 and
1569. However, since the judgment debtor is forced to sell, there
can be no liability for damages. The publicity surrounding a ju-
dicial sale and the fact that the seller does not take an active part
in the sale and in the determination of the price precludes the
existence of bad faith on his part. (see 10 Manresa 242.) While in
voluntary sales or transactions the vendor or transferor can be
expected to defend his title because of his warranty to the vendee,
no such obligation is owed by the owner whose land is sold at
execution sale. (Santiago Land Development Corp. vs. Court of
In a case, a land was sold at public auction for unpaid realty
taxes. It was held that the sale by the buyer of the land to a pur-
chaser in good faith for value was valid even if there was no com-
pliance with all the requirements of the law concerning tax sale
of delinquent property. (Reyes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
135 SCRA 214 [1985].) But an auction sale conducted to satisfy a
judgment which is null and void, necessarily is also null and void.
(Ver vs. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80 [1988].)
(2) As to government. — In judicial sales, the principle of ca-
veat emptor applies, according to which the purchaser acquires by
his purchase no higher or better title or right than that of the judg-
ment debtor. If the latter has no right, interest, or lien in and to
the property sold, the purchaser acquires none. (Lanci vs. Yangco,
52 Phil. 563 [1928]; Laxamana vs. Carlos, 57 Phil. 722 [1929];
Parreno vs. Ganancial, 29 SCRA 786 [1969]; Tay Chun Suy vs.
Court of Appeals, 47 SCAD 139, 229 SCRA 151 [1994].) The rule
of caveat emptor which governs sheriff’s sales puts the purchaser
upon inquiry as to the debtor’s title, there being no warranty of
title, such sales being involuntary as distinguished from volun-
tary transactions, and if he buys, he must do so at his own peril
(Enriquez vs. De Delgado, [C.A.] No. 24466 R, Dec. 8, 1961.), and
it is not incumbent on the sheriff to place the purchaser in pos-
session of the property. (Pabico vs. Ong Pauco, 43 Phil. 572 [1923].)
Right of purchaser in judicial sales.

(1) The purchaser of property on sale under execution and
levy takes as assignee only. (Pacheco vs. Court of Appeals, 153
SCRA 382 [1987].) Indeed, at a sheriff’s sale what is sold is not the
property advertised, but simply the interest of the debtor in the
property; if it afterwards develops that he has none, the purchaser
is still liable on his bid because he has offered so much for the
debtor’s interest in open market and it is for him to determine
before he bids what the debtor’s interest is worth. (Leyson vs.
Tañada, 109 SCRA 66 [1981], citing 30 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 691-692.)
(2) Where a judicial sale is voided or set aside without fault
of the purchaser, the latter is entitled to reimbursement of the
purchase money paid by him subject to set-off for benefits enjoyed
while he had possession of the property. As a general rule, a judi-
cial sale can only be set aside upon the return to the buyer of the
purchase price with simple interest and other expenses incurred
by him. He is ordinarily entitled to a lien on the property until he
is repaid whatever may be due him. (Seven Brothers Shipping
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 62 SCAD 546, 246 SCRA 33 [1995].)
334 SALES Arts. 1571-1572
ART. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of

the preceding ten articles shall be barred after six
months, from the delivery of the thing sold. (1490)
Prescription of actions in cases

of implied/express warranty.
(1) The action for rescission of the contract or reduction of the
purchase price (Art. 1567.) prescribes six months from the date of
delivery of the thing sold. Outside this period the action is barred.
It follows that a vendee should not be permitted to offer as a
defense, hidden defects in the thing sold six months after he had
received it. (Gaba vs. Almonidovar, [C.A.] No. 24703-R, Feb. 24,
1960.) If the action is not for breach of warranty but quasi-delict or
negligence, the prescriptive period is four (4) years. (see Art.
1146[2].)
The ten preceding articles referred to define the vendor’s li-
ability for the defects in the thing sold. (Ibid.) A cursory reading
of said articles reveals that Article 1571 may be applied only in
cases of implied warranty.
(2) With respect to an express warranty, in accordance with
the general rule on rescission of contract, the prescriptive pe-
riod which is four (4) years, shall apply (Moles vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 777 [1989]; Villostas vs. Court of
Appeals, 210 SCRA 490 [1992].) unless another period is speci-
fied in the express warranty. (Engineering & Machinery Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCAD 113, 252 SCRA 156 [1996]; Isidoro
vs. Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc., 116 SCAD 702, 319 SCRA
757 [1999].)
ART. 1572. If two or more animals are sold together,

whether for a lump sum or for a separate price for
each of them, the redhibitory defect of one shall only
give rise to its redhibition, and not that of the others;
unless it should appear that the vendee would not
have purchased the sound animal or animals without
the defective one.
The latter case shall be presumed when a team,

yoke, pair, or set is bought, even if a separate price
has been fixed for each one of the animals compos-
ing the same. (1491)
Sale of two or more animals together.

When two or more animals have been sold at the same time
and the redhibitory defect (Art. 1576.) is in one, or some of them
but not in all, the general rule is that the redhibition will not af-
fect the others without it. It is immaterial whether the price has
been fixed for a lump sum for all the animals or for a separate
price for each.
The exception is when it can be shown by the vendee that he
would not have purchased the sound ones without those which
are defective. (see Art. 1556, par. 1.) Such intention need not be
established by the vendee but shall be presumed when a team,
yoke, pair or set is bought unless the vendor proves the contrary.
Although Article 1572 provides only for redhibitory actions,
it does not bar the right of the vendee to bring an action quanti
minoris. (see Arts. 1580, 1567.)
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B two carabaos for P10,000.00. If one carabao is
defective, S is liable for his warranty on the defective animal
only. In other words, B is not entitled to return the sound carabao
unless he can show that he would not have purchased it with-
out the defective one.
Such intention is presumed when the carabaos bought are
a male and a female but S may prove the contrary as, for exam-
ple, B has no present need or use for two carabaos.
In any event, B can accept the defective carabao and de-
mand a proportionate reduction of the price.
ART. 1573. The provisions of the preceding article

with respect to the sale of animals shall in like man-
ner be applicable to the sale of other things. (1492)
336 SALES Arts. 1574-1575
Sale of two or more things together.

The points considered in the preceding article apply also to
sale of two or more things where only one or more of them but
not all have hidden defects.
ART. 1574. There is no warranty against hidden

defects of animals sold at fairs or at public auctions,
or of livestock sold as condemned. (1493a)
Sale of animals at fairs or at public

auctions or as condemned.
This article is a limitation to the provisions of Article 1570. It
is based on the assumption that the defects must have been clearly
known to the buyer.
Since the law does not make any distinction, the public auc-
tions referred to may be judicial or extrajudicial. Sale of animals
as condemned precludes all idea of warranty against hidden de-
fects. (Art. 1561.) Such animals are bought not because of their
quality or capacity for work.
ART. 1575. The sale of animals suffering from con-

tagious diseases shall be void.
A contract of sale of animals shall also be void if
the use or service for which they are acquired has
been stated in the contract, and they are found to be
unfit therefor. (1494a)
When sale of animals void.

The article declares the class of animals which cannot be the
object of commerce — animals suffering from contagious diseases
and those found unfit for the use or service stated. The sale of such
animals is void as against public interest and not merely subject
to rescission or reduction of the price. (Art. 1567.) It is to be gov-
erned by the rules relating to nullity of contracts. (see Art. 1409.)
Even if the animals are found fit for the use or service stated
in the contract, the vendee may still rescind the contract under
Article 1561. This article contemplates a sale that has been per-
fected and consummated.
ART. 1576. If the hidden defect of animals, even in

case a professional inspection has been made, should
be of such a nature that expert knowledge is not suf-
ficient to discover it, the defect shall be considered
as redhibitory.
But if the veterinarian, through ignorance or bad
faith, should fail to discover or disclose it, he shall be
liable for damages. (1495)
What constitutes redhibitory defect

of animals?
Article 1576 is another rule especially applicable to animals.
To be considered redhibitory, the defect must not only be hid-
den. It must be of such a nature that expert knowledge is not suf-
ficient to discover it. However, if the veterinarian failed to dis-
cover it through his ignorance, or failed to disclose it to the vendee
through bad faith, he shall be liable for damages. The responsi-
bility is his and not the vendor’s.
ART. 1577. The redhibitory action, based on the

faults or defects of animals, must be brought within
forty days from the date of their delivery to the vendee.
This action can only be exercised with respect to
faults and defects which are determined by law or by
local customs. (1496a)
Limitation of action in sale of animals.

The redhibitory action based on the faults of animals shall be
barred unless brought within forty days from the date of their
delivery to the vendee.
According to the second paragraph, what should be consid-
ered redhibitory defects in the sale of animals are only those de-
termined by law or by local customs. If the defects are patent, there
338 SALES Arts. 1578-1579
is no warranty against such defects although there exists a redhibi-

tory vice.
ART. 1578. If the animal should die within three

days after its purchase, the vendor shall be liable if
the disease which caused the death existed at time of
the contract. (1497a)
Responsibility of vendor where animal

dies.
If the animal sold is suffering from any disease at the time of
the sale, the vendor is liable should it die of said disease within
three days from the date of the sale (not date of delivery). This
claim of the vendee must be based on a finding of an expert that
the disease causing the death existed at the time of the contract.
If the death occurs after three days or the defect is patent or
visible, he is not liable. If the loss is caused by a fortuitous event
or by the fault of the vendee, and the animal has vices, Article 1569
should be applied.
ART. 1579. If the sale be rescinded, the animal shall

be returned in the condition in which it was sold and
delivered, the vendee being answerable for any injury
due to his negligence, and not arising from redhibi-
tory fault or defect. (1498)
Liability of buyer in case sale of animal

is rescinded.
If the vendee avails himself of the remedies granted by Arti-
cle 1567 (see Art. 1580.), the vendee must return the animal in the
condition in which it was sold and delivered. In case of injury due
to his negligence, the vendee shall be responsible but this would
be no obstacle to the rescission of the contract due to the redhibi-
tory defect or fault of the animal. (see Art. 1569.)
Under Article 1556, the buyer may not ask for rescission where
he has created new encumbrances upon the thing sold.
ART. 1580. In the sale of animals with redhibitory

defects, the vendee shall also enjoy the right men-
tioned in article 1567; but he must make use thereof
within the same period which he has been fixed for
the exercise of the redhibitory action. (1499)
Alternative remedies of vendee

in sale of animals.
The vendee has the same right to bring at his option, either a
redhibitory action or an action quanti minoris. The action must be
brought within forty days from the date of the delivery of the
animals to the vendee. (Art. 1577.)
ART. 1581. The form of sale of large cattle shall be

governed by special laws. (n)
Form of sale of large cattle.

The special law governing the sale of large cattle is Act No.
4117, now found in Sections 511 to 536 of the Revised Adminis-
trative Code, as amended, providing for the registration, brand-
ing, conveyance, and slaughter of large cattle.
The sale must appear in a public document. (see Art. 1358.)
— oOo —
340 SALES
Chapter 5
OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDEE
ART. 1582. The vendee is bound to accept deliv-

ery and to pay the price of the thing sold at the time
and place stipulated in the contract.
If the time and place should not have been stipu-
lated, the payment must be made at the time and place
of the delivery of the thing sold. (1500a)
Principal obligations of vendee.

The principal obligations of the vendee are:
(1) to accept delivery; of the thing sold; and
(2) to pay the price1 of the thing sold at the time and place
stipulated in the contract; and
(3) to bear the expenses for the execution and registration of
the sale and putting the goods in a deliverable state, if such is the
stipulation. (Arts. 1488, 1521, last par.)
A grace period granted the vendee in case of failure to pay
the amount/s due is a right, not an obligation. When uncondi-
1
The vendor and the vendee are legally free to stipulate for the payment of either
the cash price of the thing sold or its installment price. Should the vendee opt to purchase
via the installment payment system which has been the custom and widely used in our
present-day commercial life with respect to purchase and sale of subdivision lots, he is,
in effect, paying interest on the cash price whether the fact and rate of such interest
payment is disclosed in the contract or not. (Relucio vs. Brillante-Garfin, 187 SCRA 405
[1990].)
340
Art. 1582 OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDEE 341
tionally conferred, it is effective without further need of demand

either calling for the payment of the obligation or for honoring
the right. The grace period must not be likened to an obligation,
the non-payment of which, under Article 1169 of the Civil Code,
would generally still require judicial or extrajudicial demand
before “default” can be said to arise. (Bricktown Dev’t. Corp. vs.
Amor Tierra Dev’t. Corp., 57 SCAD 437, 239 SCRA 126 [1994].)
The general rule is that an agreement to extend the time of
payment in order to be valid, must be for a definite time. Although
no precise date is fixed, it is sufficient that the time can readily be
determined. The fact that the seller did not act on the request for
what amounts to an indefinite extension may be construed just
as logically as a denial thereof. (City of Cebu vs. Heirs of C. Rubi,
106 SCAD 61, 306 SCRA 408 [1999].)
Pertinent rules.
In connection with the above obligations, the following rules
must be borne in mind:
(1) In a contract of sale, the vendor is not required to deliver
the thing sold until the price is paid nor the vendee to pay the
price before the thing is delivered in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary (La Font vs. Pascacio, 5 Phil. 591 [1906]; see Art.
1524.);
(2) If stipulated, then the vendee is bound to accept delivery
and to pay the price at the time and place designated;
(3) If there is no stipulation as to the time and place of pay-
ment and delivery, the vendee is bound to pay at the time and
place of delivery;
(4) In the absence also of stipulation, as to the place of deliv-
ery, it shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment
the contract was perfected (Art. 1251.); and
(5) If only the time for delivery of the thing sold has been fixed
in the contract, the vendee is required to pay even before the thing
is delivered to him; if only the time for payment of the price has
been fixed, the vendee is entitled to delivery even before the price
is paid by him. (see Art. 1524.)
342 SALES Art. 1582
EXAMPLES:
(1) S sold to B a specific refrigerator for P7,000.00. S is not
bound to deliver the refrigerator until payment by B; neither is
B required to pay P7,000.00 until delivery by S. From the mo-
ment either party performs his obligation, the other must com-
ply with his part; otherwise, he will be guilty of delay. (Art.
1169, par. 3.)
(2) If it has been stipulated that B must accept the refrig-
erator and pay the price at the house of S on October 10, then B
is bound to accept delivery and to pay the price on October 10
at the house of S.
(3) If there is no stipulation, as to the time and place of
delivery and S delivers the refrigerator at the house of B on
October 10, then B is bound to accept the refrigerator and to
pay the price at the same time and place.
(4) If there is also no stipulation, S is not required to de-
liver the refrigerator at the house of B because in such case the
place of delivery shall be where the refrigerator was at the
moment the contract was perfected. So if it was at the house of
S at that time, then that is the place of delivery and also the
place of payment. (Art. 1582, par. 2.)
(5) If the obligation of S to deliver is subject to a period
which has not yet arrived, B is bound to pay even before the
refrigerator is delivered to him. On the other hand, if the sale is
on credit, B is entitled to its delivery though the price be not
first paid.
Liability of vendee for obligations

of company bought out.
(1) Obligation not of considerable amount or value. — In some
cases, when one company buys out another and continues the
business of the latter company, the buyer may be said to assume
the obligations of the company bought out when said obligations
are not of considerable amount or value, especially when incurred
in the ordinary course of trade and when the business of the lat-
ter company is continued.
(2) Obligation of considerable amount or value. — When said
obligations are of extraordinary value and the company was
brought out not to continue its business but to stop its operation
in order to eliminate competition, it cannot be said that the vendee

assumed all the obligations of the rival company. (Phil. Air Lines,
Inc. vs. Balinquit, 99 Phil. 486 [1956].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
See No. (2) above.
Facts: PAL purchased and acquired a majority of the shares
of FEATI. These two airlines were, previous to the said pur-
chase, then competing in various air routes throughout the
Philippines with the result that both companies were losing
and it became necessary to maintain only one airline. The pur-
chase gave rise to the problem of what to do with the FEATI
employees. After some negotiations, the parties finally reached
an agreement on May 21, 1947, whereby PAL agreed to absorb
some 70% of the FEATI employees under the same terms and
conditions as they worked for the FEATI until such time as they
come to a definite understanding.
Under the collective agreement on August 1, 1946 between
FEATI and its employees, through their union, the latter were
granted vacation and sick leaves with pay every year. On July
9, 1947, PAL reached a “definite understanding” with the un-
ion whereby they entered into an agreement cancelling the
agreements of May 21, 1947 and August 1, 1946. It also pro-
vided for the laying off of all the FEATI employees as of June 15,
1947 and the payment of 1-1/2 months separation pay which
amounted roughly to P150,000.00.
The FEATI employees union filed a petition with the (de-
funct) Court of Industrial Relations praying that PAL be ordered
to pay vacation and sick leave with pay from August 1, 1946,
which had already accrued at the time they were laid-off on June
15, 1947. The employees claim that when PAL bought out FEATI,
the former assumed all the obligations and rights of the latter.
Issue: Is PAL legally liable for the payment of the money
equivalent of the vacation and sick leave earned from FEATI?
Held: No. As the obligation of FEATI is of considerable
value, which in this case amounts to P100,000.00, and FEATI
was bought out by PAL not to continue its business but to stop
its operation in order to eliminate competition, as shown by
the fact that all the employees of FEATI were laid-off, it cannot
be said that PAL assumed the obligations of FEATI, its rival
344 SALES Art. 1583
airline. The final agreement of July 9, 1947 failed to make any

mention whatsoever about the money equivalent of the vaca-
tion and sick leave. This leave was earned by the employees
from FEATI for services rendered from August 1, 1946 up to
May 21, 1947 when they ceased to render said service to FEATI.
For those employees who were absorbed by PAL from May 21,
1947 to June 15, 1947, when they were laid-off, they may be
said to have earned the corresponding leave from PAL.
Had the employees insisted on the payment of the leave
already earned from FEATI in the execution of the agreement
of July 9, 1947, FEATI could perhaps have been made to pay
unless, of course, PAL agreed to assume the obligation. When
they failed to raise the question or have it embodied in the agree-
ment, said failure may be regarded as a waiver of their right.
(Ibid.)
ART. 1583. Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer of

goods is not bound to accept delivery thereof by
installments.
Where there is a contract of sale of goods to be
delivered by stated installments, which are to be sepa-
rately paid for, and the seller makes defective deliver-
ies in respect of one or more installments, or the buyer
neglects or refuses without just cause to take deliv-
ery of or pay for one or more installments, it depends
in each case on the terms of the contract and the cir-
cumstances of the case, whether the breach of con-
tract is so material as to justify the injured party in
refusing to proceed further and suing for damages
for breach of the entire contract, or whether the breach
is severable, giving rise to a claim for compensation
but not a right to treat the whole contract as broken.
(n)
Rules governing delivery in installments.

(1) General rule. — In an ordinary contract for the sale of goods,
the buyer is not bound to receive delivery of the goods in
installments. He is entitled to delivery of all the goods at the same
time and, it may be added, is bound to receive delivery of all at
the same time. Similarly, a buyer has no right to pay the price in
installments. Neither can he be required to make partial payments.
By agreement, however, the goods may be deliverable by
installments or the price payable in installments. (see Art. 1248.)
(2) Where separate price has been fixed for each installment. —
Where the contract provides for the delivery of goods by
installments and a separate price has been agreed upon for each
installment, it depends in each case on the terms of the contract
and the circumstances of the case whether the breach thereof is
severable or not.
(a) Where breach affects whole contract. — If the seller makes
defective, partial or incomplete deliveries or the buyer wrong-
fully neglects or refuses to accept delivery or fails to pay any
installment, the injured party may sue for damages for breach
of the entire contract if the breach is so material (e.g., breach
of one installment prevents the further performance of the
contract) as to affect the contract as a whole.
(b) Where breach severable. — Where the breach is severable,
it will merely give rise to a claim for compensation for the par-
ticular breach but not a right to treat the whole contract as
broken.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Seller, after making partial deliveries, flatly refused to make any
more delivery.
Facts: S agreed to deliver to B monthly for a period of ten
years a specified amount of water gas tar and coal gas tar. S
failed to make delivery up to a certain date and “flatly refused
to make any delivery under the contract.”
Issue: May B sue for breach of the entire contract?
Held: Yes. As a general rule, a contract to do several things
at several times is divisible in nature, so as to entitle the injured
party to damages from time to time for breaches as they occur.
But an unqualified and positive refusal to perform a contract,
though the performance thereof is not yet due, may be treated
as a complete breach entitling and requiring the injured party
to recover all his damages in one suit. (Blossom & Co. vs. Manila
Gas Corporation, 55 Phil. 226 [1930].)
346 SALES Art. 1584
ART. 1584. Where goods are delivered to the buyer

which he has not previously examined, he is not
deemed to have accepted them unless and until he
has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them
for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in
conformity with the contract, if there is no stipulation
to the contrary.
Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller tenders
delivery of goods to the buyer, he is bound, on re-
quest, to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity
of examining the goods for the purpose of ascertain-
ing whether they are in conformity with the contract.
Where goods are delivered to a carrier by the seller,
in accordance with an order from or agreement with
the buyer, upon the terms that the goods shall not be
delivered by the carrier to the buyer until he has paid
the price, whether such terms are indicated by mark-
ing the goods with the words “collect on delivery,” or
otherwise, the buyer is not entitled to examine the
goods before the payment of the price, in the absence
of agreement or usage of trade permitting such ex-
amination. (n)
Buyer’s right to examine the goods.

Acceptance, as used in Article 1584, is assent to become owner
of the specific goods when delivery of them is offered to the buyer.
(3 Williston, op. cit., p. 31.)
(1) Actual delivery contemplated. — The delivery referred to in
said article, as can be gathered from its context, is actual delivery.
In other words, the ownership of the goods shall be transferred
only upon actual delivery subject to a reasonable opportunity of
examining them to determine if they are in conformity with the
contract. (par. 1; see Arts. 1481, 1501, par. 2.)
The right of examination or inspection under paragraph 1 is
thus a condition precedent to the transfer of ownership unless there is
a stipulation to the contrary.
(2) Goods delivered C.O.D./not C.O.D. — Where, in pursuance
of a contract of sale, the seller is authorized or required to send
the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier for the
purpose of transmission to the buyer is deemed to be delivery to
the buyer. (see Art. 1523, par. 1.)
(a) Although title passes to the buyer by the mere deliv-
ery to the carrier, the buyer unless the goods are sent C.O.D.
which is the normal procedure in importations, has the right
to examine the goods before paying. In this case, the right to
examine the goods is a condition precedent to paying the price
after ownership has passed.
(b) It should be noted that even in a C.O.D. sale, the buyer
is allowed to examine the goods before payment of the price
should it have been so agreed upon or if it is permitted by
usage. (par. 3.)
(3) Right of examination not absolute. — The buyer does not have
an absolute right of examination since the seller is bound to af-
ford the buyer a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods
only “on request.” (par. 2.) If the seller refused to allow opportu-
nity for the inspection, the buyer may rescind the contract and
recover the price or any part of it that he has paid.
(4) Right to be exercised within reasonable time. — While Article
1584 accords the buyer the right to a reasonable opportunity to
examine the goods to ascertain whether they are in conformity
with the contract, such opportunity to examine should be availed
of within a reasonable time in order that the seller may not suffer
undue delay or prejudice. (Grageda vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 155 SCRA 95 [1987].)
(5) Waiver of right to examine before payment. — The right of
inspection may, of course, be given up by the buyer by stipula-
tion. (Ibid.) The waiver, however, need not be in express terms.
An illustration of a bargain inconsistent with examination of the
goods before payment is a contract by which goods are to be sent
to the buyer C.O.D. (par. 3.) But the buyer is still entitled to ex-
amine the goods after their delivery and payment of the price. (par.
1.) Here, the right of examination is a condition subsequent after
transfer of ownership and payment of the price.
ART. 1585. The buyer is deemed to have accepted

the goods when he intimates to the seller that he has
348 SALES Art. 1585
accepted them, or when the goods have been deliv-

ered to him, and he does any act in relation to them
which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller,
or when, after the lapse of a reasonable time, he re-
tains the goods without intimating to the seller that
he has rejected them. (n)
Modes of manifesting acceptance.

Article 1585 expresses a definition of acceptance. It may be
manifested either expressly or impliedly.
(1) Express acceptance takes place when the buyer, after deliv-
ery of the goods, intimates to the seller, verbally or in writing, that
he has accepted them.
(2) Implied acceptance takes place:
(a) when the buyer, after delivery of goods, does any act
inconsistent with the seller’s ownership, as when he sells or
attempts to sell the goods, or he uses (see Smith Bell & Co.
[Phils.], Inc. vs. Gimenez, 8 SCRA 407 [1963]; Pan Pacific Com-
pany [Phils.] vs. Advertising Corporation, 23 SCRA 977
[1968].) or makes alteration in them in a manner proper only
for an owner; or
(b) when the buyer, after the lapse of a reasonable time,
retains the goods without intimating his rejection. Thus, the
failure of the buyer to interpose any objection to the invoices
issued to it, to evidence delivery of the materials ordered as
per agreement with the seller and which contained the con-
ditions in question, should be deemed as an implied accept-
ance by the buyer of the said conditions. (Naga Development
vs. Court of Appeals, 41 SCRA 106 [1971]; Sy vs. Mina, 164
SCRA 312 [1988].)
The retention of the goods is a strong evidence that the
buyer has accepted ownership of the goods. While retention
may be considered an act inconsistent with the ownership of
the seller, it is stated as a separate mode of manifesting accept-
ance as it is merely a negative indication which may be due
merely to carelessness.
Delivery and acceptance, separate acts.

Delivery and acceptance are two distinct and separate acts of
different parties.
(1) Acceptance, not a condition to complete delivery. — Delivery
is an act of the vendor. Thus, one of the obligations of the vendor
is the delivery of the thing sold. (Art. 1495.) The vendee has noth-
ing to do with the act of delivery by the vendor.
On the other hand, acceptance is an obligation on the part of
the vendee. (Art. 1582.) Consequently, acceptance cannot be re-
garded as a condition to complete delivery. (La Fuerza, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 23 SCRA 1217 [1968].) In other words, the seller
must comply with his obligation to deliver although there is no
acceptance yet by the buyer.
(2) Acceptance and actual receipt do not imply the other. — Ac-
ceptance of the buyer may precede actual delivery. There may be
an actual receipt without any acceptance and there may be accept-
ance without any receipt. (1 Williston, 4th ed., op. cit., pp. 129-130.)
ART. 1586. In the absence of express or implied

agreement of the parties, acceptance of the goods by
the buyer shall not discharge the seller from liability
in damages or other legal remedy for breach of any
promise or warranty in the contract of sale. But, if,
after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give
notice to the seller of the breach in any promise of
warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer
knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller
shall not be liable therefor. (n)
Acceptance, not a bar to action

for damages.
Acceptance, as used in this article, has the meaning explained
previously — assent to receive delivery as transferring possession
and ownership in the goods; but it does not carry with it the ad-
ditional agreement that the property in the goods shall be taken
in full satisfaction of all obligations. (3 Williston, op. cit., p. 37.)
Therefore, unless otherwise agreed, acceptance of the goods
by the buyer (Art. 1585.) does not discharge the seller from liabil-
350 SALES Art. 1587
ity in damages or other legal remedy (like rescission) for breach

of any promise (Art. 1546.) or warranty (Art. 1547; see Ker & Co.
vs. De la Rama, 11 Phil. 453 [1908].) in the contract of sale. (see
Art. 1599[1, 2].)
Notice to seller of breach of promise

or warranty.
(1) Necessity. — Article 1586 requires the buyer, in order to
hold the seller liable for breach of promise or warranty, to give
notice to the seller of any such breach within a reasonable time.
(2nd sentence.) Time is counted not simply from the moment the
buyer knows of the defect, but from the time when he ought to
have known it. Prompt exercise of opportunity for discovering
defects is, therefore, essential.
(2) Purpose. — The purpose is to protect the seller against
belated claims which prevent him from making prompt investi-
gation to determine the cause and extent of his liability and also
to enable him to take any other immediate steps that his interest
may require.
Note: The word “of’’ before “warranty” in Article 1586 should
read “or.”
ART. 1587. Unless otherwise agreed, where goods

are delivered to the buyer, and he refuses to accept
them, having the right so to do, he is not bound to
return them to the seller, but it is sufficient if he noti-
fies the seller that he refuses to accept them. If he
voluntarily constitutes himself a depositary thereof,
he shall be liable as such. (n)
Where buyer’s refusal to accept

justified.
(1) Duty of buyer to take care of goods without obligation to return.
— If the goods have been sent to the buyer and he rightfully
refuses to accept them, as in the case where the goods are of not
the kind and quality agreed upon, he is in the position of a bailee
who has had goods thrust upon him without his assent. Doubt-
less, he has the obligation to take reasonable care of the goods,
but nothing more can be demanded of him. Accordingly, he is

under no obligation to return the goods to the seller.
(2) Duty of seller to take delivery of goods. — After notice that
the goods have not been and will not be accepted, the seller must
have the burden of taking delivery of said goods.
(3) Seller’s risk of loss of goods. — While the goods remain in
the buyer’s possession under these circumstances, they are, of
course, at the seller’s risk. But the buyer is not deemed and is not
liable as a depositary, unless he voluntarily constitutes himself as
such.
(4) Right of buyer to resell goods. — Should the seller, when
notified to take delivery of the goods fails to do so, the buyer may
resell the goods. The provisions governing resale by the seller
when the buyer is in default, it seems, will generally apply. (see
Art. 1533.)
ART. 1588. If there is no stipulation as specified in

the first paragraph of article 1523, when the buyer’s
refusal to accept the goods is without just cause, the
title thereto passes to him from the moment they are
placed at his disposal. (n)
Where buyer’s refusal to accept wrongful.

Under this article, the buyer’s refusal to accept the goods is
without just cause while under Article 1587, the refusal is with a
right to do so.
As a general rule, the delivery of the goods to a carrier is
deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the buyer. (Art. 1523, par.
1.) This is true even if the buyer refuses to accept the goods in case
his refusal is without just cause. The title passes to the buyer and,
therefore, the risk of loss is borne by him (Art. 1504.) from the
moment they are placed at his disposal. (Art. 1588.) In those cases
where the right of the buyer to inspect goods at the time of deliv-
ery is a condition precedent to transfer of ownership (Art. 1584,
par. 1.), the ownership passes by operation of law after such in-
spection.
352 SALES Art. 1589
ART. 1589. The vendee shall owe interest for the

period between the delivery of the thing and the pay-
ment of the price, in the following three cases:
(1) Should it have been so stipulated;
(2) Should the thing sold and delivered produce
fruits or income;
(3) Should he be in default, from the time of judi-
cial or extrajudicial demand for the payment of the
price. (1501a)
Liability of vendee for interest where

payment is made after delivery.
This article presupposes that the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment of the price were not made simultaneously but the
thing sold was delivered, first followed by the payment of the
price after the lapse of a certain period of time. The vendee is li-
able to pay interest from the delivery of the thing until the pay-
ment of the price.
(1) Interest expressly stipulated. — In such case, the rate stipu-
lated governs. The stipulation of the parties to pay interest may
be oral. Article 1956 of the Civil Code which provides that “no
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing” should be construed as applicable only to contracts of
loan.
If the parties failed to fix the rate, then the legal rate of inter-
est shall be due.
(2) Fruits or income received by vendee from thing sold. — Under
No. 2, two conditions must exist: (a) that the thing sold has been
delivered, and (b) that it produces fruits or income. If the vendee
would not be bound to pay interest for the use of the money, which
he should have paid, the principle of bilaterality which charac-
terizes a contract of sale would no longer exist.
Since the law makes no distinction, the vendee is still bound
to pay interest even if a term has been fixed for the payment of
the price. (see 10 Manresa 278.)
(3) Vendee guilty of default. — If the vendee incurs delay in the

payment of the agreed price (see Art. 1169.), the interest is due
from the time of judicial or extrajudicial demand by the vendor
for the payment of the price. This demand by the vendor is the
starting point for the commencement of default or delay on the
part of the vendee. (10 Manresa 278.) Under Nos. 1 and 2 of Arti-
cle 1589, no demand is necessary. (see Art. 1169[1].)
ART. 1590. Should the vendee be disturbed in the

possession or ownership of the thing acquired, or
should he have reasonable grounds to fear such dis-
turbance, by a vindicatory action or a foreclosure of
mortgage, he may suspend the payment of the price
until the vendor has caused the disturbance or dan-
ger to cease, unless the latter gives security for the
return of the price in a proper case, or it has been
stipulated that, notwithstanding any such contin-
gency, the vendee shall be bound to make the pay-
ment. A mere act of trespass shall not authorize the
suspension of the payment of the price. (1502a)
Right of vendee to suspend

payment of price.
(1) When vendee has right. — The vendee, under this article, may
suspend the payment of the price in two cases only:
(a) if he is disturbed in the possession or ownership of the
thing bought; or
(b) if he has a well-grounded fear that his possession or
ownership would be disturbed by a vindicatory action or fore-
closure of mortgage.
Under the circumstances provided for by Article 1590, the
vendee is only entitled to retain the price that has not been paid
to the vendor. He is not entitled to recover what has already been
paid. Under the second case, it is not necessary that an action be
brought against the vendee.
It has been held that a buyer of a condominium unit is justi-
fied in suspending payment of his monthly amortizations where
354 SALES Art. 1590
the seller fails to give him a copy of the contract to sell despite
repeated demands therefor. A buyer is entitled to a copy of the
contract to sell; otherwise, he would not be informed of his rights
and obligations under the contract. (Gold Loop Properties, Inc.
(2) When vendee has no right. — In the following cases, the
vendee cannot suspend the payment of the price even if there is
disturbance in his possession or ownership of the thing sold:
(a) if the vendor gives security for the return of the price
in a proper case;
(b) if it has been stipulated that notwithstanding any such
contingency, the vendee must make payment (see Art. 1548,
par. 3.);
(c) if the vendor has caused the disturbance or danger to
cease (see Bareng vs. Court of Appeals, 107 Phil. 641 [1960].);
(d) if the disturbance is a mere act of trespass; and
(e) if the vendee has fully paid the price.
If the thing sold is in the possession of the vendee and the price
is already in the hands of the vendor, the sale is a consummated
contract and Article 1590 is no longer applicable. Article 1590
presupposes that the price or any part thereof has not yet been
paid and the contract has not yet been consummated. (10 Manresa
286-287.)
Right of vendee to demand rescission.

Under the provisions of Article 1590, the vendee has no cause
of action for rescission before final judgment the reason being that
otherwise, the vendor might become the victim of machinations
between the vendee and the third person. (Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc. vs. Santos, 6 C.A. Rep. 706.) It must be noted that the distur-
bance must be in the possession or ownership of the thing ac-
quired.
The remedy of the buyer is rescission, not suspension of pay-
ment where the disturbance is caused by the existence of a non-
apparent servitude. (see Art. 1560.)
Arts. 1591-1592 OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDEE 355
ART. 1591. Should the vendor have reasonable

grounds to fear the loss of immovable property sold
and its price, he may immediately sue for the rescis-
sion of the sale.
Should such ground not exist, the provisions of
article 1191 shall be observed. (1503)
Right of vendor to rescind sale

of immovable property.
This article refers only to a sale of immovable or real prop-
erty where the vendor has good reasons to fear the loss of the prop-
erty and its price. It contemplates a situation where there has been
a delivery of the immovable property but the vendee has not yet
paid the price.
“Suppose the vendee has not yet paid the price, but he de-
stroys the building sold, pulls out the plants on the land, cuts
down the forest, or places himself on the brink of insolvency.
In other words, the subject matter of the sale is going to per-
ish. To think of demanding payment from the vendee is some-
thing useless, because the vendee has shown signs of irrespon-
sibility. The only remedy that can guarantee the vendor against
such damage is the rescission of the contract.” (10 Manresa
282-284.)
Article 1591 is applicable to both cash sales and to sales in
installments as it does not distinguish between one and the other.
(Ibid., 284-285.)
Pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the vendor may
sue for either fulfillment or rescission with damages in either case
upon the vendee’s failure to comply with his obligation to pay
the agreed price. Rescission, however, is allowed only where the
breach is substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment of the
obligation.
ART. 1592. In the sale of immovable property, even

though it may have been stipulated that upon failure
to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescis-
sion of the contract shall of right take place, the
356 SALES Art. 1592
vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the pe-

riod, as long as no demand for rescission of the con-
tract has been made upon him either judicially or by a
notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant
him a new term. (1504a)
Rule where automatic rescission of sale

of immovable property stipulated.
As a general rule, the vendor may sue for rescission of the
contract should the vendee fail to pay the agreed price. (Art. 1191.)
The sale of real property, however, is subject to the stipulations
agreed upon by the parties and to the provisions of Article 1592
which speaks of non-payment of the purchase price as a resolutory
condition. Article 11912 is subordinated to the provisions of Arti-
cle 1592 when applied to sales of immovable property.
Before a demand for rescission of the contract (for non-pay-
ment of the price) has been made by the vendor, either judicially3
or by a notarial act, the vendee may still pay the price even after
the expiration of the stipulated period for payment and notwith-
standing a stipulation that failure to pay the price on the stipu-
lated date ipso facto resolves the sale. (Adiarte vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 92 Phil. 758 [1953]; Villareal vs. Tan King, 43 Phil. 251 [1922].)
A judicial or notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission can
take place, whether or not automatic rescission has been stipu-
lated. It is to be noted that the law uses the phrase “even though,’’
emphasizing that when no stipulation is found on automatic re-
scission, the judicial or notarial requirement still applies. (Iriñgan
vs. Court of Appeals, 155 SCAD 686, 366 SCRA 41 [2001].) A let-
ter informing the buyer of the automatic rescission of a contract
of sale of a real property of sale does not amount to a demand for
2
See note 4 to Article 1458.
3
In the case of Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. (see facts, infra.), S
demanded from LBC, to whom B leased the properties sold, the payment of the monthly
rentals and the surrender of the same to S. As a consequence, LBC filed an action for
interpleader. S, in its answer, filed a cross-claim against B praying for the confirmation
of its right to cancel the contract. The Supreme Court held that even if the contract were
considered an unconditional sale so that Article 1592 could be deemed applicable, S’s
answer to the complaint for interpleader in the lower court constituted a judicial de-
mand for the rescission of the contract.
rescission if it is not notarized. The offer to pay prior to the de-

mand for rescission is sufficient to defeat the vendor’s right un-
der Article 1592. (Ocampo vs. Court of Appeals, 52 SCAD 610, 233
SCRA 551 [1994]; Laforteza vs. Machuca, 127 SCAD 798, 333 SCRA
643 [2000].)
There is no existing provision in our laws authorizing the
automatic rescission of contracts of sale of real property for non-
payment of the purchase price except as provided in Article 1592.4
A complaint by the vendor seeking the cancellation of the vendee’s
adverse claim on the vendor’s original certificate of title and for
the refund of the payments made, cannot be considered a judi-
cial demand under Article 1592 because it does not pray for the
rescission of the contract of sale. In other words, seeking discharge
from contractual obligations and an offer for restitution is not the
same as abrogation of the contract. To rescind is “to declare a con-
tract void in its inception and to put an end to it as though it never
were.” (Ocampo vs. Court of Appeals, supra; see Arra Realty Corp.
vs. Guarantee Development Corp. and Insurance Agency, 438
SCRA 441 [2004].)
Note: In Articles 1191 and 1592, the rescission is a principal
action which seeks the resolution or cancellation of the contract,
while in Article 1381, the action is a subsidiary one limited to cases
of rescission for lesion as enumerated in said article. The prescrip-
tive period applicable for rescission under Articles 1191 and 1592
is found in Article 1144 which provides that the action upon a
written contract should be brought within 10 years from the time
the right of action accrues. (see Iriñgan vs. Court of Appeals, su-
pra.)
Right of seller to rescind not absolute.

In a contract of sale, the remedy of the unpaid seller is either
specific performance or rescission with the right to claim dam-
ages in either case. (Art. 1191.)
4
“We concede the validity of the automatic forfeiture clause, which deems any pre-
vious payments forfeited and the contract automatically rescinded upon the failure of
the vendee to pay three successive monthly installments or any one year-end lump sum
payment. However, petitioners failed to prove the conditions that would warrant the
implementation of this clause.’’ (Valarao vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCAD 114, 304 SCRA
155 [1999].)
358 SALES Art. 1592
A seller, however, cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially re-

scind a contract of sale of immovable property where there is no
express stipulation authorizing him to extrajudicially rescind
(Laforteza vs. Machuca, supra.) except as provided in Article 1592.
Judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where
the contract provides for automatic rescission in case of breach.
(Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, 134 SCAD 206, 340 SCRA 720
[2000].)
(1) Court may grant vendee a new term. — The right to rescind
is not absolute and the court may extend the period for payment.
(Art. 1191, par. 3.) Once a demand for rescission by suit or notarial
act is made, however, under Article 1592, the court may not grant
the vendee a new term. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and
equity, the court may grant the vendee a new term where he has
substantially performed in good faith. (J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc.
vs. Javier, 31 SCRA 829 [1970].)
(2) Vendor may waive his right. — The right of “automatic re-
scission” (subject to Article 1592 when applicable) stipulated in a
contract of sale is subject to waiver. In a case, the right was held
waived by the vendor who granted many extensions to the
vendee, in all of which, the vendor never called attention to the
proviso on “automatic rescission.” (Pilipinas Bank vs. Intermedi-
ate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 546 [1987].) The unqualified ac-
ceptance by the vendor of payments after the six-month period
expired was held to constitute waiver of the period and hence, of
the ground to rescind under Article 1592. (Ocampo vs. Court of
Appeals, supra.)
(3) Written notice of cancellation must be given. — While judi-
cial action for the rescission of contract is not necessary where the
contract provides that it may be cancelled for violation of its terms
and conditions, there must be at least a written notice sent to the
defaulter informing him of the rescission. The indispensability of
notice of cancellation to the buyer of real estate is underscored in
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 6552 (see Appendix “B.”) which specifi-
cally provides that the notice of cancellation or the demand for
rescission of the contract must be by a notarial act. (Jison vs. Court
of Appeals, 164 SCRA 339 [1988]; Siska Development Corp. vs.
Office of the President of the Phils., 50 SCAD 46, 231 SCRA 674
[1994].)
A notarial act presupposes signing before a notary public and

two competent witnesses. A letter to the vendee rescinding a con-
tract of sale which is not notarized is defective. More importantly,
the notarized demand must be proven to have been received by
the vendee. (Ocampo vs. Court of Appeals, supra.) Similarly, a
letter in the form of a “Formal Notice’’ ordering the buyer to va-
cate the premises in question for the reason that the occupancy of
the lot is presumed to be illegal as the lot is still registered in the
name of the seller does not amount to a demand for rescission
where there is no reference to the sale much less a declaration that
the sale is being rescinded or abrogated from the beginning. (City
of Cebu vs. Heirs of C. Rubi, 106 SCAD 61, 306 SCRA 408 [1999].)
Neither will a letter written by the vendor declaring his intention
to rescind to operate to validly rescind the sale. But an action for
judicial confirmation of rescission and damages has been held to
comply with the requirement of the law for judicial decree of re-
scission. Even a crossclaim found in the answer can constitute a
judicial demand for rescission that satisfies the requirement of the
law. (Iriñgan vs. Court of Appeals, 155 SCAD 686, 366 SCRA 41
[2001]; Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Building Co., Inc.,
43 SCRA 93 [1972].)
(4) Breach must be substantial. — The general rule is that re-
scission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or causal
breach but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as
would defeat the very object of the parties. This is especially true
where the slight breach by the vendee is outweighed by the bad
faith of the vendor in reneging in his own prestation. The ques-
tion of whether a breach of a contract is substantial depends, of
course, upon the attendant circumstances. (Ibid.) Where it was
stipulated in the deed of sale that payment could be made even
after 10 years from the execution of the contract provided the
vendee paid 12% interest, the failure of the vendee to pay the bal-
ance of the purchase price within 10 years from the execution of
the deed would not amount to a substantial breach. (Vda. de
Mistica vs. Naguiat, 418 SCRA 73 [2003].)
When Article 1592 not applicable.

(1) Sale on installment of real estate. — Article 1592 which re-
quires rescission either by judicial action or notarial act contem-
360 SALES Art. 1592
plates an absolute sale. It does not apply to sales on installment

of real property in which the parties have laid down the proce-
dure to be followed in the event the vendee failed to fulfill his
obligation. (Albea vs. Inquimboy, 86 Phil. 477 [1950]; Caridad
Estates, Inc. vs. Santero, 71 Phil. 114 [1940]; Torralba vs. De Los
Angeles, 96 SCRA 69 [1980].)
(2) Contract to sell/conditional sale of real estate. — Neither is
Article 1592 applicable to a mere promise to sell (executory con-
tract to sell) where the title remains with the vendor until
fulfillment of a positive condition, such as full payment of the
price (Roque vs. Lapuz, 96 SCRA 741 [1980]; Caridad Estates vs.
Santero, supra.; Manila Racing Club vs. Manila Jockey Club, 69
Phil. 57 [1939]; Manuel vs. Rodriguez, 109 Phil. 1 [1960]; Joseph
& Sons Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 663 [1986];
Alfonso vs. Court Appeals, 186 SCRA 400 [1990]; Adelfa Proper-
ties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 58 SCAD 462, 240 SCRA 565 [1995];
Valarao vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCAD 114, 304 SCRA 155 [1999];
Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, 134 SCAD 206, 340 SCRA 720 [2000].)
Such payment is a positive suspensive condition the failure of
which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquir-
ing binding force. In an absolute sale, non-payment is a resolutory
condition. (Pangilinan vs. Court of Appeals, 87 SCAD 408, 279
SCRA 590 [1997]; Odyssey Park, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 87
SCAD 735, 280 SCRA 253 [1997].)
(3) Cases covered by R.A. No. 6552. — R.A. No. 6552 (see Ap-
pendix “B.”) recognizes in conditional sales of all kinds of real
estate the non-applicability of Article 1592 to such contracts to sell
on installments and the right of the seller to cancel the contract
upon non-payment, “which is simply an event that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force.” The Act in modifying the terms and application of Article
1592 recognizes the vendor’s right to cancel unqualifiedly in case
of “industrial lots, commercial buildings, and sales to tenants” and
requires a grace period in other cases, particularly residential lots,
with a refund of certain percentages of payments made on account
of the cancelled contract. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime
Bldg. Co., Inc., 43 SCRA 93 [1972] and 86 SCRA 305 [1978]; Rillo
vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCAD 905, 274 SCRA 461 [1997]; Olym-
pia Housing, Inc. vs. Panasiatic Travel Corporation, 395 SCRA 298
[2003].)
In other words, the vendee, in Nos. (1) and (2) above, may no
longer pay the price after the expiration of the time agreed upon
although no demand has yet been made upon him by suit or
notarial act, except that in the case of sale on installment payments
of residential properties, while the vendor’s right to cancel the
contract to sell upon breach by non-payment of the stipulated
installments is recognized by R.A. No. 6552, a grace period is re-
quired, with the vendee entitled to refund of certain percentages
of payments in the event that the contract is cancelled. But the
rule upholding the validity of automatic rescission clauses con-
tained in contracts to sell industrial and commercial real estates
on installments upon failure to pay stipulated installments, and
allowing the retention or forfeiture as rentals of the installments
previously paid, is not applicable to a contract to sell real estate
on installments which is not essentially such a contract but is more
of a contract for the redemption of mortgaged property foreclosed
by the mortgagee. (Phil. National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 94
SCRA 357 [1979].)
R.A. No. 6552 makes no distinction between “option” and
“sale” which, under Section 2(b) of P.D. No. 957 (Appendix B.),
virtually includes all transactions concerning land and housing
acquisition including reservation agreements. (Realty Exchange
Venture Corp. vs. Sendino, 53 SCAD 57, 233 SCRA 665 [1994].)
This law, which normally applies to all transactions or contracts,
involving the sale or financing of real estate on installments pay-
ments, including residential condominium apartments, excludes
industrial lots, commercial buildings, and sales to tenants under
R.A. No. 3844, the Code of the Agrarian Reforms.5 (Odyssey Park,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.) It has been held that a decision
in an ejectment case can operate as notice of cancellation required
by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 6552. (Leaño vs. Court of Appeals, 158
SCAD 34, 369 SCRA 36 [2001].)
5
Superseded by R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988.
362 SALES Art. 1593
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Vendor, retaining ownership of immovable property sold, under-
took to convey it provided vendee, who defaulted, paid in full balance
of purchase price payable in monthly installments.
Facts: S, vendor, entered into a contract entitled “Deed of
Conditional Sale” with B, vendee, involving three parcels of
land with the improvements thereon. The purchase price was
P1,000,000. The amount of P50,000 was paid upon the execu-
tion of the deed and the balance of P950,000 was to be paid in
monthly installments of P10,000 a month with interest. It was
stipulated that in case of failure to pay any of the installments,
the contract would be annulled at the vendor’s option, all pay-
ments forfeited, and the property repossessed.
S advised B of the cancellation of the deed of conditional
sale and demanded the return of the property, B having failed
to pay three installments. Upon suit, B invoked Article 1592.
Issue: Is Article 1592 applicable?
Held: No. S’s obligation to convey the property was ex-
pressly made subject to a suspensive (precedent) condition of
the punctual and full payment of the balance of the purchase
price. What S sought was a judicial declaration that because
the suspensive condition (full and punctual payment) had not
been fulfilled, his obligation to sell to B never arose or never
became effective, and, therefore, S was entitled to repossess the
property object of the contract, possession being a mere inci-
dent to its right of ownership. In seeking the ouster of B for
failure to pay the price as agreed upon, S was not rescinding
(or more properly, resolving) the contract, but precisely enforc-
ing it according to its express terms.
In short, the contract in question was not the ordinary con-
tract of sale envisaged in Article 1592 transferring ownership
simultaneously with delivery but one in which the vendor re-
tained ownership of the immovable property object of the sale,
merely undertaking to convey it provided B strictly complied
with the terms of the contract. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Building Co., Inc., supra.)
ART. 1593. With respect to movable property, the

rescission of the sale shall of right take place in the
interest of the vendor, if the vendee, upon the expira-
tion of the period fixed for the delivery of the thing,

should not have appeared to receive it, or having ap-
peared, he should not have tendered the price at the
same time unless a longer period has been stipulated
for its payment. (1505)
Rule where automatic rescission of sale

of movable property stipulated.
In the sale of real property, the vendor must make a demand
for rescission before he can have the right to rescind the contract.
(Art. 1592.) In the case of personal property (which has not yet
been delivered to the vendee), the vendor can rescind the contract,
as a matter of right, if the vendee, without any valid cause, does
not (1) accept delivery or (2) pay the price unless a credit period
for its payment has been stipulated.
The mere failure of the vendee to comply with the terms of
the contract does not rescind the same. It is necessary that the
vendor should take some affirmative action indicating his inten-
tion to rescind. (Guevarra vs. Pascual, 12 Phil. 311 [1908].) The
parties, however, may validly enter into an agreement that viola-
tion of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation thereof
even without judicial intervention or permission. (see University
of the Phil. vs. De los Angeles, 35 SCRA 102 [1970]; Consing vs.
Jamandre, 64 SCRA 1 [1975].)
EXAMPLE:
S sold his piano to B for P30,000.00; said piano is to be de-
livered on October 18. If on October 18, B does not accept de-
livery or pay the price without lawful cause, then S may elect
to enforce compliance or to rescind the contract with the right
to damages in either case.
Reason for the rule with respect

to movable property.
The reason for the difference is that personal properties are
not capable of maintaining a stable price in the market. Their
prices are so changeable that any delay in their disposal might
cause the vendor a great prejudice.
364 SALES Art. 1593
This is not true in the case of real property which has more or
less stable price in the market and the delay that might result from
the requirement imposed on the vendor to demand rescission
before being entitled to rescind the contract will not in any way
prove detrimental to the interest of the vendor. (see 10 Manresa
291.)
— oOo —
365
Chapter 6
ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF

CONTRACT OF SALE OF GOODS
ART. 1594. Actions for breach of the contract of

sale of goods shall be governed particularly by the
provisions of this Chapter, and as to matters not spe-
cifically provided for herein, by other applicable pro-
visions of this Title. (n)
Provisions governing breach of contract

of sale of goods.
“Goods” include all chattels personal but not things in action
or money of legal tender in the Philippines. The term includes
growing fruits or crops. (Art. 1636[1].)
Actions for breach of the contract of sale of goods are governed
primarily by the provisions of Chapter 6 (Arts. 1595-1599.) and
secondarily, by the other provisions of the Title on sales so far as
said provisions can apply. However, provisions concerning the
sale of immovable property have no application to the sale of
goods.
Actions available.
In general, the actions available for breach of the contract of
sale of goods are the following:
(1) action by the seller for payment of the price (Art. 1595.);
(2) action by the seller for damages for non-acceptance of the
goods (Art. 1596.);
365
366 SALES Art. 1595
(3) action by the seller for rescission of the contract for breach
thereof (Art. 1597.);
(4) action by the buyer for specific performance (Art. 1598.);
and
(5) action by the buyer for rescission or damages for breach
of warranty. (Art. 1599.)
ART. 1595. Where, under a contract of sale, the

ownership of the goods has passed to the buyer, and
he wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods
according to the terms of the contract of sale, the seller
may maintain an action against him for the price of
the goods.
Where, under a contract of sale, the price is pay-
able on a certain day, irrespective of delivery or of
transfer of title, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or
refuses to pay such price, the seller may maintain an
action for the price, although the ownership in the
goods has not passed. But it shall be a defense to
such an action that the seller at any time before the
judgment in such action has manifested an inability
to perform the contract of sale on his part or an inten-
tion not to perform it.
Although the ownership in the goods has not
passed, if they cannot readily be resold for a reason-
able price, and if the provisions of Article 1596, fourth
paragraph, are not applicable, the seller may offer to
deliver the goods to the buyer, and, if the buyer refuses
to receive them, may notify the buyer that the goods
are thereafter held by the seller as bailee for the buyer.
Thereafter the seller may treat the goods as the buy-
er’s and may maintain an action for the price. (n)
Seller’s right of action for the price.

The above article provides the three cases when an action for
the price of the goods under a contract of sale can be maintained
by the seller:
Art. 1595 ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 367
OF SALE OF GOODS
(1) when the ownership of the goods has passed to the buyer
and he wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the price (par. 1.);
(2) when the price is payable on a certain day and the buyer
wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay such price, irrespective of
delivery or of transfer of the title (par. 2.); and
(3) when the goods cannot readily be resold for a reasonable
price and the buyer wrongfully refuses to accept them even be-
fore the ownership in the goods has passed, if the provisions of
Article 1596, 4th paragraph (infra.) are not applicable. (par. 3.)
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B a specific refrigerator for P8,000.00. S can main-
tain an action for the price in any of the following cases:
(1) He has delivered the refrigerator to B and the latter
wrongfully fails to pay;
(2) He has not yet delivered the refrigerator but the pe-
riod fixed for the payment has already arrived while the pe-
riod fixed for delivery is yet to come; and
(3) B has refused to accept delivery without just cause and
S has notified B that he is holding the goods as bailee for B.
Under No. (1), where the unpaid goods are subsequently
sold or mortgaged to another who acted in good faith, the obli-
gation to pay remains with the buyer mortgagor-seller. The fail-
ure of the buyer to pay the purchase price does not ipso facto
revert ownership of the goods to the (first) seller unless the
sale is first liquidated. The (first) seller has no cause of action
against the purchaser or chattel mortgagee. (see Philippine
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 367 SCRA 198 [2001].)
Where ownership in goods

has not passed.
Unless the contrary appears, the presumption is that the pay-
ment of the price and the delivery of the goods were intended to
be concurrent acts and the obligation of each party to perform will
be dependent upon the simultaneous performance by the other
party.
From the above, it can be deduced that the seller cannot main-
tain an action for the price if the ownership in the goods has not
368 SALES Art. 1596
passed to the buyer, (1) unless the price is payable on a certain

day or (2) unless the goods cannot readily be resold for a certain
price and the provisions of Article 1596, 4th paragraph are not
applicable.
It must be noted that under Article 1588, the title to the goods
passes to the buyer from the moment they are placed at his dis-
posal when his refusal to accept them is without just cause. The
seller may, therefore, bring an action for the price upon wrongful
refusal of the buyer to accept.
Recovery of price payable

on a certain day.
If different times are fixed for the payment of the price and
the delivery of the goods, the general rule is that the act which is
to be performed first is absolutely due on that day, while the per-
formance which is to take place on a later day is not due unless,
as a condition precedent, the prior performance has been rendered.
(1) Buyer given credit for the price. — It is common for sellers
to give credit for the price. But it is not common for buyers to give
credit for the goods. It may, however, happen that the buyer prom-
ises to pay the price before acquiring the ownership or even the
possession of the goods. In such a case, the provisions of Article
1595, paragraph 2 are applicable. (3 Williston, op. cit., pp. 218-219.)
(2) Defense to action for the price. — Said paragraph 2 excuses,
however, the buyer from his obligation to pay the price when,
before the time of payment, the seller has manifested an inability
to perform the contract of sale or an intention not to perform it. A
contract of sale contemplates a double exchange. Accordingly,
there is justice as well as good reason for excusing the buyer from
prior performance when he will not get subsequent performance
from the seller. In this case, prospective failure to receive the thing
promised is as good as a defense as a failure which has actually
occurred.
ART. 1596. Where the buyer wrongfully neglects

or refuses to accept and pay for the goods, the seller
may maintain an action against him for damages for
non-acceptance.
OF SALE OF GOODS
The measure of damages is the estimated loss di-

rectly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course
of events, from the buyer’s breach of contract.
Where there is an available market for the goods
in question, the measure of damages is, in the ab-
sence of special circumstances showing proximate
damage of a different amount, the difference between
the contract price and the market or current price at
the time or times when the goods ought to have been
accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, then
at time of the refusal to accept.
If, while labor or expense of material amount is
necessary on the part of the seller to enable him to
fulfill his obligations under the contract of sale, the
buyer repudiates the contract or notifies the seller to
proceed no further therewith, the buyer shall be liable
to the seller for labor performed or expenses made
before receiving notice of the buyer’s repudiation or
countermand. The profit the seller would have made
if the contract or the sale had been fully performed
shall be considered in awarding the damages. (n)
Seller’s right of action for damages.

(1) If the buyer without lawful cause neglects or refuses to
accept and pay for the goods he agreed to buy, the seller may
maintain an action against him for damages for non-acceptance.
(par. 1.)
(2) In an executory contract, where the ownership in the
goods has not passed, and the seller cannot maintain an action to
recover the price (see Art. 1595.), the seller’s remedy will be also
an action for damages.
(3) If the goods are not yet identified at the time of the con-
tract or subsequently, the seller’s right is necessarily confined to
an action for damages.
Measure of damages for non-acceptance.

(1) Difference between contract price and market price. — The
measure of damage is the estimated loss directly and naturally
370 SALES Art. 1596
resulting from the buyer’s breach of contract. It is conveniently

expressed by the formula — the difference between the contract
price, that is, the amount of the obligation which the buyer failed
to fulfill, and the market or current price, that is, the value of the
goods which the seller has left upon his hands. (see Siuliong &
Co. vs. Nanyo Shoji Kaisha, 42 Phil. 722 [1922]; Warner Barnes &
Co. vs. Inza, 43 Phil. 505 [1922].) This follows the general rule that
damages comprehend not only the actual loss suffered but also
unrealized profit. (Art. 2200.)
(a) As the market price varies with time and place, the
market price is fixed at the time when and the place where the
goods ought to have been accepted or, if no time was fixed, at
the time of refusal to accept.
(b) As the burden is upon the seller to show what dam-
age, if any, he has suffered, it is incumbent upon him, in or-
der to make out a case for recovery of more than nominal
damages, to show that the market value of the goods is less
than the contract price.
(2) Full amount of damage. — If there is no available market in
which the goods can be sold at the time, the seller is “entitled to
the full amount of damage which he has really sustained by a
breach of the contract.” (3 Williston, op. cit., pp. 240-246; par. 2.)
(3) Proximate damages. — Article 1596 (par. 3.) allows the seller
under “special circumstances” proximate damages of a greater
amount than the difference between the contract price and mar-
ket price when such damages “may be reasonably attributed to
the non-performance of the obligation.” (see Art. 2201, par. 2.)
EXAMPLE:
S agreed to sell and deliver to B on a certain date 100 bags
of sugar of a certain quality for P50,000.00. On the date desig-
nated, B wrongfully refused to accept delivery.
If the market value of the sugar at the time is P40,000.00,
the damage which S ought to receive is the amount of
P10,000.00, the profit he failed to realize. However, if the mar-
ket value equals or exceeds the contract price of P50,000.00, S
OF SALE OF GOODS
has suffered no damage and, though entitled to judgment, can

recover only nominal damages.1
If B acted in bad faith (this may be considered as an exam-
ple of “special circumstances” mentioned in par. 3.), he is liable
for all the consequential damages incurred by S which clearly
originated from the breach of the contract. Thus, if the refusal
of B to accept delivery so angered S that the latter suffered a
heart attack for which he was hospitalized, hospitalization ex-
penses may also be recovered from B as they may be reason-
ably attributed to the non-performance of his obligation.
Measure of damages for repudiation

or countermand.
In case the buyer repudiates the contract or notifies the seller
to proceed no further therewith, the measure of damages to which
the seller is entitled would include:
(1) the labor performed and expenses incurred for materials
before receiving notice of the buyer’s repudiation; and
(2) the profit he would have realized if the sale had been fully
performed. (Art. 1596, par. 4.)
ART. 1597. Where the goods have not been deliv-

ered to the buyer, and the buyer has repudiated the
contract of sale, or has manifested his inability to
perform his obligations thereunder, or has commit-
ted a breach thereof, the seller may totally rescind
the contract of sale by giving notice of his election so
to do to the buyer. (n)
Seller’s right of rescission before delivery.

The above article specifies the cases when the seller may re-
scind a contract of sale of goods which have not yet been deliv-
ered to the buyer. They are:
(1) when the buyer has repudiated the contract of sale;
1
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
372 SALES Art. 1597
(2) when the buyer has manifested his inability to perform

his obligations thereunder; and
(3) when the buyer has committed a breach of the contract of
sale.
Article 1481 provides for a special cause for rescission of the
contract of sale of goods. Article 1534 (2nd par.) speaks of the re-
scission of title.
In a case, the seller was not allowed to totally rescind a con-
tract to sell two lots, it appearing that the installments paid by
the buyer were more than the value of one lot. The conveyance to
the buyer of one of the two lots was ordered. (Legarda Hermanos
vs. Saldana, 55 SCRA 324 [1974].)
If the goods have been delivered, the seller may recover the
value of what he has given. (Art. 1595.)
Giving of notice required.

The right granted to the seller follows the general rule in re-
ciprocal obligations that a party to a contract injured by non-
fulfillment, may rescind the contract and at the same time ask for
damages. (Art. 1191.)
It should be noted that the seller is required to give notice of
his election to seek rescission. The way in which election must be
manifested may vary in different cases. Formal notice is certainly
not a requisite, and bringing an action promptly for restitution is
sufficient.
Seller’s right of rescission for breach

of contract.
Article 1191 (Civil Code) establishes the principle that all re-
ciprocal obligations are rescindable in the event that one of the
parties bound should fail to perform that which is incumbent
upon him. In the contract of sale, the obligation to pay the price
is correlative to the obligation to deliver the thing sold. Non-per-
formance by one of the parties authorizes the other to exercise the
right conferred upon him by the law, to elect to demand the per-
formance of the obligation or its rescission, together with dam-
OF SALE OF GOODS
ages in either event. Rescission abrogates the contract from

its inception and requires a mutual restitution of benefits received.
The right of the seller to rescind the sale for non-performance
on the part of the buyer is not absolute.
(1) The law subordinates it to the rights of third persons who
are legally in the possession of the object of the contract and to
whom bad faith is not imputable. (Ocejo Perez & Co. vs. Interna-
tional Bank, 37 Phil. 631 [1918]; see Art. 1385.)
(2) Moreover, the general rule is that rescission of a contract
will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach but only for such
substantial breach as would defeat the very object of the parties
in making the agreement. (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Phil. Co.,
47 Phil. 821 [1925].) The question of whether a breach of a con-
tract is substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances.
(Corpus vs. Alikpala, 22 SCRA 104 [1968]; see Angel vs. Calasanz,
135 SCRA 323 [1985].)
(3) Except as provided in Article 1597, and in the absence of
express stipulation authorizing the seller to extrajudicially rescind
a contract of sale, the seller cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially
rescind the contract. It has been held that where a vendor agreed
to the resale of the property by the original vendee to another
person despite the failure of said vendee to comply with his obli-
gation under the original sale, the vendor is deemed to have ef-
fectively waived its right to rescind the sale. (Ayala Corporation
vs. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation, 139 SCAD
74, 346 SCRA 663 [2000].)
ART. 1598. Where the seller has broken a contract

to deliver specific or ascertained goods, a court may,
on the application of the buyer, direct that the con-
tract shall be performed specifically, without giving
the seller the option of retaining the goods on pay-
ment of damages. The judgment or decree may be un-
conditional, or upon such terms and conditions as to
damages, payment of the price and otherwise, as the
court may deem just. (n)
374 SALES Art. 1599
Buyer’s right to specific performance.

The article applies only where the goods to be delivered are
specific or ascertained. (see Art. 1636[1].)
In reciprocal obligations, it is the injured party who has a right
to choose between fulfillment (see Art. 1165, par. 1.) and rescis-
sion, with the payment of damages in either case. (Art. 1191.)
Consequently, the right of the injured party to demand specific
performance cannot be defeated by the guilty party’s choice to
rescind the contract.
This is also the rule in Article 1598 which grants to the buyer,
as a matter of right, the remedy of specific performance in case
the seller should violate his obligation to make delivery. The seller
cannot retain the goods on payment of damages because dam-
ages are imposed by law to insure fulfillment of contract and not
to substitute for it. In granting specific performance, the court may
impose such terms and conditions as to damages, payment of the
price and otherwise, as it may deem just.
ART. 1599. Where there is a breach of warranty by

the seller, the buyer may, at his election:
(1) Accept or keep the goods and set up against
the seller, the breach of warranty by way of
recoupment in diminution or extinction of the price;
(2) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an ac-
tion against the seller for damages for the breach of
warranty;
(3) Refuse to accept the goods, and maintain an
action against the seller for damages for the breach
of warranty;
(4) Rescind the contract of sale and refuse to re-
ceive the goods or if the goods have already been
received, return them or offer to return them to the
seller and recover the price or any part thereof which
has been paid.
When the buyer has claimed and been granted a
remedy in any one of these ways, no other remedy
OF SALE OF GOODS
can thereafter be granted, without prejudice to the

provisions of the second paragraph of article 1191.
Where the goods have been delivered to the buyer,
he cannot rescind the sale if he knew of the breach of
warranty when he accepted the goods without pro-
test, or if he fails to notify the seller within a reason-
able time of the election to rescind, or if he fails to
return or to offer to return the goods to the seller in
substantially as good condition as they were in at the
time the ownership was transferred to the buyer. But
if deterioration or injury of the goods is due to the
breach of warranty, such deterioration or injury
shall not prevent the buyer from returning or offering
to return the goods to the seller and rescinding the
sale.
Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale and
elects to do so, he shall cease to be liable for the price
upon returning or offering to return the goods. If the
price or any part thereof has already been paid, the
seller shall be liable to repay so much thereof as has
been paid, concurrently with the return of the goods,
or immediately after an offer to return the goods in
exchange for repayment of the price.
Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale and
elects to do so, if the seller refuses to accept an offer
of the buyer to return the goods, the buyer shall there-
after be deemed to hold the goods as bailee for the
seller, but subject to a lien to secure the payment of
any portion of the price which has been paid, and with
the remedies for the enforcement of such lien allowed
to an unpaid seller by Article 1526.
(5) In the case of breach of warranty of quality,
such loss, in the absence of special circumstances
showing proximate damage of a greater amount, is
the difference between the value of the goods at the
time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would
have had if they had answered to the warranty. (n)
376 SALES Art. 1599
Remedies of buyer for breach

of warranty by seller.
This article applies both to implied warranties and to express
warranties, whether of quality or of title.
The remedies allowed to the buyer when the seller has been
guilty of a breach of promise or warranty are:
(1) accept the goods and set up the seller’s breach to reduce
or extinguish the price;
(2) accept the goods and maintain an action for damages for
the breach of the warranty;
(3) refuse to accept the goods and maintain an action for dam-
ages for the breach of the warranty; and
(4) rescind the contract of sale by returning or offering the
return of the goods, and recover the price or any part thereof
which has been paid. (Nos. 1-4.)
The remedies open to the buyer under the article may be
grouped into three, to wit: (a) recoupment (No. 1.); (b) action (No.
3.) or counterclaim for damages (No. 2.); and (c) rescission. (No.
4.)
Nos. (1) and (2) should be read in connection with Article 1586.
The general measure of damage in case of breach of warranty
of quality is provided in No. (5) of Article 1599. It is similar to the
measure of damages under Article 1596, par. 2.
Remedies alternative.
The above remedies are alternative. Once a remedy has been
granted to the buyer, no other remedy can thereafter be exercised
or granted.
The only exception is when after the buyer has chosen
fulfillment, it should become impossible, in which case he may
also sue for rescission. (Art. 1191, par. 2.)
Recoupment in diminution
of the price.
The theory of recoupment is that the seller’s damages are cut
OF SALE OF GOODS
down to an amount which will compensate him for the value of

what he has given.
In view of the breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer is
not bound to perform the contract on his part, but the buyer has
received something of value for which he ought to pay. By means
of recoupment, the buyer is allowed to avoid the contract and
substitute in its stead a quasi-contractual obligation for the value
of what he has received. The word is nearly though not quite syn-
onymous with discount, reduction or deduction.
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B 50 boxes of apples for P20,000.00. Upon exami-
nation, it was discovered that apples equivalent to 15 boxes
were rotten.
In an action by S against B for the purchase price, B can set
up the breach by S of his warranty by way of recoupment in
diminution of the price of P20,000.00. In other words, from the
purchase price of P20,000.00 shall be deducted the amount of
P6,000.00, the value of the 15 boxes of apples. So B is liable only
for P14,000.00, the value of the apples received.
Action or counterclaim for damages.

The law provides that the buyer may “refuse to accept the
goods, and maintain an action against the seller for damages for
the breach of warranty.” (No. 3.) It is fundamental that the breach
of an obligation gives rise to an action for damages. It is, there-
fore, unnecessary to discuss so plain a point.
Acceptance with knowledge of the breach of warranty does
preclude rescission but it does not necessarily preclude a right to
recoupment or damages. (3 Williston, op. cit., p. 362.)
Recoupment and counterclaim,

distinguished.
The right of recoupment is to be distinguished from set-off or
counterclaim.
By means of counterclaim, both sides of the contract are en-
forced in the same litigation. The defendant (buyer) does not seek
378 SALES Art. 1599
to avoid his obligation under the contract but seeks to enforce the
plaintiff’s (seller’s) obligation and to deduct it from his liability
for the price for breach of the warranty. (see No. 2.)
When rescission by the buyer

not allowed.
The remedy of rescission is allowed on broad principles of
justice. The basis of the remedy is that the buyer has not received
what he has bargained for.
It cannot be availed of, however, in the following cases:
(1) if the buyer accepted the goods knowing of the breach of
warranty without protest;
(2) if he fails to notify the seller within a reasonable time of
his election to rescind; and
(3) if he fails to return or offer to return the goods in substan-
tially as good condition as they were in at the time of the transfer
of ownership to him. But where the injury to the goods was caused
by the very defect against which the seller warranted, the buyer
may still rescind the sale. (par. 3.)
Rights and obligations of buyer

in case of rescission.
They are as follows:
(1) In case of rescission, the buyer shall cease to be liable for
the price, his only obligation being to return the goods;
(2) If he has paid the price or any part thereof, he may recover
it from the seller (par. 4; see Embee Transportation Corp. vs.
Camacho, 80 SCRA 477 [1977].);
(3) He has the right to hold the goods as bailee for the seller
should the latter refuse the return of the goods; and
(4) He has the right to have a lien on the goods for any por-
tion of the price already paid which lien he may enforce as if he
were an unpaid seller. (par. 5.)
— oOo —
379
Chapter 7
EXTINGUISHMENT OF SALE
ART. 1600. Sales are extinguished by the same

causes as all other obligations, by those stated in the
preceding articles of this Title, and by conventional
or legal redemption. (1506)
Causes for extinguishment of sale.

The modes or causes of extinguishing the contract of sale may
be classified into:
(1) Common or those causes which are also the means of ex-
tinguishing all other contracts like payment, loss of the thing,
condonation, etc. (see Art. 1231.);
(2) Special or those causes which are recognized by the law
on sales (such as those covered by Articles 1484, 1532, 1539, 1540,
1542, 1556, 1560, 1567, and 1591.); and
(3) Extra-special or those causes which are given special dis-
cussion by the Civil Code and these are conventional redemption
and legal redemption. (see 10 Manresa 300, 303.)
— oOo —
379
380 SALES
SECTION 1. — Conventional Redemption
ART. 1601. Conventional redemption shall take

place when the vendor reserves the right to repur-
chase the thing sold, with the obligation to comply
with the provisions of article 1616 and other stipula-
tions which may have been agreed upon. (1507)
Conventional redemption defined.

Conventional redemption is the right which the vendor reserves
to himself, to reacquire the property sold provided he returns to
the vendee the price of the sale, the expenses of the contract, any
other legitimate payments made therefor and the necessary and
useful expenses made on the thing sold (Art. 1616.), and fulfills
other stipulations which may have been agreed upon.
Subject matter of conventional redemption.

Both real and personal property may be the subject matter of
pacto de retro sales or sales with right to repurchase although there
are certain articles (Arts. 1607, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1614, 1617, 1618.)
which are applicable only to immovables.
Nature of conventional redemption.

(1) It is purely contractual because it is a right created, not by
mandate of the law, but by virtue of an express contract. (Ordoñez
vs. Villaroman, 78 Phil. 116 [1947].)
(2) It is an accidental stipulation and, therefore, its nullity can-
not affect the sale itself since the latter might be entered into with-
out said stipulation. (Alojado vs. Lim Siongco, 51 Phil. 339 [1927].)
380
Art. 1601 EXTINGUISHMENT OF SALE 381
Conventional Redemption
(3) It is a real right when registered, because it binds third

persons. (Art. 1608; see Mortera vs. Martinez, 14 Phil. 541 [1909].)
(4) It is potestative because it depends upon the will of the
vendor. (see Art. 1182.)
(5) It is a resolutory condition because when exercised, the right
of ownership acquired by the vendee is extinguished. (see Art.
1179; see Aquino vs. Deal, 63 Phil. 582 [1936]; Heirs of Francisco
Parco vs. Haw Pia, 45 SCRA 164 [1972].) In a pacto de retro sale,
the title or ownership of the property sold is immediately vested
in the vendee a retro, subject only to the resolutory condition of
repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period.
(Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 81 SCAD 546, 275 SCRA
267 [1997].)
(6) It is not an obligation but a power or privilege that the ven-
dor has reserved for himself. (Ocampo vs. Potenciano, [C.A.] 48
O.G. 2230.)
(7) It is reserved at the moment of the perfection of the contract for
if the right to repurchase is agreed upon afterwards, there is only
a promise to sell which produces different rights and effects and
is governed by Article 1479. (Diamante vs. Court of Appeals, 206
SCRA 52 [1992].)
(8) The person entitled to exercise the right of redemption
necessarily is the owner of the property sold and not any third party.
(see Quimson vs. Phil. National Bank, 36 SCRA 26 [1970].) Un-
like a debt which a third person may satisfy even against the debt-
or’s will (see Art. 1237.), the right of repurchase may be exercised
only by the vendor in whom the right is recognized by contract
or by any person in whom the right may have been transferred.
(Gallar vs. Husain, 20 SCRA 186 [1967].)
(9) It gives rise to reciprocal obligation that of returning the price
of sale and other expenses, on the part of the vendor (Art. 1616.);
and that of delivering the property and executing a deed of sale
therefor, on the part of the vendee. The plea that the vendee made
delivery of the property to a third person whom he believed was
better entitled to possess it, cannot serve as an excuse for the fail-
ure to comply with said obligation. (Pandaquilla vs. Gaza, 12 Phil.
663 [1909].)
382 SALES Art. 1601
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
When period for exercise of right of repurchase expired, constitu-
tional prohibition against aliens owning lands was already in force.
Facts: S, vendor a retro, sold to B, a Chinese, vendee a retro,
a parcel of land. The sale was made in 1932, before the adop-
tion of the old Constitution. No repurchase was made by S. At
the expiration of the right of repurchase, the 1935 Constitution
(Art. XIII, Sec. 5 thereof.) contains a prohibition against aliens
owning lands save in cases of hereditary succession.
Issue: Does the prohibition apply to B, an alien who acquired
the land by sale with pacto de retro before the 1935 Constitution
became effective?
Held: No. The nature of a sale with right of repurchase is
such that the ownership over the thing sold is transferred to
the vendee upon the execution of the contract assuming the
requirements as to delivery to be present, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the vendor exercises his right of re-
purchase within the period agreed upon by the parties or pre-
scribed by law. (Heirs of Francisco Parco vs. Haw Pia, 45 SCRA
164 [1972].)
Option to buy and right of repurchase

distinguished.
An option to buy is different and distinct from the right of
repurchase which must be reserved by the vendor by stipulation
to that effect in the contract of sale. This is clear from Article 1601.
(1) The right of repurchase is not a right granted the vendor
by the vendee in a subsequent instrument, but a right reserved by
the vendor in the same instrument of sale as one of the stipula-
tions of the contract.
(2) Once the instrument of absolute sale is executed, the ven-
dor no longer reserves the right to repurchase, and any right there-
after granted the vendor by the vendee in a separate instrument
cannot be a right of repurchase, but some other right like the op-
tion to buy.
(a) Accordingly, a deed of absolute sale and an option to
buy together, cannot be considered as evidencing a contract
of sale with pacto de retro. Such option does not evidence a right
to repurchase, the extension of the period for the exercise of
which (option) does not fall under No. 3 of Article 1602.

(Villarica vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 189 [1968]; Vda. de
Zulueta vs. Octaviano, 121 SCRA 314 [1983]; Vda. de Cruzo
vs. Carriaga, Jr., 174 SCRA 330 [1989]; see Vasquez vs. Court
of Appeals, 199 SCRA 102 [1991]; Torres vs. Court of Appeals,
216 SCRA 287 [1992].)
(b) Similarly, in an early case, it has been held that an
agreement to repurchase becomes a promise to sell when
made after an absolute sale because where the sale is made
without such an agreement, the purchaser acquires the thing
sold absolutely, and if he afterwards grants the seller the right
to repurchase, it is a new contract entered into by the pur-
chaser, as absolute owner already of the object. (Ramos vs.
Icasiano, 51 Phil. 343 [1927]; Vda. de Cruzo vs. Carriaga, Jr.,
supra; Diamante vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 52 [1992].)
Right to redeem and right of repurchase

distinguished.
The right to redeem becomes functus officio on the date of its
expiry, and its exercise after the period is not really one of redemp-
tion but a repurchase.
Distinction must be made because redemption is by force of
law; the purchaser at public auction is bound to accept redemp-
tion. Repurchase, however, of foreclosed property, after redemp-
tion period, imposes no such obligation. After expiry, the pur-
chaser may or may not re-sell the property but no law will com-
pel him to do so. And, he is not bound by the bid price; it is en-
tirely within his discretion to set a higher price, for after all, the
property already belongs to him as owner.’’ (Vda. De Urbano vs.
GSIS, 157 SCAD 133, 367 SCRA 672 [2001], citing Natino vs. In-
ART. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be

an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repur-
chase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as les-
see or otherwise;
384 SALES Art. 1602
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right

to repurchase another instrument extending the pe-
riod of redemption or granting a new period is ex-
ecuted;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part
of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes
on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred
that the real intention of the parties is that the trans-
action shall secure the payment of a debt or the per-
formance of any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits or
other benefits to be received by the vendee as rent or
otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall
be subject to the usury laws. (n)
Equitable mortgage defined.

An equitable mortgage is one which lacks the proper formali-
ties, form or words, or other requisites prescribed by law for a
mortgage, but shows the intention of the parties to make the prop-
erty subject of the contract as security for a debt and contains
nothing impossible or contrary to law. (41 C.J. 303; Cachola vs.
Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 496 [1992]; Ceballos vs. Intestate
Estate of the Late E. Mercado, 430 SCRA 323 [2004].)
The “pacto de retro” problem.

Article 1602 is a new provision and is one of the suitable rem-
edies (see Arts. 1603-1607.1) sponsored by the Code Commission
1
Other remedies:
Art. 1365. If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or personal
property, but the instrument states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of
repurchase, reformation of the instrument is proper.
Art. 1450. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one person for the
benefit of another and the conveyance is made to the lender or payor to secure the pay-
ment of the debt, a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the
money is loaned or for whom it is paid. The latter may redeem the property and compel
a conveyance thereof to him.
to provide safeguards and restrictions against the evils of sales

with a right of repurchase, commonly called pacto de retro sales.
The policy of the law is to discourage pacto de retro sales and
thereby prevent the circumvention of the prohibition against
usury (see note, infra.) and pactum commissorium2 (Ching Sen Ben
“One of the gravest problems that must be solved is that
raised by the contract of sale with right of repurchase or pacto
de retro. The evils arising from this contract have festered like
a sore on the body politic.” (Report of the Code Commission,
p. 61.)
“It is a matter of common knowledge that in practically
all of the so-called contracts of sale with right of repurchase,
the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase
price is money loaned, and in order to secure the payment of
the loan, a contract purporting to be a sale with pacto de retro
is drawn up. It is, thus, that the provisions obtained in Arti-
cles 1859 and 1958 [now Articles 2087 and 2088.] of the present
[old] Civil Code which respectively prohibit the creditor from
appropriating the things given in pledge or mortgage and
ordering that said things be sold or alienated when the prin-
cipal obligations become due are circumvented.
Furthermore, it is well-known that the practice in these so-
called contracts of sale with pacto de retro is to draw up another
contract purporting to be a lease of property to the supposed
vendor, who pays in money or in crops a so-called rent. It is,
however, no secret to anyone that this simulated rent is in truth
and in fact interest on the money loaned. In many instances,
the interest is usurious. Thus, the usury law is also circum-
vented.” (Ibid., p. 63.)
Note: The Usury Law (Art. 2655, as amended.) is now “legally
inexistent” as the lender and borrower can agree on any interest
Art. 1454. If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the

performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law
is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it be-
comes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him.
2
Art. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or
mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void. (1859a)
386 SALES Art. 1602
that may be charged on the loan under Central Bank Circular No.
905 approved by the Monetary Board in Resolution No. 224 dated
December 3, 1982. (see Verdejo vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA
743 [1988].)
“Pacto de retro” and mortgage,

distinguished.
The following are the distinctions:
(1) In pacto de retro, ownership is transferred but the owner-
ship is subject to the condition that the seller might recover the
ownership within a certain period of time,3 while in mortgage,
ownership is not transferred but the property is merely subject to
a charge or lien as security for the compliance of a principal obli-
gation, usually a loan;
(2) If the seller does not repurchase the property upon the very
day named in the contract, he loses all interest thereon, while the
mortgagor does not lose his interest in the property if he fails to
pay the debt at its maturity; and
(3) In the case of a pacto de retro, there is no obligation resting
upon the purchaser to foreclose. Neither does the vendor have
any right to redeem the property after the maturity of the debt.
On the other hand, it is the duty of the mortgagee to foreclose the
mortgage if he wishes to secure a perfect title thereto, and after
the maturity of the debt secured by the mortgage and before fore-
closure, the mortgagor has a right to redeem. (Basilio vs.
Encarnacion, 5 Phil. 360 [1905]; Borromeo vs. Vda. de Gonzales,
[C.A.] 6200 O.G. 3775; see Heirs of Arches vs. De Diaz, 50 SCRA
440 [1973].)
A vendor who decides to redeem or repurchase a property
sold with pacto de retro in a sense stands as the debtor and the
vendee as the creditor of the repurchase price. (Catangcatang vs.
Legayada, 84 SCRA 51 [1978]; Rivero vs. Rivero, 80 Phil. 802
[1948].)
3
The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title to the property sold is immediately
vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the
vendor a retro within the stipulated period. (De Guzman, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 156
SCRA [1987].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. It is stipulated that upon failure of owner to redeem land by
returning the loan, title thereto shall vest in the lender.
Facts: In the instrument wherein the words “mortgage with
conditional sale” are used, it is stipulated (1) that S reserves the
right to redeem the parcel of land in question after the period
of five (5) years from the date of the instrument by paying back
and returning the loan of P5,000 to B and (2) that on his failure
to exercise the said right, the title to the property shall pass to,
and become vested, absolutely, in B.
There is no period after the five (5) years within which S
may redeem the property.
Issue: Is the second stipulation a mortgage or a sale with
pacto de retro?
Held: If the stipulation be construed as giving B the right to
own the property upon failure of S to pay the loan on the stipu-
lated time — which is not provided — that would be pactum
commissorium4 which is unlawful and void. The clause is con-
clusive proof that it is a mortgage and not a sale with pacto de
retro because if it were the latter, title to the parcel of land would
pass unto the vendee upon the execution of the sale and not
later as stipulated. (Guerrero vs. Ynigo and Court of Appeals, 96
Phil. 37 [1954].)
———— ———— ————
2. Under the contract, if the first party failed to redeem the
land “sold as by mortgage,” the other party may sell it to another.
Facts: S executed in favor of B a private document which
states that he “has sold as by mortgage” a parcel of land and
that in case of non-fulfillment of certain conditions, B may eject
S, and further states that if S be unable to redeem the mort-
gage, B may sell the land to another.
As S failed to redeem the land, B sold the land to C who
took possession. S now seeks the recovery of the land claiming
that the contract is a mortgage.
Issue: Is the contract a mortgage or a sale with pacto de retro?
4
Art. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or
mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
388 SALES Art. 1602
Held: It is a sale with pacto de retro. The right to repurchase

and the obligation to resell contained in a contract of pacto de
retro are not the same as those in a mortgage agreement to se-
cure a principal obligation, nor are they to be considered as
inherent in or annexed to the mortgage. A mortgagee cannot
appropriate or dispose of the mortgaged property, while a pur-
chaser under pacto de retro, as soon as the right of dominion is
consolidated as prescribed by law (see Art. 1607.), may dispose
of the same as his own property without restriction. (Tuazon vs.
Gaduco, 23 Phil. 342 [1912].)
———— ———— ————
3. Vendor a retro failed to exercise his right of repurchase while
vendee a retro failed to pay balance of purchase price.
Facts: S sold his land to B for the sum of P1,400 with the
right to repurchase it within five (5) years. The period expired
without S having availed himself of his right of repurchase. B
paid only P1,200 of the purchase price and never paid the bal-
ance of P200. On the other hand, although the land was sup-
posed to have an area of 8.8 hectares, its actual area was only
more than five (5) hectares or a deficiency of more than three
(3) hectares.
B filed an action to recover the deficiency. S, in his counter-
claim, asked for rescission of the sale.
Issue: What is the effect of the discrepancies, i.e., failure of
B to pay the full price and the failure of S to deliver the total
area sold?
Held: The failure of B to pay the balance did not suspend
the running of the redemption period as there is nothing to in-
dicate that the agreement of the parties is to suspend the pe-
riod until the full payment of the purchase price. (Catangcatang
vs. Legayada, 84 SCRA 51 [1978].)
Note: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) dismissing both
B’s complaint seeking recovery of the deficiency, having found
that the parcel of land sold was described by metes and bounds,
having an actual area less than that stated in the tax declara-
tion and S’s counterclaim.
R.C. Aquino, J., dissenting: In view of those discrepancies,
the contract ceased to be a true pacto de retro sale and it became
a loan secured by the delivery of the land to the creditor, a sort

of antichresis,5 wherein the creditor’s enjoyment of the fruits of
the land served as payment of the interest on the land.
Subsequent sale of property

by vendor a retro.
The sole right of the vendor under a pacto de retro agreement
is that of redemption. He has no other interest left in the property
which he can transfer. (Davis vs. Neyra, 24 Phil. 417 [1913].) But a
sale subsequently made by the vendor to an innocent purchaser
for value could defeat the vendee’s title and right to possession if
the latter’s right is not properly registered or annotated.
When contract with right to repurchase

presumed an equitable mortgage.
For a presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, there are
two (2) requisites, namely: that the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a contract of sale with a right of repurchase or
purporting to be an absolute sale (Art. 1604.) and that their inten-
tion was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. (Lustan
vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCAD 351, 266 SCRA 663 [1997]; Reyes
vs. Court of Appeals, 339 SCRA 97 [2000]; San Pedro vs. Lee, 430
SCRA 338 [2004].)
Article 16026 enumerates six distinct and separate circum-
stances the presence of any (not a concurrence) of which is suffi-
cient to give rise to the presumption that a contract, regardless of
its nomenclature, is an equitable mortgage in consonance with the
rule that the law favors the last transmission of property rights.
5
Art. 2132. By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive
the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the pay-
ment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
6
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules estab-
lished in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a
gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and interests shall prevail. If the
contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of inter-
ests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it
cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of the parties, the contract
shall be null and void. (1289)
390 SALES Art. 1602
(Art. 1378.)7 (see Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041 [1965]; Villarica
vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 189 [1968]; Quinga vs. Court of
Appeals, 3 SCRA 66 [1961]; Claravall vs. Court of Appeals, 190
SCRA 439 [1990]; Misena vs. Rongavilla, 303 SCRA 749 [1999];
Aguirre vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCAD 561, 323 SCRA 771 [2000];
Hilado vs. Heirs of R. Medalla, 377 SCRA 257 [2002].) They are
inconsistent with the vendee’s acquisition of the right of owner-
ship under a true sale subject only to the vendor’s right to redeem,
and belie the truthfulness of the sale a retro. In case of doubt, a
contract purporting to be a sale with right of repurchase shall be
construed as an equitable mortgage. (Art. 1603.)
These cases are the following:
(1) Price of the sale is unusually inadequate. (see Cabigao vs. Lim,
50 Phil. 844 [1927]; Dapiton vs. Veloso, 93 Phil. 39 [1953]; Quinga
vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Labasan vs. Lacuesta, 86 SCRA 16
[1978]; Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 179 [1985].) It is
common knowledge borne out by experience that in nearly all
cases, the zonal valuations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
hardly approximate the fair market values of real property.
(Zamora vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCAD 833, 260 SCRA 10 [1996].)
But the mere disproportion of the price to the value of the prop-
erty, in the absence of other circumstances incompatible with the
contract of purchase and sale, cannot alone justify the conclusion
that the transaction is a pure and simple loan. (Bruce vs. Court of
Appeals, 157 SCRA 330 [1988].) Inadequacy is not sufficient to set
aside a sale unless it is grossly inadequate or purely shocking to
the conscience (Cachola vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 496
[1992]; Adapo vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 180 [2000].); or is
such that the mind revolts at it and such that a reasonable man
would neither directly or indirectly be likely to consent to it (Vda.
de Alvarez vs. Court of Appeals, 23 SCRA 309 [1968], citing A.
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Phils., Vol. V, [1992], pp. 156-158.);
7
This provision was applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of
the new Civil Code since it is remedial in nature. (Magtira vs. Court of Appeals, 96
SCRA 680 [1980]; Balatero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 530 [1987]; Olea
(2) Vendor remains in possession. (see Ibid.; Garcia vs. De

Arijona, 97 Phil. 997 [1955]; Lanuza vs. De Leon, 20 SCRA 369
[1967]; Tan vs. Valdehueza, 66 SCRA 61 [1975]; Quinga vs. Court
of Appeals, supra; Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 81 SCAD 845, 275
SCRA 237 [1997].) Where the contract also provides that “It is
agreed that the vendor shall have the right to possess [e.g., as les-
see], use and build on the property during the period of redemp-
tion,” there is here an acknowledgment by the vendee of the right
of the vendor to retain possession of the property, making the
contract one of loan guaranteed by mortgage, not a conditional
sale or an option to repurchase. (Bundalian vs. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 645 [1984].) If the transaction is an absolute sale of prop-
erty, particularly land, the vendee ordinarily would assume im-
mediate possession after the execution of the deed of sale
(Capulong vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 245 [1984].) Well-set-
tled to the point of being elementary is the doctrine that where
the vendor remains in physical possession of the land sold as les-
see or otherwise, the contract should be treated as an equitable
mortgage. The real intention of the parties is determinative of the
true nature of the transaction. (Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 97
SCAD 612, 294 SCRA 512 [1998].) The vendor’s continued pos-
session of the property allegedly sold taken together with other
circumstances, may even cast a serious doubt on the due execu-
tion and genuineness of a contested deed of sale. (Domingo vs.
In a case, the vendor, under the agreement shall remain in
possession of the property for only one year. It was held that this
“did not detract from the fact that the possession of the property
an indicium of ownership, was retained by the private respond-
ent as the alleged vendor. The period of time may be deemed as
actually the time allotted for private respondent for fulfilling its
part of the agreement by paying its indebtedness x x x as may be
gleaned from paragraph (f) x x x of the agreement.’’ (Oronce vs.
(3) Period of redemption is extended after expiration (see Umali
vs. Fernandez, 28 Phil. 89 [1914]; Lizares, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
44 SCAD 492, 226 SCRA 112 [1993]; Lacorte vs. Court of Appeals,
91 SCAD 446, 286 SCRA 24 [1998].);
392 SALES Art. 1602
(4) Purchaser retains part of the price (see Camus vs. Court of
In the cited case of Oronce vs. Court of Appeals (supra.), para-
graph (f) of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage states
that the “full title and possession’’ of the property “shall vest upon
the VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms
and conditions herein set forth.’’ It “also evidences the fact that
the agreed “purchase price’’ of fourteen million pesos
(P14,000,000.00) was not handed over by petitioners to private
respondent upon the execution of the agreement. Only
P5,400,000.00 was given by petitioners to private respondent, as
the balance thereof was to be dependent upon the private respond-
ent’s satisfaction of its mortgage obligation to China Banking
Corporation. Notably, the MTC found that petitioners gave pri-
vate respondent the amount of P8,500,000.00 that should be paid
to the bank to cover the latter’s obligation, thereby leaving the
amount of P100,000.00 (P5,400,000.00 + P8,500,000.00 =
P13,900,000.00) of the purchase price still unpaid in the hands of
petitioners, the alleged ‘vendees.’ Held: “Hence, two of the circum-
stances enumerated in Article 1602 are manifest in the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, namely: (a) the vendor would
remain in possession of the property (No. 2), and (b) the vendees
retained a part of the purchase price (No. 4). On its face, there-
fore, the document subject of controversy, is actually a contract
of equitable mortgage.’’
(5) Vendor binds himself to pay taxes on the thing sold (see Aquino
vs. Deala, 63 Phil. 583 [1936]; Dalandan vs. Julio, 10 SCRA 400
[1964].) or the alleged vendee never declared in his name for taxa-
tion purposes the land sold. (Labasan vs. Lacuesta, supra.) But the
sole circumstance that the land sold continued to be registered
and all the tax declarations thereon were made in the name of the
vendor cannot be invoked to support the finding that a deed of
sale with the right of repurchase is an equitable mortgage. At best,
it may demonstrate neglect on the part of the vendee. (Bollozos
vs. Yu Tieng Su, 155 SCRA 506 [1987].)
In a case, although the tax declarations for the property in
question have been transferred to the vendee’s name and he has
been continuously paying the realty taxes thereon, the fact that
he has made no move for 30 years to oust the vendor and his heirs
from their possession of the property was taken as a circumstance
which clearly falls within the ambit of Article 1602 as a badge of
an equitable mortgage. (Dapiton vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCAD
82, 272 SCRA 95 [1997].)
(6) The parties really intended an equitable mortgage instead of a
sale, i.e., that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or
the performance of any other obligations. (see Bautista vs. Ping,
90 Phil. 409 [1952]; Macoy vs. Trinidad, 95 Phil. 192 [1954]; Gloria
Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 84 SCRA 483 [1978].) The intention of
the parties is the decisive factor in evaluating whether or not the
agreement is a simple loan accommodation secured by a mort-
gage. This intention is shown not necessarily by the terminology
used but by all the surrounding circumstances. (Molina vs. Court
of Appeals, 398 SCRA 97 [2002].)
The terms of the document itself can aid in arriving at the true
nature of the transaction. Thus, where the contract contains a
stipulation that upon payment by the vendor of the purchase price
within a certain period, the document shall become null and void
and have no legal force and effect, the purported sale should be
considered a mortgage contract. In pacto de retro sale, the payment
of the repurchase price does not merely render the document null
and void but there is the obligation on the part of the vendee to
sell back the property. (Olea vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCAD 579,
247 SCRA 274 [1995], citing A.M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Phils., 19th ed., Vol. V, p. 159.) The same presumption applies
when the vendee was given the right to appropriate the fruits
thereof in lieu of receiving interest on the loan. (Adrid vs. Morga,
108 Phil. 927 [1960]; Olea vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)
In the above cases, the repurchase price paid by the apparent
vendor is considered the principal of the loan and any money,
fruits or other benefit received thereafter by the apparent vendee,
are considered as interest on said loan and are subject to the Usury
Law.8 The denomination of the contract as a deed of sale is not
binding as to its nature. The decisive factor in evaluating such an
8
Rates of interest on loans or forebearances of money are no longer subject to any
ceiling prescribed under the Usury Law. (see C.B. Resol. No. 224, Dec. 3, 1982.)
394 SALES Art. 1602
agreement is the intention of the parties as shown, not necessar-

ily by the terminology used in the contract, but by their conduct,
words, actions and deeds prior to, during, and immediately after
executing the agreement. (see Art. 1371.) Even a conveyance ac-
companied by the registration of the same and the issuance of a
new certificate of title in favor of the transferee is no more secured
from the operation of the equitable doctrine than the most infor-
mal conveyance that could be devised. Equity looks through the
form and considers the substance. (Oronce vs. Court of Appeals,
100 SCAD 277, 298 SCRA 133 [1998]; see Tolentino and Mauni vs.
Gonzales, 50 Phil. 158 [1927].)
Documentary and parol evidence9 is competent and admissi-
ble to prove that the contract does not express the true intention
of the parties and may be introduced to show that the agreement
is, in fact, merely a mortgage given merely as a security for the
repayment of a loan, masquerading as a sale. (Vda. de Alvarez
vs. Court of Appeals, 49 SCAD 663, 231 SCRA [1994]; Misena vs.
Rongavilla, 303 SCRA 749 [1999]; Lapat vs. Rosario, 110 SCAD 896,
312 SCRA 539 [1999]; Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 339 SCRA 97
[2000].)
Intention to execute mortgage

may be fairly inferred.
A contract should be construed as a mortgage or a loan in-
stead of a pacto de retro sale when its terms are ambiguous (see
Art. 1603.) or when other circumstances rather than any of the
specific cases defined in Nos. (1) to (5) of Article 1602, may be
indicative that the real intention of the parties is to enter into a
contract of loan with mortgage. Thus:
(1) Vendor in urgent need of money. — Taking into account the
surrounding circumstances, a pacto de retro sale may be deemed
an equitable mortgage where it appears that it was executed due
9
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: “When the terms of an agree-
ment have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms,
and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evi-
dence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the
following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, x x x.’’
to the urgent necessity for money of the vendor, notwithstanding

that he was aware of the contents of the contract. Necessitous men
are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emer-
gency will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon
them. (Labasan vs. Lacuesta, supra; Claravall vs. Court of Appeals,
190 SCRA 439 [1990]; see Camus vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Lao
vs. Court of Appeals, 81 SCAD 845, 275 SCRA 239 [1997];
Matanguihan vs. Court of Appeals, 84 SCAD 463, 275 SCRA 380
[1997]; Lorbes vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCAD 490, 351 SCRA 716
[2001].)
Among the circumstances considered in a case, namely, the
vendee’s unequivocal recognition of the vendor as the owner and
lessor of the property even after the alleged sale had been executed
and his clear offer to sell back the property thereafter to the ven-
dor who was then admittedly in grave financial crisis which the
vendee took undue advantage of, were held more than enough
indicia of the true intention of the parties to treat the contract as
an equitable mortgage. (Zamora vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCAD
833, 260 SCRA 10 [1996].)
(2) Automatic appropriation by vendee of property sold stipulated.
— The stipulation in pacto de retro sale that the ownership over
the property sold would automatically pass to the vendee in case
no redemption was effected within the stipulated period, is con-
trary to the nature of a true pacto de retro sale under which the
vendee acquires ownership of the thing sold immediately upon
the execution of the sale, subject only the vendor’s right of re-
demption. The said stipulation is pactum commissorium which
enables the mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged
property without foreclosure. It is void. Its insertion in the con-
tract is an avowal of the intention to mortgage, rather than to sell
the property. (Lanuza vs. de Leon, 20 SCRA 369 [1969].)
(3) Vendee given possession of certificate of title. — In a case, the
Supreme Court, in holding that the conclusion of the trial court
that the deeds of sale in question were mere contracts of loan or,
properly speaking, a security arrangement, was not far-fetched,
said: “This court takes cognizance of the common practice of in-
dividual money lenders of taking physical possession of the cer-
tificate of title or other documents evidencing ownership of real
396 SALES Art. 1602
estate by the debtor to ensure his faithful compliance with the

obligation to pay the loan.” (Rodriguez vs. Toreno, 79 SCRA 351
[1977].)
(4) Escalation of purchase price every month stipulated. — It has
also been ruled that a stipulation in a contract sharply escalating
the repurchase price every month enhances the presumption that
the transaction is an equitable mortgage. Its purpose is to secure
the return of the money invested with substantial profit or inter-
est, a common characteristic of loans. (Bundalian vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 645 [1984].)
(5) Vendor borrowed from vendee money used in buying property
sold. — The same presumption arises from a statement in a deed
of sale with right to repurchase that the vendor borrowed from
the vendee the money used in buying the property from the origi-
nal owner. And the admission by the vendor that she “accepted”
the transaction knowing it to be a contract of sale with right to
repurchase is not a sufficient ground to arrive at such conclusion
where the vendor was in urgent need of money. Vendors covered
by Article 1602 are usually in no position to bargain with the
vendees and will sign onerous contracts to get the money they
need. It is precisely this evil which the law guards against. It is
not the knowledge of the vendors that they are executing a con-
tract of sale pacto de retro, which is the issue, but whether or not
the real contract was one of sale or a loan disguised as a pacto de
retro sale. (Ibid.; Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 81 SCAD 845, 275 SCRA
237 [1997].)
(6) Vendor of low intelligence and illiterate. — In subsequent case,
an alleged sale of a land by a father who was of low intelligence,
illiterate and could not even sign his name, having affixed his
thumbmark in the document in question entitled: “Sanglaan ng
isang Lupa na Patuluyang Ipaaari” was declared null and void, it
appearing that the execution of the document was made without
giving notice to the son who was not even a witness to the docu-
ment, that the old man would not understand the meaning of its
contents even if it were read to him, that the contract was so writ-
ten that anyone could believe he was only giving his property by
way of mortgage, not as a sale, and that the money which he had
been receiving from the alleged vendee a retro came from the sub-
ject property so that, in effect, there was no consideration for the

transfer of the property — be it sale or mortgage. (Aguinaldo vs.
Esteban, 135 SCRA 645 [1985].)
(7) Vendor continued to pay monthly interest; property not trans-
ferred to vendee; etc. — In another case, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the supposed deed of sale an equitable mortgage in view of
the following circumstances: the vendor remained in possession
of the property; the property was not transferred to the supposed
vendee for taxation purposes; the supposed vendor continued to
pay monthly interests; and the debt of the supposed vendor con-
tinued to pile up notwithstanding the alleged sale, the loan of
P6,000 having earned an interest of more than P13,000. (Dimalanta
vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 534 [1987]; see Lazatin vs. Court
of Appeals, 211 SCRA 129 [1992].)
(8) Vendor continued to be indebted. — A test to determine
whether a conveyance is a sale or merely a security for the pay-
ment of a loan is the continued existence of a debt or liability on
the part of the alleged mortgagor. If such a relationship exists, the
transaction is a mortgage; otherwise, it is a contract of sale.
(Cuyugan vs. Santos, 34 Phil. 100 [1915]; Vda. de Alvarez vs. Court
of Appeals, 49 SCAD 663, 231 SCRA 309 [1994].)
(9) Vendor mortgaged property sold to a bank; paid taxes thereon;
etc. — In a later case, the following circumstances existed to prove
that the alleged contract of sale was an equitable mortgage: the
vendor remained undisturbed in the possession of the parcel of
land sold, paid the taxes thereon, and mortgaged it to a bank; and
the price was unusually inadequate. The fact that the vendee sub-
sequently executed an affidavit to consolidate his right of owner-
ship over the subject property was held of no consequence. His
alleged “constructive possession” did not ripen into ownership
because the contract was not a contract of sale. (Balatero vs. In-
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Circumstances indicate contract was an equitable mortgage.
Facts: S and B entered into a transaction which purported
to be a sale of a lot and building by S with the right to repur-
chase.
398 SALES Art. 1602
Issue: Whether the contract was really an equitable mort-

gage.
Held: The following circumstances were held as indicating
that the transaction was intended by the parties to secure the
payment of a debt (Art. 1602[6].):
(a) S did not intend in any way to sell his lot and building;
(b) S was greatly alarmed when B registered the deed and
had a new title issued in B’s name;
(c) The money that S borrowed from B was partly to fin-
ish the construction of the building; and
(d) S made a strong remonstrance to B when the document
was explained to him by his interpreter, but B assuaged him
that it made no difference as he could get back his property
within eight (8) years if he had the money. (Bautista vs. Ping, 90
Phil. 409 [1951].)
———— ———— ————
2. Circumstances indicate contract was not an equitable mort-
gage.
Facts: S sold to B a lot for P35,000.00 in 1951. It appeared
that B sold the lot in 1953 for P47,000.00. B allowed S to collect
the monthly rent on the land for five (5) months. Subsequent to
the date of absolute sale, B gave S an option to buy the prop-
erty, and S paid the back taxes thereon up to the date of the
sale.
Issue: Should the instrument of absolute sale be presumed
an equitable mortgage?
Held: No, in view of the following:
(a) In selling the land to B, S made a profit of P15,000.00 in
one year, without having invested his money in buying the land,
as he just borrowed the part payment (P7,400.00) of the price
thereof (P20,000.00) which he made to its previous owner. The
price of P35,000.00 is not inadequate;
(b) S did not remain in possession of the land sold as les-
see or otherwise. On his request, in order to help him in the
expenses of his children in Manila, he was merely allowed by B
to collect the monthly rents, on the understanding that the
amounts so collected would be charged against him. After five
(5) months, B was the one who collected the monthly rents from
the tenants;
(c) An option is different from the right of repurchase;10

and
(d) S had the obligation to pay the back taxes because he
sold the land free from all liens and encumbrances. The taxes
due after the sale were paid by B. (Villarica vs. Court of Appeals,
26 SCRA 189 [1968].)
———— ———— ————
3. Circumstances show contract was a pacto de retro sale.
Facts: S entered into a contract with B. The contract stipu-
lates a sale by S of an agricultural land with right of repur-
chase. It does not contain any other condition to indicate that a
different transaction was intended by the parties. No extrane-
ous evidence was presented by S to show that a mortgage or
antichresis was the real purpose of the instrument. Nor was
there any proof offered by S that the purchase price was ever
repaid by him.
B, the vendee, was placed in possession of the land imme-
diately after the execution of the contract and this possession was
continued by B’s heirs without any objection from S or his heirs.
Issue: Do these circumstances exemplify a contract of sale
with pacto de retro?
Held: Yes. All the above facts justify the conclusion that the
contract was indeed a sale subject to right of repurchase and
that S failed to exercise such right. (Vda. de Luna vs. Valle, 48
SCRA 36 [1972].)
———— ———— ————
4. Circumstances show contract was an equitable mortgage.
Facts: S sold to B (in 1965) a two-storey house made of strong
materials with an assessed value of P4,000.00 built on a lot (in
Tondo, Manila) leased from X, together with the leasehold rights
to the lot, a television set, and a refrigerator in consideration of
the sum of P3,000 under a document entitled “Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase.” The deed recites among others, that
“if (S) fails to pay the said amount of P3,000.00 within the stipu-
lated period of three (3) months, his right to repurchase the
said properties shall be forfeited and the ownership thereto
automatically passes to B x x x without any court intervention
and they can take possession of the same.”
10
See “Option to buy and right of repurchase distinguished,” under Article 1601.
400 SALES Art. 1602
When the original period of redemption expired, the par-

ties extended it by another period of three (3) months. The docu-
ment was not recorded. After the execution of the instrument,
S mortgaged the house in favor of C, which mortgage was reg-
istered under Act No. 3344.
Issue: Is the contract a pacto de retro sale or an equitable mort-
gage?
Held: The following circumstances indubitably show an eq-
uitable mortgage:
(a) S, the supposed vendor, remained in possession of the
property sold, and when the three-month period of redemp-
tion expired the parties extended it;
(b) The price is grossly inadequate;
(c) S did not really transfer his ownership of the proper-
ties in question to B. What was agreed was that ownership of
the things supposedly sold would vest in B only if S failed to
pay P3,000.00. In fact, the emphasis is on S’s payment of the
amount rather than on the redemption of the things suppos-
edly sold. This stipulation is contrary to the nature of a true
pacto de retro sale under which the vendee acquires ownership
of the thing sold immediately upon execution of the sale, sub-
ject only to the vendor’s right of redemption. Indeed, what the
parties established by this stipulation is an odious pactum
commissorium which enables the mortgagee to acquire owner-
ship of the mortgaged properties without need of foreclosure
proceedings. Such a stipulation is a nullity, being contrary to
the provisions of Article 2088 of the Civil Code. Its insertion in
the contract of the parties is an avowal of an intention to mort-
gage rather than to sell; and
(d) S remained in possession even long after he had lost
his right of redemption. B brought action for consolidation of
ownership (see Art. 1607.) after more than one (1) year, and
only after C, who holds a registered mortgage, asked for the
extra-foreclosure of his mortgage. Under Article 2155, the eq-
uitable mortgage while valid between S and B as the immedi-
ate parties thereto, cannot prevail over the registered mortgage
of C. (Lanuza vs. De Leon, 20 SCRA 369 [1967].)
———— ———— ————
5. Other circumstances indicate contract was an equitable mort-
gage.
Facts: S obtained a series of loans from B, the aggregate of

which amounted to P16,250.00, secured by a continuing mort-
gage on S’s land. S failed to liquidate the mortgage upon matu-
rity. An absolute deed of sale was executed by S whereby title
to the property was transferred to B for P21,300.00, which
amount was P1,000.00 more than S’s mortgage indebtedness.
In another document executed on the same day, S was given
an option to purchase the property for the same price of
P21,300.00. S failed to exercise the option in due time, and her
efforts to secure an extension of time proved futile. B subse-
quently sold the land to his brother.
Issue: Should the “Pagbibilihang Tulayan ng Bakuran” be
treated as an equitable mortgage?
Held: Yes, in view of the following:
(a) This case must be differentiated from the Villarica case
under Article 1607 (supra.), where the ruling was based on a
particular set of facts. In the latter, the option to buy back the
property was executed six (6) days after the execution of the
deed of sale and the option to buy was interpreted to be only
an afterthought. Here, the intent of the parties to circumvent
the provision discouraging pacto de retro sales is very apparent.
The deed of absolute sale and the document giving the right to
repurchase were, in fact, only one transaction of pacto de retro
sale which must be construed as an equitable mortgage.
(b) Another factor is the sale of the property to B’s brother,
thus interposing a supposed innocent third party between the
parties to the contract. The records show that this sale and the
issuance of a new transfer certificate of title on the same date as
the sale cannot be deemed to be bona fide.
(c) The records show that over a six-month period, S bor-
rowed money on no less than 10 separate occasions from B,
and when her total borrowings of P13,000.00 were added to
what S claimed were usurious interests amounting to P3,250.00,
the cited total of P16,250.00 were made to appear as the
P21,300.00 purchase price for the lot when actually no money
outside of the 10 earlier loan transactions were exchanged be-
tween the parties.
(d) The added fact that S remained in actual possession of
the land and enjoyed the fruits thereof confirms the real inten-
tion of the parties to secure the payment of the loans with the
land as security. B waited for the period of redemption to ex-
402 SALES Art. 1602
pire before taking possession of the land. Had S really executed

an absolute sale in favor of B, the land should have been deliv-
ered to B and he would have assumed possession after the ex-
ecution of the questioned deed of sale.
The deed of sale, together with the companion “right to
redeem” contract, being only an equitable mortgage, B could
not validly sell the land to his brother. (Capulong vs. Court of
Appeals, 130 SCRA 245 [1984].)
———— ———— ————
6. Vendee a retro, after execution of “deed of sale with pacto de
retro,” gave several additional amounts and consented that they be
aggregated to the price of redemption.
Facts: The following facts are undisputed: In the first docu-
ment, Exh. “A” (deed of sale with pacto de retro), the considera-
tion was for P3,600; then a second document of exactly the same
tenor was executed hardly seven (7) months later, adding the
sum of P200 that had been later on received as addition to the
price, making the redemption price P3,800; then four (4) years
later, because an additional amount of P400 was again received,
a new document was once more executed, raising the redemp-
tion price to P4,200; and then a year later, because another sum
of P300 had been received, still another document of the same
tenor was once more executed, raising the redemption price to
P4,500.
Issue: In the light of the above admitted facts, should the
transaction be deemed an equitable mortgage?
Held: Yes. If Exh. “A” was a true deed of sale with pacto de
retro, the price was P3,600, nothing not even a centavo more,
the only right of the vendor a retro would have been to redeem
at that price. If the vendee a retro himself gave afterwards sev-
eral additional amounts and himself consented that they be
aggregated to the price of redemption, that was absolutely in-
consistent with the designation of the agreement. The case falls
under the 6th circumstance or badge of equitable mortgage
listed in Article 1602. (Gloria Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 84 SCRA
483 [1978].)
Price in pacto de retro sales

usually lower.
It should be noted that in a contract of sale with pacto de retro,
the price usually is less than in absolute sale for the reason that in
Arts. 1603-1604 EXTINGUISHMENT OF SALE 403
the former, the vendor expects to reacquire or redeem the prop-

erty sold (Amigo and Amigo vs. Teves, 96 Phil. 255 [1954].), or
else he may sell his right to redeem and thus recover the loss he
claims suffered by reason of the inadequacy of the price. (see
Barrozo vs. Macaraeg, 83 Phil. 381 [1949]; Tolentino vs. Agcaoili,
91 Phil. 917 [1952].)
The practice is to fix a relatively reduced price to afford the
vendor a retro every facility to redeem the property. In an abso-
lute sale where the vendor is permanently giving away his prop-
erty, he tries to get as compensation its real value. Hence, the in-
adequacy of repurchase price of itself cannot be considered a
ground for annulling the contract or justify the conclusion that
the contract is one of equitable mortgage.11 (Claridad vs. Novella,
105 Phil. 756 [1959]; Lacson vs. Granada, 1 SCRA 876 [1961];
Ignacio vs. Court of Appeals, 62 SCAD 731, 246 SCRA 242 [1995].)
ART. 1603. In case of doubt, a contract purporting

to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed
as an equitable mortgage. (n)
ART. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also
apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.
(n)
Presumption in case of doubt.

(1) Doubt resolved in favor of equitable mortgage. — Whether the
sale is absolute or pacto de retro, it shall be presumed to be an eq-
uitable mortgage even if only one of the circumstances mentioned
in Article 1602 is present. This is so because pacto de retro sales,
with the stringent and onerous effects that accompany them, are
not favored. (Olea vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCAD 579, 247 SCRA
274 [1995].) In case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale
with right to repurchase shall still be regarded as an equitable
11
In an extra-judicial foreclosure sale, when there is a right to redeem, inadequacy
of the price is also of no moment for the reason that the mortgagor has always the chance
to redeem and reacquire the mortgaged property sold at the foreclosure sale. The prop-
erty may be sold for less than the fair market value precisely because the lesser the price
the easier for the owner to effect a redemption. (Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals, 103
SCAD 509, 303 SCRA 287 [1999].)
404 SALES Arts. 1603-1604
mortgage. (see De la Paz vs. Garcia, 18 SCRA 779 [1966].) A con-

tract of reconveyance is but a necessary consequence of the exer-
cise of a party’s right to repurchase the property subject of a con-
tract of sale with a right of repurchase or of an equitable mort-
gage. (Lacorte vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCAD 446, 286 SCRA 24
[1998].)
The failure of the alleged vendee to take steps to consolidate
ownership of real property after the vendor failed to redeem
within the period agreed upon, may be taken as a factor in con-
struing a sale a retro an equitable mortgage. (Lacuesta vs. Labasan,
86 SCRA 16 [1978].) Where the contract is deemed an equitable
mortgage, ownership of the property cannot be consolidated until
after foreclosure of the mortgage has been undertaken. (Republic
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 43 SCAD 101, 224 SCRA 285
[1993].)
(2) Presumption, an exception to general rule. — Article 1603 is
an exception to the rule that doubts affecting an onerous contract
shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests. (Art.
1378, par. 1.) An equitable mortgage effects a lesser transmission
of rights and interests than a contract of sale, since the debtor does
not surrender all rights to his property but simply confers upon
the creditor the right to collect what is owing from the value of
the thing given as security. (see Lacuesta vs. Labasan, supra; Uy
vs. Court of Appeals, 49 SCAD 176, 230 SCRA 664 [1994]; Reyes
vs. Court of Appeals, 739 SCRA 97 [2002]; Cruz vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 412 SCRA 614 [2003].)
(3) Parol evidence admissible. — Parol evidence is admissible
to show that a transaction purporting to be an absolute or a pacto
de retro sale is really one of loan with a security and, therefore, a
mortgage. (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 179 [1985];
see Art. 1604.) Thus, it has been held that a contract should be
construed as a mortgage or a loan instead of a pacto de retro sale,
when its terms are ambiguous or the circumstances surrounding
its execution or performance are incompatible or inconsistent with
the theory that it is a sale. Accordingly, even when a document
appears on its face to be a sale with pacto de retro, the owner of the
property may prove that the contract is really a loan with mort-
gage by raising as an issue the fact that the document does not
express the true intent and agreement of the parties; and upon
proof of the truth of such allegation, the court will enforce the
agreement in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the
time of the execution of the contract. This principle is applicable
even if the purported pacto de retro sale was registered in the name
of the transferee and a new certificate of title was issued in the
name of the latter. (Olea vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Lustan vs.
The admission of parol testimony to prove that a deed of sale
absolute in form, was in fact given and accepted to secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation, does
not violate the rule against the admission of evidence to vary or
contradict the terms of the contract. (Ignacio vs. Chua Hong, 52
Phil. 940 [1929]; Aguinaldo vs. Esteban, 135 SCRA 645 [1985];
Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 179 [1985]; Ramos vs.
Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635 [1989]; Reyes vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 339 SCRA 97 [2000].)
(4) Where contract appears to be a genuine sale. — If from all in-
dications, the contract appears to be a genuine sale with right of
repurchase (or an absolute sale) and none of the suspicious cir-
cumstances mentioned in Article 1602 is present, the true agree-
ment will be upheld. (see De Luna vs. Valle, 48 SCRA 361 [1972];
Villarica vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 189 [1968]; De Bayquen
vs. Baleoro, 143 SCRA 412 [1986]; Cachola vs. Court of Appeals,
208 SCRA 496 [1992].)
The contract of sale with right of repurchase must be inter-
preted according to its literal sense and held to be such a contract.
In a case (there was no trace of any circumstances showing
that the transaction was an equitable mortgage), the following
were held evident manifestation of a genuine sale with right of
repurchase: adequate price; immediate delivery of the land to the
vendee who cultivated the same to rice and has since then been
improving the property to the exclusion of the vendor; religious
payment of all the land taxes by the vendee; neglect of the ven-
dor to pay the taxes; and vendor’s inaction to redeem the prop-
erty for a period of eight (8) years from the date of execution of
the deed of sale. (Bagadiong vs. Vda. de Abundo, 165 SCRA 459
[1988].)
406 SALES Arts. 1603-1604
Effect where contract held as an

equitable mortgage.
(1) Formal requirements of mortgage deemed complied with. —
When a contract purporting to be sale with a right to repurchase
is held as an equitable mortgage, the same shall be given effect as
if it has complied with the formal requirements of mortgage. (see
Zubiri vs. Quijano, 74 Phil. 47 [1942].) The supposed vendee (in
reality the creditor) has the right to recover the amount loaned.
(Arches vs. Dias, 50 SCRA 440 [1973].)
(2) Contract subordinate to a subsequent registered mortgage. —
The equitable mortgage, while valid as between the immediate
parties thereto, cannot, however, prevail over a subsequent reg-
istered mortgage. (see Art. 2125.)
(3) Title of property remains in supposed vendor. — The circum-
stance that the original transaction is subsequently declared to be
an equitable mortgage means that the title to the mortgaged prop-
erty which had been transferred to the supposed vendee actually
remained or is transferred back to the supposed vendor as owner-
mortgagor conformably to the well-established doctrine that the
mortgagee does not become the owner of the mortgaged prop-
erty because the ownership remains with the mortgagor. (Art.
2088.)
(4) Remedy of creditor is to foreclose. — Accordingly, it is not
proper for a court to declare the property as already owned by
the mortgagee upon failure of the mortgagor to pay his obliga-
tion within the required period, as it would produce the same
effect as a pactum commissorium, a forfeiture clause that has tradi-
tionally been held as contrary to good morals and public policy
and, therefore, void. The proper remedy to enforce a transaction
declared to be a mortgage is not an action for consolidation of
ownership (see Art. 1607.) but to foreclose the mortgage and sell
the property at public auction. (Montevirgen vs. Court of Appeals,
112 SCRA 641 [1982]; see Ching Sen Ben vs. Court of Appeals, 112
SCAD 698, 314 SCRA 762 [1999].)
(5) Conveyance of land not to affect mortgagor’s right of redemp-
tion. — Neither is a person’s right as a mortgagor in equity af-
fected by the fact that the subject property was already titled in
the name of the supposed vendee based on the mistaken notion
that the property was sold a retro. The equitable doctrine that
deems a conveyance intended as a security for a debt to be, in
effect, an equitable mortgage, operates regardless of the form of
the agreement chosen by the contracting parties. Equity looks
through the form and considers the substance. No conveyance of
land, even if accompanied by registration in the name of the trans-
feree and the issuance of a new certificate, can be allowed which
will enable a party to escape from the operation of this equitable
doctrine. (ibid.)
“Pacto de retro’’ sales not favored.

Sales with a right to repurchase, as defined by the Civil Code
(Art. 1602.), are not favored, and the contract will be construed as
a mere loan unless the court can see that, if enforced according to
its terms, it is not an unconscionable one. (Aquino vs. Deala, 63
Phil. 582 [1936].)
The presumption, however, that the contract is an equitable
mortgage may be overcome by proof to the contrary (see Vda. de
Luna vs. Valle, 48 SCRA 361 [1972].), and the fact that a document
is entitled as a mortgage (i.e., “Kasulatang Sanlaan”) is not control-
ling where the body of said document shows that is a deed with
right to repurchase as revealed by the words (i.e., “aking inilipat,
ipinagbili nang biling mabibiling muli”) used by the parties. (Magtira
ART. 1605. In the cases referred to in articles 1602

and 1604, the apparent vendor may ask for the refor-
mation of the instrument. (n)
When vendor may ask for reformation.

Article 1604 seeks to prevent a circumvention of Article 1602
by making the contract of loan appear as an absolute sale.
Reformation is that remedy granted by law by means of which
a written instrument is made or construed so as to express or con-
form to the real intention of the parties when such intention is
not expressed in the instrument. (see Art. 1359.) If the parties re-
ally intended a mortgage but the instrument states that the prop-
erty is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase, the same may
408 SALES Art. 1606
be reformed (Art. 1365.) so that the contract should appear to be

a mortgage and not an absolute sale or a pacto de retro sale.
In reformation, there has been a meeting of the minds between
the parties, but the written instrument purporting to embody their
agreement does not express their true intention by reason, for
instance, of mistake or fraud. (Art. 1359.) Where there has been
no meeting of the minds, the remedy is annulment. (Art. 1390.)
EXAMPLES:
(1) As security for a loan, S mortgaged his house to B. Both
parties intended to enter into a mortgage contract but the in-
strument as written states that the house is sold by S to B with
a right to repurchase. In this case, the remedy of reformation is
proper.
(2) If, in the same example, S was borrowing money from
B, with mortgage of his house as security, and B was buying
the house of S with right of S to repurchase, the remedy is an-
nulment. Either way, reformation cannot make the instrument
express the real intention of the parties.
ART. 1606. The right referred to in article 1601, in

the absence of an express agreement, shall last four
years from the date of the contract.
Should there be an agreement, the period cannot
exceed ten years.
However, the vendor may still exercise the right to
repurchase within thirty days from the time final judg-
ment was rendered in a civil action on the basis that
the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase.
(1508a)
Period for exercise of right of redemption.

Article 1606 refers to conventional redemption. It does not
apply where the contract is not one of sale with right of repur-
chase. (Baluran vs. Navarro, 79 SCRA 309 [1977].)
For conventional redemption to take place, the vendor should
reserve, in no uncertain terms, the right to repurchase the thing
sold. (see Art. 1601.) Thus, the right to redeem must be expressly
stipulated in the contract of sale in order that it may have legal
existence. Accordingly, where the contract provides: “In case of
sale” by the buyer of the property (sold) to the seller, the Supreme
Court held that the stipulation does not grant the right of repur-
chase. The quoted phrase should be construed to mean “should
the buyer wish to sell” which is the plain and simple import of
the words, and not “the buyer should sell.” (Leal vs. Intermedi-
ate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 394 [1987].)
(1) No agreement granting right. — If there is no agreement in
a contract of sale (see Umale vs. Fernandez, 28 Phil. 89 [1914].)
granting the vendor the right to redeem, there is no right of re-
demption since the sale should be considered an absolute sale.
(2) Agreement merely grants right. — If the parties agreed only
on the right to redeem on the part of the vendor but there is a total
absence of express stipulation as to the time within which the
repurchase should be made, then the period of redemption shall
be four (4) years from the date of the contract. (par. 1.)
(3) Definite period of redemption agreed upon. — If the parties
agreed on a definite period of redemption, then the right to re-
deem must be exercised within the period fixed provided it does
not exceed 10 years. (par. 2.) It has been held that the non-pay-
ment by the vendee a retro of the balance of the purchase price
does not suspend the running of the period of redemption agreed
upon (5 years) in the absence of a stipulation to that effect. A sale
is consummated upon the execution of the document and the
delivery of the subject matter thereof to the vendee. Failure to pay
part of the price does not in any way affect the cause or consid-
eration of the contract. (Catangcatang vs. Legayada, 84 SCRA 51
[1978].)
(4) Period agreed upon exceeds ten years. — Where the agreed
period exceeds 10 years, the vendor a retro has 10 years from the
execution of the contract to exercise his right of redemption.
(Anchuelo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 434
[1987].)
(5) Period of redemption not specified. — If the parties agreed that
the vendor shall have a right to redeem and they intend a period
which, however, is not specified, then the redemption period is
410 SALES Art. 1606
10 years. In order to be applicable, paragraph 2 of Article 1606

requires the existence of an agreement, not a definite and clear
agreement on the period. The mere fact that the agreement is
obtained by inference does not argue in favor of its non-existence.
(Tumaneng vs. Abad, 92 Phil. 18 [1952].)
(6) Final judgment that contract is pacto de retro. — “From the
time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis
that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase,” the
vendor a retro has 30 days within which to exercise the right to
repurchase. (par. 3; see Gonzales vs. De Leon, 4 SCRA 332 [1962];
Gerardino vs. The Hon. Judge, 80 SCRA 646 [1977]; Gloria Diaz
(a) As set forth in this provision, there must be an express
finding that the transaction is one of pacto de retro. (Tapas vs.
The application of the third paragraph of Article 1606 is
predicated upon the bona fides of the vendor a retro. It must ap-
pear that there was belief on his part, founded on facts attend-
ant upon the execution of the contract, honestly and sincerely
entertained, that it was in reality a mortgage, one not intended
to affect the title to the property sold, but merely to give it as
security for a loan or other obligation (Felicen, Sr. vs. Orias,
156 SCRA 586 [1987].), and because of such belief, he had not
redeemed the property within the proper period. (Leonardo
vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 254 [1993].) In short, the judg-
ment was rendered in a civil action where the issue was
whether the contract entered into by the parties was a pacto
de retro sale or an equitable mortgage.
(b) The thirty-day period is peremptory because the policy
of the law is not to leave the purchaser’s title in uncertainty
beyond the said period. It is not a prescriptive period but is
more a requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the
right of legal redemption. (Pangilinan vs. Ramos, 181 SCRA
359 [1990]; Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982].)
(c) The grant of the right of repurchase in accordance with
the third paragraph of Article 1606 is not found in the old Civil
Code. The legislative intent behind this article, along with Ar-
ticles 1602-1605 and 1607, is “to accord the vendor a retro the
maximum safeguards for the protection of his legal rights un-
der the true agreement of the parties. Experience has demon-
strated too often that many sales with right of repurchase have
been devised only to circumvent or ignore our usury laws and
for this reason, the law looks upon them with disfavor.’’ (Agan
vs. Heirs of Sps. A. Nueva and D. Nueva, 418 SCRA 421
[2003].)
EXAMPLES:
(1) A and B entered into a contract whereby A shall reap
the fruits of the riceland of B while B shall have a right to build
a house on the residential lot of A. The agreement provides
that neither party shall encumber nor alienate their respective
properties without the consent of the other and that in the event
that any of the children of A shall decide to build his house on
the lot, B shall be obliged to return the same.
Is the right to recover the lot subject to the prescriptive pe-
riod of four (4) years provided in Article 1606 (par. 1.)? No.
Article 1606 is not applicable. The agreement is not one of sale
with right of repurchase but is one of or akin to usufruct (see
Art. 562.), where the parties transferred the use or material pos-
session of each other’s property. (Baluran vs. Navarro, supra.)
(2) S sold to B a parcel of land. There was no express stipu-
lation reserving to S the right to repurchase. In this case, the
land is not subject to redemption as the sale is an absolute and
unconditional sale.
(3) If there was an express agreement granting S the right
to redeem within three (3) years from the date of the contract, S
must exercise the right within said period; but if no period for
redemption was stipulated, the law supplies it by providing
that it shall be four (4) years from the date of the contract. S
may grant a renewal or extension of the period provided it does
not exceed the balance of 10 years.
(4) Suppose it was agreed that S could redeem the land
only within eight (8) years, then S may redeem the land only
within that period. If the agreement was that A could redeem
within 12 years, the right to repurchase cannot be exercised af-
ter 10 years, the stipulation with respect to the excess (2 years)
412 SALES Art. 1606
over the term of 10 years being null and void. (Montiero vs.
Salgado, 27 Phil. 631 [1914].)
A stipulation not to repurchase within 10 years following
the execution of the sale is contrary to law. This fact, however,
does not in itself convert the contract into a mere evidence of
indebtedness and much less of mortgage, for it would at most
be considered as one where the repurchase is to be made within
the period not exceeding 10 years from the date of the sale.
(Tayao vs. Dulay, 13 SCRA 758 [1965].)
(5) If the right of redemption shall not be exercised “within
three (3) years from the date of sale,” and nothing is said as to
how long the right to redeem shall continue, its duration is seven
(7) years from the date of the contract. (Rosales vs. Reyes and
Ordovesa, 25 Phil. 495 [1913].) Where the condition as to the
exercise of the right of repurchase is that it shall not be made
“until after three (3) years from this date,” the duration of the
right, once effective is four (4) years or the balance of the 10
years limit allowed by law. (Lucido vs. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 148
[1914].)
Suppose the stipulation was that S may repurchase the
property “at any time he has the money,” the right of repur-
chase may be exercised within the period of 10 years from the
date of the execution of the contract a time having been ex-
pressly stipulated, which is “any time” which, however, is in-
definite or unlimited. (Soriano vs. Abalos, 92 Phil. 18 [1952].)
Similarly, where the instrument says that S “may repur-
chase the property in the month of March of any year,” S may
make the repurchase within 10 years, there being a period
agreed upon for the exercise of the right which, however, is not
specified. (Bandang vs. Austria, 21 Phil. 479 [1912].) It has been
held, however, that the stipulation that S could repurchase the
land “when he has established a certain business” does not
stipulate a period for the repurchase, but the suspension of the
right of repurchase until the establishment of the business and,
therefore, the repurchase should be made within 4, not 10, years
from the date of the contract. (Medel vs. Francisco, 51 Phil. 367
[1927]; see example No. 3.)
(6) Suppose the nature of the contract is the subject of con-
troversy in a civil action between S and B. B claims that the con-
tract is a sale with a right to repurchase. (Art. 1601.) On the other
hand, S contends that the contract is an equitable mortgage. (Art.
1602.) Subsequently, the court renders judgment holding that

the contract is really one with the right of repurchase.
Under the 3rd paragraph, S has 30 days from the date of
final judgment to redeem the property. If the case is appealed,
the 30-day period shall begin to run from the day the judgment
of the higher court becomes final. (see Gavina Perez vs. Zulueta,
106 Phil. 264 [1959].)
When Article 1606, par. 3, not applicable.

(1) Contract found to be an absolute sale. — Article 1606, para-
graph 3 is not applicable where the contract is found to be an
absolute deed of sale, pure and simple. There could not even be a
period of redemption. It refers to cases involving a transaction
where the seller contests or denies that the true agreement is one
of sale with right to repurchase and claims that the real intention
was a loan with equitable mortgage, but the court decides other-
wise. (Tapas vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 349 [1976].)
(2) Sale known and admitted by vendor as pacto de retro. — Nei-
ther is said provision applicable where the sale is admittedly one
with pacto de retro. If the rule were otherwise, it would be within
the power of every vendor a retro to set at naught a pacto de retro
or resurrect an expired right of repurchase, by simply instituting
an action to reform the contract — known to him to be in truth, a
sale with pacto de retro — into an equitable mortgage. (Felicen, Sr.
vs. Orias, 156 SCRA 586 [1987].) The issue or controversy between
the parties must concern or involve the juridical nature or char-
acter of the contract in question and the court makes an express
finding that the contract is one of pacto de retro. (see Tapia vs. Court
of Appeals, supra.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Lower court held Article 1606, par. 3 as applicable to a vendor a
retro who failed to redeem under a deed of sale which, as expressly
stipulated by the parties, is admittedly one with right of repurchase.
Facts: S executed in favor of B a deed of sale of a parcel of
land with right to repurchase within one (1) year from the date
of the sale. B afterwards sold the property to C who, in turn,
sold the same to D. Since the first sale S, who had not redeemed
the land from B within the stipulated period, never relinquished
414 SALES Art. 1606
the possession thereof. D brought suit to recover possession

from S.
The court held that the deed of sale between S and B should
be given the effect of a mere pacto de retro sale and S should be
permitted to exercise the right of repurchase in accordance with
the third paragraph of Article 1606.
Issue: Is the third paragraph of Article 1606 applicable?
Held: No, because the sale is expressly one with right of
repurchase. As the stipulated period has expired without S hav-
ing redeemed the land in question, B had irrevocably acquired
ownership over the property in accordance with Article 1509
of the old Civil Code which was in force at the time of the trans-
action in dispute. (Adorable vs. Inacala, 103 Phil. 481 [1958].)
Note: Under Article 1607 of the new Civil Code, the con-
solidation of ownership in the vendee shall not be recorded
without a judicial order.
(3) Party abandoned position that transaction an equitable mort-

gage after judicial declaration of transaction as a pacto de retro sale. —
In Abilla vs. Goboseng, Jr. (172 SCAD 437, 374 SCRA 51 [2002].), it
has been respondents’ consistent claim that the transaction sub-
ject hereof was an equitable mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale
or a sale with option to buy. Even after the Court of Appeals de-
clared the transaction to be a pacto de retro sale, respondents main-
tained their view that the transaction was an equitable mortgage.
Seeing the chance to turn the decision in their favor, however,
respondents abandoned their theory that the transaction was an
equitable mortgage and adopted the finding of the Court of Ap-
peals that it was in fact a pacto de retro sale. Respondents now in-
sist that they are entitled to exercise the right to repurchase pur-
suant to the third paragraph of Article 1606. Under the facts of
the case, the respondents were not allowed to exercise the right
of repurchase.
In the parallel case of Vda. de Macoy vs. Court of Appeals (206
SCRA 244 [1992].), the petitioners raised the defense that the con-
tract was not a sale with right to repurchase but an equitable
mortgage. They further argued as an alternative defense that even
assuming the transaction to be a pacto de retro sale, they can nev-
ertheless repurchase the property by virtue of Article 1606, third
paragraph of the Civil Code. It was held that the said provision
was inapplicable, thus: “The application of the third paragraph
of Article 1606 is predicated upon the bona fides of the vendor a
retro. It must appear that there was a belief on his part, founded
on facts attendant upon the execution of the sale with pacto de retro,
honestly and sincerely entertained, that the agreement was in
reality a mortgage, one not intended to affect the title to the prop-
erty ostensibly sold, but merely to give it as security for a loan or
other obligation. In that event, if the matter of the real nature of
the contract is submitted for judicial resolution, the application
of the rule is meet and proper; that the vendor a retro be allowed
to repurchase the property sold within 30 days from rendition of
final judgment declaring the contract to be a true sale with right
to repurchase. x x x’’
In Abilla, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that if respond-
ents really believed that the transaction was indeed an equitable
mortgage, as a sign of good faith, they should have, at the very
least, consigned with the trial court the amount of P896,000.00,
representing their alleged loan, on or before the expiration of the
right to repurchase x x x.’’
Date from which period reckoned.

(1) Date of contract. — Under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article
1606, the date from which the period must be counted is the date
of the contract. The date, however, of the contract must not be
taken in a very material sense. The date of the contract referred
to must be that from which the contract produces its effects, as for
example, if the contracting parties agreed on a suspensive condi-
tion to determine the effectiveness of the contract, the period
within which the right to repurchase must be exercised must not
be counted from the date of the contract itself but from the time
of the fulfillment of the suspensive condition.
(2) Date of finality of judgment. — Under paragraph 3 of Arti-
cle 1606, it has been held that the period to redeem is reckoned
from the time the judgment becomes final; and a judgment be-
comes final after the period to appeal had lapsed without one
having been perfected. The date of finality of a decision is entirely
distinct from the date of its entry and the delay in the latter does
not affect the effectivity of the former, as such is counted from the
416 SALES Art. 1606
expiration of the period of appeal. (Muñez vs. Court of Appeals,

152 SCRA 197 [1987].)
Effect of stipulation extending period

of repurchase.
(1) After expiration of period of redemption. — It is legally im-
possible to speak of extension because that which is extinguished
cannot be extended and because the ownership in the vendee is
already consolidated, and becomes absolute.
(2) Before the expiration of the period of redemption. — The origi-
nal term may be extended provided that the extension, including
the original term, shall not extend beyond 10 years; otherwise, the
extension is void as to the excess.
Reason for limiting period of redemption.

The question of the period within which the repurchase may
be made is unanimously considered as a question of public inter-
est. It is not a good thing that the title to property should be left
for a long period of time subject to indefinite conditions of this
nature. For this reason, the intention of the law is restrictive and
limitative. (10 Manresa 302.)
“A long term for redemption renders the tenure of prop-
erty uncertain and redounds to its detriment, for neither does
the precarious holder cultivate the ground with the same in-
terest as the owner, nor does he properly attend to the preser-
vation of the building, and owing to the fact that his enjoyment
of the property is temporary, he endeavors above all to derive
the greatest benefit therefrom, economizing to that end even
the most essential expenses.” (23 Scaevola 667.)
Validity of penal clause providing automatic

termination of redemption period.
In a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the parties may legiti-
mately fix any period they please, not in excess of ten (10) years,
for the redemption of the property sold by the vendor. The deter-
mination of the right of redemption may be made to depend upon
the delinquency of the vendor. (Dimatulac vs. Coronel, 40 Phil.
686 [1919].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Penal clause provides that in case of failure of vendor a retro,
who will remain in possession as lessee, to pay the agreed rentals, the
lease shall automatically be terminated and ownership of vendee shall
become absolute.
Facts: S sold to B a parcel of land. It is stipulated in the deed
of sale that S can repurchase the property within a period of 18
months from the date of the sale and that S will remain in pos-
session of the land as lessee for the same period of 18 months.
The lease covenant contained in the deed of sale with pacto de
retro provides also, among others, that in case of failure of the
vendor-lessee (S) to pay the rentals agreed upon, the lease shall
automatically terminate and the right of ownership of the
vendee (B) shall become absolute.
Issue: Is the penal clause valid?
Held: Yes. The lease that S executed on the property may be
considered as a means of delivery or tradition by constitutum
possessorium. (see Art. 1500.) While the lease covenant may be
onerous or may work hardship on S because of its clause pro-
viding for the automatic termination of the period of redemp-
tion, however, the same is not contrary to law, morals, or pub-
lic order which may serve as basis for its nullification. Rather
than being obnoxious or oppressive, it is a clause common in a
sale with pacto de retro and as such it received the sanction of
our courts. (see Amigo vs. Teves, 96 Phil. 252 [1954].)
The consequences of such provision are not worse than such
as follow from many other forms of agreement to which con-
tracting parties may lawfully attach their signatures. Never-
theless, the court should not hesitate to relieve the vendor from
its effects whenever this can be done consistently with estab-
lished principles of law. (Dimatulac vs. Coronel, supra.)
ART. 1607. In case of real property, the consolida-

tion of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the fail-
ure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of
Article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has
been duly heard. (n)
418 SALES Art. 1607
Judicial order for recording of consolidation

of ownership.
(1) Necessity. — If real property is involved and the vendor
failed to redeem within the period agreed upon, the vendee’s ti-
tle becomes irrevocable but the consolidation of ownership in the
vendee shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property without
a judicial order and until after the vendor has been duly heard.
The reason is that the transaction may not be a genuine pacto de
retro but only an equitable mortgage.
(2) Purpose. — The requirement provides additional safe-
guards to debtors. The purpose is not only to have all doubts over
the true nature of the transaction speedily ascertained and decided,
but also to prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while
such determination is being made. (Teodoro vs. Arcenas, 110 Phil.
222 [1960]; Cruz vs. Leis, 122 SCAD 693, 327 SCRA 570 [2000].)
(3) Former method. — Under the former method of consolida-
tion by a mere extra-judicial affidavit of the buyer a retro, the lat-
ter could easily cut off any claims of the seller by disposing of the
property after such consolidation to strangers in good faith and
without notice. The chances of the seller a retro to recover his prop-
erty would thus be nullified, even if the transaction were really
proved to be a mortgage and not a sale. (Ibid.)
(4) Acquisition of ownership by vendee a retro. — It is plain from
Article 1607 that the acquisition of ownership by a vendee a retro
is automatic (Oviedo vs. Garcia, 40 SCRA 17 [1971].), i.e., once there
is failure to redeem within the stipulated period, ownership of
the property sold becomes vested or consolidated by operation
of law on the vendee. Any other interpretation would be violative
of the sanctity of the contract between the parties. (Rosario vs.
Rosario, 110 Phil. 394 [1960].) The needed judicial hearing con-
templated by Article 1607 refers not to the consolidation itself, but
merely for the purpose of registering the consolidation (De
Bayquen vs. Baleoro, 156 SCRA 412 [1986].) or the consolidated
title. (De Guzman, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 701 [1987].)
(5) Effect of failure to comply with the requirement. — The only
effect of the failure of the vendee a retro to comply with Article 1607
is that the absolute ownership of the vendee a retro cannot be re-

corded in the Registry of Property. It does not impair his title or
ownership for the method prescribed under Article 1607 as men-
tioned above is merely for the purpose of registering the consoli-
dated title. The nature of a sale with the right of repurchase is such
that the ownership over the thing sold is transferred to the vendee
upon execution of the contract, subject only to the resolutory con-
dition that the vendor exercises his right of repurchase within the
period agreed upon. (Heirs of Francisco Parco vs. Haw Pia, 45
SCRA 164 [1972]; see Flores vs. So, 162 SCRA 117 [1988]; Cruz vs.
Leis, supra.)
Action to consolidate ownership.

(1) Ordinary civil actions. — The consolidation shall be effected
through an ordinary civil action cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court wherein the vendor a retro is made a party defendant. The
petition to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 does not
partake of the nature of a motion, it not being merely an incident
to an action or proceeding.
Article 1607 contemplates a contentious proceeding wherein
the vendor a retro must be named respondent in the caption and
title of the petition for consolidation of ownership and duly sum-
moned and heard. The failure on the part of the court to cause
the service of summons as prescribed (in Rule 14, Rules of Court)
is sufficient cause for attacking the validity of the judgment and
subsequent orders on jurisdictional grounds. (Yturralde vs. Court
of Appeals, 43 SCRA 313 [1972]; Ongoco vs. Judge, CFI of Bataan,
15 SCRA 30 [1965]; Crisologo vs. Centeno, 26 SCRA 68 [1968];
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635 [1989].)
(2) Registration proceedings. — Where the land has been sold
under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for
the original registration of the land. However, should the period
for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration
proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the
vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and
may continue the proceedings. (Sec. 14, par. 2, Pres. Decree No.
1529 [Property Registration Decree].)
420 SALES Art. 1608
ART. 1608. The vendor may bring his action

against every possessor whose right is derived from
the vendee, even if in the second contract no mention
should have been made of the right to repurchase,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage
Law and the Land Registration Law with respect to
third persons. (1510)
Nature of right to redeem.

(1) A right, not an obligation. — The right to redeem is what it
is: a right, not an obligation; therefore, consignation (Art. 1256.)
is not required to preserve the right to redeem. Thus, the allega-
tion that the offer to redeem was not sincere because there was
no consignation of the purchase price is devoid of merit. But to
actually redeem, there must, of course, be payment or consigna-
tion. (Immaculate vs. Navarro, 160 SCRA 211 [1988].)
(2) A real right. — By virtue of the provision of this article, it
can be concluded that the right to repurchase is of a real charac-
ter and should not be considered personal. Exception is, however,
made to the provisions of the Mortgage Law and the Land Regis-
tration Law with respect to third persons. (10 Manresa 314.) This
means that the vendor a retro cannot exercise his right of redemp-
tion against a subsequent transferee for value and in good faith if
his right is not properly registered or annotated. (see Art. 1544;
see Lucido vs. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 148 [1914]; Alarcon vs. Esteva,
16 SCRA 123 [1966].)
Note: The Spanish Mortgage Law has been discontinued by
Presidential Decree No. 892. The discontinuance is reiterated by
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the latter being the new Property
Registration Decree which superseded Act No. 196, as amended,
the Land Registration Law.
EXAMPLE:
S sold his land (not registered) to B with a right to repur-
chase within 2 years to B. If before 2 years B sold the same land
to C, a purchaser for value and in good faith. S may still repur-
chase the property from C even if in the sale between B and C
no mention was made of the right of S.
If the land, however, is registered under the Torrens Sys-

tem (Pres. Decree No. 1529.) and the right of S was not anno-
tated on B’s certificate of title, S cannot exercise his right to re-
deem against C who registered the land free from all liens and
encumbrances not noted on the certificate of title.
ART. 1609. The vendee is subrogated to the ven-

dor’s rights and actions. (1511)
Rights acquired by vendee a retro.

(1) Vendee subrogated to vendor’s rights. — Subrogation trans-
fers to the person subrogated the credit with all the rights thereto
appertaining. (Art. 1303.) The above article is logical because a
pacto de retro sale transfers ownership to the vendee although
subject to the condition of repurchase. As owner, the vendee, for
example, may transfer or alienate his right to a third person,
mortgage the property, enjoy the fruits thereof, recover the prop-
erty against every possessor, and perform all other acts of own-
ership subject only to the right of redemption of the vendor. Of
course, the vendor cannot transfer ownership if he is not the real
owner.
(2) Right to eject vendor. — Prior possession by the vendee a
retro of the property is not a condition precedent in an unlawful
detainer action against the vendor a retro who, after having failed
to redeem, and title in the vendee a retro had been consolidated,
refused to vacate the property. (Pharma Industries, Inc. vs.
Pajarillaga, 100 SCRA 339 [1980].)
ART. 1610. The creditors of the vendor cannot

make use of the right of redemption against the
vendee, until after they have exhausted the property
of the vendor. (1512)
Right of vendor’s creditors to redeem.

This article is a practical application of Article 1177 permit-
ting creditors to exercise the rights and actions of their debtor after
exhausting his properties to satisfy their claims. (see Manresa 331.)
The right to redeem being property, it is answerable for the debts
422 SALES Art. 1611
of the vendor provided the vendor’s properties are first exhausted.

The exhaustion must be established to the satisfaction of the
vendee.12
Article 1610 refers to all kinds of creditors, whether ordinary
or preferred, except those in whose favor exists a mortgage or
antichresis upon the very property sold recorded prior to the sale.
They need not exhaust. All these latter creditors have to do is to
foreclose their rights, ignoring the rights of the vendee. (see 10
Manresa 325-326.)
ART. 1611. In a sale with a right to repurchase, the

vendee of a part of an undivided immovable who ac-
quires the whole thereof in the case of article 498, may
compel the vendor to redeem the whole property, if
the latter wishes to make use of the right of redemp-
tion. (1513)
Redemption in sale of part of undivided

immovable.
The purpose of the above article (and Arts. 1612-1615.) is to
discourage co-ownership which is recognized as undesirable,
since it does not encourage the improvement of the property co-
owned.
(1) A co-owner may demand the partition of the thing owned
in common insofar as his share is concerned. (Art. 494.)
(a) If the thing is essentially indivisible, it may be allotted
to the co-owner who shall indemnify the others.
12
Art. 2059. This excussion shall not take place:
(1) If the guarantor has expressly renounced it;
(2) If he has bound himself solidarily with the debtor;
(3) In case of insolvency of the debtor;
(4) When he has absconded, or cannot be sued within the Philippines unless he
has left a manager or representative;
(5) If it may be presumed that an execution on the property of the principal debtor
would not result in the satisfaction of the obligation.
Art. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he
must set it up against the creditor upon the latter’s demand for payment from him, and
point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory,
sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.
(b) If the co-owners cannot agree that the thing be allot-

ted to one of them, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.
(Art. 498.)
(2) In either case, the vendee who acquires the whole of an
undivided immovable a part of which is subject to a right to re-
purchase, has a right to demand that the vendor a retro, who likes
to exercise his right of redemption, redeem the whole property.
EXAMPLE:
A, B, and C are co-owners of an undivided parcel of land.
A sold his undivided portion to D with the right to repurchase.
As a result of a partition, D, who is now one of the co-owners,
acquired the whole land after paying the portions belonging to
B and C.
If A would like to repurchase the portion sold by him, D
may compel him to redeem the entire parcel of land so that the
property will not revert again to a state of co-ownership.
ART. 1612. If several persons, jointly and in the

same contract, should sell an undivided immovable
with a right of repurchase, none of them may exer-
cise this right for more than his respective share.
The same rule shall apply if the person who sold
an immovable alone has left several heirs, in which
case each of the latter may only redeem the part which
he may have acquired. (1514)
ART. 1613. In the case of the preceding article, the
vendee may demand of all the vendors or co-heirs
that they come to an agreement upon the repurchase
of the whole thing sold; and should they fail to do so,
the vendee cannot be compelled to consent to a par-
tial redemption. (1515)
Redemption in joint sale by co-owners/

co-heirs of undivided immovable.
(1) The co-owners of an undivided immovable sold by them
jointly or collectively and in the same contract with the right to
424 SALES Arts. 1612-1613
repurchase, can exercise such right only as regards their respec-

tive shares. (Art. 1612, par. 1.)
(2) Similarly, the co-heirs of the vendor of an undivided im-
movable can exercise the right of redemption only for the respec-
tive portions they have inherited. (Ibid., par. 2.)
(3) The vendee a retro can refuse partial redemption; he may
require all the vendors or all the heirs to redeem the entire prop-
erty or to agree to its redemption by any one of them. (Art. 1613.)
This right is given to the vendee in line with the object of the law
(see Art. 1620.) to put an end to co-ownerships whenever possi-
ble.
(4) Under Article 1620 (infra.), the right of a co-owner who
chooses not to redeem accrues to the benefit of the others. The
extent of the share of the redeeming co-owner is not taken into
account except as provided in the second paragraph thereof.
EXAMPLE:
A, B, and C are co-owners of a parcel of land. If they should
sell the property to D with the right to repurchase in the con-
tract, each one of them may exercise that right only as regards
his own share or for one-third portion of the property.
The same rule applies if X were the sole owner of the land
and he sold it with right to repurchase to D and he should die
and leave A, B, and C as heirs. Each one of them can only ex-
ercise the right of redemption for the one-third portion he has
inherited.
But D can demand that they come to an agreement upon
the repurchase of the whole property by all of them or any one
of them. If they do not do so, D cannot be compelled to assent
to a partial redemption. (see Art. 1611.)
Effect of redemption by co-owner

of entire property.
Under Article 1612, a co-owner cannot redeem more than his
share in the co-ownership. The redemption by a co-owner of the
property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, does
not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it does not
put to end the existing state of co-ownership.
Article 1613 does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-
ownership nor does the fact that the redeeming co-owner has
succeeded in securing title over a parcel of land in his name ter-
minate the existing co-ownership. Registration of property is not
a means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of
existing title, that is, if there is one. (Adill vs. Court of Appeals,
157 SCRA 455 [1988]; see Paulmian vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA
866 [1992].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
The entire property sold by the deceased was redeemed by one of
the heirs.
Facts: Two (2) days before her death, M (mother) sold a
parcel of unregistered land with a right of repurchase within
seven (7) years. D (daughter) and her husband, H, redeemed
the property within the redemption period. The tax declara-
tion on the land in favor of M was cancelled and another one
was issued in the name of H; and since then, the real estate
taxes had been paid by D and H.
The other children of M invoked the right to the disputed
property as co-owners thereof by right of intestate succession.
Issue: Under the deed of repurchase, was the ownership of
the land in dispute vested in D and H or in all of the heirs of M?
Held: In all of the heirs. The repurchase could not have been
made by D and H by themselves alone because the right be-
longed in common to the heirs of M. This was true even if it
were assumed that the vendee a retro had intended to sell back
the land to D and H only as the repurchase was subject to the
limitations under Article 1612 and the stipulations in the origi-
nal contract, to wit, that the repurchase was to be made by the
vendor (M) or her successors. D was not the only successor,
and H was not even an heir of M.
A sale during the period of redemption to any other per-
son other than the heirs of the deceased mother, as co-owners
of the subject land, could not have been made by the vendee a
retro. Any of the co-owners could have successfully invalidated
such a transaction. (De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA
75 [1987].)
426 SALES Arts. 1614-1615
ART. 1614. Each one of the co-owners of an undi-

vided immovable who may have sold his share sepa-
rately, may independently exercise the right of
repurchase as regards his own share, and the vendee
cannot compel him to redeem the whole property.
(1516)
Redemption in separate sales by co-owners

of undivided immovable.
Although it is the policy of the law to avoid indivision, it
would be unjust, if the sale was made separately and independ-
ently, to require the co-owners to come to an agreement with re-
gard to the repurchase of the thing sold, and certainly, it would
be worse to deprive them of their right in case they fail to agree.
The very purpose of the article is to prevent such injustice. (10
Manresa 332.)
EXAMPLE:
In the preceding example, if A, B, and C sold their respec-
tive shares to D with the right of repurchase in separate instru-
ments and at different dates, each one of them may exercise his
right independently of the others and D cannot compel him to
redeem the whole property.
ART. 1615. If the vendee should leave several heirs,

the action for redemption cannot be brought against
each of them except for his own share, whether the
thing be undivided, or it has been partitioned among
them.
But if the inheritance has been divided, and the
thing sold has been awarded to one of the heirs, the
action for redemption may be instituted against him
for the whole. (1517)
Redemption against heirs of vendee.

The vendor a retro can exercise the right to redeem against the
heirs of the vendee a retro with respect only to their respective
shares, whether the thing be undivided or it has been partitioned

among them.
However, if by partition the entire property has been adjudi-
cated to one of the heirs, the vendor can exercise the right to re-
deem against said heir for the whole.
EXAMPLE:
A sold his parcel of land to B with a right to repurchase.
Then B died leaving C, D, and E, his children, as heirs.
In this case, the right of redemption by A is against each of
the heirs only for his respective share or for one-third of the
property.
If the property has been awarded to C by partition, then
the action for redemption may be instituted against him for the
entire property.
ART. 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself of the

right of repurchase without returning to the vendee
the price of the sale, and in addition:
(1) The expenses of the contract, and any other
legitimate payments made by reason of the sale;
(2) The necessary and useful expenses made on
the thing sold. (1518)
Obligation of vendor a retro

in case of redemption.
Article 1616 defines the obligations of the vendor who desires
to exercise his right of repurchase. (see Gargallo vs. Duero, 1 SCRA
134 [1961].) He must return to the vendee a retro:
(1) The price. — The law speaks of “price of the sale” and not
the value of the thing. It is lawful, however, for the parties to agree
that the price to be returned will be more or less than the original
sum paid by the vendee (10 Manresa 338-339.);
(2) Expenses of contract and other legitimate expenses. — If the
expenses for the execution and registration of the sale were paid
by the vendee, the same shall be reimbursed by the vendor. (see
428 SALES Art. 1616
Art. 1497.) But they need not be paid at the very time of the exer-
cise of the right since they are unknown amounts. They may be
paid later. The same is true of necessary and useful expenses (De-
cision of Supreme Court of Spain, Dec. 31, 1897; 10 Manresa 338.);
and
(3) Necessary and useful expenses. — The first are expenses in-
curred for the preservation of the thing or those which seek to
prevent the waste, deterioration or loss of the thing, while the
second are which increase the value of the thing or create improve-
ments thereon, such as a house.
(a) The necessary expenses which must be repaid to the
vendee are not those which are ordinary and simple expenses
of preservation because these expenses are incident to the en-
joyment of the thing and should be borne by the vendee. (10
Manresa 339-342.)
(b) Useful expenses are refunded to the vendee a retro be-
cause he is considered a possessor in good faith. (Art. 546, par.
2.)
(c) The vendor a retro is given no option to require the
vendee a retro to remove the useful improvements on the land
subject of the sale a retro, unlike that granted the owner of a
land under Articles 546 and 54713 of the Civil Code.
(d) The vendor a retro must pay for the useful improve-
ments introduced by the vendee a retro; otherwise, the latter
may retain possession of the land until reimbursement is
made. (Gargollo vs. Duero, 1 SCRA 1311 [1961].) It has been
held, however, that considering the purpose of the law on
homesteads (Public Land Act, C.A. No. 141, as amended.),
which is to conserve ownership in the hands of the home-
13
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which
the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Art. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the princi-
pal thing, the possessor in good faith may remove them, unless the person who recovers
the possession exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the preceding article.
steader and his family, Article 1616 should be construed in

conjunction with Articles 546 and 547. To allow a vendee a retro
of a homestead the right of retention until payment of useful
expenses is made by the redemptioner would be to render
nugatory the right of repurchase granted by law to a home-
steader because all a vendor a retro can do to prevent repur-
chase is to build something on the homestead beyond the ca-
pacity to pay of the homesteader who seeks to repurchase.
(Calagan vs. CFI of Davao, 95 SCRA 498 [1980].)
(e) The payment of land tax has been as neither necessary
nor useful. It is a charge against the property. The object of the
land tax is to contribute to the expenses of the government in
the protection of the vendee’s right as owner and it is but just
that he should bear said charges. (Cabigao vs. Valencia, 53 Phil.
646 [1929].) Taxes on the property may be considered neces-
sary expenses in the sense that if they are not paid, the prop-
erty may be sold for tax delinquency or forfeited to the gov-
ernment.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Property subject to right of repurchase was embargoed by the
government and vendor a retro redeemed the property from the gov-
ernment and not from vendee a retro who subsequently sold the prop-
erty.
Facts: S sold in December, 1897 to B a property with right to
repurchase within six (6) months. S was not able to effect the
repurchase in May, 1898 by reason of the fact that B was absent
from his place of residence on account of the war. About that
time the revolution broke out and the property was seized by
the revolutionary government from B.
The property was redeemed by S from said government in
November, 1898. Subsequently, B sold the property to C. S
brought action against C to recover the property.
Issue: Was the sale made by the revolutionary government
to S valid, with the result that B had no right to transfer to C the
property in question?
Held: No. What S did was to attempt to reacquire the own-
ership of the property transferred to B from a third person to
whom the property had not been transferred by B in any man-
430 SALES Art. 1616
ner whatsoever. Therefore, the payment made by S to the revo-

lutionary government which should have been made to B in
order to redeem the property, could not have extinguished the
obligation incurred by him in favor of the latter. (Panganiban
vs. Cuevas, 7 Phil. 477 [1907].)
Offer to redeem and tender of payment

generally required.
(1) Offer to redeem must be bona fide. — The mere declaration
of the vendor of his intention to exercise the right of repurchase
is not sufficient to preserve the right of redemption. The law re-
quires that the offer must be a bona fide one and accompanied by
an actual and simultaneous tender of payment or consignation
of the full amount agreed upon for repurchase. (see Torrijos vs.
Crisologo, 6 SCRA 1984 [1962]; Catangcatang vs. Legayada, 84
SCRA 51 [1978].) Thus, the mere sending of letters by the vendor
expressing his desire to repurchase without an accompanying
tender of the redemption price falls short of the requirement of
the law. (Uy Lee vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 196 [1975]; see
State Investment House, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 734
[1992].)
(2) When tender of payment not necessary. — Neither is it neces-
sary to tender payment of the repurchase price if the vendee has
already flatly refused to reconvey. (Gonzaga vs. Go, 69 Phil. 778
[1940]; Catalan vs. Rivera, [C.A.] 45 O.G. 4538; Torrijos vs.
Crisologo, supra; Lafont vs. Pascasio, 5 Phil. 391 [1905]; Fructo vs.
Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362 [1910].) This rule is premised on the ground
that under such circumstance the vendee will also refuse the ten-
der of payment. (Uy Lee vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 196 [1975].)
Where the vendor a retro had consigned or deposited in court the
redemption price when the action was filed, prior tender could
be excused. (see De la Cruz vs. Marcelino, 84 Phil. 709 [1949]; Torio
vs. Del Rosario, 93 Phil. 800 [1953]; Torrijos vs. Crisologo, supra.)
If the tender is made after the period of repurchase has ex-
pired, its acceptance would amount only to a promise to sell on
the part of the vendee because the right of repurchase having
expired, there was no more right that could have been preserved.
(Tan Queto vs. Vda. de Maquiling, 2 C.A. Rep. 150.)
Consignation of price generally

not required.
It is not a legal requisite for the vendor to make a consigna-
tion or judicial deposit of the price if the offer or tender is refused.
(Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil. 849 [1918]; see Rumbaoa vs. Arzaga,
84 Phil. 812 [1949].) He is not a debtor. He has a right, not an ob-
ligation, to repurchase. (Villegas vs. Capistrano, 9 Phil. 416 [1907].)
It is enough that a sincere and genuine tender of payment is made
and refused, although consignation may serve to provide addi-
tional security for the vendor and to indicate the veracity of his
desire to exercise the right of repurchase. (Legaspi vs. Court of
Appeals, 142 SCRA 82 [1986].)
(1) Where right of repurchase judicially declared. — Where the
right of the vendor a retro to repurchase had been judicially de-
clared to exist, the effect of the judgment is to definitely fix the
relation of the vendor a retro and the vendee a retro, as that of
debtor and creditor, respectively, in the amount and within the
period fixed in the judgment. Should the vendee (creditor) refuse
to accept the amount of the redemption price offered, the vendor
(debtor) must deposit it in court. (Torrijos vs. Crisologo, supra.)
(2) In case of absence of the vendee a retro. — In such case, the
right of redemption may still be exercised as a vendor who de-
cides to redeem a property sold with pacto de retro, in a sense,
stands as the debtor and the vendee as the creditor of the pur-
chase price. The vendor can and should exercise his right of re-
demption against the vendee by filing a suit against him and
making a consignation with the court of the amount due for re-
demption (Catangcatang vs. Legayada, supra; Rivero vs. Rivero,
80 Phil. 802 [1948].), not that deposit or consignation is legally
essential to preserve his reserved right of redemption but because
he should be regarded as having done that which should have
been done to terminate the right of the vendee over the property
where the redemption price is already due and payable. (Rumbaoa
vs. Arzaga, supra; see Legaspi vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)
ART. 1617. If at the time of the execution of the

sale there should be on the land, visible or growing
fruits, there shall be no reimbursement for or prorating
432 SALES Art. 1617
of those existing at the time of redemption, if no in-

demnity was paid by the purchaser when the sale was
executed.
Should there have been no fruits at the time of the
sale, and some exist at the time of redemption, they
shall be prorated between the redemptioner and the
vendee, giving the latter the part corresponding to the
time he possessed the land in the last year, counted
from the anniversary of the date of the sale. (1519a)
Right of parties as to fruits of land.

This article applies only when the parties have not provided
for any sharing arrangement with respect to the fruits existing at
the time of redemption. (Almeda vs. Daluro, 79 SCRA 327 [1977].)
It refers only to natural and industrial fruits. Civil fruits are
deemed to accrue daily and belong to the vendee in that propor-
tion.14
(1) If there were fruits at the time of the sale and the vendee
paid for them, he must be reimbursed at the time of redemption
as the payment forms part of the purchase price.
(2) If no indemnity was paid by the vendee for the fruits, there
shall be no reimbursement for those existing at the time of redemp-
tion. (par. 1.)
(3) If the property had no fruits at the time of the sale and
some exist at the time of redemption, they shall be apportioned
proportionately between the redemptioner and the vendee, giv-
ing the latter a share in proportion to the time he possessed the
14
Art. 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young
and other products of animals.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or
labor.
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property
and the amount of perpetual or life annuities or other similar income.
Art. 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the pos-
session is legally interrupted.
Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from the time they are gath-
ered or severed.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong to the possessor in good faith in
that proportion.
property during the last year counted from the anniversary of the
date of the sale (par. 2.) to compensate the vendee for his expense.
(see Lustado vs. Pinol, [unrep.] 102 Phil. 1164 [1958].)
The same rule, it is believed, is also applicable if there were
fruits at the time of the sale and the vendee paid for them.
EXAMPLE:
S sold to B with the right of repurchase for P500,000.00 a
parcel of land on June 5, 2001 with a three-year redemption
period. At the time of the sale, there were existing crops on the
land for which B paid an additional amount of P50,000.00.
(1) If S should exercise his right of redemption, he must
return to B the amount of P550,000.00 as the price of the sale.
(2) If B did not pay for the crops, he is not entitled to reim-
bursement for crops existing at the time of the redemption.
(3) If there were no crops at the time of the sale and some
exist at the time of redemption on June 5, 2004, B is entitled to
the crops during the last year, that is, from June 5, 2003 to June
5, 2004.
(4) If there were crops at the time of the sale and B paid for
them, B is entitled to reimbursement, or to the fruits for the last
year, because having paid for them, the effect is the same as if
there were no crops on the land when it was sold.
ART. 1618. The vendor who recovers the thing sold

shall receive it free from all charges or mortgages
constituted by the vendee, but he shall respect the
leases which the latter may have executed in good
faith, and in accordance with the customs of the place
where the land is situated. (1520)
Right of vendor a retro to recover thing

sold free from charges.
The vendee a retro may alienate, encumber, or perform other
acts of ownership over the thing sold. But his ownership being
revocable upon redemption, all acts done by him are also revoca-
ble. Thus, he may borrow money and mortgage the property but
when the vendor a retro redeems, the vendee a retro is obliged to
434 SALES Art. 1618
redeem the mortgage. The vendor has the right to receive the
property in the same condition in which it was at the time of the
sale.
The law, however, establishes an exception with respect to
leases which the vendee may have entered into in good faith ac-
cording to the custom of the place where the land is located.15 The
exception is dictated by public convenience in the interest of ag-
riculture.
— oOo —
15
Art. 1676. The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not re-
corded in the Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipula-
tion to the contrary in the contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence
of the lease.
435
SECTION 2. — Legal Redemption
ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be sub-

rogated, upon the same terms and conditions stipu-
lated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires
a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any
other transaction whereby ownership is transmitted
by onerous title. (1521a)
Legal redemption defined.

Article 1619 gives the definition of legal redemption. As the
word “thing” is employed without qualification, the right applies
to both movable and immovable property. (U.S. vs. Caballero, 23
Phil. 65 [1912].)
Transfer of ownership by onerous title.

Subrogation transfers to the person subrogated the rights
pertaining to another. (Art. 1303.) Note that legal redemption may
take place not only in purchase or dation in payment but in any
other transfer of ownership by onerous title. It has been held,
however, that it cannot take place in barter and in the transmis-
sion of property by hereditary title. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, July 9, 1903 and June 7, 1915; 10 Manresa 319.)
Evidently, the right is not available where there is only a mort-
gage or lease.
Dation in payment defined.

Dation in payment or dacion en pago is the transmission of the
ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as the accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation. (8 Manresa 314;
see Art. 1245.) In this special mode of payment, the debtor offers
435
436 SALES Art. 1619
another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of pay-

ment of an outstanding debt.
Nature of dation in payment.

(1) Sale of thing. — The undertaking partakes in one sense of
the nature of sale,1 that is, the creditor is really buying the thing
or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged
against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential elements of a
contract of sale, namely, consent, object certain, and cause or con-
sideration must be present. It is, therefore, governed by the law
of sales.2
(2) Novation of an obligation. — In its modern concept, what
actually takes place in dacion en pago is an objective novation of
the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent
of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of
the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase
price. (Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. Phil. Acetylene Co., Inc.,
111 SCRA 421 [1982].)
Basis and nature of right of legal redemption.

(1) The nature of conventional and legal rights of redemption
is identical, except for the source of the right. While conventional
redemption arises from the voluntary agreement of the parties,
legal redemption proceeds from law. (see Alarcon vs. Esteva, 16
SCRA 123 [1966].)
The concept of legal redemption may be converted into one
of conventional redemption. Thus, where there was voluntary
agreement of the parties, consisting of extensions of the redemp-
tion period granted at the request of the vendors followed by
commitment by them to pay the redemption price at a fixed date,
it was held that the concept of legal redemption is converted by
the parties into one of conventional redemption such that it gen-
erated binding contracts when approved by the vendee. In such
case, the period of redemption is that agreed upon by the parties.
1
See distinctions between dation in payment and sale under Article 1486.
2
Art. 1245. Dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to the creditor in
satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales.
Legal Redemption
(Lazo vs. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., 31 SCRA 329
[1970].)
(2) The right of legal redemption is not predicated on proprietary
right but on a bare statutory privilege to be exercised only by the
person named in the statute. In other words, the statute does not
make actual ownership at the time of sale or redemption a condi-
tion precedent, the right following the person and not the prop-
erty. (Magno vs. Viola and Sotto, 61 Phil. 80 [1934].) Under the
law (Rules of Court, Rule 39, Sec. 30.), the property sold subject
to redemption may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his
successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property. In
an extra-judicial foreclosure sale, the mortgagor, his successors-
in-interest, judgment creditor or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage, may redeem the same. (Act
No. 3155, Sec. 6.)
(3) Legal redemption is in the nature of a mere privilege cre-
ated partly for reason of public policy and partly for the benefit
and convenience of the redemptioner to afford him a way out of
what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into
which he has been thrust. It is intended to minimize co-owner-
ship. (Basa vs. Aguilar, 117 SCRA 128 [1982]; Tan vs. Court of
Appeals, 172 SCRA 660 [1989].) It works only one way in favor of
the redemptioner. Not having parted with anything, he can com-
pel the purchaser to sell, but cannot be compelled by him to buy.
(Villasor vs. Medel, [C.A.] No. 8677, Sept. 29, 1948.)
Instances of legal redemption.

(1) Under the Civil Code, the instances of legal redemption
are found in Articles 1620, 1621, 1622, 1634 (infra.), and 1088.
Article 1088 provides:
“Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period
of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale of the vendor.”
Article 1088 refers to sale of hereditary rights, and not to spe-
cific properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedent’s
438 SALES Art. 1619
estate. In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a

deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court for payment
of debts are final and not subject to legal redemption. Unlike in
ordinary execution sales, there is no legal provision allowing re-
demption in the sale of property for the payment of debts of a
deceased person. (Plan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135
SCRA 270 [1985].)
(2) Under special laws, the following are instances of legal
redemption:
(a) Redemption by owner of real property sold for delin-
quent taxes. The period is within one year from the date of sale
(R.A. No. 7160 [Local Government Code], Sec. 261.);
(b) Repurchase by homesteader of homestead sold under
the Public Land Act. The period is five years (Com. Act No.
141 [Public Land Law], Sec. 119; see Tupas vs. Damasco, 132
SCRA 593 [1984].);
(c) Redemption by judgment debtor or redemptioner of
real property sold on execution. The period is twelve months
(Rules of Court, Rule 39, Sec. 30.);
(d) Redemption by mortgagor after mortgaged property
has been judicially foreclosed and sold. The period is ninety
days but before confirmation of sale by the court. (Ibid., Rule
68, Sec. 3.) In all cases of extra-judicial foreclosure sale, the
mortgagor may redeem the property within one year from the
date of registration of the sale (see Act No. 3135, Sec. 6); and
(e) Redemption by an agricultural lessee of landholding
sold by the landowner. The period is 180 days from notice in
writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees
affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the
registration of the sale. (R.A. No. 3844, as amended [Code of
Agrarian Reform], Sec. 12.) This right has priority over any
other right of redemption, like the right of redemption of a co-
owner under Article 1620.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Redemption of property sold under execution was effected by
means of a check for the amount due.
Legal Redemption
Facts: Pursuant to a judgment to pay damages, the sheriff

levied upon two parcels of land registered in the name of S,
one of which had already been purchased by B but had not yet
been registered in the latter’s name. The two lots were sold at
public auction to P (petitioners).
Before the expiration of the period of redemption, B issued
to the sheriff a check as the redemption price for the two lots.
The sheriff acknowledged receipt of the check on the same date
and issued the following day a certificate of redemption, in favor
of B and S.
Issue: The central issue is whether or not redemption had
been validly effected by B and S in view of Article 12493 of the
Civil Code which, according to B and S, private respondents,
was applicable in case of redemption under Section 30, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.
Held: “It is contended by the private respondents that Arti-
cle 1249 is inapplicable as it ‘deals with a mode of extinction of
debts’ (Golez vs. Camara, 101 Phil. 363 [1957].) while the ‘right
to redeem is not an obligation, nor is it intended to discharge a
pre-existing debt.’ (Paez vs. Magno, 83 Phil. 403 [1949].)
They rely on Javellana vs. Mirasol (40 Phil. 761 [1920].) where
the Supreme Court held that ‘a redemption of property sold
under execution is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact
that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is
effected by means of a check for the amount due.’
The petitioners, on the other hand, invoke Belisario vs.
Natividad (60 Phil. 156 [1934].), where it was held that “even if
the check had been good, the defendant was not legally bound
to accept it because such a check does not satisfy the require-
ments of a legal tender.” They also cite Villanueva vs. Santos (67
Phil. 648 [1939].), Legarda vs. Miailhe (88 Phil. 637 [1951].), New
Pacific Timber and Supply Co., Inc. vs. Seneris (101 SCRA 686
3
Art. 1249. The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipu-
lated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is
legal tender in the Philippines.
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other
mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been
cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.
In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in
abeyance. (1170)
440 SALES Art. 1619
[1980].), and Philippine Air Lines vs. Court of Appeals (181 SCRA
557 [1990].), all of which, they claim, have overruled Javellana.
“It would appear from a study of the jurisprudence invoked
by the parties that the case applicable to the present contro-
versy is Javellana vs. Mirasol.
The cases cited by the petitioners do not involve redemp-
tion by check. The check tendered in Belisario was in the exer-
cise of an option to repurchase; in Villanueva, in connection
with a pacto de retro; in Legarda and New Pacific, as payment of
a mortgage indebtedness; and in the PAL case, in satisfaction of
a judgment.
Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals (106 SCRA 513 [1981].), besides
citing Javellana, stresses the liberality of the courts in redemp-
tion cases. On the issue of the applicability of Article 1249 of
the Civil Code and the validity of the tender of payment through
a crossed check, this Court held:
‘x x x the aforequoted Article should not be applied in
the instant case x x x
To start with, the Tolentinos are not indebted to BPI,
their mortgage indebtedness having been extinguished with
the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties. After
said foreclosure and sale, what remains is the right vested
by law in favor of the Tolentinos to redeem the properties
within the prescribed period. This right of redemption is
an absolute privilege, the exercise of which is entirely de-
pendent upon the will and discretion of the redemptioners.
There is, thus, no legal obligation to exercise the right of
redemption. Said right, can in no sense, be considered an
obligation, for the Tolentinos are under no compulsion to
exercise the same. Should they choose not to exercise it,
nobody can compel them to do so nor will such choice give
rise to a cause of action in favor of the purchaser at the
auction sale. In fact, the relationship between said purchaser
and the redemptioners is not even that of creditor and
debtor.
On the other hand, if the redemptioners choose to ex-
ercise their right of redemption, it is the policy of the law to
aid, rather than to defeat, the right of redemption. It stands
to reason, therefore, that redemptions should be looked
upon with favor and where no injury is to follow, a liberal
Legal Redemption
construction will be given to our redemption laws as well

as to the exercise of the right of redemption. In the instant
case, the ends of justice would be better served by afford-
ing the Tolentinos the opportunity to redeem the proper-
ties in question other than the homestead land, in line with
the policy aforesaid. x x x
xxx
x x x And the redemption is not rendered invalid by
the fact that the said officer accepted a check for the amount
necessary to make the redemption instead of requiring pay-
ment in money. It goes without saying that if he had seen
fit to do so, the officer could have required payment to be
made in lawful money, and he undoubtedly, in accepting a
check, placed himself in a position where he could be li-
able to the purchaser at the public auction if any damage
had been suffered by the latter as a result of the medium in
which payment was made. But this cannot affect the valid-
ity of the payment. The check as a medium of payment in
commercial transactions is too firmly established by usage
to permit of any doubt upon this point at the present day.
No importance may thus be attached to the circumstance
that a stop-payment order was issued against the check the
day following the deposit, for the same will not militate
against the right of the Tolentinos to redeem, in the same
manner that a withdrawal of the redemption money being
deposited cannot be deemed to have forfeited the right to
redeem, such redemption being optional and not compul-
sory. Withal, it is not clearly shown that said stop-payment
order was made in bad faith. x x x’
In the United States, it has also been held and recognized
that a payment by check or draft or bank bills or currency which
is not legal tender is effective if the officer accepts such pay-
ment. (93 C.J.S. Executions 258.) If in good faith the
redemptioner pays, and the officer receives before the expira-
tion of the time of redemption an ordinary banker’s check, the
payment is regarded as sufficient. (Ibid.)
We are not, by this decision, sanctioning the use of a check
for the payment of obligations over the objection of the credi-
tor. What we are saying is that a check may be used for the
exercise of the right of redemption, the same being a right and
not an obligation. The tender of a check is sufficient to compel
442 SALES Art. 1620
redemption but is not in itself a payment that relieves the

redemptioner from his liability to pay the redemption price. In
other words, while we hold that the private respondents prop-
erly exercised their right of redemption, they remain liable, of
course, for the payment of the redemption price.’’ (Fortunado
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the

right of redemption in case the shares of all the other
co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third per-
son. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive,
the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise
the right of redemption, they may only do so in pro-
portion to the share they may respectively have in the
thing owned in common. (1522a)
Right of legal redemption of co-owner.

The right of legal redemption among co-owners presupposed
of course, the existence of a co-ownership. The following are the
requisites for the right to exist:
(1) There must be co-ownership of a thing;
(2) There must be alienation of all or of any of the shares of
the other co-owners;
(3) The sale must be to a third person or stranger (Art. 1620.),
i.e., a non-co-owner; and
(4) The sale must be before partition.
The right of a co-owner to legal redemption is based on his
status as such independently of the size of his share. (Butte vs. M.
Uy & Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 527 [1961].) It can no longer be invoked
where there had been an actual partition of the property so that
co-ownership no longer exists. (Salantandol vs. Reyes, 162 SCRA
568 [1988].) Redemption by a co-owner within the period pre-
scribed by law (see Art. 1623.) inures to the benefit of all the other
co-owners. (Mariano vs. Court of Appeals, 41 SCAD 927, 222
SCRA 736 [1993].)
Legal Redemption
EXAMPLES:
(1) A, B, and C are co-owners of an undivided property
valued at P500,000.00. A sells his interest to D for P200,000.00.
B or C may exercise the right of redemption by reimburs-
ing D the price of the sale. If both B and C redeem the interest
sold by A, each of them shall pay P100,000.00 to D, which is the
proportion of their respective shares in the co-ownership. If the
price of P200,000.00 is grossly excessive, the same may be equi-
tably reduced by the court.
(2) The property inherited by A, B, and C, heirs, were mort-
gaged by X, decedent, during his lifetime, to D. The redemp-
tion of the whole property by C with his own personal funds
does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but
will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will
not put an end to the lasting state of co-ownership. Redemp-
tion is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership. (Mardeno
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
The sale was made by the father, a co-owner, to the wife of one of
his children, the other co-owners.
Facts: Spouses H and W owned a small lot. After W died
intestate, H sold one-half of the lot to T, wife of S, H’s son. T
refused to allow redemption by X, etc., other children of H and
W. The lower court disallowed redemption because it consid-
ered T, the vendee, a co-heir, being married to S, and held the
conveyance valid since it was in favor of the conjugal partner-
ship of T and S in the absence of any statement that the prop-
erty was paraphernal in character.
Issue: Should X, etc. be allowed to exercise their right to
redeem the property sold to T?
Held: Yes. A co-ownership exists. Within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 1620, the term “third person” or “stranger” refers to all
persons who are not heirs in succession, and by heirs are meant
only those who are called either by will or the law to succeed
the deceased and who actually succeeds. In short, a third per-
son is any one who is not a co-owner. (Villanueva vs. Florendo,
139 SCRA 329 [1985]; see dissenting opinion.)
444 SALES Art. 1620
By whom and against whom right

may be exercised.
(1) A co-owner has the legal right to sell, assign, or mortgage
his ideal share in the property held in common. (see Art. 493.) By
the very nature of the right of legal redemption, a co-owner’s right
to redeem is invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners
are sold to a third party or stranger.
(2) Co-owners have no right of legal redemption against each
other to whom the law grants the same privilege, but only against
a third person. (Estrada vs. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 [1915]; Reyes vs.
Concepcion, 190 SCRA 171 [1990].) A third person, within the mean-
ing of Article 1620, is anyone who is not a co-owner. Article 1620
is intended to minimize co-ownership. (Basa vs. Aguilar, 117 SCRA
128 [1982].)
(3) Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary right to a
stranger before partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subro-
gated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
purchase price, provided it be done within the period of one (1)
month to be counted from the time they were notified in writing
of the sale by the vendor. (Art. 1088.) Once the portion correspond-
ing to each heir is fixed, the co-heirs turn into co-owners and their
right of legal redemption should be governed by Articles 1620 and
1623. (Saturnino vs. Paulino, 97 Phil. 51 [1955].)
(4) The right of legal redemption is not granted solely and
exclusively to the original co-owners but applies to those who
subsequently acquire their respective shares while the commu-
nity subsists. (see Felices vs. Colegado, 35 SCRA 173 [1970].) There
is nothing in Article 1620 which, expressly or by inference, limits
the right of redemption to the original co-owners. Moreover, this
interpretation is in accordance with the spirit of the law. (Viola
and Roura vs. Tecson, 43 Phil. 808 [1922].)
When right cannot be invoked.

Article 1620 applies only if the co-ownership still exists. (see
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 778 [1992]; Abalos vs.
Court of Appeals, 42 SCAD 569, 223 SCRA [1993].) It presupposes
the existence of a co-ownership at the time the conveyance is made
by a co-owner and when it is demanded by the other co-owner
Legal Redemption
or co-owners. (Uy vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCAD 243, 246 SCRA

703 [1995].)
(1) Thing owned in common partitioned. — The right given to a
co-heir or co-owner by Article 1620 in case any of the other co-
heirs or co-owners sells his share to a third person cannot be in-
voked where the sale was made after the properties owned in
common had been partitioned, judicially or extra-judicially.
(Umengan vs. Butacan, 7 SCRA 311 [1963].) If a plan of partition
has been agreed upon though not approved at the time of the sale,
its approval by the court relates back to the date of the plan, and
property sold after such date is not subject to legal redemption.
(De Jesus vs. Daza, 77 Phil. 152 [1946].)
(2) Shares of all co-owners sold. — The provision covers the case
where some or one of the co-owners sell(s) their/his share(s) in
the property owned in common but not the case where all the co-
owners have sold their shares. (Tan Queto vs. Candongo, 106
SCRA 199 [1981].)
(3) Thing owned in common had been offered for sale by all co-own-
ers. — Neither can the right be invoked where the petitioners,
together with the other co-owners, had previously offered for sale
the entire property and after the respondent agreed to purchase
the same and advanced a considerable amount of money, said
petitioners wanted to renege on their agreement to sell and in-
stead, offered to redeem from the respondent portion of the prop-
erty sold by the other co-owners to the respondent. (Dominguez
vs. Lee, 155 SCRA 703 [1987].)
Price of redemption.
(1) Reasonable price. — The law requires the redemptioner to
pay only a reasonable price if the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive. This is to prevent collusion between the buyer and the
selling co-owner. The right of the redemptioner to pay a reason-
able price under Article 1620 does not excuse him from the duty
to make proper tender of the price that can be honestly deemed
reasonable under the circumstances, without prejudice to final
arbitration by the courts, nor does it authorize said redemptioner
to demand that the vendee accept payment by installments.
(Torrijos vs. Crisologo, 6 SCRA 186 [1962].) There is no legal re-
446 SALES Art. 1621
demption in case of a mere least. (De La Cruz vs. Marcelino, 84

Phils. 709 [1949]; Fernandez vs. Terun, 391 SCRA 653 [2002].)
(2) Price stated in the deed of sale. — The practice of understat-
ing the consideration of transactions for the purpose of evading
taxes and fees due the government is violative of public policy
and injurious to public interest and must be condemned and the
parties guilty thereof must be made to suffer the consequences of
their ill-advised agreements to defraud the State. In a case where
only P30,000 was the price stated in the deed of sale of the inter-
est of a co-owner in a piece of land “to minimize the payment of
the registration fees, stamps and sales tax,” the court ruled that
the co-owner exercising the right of legal redemption should pay
only P30,000, although much more had been paid by the buyer.
(Doromal vs. Court of Appeals, 66 SCRA 575 [1975].)
(3) Amount actually paid by the buyer. — On the other hand, if
by false representations the buyer obtains from the redemptioner
an amount (e.g., P100,000) greater than the price which he actu-
ally paid (e.g., P80,000), the co-owner who made the repurchase
can recover from the buyer the difference (P20,000) in an appro-
priate action. (see Lim Tuico vs. Cu Unjieng, 21 Phil. 493 [1912].)
Purpose of the grant of right

to co-owners.
The purpose of the law in establishing the right of legal re-
demption between co-owners is to reduce the number of partici-
pants until the community is done away with, as being a hin-
drance to the development and better administration of the prop-
erty. This reason exists while the community subsists and the
participants continue to be so whether they be the original co-
owners or their successors. (Viola and Roura vs. Tecson, 43 Phil.
808 [1922]; see Estrada vs. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 [1915]; Caram vs.
Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 315 [1957].)
ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall

also have the right of redemption when a piece of ru-
ral land, the area of which does not exceed one hec-
tare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own
any rural land.
Legal Redemption
This right is not applicable to adjacent lands which

are separated by brooks, drains, ravines, roads and
other apparent servitudes for the benefit of other es-
tates.
If two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise
the right of redemption at the same time, the owner of
the adjoining land of smaller area shall be preferred;
and should both lands have the same area, the one
who first requested the redemption. (1523a)
Right of legal redemption of adjacent

owners of rural lands.
The following are the requisites for the exercise of the right
under this article:
(1) Both the land of the one exercising the right of redemp-
tion and the land sought to be redeemed must be rural;
(2) The lands must be adjacent;
(3) There must be an alienation;
(4) The piece of rural land alienated must not exceed one (1)
hectare;
(5) The grantee or vendee must already own any other rural
land; and
(6) The rural land sold must not be separated by brooks,
drains, ravines, roads and other apparent servitudes from the
adjoining lands.
The lands mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 1621 are not
really adjacent.
When the land exceeds one (1) hectare, the adjacent owners
are not given the right of legal redemption because this may
lead to the creation of big landed estates. (10 Manresa 372.) The
right cannot be exercised against a vendee if he is also an adja-
cent owner. The last paragraph of Article 1621 refers to a situa-
tion where the vendee of a piece of rural land is not an adjoining
owner.
448 SALES Art. 1621
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Party who has the burden of proving existence of barrier be-
tween land sought to be redeemed and land of one who wants to re-
deem.
Facts: It is not disputed that the land sought to be redeemed
adjoins that of X, who seeks to repurchase the property in the
exercise of his legal right of redemption in accordance with first
paragraph of Article 1621, that it is rural and has an area of not
more than one (1) hectare, and that its purchaser already owns
or is a co-owner of another rural land.
Issue: Is it incumbent upon X to prove that his land and the
one he seeks to redeem are not separated by any of the barriers
mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 1621?
Held: No. Having proved that his land and that which he
seeks to redeem are contiguous, X should not be called upon to
prove the contrary by showing that the two estates are sepa-
rated by a brook, drain, ravine, etc. The one called upon to prove
the existence of a barrier between two estates is he who wants
to defeat the right of redemption on the ground that the two
estates are not contiguous to each other. (Maturan vs. Gullas, 94
Phil. 701 [1954].)
———— ———— ————
2. Right of redemption by adjacent owner against vendee who
is also an adjacent owner.
Facts: S sold to B, an adjacent owner, a parcel of rural land.
B bought the land for the purpose of having an egress from his
land to a road. C, another adjacent owner, seeks to redeem the
land sold to B.
Issue: Has C the right to exercise the right of redemption
granted to an adjacent owner?
Held: No. The right of redemption of adjacent owners can-
not be exercised by any of them among themselves, but only
by them against a stranger, who acquires from any one of them
by purchase or gift, in payment, or by any other title for value,
a rural estate of the area fixed by law. (Del Pilar vs. Catindig, 35
Phil. 263 [1916].)
Note: The last paragraph of Article 1523 of the old Civil
Code, except for a slight change in wordings, is the same as
that of Article 1621 of the new Civil Code. The Supreme Court
Legal Redemption
adopted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain on the same

issue. (See, however, rulings with respect to urban lands under
Article 1622, last par., infra.)
Meaning of rural lands.

The word “rural” has been defined as relating to or constitut-
ing tenement in land adopted and used for agricultural or pasto-
ral purposes. It is one which, regardless of site, is principally used
for the purpose of obtaining products from the soil as opposed to
urban lands, which are principally for the purpose of residence.
(Fabia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 364 [1984],
citing 3 Castan 124.)
Use of property a determining factor.

The above definition is correct insofar as the word is ordinar-
ily and commonly used or understood. However, in giving an
adjoining owner the right to redeem “a piece of rural land,” the
word “rural,” as used in Article 1621, must be construed in con-
sonance with the meaning intended by the framers of the law. The
reason for the law in question is to foster the development of ag-
ricultural areas by adjacent owners who may desire the increase
for the improvement of their own land. (infra.)
In view of the legislative objective, the “use” of property for
agricultural purposes is essential in order that the same may be
characterized as rural land for purposes of legal redemption un-
der Article 1621. The use and destination of the land and the cus-
toms of each town will be the data that ought to be taken into
account in order to decide firmly the cases where the qualifica-
tion appears doubtful. (Ibid., citing 10 Manresa 372.)
Preference as between two or more

adjacent owners of rural lands.
In case two or more adjacent owners desire to exercise the right
of redemption, the law gives preference to the owner of the ad-
joining land of smaller area but if both lands have the same area,
to the one who first requested the redemption.
Under Article 1620, the co-owners exercise their right of re-
demption pro rata.
450 SALES Art. 1621
Purpose of the grant of right to owners

of adjoining rural lands.
(1) To benefit adjacent owners and public weal as well. — The
object of the lawmaker in allowing the redemption by adjacent
owners is to prevent an adjoining real estate belonging to another
owner or owners, the area of which does not exceed one hectare,
from passing into the hands of a person other than someone
among the adjacent owners whereby the property of the latter
would be divided without benefit to the public weal and perhaps
to the prejudice of the adjacent owners themselves who are inter-
ested in preserving the integrity of their respective properties and
making use of the alienated property for the improvement and
development of their own lands. (Del Pilar vs. Catindig, 35 Phil.
263 [1916].)
(2) To avoid difficulties in cultivation. — “An estate of not more
than a hectare in area does not, as a general rule, produce enough
to keep one family; its cultivation cannot be accomplished eco-
nomically, as the agricultural implements used have to be brought
in across lands belonging to other owners, and the same may be
said with regard to the gathering and transportation of the pro-
duce. All these difficulties disappear if on the sale of the estate, it
is purchased by one of the adjacent owners whereby the public
interest is favored, because the production increases, the private
interests of the redemptioner are respected, and no ostensible
harm is occasioned either on the vendor or the purchaser.” (Ibid.,
quoting 10 Manresa 358.)
(3) To protect agriculture. — The intention of the law in giving
the right of redemption is to protect agriculture, by the union of
small agricultural lands and those adjoining thereto under one
single owner for their better exploitation. If the land adjacent to
that which is sought to be redeemed is not agricultural, then the
redemption is in vain — it does not answer the purpose behind
the law. (Cortes vs. Flores, 47 Phil. 992 [1925]; Fabia vs. Interme-
diate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 364 [1984].) Both the land of the
one exercising the right and the adjacent property sought to be
redeemed should be rural or destined for agricultural exploita-
tion; otherwise, there is no right of redemption.
Legal Redemption
In short, the purpose is to encourage the maximum develop-

ment and utilization of agricultural lands. (Ortega vs. Orcine, 38
SCRA 276 [1971].)
ART. 1622. Whenever a piece of urban land which

is so small and so situated that a major portion thereof
cannot be used for any practical purpose within a rea-
sonable time, having been bought merely for specu-
lation, is about to be re-sold, the owner of any adjoin-
ing land has a right of pre-emption at a reasonable
price.
If the re-sale has been perfected, the owner of the
adjoining land shall have a right of redemption, also
at a reasonable price.
When two or more owners of adjoining lands wish
to exercise the right of pre-emption or redemption,
the owner whose intended use of the land in question
appears best justified shall be preferred. (n)
Rights of pre-emption and legal redemption

of adjacent owners of urban lands.
(1) Meaning. — Article 1622 recognizes two rights; namely:
(a) Pre-emption, which has been defined as the act or right
of purchasing before others. (72 C.J.S. 478.) It is exercised be-
fore the sale or resale against the would-be vendor; and
(b) Redemption, which is exercised after the sale has been
perfected against the vendee. The recognition of the right of
redemption will result in the rescission of the sale.
(2) Requisites. — The conditions or requisites for the exercise
of the right of pre-emption or redemption, as the case may be, are
the following:
(a) The one exercising the right must be an adjacent
owner;
(b) The piece of land sold must be so small and so situated
that a major portion thereof cannot be used for any practical
purpose within a reasonable time; and
452 SALES Art. 1622
(c) Such urban land was bought by its owner merely for
speculation.
The above requisites must be alleged by the adjoining owner
in his complaint and proved by him. (Del Rosario vs. Bansil, 149
SCRA 662 [1989].)
(3) Price. — The price to be paid is a reasonable price. In a case,
an adjoining owner was held not entitled to redeem a lot (612 sq.
meters) which was much bigger area-wise, than the lot (140 sq.
meters) owned by him. (Tañedo vs. Bernad, 165 SCRA 86 [1988].)
(4) Preference as between two or more adjacent owners. — In case
two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise the right of legal
redemption, the law prefers him whose intended use of the land
appears best justified. (last par.) The determinative factor is the
intended use that appears best justified, and not whether the land
was acquired for speculative purposes.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. The land in question is intended to be used by an educa-
tional institution whose existing site is not enough for its needs.
Facts: The City of Manila and Arellano University entered
into the contract of exchange whereby 5 parcels of land belong-
ing to the city were ceded to the university for 3 parcels be-
longing to the latter.
X brought suit, claiming the right of redemption and for
pre-emption over one of the 5 city parcels with an area of 221.50
square meters, adjoining X’s property and lots of the univer-
sity.
Issue: Does X have the right of legal redemption under Ar-
ticle 1622?
Held: No. The existence of the two conditions (Nos. 2 and
3) mentioned in Article 1622 must be alleged and proved. X not
only failed to allege them but could not have proved them be-
cause, in the first place, the parcel of land in question consists
of 221.50 square meters, an area bigger than the average size of
lots in Manila as found by the trial court, and in the second
place, the City of Manila did not acquire the lot by purchase.
Furthermore, it was alleged by the university that, as an
educational institution whose existing site was not enough for
Legal Redemption
its needs, it could devote the said parcel to serve public inter-
est, which intended use entitled the university to preference
under the last paragraph of Article 1622. (De Santos vs. City of
Manila, 45 SCRA 40 [1972]; see De la Cruz vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA
307 [1970]; Soriente vs. Court of Appeals, 8 SCRA 750 [1963];
Ortega vs. Orcine, 38 SCRA 276 [1971].)
———— ———— ————
2. Part of adjoining owner’s house occupies without his fault
adjoining lot sold to another adjoining owner.
Facts: Having discovered that part of her ancestral house
was erected on an adjoining lot of 59 square meters, X wanted
to exercise her right of pre-emption but the lot owner asked for
the exorbitant sum of P9,000. Later, the 59 square meter lot was
sold to another adjoining owner for only P1,500.
Issue: Who has a better right to the lot, X or the other ad-
joining owner?
Held: X, because her intended use of the land appears best
justified. Her house was occupying the lot through no fault on
her part. (Legaspi vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 360 [1976].)
Note: In the above cases, the right of legal redemption was
sought to be exercised by an adjoining owner against the vendee
who is also an adjoining owner. (see ruling in Del Pilar case,
supra, as to rural lands.)
Meaning of urban land.

The term “urban,” as used in Article 1622, does not necessar-
ily refer to the nature of the land itself sought to be redeemed nor
to the purpose to which it is somehow devoted, but to the char-
acter of the community or vicinity in which it is found. In this
sense, even if the land is somehow dedicated to agriculture, it is
still urban in contemplation of Article 1622, if it is located within
the center of population or the more or less populated portion of
a city or town. (Ortega vs. Orcine, 38 SCRA 276 [1971].)
Urban and rural lands distinguished.

As it is not easy to fix with exactitude as to furnish a sure norm
for all cases the line that separates the rural from the urban, the
law has avoided any definition on this point.
454 SALES Art. 1622
(1) As to location. — “Rural” means of, or pertaining to, the

country as distinguished from a city or town. The word “urban”
is defined as of, or belonging to, a city or town. And “rural prop-
erty” is to be determined from the character of the locality, the
streets, lots, buildings, improvements, and the market value of
the property as also of the neighboring and surrounding proper-
ties. (Enriquez vs. Devanadera, [C.A.] 32 O.G. 1486; see Ortega
vs. Orcine, supra.)
(2) As to purpose. — Urban lands are distinguished from ru-
ral lands by their purpose or being for dwelling, industry or com-
merce, and not for agricultural, fishing or timber exploitation.
A land is urban if it is principally used for residential purposes.
The character of the locality, the streets, the neighboring and sur-
rounding properties give a clear picture of a residential area. Truly,
a residential home lot is not converted into agricultural land by
the simple reservation of a plot for the cultivation of garden crops
or the planting of bananas and some fruit trees. Nor can an or-
chard or agricultural land be considered residential simply be-
cause a portion thereof has been criss-crossed with asphalt and
cement roads with buildings here and there.
The rule of reason based on the specific facts of each case must
be applied. (Fabia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 364
[1984].)
Meaning of “to speculate.’’

According to Webster’s International Dictionary (2nd edition,
p. 2417.), “to speculate” means: “To enter into a business transac-
tion or venture from which the profits or return are conjectural
because the undertaking is outside the ordinary course of business,
to purchase or sell with the expectation of profiting by anticipated,
but conjectural fluctuations in price. Often in a somewhat depre-
ciative sense, to engage in a hazardous business transaction for the
chance of an unusually large profit; as to speculate in coffee, in
sugar, or in bank stock.” (cited in Ortega vs. Orcine, supra.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
In less than eight (8) months from date of its purchase, vendee
developed land into a subdivision for resale.
Legal Redemption
Facts: S sold to B a 4,452-square-meter parcel of land (in

Iriga, Camarines Sur). C, adjoining owner of a parcel of land
used as a school site, brought suit for the purpose of enforcing
his right of legal redemption. The land in question has been
filled with earth, developed and subdivided into small lots for
residential purposes by B in less than eight (8) months from the
date when he bought it.
Issue: Is C entitled to the right of redemption under Article
1622?
Held: No. An owner of an urban land may not redeem an
adjoining urban property where he does not allege in his com-
plaint much less prove at the trial that the latter is so small and
so situated that a major portion thereof cannot be used for any
practical purpose within a reasonable time, having been bought
merely for speculation. Considering the area of the land in ques-
tion which is far from being “so small and so situated that a
major portion thereof cannot be used for any practical purpose”
for, quite the contrary, it has been made a subdivision, and also
that it cannot be said that B bought the same “merely for specu-
lation” since in less than eight (8) months from the date when
he bought it he had developed the same into a subdivision for
resale, which shows that he must have had that definite purpose
in mind in buying the same, C cannot invoke Article 1622. Such
purpose cannot be held as speculative. (Ortega vs. Orcine, supra.)
Purpose of the grant of right to owners

of adjoining urban lands.
Whereas, the objective of the right of redemption of adjoin-
ing rural land is to encourage the maximum development and
utilization of agricultural lands, the evident purpose of Article
1622 is to discourage speculation in real estate and the consequent
aggravation of the housing problems in centers of population.
(Ibid.)
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or re-

demption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective
vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The
deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
456 SALES Art. 1623
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all

possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that
of adjoining owners. (1524a)
Exercise of right of pre-emption or redemption.

Article 1623 stresses the need for notice in writing in the three
(3) species of legal redemption mentioned in Articles 1620, 1621,
and 1622.
While the co-owner’s right of legal redemption is a substan-
tial right, it is exceptional in nature, limited in its duration and
subject to strict compliance with legal requirements. One of these
is that the redemptioner should tender payment of the redemp-
tion money within 30 days from written notice of the sale by the
co-owner. (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982].)
One who purchases an undivided interest in a property is
charged with notice that this acquisition is subject to redemption
by any other co-owner within the statutory 30-day period. (Butte
vs. M. Uy & Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 527 [1962].) The right of redemp-
tion of co-owners (Art. 1620.) is preferred over that of adjoining
owners. (Arts. 1621, 1622.) In other words, the law attaches more
importance to the necessity to put an end to tenancy in common
than to the purpose of encouraging the development of agricul-
ture.
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons. There is no longer co-ownership when the
different portions owned by different people are already con-
cretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described. This situation makes inapplicable the pro-
vision on the right of redemption of a co-owner under Article 1623.
(Si vs. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 653 [2002].)
Period for exercise of right.

(1) Absolute and non-extendible — The period provided in the
above article is absolute. It is peremptory and non-extendible.
(Cabrera vs. Villanueva, 160 SCRA 672 [1988].) In fact, there is
Legal Redemption
much stronger reason against relaxing the period in favor of a legal

redemptioner than in favor of a vendor with pacto de retro. In the
latter transaction, there is a contractual relation founded on valu-
able consideration, a contract by which the party from whom the
repurchase is sought has been benefited. The right of a legal re-
demption is a pure creature of the law, regulated by law, and
works only one way in favor of the redemptioner. Even if the
person entitled to redeem is a minor, the running of the period is
not interrupted. (Villasor vs. Medel, 81 Phil. 546 [1948].)
(2) A condition precedent. — The thirty-day period4 is not a
prescriptive period but is more a requisite or condition precedent
to the exercise of the right of legal redemption. (Caro vs. Court of
Appeals, supra.) It is a period set by law to restrict the right of the
payor exercising the right of legal redemption. It is not one of
prescription. (Hermoso vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 516
[1999].) In other words, if no offer is made within the prescribed
period, no action will be allowed to enforce the right of redemp-
tion. (Cabrera vs. Villanueva, supra.)
(3) Reason for rule. — The fundamental policy of the law is to
discourage the keeping for a long time of property in a state of
4
Under the Code of Agrarian Reform (R.A. No. 3844, as amended, Sec. 11.), the
right of pre-emption of an agricultural lessee may be exercised within 180 days from
notice in writing which shall be served by the landowner (vendor) on all lessees affected
and the Department of Agrarian Reform. The lessee who agrees with the terms and
conditions of the sale must give notice in writing to the lessor his intention to exercise
his right within the balance of 180 days. The period for the exercise of the right of legal
redemption is also 180 days from notice in writing. (Sec. 12 thereof, supra.) The Code of
Agrarian Reform gives agricultural lessees a substantially longer period than that pro-
vided by the Civil Code in view of the fact that because of their economic status, they
may not be able to avail of the right without securing funds from other sources, and the
longer period is given precisely to enable them to obtain legal and financial support
from the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank and other sources as pro-
vided by the Code itself. (Lusung vs. Vda. de Santos, 118 SCRA 669 [1982].) There is no
legal provision suspending or interrupting the period for exercising the lessee’s right of
pre-emption or redemption. The right is not a matter of intent, but of making the proper
payment or tender of the price within the specified period. How the lessee will raise the
money for the purpose is immaterial. Timeliness of the payment or tender is what mat-
ters. (De la Merced vs. De Guzman, 160 SCRA 87 [1988].)
Note: Presidential Decree No. 27 (Tenants Emancipation Decree.) impliedly repealed
the provisions of the Code of Agrarian Reform on pre-emption and redemption insofar
as rice and corn lands above seven (7) hectares are concerned. The excess areas are cov-
ered by Operation Land Transfer the objective of which is to distribute land transfer
certificates to the tenant farmers pursuant to the Decree.
458 SALES Art. 1623
uncertainty, beyond the thirty-day period, a situation which ob-

viously is unjust to the purchaser and prejudicial to public inter-
est. (Ibid.; Manaois vs. Zamora, [C.A.] 48 O.G. 5362; Daza vs.
Tomacruz, 58 Phil. 414 [1933]; Lim Tuico vs. Cu Unjieng, 21 Phil.
493 [1912].) Nevertheless, in the interpretation of Articles 1620,
1621, and 1622, it is always tilted in favor of the re-demptioner
and against the vendee. The purpose is to reduce the number of
participants until the community is terminated being a hindrance
to the development and better administration of the property. It
is a one-way street. It is always in favor of the redemptioner since
he can compel the vendee to sell to him but he cannot be com-
pelled by the vendee to buy the alienated property. (Hermoso vs.
Notice by vendor or prospective vendor.

The period of thirty (30) days is counted from the notice in
writing given by the prospective vendor or by the vendor, as the
case may be, and not by the vendee.
(1) Reasons for rule. — The reasons for requiring the vendor
to give the notice are easy to see. The seller of an undivided inter-
est is in the best position to know who are his co-owners that
under the law must be notified of the sale. Also, the notice by the
seller removes all doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection,
and its validity, the notice being a reaffirmation thereof; so that
the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still
contest the alienation. This assurance would not exist if the no-
tice should be given by the buyer. (Butte vs. M. Uy & Sons, Inc.,
supra; Salantadol vs. Reyes, 162 SCRA 568 [1988].)
(2) Notice must be in writing. — The written notice required
under Article 1088 (supra.) and Article 1623 is indispensable. Any
other kind of notice such as verbal or by registration, or the mere
knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the le-
gal redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The written notice
was obviously exacted by the law to remove all uncertainty as to
the sale, its terms and its validity and to quiet any doubts that the
alienation is not definitive. (Conejero vs. Court of Appeals, 16
SCRA 407 [1978]; Mariano vs. Court of Appeals, 41 SCAD 927, 222
Legal Redemption
SCRA 736 [1993]; see, however, Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appel-

late Court, 150 SCRA 259 [1987], infra.)
(3) Form of written notice. — Jurisprudence affirms the need
for notice but its form has been the subject of varying interpreta-
tions. Article 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of no-
tice so long as the reasons for a written notice are present or oth-
erwise satisfied. So long, therefore, as the redemptioner is in-
formed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the 30
days for redemption start running. (Ibid.)
(a) Accordingly, the mere furnishing of the deed of sale is
equivalent to giving of written notice, in a more authentic man-
ner than any other writing could have done. (Ibid., Badillo vs.
Ferrer, 152 SCRA 407 [1987]; see Castillo vs. Samonte, 106 Phil.
1023 [1960]; Garcia vs. Calaliman, 172 SCRA 201 [1989].) But
the mere statement in a deed of sale to the effect that the ven-
dor has complied with the provisions of Article 1623 does not
comply with the required written notice where the holder of
the right of pre-emption or redemption is not a party to the
deed of sale. (Primary Structures Corp. vs. Valencia, 409 SCRA
371 [2003].)
(b) The court must not adopt a stand of having to sacri-
fice substance to technicality. More so where the vendor stated
under oath in the deed of sale that notice of the sale had been
given to prospective redemptioners in accordance with Arti-
cle 1623. “A sworn statement or clause in a deed of sale to the
effect that a written notice of sale was given to possible
redemptioners or co-owners might be used to determine
whether an offer to redeem was made on or out of time, or
whether there was substantial compliance with the require-
ment of Article 1623.” (Etcuban vs. Court of Appeals, 148
SCRA 507 [1987].)
(c) Similarly, although Article 1623 has provided “a par-
ticular method of giving notice and that notice must be
deemed exclusive” (Butte vs. M. Uy & Sons, Inc., supra.), an
exception to the rule may be adopted, in view of the peculiar circum-
stances of the case, to prevent manifest injustice. The only purpose
of the written notice is to ensure that all the co-owners shall
be actually notified of the sale and to remove all doubt as to
460 SALES Art. 1623
the perfection of the sale. Thus, in a case where the co-owner

was actually present and even acted as an active intermedi-
ary in the consummation of the sale of the property, it was held
that he was and must be considered to have had actual notice
of the sale. A written notice to him as required by Article 1623
was no longer necessary since he was actually aware of the
sale. (Distrito vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 606 [1991].)
Where the buyer took possession of the property sold imme-
diately after the execution of the deed of sale in his favor and
continued to possess the same and the fact of such possession
had not been questioned by any of the co-owners, the require-
ment in Article 1623 had been rendered inutile thereby as the
latter should be deemed to have knowledge of the sale. (Pilapil
(d) In a case, it appears that the executor of the deceased
who had petitioned the court for authority to sell the property
in question was granted such authority with the conformity
of all the heirs. It was held that the heirs’ conformity was “ac-
tually a waiver of their right of pre-emption; and, in the least,
it was notice of the intention of the heirs to sell their shares,
sufficient to supplement the written notice required by Arti-
cle 1623 of the Civil Code.” (Seechung-Federis vs. Sunga, 134
SCRA 16 [1985].)
(e) In a civil case for collection of a share in the rentals by
an alleged buyer of a co-owned property, the receipt of a sum-
mons by a co-owner has been held to constitute actual knowl-
edge of the sale. On that basis, the co-owner may exercise the
right of redemption within 30 days from finality of the deci-
sion. (Francisco vs. Boiser, 127 SCAD 198, 332 SCRA 792
[2000].) Similarly, a co-owner was deemed to have been given
notice of sale to the respondents by the execution and signing
of the deed of extra-judicial partition and exchange of shares.
(Fernandez vs. Tarun, 391 SCRA 653 [2002].)
(f) The written notice of sale is mandatory. Notwithstand-
ing actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled
to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to re-
move all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions,
as well as its efficacy and status. (see Cabrera vs. Villanueva,
Legal Redemption
160 SCRA 672 [1988]; Cornejero vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)

Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (infra.), the Su-
preme Court made it clear that it was not reversing the pre-
vailing jurisprudence but merely adopting an exception to the
general rule in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
In Alonzo, the right to legal redemption was invoked several
years, not just days or months after the consummation of the
contract of sale. The complaint for legal redemption itself was
filed more than 30 years after the sale was concluded. (Verdad
vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCAD 482, 256 SCRA 593 [1996]; see
Primary Structures Corp. vs. Valencia, 409 SCRA 371 [2003].)
In Si vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCAD 754, 342 SCRA 653 [2000].),
the Supreme Court, made a contrary ruling, to wit: “Co-owners
with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A
written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-
owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise
their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days.
But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time
thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already
known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not de-
mand what is unnecessary.’’
(4) Contents of written notice of sale. — The notice in writing
which Article 1623 requires to be made is a notice not only of a
perfected sale but of the actual execution and delivery of the deed
of sale. This is implied from the second sentence of Article 1623.
A sale may not be presented to the register of deeds for registra-
tion unless it be in the form of a duly executed public instrument.
Moreover, the law prefers that all the terms and conditions of the
sale should be definite and in writing. (see Doromal vs. Court of
Appeals, 66 SCRA 575 [1975].) Note that Article 1623 merely pro-
vides that a deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property unless accompanied by an affidavit that a written no-
tice has been given to all possible redemptioners. It does not state
that by reason of such lack of notice the sale shall become void.
(Fernandez vs. Tarun, 391 SCRA 653 [2002].)
(5) Notice by any other insufficient. — The notice required by
Article 1623 must be given by the vendor (or prospective vendor)
and by nobody else. This is clear from Article 1623 unlike Article
462 SALES Art. 1623
1524 of the former Civil Code which did not specify who must
give the notice.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Notice of sale of co-owner’s share in a property was sent by the
vendee and not by the co-owner-vendor.
Facts: A, B, C, D, and E are co-owners of four (4) parcels of
land. E without the knowledge of the other co-owners, sold on
August 8, 1986 her 1/5 share for P10,000.00 to respondent X.
On August 5, 1992, petitioner D received summons, with a copy
of the complaint filed by X demanding her share in the rentals
being collected by D from the tenants of the property. D then
informed X that she was exercising her right of redemption as
co-owner of the subject property.
Issue: Whether the letter of May 30, 1992 sent by X to D on
the same date notifying her of the sale on August 8, 1986 of F’s
1/5 share of the property to X, containing a copy of the deed of
sale, can be considered sufficient compliance with the notice
requirement of Article 1623 for the purpose of legal redemp-
tion, and, therefore, the 30-day period of redemption should
be counted from said date and from August 5, 1992.
Held: (1) Notice must be given by the vendor. — The notice sent
by the vendee (X) to a co-owner (D) cannot substitute for that
required to be given by the vendor (E) or prospective vendor.
“In Etcuban vs. Court of Appeals (48 SCRA 507 [1987].), no-
tice to the co-owners of the sale of the share of one of them was
given by the vendees through their counterclaim in the action
for legal redemption. Despite the apparent meaning of Art. 1623,
it was held in that case that it was ‘of no moment’ that the no-
tice of sale was given not by the vendor but by the vendees. ‘So
long as the [co-owner] is informed in writing of the sale and
the particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption start run-
ning, and the redemptioner has no cause to complain,’ so it
was held. The contrary doctrine of Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons,
Inc. was thus overruled sub silencio.
However, in the later case of Salatandol vs. Retes, decided a
year after the Etcuban case, the Court expressly affirmed the
ruling in Butte that the notice required by Art. 1623 must be
given by the vendor. In Salatandol, the notice given to the
redemptioner by the Register of Deeds of the province where
the subject land was situated was held to be insufficient.’’
Legal Redemption
(2) Return to ruling in Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., proper.
— “There was thus a return to the doctrine laid down in Butte.
That ruling is sound. In the first place, reversion to the ruling
in Butte is proper. Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requir-
ing that the written notification should come from the vendor
or prospective vendor, not from any other person. There is,
therefore, no room for construction. Indeed, the principal dif-
ference between Art. 1524 of the former Civil Code and Art.
1623 of the present one is that the former did not specify who
must give the notice, whereas the present one expressly says
the notice must be given by the vendor. Effect must be given to
this change in statutory language.
In the second place, it makes sense to require that the no-
tice required in Art. 1623 be given by the vendor and by nobody
else. As explained by this Court through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Butte, the vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position
to know who are his co-owners who under the law must be
notified of the sale. It is likewise the notification from the seller,
not from anyone else, which can remove all doubts as to the fact
of the sale, its perfection, and its validity, for in a contract of sale,
the seller is in the best position to confirm whether consent to
the essential obligation of selling the property and transferring
ownership thereof to the vendee has been given.’’
(3) Notice, however, by vendor no longer necessary. — “Now,
it is clear that by not immediately notifying the co-owner, a
vendor can delay or even effectively prevent the meaningful
exercise of the right of redemption. In the present case, for in-
stance, the sale took place in 1986, but it was kept secret until
1992 when vendee (herein respondent) needed to notify peti-
tioner about the sale to demand 1/5 rentals from the property
sold. Compared to serious prejudice to petitioner’s right of le-
gal redemption, the only adverse effect to vendor Adela Blas
and respondent-vendee is that the sale could not be registered.
It is non-binding, only insofar as third persons are concerned.
It is, therefore, unjust when the subject sale has already been
established before both lower courts and now, before this Court,
to further delay petitioner’s exercise of her right of legal re-
demption by requiring that notice be given by the vendor be-
fore petitioner can exercise her right. For this reason, we rule
that the receipt by petitioner of summons in Civil Case No. 15510
on August 5, 1992 constitutes actual knowledge on the basis of
which petitioner may now exercise her right of redemption
within 30 days from finality of this decision.’’
464 SALES Art. 1623
(4) Need for written notification may be dispensed with. — “Our

ruling is not without precedent. In Alonzo vs. Intermediate Ap-
pellate Court (150 SCRA 259 [1987].), we dispensed with the need
for written notification considering that the redemptioners lived
on the same lot on which the purchaser lived and were thus
deemed to have actual knowledge of the sales. We stated that
the 30-day period of redemption started, not from the date of
the sales in 1963 and 1964, but sometime between those years
and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was actu-
ally filed. For 13 years, however, none of the co-heirs moved to
redeem the property. We thus ruled that the right of redemp-
tion had already been extinguished because the period for its
exercise had already expired.’’
(5) Receipt by D of summons amounted to actual knowledge. —
“In the present case, as previously discussed, receipt by peti-
tioner of summons in Civil Case No. 15510 on August 5, 1992
amounted to actual knowledge of the sale from which the 30-
day period of redemption commenced to run. Petitioner had
until September 4, 1992 within which to exercise her right of
legal redemption, but on August 12, 1992 she deposited the
P10,000.00 redemption price. As petitioner’s exercise of said
right was timely, the same should be given effect.’’ (Francisco
vs. Boiser, 127 SCAD 198, 332 SCRA 792 [2000].)
How right exercised.

(1) Consignation in court. — In exercising the right to redeem,
the redemptioner may go to the court directly, and practically
make the offer to repurchase through it. The reason for this is that
the redemptioner might not know the vendee’s whereabouts or
the latter might even conceal himself to prevent redemption. (see
De la Cruz vs. Marcelino, 84 Phil. 709 [1949]; Torio vs. Del Rosario,
93 Phil. 800 [1953].)
Consignation is not required to preserve the right of redemp-
tion as a mere tender of payment is enough if made on time. It is
not necessary because the tender of payment is not made to dis-
charge an obligation but to enforce or exercise a right. (Moreno
There is actually no prescribed form for an offer to redeem to
be properly effected. Hence, it can either be through a formal ten-
der with consignation, or by filing a complaint in court coupled
Legal Redemption
with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed

period. Either of the two modes is a condition precedent to a valid
exercise of the right of legal redemption. (Lee Chuy Realty Corp.
(2) Tender of price. — That the legal redemptioner is only re-
quired to pay a reasonable price is no obstacle to the requirement
of tender. The statutory period fixed for the exercise of the right
of legal redemption would be rendered meaningless and of easy
evasion, unless the redemptioner is required to make an actual
tender in good faith of what he believes to be the reasonable price
of the land sought to be redeemed.
Unless tender or consignation is made requisite to the valid
exercise of the right to redeem everytime redemption is attempted,
a case must be filed in court to ascertain the reasonable price. On
the other hand, a prior tender by the redemptioner of the price
he considers reasonable affords an opportunity to avoid litigation,
for the landowner may well decide to accept a really reasonable
offer, considering that he would thereby save the attorney’s fees
and the expenses of protracted litigation. (see Basbas vs. Entena,
28 SCRA 665 [1969].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Co-heirs with actual notice of sales invoked right of redemp-
tion 14 years after the sales.
Facts: A, B, C, D, and E, brothers and sisters, inherited in
equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land. On March 15, 1963, A
sold his undivided share to E and F by way of absolute sale.
One year later, on April 22, 1964, B sold her own share to the
same vendees who afterwards occupied an area correspond-
ing to the portions sold to them, enclosing the same with a fence.
In 1975, with the consent of E and F, their son H and his wife
built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
On May 22, 1977, C filed her complaint invoking her right
of redemption. C lived on the same lot, which consisted of only
604 square meters, including the portions sold to E and F and
knew that the area occupied by the petitioners had been pur-
chased by them from the other co-heirs, A and B.
Issue: In the absence of a written notice, did the actual
knowledge of the sales satisfy the requirements of Article 1623?
466 SALES Art. 1623
Held: Yes. Strictly applied and interpreted, Articles 1088 (su-

pra.) and 1623 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit: that in
view of such deficiency, the 30-day period for redemption had
not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.
It is a cardinal rule that in seeking the meaning of the law,
the concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this
is never within the legislative intent. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when ap-
plied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances.
In such a situation, the court is not bound to apply them just the
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What it must do
instead is find a balance, a balance between the word and the
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. While
a court may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, it
nevertheless has the right to read out of it the reason for its en-
actment. As courts both of law and justice, courts apply the law
with justice.
In requiring written notice, the law seeks to insure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate
the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period
of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is
really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date
it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged de-
lays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two. The instant
case presents no such problem because the right of redemption
was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in
1963 and 1964, 13 years after the first sale and 14 years after the
second. The co-heirs were undeniably informed of the sales al-
though no notice in writing was given them. The 30-day pe-
riod began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in
question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977,
without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.
By requiring written proof of such notice, the court would
be closing its eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpa-
bly false claim in ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law
over its purpose. They were actually informed, although not in
writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and such notice
was sufficient. The De Cornejo and Butte doctrines are not aban-
doned. An exception is simply adopted in view of the peculiar
circumstances of the case. (Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
150 SCRA 259 [1987].)
Legal Redemption
———— ———— ————

2. Petitioners orally offered to redeem within the period fixed
by law but their lawyer, coursed through a lawyer, offering to redeem
was made several months after notice of the sale.
Facts: The land in question is owned in common by CH
who owns 2/3 and the heirs of EH. There has been no subse-
quent distribution among the co-heirs of their specific shares.
Neither was there a deed of partition among the co-owners.
Two of the heirs (who are brothers) executed a deed of sale
covering their undivided shares in favor of BP, describing them-
selves as ‘co-owners’ who “have agreed to sell, transfer and
convey x x x all our shares, rights and interests over the above-
described parcel of land.’’ The petitioners (co-heirs, their mother
and sister) who are their mother and sister had notice of the
sale in January, 1984 and considering that their letter, offering
to redeem the property was made only in September 1984, the
Court of Appeals was of the view that the action to enforce
redemption had prescribed. As found, however, by the trial
court, the petitioners immediately started negotiations with B.P.
to redeem the alienated shares. At this time, BP had not yet
completed payment for the shares.
Issue: Could the petitioners still exercise the right of redemp-
tion?
Held: Yes. (1) Period of legal redemption not a prescriptive pe-
riod. — “It was error for the respondent court to rule that the
right of the petitioners to redeem the alienated share had long
prescribed. This finding fails to take into account that the pe-
riod of legal redemption is not a prescriptive period. It is a con-
dition precedent to the exercise of the right of redemption. It is
a period set by law to restrict the right of the person exercising
the right of legal redemption. It is not one of prescription.’’
(2) Sale was deliberately hidden from petitioners. — “The writ-
ten notice required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code was en-
acted to remove all doubts and uncertainty that the alienation
may not be definite. The co-owners must know with certainty
the circumstances of the sale by his co-owners and the terms
and the validity of the alienation. Only after said knowledge is
the co-owner required to exercise the right of redemption given
to him by law.
While the law requires that the notice must be in writing, it
does not state any particular form thereof, so long as the rea-
468 SALES Art. 1623
sons for a written notice are present. The records of the case
show that the sale of the brothers’ share was deliberately hid-
den from the petitioners. For sometime after the sale, the peti-
tioners were ignorant about its execution. When they some-
how heard rumors about it, they had to take one step after an-
other to find out if the information was true. x x x Far from
giving the notice required by law or giving information on the
history and details of the sale, Agustinito and Danilo gave the
petitioners the run-around until the brothers were practically
forced to admit it and the petitioners immediately went to see
Ben Palaganas. In their dialogue with Ben Palaganas, petition-
ers offered to redeem the property, but this time, unlike the
first, the offer was rejected.’’
(3) Petitioners orally offered to redeem within the period fixed
by law. — “When the petitioners offered to redeem within the
period fixed by law, they complied with the condition prec-
edent to the exercise of their right. The filing of an action to
enforce the redemption is not the determining point in time. In
Conejero vs. Court of Appeals (16 SCRA 775 [1966].), this Court
ruled that a consignation of the tendered price is not necessary
as long as a valid tender is present. However, the offer to re-
deem is indispensable. Considering the indignation and the
wrath of the petitioners directed at the two brothers for their
acts of alienating an undivided portion of the property, despite
the earlier redemption of the sale sold in 1979, there can be no
question about the willingness and capability of the petition-
ers to buy back the shares sold in 1980.’’
(4) Interpretation in applying Article 1623. — “In applying
Article 1623 of the Civil Code on the exercise of legal redemp-
tion to certain facts, the interpretation must be in favor of jus-
tice and equity. This Court explained –– ‘x x x. We test a law by
its result. A law should not be interpreted so as not to cause an
injustice x x x. There are laws which are generally valid but
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because
of its peculiar circumstances. We are not bound to apply them
in slavish obedience to their language.’
Whether it is the vendees who will prevail as in the Alonzo
doctrine, or the redemptioners as in this case, the righting of
justice is the key to the resolution of the issues.
The standards and conditions of legal redemption provided
under Article 1623 of the Civil Code have not been met in this
Legal Redemption
petition. Furthermore, there is the fact that justice and equity,

as the law provides, are also on the side of the petitioners. As
we said, the righting of an injustice is the key to the resolution
of this case and thus would be the end result of our decision.’’
(5) Petitioners made investigation to confirm their hearsay
knowledge about the transaction. — “From the records, one gets
the impression that the two brothers, Agustinito and Danilo,
were irresponsible and self-centered, failing to consider the
wishes of their mother. x x x Again, we reiterate the salient fact
that Clarita Carin, their mother, and Victoria Hermoso, their
sister, were kept in the dark about the sale. Considering the
factual background of this case, the honorable and expected
step for the Palaganas was to inform the petitioners about the
action taken by Agustinito and Danilo. Instead, as the record
reveals the parties to the sale concealed the transaction from
petitioners for four (4) years. It was only after hearing rumors
about the sale when petitioners started to investigate and search
for evidence to confirm their hearsay knowledge about the
transaction. Even then, the two brothers and the Palaganases
gave them a hard time.’’
(6) BP clan were in bad faith. — “The Palaganas clan knew
all along the strong feelings of the petitioners against the al-
ienation of share in the still undivided property. This was their
second attempt to buy the property. As a matter of fact, they
knew that in 1979 when the land was first sold, the petitioners
immediately took steps to cancel the sale upon discovery
thereof. In 1980, the private respondents and Ben Palaganas
still did exactly what the petitioners vigorously opposed and
did not want to happen. They also hid the sale from the peti-
tioners until confronted with facts that they could no longer
hide or deny. x x x There can be no doubt that the Palaganas
clan were in bad faith at the time they bought the disputed
property from the Hermoso brothers. We cannot thus close our
eyes to the injustice which would befall the petitioners consid-
ering that this is not the first time that they have expressed their
desire to redeem the property sold by the Hermoso brothers.
Under the circumstances, it is just and equitable to rule in favor
of the exercise of legal redemption.’’ (Hermoso vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 300 SCRA 516 [1999].)
— oOo —
470 SALES
Chapter 8
ASSIGNMENT OF CREDITS AND OTHER

INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
ART. 1624. An assignment of credits and other in-

corporeal rights shall be perfected in accordance with
the provisions of article 1475. (n)
Assignment of credit defined.

Assignment of credit is a contract by which the owner (assignor/
creditor) of a credit and other incorporeal rights transfers, either
onerously or gratuitously, to another (assignee) his rights and
actions against a third person (debtor).
It is the process of transferring the right of the assignor to the
assignee who would then be allowed to proceed against the
debtor1 for the enforcement or satisfaction of the credit to the same
extent as the assignor could.
Where the assignment is on account of pure liberality on the
part of the assignor, the rules on donation would be pertinent;
where valuable consideration is involved, the assignment partakes
of the nature of a contract of sale or purchase. (Nyco Sales Corpo-
ration vs. BA Finance Corporation, 200 SCRA 637 [1991]; Project
Builders, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCAD 322, 358 SCRA 626
[2001].)
Nature of assignment of credit.

(1) Assignment of credit and other incorporeal rights is a con-
sensual, bilateral, onerous, and commutative or aleatory contract.
1
Assignment of receivables is a commonplace commercial transaction today. It is
an activity or operation that permits the assignee to monetize or realize the value of
receivables before the maturity thereof. (Atok Finance Corporation vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 41 SCAD 450, 222 SCRA 232 [1993].)
470
Art. 1624 ASSIGNMENT OF CREDITS AND OTHER 471
INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
(2) The assignment involves no transfer of ownership but

merely effects the transfer of rights which the assignor has at the
time to the assignee. (Casabuena vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCAD
933, 286 SCRA 594 [1998].) As a consequence of the assignment,
the third party (assignee) steps into the shoes of the original credi-
tor (assignor) as a subrogee of the latter. (see South City Homes,
Inc. vs. BA Finance Corporation, 159 SCAD 880, 371 SCRA 603
[2001].)
(3) It may be done gratuitously (i.e., by donation) or onerously.
If done onerously (i.e., exchange, dacion en pago), whatever may
be the legal cause, it is really a sale. Thus, the subject matter is the
credit or right assigned; the consideration is the price paid for the
credit or right; and the consent is the agreement of the parties to
the assignment of the credit or right at the agreed price. Hence,
Article 1475 is made applicable.
(a) There is, however, one important difference and, that
is, after the transfer, a definite third person is obliged; whereas
in sale, the subject obliged is the whole world which must
respect the title to the buyer. (10 Manresa 376.)
(b) In assignments, a consideration is not always a requi-
site, unlike in sales. Thus, an assignee may maintain an action
based on his title and is immaterial whether or not he paid any
consideration therefor. Furthermore, in an assignment, title is
transferred but possession need not be delivered. (Philippine
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 82 SCAD 472, 272 SCRA
291 [1997].)
(c) As a general rule, all principles governing sales also
apply to this transaction. As in sale, the assignee cannot ac-
quire a greater right than that pertaining to the assignor.
Hence, the act of assignment cannot operate to erase liens or
restrictions burdening the right assigned. (Gonzales vs. Land
Bank of the Philippines, 183 SCRA 520 [1990].)
Perfection of contract for assignment

of credit.
The contract for the assignment or transfer of credit and other
incorporeal rights is perfected from the moment the parties agree
472 SALES Art. 1625
upon the credit or right assigned and upon the price even if nei-
ther has been delivered. (see Art. 1475.)
However, the assignee will acquire ownership only upon de-
livery. (see Arts. 1498, par. 2 and 1501.)
Assignment distinguished from other

terms.
(1) Renunciation is the abandonment of a right without a trans-
fer to another. (see Art. 1270.)
(2) Agency involves representation, not transmission wherein
the agent acts for the principal.
(3) Substitution is the change of a new debtor for the previ-
ous debtor with the credit remaining in the same creditor. (see 10
Manresa 377.)
(4) Subrogation is the change in the person of the creditor with
the credit being extinguished. (see 8 Manresa 400.)
ART. 1625. An assignment of a credit, right or ac-

tion shall produce no effect as against third persons,
unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instru-
ment is recorded in the Registry of Property in case
the assignment involves real property. (1526)
Binding effect of assignment.

(1) As between the parties, the assignment is valid although
it appears only in a private document so long as the law does not
require a specific form for its validity. (see Art. 1356.)
(2) To affect third persons, the assignment must appear in a
public instrument, and in case it involves real property, it is in-
dispensable that it be recorded in the Registry of Property. (see
Lopez vs. Alvarez, 9 Phil. 28 [1908].)
(3) The assignee merely steps into the shoes of the assignor,
the former acquiring the credit subject to defenses (e.g., fraud,
prescription, etc.) available to the debtor against the assignor. The
assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to the ob-
ligations of the seller. He cannot acquire greater rights than those
INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
pertaining to the assignor. (Koa vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA

541 [1993].) Hence, the act of assignment cannot operate to efface
liens or restrictions burdening the right assigned. (Casabuena vs.
ART. 1626. The debtor who, before having knowl-

edge of the assignment, pays his creditor shall be
released from the obligation. (1527)
Consent of debtor to assignment

not required.
In an assignment of credit, the consent of the debtor is not
essential in order that it may produce legal effects. Hence, the duty
to pay does not depend on the consent of the debtor; otherwise,
all creditors would be prevented from assigning their credits be-
cause of the possibility of the debtors’ refusal to give consent.
(Sison vs. Yap Tico, 37 Phil. 587 [1918]; Rodriguez vs. Court of
Appeals, 207 SCRA 553 [1992].)
The law speaks not of consent but of notice to the debtor. The
purpose of the notice by the assignee is to inform the debtor that
from the date of the assignment he should make payment to the
assignee and not to the original creditor. (Ibid.)
Effect of payment by debtor after

assignment of credit.
(1) Before notice. — The notice is thus for the protection of the
assignee because before the said notice, payment to the original
creditor is valid. (Elizalde & Co., Inc. vs. Biñan Transportation Co.,
[C.A.] 56 O.G. 5886.) “No man is bound to remain a debtor; he
may pay to him with whom he contracted to pay; and if he pay
before notice that his debt has been assigned, the law holds him
exonerated, for the reason that it is the duty of the person who
has acquired a will by transfer to demand payment of the debt to
give debtor notice.” (Sison vs. Yaptico, supra.) In such case, the
assignee has a right of action against the assignor, the original
creditor. In the absence of notice, the burden of proving that the
debtor had knowledge of the assignment is on the interested party
which is the assignee. (see 10 Manresa 377.)
474 SALES Arts. 1627-1628
It has been held that since the law does not require the regis-
tration of an assignment of a chattel mortgage, its registration does
not ipso facto operate as constructive notice to the mortgagor. (Sison
vs. Yap Tico, supra.)
(2) After notice, or before notice but debtor had knowledge of as-
signment. — Payment by the debtor to the original creditor after
the former had received notice of the assignment, whether or not
he consented, is not valid as against the assignee. Even without
notice, the debtor will not also be released from his obligation
should he pay the creditor after having had knowledge of the
assignment of the obligation. He thereby acts in bad faith. He can
be made to pay again by the assignee.
ART. 1627. The assignment of a credit includes all

the accessory rights, such as a guaranty, mortgage,
pledge or preference. (1528)
Extent of assignment of credit.

The assignment of credit includes not only the credit itself but
also all rights accessory thereto. (see Art. 1537.) This follows the
familiar rule that the accessory follows the principal. But the par-
ties may stipulate that the accessory rights shall not be included
in the assignment.
EXAMPLE:
D owes C P1,000.00, with G as guarantor. C assigns his credit
to T with notice given to D.
In case D fails to pay T, the latter may enforce the guaranty
of G unless the credit was transferred with express stipulation
that G shall be released from his obligation.
ART. 1628. The vendor in good faith shall be re-

sponsible for the existence and legality of the credit
at the time of the sale, unless it should have been
sold as doubtful; but not for the solvency of the debtor,
unless it has been so expressly stipulated or unless
the insolvency was prior to the sale and of common
knowledge.
INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
Even in these cases he shall only be liable for the

price received and for the expenses specified in No. 1
of Article 1616.
The vendor in bad faith shall always be answer-
able for the payment of all expenses, and for dam-
ages. (1529)
Warranties of the assignor of credit.

In dation in payment or dacion en pago, as a special mode of
payment, the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who ac-
cepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. (see Art.
1245.) the undertaking really partakes of the nature of sale. As
such, the vendor in good faith shall be responsible for the exist-
ence and legality of the credit. An assignment credit which is in
the nature of sale of personal property produces the effects of a
dation in payment which may extinguish the obligation. How-
ever, as in any other contract of sale, the vendor or assignor is
bound by certain warranties. More specifically, they are provided
in Article 1628 (par. 1.). (Lo vs. KJS Eco-Formwork System, Phil.,
Inc., 413 SCRA 182 [2003].)
(1) When a creditor assigns his credit, he warrants only the
(a) existence and (b) legality of the credit at the perfection of the
contract. He is not even liable for the warranty if the credit had
been sold as doubtful.
(2) There is no warranty as to the solvency of the debtor un-
less it is expressly stipulated or unless the insolvency was already
existing and of public knowledge at the time of the assignment.
If there be any breach of the above warranties, the assignor-
vendor shall be held answerable therefor.
Liabilities of the assignor of credit.

(1) For violation of the above warranties, the liability of the
vendor (assignor) in good faith is limited only to the price received
and to the expenses of the contract, and any other legitimate pay-
ments by reason of the assignment. (Art. 1616, par. 1.)
(2) The assignor in bad faith is liable not only for the payment
of the price and all expenses, but also for damages. An assignor in
bad faith is one who has knowledge of any of the circumstances
476 SALES Art. 1629
mentioned above (i.e., non-existence or illegality of the credit,

insolvency of the debtor, etc.) while an assignor in good faith is one
who is ignorant of them.
EXAMPLE:
D owes C P20,000.00, which represents the purchase price
of a car bought by D. C assigns the credit to T.
C is liable to T if at the time of the assignment the credit
has already prescribed, or has been paid, or is annullable and
its nullity is subsequently declared because C warrants the ex-
istence and legality of the credit.
But C is not liable if D cannot fulfill his obligation due to in-
solvency because insolvency has nothing to do with the exist-
ence and legality of the credit unless it has been so expressly
stipulated, or the insolvency of D was existing prior to the as-
signment and of common or public knowledge although it was
not known to C (for C is conclusively presumed to have known
of the same), or known to C although it was not of common
knowledge.
If C lacks sufficient data to determine whether the credit is
still enforceable or not, as for instance, whether the period of
prescription was interrupted and there is a full disclosure of
such fact when the credit was assigned, he cannot be held re-
sponsible even for the existence and legality of the credit.
ART. 1629. In case the assignor in good faith

should have made himself responsible for the sol-
vency of the debtor, and the contracting parties should
not have agreed upon the duration of the liability, it
shall last for one year only, from the time of the as-
signment if the period had already expired.
If the credit should be payable within a term or
period which has not yet expired, the liability shall
cease one year after the maturity. (1530a)
Duration of assignor’s liability where

debtor’s solvency guaranteed.
This provision does not apply if the assignor acted in bad faith.
(see Art. 1628.)
INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
In case the assignor has expressly warranted the solvency of

the debtor,2 the duration of the assignor’s liability shall be as fol-
lows:
(1) If there is a stipulation, then for the term or period fixed;
(2) If there is no stipulation:
(a) for one year from the assignment of the credit when
the period for payment of the credit has expired; or
(b) for one year after its maturity, when such period for
payment has not yet expired.
EXAMPLE:
D owes C P50,000.00 payable on July 1, 2004. C assigns his
credits to T with C making himself responsible for the solvency
of D.
(1) If the agreement is that the duration of C’s liability shall
last for two years from July 1, 2004, then his guaranty shall last
as agreed upon.
(2) If there is no stipulation, and the assignment was made
on August 1, 2004, the liability is limited to one year from the
assignment.
(3) However, if the assignment was made on June 1, 2004,
the responsibility shall cease exactly one year after July 1, 2004
or one year after the maturity of the debt.
Reasons for the rule.

There are two reasons for the rule contained in Article 1629.
First, to prevent fraud which may be committed by feigning
the solvency of the debtor at the time of the assignment when in
fact he is insolvent; and
2
The liability of the assignor under Article 1629 is ex lege; it rests on the breach of
the warranty of solvency. Where the liability is ex contractu, the limiting period set out in
Article 1629 is not applicable. Thus, in a case, although the assignor warrants the sol-
vency of the debtors under the deed of assignment, it also binds itself to become solidarily
liable with the other respondents in case of non-payment by the debtors. “The effect of
non-payment by the original trade debtors was a breach of warranty of solvency by [the
assignor], resulting in turn in assumption of solidary liability by [it] under the receiva-
bles assigned. In other words, the assignor becomes a solidary debtor under the terms
of the receivables covered and transferred by virtue of the Deed of Assignment.’’ (Atok
Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 41 SCAD 450, 222 SCRA 232 [1993].)
478 SALES Art. 1630
Second, to oblige the assignee to exert efforts in the recovery

of the credit and thereby avoid that by his oversight, the assignor
may suffer. (10 Manresa 400-401.)
ART. 1630. One who sells an inheritance without

enumerating the things of which it is composed, shall
only be answerable for his character as an heir. (1531)
Sale of successional or hereditary

rights.
This article refers to the sale of successional right or the right
to an inheritance before partition.
(1) Subject of sale is hereditary right, not objects which make up
inheritance. — An inheritance may be sold either with specifica-
tion of the properties to be alienated or without enumerating the
things comprising it, that is to say, the hereditary rights only. (Arts.
1630, 1632.) What the law prohibits is the sale of a future inherit-
ance, upon which no contract can be made other than those mak-
ing a division inter vivos of an estate in accordance with Article
1347 of the Civil Code. (Abella vs. Cinco, [C.A.] 37, O.G. 924.)
Hereditary rights in an estate under judicial settlement can be
validly sold without need for approval by the probate court. (Heirs
of P. Escanlar vs. Court of Appeals, 88 SCAD 532, 281 SCRA 176
[1997].)
(2) Warranties of seller. — The seller of an inheritance warrants
only the fact of his heirship but he does not warrant the objects
which make up his inheritance. The sale is, therefore, a sort of an
aleatory contract because the assignee bears the risk that the es-
tate may not be sufficient to pay the obligations of the deceased.
(10 Manresa 404; see Art. 2010.)
EXAMPLE:
H and I are the heirs of the estate left by D, deceased. Be-
fore partition and without specifying his definite share in the
inheritance, H sold his share to B for P100,000.00.
In this case, H only warrants the fact that he is an heir to D.
He is not liable to B should his share after partition be less than
P100,000.00.
INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
(3) Limitation. — There is no law which prohibits an heir

from selling his interests in an inheritance before partition (see
Art. 1088.) except that any such sale must be deemed subject to
the result of the administration proceedings and any pending
litigation. (Beltran vs. Soriano, 32 Phil. 66 [1916].) Pursuant to
Article 774 (Civil Code), “the rights to the succession are trans-
mitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.” In other
words, the person concerned is an heir and may exercise his
rights as such, from the very moment of the death of the
decedent. (Saturnino vs. Paulino, 97 Phil. 50 [1955].)
(4) Distinguished from a waiver of hereditary rights. — There
is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a
waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of
a contract of deed of sale between the parties. The second is,
technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where
there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known
right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relin-
quish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the suc-
cession. (Acap vs. Court of Appeals, 66 SCAD 359, 251 SCRA
30 [1995].)
ART. 1631. One who sells for a lump sum the whole
of a certain rights, rents, or products, shall comply
by answering for the legitimacy of the whole in gen-
eral; but he shall not be obliged to warrant each of
the various parts of which it may be composed, ex-
cept in the case of eviction from the whole or the part
of greater value. (1532a)
Sale of whole of certain rights, rents,

or products.
In the sale of the whole of certain rights, rents, or products
for a lump sum, the subject matter is the totality of such rights,
rents, or products. As a consequence, the vendor warrants only
the legitimacy of the whole and not the various parts of which it
may be composed. The vendor is not liable for eviction of each of
the various parts unless the eviction involves the whole or the part
of greater value.
480 SALES Arts. 1632-1633
EXAMPLE:
P is a partner in a partnership. He sells all his interests to B
for the lump sum of P150,000.00. Upon the dissolution of the
partnership, B received the share of P in its assets consisting of
P50,000.00, some office equipment and a car. Subsequently, the
car was recovered by C, a creditor of the partnership.
P is not liable to B because P does not warrant each of the
various parts of his interest in the partnership but only the le-
gitimacy of his rights as partner taken as a whole. But if the
value of the car exceeds P75,000.00, P will be liable because B is
evicted from “the part of greater value.”
ART. 1632. Should the vendor have profited by

some of the fruits or received anything from the in-
heritance sold, he shall pay the vendee thereof, if the
contrary has not been stipulated. (1533)
Liability of vendor of inheritance

for fruits received.
Unless otherwise stipulated, the fruits of an inheritance are
included in the sale thereof. (see Art. 1537.) If the vendor merely
received the fruits, he must deliver them to the vendee; if they
have been consumed, he must reimburse the vendee; if they have
been sold, he must deliver the price of the sale. (see 10 Manresa
406.)
The liability of the vendor for anything received from the in-
heritance sold is subject to any agreement to the contrary.
ART. 1633. The vendee shall, on his part, reimburse

the vendor for all that the latter may have paid for the
debts of and charges on the estate and satisfy the
credits he may have against the same, unless there is
an agreement to the contrary. (1534)
Liability of vendee for debts of

and charges on estate.
Since under Article 1632 the vendor is obliged to pay the
vendee the fruits or anything received from the inheritance, it is
INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
also just that the vendee be required to reimburse the vendor for
whatever the latter has paid for the debts of and charges on the
estate.
The liability of the vendee for the debts and charges is like-
wise subject to any contrary agreement.
ART. 1634. When a credit or other incorporeal right

in litigation is sold, the debtor shall have a right to
extinguish it by reimbursing the assignee for the price
the latter paid therefor, the judicial costs, incurred by
him, and the interest on the price from the day on
which the same was paid.
A credit or other incorporeal right shall be consid-
ered in litigation from the time the complaint concern-
ing the same is answered.
The debtor may exercise his right within thirty days
from the date the assignee demands payment from
him. (1535)
Legal redemption in sale of credit or other

incorporeal right in litigation.
This article is an instance of legal redemption.
The following are the requisites before the right of legal re-
demption can be exercised:
(1) There must be a sale or assignment of a credit. The con-
cept of sale must be understood in its restricted sense. The right
cannot be exercised if the transaction is exchange or donation (see
10 Manresa 416.);
(2) There must be a pending litigation at the time of the as-
signment. The complaint by the assignor must have been filed and
answered by the creditor before the sale of the credit. Article 1634
applies only to a claim in litigation the meaning of which is not a
claim open to litigation, but one which is actually litigated; that
is to say, disputed or contested, which happens only after an an-
swer interposed in a suit (Robinson vs. Garry, 8 Phil. 275 [1907].);
(3) The debtor must pay the assignee:
482 SALES Art. 1634
(a) the price paid by him;

(b) the judicial costs incurred by him; and
(c) the interest on the price from the date of payment; and
(4) The right must be exercised by the debtor within thirty (30)
days from the date the assignee demands (judicially or extra-ju-
dicially) payment from him. A debtor who has paid the full
amount of a litigated credit to one who has purchased such liti-
gated credit cannot counterclaim the difference between the
amount paid by such debtor and the amount paid by the pur-
chaser of such litigated credit unless such debtor shall make use
of his right to do so within the prescribed period.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Mortgagee assigned its rights as such and as highest bidder
in foreclosure sale of mortgaged land while there was a pending case
between unpaid seller of the land and mortgagor (buyer).
Facts: S sold several lots to B, who, after securing registra-
tion of said lots in her name, mortgaged them to C (bank). B
failed to complete payment of the purchase price. The sale was
rescinded by the court without prejudice to the right of C, which
was adjudged a mortgagee in good faith. C foreclosed the mort-
gage. At the public auction, C was the highest bidder. Subse-
quently, C assigned its rights as mortgagee and as the highest
bidder to D (NIDC).
S filed a motion to cancel the encumbrance of D from the
certificates of title concerned which was granted by the lower
court on the ground that C “should have submitted the deed of
assignment for approval of the court knowing that the subject
matter of said deed is in custodia legis and so that the consent of
S could be taken.”
Issue: Upon the facts, has a valid assignment been made by
C to D of its rights over the lots in question?
Held: Yes. There is nothing in our statutes or jurisprudence
which prohibits a creditor without the consent of the debtor
from making an assignment of his credit and the rights acces-
sory thereto; and, certainly, an assignment of credit and its ac-
cessory rights does not at all obliterate the obligation of the
debtor to pay, but merely puts the assignee in the place of his
assignor. Indeed, Article 1634 definitely recognizes the likeli-
INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
hood that credits and other incorporeal rights in litigation may

be assigned pendente lite and, in such event, provides that the
debtor may extinguish his obligation by making appropriate
reimbursement to the assignee.
In other words, an assignment of credit pendente lite does
not extinguish the credit or accessory rights assigned, but sim-
ply changes the bag into which the debtor must empty the
money in payment. (National Investment & Development Corp.
vs. De Los Angeles, 40 SCRA 487 [1971].)
———— ———— ————
2. Plaintiff in a case, who had previously assigned in favor of
his creditor his litigated credit in said case by a deed of assignment
which was duly submitted to the court, entered into a compromise
agreement thereafter releasing the defendant therein from his claim
without notice to his assignee.
Facts: T brought an action against M for the collection of a
sum of money. While the case was pending resolution, T as-
signed in favor of L by way of securing or guaranteeing T’s
obligation to L his litigated credit against M duly submitted to
the court with notice to the parties. The lower court ruled in
favor of T. Subsequently, pending resolution of the appeal of M
to the Court of Appeals, M entered into a compromise agree-
ment with T wherein T acknowledged that all his claims against
M had been settled.
After the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in
toto the decision of the lower court, M filed a motion for recon-
sideration praying that said decision be set aside, principally an-
chored upon the ground that a compromise agreement was en-
tered into between him and T which, in effect, released M from
liability. The validity of the guarantee or the pledge in favor of
L has not been questioned and it appears that the deed of as-
signment fulfills the requisites of a valid pledge or mortgage.
Issue: Is the compromise agreement valid?
Held: No. Although T (assignor) may validly alienate the
litigated credit under Article 1634, said provision should not
be taken to mean as a grant of an absolute right on the part of T
to indiscriminately dispose of the thing or the right given as
security. It should be read in consonance with Article 2097.3
3
Art. 2097. With the consent of the pledgee, the thing pledged may be alienated by
the pledgor or owner, subject to the pledge. The ownership of the thing pledged is trans-
484 SALES Art. 1635
Although the pledgee or assignee (L) did not ipso facto be-
come the creditor of M, the pledge being valid, the incorporeal
right assigned by T in favor of L can only be alienated by T
with due notice to and consent of L or his duly authorized rep-
resentative. To allow the assignor to dispose or alienate the se-
curity without notice to and consent of the assignee will render
nugatory the very purpose of a pledge or an assignment of
credit.
Moreover, under Article 1634, the debtor (M) has a corre-
sponding obligation to reimburse the assignee (L) for the price
the latter paid or for the value given in consideration for the
deed of assignment. Failing in this, the alienation of the liti-
gated credit made by T in favor of M by way of a compromise
agreement does not bind L.
Furthermore, having knowledge of the assignment, M was
estopped from entering into a compromise agreement without
notice to and consent of L. More so, in the light of the fact that
no reimbursement has even made in favor of L as required un-
der Article 1634. M acted in bad faith and in connivance with T
so as to defraud L in entering into the compromise agreement.
(Estate of G. Litton vs. Mendoza, 163 SCRA 246 [1988].)
Purpose of grant of right to debtor.

The above provision gives an advantage to the debtor because
he will pay less than the value of the credit assigned if he exer-
cises his right to redeem the same.
The object of the law in allowing the redemption by the debtor
is to avoid the purchase by the third person of credits in litiga-
tions merely for speculation.
ART. 1635. From the provisions of the preceding

article shall be excepted the assignments or sales
made:
(1) To a co-heir or co-owner of the right assigned;
(2) To a creditor in payment of his credit;
mitted to the vendee or transferee as soon as the pledgee consents to the alienation, but
the latter shall continue in possession. (n)
INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
(3) To the possessor of a tenement or piece of land

which is subject to the right in litigation assigned.
(1536)
Exceptions to debtor’s right to legal

redemption.
Article 1635 enumerates three instances of assignments or
sales as exceptions to the provisions of Article 1634. (see Art.
1491[5].)
It must be emphasized that under both Articles 1634 and 1635,
the debtor cannot redeem if the credit or other incorporeal right
is not in litigation when the same is sold.
(1) Sale to a co-heir or co-owner. — This exception is based on
the desire to do away with co-ownership or pro-indivision.
Moreover, if the right of redemption is granted to the debtor, it
would not terminate litigation which is the purpose of this arti-
cle because the co-owner or co-heir may still sue the debtor for
the share that corresponds to the former in the credit. (10 Manresa
419.)
EXAMPLE:
D is indebted to B and C in the amount of P10,000.00. For
failure to pay his debt, B sues D.
If B transfers his credit to C during the pendency of the
litigation, D cannot redeem.
(2) Sale to a creditor. — There is a lawful basis for the assign-

ment as the assignee cannot be considered as a vendee of a right
in litigation and as a speculator. It really refers to a dation in pay-
ment. (see Art. 1245; 10 Manresa 419.)
EXAMPLE:
A owes B the sum of P10,000.00 and B owes C P8,000.00.
If B assigns his credit against A to C then the subject of
litigation (between A and B), A has also no right of legal re-
demption.
486 SALES Art. 1635
(3) Sale to the possessor of property in question. — The reason for

this exception is that the assignee is moved by a desire to preserve
the property and not to speculate at the expense of the debtor.
The example usually given is that where a vendee (assignee)
of a property subject to a mortgage acquires the mortgage credit
of the assignor (mortgage-creditor) against the vendor (mortgage-
debtor). It may also refer to a purchaser of property under attach-
ment who subsequently acquires the credit giving rise to the at-
tachment. (Ibid., 419-420.)
EXAMPLE:
A owes B P10,000.00 which is secured by a mortgage on a
land owned by A.
If A sells the land to C and B assigns his credit in litigation
against A to C, A is not entitled to redeem.
— oOo —
487
Chapter 9
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ART. 1636. In the preceding articles in this Title

governing the sale goods, unless the context or sub-
ject matter otherwise requires:
(1) “Document of title to goods” includes any bill
of lading, dock warrant, “quedan,” or warehouse re-
ceipt or order for the delivery of goods, or any other
document used in the ordinary course of business in
the sale of transfer of goods, as proof of the posses-
sion or control of the goods, or authorizing or pur-
porting to authorize the possessor of the document
to transfer or receive either by indorsement or by de-
livery, goods represented by such document.
“Goods” includes all chattels personal but not
things in action or money of legal tender in the Philip-
pines. The term includes growing fruits or crops.
“Order” relating to documents of title means an
order by indorsement on the documents.
“Quality of goods” includes their state or condi-
tion.
“Specific goods” means goods identified and
agreed upon at the time a contract of sale is made.
An antecedent or pre-existing claim, whether for
money or not, constitutes “value” where goods or
documents of title are taken either in satisfaction
thereof or as security therefor.
487
488 SALES Art. 1636
(2) A person is insolvent within the meaning of this

Title who either has ceased to pay his debts in the
ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts
as they become due, whether insolvency proceedings
have been commenced or not.
(3) Goods are in a “deliverable state” within the
meaning of this Title when they are in such a state
that the buyer would, under the contract, be bound to
take delivery of them. (n)
This article defines or explains the various terms used in the
preceding articles governing the sale of goods. They hardly re-
quire comment. The definitions in this article do not apply if the
context or subject matter of any particular portion of the law oth-
erwise requires.
(1) Goods do not include things or choses in action or negoti-
able instruments.
(a) A chose in action is any claim or right which may be
pleaded in a suit at law, such as a claim of reparation for a tort
or quasi-delict, or a right acquired under a contract.
(b) Stock certificates have been held to be goods within the
meaning of the U.S. Uniform Sales Act. (Babb & Martin, op. cit.,
p. 86.)
(c) Real property is not the proper subject of a transaction
involving a sale of goods within the definition of the term.
However, growing crops or fruits which are agreed to be sev-
ered under the contract of sale are treated as goods and not as
interest in realty.
(d) The U.S. Uniform Commercial Code excludes money
from the term “goods” but only where money is the medium
of payment. Said another way, money in which the price is to
be paid for the goods involved, is not to be considered part of
the goods which are the subject matter of the transaction. Said
Code (Sec. 2-105 thereof.) specifically provides that money,
when treated as a commodity, is a good and the contract
Art. 1637 GENERAL PROVISIONS 489
formed out of the transaction is one for the sale of goods. (1

Williston, 4th ed., p. 152.)
(e) Any transaction between the parties, even if in the
form of an unconditional contract to sell or even if in the form
of present sale, is excluded from a sale of goods if the par-
ties to the transaction intended that the transaction operate
only as a security transaction; but the provision on sales will
govern the general sales aspects of such transaction. (Ibid.,
p. 176.)
(2) Ascertained goods means goods that are identified and
agreed upon as forming the subject matter of the bargain.
(a) They are specific if they are identified and agreed upon
at the time the contract of sale is made.
(b) If identification takes place afterwards, the goods are
specified but not specific.
(c) Existing goods (owned or possessed by the seller) may
or may not be specific.
(d) Future goods (to be manufactured or acquired by the
seller after the making of the contract to sell) cannot be spe-
cific. (Ibid., pp. 101-102.)
EXAMPLES:
(1) S sells to B one used X truck, Motor No. 12345. S and B
are on the truck when the bargain is made. The goods are exist-
ing, ascertained, and specific.
(2) B, a retail grocer, orders 6 dozen cans of X brand toma-
toes from S, a wholesale concern. S has the canned goods in
stock, and accepts the order but does not immediately set aside
6 dozen cans. The goods are existing and unascertained. When
6 dozen cans have been set aside and earmarked for B, the goods
have become ascertained or specified — not specific. (Ibid.)
ART. 1637. The provisions of this Title are subject

to the rules laid down by the Mortgage Law and the
Land Registration Law with regard to immovable prop-
erty. (1537a)
490 SALES Art. 1637
Sale of immovable subject

to registration law.
Under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Land Registration
Law, the registration of documents or titles pertaining to immov-
able property is the operative act that binds the property and
serves as constructive notice to the public. This means that the
right of third persons are not adversely affected by the sale of
immovable property until after its registration.
The Spanish Mortgage Law has been discontinued by Presi-
dential Decree No. 892. This discontinuance was reiterated in
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree,
which superseded Act No. 496, as amended, the Land Registra-
tion Law.
(1) Under the decree, “no deed, mortgage, lease or other vol-
untary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land,
but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registra-
tion. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned.” (Sec. 51
thereof.)
(2) Every conveyance, if registered, shall be constructive no-
tice to all persons from the time of such registration. (Sec. 52
thereof.)
(3) “The registration shall be made in the office of the Regis-
ter of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.” (Sec. 51
thereof.)
— oOo —
491
BARTER OR EXCHANGE
(Title VII, Arts. 1638-1641)
ART. 1638. By the contract of barter or exchange

one of the parties binds himself to give one thing in
consideration of the other’s promise to give another
thing. (1538a)
Barter defined.
The contract of barter is defined by Article 1638. It is similar
to sale with the only difference that instead of paying a price in
money, another thing is given in lieu thereof. (see Art. 1468.) A
contract whereby one person transfers the ownership of non-fun-
gible things to another with the obligation on the part of the lat-
ter to give things of the same kind, quantity, and quality is con-
sidered a barter. (Art. 1954.)
The use of the term “barter” in describing a contract is not
controlling. (Baluran vs. Navarro, 79 SCRA 309 [1977].)
Perfection and consummation

of the contract.
(1) The contract of barter is perfected from the moment there
is a meeting of minds upon the things promised by each party in
consideration of the other. (see Art. 1475.)
(2) It is consummated from the time of mutual delivery by
the contracting parties of things they promised. (Tagaytay Dev.
Co. vs. Osorio, 69 Phil. 180 [1939]; Biagtan vs. Viuda de Oller, 62
Phil. 933 [1936].)
491
492 SALES Art. 1638
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. A party to a barter issued a promissory note for the value of
the things he promised to give.
Facts: The agreement between A and B was for A to deliver
sugar to B, who was to give A 50 bottles of whisky for every
picul of sugar. Because at the time B had no whisky, he signed a
promissory note for the value of the whisky.
Issue: Did the contract become one of sale?
Held: The contract was still barter. The consideration for
the sugar was not cash but the whisky, and the note was ex-
ecuted in consideration for the liquor. The Price Control Law
(then in force) contemplated sales payable in cash. Being in
derogation of a natural right, it must be construed strictly, bar-
ring collusions to evade its provisions. It appeared that the trans-
action was bona fide and fair, B being a manufacturer of and
dealer in whisky on a large scale, and as such he needed large
quantities of sugar to carry on his business. (Herrerias vs.
Javellana, 84 Phil. 609 [1949].)
———— ———— ————
2. In the contract entitled “barter,” the parties shall enjoy the
material possession, and neither shall alienate the property received,
one party even obliging himself to return the property should any of
the children of the other need it.
Facts: Spouses A and B executed a written document enti-
tled “Barter” whereby they agreed to “barter” and exchange
their residential lot with the riceland of spouses C and D. Un-
der the agreement, the parties shall enjoy the material posses-
sion of their respective properties. A and B shall reap the fruits
of the riceland, while C and D shall have the right to build their
house on the lot, subject to the condition that should any of the
children of A and B decide to reside in the municipality where
the lot is located and build his house on the lot, C and D shall
be obliged to return the lot to such children, and that neither
party shall encumber, alienate or dispose of their respective
properties without the consent of the other. E, a son of A and B,
filed a complaint against C and D to recover the lot claiming
that he needed the property for the construction of his house
thereon.
Issue: Did the contract of “barter” transfer the ownership
of the lot to C and D?
Arts. 1639-1640 BARTER OF EXCHANGE 493
Held: No. Contracts are not what the parties may see fit to
call them but what they really are as determined by the princi-
ples of law. Thus, in the instant case, the use of the term “bar-
ter” in describing the agreement is not controlling. The stipula-
tions in the document are clear enough to indicate that there was
no intention at all on the part of the signatories thereto to con-
vey the ownership of their respective properties. The agreement
is not barter but one of or akin to usufruct (see Art. 562.) in that
all that was conveyed or transferred from one to the other is only
the use or material possession or enjoyment of each other’s real
property. (Baluran vs. Navarro, 79 SCRA 309 [1977].)
ART. 1639. If one of the contracting parties, hav-

ing received the thing promised him in barter, should
prove that it did not belong to the person who gave it,
he cannot be compelled to deliver that which he of-
fered in exchange, but he shall be entitled to dam-
ages. (1539a)
Effect where giver not lawful owner

of thing delivered.
Under this provision, the aggrieved party cannot be compelled
to deliver the thing he has promised (see Biagtan vs. Viuda de
Oller, 62 Phil. 933 [1936].) Moreover, he is entitled to claim dam-
ages. The rule is analogous to Articles 1590 and 1591.
ART. 1640. One who loses by eviction the thing

received in barter may recover that which he gave in
exchange with a right to damages, or he may only
demand an indemnity for damages. However, he can
only make use of the right to recover the thing which
he has delivered while the same remains in the pos-
session of the other party, and without prejudice to
the rights acquired in good faith in the meantime by a
third person. (1540a)
Effect of eviction.
Each contracting party warrants to the other that he has right
to transfer ownership of the thing exchanged. (see Arts. 1547,
1548.)
494 SALES Art. 1641
In case of eviction, the injured party is given the option either

to recover the property he has given in exchange with damages
or only claim an indemnity for damages. The right to recover is,
however, subject to the rights of innocent third persons. (see Art.
1385.)
ART. 1641. As to all matters not specifically pro-

vided for in this Title, barter shall be governed by the
provisions of the preceding Title relating to sales.
(1541a)
Applicability of provisions on sales.

Barter is a mutual sale. Each party really is both a vendor and
a vendee. For this reason, the provisions on sales are also appli-
cable to barter.
— oOo —
495
THE BULK SALES LAW

(Act No. 3952, as amended.)
Section 1. This Act shall be known as “The Bulk

Sales Law.”
Purpose of the law.

The Bulk Sales Law is designed to prevent the defrauding of
creditors by the secret sale or disposal or mortgage in bulk of all
or substantially all of a merchant’s stock of goods. (37 C.J.S. 1320.)
Scheme of the law.

The general scheme of the law is to declare such bulk sales
fraudulent and void as to creditors of the vendor, or presump-
tively so, unless specified formalities are observed, such as the
demanding and the giving of a list of creditors, the giving of ac-
tual or constructive notice to such creditors, by record or other-
wise, and the making of an inventory. (Ibid.)
The effect of the law is to create a new type or kind of fraudu-
lent conveyance. (Ibid., 1324.)
Constitutionality of the law.

The Bulk Sales Law is constitutional. (Liwanag vs. Neng-hraj,
40 O.G. 1441.) It does not deprive persons of their property with-
out due process of law nor do they deny to such persons the equal
protection of the law.
While the Legislature may not constitutionally declare void
that which in its nature is, and under all circumstances, entirely
honest and harmless, yet it may, under its police powers, place
such reasonable restrictions on the right of an owner in relation
495
496 SALES Sec. 2
to his property as it finds necessary to protect the interests of the

public, or prevent frauds among individuals. (MC Daniels vs.
Connely Shoe Co., 71 Pac. 37.)
Construction of the law.

The statute should be read as a whole for purposes of con-
struction. As the law is of a penal character and in derogation of
the right to alienate property without restriction, it is to be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused,
and is not to be extended by construction to situations not clearly
intended thereby.
However, it should be construed and applied with a view to
cure the evil at which it is aimed, which is the defrauding of credi-
tors by secret bulk sales. (37 C.J.S. 1322; People vs. Wong Szu Tung,
[C.A.] No. 9770-R, March 26, 1954.)
Sec. 2. Any sale, transfer, mortgage or assignment

of a stock of goods, wares, merchandise, provisions,
or materials otherwise than in the ordinary course of
trade and the regular prosecution of the business of
the vendor, mortgagor, transferor, or assignor, or any
sale, transfer, mortgage or assignment of all, or sub-
stantially all, of the business or trade thereto con-
ducted by the vendor, mortgagor, transferor, or
assignor, or of all, or substantially all, of the fixtures
and equipment used in and about the business of the
vendor, mortgagor, transferor, or assignor, shall be
deemed to be a sale and transfer in bulk, in contem-
plation of this Act: Provided, however, That if such
vendor, mortgagor, transferor, or assignor, produces
and delivers a written waiver of the provisions of this
Act from his creditors as shown by certified state-
ments, then, and in that case, the provisions of this
section shall not apply.
When sale or transfer in bulk.

A sale and transfer in bulk under the Bulk Sales Law is any sale,
transfer, mortgage, or assignment —
Sec. 2 THE BULK SALES LAW 497
(1) of a stock of goods, wares, merchandise, provisions, or

materials otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and the
regular prosecution of the business; or
(2) of all or substantially all, of the business or trade; or
(3) of all or substantially all, of the fixtures and equipment
used in the business of the vendor, mortgagor transferor, or
assignor. (Sec. 2.)
When sale or transfer in bulk not covered

by the Bulk Sales Law.
The Bulk Sales Law does not apply to the following:
(1) If the sale or transfer is in the ordinary course of trade and
the regular prosecution of the business of the vendor;
(2) If it is made by one who produces and delivers a written
waiver of the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act from his creditors
(Ibid.);
(3) If it is made by an executor, administrator, receiver, as-
signee in insolvency, or public officer, acting under judicial proc-
ess (Sec. 8.); and
(4) If it refers to properties exempt from attachment or execu-
tion. (Rules of Court, Rule 39, Sec. 12.)
Meaning of stock.
The common use of the term stock when applied to goods in a
mercantile house refers to that which are kept for sale. (Albrecht
vs. Cudikee, 79 Pac. 628.)
Meaning of merchandise.
Merchandise must be construed to mean such things as are
usually bought and sold in trade by merchants. (People’s Savings
Bank vs. Ban Allsburg, 131 N.W. 101.) It means something that is
sold everyday, and is constantly going out of the store and being
replaced by other goods. (Boise Credit Men’s Assoc. vs. Ellis, 133
Pac. 6.)
It has been held that the sale of an entire foundry shop which
does not sell merchandise, but whose main business is to manu-
498 SALES Sec. 3
facture ironworks, or processes or casts metals, together with the

goodwill and credits, equipment, tools and machineries thereof,
is not covered by the law because the contents are not the “stock,
goods, wares, merchandise, provisions, or materials” in bulk con-
templated in Section 3 of the law. (People vs. Wong Szu Tung,
[C.A.] L-9776-R, March 26, 1954.) Neither are land and buildings
“goods, wares and merchandise” within the statute. (McMillan
vs. Nelson, 181 N.W. 618.)
Meaning of fixtures.
The term fixtures refers to such articles of merchandise usu-
ally possessed and annexed to the premises occupied by mer-
chants to enable them better to store, handle, and display their
wares and which are commonly known as trade fixtures, although
removable without material injury to the premises at or before
the end of tenancy. (Brown vs. Quigley, 130 N.W. 690.)
The law has reference to trade fixtures connected with the
business and not to the building in which the business is carried
on. (Robbins vs. Fuller, 229 S.W. 8.)
Sec. 3. It shall be the duty of every person who

shall sell, mortgage, transfer, or assign any stock of
goods, wares, merchandise, provisions or materials,
in bulk, for cash or on credit, before receiving from
the vendee, mortgagee, or his or its agents or repre-
sentatives any part of the purchase price thereof, or
any promissory note, memorandum, or other evidence
therefor, to deliver to such vendee, mortgagee, or
agent, or if the vendee, mortgagee, or agent be a cor-
poration, then to the president, vice-president, treas-
urer, secretary or manager of said corporation, or, if
such vendee or mortgagee be a partnership firm, then
to a member thereof, a written statement sworn to
substantially as hereinafter provided, of the names
and addresses of all creditors to whom said vendor
or mortgagor may be indebted, together with the
amount of indebtedness due or owing, or to become
due or owing by said vendor or mortgagor to each of
Sec. 4 THE BULK SALES LAW 499
said creditors, which statement shall be verified by

an oath to the following effect:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROVINCE/CITY OF . . . . .
Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared . . . .
. . . . (vendor, mortgagor, agent or representative, as the case may
be), bearing Res. Cert. No. . . . . . . . . issued at . . . . . . . on the . . . .
. . day of . . . . . . . who, by me being first duly sworn, upon his oath,
deposes and states that the foregoing statement contains the names
of all of the creditors of . . . . . . (vendor, or mortgagor) together with
their address, and that the amount set opposite each of said respec-
tive names, is the amount now due and owing, and which shall be-
come due and owing by . . . . . . . (vendor, or mortgagor) to such
creditors, and that there are no creditors holding claims due or which
shall become due, for or on account of goods, wares, merchandise,
provisions or materials purchased upon credit or on account of money
borrowed to carry on the business of which said goods, wares, mer-
chandise, provisions or materials are a part, other than as set forth
in said statement.
............
Subscribed and sworn to before me this . . . . . . . . . day of
. . . . . . . . 19 . . . . . . . at . . . . . . .
Sec. 4. Whenever any person shall sell, mortgage,

transfer, or assign any stock of goods, wares, mer-
chandise, provisions, or materials, in bulks, for cash
or on credit, and shall receive any part of the purchase
price, or any promissory note, or evidence of indebt-
edness for said purchase price or advance upon mort-
gage without having first delivered to the vendee or
mortgagee or to his or its agent or representative, the
sworn statement provided for in Section three hereof,
and without applying the purchase or mortgage money
of the said property to the pro rata payment of the
bona fide claim or claims of the creditors of the ven-
dor or mortgagor, as shown upon such sworn state-
500 SALES Secs. 3-5
ment, he shall be deemed to have violated this Act,

and any such sale, transfer or mortgage shall be
fraudulent and void.
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of every vendor,
transferor, mortgagor, or assignor, at least ten days
before the sale, transfer, or execution of a mortgage
upon any stock of goods, wares, merchandise, provi-
sions or materials, in bulk, to make a full detailed in-
ventory thereof and to preserve the same showing the
quantity and, so far as is possible with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, the cost price to the vendor,
transferor, mortgagor, or assignor of each article to
be included in the sale, transfer or mortgage, and
notify every creditor whose name and address is set
forth in the verified statement of the vendor, transferor,
mortgagor, or assignor at least ten days before trans-
ferring possession thereof, personally by or registered
mail, of the price, terms and conditions of the sale,
transfer, mortgage, or assignment.
Protection accorded to creditors

by the law.
The law protects or benefits the creditors as follows:
(1) It requires the vendor, etc. to deliver to the vendee, etc. a
sworn written statement of the names and addresses of all credi-
tors to whom said vendor, etc. may be indebted together with the
amount of indebtedness due or to become due (Sec. 3.); and
(2) It requires the vendor, etc. at least ten (10) days before the
sale, etc., to make a full detailed inventory showing the quantity
and the cost price of the goods and to notify every creditor of the
price, terms, and conditions of the sale, etc. (Sec. 5.)
Creditors contemplated by law.

The statute contemplates not only creditors whose claims are
due but includes all persons who were creditors of the seller at
the time of the sale, although their claims had not been reduced
to judgment, or were not due. But creditors whose claims came
Secs. 3-5 THE BULK SALES LAW 501
into existence subsequent to the sale are not entitled to the ben-
efits of the statute. (37 C.J.S. 1532, 1535.)
Waiver and estoppel of creditors.

Creditors may waive the right to the benefit of the statute or
estop themselves to claim that the sale was invalid because the
requirements of statute were not complied with. (31 C.J.S. 1328.)
Thus, a creditor who consents to and participates in a bulk sale in
the expectation that the proceeds thereof are to be applied to his
credits (Polo Sav. Bank vs. Caneron, 168 N.W. 769.), or who af-
firms the sale thus making it his own (Warren vs. Parlin, 206 S.W.
586.), or who, after he has been notified of the sale, states that he
will look to the seller for payment and remains silent for two (2)
years (Rice vs. West, 157, Pac. 1105.), cannot be heard to say that
the sale was void.
The benefit of the statute is for those who take the steps pre-
scribed thereby in order to protect their claims. But there is no
estoppel unless the conduct was relied on by the other party to
his prejudice, in accordance with the rule as to estoppel gener-
ally. (37 C.J.S. 1329; see Arts. 1431, 1432.)
Effects of false statements in the schedule

of creditors.
(1) Without knowledge of buyer. — If the statement is fair upon
its face and the buyer has no knowledge of its incorrectness (as
when the seller misrepresents the amount of his indebtedness),
and nothing to put him on inquiry about it, he will be protected
in its purchase. (International Silver Co. vs. Hull, 79 S.E. 609.) In
such case, the remedy of the creditor is not against the goods but
to prosecute the seller criminally. (Seltzer vs. Peddi, 24 Pa. Dist.
456.) It would be unreasonable to make the purchaser responsi-
ble for any incorrectness in the list. (Glantz vs. Gardinc, 40 R.I. 367.)
(2) With knowledge or imputed knowledge of buyer. — If the
vendee has knowledge of the false statement or the statement is
defective on its face (as when it fails to give the addresses of the
creditors), the vendee accepts it at his peril. (Fitzhugh vs. Munnel,
179 Pac. 679.) The sale is valid only as between the vendor and
the vendee but void as against the creditors.
502 SALES Secs. 3-5
(3) With names of certain creditors without notice omitted. — If

the list omits to name certain creditors who are not notified, the
sale is void as to such creditors, whether that omission was fraudu-
lent or not. (Williams vs. J.W. Crowdus Drug Co., 167 S.W. 187.) It
has been held that a sale made of all the effects in the vendor’s
store without the buyer being furnished a sworn list of creditors
as required by Section 3 is null and void irrespective of the good
or bad faith of the buyer. (Chin Asing vs. Gongco & Co., [C.A.] 40
O.G. 142.)
(4) With respect to an innocent purchaser for value from the origi-
nal purchaser. — But the creditor of the vendor who fails to com-
ply with the requirements of the statutes does not have the right
to pursue the property in whosoever hands it may fall. An inno-
cent purchaser for value from the original purchaser is protected.
However, if the circumstances are such as to bind the subsequent
purchaser with constructive notice that the sale to the vendor was
fraudulent, the property will be liable in his hands to creditors of
the original vendor. (37 C.J.S. 1356.)
Effect of violation of law on transfer.

(1) As between the parties. — The bulk sales law does not in
any way affect the validity of the transfer as between the inter-
mediate parties thereto. A sale not in compliance with the bulk
sales statutes is valid against all persons other than creditors. (see
Ibid.)
(2) As against creditors. — A purchaser in violation of the law
acquires no right in the property purchased as against the credi-
tors of the seller. His status is that of a trustee, or receiver for the
benefit of all the creditors of the seller. As such, he is responsible
for the disposition of the property. (Ibid., pp. 1349-1350.)
Remedies available to creditors.

Mere non-compliance with the statute does not render the
purchaser personally liable to creditors. Hence, an ordinary ac-
tion against him by creditors to obtain a money judgment will not
lie, unless the purchaser has sold or otherwise disposed of, or dealt
with, the property, so as to become personally liable to creditors
for the value of it.
Secs. 6-8 THE BULK SALES LAW 503
The proper remedy is one against the goods to subject them

to the payment of a debt, such as execution, attachment,
garnishment, or by a proceeding in equity. (37 C.J.S. 1356.)
Sec. 6. Any vendor, transferor, mortgagor, or

assignor of any stock of goods, wares, merchandise,
provisions or materials, in bulk, or any person acting
for, or on behalf of any such vendor, transferor, mort-
gagor, or assignor, who shall knowingly or willfully
make, or deliver or cause to be made or delivered, a
statement, as provided in Section three hereof, which
shall not include the names of all such creditors, with
the correct amount due and to become due to each of
them, or shall contain any false or untrue statement,
shall be deemed to have violated the provisions of
this Act.
Sec. 7. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or
corporation, as owner of any stock of goods, wares,
merchandise, provisions, or materials, in bulk, to
transfer title to the same without consideration or for
a nominal consideration only.
Acts punished by law.

They are:
(1) Knowingly or willfully making or delivering a statement
as required by the Act (Sec. 3.) which does not include the names
of all the creditors of the vendor, etc. with the correct amount due
and to become due or which contains any false or untrue state-
ment (Sec. 6.); and
(2) Transferring title to any stock of goods, wares, merchan-
dise, provisions or materials sold in bulk without consideration
or for a nominal consideration only. (Sec. 7.)
Sec. 8. Nothing in this Act contained shall apply

to executors, administrators, receivers, assignees in
insolvency, or public officers, acting under judicial
process.
504 SALES Secs. 9-12
Sec. 9. The sworn statement containing the names

and addresses of all creditors of the vendor or mort-
gagor provided for in Section three of this Act, shall
be registered in the Bureau of Commerce.1 For the
registration of each such sworn statement a fee of
five pesos shall be charged to the vendor or mortga-
gor of the stock of goods, wares, merchandise, provi-
sions or materials in bulk. (As amended by R.A. No.
111.)
Sec. 10. The provisions of this Act shall be admin-
istered by the Director of the Bureau of Commerce,
who is hereby empowered, with the approval of the
Department Head,2 to prescribe and adopt from time
to time such rules and regulations, as may be deemed
necessary for the proper and efficient enforcement of
the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 11. Any person violating any provisions of
this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than six months, no more
than five years or fine in a sum not exceeding five
thousand pesos, or by both such imprisonment and
fine, in the discretion of the court.
Sec. 12. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
APPROVED: December 1, 1932.
— oOo —
1
Now, Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), under the
Department of Trade and Industry.
2
Secretary of Trade and Industry.
560 LEASE
Part II
LEASE
(Title VIII, Arts. 1642-1699, 1713-1731)
Chapter 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ART. 1642. The contract of lease may be of things,

or of work and service. (1542)
Concept and nature of contract of lease.

(1) The contract of lease is an agreement whereby one person
(lessor) binds himself to grant temporarily the enjoyment or use
of a thing or to render some work or service to another (lessee)
who undertakes to pay rent, compensation or price therefor.
(2) Lease is only a personal right. It is a real right only by ex-
ception as in the case of lease of real estate recorded in the Regis-
try of Property which makes it binding upon third persons, like a
purchaser. In the absence of registration, the purchaser may ter-
minate the lease, save when there is a stipulation in the contract
of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease.
(Art. 1676.), actual knowledge being equivalent to registration.
(Art. 1648.)
(3) A lease contract is not essentially personal in character in
the sense that the rights and obligations therein are transmissible
to the heirs. The death of a party does not excuse non-performance
of a contract, which involves a property right, and the rights and
560
obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives

of the deceased. (Sui Man Hui Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 424
SCRA 127 [2004].)
Kinds of lease according to subject matter.

Lease contract may be.
(1) Lease of things, whether real or personal, involving an ob-
ligation on the part of the lessor to deliver the thing which is the
object thereof and the correlative right of the lessee to the peace-
ful and adequate enjoyment thereof for a price certain (Art. 1654.);
or
(2) Lease of work which refers to a contract for a piece of work,
involving an obligation on the part of the contractor (lessor) to
execute a piece of work for the employer (lessee) in considera-
tion of a certain price or compensation) (Art.1 1713.); or
(3) Lease of service involving an obligation on the part of the
housekeeper (Art. 1689.), laborer or employee (Art. 1700.), or com-
mon carrier (Art. 1732.) to do or perform a service for the head of
a family, or master, employer, or passenger or shipper of goods,
respectively, in consideration of compensation.
Under the Civil Code, this kind of lease covers household
service (Arts. 1689-1699.), contract of labor2 (Arts. 1700-1712.),
contract for a piece of work (Arts. 1713-1731.), and common car-
riers.3 (Arts. 1732-1766.)
Characteristics and elements of the contract.

(1) The contract of lease is consensual, bilateral, onerous, com-
mutative, nominate, and principal.4
In lease as in sale, there is an exchange of equivalent values.
The use by the lessee of the thing, work, or service is considered
the equivalent to the rent, compensation, or price paid to the les-
sor.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, refers to article in the Civil Code.
2
This topic is more appropriately taken up in Labor Law.
3
This topic is studied in the course on transportation.
4
See comments under Article 1458, Part I.
562 LEASE Art. 1643
(2) As in ordinary contracts, a contract of lease has three (3)

elements, namely: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) ob-
ject certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause
of the obligation which is established. (Art. 1318.)
ART. 1643. In the lease of things, one of the parties

binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use
of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which
may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease for
more than ninety-nine years shall be valid. (1543a)
Lease of things.
In legal parlance and in ordinary usage, the term “landlord’’
means lessor or owner and the word “tenant’’ means lessee.
(Gutierrez vs. Santos, 107 Phil. 419 [1960].)
(1) Essence of lease. — The essence or essential purpose of the
lease of things is the transmission of the temporary enjoyment or
use by the lessee of a thing for a certain period in consideration
of the undertaking to pay rent therefor. Hence, the object of the
lease must be within the commerce of man (Art. 1374.); otherwise,
it is void. Thus, a lease of property belonging to the public do-
main such as a road or a public plaza is void ab initio. (Yngson vs.
Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources, 123 SCRA 441
[1983]; Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602 [1915].)
The lease of a building naturally includes the lease of the lot
on which it stands, and the rentals of the buildings include those
of the land. (Duellowe vs. Gotoco, 7 SCRA 841 [1963]; Phil. Con-
solidated Freight Lines, Inc. vs. Ajon, 103 Phil. 318 [1958]; City of
Manila vs. Chin Kam, 101 Phil. 1252 [1957].)
(2) Subject-matter of lease. — Article 1643 applies to lease of
things, whether movable or immovable. The Civil Code makes
no special-provisions for the lease of movables. Nevertheless, the
provisions of the Code on leases of lands are also applicable to
leases of personal property except those provisions which by their
nature and intent, can only be applied where the object of the lease
is immovable.
In a lease of chattels, the lessor loses complete control over

the chattel leased although the lessee would be responsible to the
lessor should he make bad use thereof. (National Labor Union vs.
Dinglasan, 98 Phil. 649 [1956].)
(3) Ownership of thing. — The lessor need not be the owner of
the thing leased as long as he can transmit its enjoyment or use to
the lessee since ownership is not being transferred. For example,
the usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct or
he may lease it to another but the lease contract shall terminate
upon the expiration of the usufruct saving only leases of rural
lands (infra.), which shall be considered as subsisting during the
agricultural year. (Art. 572.) But an easement cannot be leased in-
dependently of the estate to which it actively or passively belongs
as it is inseparable therefrom (Art. 617.), being an accessory thing
whose very existence depends upon the principal thing (immov-
able).
Even the lessee himself may lease the property to another; in
such case, a sublease results. (Art. 1650.)
(4) Consideration of lease. — The cause of a contract of lease of
things must be a price certain generally called “rent’’ or “rental’’
in money or its equivalent, such as products, fruits, or other use-
ful things, or some other prestation or labor which the lessee binds
himself to undertake. The important thing is that what is given
by the lessee has value.
(a) The phrase “price certain’’ means that the price of the
lease or rent has been determined by the parties or is at least
capable of determination under the contract. A price certain
exists when the same can be ascertained according to the us-
ages or customs of the place. (Arroyo vs. Azur, 76 Phil. 493
[1946].)
(b) The amount must not be nominal or so insignificant
as to indicate an intention to enter into a contract of commo-
datum which is essentially gratuitous. (Art. 1933.)
(c) Since lease is essentially a consensual contract, in the
absence of a law fixing a ceiling on rentals, the lessor has the
right to fix the amount of the rent, and upon the expiration of
the contract, to demand an increase thereof. The lessee may
564 LEASE Art. 1643
agree with the rent or not consent to the lease. (see Vda. de
Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 302 [1975]; Ramon
Magsaysay Award Foundation vs. Court of Appeals, 134
SCRA 134 [1985].)
(d) Of course, during the period fixed in the contract
where there is a stipulated rent, the lessor cannot increase the
rental without the consent of the lessee. Neither can a court
fix a different rental, even where there is an increase in realty
taxes. (Ledesma vs. Javellana, 121 SCRA 794 [1983].)
(5) Period of lease. — The period may be definite or indefinite.
In any case, the period is temporary, not perpetual.
(a) When the period is definite or fixed, the longest is 99
years. According to the Code Commission, Article 1643 “lim-
its a lease to 99 years because it is an unsound economic policy
to allow ownership and enjoyment to be separated for a very
long time. A similar limitation applies in Philippine law to
sales with a right of redemption, fideicommerssary substitu-
tions, and other cases.’’ (Report, p. 142.)
In fact, the period of 99 years is even too long. Under the
old Civil Code (Art. 1543 thereof.), there was no maximum
period; it only provides that the lease must be for “definite
period.’’
(b) In case the period fixed is more than 99 years, the lease
should be considered as having expired after the end of said
term. Where there is an implied new lease (see Art. 1670.), the
lease will be for an indefinite time.
(d) If a term is fixed but it is indefinite, but from the circum-
stances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the court
may fix the duration thereof. (Art. 1196.) A contract established
to be a lease can only be for a determinate period for a lease,
by its very nature, must be temporary.
(d) If no term is fixed, Article 1682 applies for leases of ru-
ral lands, and Article 1687, for leases of urban lands.
(e) A verbal contract of lease “for as long as the lessees are
doing business and as long as they can pay just rents’’ has been
held to be a lease from month to month under Article 1687
and not one of indefinite duration, terminable without neces-

sity of a special notice upon the expiration of any month.
(Evangelista vs. Alvarez, [CA] 45 O.G. 1792; see Rivera vs.
Trinidad, 48 Phil. 396 [1925].)
(f) A lease of things during the lifetime of one of the parties
is for in indefinite period. A lease for such time as the lessor
or the lessee may please, is one for life, ending upon the death
of either party. (see Eleizegui vs. Lawn Tennis Club, 2 Phil.
309 [1903].)
(g) The continuance and fulfillment of a lease of a house can-
not be made to depend solely upon the uncontrolled choice
of the lessee on whether or not the lessee would pay rentals,
thus depriving the lessor of any say on the matter. If the les-
see elected to pay rentals, the lessor would never be able to
terminate the lease. On the other hand, if the lessor should
desire to continue the lease, the lessee could thwart his pur-
pose by the simple expedient of stopping the payment of
rentals. Such an arrangement is contrary to Article 1308 which
prohibits the validity or compliance with a contract to be left
to the will of one of the parties. (Singson Encarnacion vs.
Baldomar, 77 Phil. 470 [1946].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. The lease contract expressly gives the lessor the sole option
to renew the lease.
Facts: Private respondents, spouses FT and LT (Tangcuecos),
leased their lot to petitioner ALLIED (bank) for a monthly rental
of P1,000.00 for the first three (3) years, adjustable by 25% every
three (3) years thereafter. The lease contract specifically states
in its Provision No. 1 that “the term of this lease shall be four-
teen (14) years commencing from April 1, 1978 and may be re-
newed for a like term at the option of the lessee.”
Pursuant to their lease agreement, ALLIED introduced an
improvement on the property consisting of a concrete building
with a floor area of 340-square meters which it used as a branch
office. As stipulated, the ownership of the building would be
transferred to the lessors upon the expiration of the original
term of the lease.
566 LEASE Art. 1643
A year before the expiration of the contract of lease, the

respondents notified petitioner ALLIED that they were no
longer interested in renewing the lease. ALLIED replied that it
was exercising its option to renew their lease under the same
terms with additional proposals.
When the lease contract expired in 1992 private respond-
ents demanded that ALLIED vacate the premises. But the lat-
ter asserted its sole option to renew the lease and enclosed in
its reply letter a cashier’s check in the amount of P68,400.00
representing the advance rental payments for six (6) months
taking into account the escalation clause. Private respondents,
however, returned the check to ALLIED, prompting the latter
to consign the amount in court.
Issues: There are two main issues in the petition for review,
namely:
(a) whether a stipulation in a contract of lease to the effect
that the contract “may be renewed for a like term at the option
of the lessee” is void for being potestative or violative of the
principle of mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the
Civil Code and, corollarily, what is the meaning of the clause
“may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee’’;
and
(b) whether a lessee has the legal personality to assail the
validity of a deed of donation executed by the lessor over the
leased premises.
Held: (1) Principle of mutuality of contracts. — “Article 1308
of the Civil Code expresses what is known in law as the princi-
ple of mutuality of contracts. It provides that ‘the contract must
bind both the contracting parties; its validity or compliance
cannot be left to the will of one of them.’ This binding effect of
a contract on both parties is based on the principle that the ob-
ligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties, and there must be mutuality between
them based essentially on their equality under which it is re-
pugnant to have one party bound by the contract while leav-
ing the other free therefrom.
The ultimate purpose is to render void a contract contain-
ing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent solely
upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.’’
(2) Sole option of lessee to renew, an integral part of the agree-
ment. — “An express agreement which gives the lessee the sole
option to renew the lease is frequent and subject to statutory

restrictions, valid and binding on the parties. This option, which
is provided in the same lease agreement, is fundamentally part
of the consideration in the contract and is no different from any
other provision of the lease carrying an undertaking on the part
of the lessor to act conditioned on the performance by the les-
see. It is a purely executory contract and at most confers a right
to obtain a renewal if there is compliance with the conditions
on which the right is made to depend.
The right of renewal constitutes a part of the lessee’s inter-
est in the land and forms a substantial and integral part of the
agreement.’’
(3) Mutuality obtains in the contract. — “The fact that such
option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only
by the lessee does not render it void for lack of mutuality. After
all, the lessor is free to give or not to give the option to the
lessee. And while the lessee has a right to elect whether to con-
tinue with the lease or not, once he exercises his option to con-
tinue and the lessor accepts, both parties are thereafter bound
by the new lease agreement. Their rights and obligations be-
come mutually fixed, and the lessee is entitled to retain posses-
sion of the property for the duration of the new lease, and the
lessor may hold him liable for the rent therefor. The lessee can-
not thereafter escape liability even if he should subsequently
decide to abandon the premises.
Mutuality obtains in such a contract and equality exists be-
tween the lessor and the lessee since they remain with the same
faculties in respect to fulfillment.’’
(4) Lessor bound by the option he has conceded to lessee. — “The
case of Lao Lim vs. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 156 [1990].) relied
upon by the trial court is not applicable here. In that case, the
stipulation in the disputed compromise agreement was to the
effect that the lessee would be allowed to stay in the premises
‘as long as he needs it and can pay the rents.’ In the present
case, the questioned provision states that the lease ‘may be re-
newed for a like term at the option of the lessee.’ The lessor is
bound by the option he has conceded to the lessee. The lessee
likewise becomes bound only when he exercises his option and
the lessor cannot thereafter be excused from performing his part
of the agreement.
568 LEASE Art. 1643
Likewise, reliance by the trial court on the 1967 case of Garcia

v. Rita Legarda, Inc. (21 SCRA 555 [1976].), is misplaced. In that
case, what was involved was a contract to sell involving resi-
dential lots, which gave the vendor the right to declare the con-
tract cancelled and of no effect upon the failure of the vendee
to fulfill any of the conditions therein set forth. In the instant
case, we are dealing with a contract of lease which gives the
lessee the right to renew the same.’’
(5) Meaning of clause “may be renewed for a like term at the
option of the lessee.’’ — “With respect to the meaning of the clause
‘may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee,’ we
sustain petitioner’s contention that its exercise of the option
resulted in the automatic extension of the contract of lease un-
der the same terms and conditions. The subject contract simply
provides that ‘the term of this lease shall be fourteen (14) years
and may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee.’
As we see it, the only term on which there has been a clear
agreement is the period of the new contract, i.e., fourteen (14)
years, which is evident from the clause ‘may be renewed for a
like term at the option of the lessee,’ the phrase ‘for a like term’
referring to the period. It is silent as to what the specific terms
and conditions of the renewed lease shall be. Shall it be the
same terms and conditions as in the original contract, or shall
it be under the terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed
upon by the parties after the expiration of the existing lease?’’
(6) Where contract failed to specify terms and conditions to be
embodied in renewed contract. — “In Ledesma vs. Javellana (121
SCRA 794 [1983].), this Court was confronted with a similar
problem. In that case, the lessee was given the sole option to
renew the lease, but the contract failed to specify the terms and
conditions that would govern the new contract. When the lease
expired, the lessee demanded an extension under the same
terms and conditions. The lessor expressed conformity to the
renewal of the contract but refused to accede to the claim of the
lessee that the renewal should be under the same terms and
conditions as the original contract. In sustaining the lessee, this
Court made the following pronouncement:
‘x x x in the case of Hicks vs. Manila Hotel Company, a
similar issue was resolved by this Court. It was held that
‘such a clause relates to the very contract in which it is
placed, and does not permit the defendant upon the renewal
of the contract in which the clause is found, to insist upon
different terms than those embraced in the contract to be

renewed’; and that ‘a stipulation to renew always relates
to the contract in which it is found and the rights granted
thereunder, unless it expressly provides for variations in
the terms of the contract to be renewed.
The same principle is upheld in American Law regard-
ing the renewal of lease contracts. In 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec.
1159, at p. 45, we find the following citations: ‘The rule is
well-established that a general covenant to renew or ex-
tend a lease which makes no provision as to the terms of a
renewal or extension implies a renewal or extension upon
the same terms as provided in the original lease.’
In the lease contract under consideration, there is no
provision to indicate that the renewal will be subject to new
terms and conditions that the parties may yet agree upon.
It is to renewal provisions of lease contracts of the kind
presently considered that the principles stated above
squarely apply. We do not agree with the contention of the
appellants that if it was intended by the parties to renew
the contract under the same terms and conditions stipu-
lated in the contract of lease, such should have expressly
so stated in the contract itself. The same argument could
easily be interposed by the appellee who could likewise
contend that if the intention was to renew the contract of
lease under such new terms and conditions that the parties
may agree upon, the contract should have so specified.
Between the two assertions, there is more logic in the lat-
ter.
The settled rule is that in case of uncertainty as to the
meaning of a provision granting extension to a contract of
lease, the tenant is the one favored and not the landlord.
‘As a general rule, in construing provisions relating to re-
newals or extensions, where there is any uncertainty, the
tenant is favored, and not the landlord, because the latter,
having the power of stipulating in his own favor, has ne-
glected to do so; and also upon the principle that every
man’s grant is to be taken most strongly against himself.’
(50 Am Jur. 2d, Sec. 1162, p. 48; see also 51 C.J.S. 599.)’’
(7) Terms and conditions no longer subject to mutual agreement.
— “Besides, if we were to adopt the contrary theory that the
terms and conditions to be embodied in the renewed contract
570 LEASE Art. 1643
were still subject to mutual agreement by and between the par-

ties, then the option — which is an integral part of the consid-
eration for the contract — would be rendered worthless. For
then, the lessor could easily defeat the lessee’s right of renewal
by simply imposing unreasonable and onerous conditions to
prevent the parties from reaching an agreement, as in the case
at bar.
As in a statute no word, clause, sentence, provision or part
of a contract shall be considered surplusage or superfluous,
meaningless, void, insignificant or nugatory, if that can be rea-
sonably avoided. To this end, a construction which will render
every word operative is to be preferred over that which would
make some words idle and nugatory.’’ (Allied Banking Corpora-
tion vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 357 [1998].)
——— ———— ———-
2. The lease contract stipulates an indefinite period, the lease

to continue for as long as the lessee is paying the rent.
Facts: Petitioner JRC leased its apartment building to the
respondents. The terms of the contract, among others, are the
following:
“Period of lease. — The lease period shall be effective
as of February 1, 1985 and shall continue for an indefinite
period provided the lessee is up-to-date in the payment of
his monthly rentals. The LESSEE may, at his option, termi-
nate this contract any time by giving sixty (60) days prior
written notice of termination to the LESSOR.
‘However, violation of any of the terms and conditions
of this contract shall be a sufficient ground for termination
thereof by the LESSOR.
‘xxx xxx xxx
‘RENT INCREASE — For the duration of this contract,
the LESSEE agrees to an automatic 20% yearly increase in
the monthly rentals.’
Since the effectivity of the lease agreement on February
1985, the lessees religiously paid their respective monthly
rentals together with the 20% yearly increase in the monthly
rentals as stipulated in the contract. On January 2, 1990, JRC
sent a written notice to the lessees informing them of the
former’s intention to increase the monthly rentals on the occu-
pied premises to P3,500.00 monthly effective February 1, 1990.

The respondents manifested their opposition alleging that the
same is in contravention of the terms of the contract of lease as
agreed upon. Due to the opposition and the failure of the les-
sees to pay the increased monthly rentals in the amount of
P3,500.00, JRC demanded that the lessees vacate the premises
and pay the amount of P7,000.00 corresponding to the months
of February and March, 1990.
The respondents exerted effort to pay the rentals due for
the months of February and March 1990 at the monthly rate
stipulated in the contract but was refused by the lessor so that
on May 2, 1990, they instituted before the Metropolitan Trial
Court a case for consignation.
Issues: The petitioners raise the following questions:
(a) When the parties to a contract of lease stipulated for an
indefinite period and shall continue for as long as the lessee is
paying the rent, is the said contract interminable even by the
lessor?
(b) When there is a disagreement on the rentals to be paid,
should it be resolved in a consignation case or in an ejectment
case?
Held: (1) Article 1687 not applicable. — “We agree with the
ruling of the Court of Appeal. Article 1687 finds no application
in the case at bar.
The lease contract between petitioner and respondents is
with a period subject to a resolutory condition. The wording of
the agreement is unequivocal: ‘The lease period xxx shall continue
for an indefinite period provided the lessee is up-to-date in the pay-
ment of his monthly rentals.’ The condition imposed in order that
the contract shall remain effective is that the lessee is up-to-
date in his monthly payments. It is undisputed that the lessees
Gutierrez and Co Tong religiously paid their rent at the increas-
ing rate of 20% annually.
The agreement between the lessor and the lessees are there-
fore still subsisting, with the original terms and conditions
agreed upon, when the petitioners unilaterally increased the
rental payment to more than 20% or P3,500.00 a month.’’
(2) Factual backgrounds in cases cited by petitioner not the same
as in case at bar. — “Petitioner cites Puahay Lao vs. Suarez (22
SCRA 215 [1968].) where it said that ‘the Court in the earlier
572 LEASE Art. 1643
case of Singson vs. Baldomar (77 Phil. 470 [1946].), rejected the
theory that a lease could continue for an indefinite term so long
as the lessee paid the rent, because then its continuance and
fulfillment would depend solely on the free and uncontrolled
choice of the tenant between continuing to pay rentals or not,
thereby depriving the lessors of all say in the matter as it would
be contrary to the spirit of Article 1256 of the Old Civil Code,
now Article 1308 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides that validity or compliance of contracts can not be left
to the will of one of the parties.’
A review of the Puahay and Singson cases shows that the
factual backgrounds therein are not the same as in the case at
bar. In those cases, the lessees were actually in arrears with their
rental payments. The Court, in the Puahay case, ruled that the
lessor had the right to terminate the lease under par. 3, Art.
1673 of the Civil Code, declaring that the lessor may judicially
eject the lessee for violation of any of the conditions agreed upon
in the contract. In the case of Singson, the lease contract was
expressly on a month-to-month basis.’’
(3) Stipulation not contrary to Article 1308 of the Civil Code.
— “The contention of the petitioner that a provision in a con-
tract that the lease period shall subsist for ‘an indefinite period
provided the lessee is up-to-date in the payment of his monthly rentals’
is contrary to Art. 1308 of the Civil Code is not plausible. As
expounded by the Court in the case of Philippine Banking Cor-
poration vs. Lui She (21 SCRA 52 [1967].):
‘We have had occasion to delineate the scope and applica-
tion of article 1308 in the early case of Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao
(43 Phil. 873 [1922].) We said in that case:
‘Article 1256 [now Art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our
opinion creates no impediment of the insertion in a con-
tract for personal service of a resolutory condition permit-
ting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties.
Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make
either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract depend-
ent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the
privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting parties
have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the
option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any
other act which may have been the subject of agreement.
xxx’
Also held in the recent case of Allied Banking Corp. vs. CA

(284 SCRA 357 [1998].) where this Court upheld the validity of
a contract provision in favor of the lessee.
xxx xxx
As correctly ruled by the MTC in its decision, the grant of
benefit of the period in favor of the lessee was given in exchange
for no less than an automatic 20% yearly increase in monthly
rentals. This additional condition was not present in the Puahay
and Singson cases.
Moreover, the express provision in the lease agreement of
the parties that violation of any of the terms and conditions of
the contract shall be sufficient ground for termination thereof
by the lessor, removes the contract from the application of Arti-
cle 1308.’’
(4) Lessor in estoppel. — “Lastly, after having the lessees be-
lieve that their lease contract is one with an indefinite period
subject only to prompt payment of the monthly rentals by the
lessees, we agree with private respondents that the lessor is
estopped from claiming otherwise.
In the case of Opulencia vs. Court of Appeals (293 SCRA 385
[1998].), this Court held that petitioner is estopped from back-
ing out of her representations in the contract with respondent,
that is, she may not renege on her own acts and representa-
tions, to the prejudice of the respondents who relied on them.
We have held in a long line of cases that neither the law nor the
courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable con-
tract he or she entered into with all the required formalities
and willfull awareness of its consequences.’’
(5) Petitioner’s allegation of respondents’ non-payment is false.
— “Anent the second issue, we likewise hold that the conten-
tion of petitioner is without merit. The Court of Appeals found
that the petitioner’s allegation of respondents’ non-payment is
false. This is a finding of fact which we respect and uphold,
absent any showing of arbitrariness or grave abuse on the part
of the court. Furthermore, the statement of petitioner that the
correct amount of rents cannot be considered in a consignation
case but only in the ejectment case is misleading because no-
where in the decision of the appellate court did it state other-
wise. This second issue is clearly just a futile attempt to over-
throw the appellate court’s ruling.’’
574 LEASE Art. 1643
(6) Rationale for consignation. — “Nevertheless, suffice it to

be stated that under Article 1258 of the Civil Code which pro-
vides:
‘Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing
the things due at the disposal of judicial authority, before
whom to tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper
case, and the announcement of the consignation in other
cases. The consignation having been made, the interested
parties shall also be notified thereof.’
the rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an
obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of
causes not imputable to him. Whether or not petitioner has a
cause of action to eject private respondents from the leased
premises due to refusal of the lessees to pay the increased
monthly rentals had been duly determined in the ejectment case
by the Municipal Trial Court which was correctly upheld by
the Court of Appeals. (Jespajo Realty Corporation vs. Court of
Estoppel against lessee.

A lessee is stopped from asserting title to the thing leased as
against the lessor (Art. 1436.), or to deny the lessor’s title, or to
assert a better title not only in himself, but also in some third per-
son, including the State while he remains in possession of the
leased property and until he surrenders possession to the lessor.
(VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 394 SCRA
74 [2002].) This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no
title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created. It
may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those
who succeed to his title. (Geminiano vs. Court of Appeals, 72
SCAD 518, 259 SCRA 344 [1996].) Indeed, the relation of lessor
and lessee does not depend on the former’s title but on the
agreement between the parties as long as the lessee remains in
undisturbed possession, it is immaterial whether the lessor has a
valid title — or any title at all — at the time the relationship was
entered into. However, due to the peculiar circumstances availing
in a case, the rule may be relaxed to avoid unjust enrichment in
favor of the lessor at the expense of the lessee such as in a case
where the lessee would, in effect, be paying in rental twice for the
use of the same property for the same period of time — to the real
owner if he were to still pay the lessor. (Tamio vs. Ticson, 443 SCRA
44 [2004].)
Under the Rules of Court, conclusive presumptions include:
“(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord
at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.” (Sec. 3-b, Rule 131, Rules of Court.) A judg-
ment rendered in ejectment cases, however, shall not bar an ac-
tion between the same parties respecting title to land and shall
not be conclusive as to the facts found therein in a case between
the same parties upon a different cause of action involving pos-
session of the same property. In ejectment cases, the issue is the
physical or material possession and any pronouncement made by
the trial court on the question of ownership is provisional in na-
ture. (Heirs of R.S. Florencio vs. Heir of T. S. De Leon, 425 SCRA
447 [2004]; Amagan vs. Marayag, 326 SCRA 581 [2000]; Olan vs.
Lease distinguished from sale.

(1) In lease of things, only the enjoyment or use is transferred,
while in sale, ownership is transferred (Art. 1460.);
(2) In the first the transfer is temporary, while in the second,
it is permanent, unless subject to a resolutory condition (Art.
1465.);
(3) In the first, the lessor need not be the owner, while in the
second, the seller must be the owner or at least authorized by the
owner to transfer ownership, of the thing sold at the time it is
delivered (Art. 1459.); and
(4) In the first, the price of the subject matter, is usually not
mentioned, being immaterial, while in the second, the price of the
thing is usually fixed in the contract. (Art. 1473.)
In case of doubt, the intention of the parties is an important
factor in determining the contract entered into. Thus, the fact that
the price of the thing (machine) was fixed in the contract, makes
said contract a sale and not a lease, because in contracts of lease,
as distinguished from those sale, it is plain redundancy to fix or
make any mention of the price of the thing which is the subject
576 LEASE Art. 1643
matter thereof. (H.E. Heacock Co. vs. Buntal Mfg. Co., 66 Phil. 245
[1937].)
Conditional sales of goods.

A lease of personalty with option to buy is an installment sale
and not a lease. Sellers desirous of making conditional sales of
their goods, but who do not wish openly to make a bargain in that
form, for one reason or another, have frequently resorted to the
device of making contracts in the form of leases either with op-
tion to the buyer to purchase for a small consideration at the end
of term, provided the so-called rent has been duly paid, or with
stipulation that if the rent throughout the term is paid, title shall
thereupon vest in the lessee.
It is obvious that such transactions are leases only in name.
The so-called rent must necessarily be regarded as payment of
the price in installments since the due payment of the agreed
amount results, by the terms of the bargain, in the transfer of title
to the lessee. (Vda. De Jose vs. Veloso Barrueco, 67 Phil. 191 [1939];
see Manila Gas Corporation vs. Calupitan, 66 Phil. 747 [1937];
Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 188
[1989].)
Lease distinguished from commodatum.

By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to another,
either something not consumable so that the latter may use the
same for a certain time and return it, in which case the contract is
called a commodatum; or money or other consumable thing, upon
the condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality
shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan or
mutuum. (Art. 1933.)
(1) The first is an onerous contract, although the rent may sub-
sequently be condoned or remitted, while the second is essentially
gratuitous (Art. 1933.);
(2) The first is not essentially personal in character and, there-
fore, the right may be transmitted to the heirs, while the second
is purely personal in character, and consequently, the death of
either the bailor or the bailee extinguishes the contract (Art. 1939.);
and
(3) The first is a consensual contract, while the second is a real

contract as it is perfected only upon delivery of the object thereof.
(Art. 1934.)
Both contracts consist in the transmission of the enjoyment or
use of a thing to another. (Art. 1933.)
Lease distinguished from mutuum.

(1) In the first, the owner of the property does not lose his
ownership, while in the second, the lender or creditor loses owner-
ship of the thing loaned which becomes the property of the bor-
rower or debtor (Art. 1953.);
(2) In the first, the relationship is one of lessor and lessee,
while in the second, it is that of creditor or obligee and debtor or
obligor (Ibid.);
(3) In the first, the subject matter may be real and/or personal
property, while in the second, it is only money or any other fun-
gible thing (Ibid.);
(4) The first is governed by the statute of frauds where the
thing leased is real property for more than one year (Art. 1403[e].),
while the second is not governed by the statute of frauds (Art.
1403); and
(5) The first is not governed by the Usury Law, while the sec-
ond is governed by said law.5 (Arts. 1175, 1961.)
Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation. (Art.
1933.)
Lease distinguished from usufruct.

Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with
the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides. (Art. 562.)
(1) The first is a real right only in the case of the lease of real
property where the lease is registered, while the second is always
a real right (see Art. 567, 3rd par.);
5
Central Bank Circular No. 905 (Dec. 10, 1982) suspended the effectivity of the Usury
Law. It removed the ceiling on interest rates.
578 LEASE Art. 1643
(2) In the first, the lessor may or may not be the owner, while
in the second, the creator of the right must be the owner or one
duly authorized by him (see Art. 563.);
(3) In the first, the lessor has the active obligation to main-
tain the lessee in the enjoyment or use of the properly, while in
the second, the owner has the passive duty to allow the usufruc-
tuary to enjoy or use the same (see Art. 562.);
(4) In the first, the lessee generally pays no taxes, while in the
second, the usufructuary pays the annual charges and taxes on
the fruits (Art. 596.);
(5) In the first, the lessee generally has no obligation to pay
for repairs, while in the second, the usufructuary is obliged to
make the ordinary repairs needed by the thing given in usufruct
(Art. 592.);
(6) In the first, the lessee cannot constitute a usufruct on the
property, while in the second, the usufructuary may lease the thing
in usufruct to another (Art. 581.);
(7) The first, as a rule, may be created only by contract, while
the second may be created by law, contract, last will and testa-
ment, or prescription (Art. 563.); and
(8) The first generally covers particular uses limited by the
contract, while the second, as a rule, covers all possible uses of
the property. (Arts. 562, 564, 566.)
Lease distinguished from deposit.

A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a
thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping
it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing deliv-
ered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no de-
posit but some other contract. (Art. 1962.)
(1) In the first, the enjoyment or use of the thing leased is the
essential purpose, while in the second, the safekeeping of the thing
delivered is the principal purpose (Ibid.);
(2) In the first, the lessor can not demand the thing leased
before the expiration of the contract, while in the second, the
depositor can demand the return of the subject matter at will (Art.
1972.);
(3) In the first, both movable and immovable property may
be the object, while in the second, if it is extrajudicial, only mov-
able (corporeal) things may be the object (Art. 1966.);
(4) The first is onerous, while the second may be gratuitous
(Art. 1965.); and
(5) The first is consensual, while the second is a real contract
perfected only upon delivery of the object thereof. (Art. 1963.)
Lease of chattels distinguished from employment.

(1) In the first, the relationship is that of lessor and lessee,
while in the second, it is one of employer and employee (Arts.
1689, 1713.);
(2) In the first, the lessor loses control or management over
the chattel leased, while in the second, the employer retains con-
trol or management over his chattel;
(3) In the first, the lessor has no control or supervision over
the lessee, while in the second, the employer exercises control and
supervision over his employee; and
(4) In the first, the lessee pays rent to the lessor for the enjoy-
ment or use of the chattel, while in the second, the employer pays
wage or salary for the services of the employee.
Service as driver under the boundary

system.
Under the boundary system, the relation between the driver and
the jeepney owner is that of employer and employee, not lessor
and lessee.
Thus, in a case, where the respondent is the owner and op-
erator of TPU jeepneys, while the petitioners are drivers who had
an oral contract with the respondent for the use of his jeepneys in
consideration of P7.50 for 10 hours’ use, the drivers receiving no
salaries or wages, their days’ earnings being the excess over the
P7.50 that they paid for the use of the jeepneys, and the respond-
ent’s supervision over the drivers consisted only in inspection of
580 LEASE Art. 1644
the jeepneys when they passed his gasoline station for water, and
checking the route prescribed by the Public Service Commission
(now Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board), the
Supreme Court held:
“The only features that would make the relationship of
lessor and lessee between the respondent, owner of the jeeps,
and the drivers, members of the petitioner union, are the fact
that he does not pay them any fixed wage but their compen-
sation is the excess of the total amount of fares earned or col-
lected by them over and above the amount of P7.50 which
they agreed to pay to the respondent, and the fact that the
gasoline burned by the jeeps is for the account of the drivers.
These two features are not, however, sufficient to withdraw
the relationship between them from that of employer-em-
ployee, because the estimate earnings for fares must be over
and above the amount they agreed to pay to the respondent
for a ten-hour shift or ten-hour a day operation of the jeeps.
Not having any interest in the business because they did not
invest anything in the acquisition of the jeeps and did not par-
ticipate in the management thereof, their service as drivers of
the jeeps being their only contribution to the business, the re-
lationship of lessor and lessee cannot be sustained.’’ (National
Labor Union vs. Dinglasan, 98 Phil. 64 [1955].)
ART. 1644. In the lease of work or service, one of

the parties binds himself to execute a piece of work
or to render to the other some service for a price cer-
tain, but the relation of principal and agent does not
exist between them. (1544a)
Lease of work or service.

In a lease of work, the object is the execution of a piece work
for an employer by an independent contractor (Art. 1713.), while
in a lease of service, it is the performance of some service or an
employer by a househelper (Art. 1689.) or laborer (Art. 1700.) or
for a passenger or owner of goods by a common carrier. (Art.
1732.)
In both kinds of lease, the employer or passenger or owner of

goods binds himself to pay some renumeration or compensation
in favor of the independent contractor, employee, or common
carrier and the relation of principal and agent does not exist be-
tween the parties.
Lease of work or service distinguished

from agency.
By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some
service or to do something in representation or on behalf of an-
other, with the consent or authority of the latter. (Art. 1868.)
(1) In the first, the basis is employment, while in the second,
it is representation (Ibid.);
(2) In the first, the lessor performs a material act for the ben-
efit of his employer without representation of the latter (Art.
1644.), while in the second, the agent executes a juridical act for
and in behalf of his principal (Art. 1868.);
(3) In the first, the work or service must be for a price or com-
pensation, while in the second, it is presumed for a compensa-
tion (Art. 1875.);
(4) In the first, the will of both parties is necessary for the ex-
tinguishment of the relationship (Art. 1159.), while in the second,
the will of one is sufficient (Arts. 1919[1, 2], 1920, 1928.);
(5) In the first, only two persons are involved: the lessor and
the lessee, while in the second, three persons: the principal, the
agent, and the third person with whom the agent has contracted;
(6) In the lease of work, the risk of loss before delivery is borne
by the independent contractor, especially in the lease of work for
a fixed price (Arts. 1717, 1718.), while in the second, the risk is
borne by the principal since the agent acts merely as his repre-
sentative;
(7) In the lease of work, the independent contractor is person-
ally liable for his contracts with third persons, while the agent is
not, unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his
authority (Art. 1897.); and
582 LEASE Art. 1644
(8) In the lease of service, the lessor (like a servant or laborer)

ordinarily performs only ministerial duties, while in the second,
the agent exercises discretionary powers. (Arts. 1876, 1877, 1881,
1882, 1884, 1887, 1888.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Respondent corporation claims that the management contract it
entered into with petitioner corporation is a contract of agency such
that it has the right to revoke and terminate the said contract, as it did
terminate the same.
Facts: Nielson was hired by Lepanto to manage and oper-
ate the mining properties of the latter.
“Under the contract, Nielson had agreed, for a period of
five years, with the right to renew for a like period, to explore,
develop and operate the mining claims of Lepanto, and to mine,
or mine and mill, such pay ore as may be found therein and to
market the metallic products recovered therefrom which may
prove to be marketable, as well as to render for Lepanto other
services specified in the contract.
Nielson was to take complete charge, subject at all times to
the general control of the Board of Directors of Lepanto, of the
exploration and development of the mining claims, of the hir-
ing of a sufficient and competent staff and of sufficient and ca-
pable laborers, of the prospecting and development of the mine,
of the erection and operation of the mill, and of the beneficiation
and marketing of the minerals found on the mining properties;
and in carrying out said obligation, Nielson should proceed
diligently and in accordance with the best mining practice. In
connection with its work, Nielson was to submit reports, maps,
plans and recommendations with respect to the operation and
development of the mining properties, make recommendations
and plans on the erection or enlargement of any existing mill,
dispatch mining engineers and technicians to the mining prop-
erties as from time to time may reasonably be required to in-
vestigate and make recommendations without cost or expense
to Lepanto. Nielson was also to ‘act as purchasing agent of sup-
plies, equipment and other necessary purchases by Lepanto,
provided, however, that no purchase shall be made without
the prior approval of Lepanto; and provided further, that no
commission shall be claimed or retained by Nielson on such
purchase’; and ‘to submit all requisition for supplies, all con-
tracts and arrangement with engineers, and staff and all mat-
ters requiring the expenditures of money, present or future, for
prior approval by Lepanto; and also to make contracts subject
to the prior approval of Lepanto for the sale and marketing of
the minerals mined from said properties, when said products
are in a suitable condition for marketing.’’
Lepanto contends that the management contract in ques-
tion as one of agency because: (1) Nielson was to manage and
operate the mining properties and mill on behalf, and for the
account of Lepanto; and (2) Nielson was authorized to repre-
sent Lepanto in entering, on Lepanto’s behalf, into contracts
for the hiring of laborers, purchase of supplies, and the sale
and marketing of the ores mined. All these Lepanto claims show
that Nielson was, by the terms of the contract, destined to ex-
ecute juridical acts not on its own behalf but on behalf of
Lepanto under the control of the Board of Directors of Lepanto
“at all times.’’ Hence, claims that the contract is one of agency:
Lepanto then maintains that an agency is revocable at the will
of the principal regardless of any term or period stipulated in
the contract, and it was in pursuance of that right that Lepanto
terminated the contract in 1945 when it took over and assumed
exclusive management of the work previously entrusted to
Nielson under the contract. Lepanto finally maintains that
Nielson as an agent is not entitled to damages since the law
gives to the principal the right to terminate the agency at will.
Issue: Is the management contract, a contract of agency or a
contract of lease?
(1) Distinctions between agency and lease of services. — “In
both agency and lease of services one of the parties binds him-
self to render some service to the other party. Agency, however,
is distinguished from lease of work or services in that the basis
of agency is representation, while in the lease of work or serv-
ices the basis is employment. The lessor of services does not
represent his employer, while the agent represents his princi-
pal. x x x.
There is another obvious distinction between agency and
lease of services. Agency is a preparatory contract, as agency
‘does not stop with the agency because the purpose is to enter
into other contracts.’ The most characteristic feature of an
agency relationship is the agent’s power to bring about busi-
584 LEASE Art. 1644
ness relations between his principal and third persons. ‘The

agent is destined to execute juridical acts (creation, modifica-
tion or extinction of relations with third parties). Lease of serv-
ices contemplate only material (non-juridical) acts.’’’
(2) Principal and paramount undertaking of Nielson. — “In
the light of the interpretations we have mentioned in the fore-
going paragraphs, let us now determine the nature of the man-
agement contract in question. x x x.
It thus appears that the principal and paramount under-
taking of Nielson under the management contract was the op-
eration and development of the mine and the operation of the
mill. All the other undertakings mentioned in the contract are
necessary or incidental to the principal undertaking — these
other undertakings being dependent upon the work on the de-
velopment of the mine and the operation of the mill. In the per-
formance of this principal undertaking Nielson was not in any
way executing juridical acts for Lepanto, destined to create,
modify or extinguish business relations between Lepanto and
third persons. In other words, in performing its principal un-
dertaking Nielson was not acting as an agent of Lepanto, in the
sense that the term agent is interpreted under the law of agency,
but as one who was performing material acts for an employer,
for a compensation.
It is true that the management contract provides that
Nielson would also act as purchasing agent of supplies and
enter into contracts regarding the sale of mineral, but the con-
tract also provides that Nielson could not make any purchase,
or sell the minerals, without the prior approval of Lepanto. It is
clear, therefore, that even in these cases Nielson could not ex-
ecute juridical acts which would bind Lepanto without first
securing the approval of Lepanto. Nielson, then, was to act only
as an intermediary, not as an agent.’’
(3) Contract not terminable at will. — “Lepanto contends that
the management contract in question being one of agency it
had the right to terminate the contract at will pursuant to the
provision of Article 1733 of the old Civil Code. We find, how-
ever, a proviso in the management contract which militates
against this stand of Lepanto. Paragraph XI of the contract pro-
vides:
‘Both parties to this agreement fully recognize that the
terms of this Agreement are made possible only because of
the faith or confidence that the Officials of each company

have in the other; therefore, in order to assure that such
confidence and faith shall abide and continue, Nielson
agrees that Lepanto may cancel this Agreement at any time
upon ninety (90) days written notice, in the event that
Nielson for any reason whatsoever, except acts of God,
strike and other causes beyond its control, shall cease to
prosecute the operation and development of the proper-
ties herein described in good faith and in accordance with
approved mining practice.’
It is thus seen, from the above-quoted provision of para-
graph XI of the management contract, that Lepanto could not
terminate the agreement at will. Lepanto could terminate or
cancel the agreement by giving notice of termination ninety days
in advance only in the event that Nielson should prosecute in
bad faith and not in accordance with approved mining prac-
tice the operation and development of the mining properties of
Lepanto. Lepanto could not terminate the agreement if Nielson
should cease to prosecute the operation and development of
the mining properties by reason of acts of God, strike and other
causes beyond the control of Nielson.’’
(4) Cause for revocation of contract. — “There is no
showing that Nielson had ceased to prosecute the operation
and development of the mines in good faith and in
accordance with approved mining practice which would
warrant the termination of the contract upon ninety days
written notice. In fact there was no such written notice of
termination. It is an admitted fact that Nielson ceased to
operate and develop the mines because of the war — a cause
beyond the control of Nielson.
Indeed, if the management contract in question was in-
tended to create a relationship of principal and agent between
Lepanto and Nielson, paragraph XI of the contract should not
have been inserted because as provided in Article 1733 [now
Art. 1920], agency is essentially revocable at the will of the prin-
cipal — that means with or without cause. But precisely said
paragraph XI was inserted in the management contract to pro-
vide for the cause of revocation. The provision of paragraph XI
must be given effect.’’ (Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Con-
solidated Mining Company, 26 SCRA 540 [1968].)
586 LEASE Art. 1644
Lease of work or service distinguished

from partnership.
By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind them-
selves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common
fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
(Art. 1767.)
(1) In the first, there is no principle of representation, while
in the second, every partner is an agent of the partnership for the
purpose of its business (Art. 1818.);
(2) In the first, the lessor performs a material act for the ben-
efit of the employer, while in the second, the partners enter into
commercial or business transactions for the realization of profits
(Art. 1767.);
(3) In the first, only two persons are involved, while in the
second, a juridical personality (partnership) separate and distinct
from that of each of the partner is formed (Art. 1768.);
(4) In the first, the work or service is dependent upon the ends
or purposes of the lessee, while in the second, the partners per-
form acts conducive to their own business purposes (Art. 1767.);
(5) In the first, the work or service must be for a price or com-
pensation, in the second, the partners share in the profits or losses
(Art. 1797.);
(6) In the first, the will of both parties is necessary for the ex-
tinguishment of the relationship (Art. 1159.), while in the second,
the will of any partner is sufficient (Art. 1830[1, a], [2].);
(7) In the lease of work, the independent contractor is person-
ally liable for his contracts with third persons, while a partner is
generally not (Arts. 1816, 1818.); and
(8) In the lease of service, the lessor (like a servant) ordinar-
ily performs only ministerial duties while in the second, every
partner as an agent of the partnership, exercises discretionary
powers. (Ibid.)
Compensation in lease of work or service.

(1) Where there is an agreement. — The lessee must be com-
pelled to pay the agreed price unless it is found to be iniquitous
or unreasonable in which case the courts may fix a reasonable and

just remuneration. Where the compensation is renounced or
waived after the service has been rendered, there is still a lease of
service although it has become gratuitous. (Arroyo vs. Hospital
de San Pedro, 81 Phil. 333 [1948].)
(2) Where the agreement may be implied. — On principle one who
performs work or service in favor of another who impliedly con-
sents thereto and who benefits thereby, is entitled to compensa-
tion by virtue of an innominate contract (Art. 1307.) of facio ut des
(I give that you may do) or of the case of services tacitly contracted
in which case the courts will fix the reasonable worth of the serv-
ices rendered. (Arroyo vs. Azur, 76 Phil. 493 [1946].) No one should
be enriched by the work of another unless the services are ex-
pressly stated to be gratuitous. (Reguera vs. Tanodra, 81 Phil. 404
[1948]; Arroyo vs. Hospital de San Pablo, supra.)
(a) The tacit agreement of both parties with respect to the
services of interpreter rendered by the plaintiff to the defend-
ant and reciprocal benefits accruing to each, are the best evi-
dence that there was an implied contract sufficient to be bind-
ing. Article 1644 is applicable. (Perez vs. Pomar, 2 Phil. 682
[1903].)
(b) When a vessel has been disabled by the breaking of
its shaft at sea and hoists signals for aid, and another vessel
goes to its relief and takes it in tow, such service is one of sal-
vage and not merely towage, and must be remunerated. (G.
Urrutia & Co. vs. Pasig Steamer and Lighter Co., 22 Phil. 33
[1912].)
(3) Where no rate or amount is fixed in the contract. — Although
no exact amount may have been expressly determined by the par-
ties as the consideration for the contract of hiring, the contract is
nevertheless valid if the amount can be ascertained in the light of
the customs and usages of the place, or by findings of fact on the
basis of evidence submitted in case of disagreement. (Perez vs.
Pomar, supra.; Herrera vs. Cruz, 7 Phil. 275 [1906]; Reguera vs.
Tanodra, supra.) A price certain exists when the same can be ascer-
tained according to the customs and usages of the place. (Arroyo
vs. Azur, supra.)
588 LEASE Art. 1644
(a) When no rate has been fixed in a contract of hire of

services, such as those rendered by a physician to a sick per-
son, the court, in case of disagreement, shall determine a rea-
sonable and equitable compensation according to usages and
customs of the place and the evidence in the case, with or
without the testimony of experts. (Imperial vs. Alejandre, 14
Phil. 203 [1909].)
(b) With respect to the value of the services rendered on
different occasions, the most important of which was the first,
as it does not appear that any salary was fixed upon by the
parties at the time the services were accepted, it devolves upon
the court to determine, upon the evidence presented, the value
of such services, taking into consideration the few occasions
on which they were rendered. The fact that no fixed or deter-
mined consideration for the rendition of the services was
agreed upon does not necessarily involve a violation of the
provisions of Article 1644, because at the time of the agree-
ment this consideration was capable of being made certain.
(Perez vs. Pomar, supra.)
(c) In a case, where it was stipulated that the plaintiff
would be liberally compensated by “providing for the main-
tenance of herself, her husband, and their child during all the
time that the services of the plaintiff were required’’ as wet
nurse and governess of defendant’s infant daughter, the fact
that the exact amount to be paid for the hired services is not
precisely fixed is no bar to an action to recover provided that
the contract by its terms, furnishes a basis or measure of as-
certaining the amount agreed upon.
In this case, the contracting parties fixed the maintenance of
the plaintiff and her family as the price for the services required
for her. Said maintenance is the specific and determinate thing
that in its turn fixes the price, inasmuch as its cost determines the
price according to the agreement of the parties to the contract.
There might be a question as to the actual cost of the plaintiff’s
maintenance, but this is a matter of fact which in such a case would
have to be proven. Be it as it may, whatever might be the cost of
said subsistence, it would constitute the price for the services ren-
dered by the plaintiff. (Majarabas vs. Leonardo, 11 Phil. 272

[1908].)
ART. 1645. Consumable goods cannot be the sub-

ject matter of a contract of lease, except when they
are merely to be exhibited or when they are acces-
sory to an industrial establishment. (1545a)
Lease of consumable goods.

Under the old Civil Code (Art. 1545 thereof.), “fungible6 things
which are consumed by use cannot be the subject matter of lease.’’
The rule is the same under Article 1645 with the qualification now
that consumable goods may be the object of lease when they are
merely to be exhibited or when they are accessory to an industrial
establishment.
The essence of a lease of things is the enjoyment or use of the
property (Art. 1643.) with the obligation on the part of the lessee
to return the same upon the expiration of the lease. (Art. 1665.)
Ownership is not transfered to the lessee. Hence, things which
by their nature cannot be used without being consumed, cannot
be the subject matter of lease.
— oOo —
6
See comments under Article 1464, Part I.
590 LEASE
Chapter 2
LEASE OF RURAL AND URBAN LANDS
SECTION 1. — General Provisions
ART. 1646. The persons disqualified to buy referred

to in Articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to
become lessees of the things mentioned therein. (n)
Rural lands distinguished from urban lands.

The law has avoided, without doubt deliberately, any defini-
tion on this point as it is not easy to fix, with such exactitude as to
furnish a sure guide for all cases, the line that separates the rural
from the urban.
The focal or determining factor is generally the location of the
property. The word “rural’’ has been defined as relating to, or
associated with, or typical of, the country, the word being derived
from the Latin word “ruralis’’ meaning country. It pertains to a
country as distinguished from a city or town. However, it is the
legal definition of the word with which we are concerned. Thus,
a construction of the word “rural’’ that is an consonance with the
legislative purpose must be followed.
Having in view the legislative objective, the word “rural’’ has
been defined as relating to or constituting tenement in land
adopted and used for agricultural or pastoral purposes. It is one
which, regardless of site, is principally used for the purpose of
obtaining products from the soil as opposed to urban lands, which
are principally for the purpose of residence. (Fabia vs. Interme-
diate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 364 [1984], citing 3 Castan 124.)
590
Art. 1646 LEASE OF RURAL AND URBAN LANDS 591
General Provisions
Persons disqualified to become lessees.

Article 1646 provides that persons disqualified to buy in ac-
cordance with Articles 1490 and 1491 are likewise disqualified to
lease the thing therein mentioned.
Article 1490 refers to the relative incapacity of husband and
wife to sell property to each other, while Article 1491, to the inca-
pacity of the persons enumerated therein who, by the special re-
lations they have with the property under their charge or pecu-
liar control, are prohibited from purchasing said property.1 The
prohibition is adopted in Article 1646 because of the similarity
between the contract of lease and that of sale.
Lease of real property by aliens.

Foreigners are prohibited by the Constitution, except only in
cases of hereditary succession, to acquire lands in the Philippines.
(Secs. 7, 2, par. 1, Art. XII, Constitution.) Nevertheless, they can
lease real or immovable property in the Philippines.
It is true that there is a similarity between the one and the other
but it is only apparent, superficial. The lessee has apparently the
same rights as the owner; but between the one and the other, there
exists an important, substantial difference as regards ownership.
The lessor does not have the possession of the thing but he pre-
serves the title, the ownership. The lessee enjoys the use of the
immovable, nothing, more; he does not exercise any proprietary
right. The foreigner who buys a land becomes the owner, exer-
cises ownership over the same; but a lessee does not obtain more
than the possession or use of the land; there is no danger that a
lessee be converted into an owner of the land; the ownership is
preserved in the lessor. (Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Register of
Deeds, 96 Phil. 53 [1953].) Since the residence of aliens in the
Philipines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights
such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitu-
tion. (Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 [1947].)
The parties, however, will not be permitted to resort to another
transaction for the purpose of disguising the transfer in violation
1
See comments under said articles in Part I.
592 LEASE Art. 1647
of the Constitution. Accordingly, it has been held that a contract

whereby an alien is given not only a lease but also an option to
buy a parcel of land by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot
sell or otherwise dispose of her property, this to last for 50 years,
is a virtual transfer of ownership and circumvents the constitu-
tional ban against alien landholding. (Philippine Banking Corpo-
ration vs. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 [1967]; which qualifies the ruling
laid down in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827 [1953], and
subsequent similar cases.) Incidentally, under Presidential Decree
No. 471, the maximum period allowable for the duration of leases
of private lands to aliens or alien-owned entities not qualified to
acquire private lands under the Constitution is 25 years, renew-
able for another period of 25 years upon mutual agreement of both
lessor and lessee.
ART. 1647. If a lease is to be recorded in the Reg-

istry of Property, the following persons cannot con-
stitute the same without proper authority: the husband
with respect to the wife’s paraphernal real estate, the
father or guardian as to the property of the minor or
ward, and the manager without special power. (1548a)
Proper authority required if leased to be recorded

in Registry of Property.
If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property, the per-
sons mentioned in Article 1647 cannot constitute the same with-
out proper authority (i.e., power of attorney) to constitute the
same. Under the old Civil Code (Art. 1548 thereof.), said persons
could not lease for a term of more than six (6) years without a
special power of attorney for the purpose because such a lease
was considered an act of strict ownership and not a mere act of
administration.
Article 1647 does not specify the term of the lease. Every lease
of real estate may be recorded, and if recorded, creates a real right
binding upon third persons. (Arts. 1648, 1676.) The registration
of the lease is, therefore, an act of strict ownership; hence, a spe-
cial power of attorney is necessary. But if the lease is not to be
General Provisions
recorded, the lease entered into by said persons is valid even with-
out a special power.
Under Article 1878(8), a special power of attorney is neces-
sary “to lease any real property to another person for more than
one year.’’ This requirement is imposed whether or not the lease
will be recorded. In the absence of a special power, a lease for than
one (1) year executed by the persons mentioned in Article 1647 is
valid only for one (1) year but void as to the excess.
The word “administrator’’ in the old Civil Code is changed
to “manager’’ in Article 1647. Said word has been held to apply
to an administrator of conjugal property (Rodriguez vs. Borromeo,
43 Phil. 479 [1925].), property owned in common (Melencio vs.
Dy Tiao Lay, 55 Phil. 91 [1930].), property of a decedent (Jocson
vs. Nava, 69 Phil. 1 [1939]; Ferraris vs. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 [1938].),
and patrimonial or private property of the State. (Tipton vs.
Andueza, 5 Phil. 477 [1905].)
ART. 1648. Every lease of real estate may be re-

corded in the Registry of Property. Unless a lease is
recorded, it shall not be binding upon third persons.
(1549a)
Effect of registration of lease

of real estate.
(1) As against third persons. — A lease contract is valid and
binding between the parties, their privies, and their heirs (Art.
1311.), unless it be an oral lease for a longer period than one (1)
year in which case it cannot be enforced by action for non-com-
pliance with the statute of frauds. (Art. 1403[2, e].) To affect or bind
third persons, a lease of real property should be registered in the
Registry of Property. Unless so recorded, an innocent purchaser
for value is not bound to respect the existing lease and he may
terminate the same. (Art. 1676.) A contract of lease of land must
be in a public instrument so that it may be recorded.
According to the Code Commission, Article 1648 “is intended
to protect the lessee, who cannot be ousted by the buyer if the lease
594 LEASE Art. 1648
is recorded. The right of the buyer to terminate the lease should

be curbed as much as possible because it is unjust to the lessee,
and practically sanctions a violation of the contract of lease by the
lessor.’’ (Report, p. 142.)
The lessor may be compelled by the court to deliver to the
lessee the certificate of title over the property leased so that the
lease may be annotated therein. (Domestic Savings and Loan Assn.
vs. Villafenia-Caguioa, 115 SCRA 803 [1982].)
(2) As between the parties. — Lease is a mere personal right. Its
inscription in the Registry of Property to bind third persons does
not in any way alter or modify the rights and obligations of the
parties under the contract which has a life of its own independ-
ent of the registration. Thus, where the instrument registered is
invalid or legally defective, registration will not render it valid
or cure its defect. Lease partakes of the nature of a real right when
it is recorded on the title of the lessor (regardless of duration) only
in the sense that it is binding even as against third persons with-
out actual notice of the transaction.
Leases of personal property.

Article 1648 applies only to lease of real estate; hence, leases
of personal or movable property cannot be registered.
Under Article 1625 (Part I.), an assignment of a credit, right,
or action shall affect third persons if the assignment appear in a
public instrument. By analogy with said rule, leases of personal
property shall be binding on third persons if they appear in a
public instrument.
Effect of actual notice of unregistered lease

by purchaser.
As a rule, where the contract of lease entered into by the les-
see with the former owner was not recorded, said contract can-
not bind a purchaser of the property.
(1) Where a purchaser of land at the time of the purchase has
full knowledge of the fact that the land has been leased to a third
person and is informed of the terms of such lease, he is bound to
General Provisions
respect said lease, although it is not entered upon the certificate

of title. The lease, in effect, became a part of the contract of sale.
(Gustillo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442 [1925].)
(2) Where the plaintiff (lessee) was in open possession of the
land at the time the condemnation proceedings were instituted
and that long before the railroad company bought the land from
the Archbishop of Manila, the plaintiff presented his claim in the
condemnation proceedings asking that he be allowed to intervene
therein, but that his motion for intervention was resisted by the
railroad company and, therefore, denied by the court, the railroad
company cannot be regarded as a third party within the meaning
of Article 1648 of the Civil Code and Article 34 of the Mortgage
Law. (Sayo vs. Manila Railroad Co., 43 Phil. 551 [1922].)
(3) Where at the time of the execution of the contract of lease
the plaintiff knew that the defendant was in possession of the land,
but was told by the landlords that defendant’s lease would ex-
pire before the beginning of term of the plaintiff’s lease, by virtue
of its registration, the plaintiff’s lease held priority over the de-
fendant’s unregistered lease and the plaintiff’s knowledge of the
fact that the defendant was in possession of the land was not suf-
ficient to charge him with notice of the duration of the term of
the defendant’s lease, but that he had a right to rely on the certifi-
cate of title and was not bound to make further inquiries.
(Quimson vs. Suarez, 45 Phil. 901 [1924].) Here, the plaintiff be-
lieved in good faith the representation of the landlords, which was
not true. His information was that the lease had expired. He was
considered an innocent third person.
ART. 1649. The lessee cannot assign the lease with-

out the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipu-
lation to the contrary. (n)
Assignment of lease by lessee.

In an assignment of lease, the personality of the lessee
(assignor/debtor) disappears. The lessee makes an absolute trans-
fer of his lease, involving not only his rights but also obligations
as such lessee and thus, dissociates himself from the original con-
596 LEASE Art. 1650
tract of lease. There arises the new juridical relation between the
lessor and the assignee who is converted into a new lessee. There
is, in effect, a novation by substituting the person of the debtor
(Art. 1291[2].) and novation cannot take place without the con-
sent of the creditor. (Art. 1293.) Hence, the lessee cannot assign
the lease without the consent of the lessor (creditor), unless there
is a stipulation granting him that right. (Manlapat vs. Salazar, 98
Phil. 356 [1956]; Sy Juco vs. Montemayor, 52 Phil. 73 [1928]; Vda.
De Hijos de Barretto vs. Sevilla, Inc., 62 Phil. 593 [1935]; Tamio
vs. Ticson, 443 SCRA 4 [2004].)
The objective of the prohibition is to protect the lessor or owner
of the leased properly. (Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877
[1983].) An assignment of lease without the consent of the lessor
is a ground for rescission of the lease. (Caco vs. Court of Appeals,
80 SCRA 699 [1977].)
What is contemplated by Article 1649 is a transfer whereby
the original lessee is released from his obligations under the con-
tract. In other words, there must be transfer of the contract itself,
not merely of the rights of the lessee. Where the assignee of the
lessee did not assume the liabilities and obligations of the lessee
under an express stipulation that the assignment “does not carry
with it any of the liabilities and obligations’’ of the lessee-assignor,
the assignee cannot be held liable for the rentals unpaid by the
lessee-assignor. Here, the lessor’s consent is not required and he
has no right of action against the assignee. (Rohde Shotwell vs.
Manila Motor Co., Inc., 100 Phil. 655 [1956].)
ART. 1650. When in the contract of lease of things

there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sub-
let the thing leased, in whole or in part, without preju-
dice to his responsibility for the performance of the
contract toward the lessor. (1550)
Sublease by lessee of thing leased.

(1) Unlike in assignment of a lease, a lessee may sublease the
property in the absence of express prohibition. (Filoil Refinery
Corp. vs. Mendoza, 150 SCRA 632 [1987].) A violation of the prohi-
General Provisions
bition entitles the lessor to rescission of the contract and indem-

nification for damages or only the latter allowing the contract to
remain in force. (see Art. 1659.) That the sublessee is financially
solvent is not a defense. If the prohibition is merely implied, a
sublease is still allowed. The contract of lease must expressly stipu-
late the prohibition on subletting.
(2) In sublease, the lessee remains a party to the contract. The
personality of the lessee does not disappear. There are two leases
and two distinct juridical relations: between the lessor and the
lessee, and between the sublessor (lessee) and the sublessee, al-
though intimately related to each other. The sublessee generally
does not have any direct action against the lessor to require com-
pliance with his or lessee’s obligations, or vice versa. The subles-
sor is the one directly liable to the sublessee whose damages are
included in whatever damages the former may recover from the
lessor. (A. Maluenda & Co. vs. Enriquez, 46 Phil. 916 [1924]; Ortiz
vs. Balgos, 54 Phil. 171 [1929]; Manlapat vs. Salazar, 98 Phil. 356
[1955]; Marumperio Cia Naviera vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA
368 [1987].)
(3) The sublease of a leased property cannot affect the efficacy
of the contract of lease which subsists with all its legal consequences
notwithstanding said sublease. (Celis vs. De Vera, [C.A.] 39 O.G. 652.)
By express provision of Article 1650, the lessee is still responsible
for the performance of his obligations toward the lessor.
(4) A judgment of eviction against the lessee affects the sub-
lessee even if the latter is not sued in the ejectment case. This is so
because the sublessee can invoke no right superior to that of the
sublessor from which his own right is derived, and the moment
the sublessor is duly ousted from the premises, the sublessee has
no leg to stand on. His possession is entirely dependent on the
lessee. His right, if any, is to demand reparation for damages from
his sublessor, should the latter be at fault. (Ng Sui Tian vs. Amparo,
80 Phil. 921 [1948]; Go King vs. Geronimo, 81 Phil. 445 [1948]; Sipin
vs. Court of First Instance, 74 Phil. 649 [1944]; De La Cruz vs.
Roxas, 75 Phil. 457 [1946]; Brodett vs. De La Rosa, 77 Phil. 752
[1947]; Gozon vs. De La Rosa, 77 Phil. 919 [1947].)
598 LEASE Art. 1650
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
The lessee, without the written consent of the lessors, accepted
boarders in their apartment, the latter alleging that the lessee vio-
lated the prohibition against subleasing any portion of the premises
without their written consent.
Facts: Respondents, spouses N and R Gopiao, leased to the
petitioner V. Malasarte an apartment on a month to month ba-
sis for a monthly rental of P300. The lease agreement prohib-
ited the subleasing or assignment of a portion of the leased
premises. The respondents, through their attorney-in-fact, made
an annual inspections of their apartment. They discovered that
two (2) rooms on the second floor and a portion of the living
and dining rooms had been converted into bed spaces for board-
ers. There were eight (8) bed spacers and boarders. One of the
boarders moved out of the apartment and petitioner’s daugh-
ter moved in on the same day.
Alleging that the petitioner had violated the lease contract,
the Gopiaos demanded that he vacate the premises. When he
did not comply, they filed a complaint for ejectment in the
barangay court. Eventually, the case reached the courts.
Petitioner alleged that the boarders were his nephew, nieces,
grandchildren or other relatives, who are students at the Far
Eastern University, and that the respondents filed the ejectment
suit because they had demanded an increase in his rent from
P300 to P600 per month which he refused to pay.
Issue: Did the petitioner violate the lease agreement by tak-
ing in of boarders?
Held: No. (1) Accepting boarders not equivalent to subleasing.
— “The taking in of boarders by the petitioner in the leased
premises, without the consent of the lessors, did not violate the
lease agreement, for a prohibition against subleasing may not
embrace the taking in of boarders. Accepting boarders is not
equivalent to subleasing the premises. The lessee, by accepting
boarders and assigning rooms or bed spaces for them in the
leased premises, does not relinquish or surrender his lease to
them. He did not cease to become the actual occupant and pos-
sessor of the demised premises. He did not surrender the pos-
session and control of the leased premises or a part thereof.
‘The word ‘sublet’ has a clear and distinct meaning, that is,
it means to make a sublease, accompanied by a surrender of
the possession and control of the premises, or at least a part

thereof.2 (51 C.J.S. 108.)’’
(2) Boarders merely provided with meals and lodging for a price.
— By accepting boarders in the apartment, the petitioner did
not sublease portions of the apartment to the boarders, but only
agreed to provide them with meals and/or lodging for a price.
To this effect are the following rulings:
‘Letting a room for personal occupation to a lodger does
not constitute a subletting’ (51C C.J.S., citing Pembrook vs.
Goldman, App., 176 So. 888).
‘Since a roomer or lodger is not a tenant in the strict
legal sense, it has generally been held that the taking in of
roomers or lodgers by a lessee does not constitute a viola-
tion of a covenant or provision against subletting. How-
ever, where the lease of one of the two houses of a double
brick dwelling contained a provision that there should be
no subletting of the leased premises, it was held that there
was a technical violation of the lease where the lessees
rented one of the rooms of such house to a person who was
not related to the lessees in any way, and who, in addition
to having a room and private bath, had breakfast with the
lessees, and who was certified by such lessees as a tenant
to the Price Administration.’ (49 Am. Jur. 2d Section 490,
pp. 476.)
‘A sublease is a grant by a tenant of an interest in the
demised premises less than his own, retaining to himself a
reversion, and a subtenant is a person who rents all or a
portion of leased premises from the lessee for a term less
than the original one, leaving a reversionary interest in the
first lessee.’ (49 Am. Jur. 2d Sec. 480, p. 469.)
‘A lessee’s common-law right to sublet may be ex-
pressly restricted by a covenant or stipulation against sub-
letting, but since such restriction are in restraint of aliena-
tion, they are not looked upon with favor by the courts;
they are construed with the utmost jealousy, and very easy
modes have always been countenanced for defeating them.’
(49 Am. Jur. 2d Sec. 485, pp. 472-473.)
2
Under Section 7(a) of the Rental Reform Act of 2002 (under Art. 1673.), sublease of
residential units include the acceptance of boarders or bedspacers.
600 LEASE Arts. 1651-1652
‘Permitting lodgers or boarders to occupy rooms in a

demised building is not a subletting.’ (White v. Maynard,
111 Mass 250, 15 Am. Rep. 28; 32 Am. Jur., pp. 331-332.)’’
(3) Lease contract has not been violated. — “Since neither the
law (BP Blg. 25, as amended.) nor his contract with the prop-
erty owner prohibits the petitioner from accepting roomers, bed
spacers, or boarders in the leased apartment, the lease has not
been violated. The lessors have no cause of action for the judi-
cial ejectment of petitioner-lessee.’’ (Malasarte vs. Court of Ap-
peals, 178 SCRA 310 [1989].)
ART. 1651. Without prejudice to his obligation to-

ward the sublessor, the sublessee is bound to the les-
sor for all acts which refer to the use and preserva-
tion of the thing leased in the manner stipulated be-
tween the lessor and the lessee. (1551)
Direct liability of sublessor to lessor.

The sublessee is not a party to the contract between the lessor
and the lessee; hence, under the general rule in contracts (Art.
1311.), the sublessee can only be held liable directly to the subles-
sor. Article 1651 provides an exception to the rule. The lessor may
bring an action directly against the sublessee if he does not use
and preserve the thing leased in accordance with the agreement
between the lessor and the lessee or with the nature of the prop-
erty. (see Art. 1657[2].) It is not necessary that the sublessor be
joined as a defendant. (Ortiz vs. Balgos, 54 Phil. 171 [1929].)
The duty of the sublessee insofar as the use and preservation
of the thing leased is concerned is without prejudice to his obli-
gation towards the sublessor.
ART. 1652. The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to

the lessor for any rent due from the lessee. However,
the sublessee shall not be responsible beyond the
amount of rent due from him, in accordance with the
terms of the sublease, at the time of the extra-judicial
demand by the lessor.
Payments of rent in advance by the sublessee shall

be deemed not to have been made, so far as the
lessor’s claim is concerned, unless said payments
were effected in virtue of the custom of the place.
(1552a)
Subsidiary liability of sublessee to lessor.

(1) Remedy to collect rents from the sublessee. — Although the
sublessee has assumed no direct obligation to answer for the rents
due from the lessee to the lessor, the law grants the lessor the right
to demand payment from the sublessee the rents which the sub-
lessor failed to pay the lessor. The evident purpose of the remedy
is to prevent a situation where the lessee collects rents from the
sublessee but does not pay his rents to the lessor.
Article 1652 does not annul the contractual relations between
the lessee and sublessee but simply helps the owner of the prop-
erty to collect the rentals on the same. The demand to pay rents
made by the lessor on the sublessee does not exempt the latter
from his obligation to pay the sublessor the rents which said sub-
lessee failed to pay the lessor. (Vera vs. Fisher, [C.A.] 51 O.G. 3476.)
(2) Amount of rent recoverable. — The liability of the sublessee
is limited to the amount of rent due from him to the sublessor
under the terms of the sublease at the time of the extrajudicial
demand by the lessor. Future rents cannot be recovered. Note that
the liability of the sublessee is subsidiary, i.e., he is liable to the
lessor only for rents the lessee failed to pay the lessor.
(3) Liability for rents paid in advance. — Articles 1651 and 1652
impose upon the sublessee certain obligations which imply the
grant of a direct action in favor of the lessor against the former.
Under the second paragraph of Article 1652, payments of rent in
advance by the sublessee shall be deemed not to have been made,
so far as the lessor’s claim is concerned, unless said payments were
effected in virtue of the custom of the place. The sublessee con-
tinues to be subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent unpaid
by the lessee. The rule is a precaution to avoid collusion between
the lessee and lessee. With the insolvency of the sublessee and the
supposed advance payment by the sublessee, the rights of the
602 LEASE Art. 1653
lessor might be rendered nugatory. (Celis vs. De Vera, [C.A.] 39

O.G. 652.)
ART. 1653. The provisions governing warranty,

contained in the Title on Sales, shall be applicable to
the contract of lease.
In the cases where the return of the price is
required, reduction shall be made in proportion to the
time during which the lessee enjoyed the thing. (1553)
Warranty of the lessor.

Article 1653 applies to leases the warranties in sales. (see Com-
ments under Arts. 1547, 1548, 1561, 1566, Part I.)
In a lease contract, the lessor likewise warrants that he has a
right to lease the thing, that the lessee shall enjoy the legal and
peaceful possession of the thing, and that the thing is fit for the
use for which it is intended and free from any hidden fault or
defect. (see Art. 1654.)
In case of eviction of the lessee, and the return of the rents paid
is required, a reduction shall be made taking into account the
period during, which the lessee enjoyed the thing. The lessee has
also the right to ask for the proportionate reduction of the rents
agreed upon where the area or number of the object of the lease
is less than that stated in the contract. (see Art. 1542, Part I.)
Lessor’s warranty distinct from his liability

for damages.
In connection with a lease, warranty is the obligation to re-
pair or correct any fault or defect existing when the lessee took
over the property leased, but when the law declares that the les-
sor must warrant the thing leased; it is not to be understood that
he must also indemnify the lessee. Liability for the warranty is
not equivalent to liability in damages, as the latter is an obliga-
tion distinct from the former.
The lessor’s obligation to warrant the thing leased, whether
or not he knew of the existence therein of defects that rendered it
unsuitable for the use for which the lessee intended it, is distinct
from his liability for damages, which only attaches when he knew
about such defects and failed to reveal them to the lessee or con-
cealed them, in which case fraud and bad faith may be presumed
on his part. (Yap Kim Chuan vs. Tiaoqui, 31 Phil. 433 [1915].)
In a lease of a cold storage plant for foodstuffs, the lessor is
understood as having warranted that the leased premises would
be free from rats. In this warranty, fraud or bad faith on the part
of the lessor is not a necessary element. A lessor of a cold storage
plant may be held liable for the deterioration of the foodstuffs
stored therein by the lessee because some foodstuffs were gnawed
by rodents. (United States Lines Company vs. San Miguel Brew-
ery, Inc., 10 SCRA 805 [1964].)
— oOo —
604 LEASE
SECTION 2. — Rights and Obligations

of the Lessor and the Lessee
ART. 1654. The lessor is obliged:

(1) To deliver the thing which is the object of the
contract in such a conditions as to render it fit for the
use intended;
(2) To make on the same during the lease all the
necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for the
use to which it has been devoted, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary;
(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and ad-
equate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration
of the contract. (1554a)
Obligations of the lessor.

Article 1654 enumerates the three (3) principal obligations of
the lessor. Another obligation of the lessor is that he cannot alter
the form of the thing leased. (Art. 1661.)
(1) Delivery of the property. — The thing leased must be deliv-
ered in order that the lessee may enjoy or use the same. Delivery,
may, of course, be actual or constructive. (see Art. 1496, Part I.)
(a) At the time of delivery, the thing must be in a condi-
tion fit for the use intended. The contract, however, may val-
idly provide that the thing, when delivered, shall be in the
same condition in which it might be at the time of the perfec-
tion of the contract. The parties may stipulate regarding the
fitness of the thing and the particular use to which it will be
devoted by the lessee.
604
Rights and Obligations of the Lessor and the Lessee
(b) When a lessee rents a building which turns out, how-

ever, to be occupied by another person, and the former can-
not obtain possession, his (the lessee’s) cause of action is
against the lessor for breach of contract in that the latter vio-
lated the obligation of delivering to him the peaceful posses-
sion of the leased premises. The lessee has no cause of action
against the possessor because he has no relation, contractual
or ex delicto, with the latter. (Republic vs. De Los Angeles, 41
SCRA 422 [1971].) A lessee who fails to take possession of the
leased premises on account of the presence of third persons
unwilling to vacate the premises because of some previous
act or transaction of the lessor, should institute the action
against the lessor based upon the latter’s failure to comply
his obligation to deliver the same. (Rivera vs. Halili, 9 SCRA
59 [1963].)
(2) Making of necessary repairs. — Article 1654 speaks of neces-
sary repairs to keep the thing leased suitable for the use to which
it has been devoted unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
In default of a special stipulation, the custom of the place shall be
observed as to the kind of repairs. (Art. 1686.) If the lessor fails in
the performance of this duty, the lessee may suspend the payment
of rent (Art. 1658.) or avail himself of the other remedies provided
in the law. The lessor is not liable for repairs for damages or dete-
rioration caused by the lessee himself.
(a) The lessee may agree to do the repairs and relieve the
lessor of the duty, as where the lessee is to pay only a very
moderate if not nominal, rent. (Gonzales vs. Mateo, 74 Phil.
573 [1944].)
(b) The word “repairs’’ implies the putting back of some-
thing in the condition in which it was originally, while an “im-
provement’’ is the adding of something new thereto; hence,
the filling of a vacant lot is not a repair (Albano vs. Villanueva,
7 Phil. 277 [1906].) nor the construction of a house. (Valencia
vs. Ayala de Roxas, 13 Phil. 45 [1909].)
(c) The word “repairs,’’ in its ordinary acceptation, must
be understood to apply to the restoration of things after in-
jury or partial destruction, without complete loss of identity
in the thing repaired.
606 LEASE Art. 1654
The obligation to make repairs is very different from re-

construction in case of total loss. Thus, the lessor’s obligation
to make repairs does not extend to the obligation to recon-
struct a camarin which has been totally destroyed by fire. Re-
pairs mean the restoration of the camarin which had deterio-
rated from use or has been partially destroyed without total
loss of identity. (Lizares vs. Alunan, 40 Phil. 981 [1920].)
(d) When the lessor agrees to keep a building under lease
in a proper condition but fails to do so, and the lessee vacates
the building before the expiration of the lease, the lessor can-
not recover damages nor rent for the unexpired term. (Donato
vs. Lack, 20 Phil. 503 [1911].)
(e) There are no authorities to the effect that it is incum-
bent upon the owner to constantly inspect the premises and
that if he fails to do so or through error of judgment fails to
make repairs before the damage is material, the lessee has a
cause of action. As the lessee is in possession and if repairs
are necessary, which it is the duty of the owner to make, the
lessee should call upon the owner to make the necessary re-
pairs. If the owner then fails to perform his duty, action would
lie. (Gregorio Araneta, Inc. vs. Lyric Film Exchange, Inc., 58
Phil. 735 [1933].)
(f) Where the lessee’s goods got wet as a result of torren-
tial rain even though the roof of the building occupied by the
lessee was in good condition and there was no proof that the
lessor knew that it had cracks or defects, the lessor cannot be
held liable for damages in the absence of express agreement
to that effect. (Yap Kim Chuan vs. Tiaoqui, 31 Phil. 433 [1915].)
Note that while the lessor is not liable for damages due to a
fortuitous event or force majeure, he must make the repairs after
he has been advised by the lessee of the necessity thereof
within the shortest time possible.
(3) Keeping lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment. — The les-
sor’s obligation to maintain the lessee arises when acts termed
“legal trespass’’ disturb, dispute, or place difficulties in the les-
see’s peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises that
in some manner or other cast doubt upon the right of the lessor
to execute the lease. The lessor must answer for such legal tres-
pass. (Liwayway Publications, Inc. vs. Permanent Concrete Work-

ers Union, 108 SCRA 161 [1981].)
(a) The lessor who fails in the performance of his obliga-
tions shall be subject to indemnity for the losses and dam-
ages caused thereby. The true measure of damages for the
breach of such a contract is what the plaintiff has lost by the
breach. (De La Cruz vs. Seminary of Manila, 18 Phil. 330
[1911].)
(b) The warranty of the lessor is that the lessee shall not
be disturbed in his legal, not physical possession. (Bobol vs.
Torres, 84 SCRA 302 [1978]; Goldstein vs. Roces, 34 Phil. 562
[1916]; see Chua Tee Dee vs. Court of Appeals, 429 SCRA 418
[2004].) Hence, the lessor is not liable for physical trespass,
but is liable when his non-payment of the real estate tax re-
sults in the eviction of the lessee. (Heirs of Ormaechea vs. Cu
Chee Gan & Co., [C.A.] 36 O.G. 3527.) The lessor, however, is
not responsible for his lessee’s eviction through condemna-
tion proceedings for the reason that expropriation is involun-
tary. (Sayo vs. Manila Railroad Co., 43 Phil. 551 [1922].)
(c) It has been held that the act of the Japanese Armed
Forces in evicting the lessee from the leased premises consti-
tuted not merely an act of trespass (pertubacion de mero hecho)
but a trespass under a color of title (perturbacion de derecho)
chargeable to the lessor. The lessee’s obligation to pay rentals
ceased during such deprivation. (Vda. De Villareal vs. Ma-
nila Motor Co., 104 Phil. 926 [1958].)
(d) In a case where the agreement of the parties is for the
lease of an entire area and “the term of the lease shall be con-
sidered as extended for a period equal to that during which
the lessee was not in possession of the leased premises’’, the
failure of the lessee to use a portion of the leased premises
was held equivalent to a dispossession from the entire area in
question, for there was incomplete performance by the lessor
of its principal prestation, thereby calling for the application
of the contractual provision on extension of term. (Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Authority vs. Court of Appeals,
398 SCRA 703 [2003].)
608 LEASE Art. 1655
(e) The obligation of the lessor to maintain the lessee in

the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease persists only
for the duration of the contract. (Tagbilaran Integrated Sellers
Assoc. vs. Court of Appeals, 444 SCRA 193 [2004].)
ART. 1655. If the thing leased is totally destroyed

by a fortuitous event, the lease is extinguished. If the
destruction is partial, the lessee may choose between
a proportional reduction of the rent and a rescission
of the lease. (n)
Effect of destruction of thing leased

by fortuitous event.
(1) Destruction total. — In this case, the lease is extinguished,
because of the absence of the object of the contract. The lessee of
a room in a building which is subsequently destroyed cannot
consider himself a lessee of the land on which said building was
constructed and from which he is sought to be ousted, just be-
cause he was a lessee of one of the rooms of said buildings. His
lease came to an end when the building was destroyed, so that,
to make him lessee of the land thereafter, a new contract of lease
would have to be made. (Roces vs. Rickards, [C.A.] 45 O.G. [Supp.]
97.) Where the buildings and the land, which formed part of the
causa or consideration of the lease contract, constituted an indi-
visible unit, the destruction of the buildings extinguished the
obligation or terminated the lease contract. (Rohde Shotwell vs.
Manila Motors Co., Inc., 100 Phil. 655 [1957].)
(2) Destruction partial. — In this case, the lessee is given the
option to choose between a proportionate reduction of the rent
and rescission of the lease. Once the choice of the lessee has been
communicated to the lessor, the former cannot change it. (see Art.
1201.) If reduction of rent is chosen, the same shall be retroactive
to the date the partial destruction occurred. In case of rescission,
the general rule is that it will not be granted for slight or trivial
causes. The partial destruction, under the circumstances, should
be important or substantial as to defeat the purpose of the lessee
in entering into the contract of lease.
Arts. 1656-1657 LEASE OF RURAL AND URBAN LANDS 609
ART. 1656. The lessor of a business or industrial

establishment may continue engaging in the same
business or industry to which the lessee devotes the
thing leased, unless there is a stipulation to the con-
trary. (n)
Right of lessor to continue same business

or industry engaged in by lessee.
This provision permits the lessor of a business or industrial
establishment to continue engaging in the same business or in-
dustry to which the lessee has devoted the thing leased. A lease
is no warranty by the lessor to the lessee that the latter’s business
would be successful. Even if the lessee should suffer losses, he
would still be bound to fulfill the terms of the lease. (City of Naga
vs. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 153 [1954].)
Neither does a lease create a right in favor of the lessee to be
free from competition offered by the lessor or other persons. It is
submitted that the lessor may engage or continue to engage in
the same business of the lessee, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary.
ART. 1657. The lessee is obliged:

(1) To pay the price of the lease according to the
terms stipulated;
(2) To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a
family, devoting it to the use stipulated; and in the
absence of stipulation, to that which may be inferred
from the nature of the thing leased, according to the
custom of the place;
(3) To pay the expenses for the deed of lease.
(1555)
Obligations of the lessee.

Article 1657 enumerates the three (3) principal obligations of
the lessee. Another obligation of the lessee is to notify the lessor
of every usurpation or untoward act by any third person and of
the necessity of urgent repairs. (Art. 1663.)
610 LEASE Art. 1657
(1) Payment of agreed price of lease. — The obligation of the les-

see to pay the rent agreed upon arises only when the thing leased
has been delivered to the lessee for the purposes stipulated in the
contract. Thus, where the agreement to lease a vessel was never
consummated for the reason that the defendant did not accept
delivery of the same because it was not what it was represented
to him, the lessee was not liable for rent. (Sugar Estates vs. Iribar,
5 Phil. 316 [1905].)
(a) Only the lessor has the right to fix the rents. The court
cannot determine the rent and compel the lessor to conform
thereto and allow the lessee to enjoy the premises on the ba-
sis of the rents fixed by it. (Lim Si vs. Lim, 109 Phil. 251 [1960].)
It is error for the court to fix a monthly rental at an amount
which is lower than what the lessee is willing to pay for the
leased premises. (Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. Simon, 14 SCRA
855 [1965].)
(b) The lessor has not only the right to terminate the lease
upon the expiration of the term but also to increase the rent
in case of renewal. The lessee has to option to accept the new
rate or vacate the premises; otherwise, he will be considered
a possessor in bad faith of the property. (Bulahan vs. Tuason,
109 Phil. 251 [1960]; see De Leon Vda. de Roxas vs. Court of
Appeals, 63 SCRA 302 [1975].)
(c) Where the lessee was in continuous possession of the
leased building and lot during the pendency of the case, op-
erating its business therein and making profits thereby,
whereas the lessor was not only deprived of the possession
of his property but also of the rental therefor, said lessee must
be required to compensate the lessor for such occupancy un-
til it vacates the premises. (Camus vs. Price, Inc., 5 SCRA 581
[1962]; Price, Inc. vs. Rilloraza, 17 Phil. 957 [1955].) The lessee
is obliged to pay rentals during the pendency of the action
for rescission of the lease. (M & M Management Aids, Inc. vs.
(d) Where on few occasions the lessee paid late the rentals
due, but the delay was only for a few days, such breaches are
not so substantial and fundamental to warrant the rescission
of the lease. (Filoil Refinery Corp. vs. Mendoza, 150 SCRA 632
[1987].)
(e) The fact that the vendor-lessee has a right to repur-
chase the lots sold by him under a pacto de retro sale and leased
to him by the vendee, is no excuse for failure to pay rentals.
The sale and the lease are independent of each other. (Beech
vs. Jimenez, 12 Phil. 212 [1908].)
(f) The disagreement between a lessor and a lessee as to
the amount of rent to be paid cannot be decided in an action
of consignation (see Art. 1256.) but in that of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer that the lessor institutes when the les-
see refuses to pay the rents that the lessor has fixed for the
property. (Lim vs. Lim, supra.)
(g) The place for the payment of rental is governed by the
same rules regarding payment of obligations in general.1
(2) Proper use of the thing leased. — The lessee must exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family. He must devote the thing
to the use stipulated, and if none was stipulated, to that which
may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased according to
the custom of the place. The use of the thing for an illegal pur-
pose entitles the lessor to terminate the contract.
“When a thing by its nature is susceptible of various uses,
the lessee may use it for any of the purposes for which it may
be suitable. The lessee need limit himself to the use to which
the thing was devoted at the time of the lease. Thus, a lot may
at the time of the contract may have been used as a deposi-
tary for lumber; the lessee may use it as a motor compound
or even for purposes of constructions suitable to the place.
But when the lease is of a commercial establishment dedicated
to a particular business, such as a bakery or grocery, the les-
1
Art. 1251. Payment shall be made in the place designated in the obligation.
There being no express stipulation and if the undertaking is to deliver a determi-
nate thing, the payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the
obligation was constituted.
In any other case the place of payment shall be the domicile of the debtor.
If the debtor changes his domicile in bad faith or after he has incurred in delay, the
additional expenses shall be borne by him.
These provisions are without prejudice to venue under the Rules of Court. (1171a)
612 LEASE Art. 1658
see cannot change the purpose of such establishment.’’ (A.M.

Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code
of the Phils., 1992 Ed., Vol. V, p. 229.)
(3) Payment of expenses for deed of lease. — In sale, the expenses
for the execution and registration of the deed of sale shall be borne
by the vendor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. (Art.
1487.) In lease, the law imposes the obligation to pay expenses
for the deed of lease on the lessee. By agreement, the obligation
may be assumed by the lessor.
ART. 1658. The lessee may suspend the payment

of the rent in case the lessor fails to make the neces-
sary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and
adequate enjoyment of the property leased. (n)
Suspension of the payment of rent.

The provision mentions two (2) grounds which give the les-
see the right to suspend the payment of rent.
A similar rule in sales permit the vendee to suspend the pay-
ment of the price should he be disturbed in the possession or
ownership of the thing bought, by a vindicatory action or fore-
closure of mortgage. (Art. 1590.) In the case of sale, however, the
rule is justified for the vendee may lose the price he paid and the
thing bought. In lease, there is no risk that the lessee will lose both
his rental payment and his possession of the thing leased except
where the rentals have been paid in advance.
(1) In the case of repairs, the lessee may suspend payment
from the time demand is made upon the lessor and the latter fails
to perform his obligation.
(2) In the case of eviction, the lessee is released from the obli-
gation to pay rents from the time he is unlawfully dispossessed.
(Heirs of Ormachea vs. Cu Chee Gan & Co. [C.A.] 36 O.G. 3527.)
However, where the disturbance in the lessee’s possession is
caused by mere intruder who acted without any color of title or
right, the disturbance is a mere act of trespass for which the les-
sor is not liable. The lessee has a direct against the trespasser.
(Madamba vs. Araneta, 106 Phil. 103 [1958].)
If the cause for suspending payment has ceased to exist, the

lessee has no liability to pay the rents, for the intervening period
unless the lessor can prove that the suspension was not legally
justifiable.
ART. 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should not

comply with the obligations set forth in Articles 1654
and 1657, the aggrieved party may ask for the rescis-
sion of the contract and indemnification for damages,
or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in
force. (1556)
Alternative remedies of aggrieved party.

A lease contract imposes reciprocal obligations. Upon failure
of either the lessor or the lessee to comply with any of his obliga-
tions, the aggrieved or innocent party may elect to demand the
rescission of the contract or its fulfillment with damages in either
case.2
(1) Article 1659 follows the general rule in obligations con-
tained in Article 11913 with the difference that while the courts
are granted by said article the discretion to grant an obligor addi-
tional time for performance (par. 3 thereof.), under Article 1659,
there is no such discretion granted to courts. (Mina vs. Rodriguez,
[CA] 40 O.G. [Supp. 5] 65.)
(2) A violation of the lease contract entitles the aggrieved
party to demand indemnity for damages.
(a) An action which has for its object the recovery of dam-
ages is quite different from an action for ejectment which has
2
Art. 1192. In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation, the li-
ability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. If it cannot be
determined which of the parties first violated the contract, the same shall be deemed
extinguished, and each shall bear his own damages. (n)
3
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case
one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission,
even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing
the fixing of a period.
614 LEASE Art. 1659
for its object the recovery of the possession of the leased prop-
erty. (Yunti vs. Dy-Yco, Phil. 353 [1906].)
(b) As to the amount of damages recoverable by the les-
sor, it is the difference between the rental actually obtained
and that stipulated in the contract of lease. (Maluenda & Co.
vs. Enriquez, 46 Phil. 916 [1924].) The indemnity for damages
does not include rents for the future where the termination of
the lease abrogated liability for future rents. (Rios vs. Jacinto,
Palma y Hermanos, 49 Phil. 1 [1926].)
(c) Where the lessee fails to pay on time the stipulated
rents, the lessor has the right to rescind the contract, recover
the unpaid rents, and eject the lessee. (Hernaez vs.
Montelibano, 34 Phil. 954 [1916]; Avila vs. Veloso, 69 Phil. 357
[1939].)
Rescission of lease contract.

(1) In addition to the general remedy of rescission granted
under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, Article 1659 grants the rem-
edy of rescission for breach of any of the lessor’s or lessee’s statu-
tory obligation. Ordinarily, an obligee’s remedies upon breach of
an obligation are judicial in nature. This is implicit in the third
paragraph of Article 1191, and in Article 1659. In certain excep-
tional cases, the law recognizes the availability of extrajudicial
remedies, which exist in addition to the judicial remedies given
in the above provisions. (Chua vs. Victorio, 428 SCRA 447 [2005];
see Art. 1673.)
(a) Upon nonpayment of rent by the lessee, the lessor may
elect to treat the contract as rescinded and thereby determine
the right of the lessee to continue in possession; and his right
to recover possession may be enforced in an action for un-
lawful detainer. It is not necessary, in such situation, that an
independent action for the rescission of the lease should first
be instituted for the purpose of putting an end to the right of
the tenant to remain in possession under the lease (Pamintuan
vs. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 7 [1929].), unlike resolution of reciprocal
obligations under Article 1191. (Dio vs. Concepcion, 296 SCRA
579 [1998].)
(b) The lessor may rescind the lease for the lessee’s fail-
ure to pay the rentals. If the lessor does not accept the rentals,
the lessee’s remedy is tender of payment and consignation.
Rescission under Article 1659 is different from the automatic
rescission if the lessee failed to make the required deposit of
rentals. In making the deposit, the lessee prevents the auto-
matic cancellation of the lease but does not preclude the les-
sor from suing for rescission of the lease for the lessee’s fail-
ure to pay the stipulated rentals. (Pamintuan vs. Court of
Appeals, 42 SCRA 344 [1971].)
(c) A judgment rescinding a lease should order the lessee
to vacate and return the premises to the lessor. The court has
no discretion under Article 1659 to grant the lessee a longer
period for performance. The lessee should pay the accrued
rent. (Luna vs. Carandang, 26 SCRA 306 [1968].)
(d) A lessee cannot take advantage of his own wrong to
rescind the lease. He cannot refuse to pay rent and then de-
clare the lease rescinded. A stipulation allowing the lessor to
rescind the lease for nonpayment of rentals does not mean
that the lessee may refuse to pay the rentals and thereby pro-
duce the abrogation of the lease. (Hernaez vs. Montelibano,
34 Phil. 954 [1916].) Rescission is a remedy granted only to
the injured party and cannot be availed of by the wrongdoer.
If a person could rescind an obligation by the simple act of
refusing to fulfill it, then contracts would be a worthless thing
and if one may take advantage of his own wrong then there
is no inducement to do right. (Fernandez Hermanos vs. Pitt,
34 Phil. 549 [1916].)
(e) Where the lessor takes possession of the leased land
for nonpayment of rentals and the lessee voluntarily surren-
ders it, the lessor has no right to recover the rent accruing sub-
sequently. (Rios vs. Jacinto, Paloma y Hermanos, 49 Phil. 7
[1926].)
(f) A lessor may seek rescission of a lease contract and
ejectment of the lessee simultaneously in a single action for
unlawful detainer. (Dayao vs. Shell Company, 97 SCRA 407
[1980].)
616 LEASE Art. 1659
(2) An action to annul a lease and the grounds therefor pro-

vided by law, and an action for rescission thereof and the grounds
upon which the same may be based, should not be confused. Fail-
ure on the part of the lessor or lessee to comply with their con-
tract gives rise to an action to rescind the same and not one to
annul it. The allegation of non-performance of lessee’s obligation
to pay the rental agreed upon made in lessor’s complaint is obvi-
ously not a ground to annul the lease but to rescind it. (Vda. De
Santi vs. Alcid, [C.A.] 44 O.G. 130.)
(3) In an action for rescission of a contract of lease and indem-
nity for losses and damages, the withdrawal made by the lessor
of the amounts deposited with the Clerk of Court by the lessee
for rentals due, does not constitute a waiver of the right of action
for ejectment in which the complaint of said lessor is based and
with more reason when such withdrawal was made with the au-
thority of the court. (Veloso vs. Avila, [C.A.] 38 O.G. 3217.)
(4) Rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual
breach of the contract, but only for such breaches as are so sub-
stantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in
making the agreement. (Song & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co.,
47 Phil. 821 [1925]; Ang vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 286 [1989].)
The question of whether a breach is substantial depends upon the
attendant circumstances. (Delta Motor Corp. vs. Genuino, 170
SCRA 29 [1989].)
(a) Where the defendant leased a jukebox for a stipulated
period for 75% of the gross receipts per week, and once in a
while coins would be stuck but such sticking-up of the coins
was a normal occurrence, the defendant was held not justi-
fied in trying to return the jukebox and considering the con-
tract automatically rescinded, for in order that an action of
rescission to prosper, the breach must be substantial, not like
the stick-up in this case, which happened only occasionally.
(Philippine Amusement Enterprises, Inc. vs. Natividad, 21
SCRA 284 [1967].)
(b) Where time is not of the essence of the contract, a slight
delay on the part of the lessor or lessee in the performance of
his obligation is not a sufficient ground for the rescission of
the contract. Thus, it has been held that delay on four (4) oc-
casions in the payment of rentals for a few days did not con-
stitute substantial breaches in a contract of lease because the
law is not concerned with trifles. De minimis non curat lex.
(Filoil Refinery Corp. vs. Mendoza, 150 SCRA 632 [1987].)
(c) In another case, the lessee sent a letter on January 15,
1986 to the lessor manifesting his intent to exercise the option
to purchase the leased property subject of the option within
the lease period ending January 30, 1986 but requesting for a
six-month extension of the lease contract for the alleged pur-
pose of raising funds intended to purchase the property. The
request was denied by the lessor on February 14, 1986. By a
letter dated February 18, 1986, the lessee notified the lessor of
his desire to exercise the option formally. It was held that the
delay of 18 days was neither “substantial’’ nor “fundamen-
tal’’ and did not amount to breach that would defeat the in-
tention of the parties when they executed the lease contract
with option to purchase. (Carciller vs. Court of Appeals, 103
SCAD 258, 302 SCRA 718 [1999].)
ART. 1660. If a dwelling place or any other building

intended for human habitation is in such a condition
that its use brings imminent and serious danger to
life or health, the lessee may terminate the lease at
once by notifying the lessor, even if at the time the
contract was perfected the former knew of the dan-
gerous condition or waived the right to rescind the
lease on account of this condition. (n)
Dwelling place or building dangerous

to life or health.
Under Article 1660, the lessee may terminate the lease at once
by notice to the lessor in case the dwelling place or any other
building is unfit for human habitation and is dangerous to life or
health. The right is given to the lessee even if at the time the con-
tract was perfected, the lessee knew of the dangerous condition
or waived the right to rescind the lease on account of said condi-
tion.
618 LEASE Art. 1661
This right of the lessee is a precaution for public safety which

is above any stipulation. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 142.)
It cannot be waived. (Art. 6.)
ART. 1661. The lessor cannot alter the form of the

thing leased in such a way as to impair the use to
which the thing is devoted under the terms of the
lease. (1557a)
Alteration of form of lease.

(1) By the lessor. — The lessor can alter the form of the lease
provided there is no impairment in the use to which the thing is
devoted under the terms of the lease.
To constitute an alteration within the purview of the law, the
modification must be in such a manner that it would destroy the
substance of the thing leased or change its conditions in such a
way to render the thing leased unserviceable for the use intended.
Under the facts presented in a case, it was held that the conver-
sion of the main gate into a concrete culvert did not at all alter the
form of the thing leased in such a way as to impair the use of the
thing leased and render it unserviceable. (Banate vs. Cuñada, 6
C.A. Rep. 306.)
(2) By the lessee. — The lessee may alter the form of the lease
so long as the value of the property is not impaired by the altera-
tion.
The lessee of a building under an 18-year lease had the right
to make such changes as the business established therein required,
provided that neither the value nor the solidity of the building
was impaired. Said lessee undertook to remove a thick masonry
wall and substitute therefor a reinforced concrete wall, which
would add materially to the floor space, which he needed in his
business, and at the same time strengthen the building and add
materially to the value of the building. The lessors claimed the
lease should be rescinded because the form and substance of the
leased premises had been changed. Held: Not such alteration of
the form and substance under the circumstances of the leased
premises as to entitle the lessor to rescission of the lease. (Enriquez
vs. Watson & Co., 22 Phil. 623 [1912].)
If the object leased were a house, the lessee might effect such
improvements for use, recreation or comfort as would not change
its form or substance as he deemed fit; he could build a bower or
luxurious pavilion more expensive than the house itself, to which,
at the expiration of the lease, the owner of the house would have
no right whatever, unless the lessee could not remove the same
without injury to the house to which it was attached as an im-
provement, excepting, of course, the right to cause the same to be
demolished so that the house might be returned to him in the same
condition that the lessee received it as provided in Article 1665.
(In re Building and Loan Association and Peñaloza, 13 Phil. 575
[1909].)
ART. 1662. If during the lease it should become

necessary to make some urgent repairs upon the thing
leased, which cannot be deferred until the termina-
tion of the lease, the lessee is obliged to tolerate the
work, although it may be very annoying to him, and
although during the same, he may be deprived of a
part of the premises.
If the repairs last more than forty days the rent
shall be reduced in proportion to the time — includ-
ing the first forty days — and the part of the property
of which the lessee has been deprived.
When the work is of such a nature that the portion
which the lessee and his family need for their dwell-
ing becomes uninhabitable, he may rescind the con-
tract if the main purpose of the lease is to provide a
dwelling place for the lessee. (1558a)
Rule in case of urgent repairs.

(1) Need to make the repairs. — The lessor has the obligation to
make necessary repairs (Art. 1654[2].) and the lessee is obliged to
notify the lessor of the urgency of such repair. (Art. 1663, par. 2.)
If the repairs are not urgent, the lessee can refuse to be disturbed
in the enjoyment of the thing leased. But if the repairs are so ur-
gent that they cannot be deferred until the termination of the lease,
the lessee has no choice but to bear the burden of whatever in-
620 LEASE Art. 1663
convenience they may cause. The burden is on the lessor to prove

the urgency of the repair.
Note that Article 1662 speaks of repairs. Modifications or
improvements which the lessor may want to make on the prop-
erty during the period of the lease cannot be done against the
objection of the lessee.
(2) Length of time for the repairs. — If the repairs should last
for more than 40 days, the lessee is entitled to a proportionate
reduction of the rent, taking into account the time (including the
first 40 days) and the part of the property of which the lessee has
been deprived. If the repairs did not last 40 days, the lessee can-
not ask for reduction in the absence of a provision in the contract
giving him such right.
(3) Rescission of the lease. — Regardless of the length of time
taken up for repairs, rescission may be availed of by the lessee if
the main purpose of the lease is to provide a dwelling place for
the lessee and work done has made the same uninhabitable.
ART. 1663. The lessee is obliged to bring to the

knowledge of the proprietor, within the shortest
possible time, every usurpation or untoward act
which any third person may have committed or
may be openly preparing to carry out upon the thing
leased.
He is also obliged to advise the owner, with the
same urgency, of the need of all repairs included in
No. 2 of Article 1654.
In both cases the lessee shall be liable for the dam-
ages which, through his negligence, may be suffered
by the proprietor.
If the lessor fails to make urgent repairs, the les-
see, in order to avoid an imminent danger, may order
the repairs at the lessor’s cost. (1559a)
Obligation of lessee to notify lessor.

To the obligations of the lessee under Article 1657, Article 1663
adds the obligation to notify the lessor of any usurpation and of
the need for repairs. In both cases, the lessee shall be liable for
the damages which, through his negligent failure to give the re-
quired notice, may be suffered by the lessor.
(1) Usurpation or untoward act by a third person. — The purpose
of the notice is to enable the owner to maintain his civil posses-
sion, by suit if necessary. (Simpao vs. Dizon, 1 Phil. 261 [1901].) A
possessor must be respected in his possession. (Art. 539.)
The owner is entitled to defend his property from any aggres-
sion in order to prevent serious injury to his interests which would
happen if this was left to the lessee who has no interest and has
no real right in the property leased. Whatever may be the nature
of the disturbance occurring, so long as it may affect the posses-
sion or the right of the owner over the leased property, he is enti-
tled to institute the proper action. It would be a judicial absurd-
ity to deny him such a right and trust and the defense of his inter-
ests to the lessee whose obligations and rights are entirely differ-
ent. (Roxas vs. Mijares, 9 Phil. 252 [1907].)
(2) Need of repairs. — As the lessee is in possession and if re-
pairs are necessary, which it is the duty of the owner to make, the
lessee should call upon the owner to make the necessary repairs.
If the owner then fails to perform his duty, action would lie. It is
not the duty of the lessor to constantly inspect the premises to see
if there is a need to make repairs. (Gregorio Araneta, Inc. vs. Lyric
Film Exchange, Inc., 58 Phil. 736 [1933].)
The last paragraph is new, adopting the principle laid down
in a Court of Appeals case, to wit:
“We believe that this provision does not deprive the les-
see of the right to adopt certain measures to protect his inter-
ests and avoid losses and damages or minimize them, mak-
ing for his account the repairs of the nature mentioned in
Article 1554, paragraph 2, and to later claim against the les-
sor what he spent for them so long as having advised him of
the necessity of said repairs the lessor should fail to make
them. Such right becomes clearer above all when the repairs
are urgent which can not be delayed without serious damage
to the lessee or to the public.
622 LEASE Art. 1664
It appears unjust to us to impose upon the lessee inter-

ested in the continuance of the lease the attitude of resigning
to bear the losses and damages and satisfying himself with
the hope of claiming them afterwards from the lessor. To in-
terpret Article 1556 in this manner is to give it a limited sense
that it would not only diminish its practical utility but it would
make it an anachronism in this modern age of progress and
advancement in which we live. And it can not be said that to
grant the lessee the right which we mention is to open to him
the way of taking the law into his own hands since it is only a
means of protection, a defense, always justified when they
are prompted by culpable and negligent acts of him who in
the last analysis would have to answer for losses and dam-
ages if they are not avoided.’’ (Johnson-Pickett Rope Co. vs.
Grey, [C.A.] 40 O.G. [Supp. 11] 239.)
ART. 1664. The lessor is not obliged to answer for

a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause
on the use of the thing leased: but the lessee shall
have a direct action against the intruder.
There is a mere act of trespass when the third per-
son claims no right whatever. (1560a)
Rule in case of mere act of trespass.

There are two (2) kinds of trespass with respect to property:
Mere act of trespass (disturbance in fact) where a third person claims
no right whatever, as in forcible entry; and trespass in law (distur-
bance in law) where a third person claims a legal right to the
property, such as an action to recover possession based on own-
ership.
In case of a mere act of trespass by a third person upon the
leased property, the lessor is not liable to the lessee for the distur-
bance of the latter’s possession. The lessee shall have a direct ac-
tion against the usurper or intruder. In case of trespass in law, the
real party in interest is the lessor who becomes liable to the les-
see. The lessor may maintain an action to recover title (accion
reinvindicatoria) or to establish his better right of possession (accion
publiciana). It has been held that the act of the Japanese armed
forces in evicting the lessee from the leased premises and occu-
pying the same was a trespass in law under the rules of “belliger-
ent occupation.’’ Our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. II.) adopts the gen-
erally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land. (Vda. De Villaruel vs. Manila Motor Co.,4 104 Phil.
926 [1958].)
A lessor is not responsible for his lessee’s eviction through
condemnation proceedings and cannot be held liable for damages
therefor. The lessee must look to the expropriating plaintiff for his
compensation. (Sayo vs. Manila Railroad Co., 43 Phil. 551 [1922].)
In connection with Article 1664, Manresa makes this commen-
tary on the reason for the non-liability of the lessor in trespass in
fact only:
“A necessary condition of the enjoyment of the lessee, the
chief feature of the lease, is the possession he must have to
the thing; without that, there can be no enjoyment. True it is
that the lessee does not hold such possession in the capacity
of owner and that, therefore, he cannot and should not de-
rive from it the effects which, under other circumstances,
would ensue; but, after all, he is a possessor. If we carefully
examine that relation of possession, we shall see that it is dou-
ble; on the one hand, he possesses the thing as a condition of
enjoying it while, on the other, he possesses his right to the
enjoyment of the thing. In certain respects, he holds posses-
sion of the thing in the name of its owner, in so far as this
latter has not ceased to hold it for the purpose of prescrip-
tion, for example, because he leases the property; but the pos-
session of his right of use pertains to him in his own name, as
acquired by virtue of a just title, that is, the contract of lease.
If then, the trespass in fact only refers to the use of the thing
who but the lessee can have the personality to oppose it?
4
The reverses Reyes vs. Caltex [Phil.], Inc. (94 Phil. 654 [1959].), distinguishing it
from the ruling in Lo Ching vs. Archbishop of Manila (81 Phil. 602 [1948].) where the Japa-
nese army took possession of the leased premises and delivered the same to a German,
who occupied them until liberation in January, 1945. The deprivation went beyond the
limits set by the Hague Conventions.
624 LEASE Art. 1665
It must be carefully noted that Article 1560 [now Art. 1664]

speaks of trespass in fact only in the use of the property leased
and that if such trespass is translated into anything material
which affects the property itself, then only so far as it is a dis-
turbance of the use of the property is it incumbent upon the
lessee to repel it.
True it is that, pursuant to paragraph 3, of Article 1554
[now 1654], the lessor must maintain the lessee in the peaceful
enjoyment of the lease during all of the time covered by the
contract, and that, in consequence thereof, he is obliged to re-
move such obstacles as impede said enjoyment, but, as in
warranty in a case of eviction, the obstacles to enjoyment
which the lessor must remove are those that in some manner
or order cast doubt upon the right by virtue of which the lessor
himself executed the lease and, strictly speaking, it is this right
that the lessor should guarantee to the lessee.
Briefly, if the act of the trespass is not accompanied or pre-
ceded by anything which reveals a really juridic intention on
the part of the trespasser, in such wise that the lessee can only
distinguish the material fact, stripped of all legal forms or
reason, we understand it to be trespass in fact only (de mero
becho).’’ (Goldstein vs. Roces, 34 Phil. 562 [1916].)
ART. 1665. The lessee shall return the thing leased,

upon the termination of the lease, just as he received
it, save what has been lost or impaired by the lapse of
time, or by ordinary wear and tear, or from an inevita-
ble cause. (1561a)
Return of thing leased upon expiration

of lease.
At the expiration of the lease, the lease must return the prop-
erty to the lessor in the same condition as he received it. He is not
liable for loss or depreciation due to: (1) lapse of time; (2) ordi-
nary wear and tear; and (3) inevitable cause or fortuitous event.
(1) Such obligation to return the leased premises is not
deemed fulfilled if the lessor cannot resume possession because
of some impediment for which the lessee is responsible, or when
there is an occupant, placed by the lessee, who refuses to leave.

In such instance, the relation of landlord and tenant is not dis-
solved, and the lessee will be considered as holding over and held
liable for the injuries resulting from the lessor’s inability to have
dominion of the property subject-matter of the lease. (Arevalo vs.
Llantos, 5 C.A. Rep. 310; Tanangco vs. Tuazon, [C.A.] 57 O.G.
6259.)
(2) As a general rule, the whole of the property subject to the
lease and not only a part thereof, must be returned to the lessor.
(Godoy vs. Ramirez, 168 SCRA 85 [1988]; Syjuco vs. Court of
Appeals, 172 SCRA 111 [1989].)
(3) There is no legal obstacle for the owner to allow a default-
ing tenant to remain in the rented property one month, one year
or even more. That consent, no matter how long it may last, makes
the tenant’s possession lawful. Only when that consent is with-
drawn and the owner demands the tenant to leave the property
is when the owner’s right of possession is asserted and the ten-
ant’s refusal or failure to move out makes his possession unlaw-
ful, because it is violative of the owner’s preferential right of pos-
session. (Maceda vs. Pedraza, [C.A.], G.R. No. 8644-R, April 11,
1953.)
ART. 1666. In the absence of a statement concern-

ing the condition of the thing at the time the lease
was constituted, the law presumes that the lessee re-
ceived it in good condition, unless there is proof to
the contrary. (1562)
Presumption of receipt of thing leased

in good condition.
Article 1666 establishes the legal presumption that the lessee
received the thing leased in good condition at the beginning of
the lease. Upon the termination of the lease, he must retain it in
the same good condition. (Art. 1664.)
The presumption is merely prima facie. The lessee may prove
the contrary. No such presumption arises where there is a state-
ment or representation, written or oral, concerning the actual
condition of the thing at the time the lease was constituted.
626 LEASE Art. 1667
ART. 1667. The lessee is responsible for the dete-

rioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he proves
that it took place without his fault. This burden of proof
on the lessee does not apply when the destruction is
due to earthquake, flood, storm or other natural ca-
lamity. (1563a)
Responsibility of lessee for deterioration

or loss of thing leased.
The general rule is that the lessee is responsible on the pre-
sumption that he is guilty of fault or negligence. Hence, the bur-
den of proof is upon the lessee to overcome the presumption.
There is no such presumption when the destruction is due to
a natural calamity. In such case, it is unjust to impose upon the
lessee the burden of proving due diligence. It is more probable
that the lessee was not negligent. (Report of the Code Commis-
sion, p. 143.) The burden of proving that the lessee was negligent
lies on the lessor.
(1) In the absence of proof that the current of the river was so
swift that the collision was unavoidable, or that the wind that blew
was strong and unexpected which carried inevitably the craft to
the scow causing one to collide with the other, we cannot accept
the theory that the sinking was caused by a fortuitous event. The
burden is upon the defendants to show that there was no negli-
gence on their part or on the part of their agent, for such negli-
gence is presumed from the mere sinking of the craft. (Santos vs.
Villegas, [C.A.], 40 O.G. [Supp. 5] 135.)
(2) When a question arises as to the responsibility of a lessee
for the loss of the thing leased resulting from fire, and the trial
court finds that reasonable precautions were taken by the lessee
to prevent fires, but that nevertheless a fire did occur, of inscruta-
ble origin which destroyed the property in spite of all reasonable
efforts that cold be put forth to prevent it, this is equivalent to a
finding that lessee was without fault and that the loss was due to
an inevitable cause. (Lizares vs. Hernaez, 40 Phil. 981 [1920].)
Ordinarily, fire is not a natural calamity. It is not mentioned
in Article 1667. The lessee must prove he was without fault.
(3) When a loss of leased property occurs, there is a presump-

tion against the lessee, which makes him responsible, in the ab-
sence of proof that the loss happened without his fault. But the
question whether there has been fault on his part must be deter-
mined in relation with other provisions of the Civil Code as well
as in the light of the general principles of jurisprudence. Under
Article 1665, the lessee of lands is not responsible for a loss re-
sulting from inevitable cause: and in Article 1174 the general rule
is declared that, in the absence of express provision to the con-
trary, no one is liable for events which can not be foreseen or
which, if foreseen, were inevitable. (Ibid.)
(4) Under a stipulation in a lease contract that the lessee
would be responsible for necessary repairs on the building leased,
the failure of the lessee to make the repairs which caused the even-
tual destruction of the building, renders him liable to the lessor.
(Gonzales vs. Mateo, 74 Phil. 573 [1942].)
ART. 1668. The lessee is liable for any deterioration

caused by members of his household and by guests
and visitors. (1564a)
Deterioration caused by others.

The liability of the lessee for any deterioration to the leased
property extends to members of his household, and to guests and
visitors. He is made legally responsible for their acts as in quasi-
delicts (see Arts. 2176, 2180.) under the principle of “command
responsibility.’’
The liability of the lessee for the acts of third persons is based
on the contract itself, under which the lessee has assumed cus-
tody of the thing of which the lessor has been dispossessed. There
is no need of proving that he was negligent in selecting and su-
pervising his household helpers, visitors and guests. He is liable
from the mere fact of having allowed them into the immovable
leased. (A.M. Tolentino, op. cit., p. 241, citing 10 Planiol & Ripert
714.)
The law makes no distinction between intentional and negli-
gent acts of the third persons. The lessee, however, may recover
628 LEASE Art. 1669
from them what he has paid in satisfaction of the claim of the

lessor.
ART. 1669. If the lease was made for a determinate

time. It ceases upon the day fixed, without the need
of a demand. (1565)
Lease made for a determinate time.

When the lease is for a definite period stipulated in a contract
of lease, the lease terminates on the day fixed without need of a
demand or notice to vacate and return possession.
(1) When the lessee refuses to pay the new rent but contin-
ues in his possession of the premises, he becomes a deforciant
withholding the property unlawfully. (see Bulahan vs. Tuason, 109
Phil. 251 [1960].) But if he agrees to pay the increased rent, he
cannot be ejected until he fails to comply with said obligation.
(Vda. De Nuñga vs. Chan, 25 SCRA 441 [1968].)
(2) The continuous possession of the leased premises after the
end or expiration of the time fixed in the contract, with the acqui-
escence of the lessor, constitutes an implied renewal of the lease,
not for the period of the original contract, but for the time estab-
lished in Articles 1682 and 1687, so that if rentals were stipulated
to be paid monthly, the new lease is deemed to have been renewed
from month to month and may be terminated each month upon
demand. (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. De Ocampo,
1 C.A. Rep. 391.)
(3) Under Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, a demand
on the lessee is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer,
when the action is ‘for failure to pay rent due or to comply with
the conditions of his lease,’ and not where the action is to termi-
nate the lease because of the expiration of its term. (De Santos vs.
Vivas, 96 Phil. 538 [1955]; Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672 [1944].)
(4) In a contract of lease of urban property for an indefinite
period, a notice to increase the rent is equivalent to a notice of the
termination of the contract. (Laguda vs. Javellana, [C.A.], 57 O.G.
7178; Iturralde vs. Magcauas, 9 Phil., 599 [1907]; Cortes vs. Ramos,
46 Phil. 184 [1924].)
(5) Where a lease contract expressly stipulates that the lessor

may terminate the lease when his children shall need the same,
the lease shall be deemed terminated when the condition happens.
(Ducusin vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 280 [1983].) When the
agreement between the lessor and the lessee is that the lease is
only temporary and that it may be terminated in case the former
needs the same for business, the lease is deemed terminated when
the lessee is notified accordingly. (Madriaga vs. Court of Appeals,
163 SCRA 461 [1988].)
Extension or renewal of lease.

(1) Authority of court. — A court is without authority to ex-
tend a lease where the stipulated period of the contract has al-
ready expired, especially if the lessor is unwilling to extend the
same. Such extension is completely devoid of legal basis. (Gindoy
vs. Tapucar, 75 SCRA 31 [1977].)
(2) Lease not to be deemed extended or renewed by implication. —
Where a lease contract expressly stipulates that the lease shall not
be deemed extended or renewed by implication beyond the con-
tractual period for any cause or reason whatsoever but only by
negotiations, the mere fact that the lessee was willing to pay what
he claimed to be a reasonable rent — which was less than that
demanded by the lessor — did not operate in any sense to extend
the lease. To hold that there had been such implied renewal of the
lease simply because the lessee continued to occupy the premises
after the expiration of the fixed period of the lease, would lead to
the absurd consequence that all that an overstaying lessee would
have to do to defeat the right of the lessor to change the prevail-
ing rentals would be to resist and delay the ejectment action.
(Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation vs. Court of Appeals, 134
SCRA 136 [1985]; Teresa Realty vs. Sison, 4 SCRA 958 [1962].)
(3) Lease extendible for a similar period. — A stipulation that a
lease is “extendible’’ for a further similar period is to be under-
stood as giving the lessee the right to the additional period or to
quit upon the expiration of the first term. The word “extendible’’
standing without qualification in a contract of lease means that
the term of the lease may be extended and is equivalent to a prom-
ise by the lessor to extend and as a unilateral stipulation obliges
630 LEASE Art. 1669
the lessor to fulfill his promise. As a general rule, in construing

such a provision, where there is an uncertainty or doubt, the les-
see is favored, and not the lessor, because the latter, having the
power of stipulating in his favor, has neglected to do so; and upon
the principle that a grant should be taken most strongly against
the grantor. (Cruz vs. Alberto, 39 Phil. 991 [1919]; Koh vs.
Ongsiako, 36 Phil. 185 [1917]; Ledesma vs. Javellana, 121 SCRA
794 [1983], see Cañete vs. San Antonio Agro-Industrial Dev. Corp.,
113 SCRA 723 [1982].)
(4) Lease renewable at option of both parties. — A stipulation that
the lease of a parcel of land will be “renewable for another 10 years
at the option of both parties under such terms, conditions and
rentals reasonable at the time,’’ means that there should be mu-
tual agreement as to the renewal of the lease. (Fernandez vs. Court
of Appeals, 166 SCRA 577 [1988]; Mallare vs. Hernando, 151 SCRA
484 [1987].)
(5) Option to renew given to lessor. — In Cruz and Koh (supra.),
the option to renew the lease was given to the lessee. If the op-
tion is given to the lessor, the lessee cannot renew the lease against
the former’s refusal. (Ong Ching vs. Ramolete, 51 SCRA 13 [1973].)
The lease is deemed terminated. (De Leon Vda. de Roxas vs. Court
of Appeals, 63 SCRA 762 [1975]; Tuason, Jr. vs. De Asis, 107 Phil.
131 [1960].)
(6) Extension exclusively for the benefit of lessor. — The stipula-
tion in a lease contract extending the lease term beyond that origi-
nally agreed upon, in order to save the lessor the trouble of reim-
bursing the lessee in cash for the expenses incurred on the leased
premises was exclusively for the benefit of the lessor; hence, the
latter has the right to terminate the lease upon the expiration of
the original period, or at any other time thereafter, by tendering
to the lessee, or consigning to the court, the outstanding balance
of his expenditures. The lessor should be given the option to ei-
ther reimburse the balance of the expenditures or demand that
the lessee should account for and credit the lessor for the fruits of
the properties since the expiration of the lease against the balance
due to the lessee, turning over any excess to the lessor. (Litao vs.
National Assoc. of Retired Civil Employees, 8 SCRA 648 [1963].)
(7) Option to renew given to lessee. — Where a lessee is given

the option to continue or renew the contract of lease and is silent
upon the rentals, the old terms are to be followed in the renewed
lease. (Gustilo vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 927 [1983].) A cov-
enant to renew a lease which makes no provision as to the terms
of the extension or renewal implies an extension or renewal upon
the same terms as provided in the original lease. (Ledesma vs.
Javellana, supra.) The continued possession of the lessee is evi-
dence of his exercise of the option to extend the lease. There is no
necessity to notify the lessor of the extension in the absence of
stipulation to the contrary.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Before the expiration of the lease, the lessor communicated to the
lessee the terms and conditions under which the lease shall be re-
newed but after the lease expired, the lessor accepted a month’s pay-
ment of rent sent by the lessee, which is less than the amount the
lessor had indicated to the lessee.
Facts: Petitioner-lessor Roxas and respondent-lessee SY on
October, 1967 entered into a contract whereby the latter agreed
to lease a building for P550.00 a month for 10 years or until
September, 1977. On June 1, 1971, Roxas sent a letter-request to
SY for increase of rentals to which the latter declined. On Au-
gust 11, 1977, Roxas wrote another letter reminding SY of the
forth coming termination of their contract with the addendum
that following the expiration of the contract, the rental will be
increased to P4,000.00 a month, with three (3) years to be paid
in advance together with a yearly increase of 15%.
SY posted a reply dated August 4, 1977, indicating mean-
while to study Roxas’ proposition until the end of September.
In October 6, 1977, with Sy’s indecision, Roxas sent SY another
letter demanding that SY vacate the premises within five (5)
days from receipt. SY, without signifying willingness or unwill-
ingness, simply sent Roxas on October 14, 1977, a letter con-
taining a check for P550.00 corresponding to the rental for Oc-
tober contrary to the demand to vacate the place.
The Court of First Instance modified the decision of the
municipal trial court by ordering Sy to pay Roxas “the amount
of P1,500.00 monthly rental for 10 years effective October, 1977.’’
632 LEASE Art. 1669
Issues: (a) Whether or not the petitioner, as lessor, had the

right to demand an increase in the monthly rental of the leased
premises from P550.00 to P4,000.00 as a condition for a renewal
or extension of the lease; and
(b) Whether or not there was an implied renewal of the
lease contract.
Held: “We resolve the first issue in the affirmative in ac-
cordance with settled jurisprudence on the matter.’’
(1) Right of lessor to fix rents. — “In the case of Lim Si vs.
Lim (98 Phil. 868 [1956].), this Tribunal categorically stated: ‘Only
the owner has the right to fix the rents. The court cannot deter-
mine the rents and compel the lessor or owner to conform
thereto and allow the lessee to occupy the premises on the ba-
sis of the rents fixed by it.’
A subsequent case, that of Bulahan, et al. vs. Tuason (109
Phil. 251 [1960].), is almost on all fours with the case at bar.
There, the lease contracts were to expire on December 31, 1953.
As early as January of the same year, therein lessors sent letters
to the lessees reminding them of the expiry date of their lease
contracts and offering to renew the same at an increased rental.
The lessees, however, ignored the proposed terms for the re-
newal of the lease contracts, and after the expiration thereof,
they continued to occupy the premises but refused to pay the
new rent fixed by the lessors. The lessees filed an action for the
court to fix a reasonable rental and a reasonable duration for
the lease of the properties there in question. Holding for the
lessors, this Court ruled as follows:
‘The rule is settled that the owner of the land leased
has the right not only to terminate the lease at the expira-
tion of the term, but also to demand a new rate of rent. The
tenant or lessee has the option either to accept the new rent
or vacate the premises. As (lessees), after the termination
of their lease, refused either to pay the new rent or to va-
cate the lots after the termination of their lease, they have
evidently become deforciants, and can be ousted judicially
without the need of a demand.’
The Bulahan ruling is reiterated in the more recent case of
Gindoy vs. Hon. Tapucar. (75 SCRA 31 [1977].)
The case of Velasco vs. Court of Agrarian Relations and
Domingo (109 Phil. 642 [1960].) cited by respondent Court of
First Instance is not in point. It involved a contract of lease of a
parcel of agricultural land, the existence of which agreement

was not disputed by the parties. It was a case of reformation of
such contract voluntarily entered into on the ground that the
rental agreed upon was excessive. It had nothing to do with
the right of a lessor to demand an increase in rental as a condi-
tion for a renewal of a lease contract.
Likewise, the cases of Peligrino vs. General Base Metals, Inc.,
(39 SCRA 216 [1971].) Teresa Realty, Inc. vs. Sison (4 SCRA 958
[1962].), and the five Tuason cases in 107 Phil. 131 (1960), cited
by respondent Court of First Instance, do not support its ruling
that the court has the authority to fix a reasonable rental when
the lessor tries to demand, after the termination of a lease con-
tract, an exorbitant rental for the renewal of the lease.
In Peligrino, the contract of lease was for an indefinite pe-
riod and the rents agreed upon were payable on a monthly ba-
sis. The company that acquired the lease-hold rights of the origi-
nal lessee refused to pay the increased rental demanded by the
lessor. This Court held that the company was entitled to have
its right of possession extended for one year, and reduced the
increased rental which it found to be excessive. In the instant
case, on the other hand, the contract of lease is for a definite
term of ten (10) years which had already expired, and respond-
ent-lessee has not shown any right to continue in possession of
the premises owned by petitioner.
In the case of Teresa Realty, Inc., this Court affirmed the trial
court’s finding that the increased rental demanded by the les-
sor was reasonable for it represented only 12% of the assessed
value of the leased property. Such a finding was, however, made
by the Court only for the purpose of determining how much
therein lessee Sison should pay the lessor Teresa Realty, Inc. as
rental for the period during which the case remained pending
final decision, and not for the purpose, as in the case at bar, of
fixing the rent to be paid by the lessee during a supposed ex-
tension or renewal of the lease contract.
The aforementioned Tuason cases are inapplicable for sub-
stantially the same reason as the Peligrino case, i.e., the Tuason
lease contracts were not for a fixed period but from year to year.
This Court held that “if at the end of the year, the owner de-
mands a rental which is exorbitant, . . . the courts may deter-
mine what is a reasonable rental and allow the lessee to con-
tinue with the lease. (107 Phil. 131 [1960].)
634 LEASE Art. 1669
According to [the] Court, petitioner’s statement in his let-

ter to private respondent dated August 11, 1977, Exh. C, that ‘If
I will not receive a reply within 15 days from date of your re-
ceipt, it is understood that you are amenable, and I will no
longer accept any other offers for the lease of the building,’ cou-
pled with the circumstance that petitioner in fact did not lease
the property to another person after September 30, 1977, and
further, that private respondent paid P550.00, the monthly rental
paid for the month of October, 1977, taken together all lead to
the conclusion that the ten-year lease contract entered into on
October 16, 1967 was tacitly renewed. The Court of First In-
stance also stated thus: ‘(that petitioner) did not return the check
to the (private respondent) . . . shows he was agreeable to the
renewal of the terms of the lease contract for another ten (10)
years.’
We do not agree. Petitioner’s letter of August 11, 1977 was
a reminder to private respondent of the impending expiration
of the lease contract, with a statement that was in effect an offer
or proposal to renew the contract on the terms and conditions,
namely: (1) that the rental would be P4,000.00 a month; (2) that
three years advance rental should be paid by private respond-
ent; and (3) that a 15% yearly increase in rental would be im-
posed. In other words, petitioner laid down the foregoing stipu-
lations as conditions sine qua non for any subsequent contract
that might be negotiated with private respondent. Thus clear
from the letter, is that if private respondent were not agreeable
to any or all of the new stipulations, there would be no renewal
of the lease. Private respondent was to communicate his reply
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of Exh. C, absent which
petitioner would take it to mean that his conditions were ac-
ceptable to private respondent and their contract renewed on
the specified terms. However, private respondent’s letter, Exh.
F, evidently posted before the expiration of the period allowed
within which to decide, did not give a categorical affirmative
or negative answer to petitioner’s proposition, and merely
manifested the said lessee’s desire to study the matter until the
end of the following month of September, 1977, or up to the
termination of the then existing contract of lease.
Petitioner’s failure to reply to the letter, Exh. F, can only be
taken to mean that he acceded to the request for additional time.
For the obvious reason that the lease contract was expiring, it
became more imperative for private respondent to make a fi-
nal decision within and not later than the extended period which
he asked for. Thus, when petitioner did not hear from private
respondent at the end of the aforesaid month of September,
private respondent ceased to have any legal right to possess
and occupy the premises in question commencing the first day
of the following month of October.
That the petitioner did not lease the property to another is
understandable, as he had no idea as to when private respond-
ent intended to vacate the premises. Thus, although petitioner
might have had offers from third persons, circumstances be-
yond his control held him back from finalizing any kind of
agreement involving the property in question.’’
(2) Effect of acceptance of the P500.00 check. — “Likewise, pe-
titioner’s acceptance of the P500.00 check supposedly to an-
swer for the rental for the month of October, 1977, cannot be
taken against him. As in the case of Hautea vs. Magallon and
Soriano (12 SCRA 514 [1964].), such acceptance is irrelevant to
the issue. This is an ejectment case premised on the expiration
of the lease contract between the parties, and not on any al-
leged violation of a lease contract for non-payment of rent.
Moreover, petitioner had no other choice but to keep the check
sent to him. Private respondent, after all, continued to stay in
the premises and use the same for his hardware and construc-
tion materials business.’’ (Roxas vs. Alcantara, 113 SCRA 21
[1982].)
ART. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee

should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen
days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless
a notice to the contrary by either party has previously
been given, it is understood that there is an implied
new lease, not for the period of the original contract,
but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687.
The other terms of the original contract shall be re-
vived. (1566a)
Implied new lease.

(1) When it takes place. — An implied new lease (tacita
reconduccion) arises when the lessee, with the acquiescence of the
lessor, holds over after the expiration of the contract of lease, under
the same terms and conditions except that instead of the original
636 LEASE Art. 1670
period, the period of the new lease will be according to the char-
acter of the property and mode of payment of the rent, i.e., that
established in Article 1682 (rural lease) whose period extends to
one (1) year or period necessary to gather the fruits or in Article
1687 (urban lease) whose period depends upon the periods of
payment. Thus, where the rent for a 10-year period lease which
has expired was paid monthly, the implied new lease must be
deemed from month to month and may be terminated after each
month.
(2) Terms which are revived. — The original terms of the origi-
nal contract which are revived are only those which are germane
to the lessee’s right of continued enjoyment of the property leased
or related to such possession, such as the amount of rental, the
date when it must be paid, the care of the property, the responsi-
bility for repairs, etc. No such presumption may be indulged in
with respect to special agreements (e.g., preferential right given
to lessee to purchase leased property) which by their nature are
foreign to the right of occupation or enjoyment inherent in a con-
tract of lease. (Dizon vs. Magsaysay, 57 SCRA 250 [1974]; Dizon
vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 288 [1999]; Guda vs. Leynes, 403
SCRA 318 [2003].)
(3) Requisites. — The requisites for an implied renewal of lease
are:
(a) The term of the original contract of lease are:
(b) The lessee continues enjoying the thing leased for at
least 15 days;
(c) The continuation of the occupation by the lessee is with
the acquiescence of the lessor; and
(d) The lessor or lessee has not previously given a notice
to vacate.
The notice required under Article 1670 is the one given after
the expiration of the lease period for the purpose of aborting an
implied renewal of lease. The notice to vacate constitutes an
express act on the part of the lessor that he no longer consents to
the continued occupation by the lessee of the leased property.
(Tagbilaran Integrated Settlers Assoc. vs. Court of Appeals, 444
SCRA 193 [2004].)
A lessor who gives notice after the 15-day period has no cause
of action for unlawful detainer as there is already an implied new
lease.
Instances when implied renewal

not applicable.
(1) Stipulation against implied renewal. — There can be no im-
plied renewal of the lease where the parties stipulated that there
would be no renewal by implication (Ramon Magsaysay Award
Foundation vs. Court of Appeals, 134 SCRA 136 [1985].) or that
the renewal requires mutual consent. (Agaloos vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 139 SCRA 546 [1985].)
(2) Invalidity of original lease. — Where the original lease was
declared void for being repugnant to the Constitution and the
lessor and the lessee could not agree on the rental to be paid, the
acceptance by the former of monthly payments from the latter
with reservation or condition cannot be considered as evidence
of an implied new lease. (Estate of J. Santos vs. De Veyra, 28 SCRA
1108 [1969].)
(3) Acceptance of rentals beyond original term. — Similarly, the
acceptance of rentals beyond the original term by the lessor who
had previously informed the lessee that she was not renewing the
lease and, in fact, later demanded the lessee to vacate the prop-
erty, did not signify that she had agreed to the implied renewal
of the lease where the lessee remained in possession and had to
pay rentals for the use of the property. Instead of implied renewal,
there was an express termination of the contract of lease. (Torres
(4) Acceptance of rentals less than amounts stipulated. — The fact
that the lessor had accepted partial payments from the lessee, in
amounts less than the stipulated monthly rentals, may not be
considered as a renewal of lease contract. While a lessor may tol-
erate the continued default of the lessee, hoping that the latter
would eventually pay all his back rentals, said lessor could not
very well refuse to accept payments by the lessee just because they
did not cover full unpaid rentals. That would have been unwise
and unbusiness-like. If he did that, he might get nothing from his
delinquent lessee. (Uichangco vs. Laurilla, 108 Phil. 828 [1960].)
638 LEASE Art. 1671
ART. 1671. If the lessee continues enjoying the

thing after the expiration of the contract, over the
lessor’s objection, the former shall be subject to the
responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith. (n)
Continuous possession by lessee over lessor’s

objection.
The lessee may, with the acquiescence of the lessor, continue
enjoying the thing leased after the expiration of the contract and
thereby create an implied new lease. (Art. 1670.) If he continues
the lease over the objection of the lessor, he becomes a possessor
in bad faith and subjects himself to the liabilities of such posses-
sor.5
The remedy of the lessor is to bring an action of unlawful
detainer to recover possession of the premises and the rents or
fair rental value of the premises.
Damages in forcible entry and unlawful

detainer cases.
(1) While damages may be adjudged in forcible and detainer
5
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. (362)
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown
in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the per-
son who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the
price of the land, and the sower the proper rent. (363a)
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to
damages from the builder, planter or sower. (n)
Art. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for
the necessary expenses of preservation of the land. (n)
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the
foregoing. x x x
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. x x x
Art. 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received and those
which the legitimate possessor could have received, and shall have a right only to the
expenses mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 546 and in Article 443. The expenses in-
curred in improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in bad faith; but he may remove the objects for which such expenses have
been incurred, provided that the thing suffers no injury thereby, and that the lawful
possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they may have at the time
he enters into possession. (455a)
cases, these damages mean “rents’’ or “the reasonable compen-

sation for the use and occupation of the premises,’’ or “fair rental
value of the property.”
(a) Profits which the plaintiff might have received were
it not for the forcible entry or detainer do not represent a fair
rental value. Although Section 1 of Rule 70 uses the word
“damages,’’ the authors of the Rules of Court in drafting Sec-
tion 6 (now Sec. 17.) of Rule 70 on the judgment to be pro-
nounced, eliminated the word “damages,’’ placing in lieu
thereof, the word “reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises.’’
(b) The damages which a plaintiff expects to obtain from
his business to be located in the premises, or for material in-
jury caused to the premises cannot also be claimed in connec-
tion with or as incidental to an action of illegal detainer or
forcible entry. Actual moral and exemplary damages are dif-
ferent from rentals or “reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the premises,’’ hence, they cannot be
awarded. (Baens vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 634 [1983].)
(2) Fair rental value is recoverable in the concept of actual
damages. It is clear from Section 17 of Rule 70 that the trial court
is empowered to award reasonable compensation only if the claim
is true. In fixing the reasonable amount of rent, the court must
base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties. Fair rental
value has been defined as the amount at which a willing lessee
would pay and a willing lessor would receive, for the use of cer-
tain property neither being under compulsion and both parties
having a reasonable knowledge of all facts, such as the extent
character and utility of the property, sales and holding prices of
similar land and the highest and best use of the property. (Asian
Transmission Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates, 410 SCRA
202 [2003].)
ART. 1672. In case of an implied new lease, the

obligation contracted by a third person for the security
of the principal contract shall cease with respect to
the new lease. (1567)
640 LEASE Art. 1673
Effect of implied new lease on accessory obligations

contracted by a third person.
The renewal of the lease is, in effect, a novation of the original
contract of lease. (Art. 1291.) The renewal of lease is considered a
new lease. The general rule is that when the principal obligation
is extinguished in consequence of a novation, accessory obliga-
tions (e.g., guaranty) are also extinguished. (Art. 1296.)
ART. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the les-

see for any of the following causes:
(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is
fixed for the duration of lease under Articles 1682 and
1687, has expired;
(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;
(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon
in the contract;
(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to
any use or service not stipulated which causes the
deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the
requirement in No. 2 of Article 1657, as regards the
use thereof.
The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is
governed by special laws. (1569a)
Causes for judicial ejectment of lessee.

Article 1673 enumerates the causes for which the lessor may
judicially eject the lessee. With respect to tenants of agricultural
lands, their ejectment is governed by special laws. (see Art. 1684.)
(1) Article 1673 must be read in conjunction with Section 2,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a demand to
pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate
the premises is a condition precedent for the institution of an
ejectment suit against the lessee. The import of these provisions
is to grant the lessor the option of extrajudicially terminating the
lease by simply serving a written notice upon the lessee. This
extrajudicial termination has the same effect as rescission. Thus,
in Dio vs. Concepcion (296 SCRA 579 [1998].), reiterating the rul-
ing in Vda. De Pamintuan vs. Tiglao (53 Phil. 1 [1929].), it was ex-
plained that the rescission of lease of contracts under Article 1659
is not one that requires an independent action, unlike resolution
of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
(Chua vs. Victorio, 428 SCRA 447 [2004].)
(2) Section 2, Rule 70 is applicable only where there is a les-
sor-lessee relationship under a contract of lease and only in in-
stances where the grounds relied upon for ejectment is non-pay-
ment of rentals or violation of any of the conditions of the lease.
In such situations, notice to vacate is crucial. A demand is a pre-
requisite to an action for unlawful detainer where the action is
based on either ground but not where the action is to terminate
the lease because of the expiration of its term. (Lanuza vs. Muñoz,
429 SCRA 562 [2004]; Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672 [1946].)
Expiration of the period.

The period in a contract of lease may be conventional or that
fixed by agreement of the parties; or legal or that fixed by law in
accordance with Article 1682 in case of rural leases and Article
1687 in case of urban leases.
(1) Ejectment lies without the need of a demand, when the
period of the lease has expired. The notice of the lessor is imma-
terial. (Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 428 [1984].) He is
free to dispose of the leased property to another lessee. (Zarroga
vs. Sleeper, 25 Phil. 650 [1913]; Barreras vs. Garcia, 169 SCRA 401
[1989].)
(2) A lease on a month-to-month basis is for a definite period
and may be terminated at the end of any month. (Lesaca vs.
Cuevas, 125 SCRA 384 [1983].) It is valid for the parties to stipu-
late that either party may terminate a month-to-month lease on a
30-day notice. (Cruz vs. Puno, 120 SCRA 497 [1983].)
(3) The lessee must restore possession of the leased property
after the expiration of the stipulated period. The unlawful hold-
ing or deprivation of possession is to be counted from the date of
the demand to vacate. (Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877
[1983].) Prior possession of the plaintiff is not necessary in an
642 LEASE Art. 1673
unlawful detainer case. (Pharma Industries, Inc. vs. Pajarilla, 100

SCRA 339 [1980].)
(4) Possession of land by tolerance becomes an unlawful de-
tainer, from the time a demand to vacate is made. (Prieto vs. Reyes,
4 SCRA 430 [1965]; Lesaca vs. Cuevas, 125 SCRA 385 [1983].)
(5) A notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the
increased rental or otherwise to vacate the leased premises is not
the demand contemplated in an unlawful detainer case. The de-
mand to vacate must be definite, subject to no condition; other-
wise, the lessor cannot bring the action of unlawful detainer.
(Murga vs. Chan, 25 SCRA 441 [1968].)
(6) A lessor’s letter to the lessee demanding payment of back
rentals, and that if the latter failed to pay, an ejectment suit would
be filed against him is a sufficient notice. The omission of the word
“vacate’’ in the notice is immaterial. (Golden Gate Realty Corp.
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 684 [1987].)
(7) It is not a valid defense in ejectment cases that the lessor
refused to receive the rent. The lessee must consign in court the
rent due from him. (Magen vs. Avelino, 127 SCRA 602 [1984];
Cursino vs. Bautista, 176 SCRA 66 [1989].)
Lack of payment of stipulated rental.

The lessee is obliged to pay the price of the lease according to
the terms stipulated. (Art. 1657[1].) His failure to comply with this
principal duty entitles the lessor to ask for rescission of the lease
or fulfillment, with right to damages in either case. (Art. 1659.)
(1) Mere failure to pay rents, or a breach of contract to pay
rents, does not render the possession of the lessee per se unlaw-
ful, nor may the action for his ejectment from the land accrue upon
such failure or breach. In accordance with Section 2, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, the right to bring the action of ejectment or
unlawful detainer must be counted from the time the defendant
has failed to pay rents as agreed upon in a contract, but it is the
failure to pay the rents after a demand therefor is made that entitles
the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer. (Zobel vs. Abreu,
98 Phil. 343 [1955]; Cetus vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 72 [1989];
Cursino vs. Bautista, 176 SCRA 65 [1989].)
(2) If the default in the payment of rent is based on the fact

that the rent sought to be collected is not that agreed upon, an
action for ejectment will not lie. (Belmonte vs. Marin, 76 Phil. 198
[1946]; Gomez vs. Ng Fat, 76 Phil. 555 [1946].)
(3) A lessor has the right to increase the rent from and after
the expiration of the period of lease, and if the tenant thereafter
remains in possession without agreeing to the increase, he is
bound to pay the reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the property leased. This reasonable amount is a question of evi-
dence. (Iturralde vs. Garduño, 9 Phil. 605 [1907]; Iturralde vs.
Evangelista, 7 Phil. 588 [1906].)
(4) The lessor has the right not only to terminate the lease at
the expiration of the term, but to demand a new rate of rent. The
question whether or not the new rate of rent fixed by the owner
is reasonable must be decided according to the evidence. The tes-
timony of the owner that another person was willing to lease the
property at an annual rent equal to that demanded by the plain-
tiff of the defendant, is prima facie proof that the new rate of rent
demanded by him is reasonable. (Cortez vs. Ramos, 46 Phil. 184
[1924].)
(5) Where the lessee refuses to pay the stipulated rentals and
the lessor initiates an ejectment suit, the juridical bond between
the parties is severed. They cease to be connected by the link of a
lessor-lessee relation. No amount of subsequent payment by the
lessee can automatically restore the parties to what they once were.
Nor will the lessor’s acceptance of the increased rentals have the
effect of reviving the earlier contract of lease. Upon the moment
of acquiescence by the lessor to the increased amount, an entirely
new contract of lease is entered into, forging an entirely new ju-
ridical relation. (Chua vs. Victorio, 428 SCRA 447 [2004].)
Violation of any condition agreed upon.

The contract of lease may provide for accidental stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as the parties may deem conven-
ient.
(1) A violation of any such conditions, etc. agreed upon would
constitute breach of the lease contract. Thus, a violation by the
644 LEASE Art. 1673
lessee of the prohibition against devoting the property to a use

not stipulated in the contract, or introducing improvements with-
out the consent of the lessor, is enough ground to eject the lessee.
(2) A demand is a prerequisite in an action of unlawful de-
tainer when it is for failure to comply with any of the conditions
of the lease, but not when that action is to terminate the lease
because of the expiration of the term. (Art. 1669.)
(3) A lease contract may validly stipulate that the lessor may
take possession of the leased premises without resorting to judi-
cial action, upon failure of the lessee to comply with any of the
terms and conditions of the contract. (Consing vs. Jamadre, 64
SCRA 1 [1975]; see Arts. 1159, 1306.)
(4) When a lease provides for the payment of the rent in
installments, each failure to pay an installment is a separate cause
of action. In an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent,
all installments due and demandable at the time the action is
brought, should be pleaded, and failure to do so will constitute a
bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that rent.
(Intramuros Administration vs. Contacto, 402 SCRA 581 [2003].)
Improper use of the leased property.

The second principal duty of the lessee is to use the thing
leased, exercising the diligence of a good father of a family, ac-
cording to the terms of the contract, or in the absence of stipula-
tion, the nature of the thing leased. (Art. 1657[2].) It is his duty to
return the thing, upon the termination of the lease, just as he re-
ceived it. (Art. 1665.)
The law presumes that he received it in good condition. (Art.
1666.) Without the duty to take care of the thing, the lessee would
not be liable even if it is lost or destroyed through his fault or
negligence, thus rendering illusory the obligation to return.
Regulation of rentals of certain residential

units.
A number of laws have been enacted freezing rentals for a
certain period of time at their current level for the benefit of the
lower income group.6 The common feature of these laws is the

suspension of the application of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of
the Civil Code (except when the lease is for a definite period)
during the period of their effectivity, to lease of a dwelling unit
or of land on which another’s dwelling is located.
(1) Presidential Decree No. 20 (Oct. 12, 1972) which amended
R.A. No. 6359, prohibits the increase of the monthly rental agreed
upon between the lessor and the lessee when said monthly rental
does not exceed P300.00.
(2) B.P. Blg. 25 (April 10, 1979) prohibits for a duration of five
(5) years from its effectivity, the increase of monthly rentals of all
residential units not exceeding P300.00, for any one (1) year pe-
riod, by more than 10% of the monthly rentals existing at the time
of the approval of the Act.
(3) B.P. Blg. 877 (June 6, 1985) provides that beginning July 1,
1985 and for a duration of two and half years thereafter ending
December 31, 1987, monthly rentals of all residential units not
exceeding P480 shall not be increased by the lessor by more than
10% in 1985, 20% in 1986 and 20% in 1987, which increases shall
be cumulative and compounded.
(4) R.A. No. 6643 (Dec. 28, 1987) extends the effectivity of B.P.
Blg. 877 for another two (2) years, fixing the allowable maximum
increase for the two-year period to not more than 20% in 1988 and
20% in 1989, which increases shall be cumulative and com-
pounded.
Blg. 877 for five (5) years, fixing the allowable maximum increase
for the five-year period from 1993 to 1997 at 20% yearly, which
increases shall be cumulative and compounded.
Blg. 877 for four (4) years, fixing the allowable maximum increase
6
Following liberation, after the war, when there was an acute shortage of housing,
C.A. No. 689 (Oct. 15, 1945) entitled “An Act of penalize speculation of rents of build-
ings destined for dwelling purposes’’ was passed. This was amended by R.A. No. 66
(Oct. 18, 1946) under which a lessee cannot be ejected for non-payment of rents, where
such non-payment is not willful and deliberate. Both acts expired on October 15, 1949.
646 LEASE Art. 1673
for the four-year period from 1998 to 2001 at 15% yearly, which
increases shall be cumulative and compounded.
Rental Reform Act of 2002.

This is R.A. No. 91617 (Dec. 22, 2001), “An Act establishing
reforms in the regulation of rentals of certain residential units,
providing the mechanisms therefor and for other purpose.’’ The
pertinent provisions are copied verbatim hereunder:
SECTION 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known and
cited as the “Rental Reform Act of 2002.’’
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall, for the com-
mon good, undertake a continuing program of urban land re-
form and housing which will make available at affordable cost
decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas.
Toward this end, the State shall establish reforms in the
regulation of rentals of certain residential units.
SEC. 3. Monthly Rentals and Maximum Increases. — Begin-
ning 01 January 2002 and for a duration of three (3) years there-
after ending on 31 December 2004, the monthly rentals of all
residential units in the National Capital Region and other
highly urbanized cities not exceeding Seven thousand five
hundred pesos (P7,500.00) and the monthly rentals of all resi-
dential units in all other areas not exceeding Four thousand
pesos (P4,000.00) shall not be increased annually by the les-
sor, without prejudice to existing contracts, by more than ten
percent (10%).
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. — The following terms as used
in this Act shall be understood as:
(a) “Rental” shall mean the amount paid for the use or
occupancy of a residential unit whether payment is made on
a monthly or other basis.
(b) “Residential unit” shall refer to an apartment, house
and/or land on which another’s dwelling is located and used
7
There is a pending bill in Congress to extend the effectivity of the Act.
for residential purposes and shall include not only buildings,

parts or units thereof used solely as dwelling places, board-
ing houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces offered for rent
by their owners, except motels, motel rooms, hotels, hotel
rooms, but also those used for home industries, retail stores
or other business purposes if the owner thereof and his or her
family actually live therein and use it principally for dwell-
ing purposes.
(c) “Immediate members of family of the lessee or lessor”
for purposes of repossessing the leased premises, shall be lim-
ited to his or her spouse, direct descendants or ascendants,
by consanguinity or affinity.
(d) “Lessee” shall mean the person renting a residential
unit.
(e) “Owner/Lessor” shall include the owner or adminis-
trator or agent of the owner of the residential unit.
(f) “Sublessor” shall mean the person who leases or rents
out a residential unit leased to him by an owner.
(g) “Sublessee” shall mean the person who leases or rents
out a residential unit from a sublessor.
(h) “Assignment of lease” shall mean the act contemplated
in Article 1649 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Rental and Deposit. — Rental shall be paid in ad-
vance within the first five (5) days of every current month or
the beginning of the lease agreement unless the contract of
lease provides for a later date of payment. The lessor cannot
demand more than one (1) month advance rental and two (2)
months deposit.
SEC. 6. Assignment of Lease or Subleasing. — Assignment
of lease or subleasing of the whole or any portion of the resi-
dential unit, including the acceptance of boarders or
bedspacers, without the written consent of the owner/lessor
is prohibited.
SEC. 7. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment. — Ejectment shall
be allowed on the following grounds:
648 LEASE Art. 1673
(a) Assignment of lease or subleasing of residential units

in whole or in part, including the acceptance of boarders or
bedspacers, without the written consent or the owner/lessor;
(b) Arrears in payment of rent for a total of three (3)
months: Provided, That in the case of refusal by the lessor to
accept payment of the rental agreed upon, the lessee may ei-
ther deposit, by way of consignation, the amount in court, or
with the city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, or in
a bank in the name of and with notice to the lessor, within
one (1) month after the refusal of the lessor to accept payment.
The lessee shall thereafter deposit the rental within ten
(10) days of every current month. Failure to deposit the rentals
for three (3) months shall constitute a ground for ejectment. If
an ejectment case is already pending, the court upon proper
motion may order the lessee or any person or persons claim-
ing under him to immediately vacate the leased premises
without prejudice to the continuation of the ejectment pro-
ceedings. At any time, the lessor may, upon the authority of
the court, withdraw the rentals deposited.
The lessor, upon authority of the court in case of consig-
nation or upon joint affidavit by him and the lessee to be sub-
mitted to the city or municipal treasurer and to the bank where
deposit was made, shall be allowed to withdraw the depos-
its;
(c) Legitimate need of the owner/lessor to repossess his
or her property for his or her own use or for the use of any
immediate member of his or her family as a residential unit:
Provided, however, That the lease for a definite period has ex-
pired: Provided, further, That the lessor has given the lessee
formal notice three (3) months in advance of the lessor’s in-
tention to repossess the property and: Provided, finally, That
the owner/lessor is prohibited from leasing the residential
unit or allowing its use by a third party for a period of at least
one year from the time of repossession;
(d) Need of the lessor to make necessary repairs of the
leased premises which is the subject of an existing order of
condemnation by appropriate authorities concerned in order
to make the said premises safe and habitable: Provided, That
after said repair, the lessee ejected shall have the first prefer-
ence to lease the same premises: Provided, however, That the
new rental shall be reasonably commensurate with the ex-
penses incurred for the repair of the said residential unit and:
Provided, finally, That if the residential unit is condemned or
completely demolished, the lease of the new building will no
longer be subject to the aforementioned first-preference rule
in this subsection; and
(e) Expiration of the period of the lease contract.
SEC. 8. Prohibition Against Ejectment by Reason of Sale or
Mortgage. — No lessor or his successor-in-interest shall be
entitled to eject the lessee upon the ground that the leased
premises have been sold or mortgaged to a third person re-
gardless of whether the lease or mortgage is registered or not.
SEC. 9. Rent-to-Own Scheme. — At the option of the lessor,
he or she may engage the lessee in a written rent-to-own agree-
ment that will result in the transfer of ownership of the par-
ticular dwelling in favor of the latter. Such an agreement shall
be exempt from the coverage of Section 3 of this Act.
SEC. 10. Application of the Civil Code and Rules of Court of
the Philippines. — Except when the lease is for a definite pe-
riod, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, insofar as they refer to residential
units covered by this Act, shall be suspended during the
effectivity of this Act, but other provisions of the Civil Code
and the Rules of Court on lease contracts, insofar as they are
not in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall apply.
SEC. 11. Coverage of this Act. — All residential units in the
National Capital Region and other highly urbanized cities the
total monthly rental for each of which does not exceed Seven
thousand five hundred pesos (P7,500.00) and all residential
units in all other areas the total monthly rental for each of
which does not exceed Four thousand pesos (P4,000.00) as of
the effectivity date of this Act shall be covered, without preju-
dice to existing contracts.
SEC. 12. Penalties. — A fine of not less than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Fifteen thousand pesos
650 LEASE Art. 1674
(P15,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than one (1) month

and one (1) day to not more than six (6) months or both shall
be imposed on any person, natural or juridical, found guilty
of violating any provision of this Act.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1674. In ejectment cases where an appeal is

taken, the remedy granted in Article 539, second para-
graph, shall also apply, if the higher court is satisfied
that the lessee’s appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or that
the lessor’s appeal is prima facie meritorious. The
period of ten days referred to in said article shall be
counted from the time the appeal is perfected. (n)
Preliminary mandatory injunction to restore

possession pending appeal.
Chapter 2, although entitled “Lease of Rural and Urban
Lands,’’ refers not only to the lease of lands but also to the build-
ings standing thereon on the principle that the accessory follows
the principal. While Article 5398 seems to refer only to forcible
entry actions, Article 1674 expressly refers to ejectment cases or
those in which there is a pre-existing relationship of lessor and
lessee. (Sycip vs. Soriano, [C.A.] 52 O.G. 1474.)
(1) Ground. — The lessor is entitled to a writ of preliminary
injunction to restore him in his possession in case the higher court
is satisfied that the lessee’s appeal is frivolous or dilatory (i.e.,
without merit) or the lessor’s appeal is prima facie meritorious. For
the purpose of Article 1674, it is enough that the plaintiff is the
owner of the land and the defendant is in temporary occupancy
thereof whether under a lease contract or on mere tolerance or
8
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should
he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the
means established by the laws and the Rules of Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days
from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court, in
the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him
in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from filing
thereof. (446a)
under a temporary permit. Where, after the termination of the

lease contract or the revocation of the permit, the lessee or occu-
pant unlawfully prolongs his occupation of the premises, there is
unlawful detainer. (De La Cruz vs. Bocar, 99 Phil. 492 [1956].)
(2) Summary character. — Article 1674 is an consonance with
the summary character of an ejectment suit which is an expedi-
tious means for recovering possession of realty but the effective-
ness of which is often frustrated by the lessee’s dilatory tactics
often tolerated by Municipal Trial Courts. (Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella,
65 SCRA 471 [1975]; Devesa vs. Montecillo, 27 SCRA 822 [1969];
De Laureano vs. Adil, 72 SCRA 148 [1976]; Palanca vs. Chua Keng
Kian, 27 SCRA 357 [1969].) Actions for forcible entry and unlaw-
ful detainer involve perturbation of social order which must be
resolved as promptly as possible and accordingly, technicalities
or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delay are
carefully avoided. (Montemayor vs. Bermejo, Jr., 425 SCRA 403
[2004].)
(3) Rationale. — The remedy is intended “to put an end to the
present state of the law which unjustly allows the lessee to con-
tinue in possession during an appeal.’’ (Report of the Code Com-
mission, p. 143.) The ordinary action to revindicate ownership or
to recover possession as a right is not expeditious; yet in such
action where judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the
trial court may, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
“upon good reasons,’’ order immediate execution of the judgment.
This being so, there is more reason to order immediate execution
of the judgment in a case of unlawful detainer with respect to the
restoration of possession where it is obvious that the defendant
has no valid defense and that his appeal is dilatory or frivolous.
(Abellana vs. Gomez, [C.A.] 63 O.G. 6201.)
(4) Remedy given to lessor. — The remedy is available to the
lessor in unlawful detainer cases but only in case of an appeal. In
the original case, the possession of the lessee is presumed to be
lawful. In forcible entry case, the writ may be granted even when
there is no appeal. (par. 2, Art. 539.) The 10-day period for filing a
motion to secure the writ shall be counted from the date when
the petitioning party (lessor) is notified of the perfection of the
appeal. (De La Cruz vs. Bocar, supra.)
652 LEASE Arts. 1675-1676
(5) Issuance vested in “higher court.’’ — The issuance of the writ

is expressly vested by Article 1674 in the “higher court’’ or appel-
late court. Thus, the Regional Trial Court in ejectment cases, be-
ing an appellate court, may grant the writ. (Sycip vs. Soriano,
supra.)
(6) Superdeas bond and monthly deposit by lessee. — The prelimi-
nary mandatory injunction refers to the possession of the realty
in litigation. The superdeas bond and monthly deposit are pri-
marily designed to insure that the lessor would be paid back the
back rentals. (De Laureano vs. Adil, 72 SCRA 148 [1976].) Should
the lessee fail to make the payments from time to time during the
pendency of the appeal, execution shall issue. (Sec. 19, Rule 70,
Rules of Court.) Article 1674 provides an additional ground for
execution before judgment.
ART. 1675. Except in cases stated in Article 1673,

the lessee shall have a right to make use of the peri-
ods established in Articles 1682 and 1687. (1570)
Use by lessee of legal period.

Unless there is a proper ground for his ejectment (Art. 1673.),
the lessee is entitled to make use of the (conventional) period
agreed upon (Art. 1669.) or the (legal) period established in Arti-
cles 1682 and 1687.
ART. 1676. The purchaser of a piece of land which

is under a lease that is not recorded in the Registry of
Property may terminate the lease, save when there is
a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of sale, or
when the purchaser knows of the existence of the
lease.
If the buyer makes use of this right, the lessee may
demand that he be allowed to gather the fruits of the
harvest which corresponds to the current agricultural
year and that the vendor indemnify him for damages
suffered.
If the sale is fictitious, for the purpose of extin-

guishing the lease, the supposed vendee cannot make
use of the right granted in the first paragraph of this
article. The sale is presumed to be fictitious if at the
time the supposed vendee demands the termination
of the lease, the sale is not recorded in the Registry
of Property. (1571a)
Termination of lease by purchaser

of leased land.
Although 1676 makes express reference only to sales, its in-
tent and reason justify its application to any other form of aliena-
tion (A.M. Tolentino, op. cit., p. 250, citing De Buen: Colin &
Capitant 374.), like donation. It applies only to lease for a fixed
term and not to those from month to month. Where the lease is
on a month to month basis and the purchaser seeks to recover from
the lessee property which said lessee had leased from the ven-
dor, the purchaser’s right of action is not based on the provisions
of Article 1676 authorizing him to terminate the lease but is based
on his right as the owner or vendee to recover possession from a
tenant holding over after the termination of the right to hold pos-
session. In such a case, the vendee’s action is governed by the
provisions of the Rules of Court, Rule 70, on forcible entry and
detainer. (Rivera vs. Trinidad, 48 Phil. 396 [1925]; Alicante vs.
Tordesillas, [C.A.] 46 O.G. 142.)
Lease binds only the parties, their assigns and heirs. (Art.
1311.) It does not create a real right unless recorded in the Regis-
try of Property in which case it shall be binding upon third per-
sons. (Art. 1648.) The purchaser is not entitled to terminate the
lease even if he has no actual knowledge of its existence. He has
constructive knowledge which is equivalent to actual knowledge.
Unrecorded lease.
The purchaser may terminate the lease unless:
(1) There is a stipulation in the contract of sale he must re-
spect the existing lease;
(2) He knows of the existence of the lease; or
654 LEASE Art. 1677
(3) The property is sold fictitiously just to terminate the lease.

An innocent purchaser for value without notice of an unre-
corded lease has a right to rely on the certificate of title. If the lease
is not annotated thereon, the lessee does not deserve to be pro-
tected. A purchaser with full knowledge of the existence of an
unrecorded lease is bound to respect it because actual knowledge
is equivalent to registration. The lease, in effect, becomes a part
of the contract of sale.
It has been held that the right granted in the second paragraph
of Article 1676 to a lessee to gather the fruits of the crop corre-
sponding to the current agricultural year, does not extend to the
gathering of fishes, which require two years before they are of any
commercial value. (Manila Building and Loan Assn. vs. Green,
[C.A.] O.G. 2088, citing 10 Manresa 645, 1908 Ed.)
The last paragraph states when the sale is presumed to be fic-
titious. It “is calculated to discourage the practice which has de-
veloped in recent years of fictitiously selling the premises in or-
der to oust the lessee before the termination of the lease.’’ (Re-
port of the Code Commission, p. 143.)
ART. 1677. The purchaser in a sale with the right

of redemption cannot make use of the power to eject
the lessee until the end of the period for the redemp-
tion. (1572)
Where sale subject to right of redemption.

In case of sale with right of repurchase by the vendor (Art.
1601.), the vendee cannot terminate an existing lease entered into
between the vendor and a third person until after the period for
redemption has expired. He may, however, make use of the power
to oust the lessee if any of the grounds for ejectment under Arti-
cle 1673 is present.
This limitation contained in said article refers to the tenant or
lessee who has contracted with the vendor and who has had no
relation whatever with the purchaser under an agreement of re-
demption. Such tenant is a third person with respect to said ven-
dor and purchaser. If the vendor should by redemption recover
the property, the lessee would again be entitled to the enjoyment

of the lease; wherefore, the limitation of the purchaser’s right is
proper and just. (Dorado vs. Viriña, 34 Phil. 246 [1916].)
Article 1677 is not applicable to a case where the vendor, on
disposing of real property under right of repurchase, continues
nevertheless in possession thereof by virtue of a special agree-
ment, not as owner, but as a tenant of the purchaser by the pay-
ment of rent. So, a vendor who remains in possession as a lessee
and violates any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract of
lease (Art. 1673.) may be evicted by the vendee even before the
end of the redemption period. (Gonzales vs. Salas, 49 Phil. 1
[1926].)
ART. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, use-

ful improvements which are suitable to the use for
which the lease is intended, without altering the form
or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon
the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-
half of the value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount,
the lessee may remove the improvements, even
though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby.
He shall not, however, cause any more impairment
upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee
shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may
remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage
is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does
not choose to retain them by paying their value at the
time the lease is extinguished. (n)
Right of lessee with regard to useful

improvements and ornamental expenses.
(1) Reimbursement or removal as to useful improvements. – Un-
der Article 1573 of the old Civil Code (deleted in present Civil
Code), the lessee was not entitled to be reimbursed for any im-
provements made by him although he could remove them pro-
656 LEASE Art. 1678
vided the principal did not suffer injury, and he could set-off his
liability for damages against said improvements. Now, under the
present article, he is given the right to reimbursement of one-half
of their value or to their removal should the lessor refuse to reim-
burse.
The Code Commission justifies the change as follows:
“The first paragraph is intended to prevent the unjust en-
richment of the lessor, which is allowed by Article 1573 of the
present Code. Expenses for useful improvements are reim-
bursed to a possessor in good faith, under Articles 453 [now
Art. 456] and 361 [now Art. 448] of the Code now in force.
True, the lessee is not a possessor in good faith in the sense
that he believes himself to be the owner, but neither is he a
possessor in bad faith. He is in possession by virtue of a
contract, so his possession is lawful. The reform requires: (1)
that lessee should make the improvements in good faith; (2)
that the improvements be suitable to the use for which the
lease is intended; and (3) that the form and substance of the
property leased be not altered. These requisites will prevent
the lessee from making such valuable improvements that the
lessor may never recover the property leased.
Moreover, the lessee has a right to make reasonable im-
provements to attain his purpose in entering upon the lease.
The lessor is to pay only one-half of the value of the im-
provements at the time the lease terminates because the les-
see has enjoyed the same. On the other hand, the lessor will
enjoy them indefinitely thereafter.’’ (Report, pp. 144-145.)
(2) Requirements. — With respect to useful improvements, to
be entitled to reimbursement, there are three (3) requisites:
(a) The lessee should make useful improvements in good
faith;
(b) The improvements must be suitable to the use for
which the lease is intended; and
(c) The form and substance of the property leased should
not be altered. (Susana Realty, Inc. vs. Hernandez, [C.A.] 54
O.G. 2206.)
The improvements can be considered made in good faith if

they are not in violation of the lease contract.
The right to indemnity under Article 1678 (par. 1.) arises only
if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. (Lopez vs.
Sarabia, 439 SCRA 35 [2004].)
Note that under Article 1678 (par. 2.), the lessor, not the les-
see, is given the option provided for therein. (Lapeña vs. Morfe,
101 Phil. 997 [1995].) So, the lessee cannot compel the lessor to
appropriate the improvements and pay him one-half of their
value. (Chua Beng She vs. Lee Chy Kao, 6 C.A. Rep. 490.)
Certainly, the lessee has no right to reimbursement by the les-
sor of improvements made after the termination of the lease. (Phil.
National Bank vs. Pineda, 29 SCRA 262 [1969]; Imperial Insurance,
Inc. vs. Simon, 14 SCRA 855 [1965].)
(3) With regard to ornamental expenses. — This is provided in
the second paragraph of the article. The rule is similar to the ex-
penses for pure luxury of a possessor in good faith.9
Right of lessee over necessary repairs.

Necessary repairs are those made for the preservation of the
thing upon which they have been expended. When a repair is
essential to preserve the thing rented in a condition suitable to
the use agreed upon, it is, in law deemed a necessary repair.
(Alburo vs. Villanueva, 7 Phil. 279 [1906].)
Repairs, for example, made on the plumbing system and elec-
trical wiring are necessary repairs, and the lessee is entitled to full
reimbursement of the total amount spent therefor.
However, repairs of the window screens, kitchen cabinets and
wooden fixtures in the house constitute useful improvements only,
for which the lessee, under Article 1678 is entitled to claim one-
half the value thereof at the termination of the lease. (Ty vs. Acuña,
[CA], 57 O.G. 5732.) The construction of a garage, as well as the
9
Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embel-
lished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the pos-
session does not prefer to refund the amount expended. (454)
658 LEASE Art. 1679
filling and fencing of a lot, are not necessary expenses. (Valencia

vs. Ayala de Roxas, 13 Phil. 45 [1909]; Rivera vs. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 40 Phil. 717 [1920]; Robles vs. Lazarraga, 42 Phil. 584
[1921]; Flores vs. Lim, 50 Phil. 738 [1926]; Valenzuela vs. Lopez,
51 Phil. 279 [1927].)
ART. 1679. If nothing has been stipulated concern-

ing the place and the time for the payment of the lease,
the provisions of Article 1251 shall be observed as
regards the place; and with respect to the time, the
custom of the place shall be followed. (1574)
Place and time for payment of lease.

(1) Article 125110 applies to the obligation of a lessee to pay
rent which is usually in the form of money, an indeterminate thing.
Payment should be at the place designated in the least contract;
in the absence of stipulation, at the domicile of the lessee or the
place where the leased premises are located, or if the rent is pay-
able in the form of a determinate thing, wherever the thing might
be at the moment the contract was entered into.
(2) As regards the time of payment, the custom of the place
shall be followed unless there is a contrary stipulation in the lease
contract.
— oOo —
10
See note 1.
659
SECTION 3. — Special Provisions for

Leases of Rural Lands
ART. 1680. The lessee shall have no right to a re-

duction of the rent on account of the sterility of the
land leased, or by reason of the loss of fruits due to
ordinary fortuitous events; but he shall have such right
in case of the loss of more than one-half of the fruits
through extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous
events, save always when there is a specific stipula-
tion to the contrary.
Extraordinary fortuitous events are understood to
be: fire, war, pestilence, unusual flood, locusts, earth-
quake, or others which are uncommon, and which the
contracting parties could not have reasonably fore-
seen. (1575)
ART. 1681. Neither does the lessee have any right
to a reduction of the rent if the fruits are lost after
they have been separated from their stalk, root or
trunk. (1576)
Reduction of rent in rural leases.

(1) Application. — Article 1680 is a special provision for leases
of rural lands. It cannot be applied analogously to ordinary leases,
for precisely because of its special character, it was meant to ap-
ply only to a special specie of lease. It is a provision of social jus-
tice designed to relieve poor farmers from the harsh consequences
of their contracts, with rich landowners. In this light, the article
provides no refuge to lessees whose financial standing or social
659
660 LEASE Arts. 1680-1681
position is equal to, or even better than the lessor. (Laguna Tayabas
Bus Co. vs. Manabat, 58 SCRA 650 [1974].)
(2) Requisites. — The lessee is entitled to reduction of rent if
the following requisites are present:
(a) The land leased is rural;
(b) More than one-half of the fruits have been lost;
(c) The loss occurred through extraordinary and unfore-
seen fortuitous event; and
(d) There is no specific stipulation that the lessee is nev-
ertheless not entitled to reduction.
(3) Cases that do not justify reduction. — The lessee is not enti-
tled to reduction of rent in the following cases:
(a) on account of the sterility of the land leased;
(b) by reason of the loss of the fruits due to ordinary for-
tuitous events, regardless of the extent of the loss;
(c) by reason of the loss of less than one-half of the fruits
even though extraordinary and unforeseen events;
(d) by reason of the loss of the fruits through extraordi-
nary but foreseen1 events, regardless of the extent of the loss;
(e) by reason of the loss of more than one-half of the fruits
through extraordinary and unforeseen events, where there is
a specific stipulation to the contrary; and
(f) where the loss of the fruits occurred after they have
already been gathered, regardless of the extent of the loss.
(3) Other cases:
(a) Where by the terms of the contract of lease the rent is
fixed at an aliquot part of the crops, the tenant cannot demand
a reduction on account of loss of more than half of the crop by
fortuitous events under Article 1680, and the failure to deliver
the stipulated proportion of the crop gathered entitles the
landlord to evict the tenant. That article does not refer to a
1
If the fortuitous event, though foreseen, is inevitable (see Note 2.) and the lessee
can prove absence of fault on his part, the reduction of rent may be justified.
Special Provisions for Leases of Rural Lands
contract of this nature. (Hijos de I. De La Rama vs. Benedicto,

1 Phil. 495 [1902].)
(b) Where a bidding was held by a municipality for the
lease of the municipal fishponds, and the lease was awarded
by lot and by area of the fishponds involved, reduction of the
rent is not proper although it turns out that the areas of the
fishponds were actually smaller than those given in the no-
tice of bid. Since the lessee undertook to make all the neces-
sary repairs and maintain the dikes at all times, he is not enti-
tled to reimbursement for the repairs of the damages due to
typhoon and action of the sea. (Sibug vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, 98 Phil. 542 [1956].)
Fortuitous events.
Under Article 1680, the fortuitous event must not only be ex-
traordinary or uncommon but also one which the contracting
parties could not have reasonably foreseen. One of the essential
characteristics of fortuitous events is that “the cause of the un-
foreseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor
to comply with his obligation must be “independent of the hu-
man will.’’ The phrase must be given the meaning of “independ-
ent of the will of the debtor or his agents.’’
(1) War, although dependent upon the will of the combatants,
is recognized in the second paragraph of Article 1680 as an ex-
traordinary fortuitous event; and violence of robbers, while not
independent of the human will, is recognized as caso fortuito that
excused non-performance and has been always so recognized in
the ancient law (“fuerza de ladrones,’’ in Law II, Tit. 33, Partida
VII). The will of a third person who prevents performance of the
obligation is an inevitable cause, fuerza mayor, which comes un-
der the general description of caso fortuito in Article 11742 of the
Civil Code. (Reyes vs. Crisostomo, [C.A.] 47 O.G. 3625.)
2
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which, could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
662 LEASE Arts. 1680-1681
(2) War, already existing when the contract was entered does
not come under category of fortuitous event contemplated in the
article. Neither are typhoons because in this country it cannot be
said that they are extraordinary or uncommon and cannot be rea-
sonably foreseen by the contracting parties. (Estrada vs.
Hermogeno, [C.A.] 50 O.G. 4919.) When the cause already existed
when the contract was executed, the same cannot be ascribed to
a fortuitous event or circumstance beyond the control of the lessee.
(Cuyugan vs. Dizon, 79 Phil. 80 [1947]; Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.
vs. Manabat, supra.)
(3) Fire is not ordinary a fortuitous event. Floods must be
unusual. Typhoons and floods submerging the land under water
lasting for about a day or two and the water receding immedi-
ately after, are conditions that could be foreseen. But when the
depth of the water was from 6 to 8 feet, the inundation of the
ricefields lasting from two to three weeks, and after the water had
receded the ricefields were infested by rodents causing destruc-
tion on the crops, the occurrence were extraordinary and unfore-
seen fortuitous events, that even granting they could have been
foreseen, they were, however, inevitable. Such condition of the
floods is, “unusual’’ as contemplated in Article 1680 which could
justify the reduction of rents. (Panayotti vs. Tan Lim Te, [C.A.] 56
O.G. 4568.)
Percentage of reduction.
Article 1680 does not determine the percentage of reduction
of the rental to which the lessee becomes entitled. It is logical that
the rent stipulated be reduced in the same ratio that the actual
receipts bear to the normal income obtainable from the land
leased. The rent must be reduced proportionately. Manresa’s for-
mula, which is deemed equitable, is as follows:
Normal fruits are to fruits actually received as rent stipu-
lated is to X.
In a case, it appeared from the record that the appellant ob-
tained during the first year P28,000 for the sale of fish and P7,000
for the sale of nipa leaves, or a total of P35,000, in Japanese cur-
rency which, at the proved exchanged rate of 14 to one, repre-
sented around P2,500 in Philippine currency. But for the second
year appellant only obtained P800. The testimony of the appel-

lant’s witness about the receipts of the lessee was not found cred-
ible, since he was not placed in charge of the fishpond until 1947.
In consequence, the rent for the second year, was reduced to 8/
25ths of P14,000 (the rent originally stipulated), i.e., P4,480. For
the third year (1946-1947), no rental was due since the lessee was
dispossessed completely and received nothing on account of the
products. (Reyes vs. Crisostomo, supra.)
ART. 1682. The lease of a piece of rural land, when

its duration has not been fixed, is understood to have
been made for all the time necessary for the gather-
ing of the fruits which the whole estate leased may
yield in one year, or which it may yield once, although
two or more years may have to elapse for the pur-
pose. (1577a)
Duration of rural lease.

(1) The duration is that fixed in the contract of lease between
the parties.
(2) In the absence of stipulation, the duration is fixed by law,
to wit:
(a) the time necessary to gather the fruits which ordinar-
ily would cover one (1) year in case of agricultural crops; or
(b) more than one (1) year in case the land may yield only
once and two or more years may have to elapse for the pur-
pose.
Since the duration of a lease depends upon the stipulations
in the contract of lease, it can not be affected by the more or less
valuable improvements voluntarily made by the lessee upon the
property. Thus, the fact that the defendant or his ancestors had
built a house and planted fruit trees on the land in question, which
impressed upon the contract the character of an indefinite term
and implied long duration, would not affect the stipulated dura-
tion, for the reason that the duration of lease contracts depends
on what many have been stipulated by the parties at the time
when the same were entered into, and not on the more or less
664 LEASE Art. 1683
importance of the improvements introduced or effected by the

tenant on the leased property. (Iturralde vs. Garduño, 9 Phil. 605
[1906].)
ART. 1683. The outgoing lessee shall allow the in-

coming lessee or the lessor the use of the premises
and other means necessary for the preparatory labor
for the following year; and, reciprocally, the incoming
lessee or the lessor is under obligation to permit the
outgoing lessee to do whatever may be necessary for
the gathering or harvesting and utilization of the fruits,
all in accordance with the custom of the place. (1578a)
Obligation of outgoing/incoming lessee

or lessor.
Even before the end of the lease, in the absence of a contrary
stipulation, a reciprocal obligation/privilege is given by the
present article as follows:
(1) The outgoing lessee shall allow the incoming lessee or les-
sor to make the necessary work preparatory for the crop the fol-
lowing year; and
(2) The incoming lessee and lessor shall permit the outgoing
lessee to gather or harvest and utilize the fruits he has produced.
In a case, where the lease of a sugar hacienda was to expire
with the 1953-1954 crop-year and the lessor sued the lessee in
November 27, 1953 to allow him to cultivate the fields already
harvested, a writ of injunction secured by the lessor to restrain
the lessee from preventing him to enter the land was held prop-
erly issued. The action is not for unlawful detainer to eject the
lessee before the expiration of the lease but one based on Article
1683. (Escay vs. Teodoro, 105 Phil. 141 [1959].) In another case,
where the lease of a sugar hacienda with an area of 192 hectares
was to expire with the 1938-1939 crop-year, the lessee was required
to allow the lessor to take possession in August, 1938 of 80 hec-
tares of the hacienda which was not cultivated to enable him to
cultivate it for the 1939-1940 crop-year. (Jison vs. Hernaez, 74 Phil.
66 [1942].)
The privilege given to the outgoing lessee to harvest the fruits

evidently indicates that existing crops at the termination of the
lease shall belong to him.
ART. 1684. Land tenancy on shares shall be gov-

erned by special laws, the stipulations of the parties,
the provisions on partnership and by the customs of
the place. (1579a)
ART. 1685. The tenant on shares cannot be ejected
except in cases specified by law. (n)
Rules governing law tenancy on shares.

Land tenancy on shares is primarily governed by special laws,
and suppletorily, by the stipulations of the parties, the provisions
on partnership, and the customs of the place.
According to the Code Commission, “land tenancy should be
governed by special laws because agrarian problems need legis-
lative solution from time to time, as changing conditions may
warrant. Only those laws of a more or less permanent nature
should be included in a Civil Code. It goes without saying that
the customs of the place, referred to in the article should not be
contrary to law or to public policy, such as social justice.’’ (Report,
p. 146.)
Special laws on land tenancy.

Agricultural tenancy is now governed by (1) R.A. No. 3844,
as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms
of the Philippines, (2) Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended
(particularly by Exec. Order No. 228.), otherwise known as the
Tenants Emancipation Decree, (3) Executive Order No. 229 which
provides the mechanisms needed initially to implement the Com-
prehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as instituted by
Proclamation No. 131, (4) R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which
institutes a new Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and
(5) other existing laws and regulations related to agrarian reform
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the CARL of 1988.
666 LEASE Arts. 1684-1685
Incidentally, agricultural tenancy is classified into share ten-

ancy, where the produce is divided between the landholder and
the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions; and
leasehold tenancy, where rent is paid by the tenant either in per-
centage of the production or a fixed amount in money, or both.
Agricultural share tenancy has been abolished.
Extinguishment of leasehold relation.

The following are the causes or modes by which the agricul-
tural leasehold relation may be extinguished:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge
of the lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the lessee, writ-
ten notice of which shall be served three (3) months in advance;
(3) Absence of a successor or heir in the event of death or per-
manent incapacity (such as total blindness, insanity, etc.) of the
lessee (Sec. 8, R.A. No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6839.);
(4) Termination of the leasehold by the lessee under Section
28;
(5) Acquisition of the land in question by the lessee;
(6) Mutual consent of the parties; and
(7) Judicial ejectment of the lessee under Section 36. (infra.)
Causes for dispossession of leasehold tenant.

They are the following:
(1) Declaration of suitability for non-agricultural purposes. —
Declaration of the landholding by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (now Land Reform) to be suited for residential, commer-
cial, industrial or some other urban purposes;
(2) Non-compliance with obligations. — Failure of the lessee to
substantially comply with his contractual and legal obligations
except if caused by fortuitous event;
(3) Use of land contrary to stipulations. — Planting crops or
using the landholdings for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;
(4) Non-adoption of proven farm practices. — Failure of the les-

see to adopt proven farm practices;
(5) Wrongful injury to land. — Substantial damage or destruc-
tion or unreasonable deterioration of the land or other substan-
tial improvements thereon through the fault or negligence of the
lessee;
(6) Non-payment of rental. — Failure of the lessee to pay the
lease rental; and
(7) Employment of sub-lessee. — Employing a sub-lessee except
if the lessee is ill or temporarily incapacitated. (Sec. 36, Ibid.)
— oOo —
668 LEASE
SECTION 4. — Special Provisions for the

Lease of Urban Lands1
ART. 1686. In default of a special stipulation, the

custom of the place shall be observed with regard to
the kind of repairs on urban property for which the
lessor shall be liable. In case of doubt it is understood
that the repairs are chargeable against him. (1580a)
Kind of repairs on urban property

by lessor.
The lessor is obliged to make the necessary repairs on the
property leased. (Art. 1654[2].) The kind of repairs he is required
to make is that provided in the lease agreement, and in the ab-
sence of a special stipulation, the same must be determined in
accordance with the custom of the place.
In case of doubt as to who shall bear the cost of the repairs, it
is understood that it is chargeable against the lessor. While it is
the duty of the lessor to make on the property leased all repairs
necessary in order to keep it in serviceable condition for the pur-
pose for which it was intended, the parties are at liberty to stipu-
late the contrary, in which case, the lessor is relieved of that duty.
(Gonzales vs. Mateo, 74 Phil. 373 [1942].) The right to repair may
be waived by the lessee or he may assume the duty to repair.
1
Presidential Decree No. 1517 (June 11, 1978) proclaimed urban land reform in the
Philippines. The President shall proclaim specific parcels of urban and urbanizable lands
as Urban Land Reform Zones. Within the urban zones, legitimate tenants who have
resided on the land for 10 years or more and have built-their homes on the land and
residents who have legally occupied the land by contract continuously for the last 10
years, shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal
to purchase the same within a reasonable time and for reasonable prices, under terms
and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Manage-
ment Committee. Proclamation No. 1893 and 1907 specified the urban land reform zones
in metropolitan. (Secs. 4, 6, thereof.)
668
Special Provisions for the Lease of Urban Lands
ART. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been
fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the
rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it
is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly;
and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.
However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no
period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a
longer term for the lease after the lessee has occu-
pied the premises for over one year. If the rent is
weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer
period after the lessee has been in possession for over
six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also
fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the
place for over one month. (1581a)
Duration of lease depending on period

at which rent payable.
(1) Application of provision. — Article 1687 is based on the pre-
sumed intention of the parties. It applies only to a lease without
a fixed period (Art. 1669.) and to a lessee, that is, one who has a
contract of lease with the owner. Hence, a sublessee, much less a
mere occupant, is not entitled to its benefits. (Acasion vs.
Corporacion de los PP Dominicos de Filipinas, 100 Phil. 523
[1956].)
Article 1687 does not apply where there is a fixed period,
whether such period is definite or indefinite.
(a) A lease contract on a month-to-month basis is a lease
with a definite period; it expires at the end of each month
without the need of a demand. (Sy Yong Gim vs. Sia Song Peck
[C.A.] 50 O.G. 1180.) A previous demand by the lessor to va-
cate can justify ejectment. (Junson vs. Martinez, 405 SCRA 390
[2003].) The lease is terminable at the end of each month upon
demand to vacate by the lessor. The subsequent acceptance
by the lessor of rental payments does not, absent any
circumstance that may indicate a contrary conclusion,
legitimize the unlawful character of the lessee’s possession.
(Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 744 [1995]; Tagbilaran
Integrated Settlers’ Assoc. vs. Court of Appeals, 444 SCRA 193
670 LEASE Art. 1687
[2004]; LL and Company Dev. and Agro-Industrial Corp. vs.

Huang Chao Chun, 378 SCRA 612 [2002].)
(b) A lease stipulating that the lessee will vacate as soon
as the lessor needed the premises, fixes a period. (Lim vs.
Legarda Vda. De Prieto, 53 O.G. 7678.) If it is shown that the
lessor needs the property, the lease is considered terminated
as of the end of the month after proper notice or demand to
vacate is given. (Junson vs. Martinez, supra.)
(c) Article 1687 finds no application in the case of a lease
contract with a period subject to a resolutory condition, i.e.,
“the lease period x x x shall continue for an indefinite period
provided the lessee is up-to-date in the payment of his
monthly rentals.’’ (Jespayo Realty Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,
390 SCRA 27 [2002].)
The lessor is within his right to increase the rental each
period (year, month, or day, as the case may be) subject to ex-
isting laws; and the lessee is similarly within his right to refuse
to acquiesce. Upon this refusal, the contract of lease between
the parties is terminated. The lessor thus has the right to de-
mand that the lessee vacate the leased property. (Chua vs.
Victorio, 428 SCRA 447 [2004].)
(2) Two distinct provisions. — Article 1687 has two (2) distinct
provisions, to wit:
(a) If the contract has no fixed duration, the law fixes the
term according as the parties have agreed to pay the rentals
annually, monthly, weekly, or daily; and
(b) Even if the parties have agreed as to the periodical pay-
ment of rentals, the law empowers the courts, nevertheless,
to exercise their discretion in fixing the term, if the lessee has
stayed in the premises for a certain length of time. It should
be noted that the second portion gives the court discretion
and does not compel it to fix the duration of the contract.
Article 1687 contemplates a situation where neither of the
parties being at fault, the lessor decided to terminate the contract
of lease. (Susana Realty, Inc. vs. Hernandez, [C.A.] 54 O.G. 2206.)
(3) Implied new lease. — A lease whose duration is dependent
upon the mode of payment of the rental may also arise, where at
the expiration of a lease for a fixed term, the lessee should con-
tinue to enjoy the thing leased for at least 15 days with the acqui-
escence of the lessor, not for the period of the original contract,
but for the time established in Article 1687. (Art. 1670.)
(4) Discretion of court to fix a longer period. — Under the former
provision of the old Civil Code (Art. 1581 thereof.), “the lease
ceases, without the necessity of a special notice, upon the expira-
tion of the term.’’ Now, the court is authorized to fix a longer term
if the lessee who is not at fault has been in occupation of the
premises for a certain period and the lessor decided to terminate
the lease. It may, however, legally refuse to do so, if the circum-
stances surrounding the case warrants such action. (Prieto vs.
Santos, 98 Phil. 509 [1956]; Divino vs. De Marcos, 45 SCRA 180
[1972]; Ramirez vs. Sy Chit, 121 SCRA 1364 [1967]; Guiang vs.
Samano, 196 SCRA 114 [1990]; Heirs of M. Suico vs. Court of
Appeals, 266 SCRA 444 [1997].)
(a) The extension of the lease should be commensurate
with the period during which the lessee had been occupying
the premises. Where the lessee had stayed for 50 years, an ex-
tension of three (3) years was held reasonable. (Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. vs. De Mesa, 35 SCRA 137 [1970].)
(b) Article 1687 does not contemplate an unwarrant ex-
tension of the period of the lease as to make the period in-
definite. The court may not grant an extension beyond the
period sought by the lessee himself. Thus, if the lessee asked
for a one-year extension, the court should not grant two (2)
years. (Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. Simon, 14 SCRA 855 [1965].)
(c) Article 1687 does not apply to a lease whose termina-
tion is expressly left to the lessee. In such a case, a term may
be fixed under the general provisions of Article 1197. 2
(Eleizegui vs. Lawn Tennis Club, 2 Phil. 309 [1903].)
2
Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the cir-
cumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the dura-
tion thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will
of the debtor.
In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the circum-
stances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the
period cannot be changed by them. (1128a)
672 LEASE Art. 1687
(d) Article 1687 does not grant a lessee an absolute right

to an extension of the lease term but merely gives the courts
the discretion to allow additional time for the lessee to pre-
pare for his eventual ejection. (Melotindos vs. Tobias, 391
SCRA 299 [2002].)
(e) Article 1197 is not applicable where the duration of
the lease is left to the will of the lessor. In a lease, the lessor is
the creditor and the lessee, the debtor. (Lim vs. Legarda Vda.
De Prieto, 53 O.G. 7678.)
(f) The stipulation that the lease can be renewed at the
option of both parties implies that the lease cannot be renewed
without the lessor’s consent. (Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals,
166 SCRA 577 [1988]; Cruz vs. Alberto, 39 SCRA 991 [1971].)
(g) The lessee cannot be granted an extension of the lease
when the parties stipulated that the lease shall not be renewed
or extended by implication. (Ramon Magsaysay Award Foun-
dation vs. Court of Appeals, 134 SCRA 136 [1985].)
(h) The mere fact that Article 1687 does not authorize the
court to fix the term of the lease whhen the rental is payable
yearly, would not prevent it from fixing the period of the lease
under Article 1197.
(i) It is not necessary for the lessor to file an independent
action. The power to extend the period of lease may be exer-
cised by the court as an incident of the ejectment suit. (Ramirez
vs. Sy Chit, supra; Divinagracia vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA
180 [1981].) It would be an idle and costly procedure to require
a lessor to file one action to have the term of the lease fixed,
with all the possible delays attendant upon a lawsuit, and then
file another action for ejectment on the ground that the period
fixed in the first one has expired. (Legarda Vda. De Prieto vs.
Lim, [C.A.] 51 O.G. 5254.)
(j) A subsequent agreement between the parties to a lease
contract over a parcel of land, authorizing an agent to sell the
land owned by the lessor and the improvements thereon,
owned by the lessee, and fixing the rental a month until the
property shall have been actually sold, does not make the
purported sale a condition precedent for the termination of
the lease. Rather, it merely authorizes the lessee to remain in

possession until the sale is effected, or it becomes clear that
the property could not be sold. Where the agent resigns his
commission because of his expressed inability to sell the prop-
erty on the terms specified, then said agreement becomes func-
tus officio and its binding force is terminated. The consequence
is that the situation of the parties reverted to what it was be-
fore said agreement. Since the former agreement did not
specify the period of lease, then it was on a month-to-month
basis because the rental was monthly. (Cajucom vs. Manila
Remnant Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 1049 [1966].)
(k) There is no law conferring on a lessee the preferential
right to occupy the premises over other prospective lessees
after the termination of the lease. To compel the owner to grant
the lessee that concession would be sheer intrusion on the right
of ownership which is violative of the due process clause of
the Constitution. (Hunniecutt vs. Flores, [C.A.] 59 O.G. 2772.)
ART. 1688. When the lessor of a house, or part

thereof, used as a dwelling for a family, or when the
lessor of a store, or industrial establishment, also
leases the furniture, the lease of the latter shall be
deemed to be for the duration of the lease of the
premises. (1582)
Lease of premises together with furniture.

The provision does not say that the lease of the premises is
presumed to include the furniture, but that the lessor also leases
the furniture. The lease of the furniture shall be deemed to be for
the duration of the lease of the premises because the former is
considered as an accessory to the latter.
Nevertheless, under the attendant circumstances, it may be
inferred that the intention of the parties is that the lease of the
premises also covers the furniture contained therein although not
expressly included by the terms of the lease agreement.
— oOo —
674 LEASE
Chapter 3
WORK AND LABOR
SECTION 1. — Household Service
New provisions.
Articles 1689 to 1699 on Household Service, like Articles 1700
to 1712 on Contract of Labor are new provisions. The latter is gov-
erned generally by the special laws on labor.
According to the Code Commission:
“There is a section ‘Household Service.’ The domestic serv-
ants in the Philippines have not, as a general rule, been fairly
treated. Social justice is to be measured by the manner in which
the humblest servant is dealt with, for no social system can
rise above its lowliest class any more than a chain is stronger
than its weakest link. Consequently, under the heading of
‘Household Service,’ there are provisions to strengthen the
right of domestic servants.’’ (Report, 15.)
ART. 1689. Household service shall always be rea-

sonably compensated. Any stipulation that household
service is without compensation shall be void. Such
compensation shall be in addition to the house help-
er’s lodging, food, and medical attendance.
Scope of household service.

Household or domestic service is that rendered by a domestic
servant, who works in the house or with the family with whom
the helper usually lives. (Rosales vs. Tan Que, [C.A.] 46 O.G. 4328.)
674
Art. 1690 WORK AND LABOR 675
Household Service
The family he serves is that of his master and no one else. The
term includes service performed by a family driver. (Balolong vs.
Uy, [C.A.] 52 O.G. 5561; Basco vs. Coronel, 5 C.A. Rep. 997;
Ancheta vs. Colcol, [C.A.] 55 O.G. 3317.)
A laborer, worker, or employee in a commercial, or industrial
enterprise is not a domestic servant. Thus, a waiter and any per-
son employed in a hotel, club, corporation, or society, to serve its
members, are not “domestic servants,’’ in the proper sense of this
term under Article 1689. (Zamora vs. Sy, [C.A.] 52 O.G. 1513;
Rosales vs. Tan Que, supra.)
Reasonable compensation for household service.

A house helper or domestic servant is entitled to reasonable
compensation in addition to suitable lodging, food and medical
attendance. Household service cannot be gratuitous.
Any stipulation that household service is without compensa-
tion is against public morals and void. No agreement may sub-
sist in law in which it is stipulated that any domestic service shall
be absolutely gratuitous, unless it be admitted that slavery may
be established in this country through a covenant entered into
between the interested parties. (De Los Reyes vs. Alojado, 16 Phil.
499 [1910].)
ART. 1690. The head of the family shall furnish,

free of charge, to the house helper, suitable and
sanitary quarters as well as adequate food and medical
attendance.
Obligations of head of the family.

The term “head of family,’’ as used in the law, may refer to
the husband or father, the wife or mother, or any person who lives
alone or with another or other persons, but has servant/s in his
or her employ.
Some of the obligations imposed on the head of the family are
also applicable to the other members of the family, to wit.
(1) to furnish, free of charge, to the house helper, suitable and
676 LEASE Art. 1690
sanitary quarters as well as adequate food and medical attend-

ance (Art. 1690.);
(2) to give an opportunity to the house helper who is under
the age of 18, for at least elementary education (Art. 1691.);
(3) to provide the house helper suitable clothing (Art. 1693.);
(4) to treat the house helper in a just and humane manner (Art.
1693.);
(5) to allow the house helper four (4) days’ vacation each
month, with pay, and not to require him/her to work more than
10 hours a day;
(6) to bear the funeral expenses in case of death of the house
helper (Art. 1696.);
(7) to terminate the contract before that expiration of the term
only for a just cause (Art. 1697.);
(8) to pay the house helper unjustly dismissed compensation
already earned plus that for 15 days by way of indemnity (Ibid.);
and
(9) to give the house helper, upon demand, a written state-
ment on the nature and duration of the service and the conduct
and efficiency of the house helper. (Art. 1699.)
Medical attendance.
The right of house helpers to medical attendance — exclusive
of hospitalization — is purely statutory in character, and where
specifically conferred by statute, is deemed subject to the “rule of
necessity,’’ in the sense that it is dependent upon the need for said
medical attendance. Hence, the determination of the question
whether “expenses of hospitalization’’ are included in “medical
attendance’’ must depend upon the circumstances surrounding
each case.
Even assuming that house helpers’ expenses of hospitaliza-
tion can, in proper cases, be deemed to be within the purview of
“medical attendance,’’ it will only be fair that, except in cases of
extreme urgency, the party who may have to defray the cost of
medical attendance and/or hospitalization, be given a say in the
choice of the physician who will treat the patient and/or the hos-
Arts. 1691-1693 WORK AND LABOR 677
Household Service
pital in which he will be confined. (Cuajao vs. Chua Lo Tan, 6

SCRA 136 [1962].)
ART. 1691. If the house helper is under the age of

eighteen years, the head of the family shall give an
opportunity to the house helper for at least elemen-
tary education. The cost of such education shall be a
part of the house helper’s compensation, unless there
is a stipulation to the contrary.
Opportunity for at least elementary education.

Under the provision, the cost of such education is chargeable
to the house helper’s compensation unless there is an agreement
to the contrary.
Literally, construed, a house helper under 18 years of age is
not entitled to secondary education at the head of the family’s
expense; if 18 years or above, not even to elementary education.
ART. 1692. No contract for household service shall

last for more than two years. However, such contract
may be renewed from year to year.
Duration of household service.

The duration is limited to two (2) years. However, the con-
tract may be renewed from year to year. A contract for more than
two (2) years is void as to the excess.
ART. 1693. The house helper’s clothes shall be sub-

ject to stipulation. However, any contract for house-
hold service shall be void if thereby the house helper
cannot afford to acquire suitable clothing.
Clothes of the house helper.

The house helper is entitled to suitable clothing subject to
stipulation between the parties. If the house helper cannot afford
to acquire suitable clothing, the house helper cannot waive this
right by stipulation. Any such stipulation is void.
678 LEASE Arts. 1694-1695
ART. 1694. The head of the family shall treat the

house helper in a just and humane manner. In no case
shall physical violence be used upon the house helper.
Treatment of house helper.

A house helper shall be treated by the head of the family in a
just and humane manner. Whatever the infractions he/she may
have committed, will not justify the use of physical violence upon
his/her person.
A similar provision is contained in Article 147 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, except that the obligation is imposed on
an employer. (Pres. Decree No. 442, as amended.)
ART. 1695. House helpers shall not be required to

work more than ten hours a day. Every house helper
shall be allowed four days vacation each month, with
pay.
Ten-hour a day work.

The prohibition contained in Article 1695 is against requiring
house helpers to work more than the prescribed period.1 What is
unlawful is for house helpers to be compelled by their employers
to do so, but not for both parties to agree otherwise upon pay-
ment of additional compensation. However, unless the existence
of such agreement is clearly established whatever doubt there may
be should be resolved in favor of the house helper. This rule of
construction in case of doubt is necessary lest the law be made a
refuge of unscrupulous heads of the family. (Balolong vs. Uy,
[C.A.], 52 O.G. 556; Basco vs. Coronel, 5 C.A. 997.)
The househelper cannot demand payment of compensation
for overtime work done, unless such overtime work be required
by the employer, or is demanded by the nature of the work.
(Zamora vs. Sy, [C.A.] 52 O.G. 1513.)
1
Art. 1418. When the law fixes, or authorizes the fixing of the maximum number of
hours of labor, and a contract is entered into whereby a laborer undertakes to work
longer than the maximum thus fixed, he may demand additional compensation for service
rendered beyond the time limit.
Household Service
Vacation leave.
Such vacation leave with pay, if not enjoyed, could not be ac-
cumulated. The house helper is not entitled to payment for such
leave, unless he had asked therefor and his employer refused his
request, for in such case there is an implied agreement on the part
of the employer to pay for such vacation. (Zamora vs. Sy, supra.)
ART. 1696. In case of death of the house helper,

the head of the family shall bear the funeral expenses
if the house helper has no relatives in the place where
the head of the family lives, with sufficient means
therefor.
Funeral expenses.
This article applies only “if the house helper has no relatives
in the place where the head of the family lives, with sufficient
means therefor.’’ The head of the family must bear the funeral
expenses where the relatives, although with sufficient means, do
not live in the same locality.
ART. 1697. If the period for household service is

fixed neither the head of the family nor the house
helper may terminate the contract before the expira-
tion of the term, except for a just cause. If the house
helper is unjustly dismissed, he shall be paid the com-
pensation already earned plus that for fifteen days by
way of indemnity. If the house helper leaves without
justifiable reason, he shall forfeit any salary due him
and unpaid, for not exceeding fifteen days.
Termination of household service.

(1) If no period for household service is fixed, the head of the
family may terminate the same at any time by giving notice (Art.
1698.) but he must act in good faith and under circumstances to
avoid undue prejudice to the house helper.
(2) If a period is fixed, neither party may terminate the con-
tract before the expiration of the term, except for a just cause.
680 LEASE Art. 1698
(a) In case of unjust dismissal, the house helper is enti-

tled to be paid the compensation already earned plus 15 days
wages as indemnity.
(b) If the house helper leaves withut justifiable reason, he
forfeits any salary earned and unpaid, for not more than 15
days.
ART. 1698. If the duration of the household service

is not determined either by stipulation or by the na-
ture of the service, the head of the family or the house
helper may give notice to put an end to the service
relation, according to the following rules:
(1) If the compensation is paid by the day, notice
may be given on any day that the service shall end at
the close of the following day;
(2) If the compensation is paid by the week, no-
tice may be given, at the latest, on the first business
day of the week, that the service shall be terminated
at the end of the seventh day from the beginning of
the week;
(3) If the compensation is paid by the month, no-
tice may be given, at the latest, on the fifth day of the
month, that the service shall cease at the end of the
month.
Notice to terminate service relation

where no period fixed.
The head of the family or the house helper, as the case may
be, may give the notice to put an end to the service relation ac-
cording to the rule provided in the present article, depending as
to whether the compensation is paid by the day, by the week, or
by the month.
In lieu of the required notice, the monetary value may be given
by the head of the family. Thus, where a house helper, being paid
by the month, is dismissed without notice by the head of the fam-
ily, the latter is liable to pay the former the equivalent of one (1)
Household Service
month’s pay. (Balolong vs. Uy, supra; Ancheta vs. Colcol, [C.A.]
55 O.G. 3317.)
ART. 1699. Upon the extinguishment of the service

relation, the house helper may demand from the head
of the family a written statement on the nature and
duration of the service and the efficiency and con-
duct of the house helper.
Written statement from head of the family.

The written statement mentioned in the provision may be-
come necessary in case the house helper applies for employment
in another household or even in other kinds of work.
— oOo —
682 LEASE
SECTION 2. — Contract for a Piece of Work
ART. 1713. By the contract for a piece of work the

contractor binds himself to execute a piece of work
for the employer, in consideration of a certain price
or compensation. The contractor may either employ
only his labor or skill, or also furnish the material.
(1588a)
Contract for a piece of work distinguished

from lease of service.
Article 1713 defines a contract for a piece of work. This kind
of lease (locatio operis) is distinguished from lease of service (loca-
tio operarum) as follows:
(1) In the first (Arts. 1689, 1700.), the direct object of the con-
tract is the result, the complete and finished work done by the
independent contractor (lessor or promissor), while in the second,
it is the service itself by the hired servant or laborer/employee;
(2) In the first, the person for whom the services are to be
performed controls only the result or end to be accomplished,
while in the second, he also controls the manner and means to be
used to produce the stipulated result;
(3) In the first, the risk is upon the independent contractor,
while in the second, even if the result intended is not accomplished
without fault of the lessor, remuneration is still due for the serv-
ice rendered;
(4) In the first, the price is generally not payable until the work
is completed and accepted, while in the second, it is after the serv-
ice has been performed; and
(5) In the first, there is no relation of employer-employee (al-
682
Contract for a Piece of Work
though the contract is referred to in the law as employer), while

in the second, such a relation exists. (Art. 1644.)
In both, there is a price certain or compensation and the rela-
tion of principal and agent does not exist between the lessor and
the lessee. (Art. 1644.) There is also no employer-employee rela-
tion between a common carrier and the passenger, or owner or
shipper of goods. (Art. 1722.)
ART. 1714. If the contractor agrees to produce the

work from material furnished by him, he shall deliver
the thing produced to the employer and transfer do-
minion over the thing. This contract shall be governed
by the following articles as well as by the pertinent
provisions on warranty of title and against hidden de-
fects and the payment of price in a contract of sale.
(n)
Material furnished by the contractor.

Here, the contractor furnishes both the material and his labor.
“Some jurists consider this as a contract of sale. Indeed, it is very
similar to sale.’’ (Report of the Code Commission, p. 147.); hence,
he has the obligation:
(1) to deliver the thing produced to the employer;
(2) to transfer dominion over the thing; and
(3) to warrant against eviction and hidden defects. (see Art.
1545, et seq., Part I.)
Accordingly, the contract shall be governed not only by the
provisions of Section 3 but also by the pertinent provisions on
warranty of title and against hidden defects and the payment of
price in a contract of sale.
ART. 1715. The contractor shall execute the work

in such a manner that it has the qualities agreed upon
and has no defects which destroy or lessen its value
or fitness for its ordinary or stipulated use. Should
the work be not of such quality, the employer may
684 LEASE Art. 1715
require that the contractor remove the defect or ex-

ecute another work. If the contractor fails or refuses
to comply with this obligation, the employer may have
the defect removed or another work executed, at the
contractor’s cost. (n)
Remedy of employer in case of defects.

The contractor must execute the work in accordance with the
qualities stipulated and without defects which destroy or lessen
its value or fitness for the use intended. (see Art. 1561, Part I.)
If the contractor does not comply with his contract, the em-
ployer may:
(1) require the contractor to remove the defect or execute an-
other; or
(2) have the defect removed or another work executed, at the
expense of the contractor if fails or refuses to do so.
The above rules arise from the nature of the contract. (Report
of the Code Commission, p. 147.)
Article 1715 may be available only when there is proof of de-
fects in the work. In the absence of proof to the contrary the work
is presumed satisfactory. (Ramcar, Inc. vs. Garcia, 4 SCRA 1087
[1962]; see Art. 1169.) The measure of damages for failure to com-
plete a construction, is the amount spent by the owner to com-
plete it and correct its defects. (Marker vs. Garcia, 5 Phil. 557
[1905].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Petitioners accepted only the offer of respondent to make a topo-
graphic survey rejecting the offer to make a subdivision survey, and
discrepancies arose as a result of the absence of the latter survey.
Facts: Respondent S offered to make two (2) surveys for
petitioner Philam: a topographic and a subdivision survey of a
45 hectare housing project for the petitioner. For the proposed
subdivision survey, S stated that he would relocate all the
boundary monuments of the project area. Philam accepted the
offer only in so far as the topographic survey is concerned.
Philam, in seeking to recover damages claims, that it

incurred additional expenses caused by the resurvey of the
property, the additional grading work done in the new road
lay-out, the charges in the design of the buildings and residen-
tial houses to be constructed, and the charge in the shipping
area which became smaller due to the fact that the actual area
of the project is less than what appeared in the topographic
map.
For his defense, S contends that under his contract he is
not required to prepare a plan which shows the exact bounda-
ries of the project nor the exact measurement of said bounda-
ries; and that inasmuch as a topographic survey could be pre-
pared on a property even without indicating definitely its metes
and bounds, he proceeded with the topographic survey and
submitted the result of his work. He disclaims liability for losses
arising from the discrepancies referred to by a representative
as well as the architect of Philam whose attention he called be-
fore preparing the topographic map, as he was informed that
he should proceed even without a survey plan because time
was then of the essence and that whatever discrepancies may
arise as a result of the absence of such horizontal survey could
be remedied later.
Issue: Has S been at fault or remiss in the performance of
his duty to prepare the topographic map pursuant to his con-
tract with Philam?
Held: No. (1) Use of topographic map which is not linearly
plotted. — “When a topographic map which is not linearly
plotted and whose boundaries are consequently not accurate
is used in sketching the road lay-out and other parts of the sub-
division scheme, such procedure would be improper unless the
sketch is intended to be merely a preliminary lay-out, subject
to final adjustment after a fixed boundary survey has been
made. x x x.
In planning a scheme for a new housing project, there
should be not only a topographic survey of the entire project
area but also an accurate planimetric survey of the same indi-
cating the exact boundaries thereof.’’
(2) Obligation of contractor under article not absolute. — “Pe-
titioner would have us construe the obligation of the contrac-
tor to execute the work in such a manner that it had the quali-
ties agreed upon and was free from defects which destroyed or
686 LEASE Arts. 1716-1717
lessened its value or fitness as well-nigh absolute. It would

impose the duty on the party thus bound to perform such work
to attain, in each and every case, a degree of perfectibility on
pain of being visited with a liability for damages. That is to
misread Art. 1715. It is to give it an interpretation at war with
the demands of reason. It might have been otherwise if the work
agreed upon to be performed consisted of machinery, which
must be constructed according to specification, otherwise it
would not serve the purpose contemplated. Such is not the case,
however. As Justice Holmes noted, there is no such principle
‘against using common sense in construing laws.’
Petitioner, however, appears to be of a different mind. Ig-
noring the vital circumstance that precluded respondent
Santamaria’s work from being as satisfactory as was hoped for,
for which it could not escape responsibility as it rejected his
offer to conduct both a topographic and a subdivision survey,
it would interpret this codal provision without any thought of
the canons of fairness. It would stretch its meaning in an un-
warranted manner. No legal norm should be susceptible to such
a reproach.’’ (Philippine American Life Ins. Co. vs. Santamaria, 31
SCRA 798 [1970].)
ART. 1716. An agreement waiving or limiting the

contractor’s liability for any defect in the work is void
if the contractor acted fraudulently. (n)
Agreement waiving or limiting contractor’s

liability for defects.
The agreement or “stipulation, if the contractor acted fraudu-
lently is contrary to public policy’’ (Report of the Code Commis-
sion, p. 147.) and is void. Article 1716 is similar to Article 1553
(Part I.) which declares void any stipulation exempting the ven-
dor from the obligation to answer for eviction if he acted in bad
faith.
ART. 1717. If the contractor bound himself to fur-

nish the material, he shall suffer the loss if the work
should be destroyed before its delivery, save when
there has been delay in receiving it. (1589)
Risk of loss where material furnished

by contractor.
Here, the contractor furnishes both his labor and material. He
shall suffer the loss if the work should be destroyed even if due
to a fortuitous event, before its delivery, unless the lessee-owner
is guilty of mora accipiendi, in which case the risk is shifted to him.
Thus, where the contractor of a building completed its construc-
tion and the owner wrongfully refused to accept delivery, the lat-
ter must bear the loss although there has been no actual delivery
by reason of the loss of the building by fire. (Tuason vs. Zamora
& Sons, 2 Phil. 305 [1903]; Atlantic Gulf Co. vs. Insular Govern-
ment, 10 Phil. 166 [1908].)
The contract is not extinguished, and, therefore. The contrac-
tor may be required to do the work again, unless there is a stipu-
lation to the contrary or a repetition of the work has become im-
possible.
ART. 1718. The contractor who has undertaken to

put only his work or skill, cannot claim any compen-
sation if the work should be destroyed before its de-
livery, unless there has been delay in receiving it, or
if the destruction was caused by the poor quality
of the material, provided this fact was communicated
in due time to the owner. If the material is lost through
a fortuitous event, the contract is extinguished.
(1590a)
Risk of loss where contractor

furnished only his work.
Under the present article, the contractor has undertakien to
put only his work or skill and the work is destroyed by a fortui-
tous event before its delivery. He cannot claim any compensation
for his labor or work unless:
(1) the lessee-owner is guilty of mora accipiendi; or
(2) the destruction was caused by the poor quality of the
material furnished by the owner, provided the contractor com-
municated this fact in due time to the owner.
688 LEASE Art. 1719
If the material is lost through a fortuitous event, the contract

is extinguished. The contractor is not liable for damages or for the
value of the materials. If the loss or destruction is due to the con-
tractor’s fault, he may be obliged to do the work all over again.
ART. 1719. Acceptance of the work by the employer

relieves the contractor of liability for any defect in the
work, unless:
(1) The defect is hidden and the employer is not,
by his special knowledge, expected to recognize the
same; or
(2) The employer expressly reserves his rights
against the contractor by reason of the defect. (n)
Effect of acceptance by the employer.

The acceptance of the work by the lessee-owner without ob-
jection or protest relieves the contractor of liability except in the
cases mentioned.
(1) The acceptance of the building without objecting with ref-
erence to the work or material furnished in the construction of
the house has the effect of acknowledging that the work and
material had been performed and furnished substantially as
agreed upon. This acceptance, of course, would not prevent the
defendant from subsequently raising the objection that there ex-
isted hidden defects in the construction of said house. (Choy vs.
Heredia, 12 Phil. 259 [1908]; Campbell vs. Behn Meyer Co., 3 Phil.
590 [1904]; Naval vs. Benavides, 8 Phil. 250 [1907]; Chan Suanco
vs. Alonso, 14 Phil. 517 [1909].)
(2) The acceptance of a building under protest is not a waiver
of any claim for damages for defects in its construction. (Ang Toa
vs. Alvarez, 11 Phil. 146 [1908]; Marker vs. Garcia, 5 Phil. 557
[1905]; Casimiro vs. Tamparong, 78 Phil. 804 [1947].)
(3) From the very nature of things, it is impossible to deter-
mine by the simple inspection of a concrete wall, floor, or plat-
form whether it has been made of reinforced concrete, for the rea-
son that this work is done by embedding iron or steel rods in the
concrete in such manner as to increase its strength. (Limjap vs. J.

Machuca & Co., 38 Phil. 451 [1918].)
ART. 1720. The price or compensation shall be paid

at the time and place of delivery of the work, unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary. If the work is to
be delivered partially, the price or compensation for
each part having been fixed, the sum shall be paid at
the time and place of delivery, in the absence of stipu-
lation. (n)
Time and place of payment of price

or compensation.
In the absence of stipulation to the contrary:
(1) The price or compensation shall be paid at the time and
place of delivery (see Art. 1582, Part I.);
(2) In case the work is to be delivered partially, and the price
or compensation for each part has been fixed, the same shall be
paid at the time and place of delivery of said part.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Architect/contractor who was guilty of delay in the submis-
sion of working drawings and specifications of a proposed condo-
minium building, was ordered by the Court of Appeals to return the
amount paid to him for the building plans which he submitted on
time as per contract, and attorney’s fees.
Facts: In a letter-agreement between petitioner J. Gonzales,
architect and contractor, and respondent Endel Corp. for the
construction of a condominium building on the latter’s lot,
Gonzales agreed to undertake the preparation of plans of said
building as well as the supervision of its construction.
Endel sued for rescission of its contract which Gonzales,
alleging that the latter’s neglect and delay in completing the
drawings and specifications within three (3) months, or by April
30, 1972, conformably with the practice of architects, to enable
Endel to complete plans for financing and make public an-
nouncements of said project, resulted in great damage and
prejudicial to it.
690 LEASE Art. 1720
Traversing the complaint, Gonzales alleges, among others:

there was no delay; assuming there was delay, it was due to
Endel’s refusal to discuss with him the preparation of said draw-
ings and specifications, and Endel did not inform him of its
desire to abandon the construction and had he been so informed,
he would not have incurred expenses in preparing the work-
ing drawings and specifications.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the rescission of the con-
tract, holding Gonzales obligated to return to Endel the amount
of P20,000 paid by Endel for the preparation of the plans, with
legal interest and P2,000 as attorney’s fees.
Issue: Is Gonzales liable to Endel for the return of the amount
of P20,000.00 and for the payment of attorney’s fees.
Held: No. (1) Compensation apportioned according to stage of
services to be rendered. — “It is fundamental that contracts are to
be interpreted according to their liberal meaning when the terms
and conditions are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention
of the contracting parties. An examination of the contract re-
veals that the compensation of Gonzales was apportioned in
accordance with the stage of services to be rendered.
Upon his being commissioned. Gonzales received
P10,000.00 under item 5(a) of the contract. And under item 5
(b), he was paid P20,000.00 upon approval of the plans by the
Engineering Department of Ayala Securities Corporation.
Gonzales is entitled to those payments by the very terms of the
contract. He had performed the services required and had
earned his fees.’’
(2) Effect of abandonment of project for payments received for
services already rendered. — “The fact that the condominium
project was later abandoned should not result in the forfeiture
by Gonzales of those payments. Nor the fact that the contract
has been rescinded and would ordinarily create the obligation
to return the things which were the object of the contract, and
the price with its interest. Upon a showing that an architect has
fully performed services relating to the completion of specifi-
cations and general working drawings, he is entitled to recover
payments specified for such services even though the project is
thereafter abandoned so as to prevent performance of other
services for which additional compensation has been provided.’’
(3) Delay only with submission of working drawings and speci-
fications. — “While it may be true that Gonzales incurred in
delay, as found by both the Trial and Appellate Courts, which

finding is binding on us, that delay was only with respect to
the submission of working drawings and specifications as pro-
vided in item 5(c) of the letter-agreement. By reason of that
delay, Gonzales is not entitled to the compensation provided
therefor, or P20,000.00, even though he may have already sub-
mitted those drawings and specifications to Endel. Besides, the
delay in the presentation of those working drawings are not
the only cause for the failure of the contract. Endel itself had
decided to abandon the project for other reasons. If time were,
indeed, of the essence of the contract, as Endel alleges, it could
have cancelled it in April, 1972 and it should not have allowed
Gonzales to continue working further on the drawings and
specifications under item 5(c) of the agreement.
Neither do we deem it just and equitable that Endel should
recover attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
(Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 630 [1983].)
——— ———— ———-
2. Petitioner requires respondent (contractor) to file a new per-
formance bond equal to the cost of the entire unfinished work instead
of 20% of the cost of the next stage of the construction to be under-
taken by respondent.
Facts: Pursuant to a contract with petitioner City of Pasay
for the construction of a new Pasay City Hall, respondent V.D.
Isip proceeded with the construction of the building as per duly
approved plans and specifications. After the respondent filed
an action for specific performance with damages against the
petitioner, the parties entered into a compromise agreement
which was approved by the trial court. There was an amount
still due from the petitioner to the respondent.
The pertinent provisions of the compromise agreement are
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
[1] “Whereas, one of the conditions set forth in the pro-
posal is that the Contractor shall start the construction of the
Pasay City Hall building as per plans and specifications by
stages advancing the necessary amount needed for each stage
of work and the Party of the First Part to reimburse the amount
spent on the work accomplished by the Contractor before pro-
ceeding on the next stage; Provided, The First Party shall sup-
ply the cement needed;
692 LEASE Art. 1720
xxx xxx xxx

2. That the work shall be done in stages to be deter-
mined by the City Engineer considering structural and func-
tional criteria and consistent with funds immediately avail-
able for the purpose;
3. That the Contractor shall advance the necessary
amount needed for each stage of work; Provided, That the
Contractor shall, before starting each stage of work, inform
the First Party in writing as to the amount necessary to be
advanced by the former; . . .
4. That the Party of the First Part shall reimburse the
Contractor the cost of the work completed as estimated by
the City Engineer for each stage of work before the Con-
tractor proceed to the next stage; x x x x x x’’
[2] “H. That detailed, separate reports on the progress
of the construction work during each stage shall regularly be
submitted to the City Engineer and the City Mayor;
xxx xxx xxx
2. That within a reasonable period of time, at least ninety
(90) days from the final approval of this Compromise Agree-
ment by this Honorable Court, the defendant Pasay City Gov-
ernment shall pay and remit the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THIRTEEN THOUSAND NINETY-SIX PESOS (P613,096.00)
. . . to the plaintiff contractor, who, in turn, immediately upon
receipt thereof, shall be bound and obliged to commence and
start the construction work corresponding to the next stage
thereof; . . .’’
xxx xxx xxx’’
[3] “B. That immediately upon final approval hereof by
this Honorable Court, the plaintiff contractor will submit and
file in favor of Pasay City Government a new performance bond
in the amount required by pertinent law, rules and regulations,
in proportion to the remaining value or cost of the unfinished
work of the construction as per approved plans and specifica-
tions . . .’’
Petitioner claims that since respondent has not put up a
performance bond in the sufficient amount equivalent to 20%
of the remaining cost of construction as per agreement, it can-
not be obliged to pay the sum due respondent as yet.’’
Issue: Did the contracting parties envision a stage by stage

construction on the part of respondent and payment on the part
of petitioner?
Held: Yes. (1) Stage by stage construction and payment approach.
— “This is manifested in the compromise agreement, to quote:
[1].
An sub-paragraph H of paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of
the compromise agreement also reiterated the stage by stage
construction and payment as follows: [2].
Subparagraph B of paragraph 1 of the compromise agree-
ment, to wit: [3] read together with the stage-by-stage construc-
tion and payment approach, would inevitably lead to the con-
clusion that the parties to the compromise contemplated a di-
visible obligation necessitating therefore a performance bond
‘in proportion to’ the uncompleted work.’’
(2) Performance bond to cover only remaining cost of next stage
of work to be done. — “What is crucial in sub-paragraph B of
paragraph 1 of the compromise agreement are the words “in
proportion.’’ If the parties really intended the legal rate of 20%
performance bond to refer to the whole unfinished work, then
the provision should have required the plaintiff contractor
to submit and file a new performance bond to cover the remain-
ing value/cost of the unfinished work of the construction.
Using the words in proportion then significantly changed
the meaning of the paragraph to ultimately mean a perform-
ance bond equal to 20% of the next stage of work to be done.’’
(Pasay City Government vs. Court of First Instance, 132 SCRA 156
[1984].)
ART. 1721. If, in the execution of the work, an act

of the employer is required, and he incurs in delay or
fails to perform the act, the contractor is entitled to a
reasonable compensation.
The amount of the compensation is computed, on
the one hand, by the duration of the delay and amount
of the compensation stipulated, and on the other hand,
by what the contractor has saved in expenses by rea-
son of the delay, or is able to earn by a different em-
ployment of his time and industry. (n)
694 LEASE Arts. 1722-1723
Default of the employer.

If the employer incurs in delay or fails to perform an act re-
quired of him under the contract, the contractor is entitled to rea-
sonable compensation to be determined by considering the fol-
lowing:
(1) the duration of the delay;
(2) the amount of compensation stipulated;
(3) expenses saved by the contractor by reason of the delay;
and
(4) the amount he would have earned by a different employ-
ment of his time and industry.
The general rule is that an obligor incurs in delay from the
time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from him
the fulfillment of his obligation. (Art. 1169.)
ART. 1722. If the work cannot be completed on ac-

count of a defect in the material furnished by the em-
ployer, or because of orders from the employer, with-
out any fault on the part of the contractor, the latter
has a right to an equitable part of the compensation
proportionally to the work done, and reimbursement
for proper expenses made. (n)
Non-completion attributable to employer.

The present article grants the contractor the right to an equi-
table part of the compensation due him under the contract and to
reimbursement for his expenses, if the work cannot be completed
because the materials furnished by the employer are defective or
because of orders from the employer. The amount of compensa-
tion to which the contractor shall be proportional to the work al-
ready done.
ART. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up

the plans and specifications for a building is liable
for damages if within fifteen years from the comple-
tion of the structure, the same should collapse by rea-
son of a defect in those plans and specifications, or

due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is
likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice
falls, within the same period, on account of defects in
the construction or the use of materials of inferior
quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of
the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect
supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily li-
able with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does
not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceeding
paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years fol-
lowing the collapse of the building. (n)
Liability of engineer or architect/contractor

for collapse of building constructed.
(1) Liability of engineer or achitect. — The engineer or architect
who drew up the plans and specifications shall be liable for dam-
ages, if:
(a) The collapse took place within 15 years from the com-
pletion of the structure;
(b) it took place by reason of a defect in the plans and
specifications, or due to the defects in the ground; and
(c) The action for damages is brought within 10 years fol-
lowing the collapse of the building.
(2) Liability of contractor. — The contractor is likewise respon-
sible for the damages if:
(a) The edifice falls within the same period;
(b) The collapse took place on account of defects in the
construction or the use of materials of inferior quality fur-
nished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the con-
tract; and
(c) The action for damages is brought within 10 years fol-
lowing the collapse of the building.
696 LEASE Art. 1723
(3) Solidary liability. — In case the engineer or architect super-

vised or directed the construction he shall be solidarily liable (see
Arts. 1207, 1216.) with the contractor.
Note that Article 1723 speaks of a building that should “col-
lapse’’ or edifice that “falls’’; hence, it does not apply to minor
defects. (see Bosque vs. Chipco, 14 Phil. 95 [1909].) However, a
third person suffering damage as a result of any defect in the con-
struction may proceed, against the engineer or architect or con-
tractor. (Art. 2192.)
(4) Effect of acceptance of work. — The general rule in a contract
for a piece of work is that acceptance of the work by the employer
relieves the contractor of liability for any defect in the work. (Art.
1719.) But mere acceptance of the building after competition, does
not imply waiver of any of the causes of action arising from any
defect in the construction.
The owner of a building is not estopped from claiming dam-
ages for defective construction by the circumstance that the cost
of construction has been paid to the contractor, before discovery
of the defects, upon certificates as to the progress of the work is-
sued by the architect representing the owner. (Hospicio de San
Jose vs. Findley Miller Timber Co., 50 Phil. 277 [1926].) A contrac-
tor’s engagement is to build according to plans and specifications.
Since the designs are made by the architect, the builder-contrac-
tor is not responsible as to the sufficiency or inadequacy of the
structure carrying the weight of the building. (Koster vs. Zulueta,
97 Phil. 945 [1956].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
After an earthquake, the building in question sustained major
damage, but after three subsequent earthquakes, the damage caused
resulted in its eventual demolition for which the architect and the
builder-contractor were sought to be held liable.
Facts: The Philippine Bar Association (PBA) decided to con-
struct an office building. For the plans, specifications, and de-
signs, it contracted the services of J.F. Nakpil & Sons (Nakpils)
and for the construction, United Construction Company, Inc.
(United). The building was completed in June 1966.
On August 2, 1998, an unusually strong earthquake hit Ma-

nila and its environs, and the building sustained major dam-
age. The front columns of the building buckled, causing the
building to tilt foreward dangerously. As a temporary meas-
ure, the building was shored up by United. On November 29,
1968, PBA commenced an action against United claiming that
the collapse of the building was caused by defects in the con-
struction. United, in turn, filed a third party complaint against
Nakpils, alleging that the collapse of the building was due to
the defects in the architects’ plans, specifications, and designs.’
At the pre-trial, the court, with the agreement of the par-
ties, appointed a lawyer and structural engineer as commis-
sioner to make findings on technical issues. On April 30, 1979,
the building was authorized to be demolished at the expense
of PBA, but not before another earthquake of high intensity on
April 7, 1970 followed by other strong earthquakes on April 9
and 10, 1970, caused further damage to the property. The ac-
tual demolition was undertaken by the buyer of the damaged
building.
The commissioner submitted his report on September 25,
1970 with the findings that while the damage sustained by the
building was caused directly by the August 2, 1968 earthquake,
they were also caused by the defects in the plans and specifica-
tions prepared by Nakpils; United deviations from said plans
and specifications and its failure to observe the workmanship
in the construction of the building; and failure of PBA to exer-
cise the requisite degree of supervision in the construction of
the building.
This is a motion for reconsideration of the October 3, 1986
of the Supreme Court, filed by United.
Issues: (a) Did the findings of the commissioner, adopted
by the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court,
negate the premise that the subject building collapsed; hence,
Article 1723 is not applicable?
(b) Had PBA the legal duty to provide full time and active
supervision in the construction of the building?
(c) Was there bad faith on the part of Nakpils and United?
Held: (1) After partial collapse, there was unavoidable collapse.
— “United gave considerable emphasis on the fact that the PBA
building did not collapse as found by the trial court and af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals. Otherwise stated, United
698 LEASE Art. 1723
wishes to stress that subject building did not disintegrate com-

pletely as the term ‘collapse’ is supposed to connote.
Be that as it may, it will be observed that in the assailed
decision, this Court is in complete accord with the findings of
the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that after
the April 2, 1968 earthquake, the building in question was not
totally lost, the collapse was only partial and the building could
still be restored at the expense of P900,000.00. But after the sub-
sequent earthquakes on April 7, 9, and 12, 1970, there was no
question that further damage was caused to the property re-
sulting in an eventual and unavoidable collapse or demolition (com-
plete collapse). In fact, on April 30, 1970, the building was au-
thorized by the trial court to be demolished at the expense of
the plaintiff. Note that a needed demolition is in fact a form of
‘collapse’.
The bone of contention is, therefore, not on the fact of col-
lapse but on who should shoulder the damages resulting from
the partial and eventual collapse. As ruled by this Court in said
decision, there should be no question that the NAKPILS and
UNITED are liable for the damage.
Citing the case of Tucker v. Milan (49 O.G. 4379, 4380) as the
case in point, the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
‘One who negligently creates a dangerous condition
cannot escape liability for the natural and probable conse-
quences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an
act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to
precipitate the loss.’’’
(2) Charging PBA with full supervision of construction with-
out legal or contractual basis. — “United argues that it is the legal
duty of PBA to provide full-time and active supervision in the
construction of subject building. Failing to cite any provision
of law to support its arguments, United insists on the inherent
legal duty of the owner, reinforced by practice, usage and cus-
tom, to exercise such supervision. Apart from the fact that
United seems to have completely contradicted its own view
that this construction involves highly technical matters and,
therefore, beyond the ambit of ordinary understanding and
experience, the contrary appears to be more in accord with or-
dinary practice, which is to avail oneself of the services of ar-
chitects and engineers whose training and expertise make them
more qualified to provide effective supervision of the construc-
tion. In fact, it was on the suggestion of Juan F. Nakpil, one of
the petitioners herein, that the construction was undertaken on

an administration basis. Thus, the trial court did not err in hold-
ing that charging the owner with full time supervision of the
construction has no legal or contractual basis.’’
(3) Wanton negligence of United and Nakpils equivalent to bad
faith. — United points out that bad faith is a question of fact
which was not established. The Commissioner, the trial court,
and the Court of Appeals, all of which are triers of fact, alleg-
edly concede that there was negligence but not bad faith.
A careful study of the decision will show that there is no
contradiction between the above finding of negligence by the
trial court which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
ruling of this Court. On the contrary, on the basis of such find-
ing, it was held that such wanton negligence of both the de-
fendant and the third-party defendants in effecting the plans,
designs, specifications, and construction of the PBA building is
equivalent to bad faith in the performance of their respective
tasks. (Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 334 [1988].)
Note: United and Nakpils were held solidarily liable for
damages under Article 1723. (Ibid., 144 SCRA 596 [1986].)
ART. 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build

a structure or any other work for a stipulated price, in
conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon
with the landowner, can neither withdraw from the
contract nor demand an increase in the price on ac-
count of the higher cost of labor or materials, save
when there has been a change in the plans and speci-
fications, provided:
(1) Such change has been authorized by the pro-
prietor in writing; and
(2) The additional price to be paid to the contrac-
tor has been determined in writing by both parties.
(1593a)
Right of contractor to withdraw

or ask for increase in price.
An owner may withdraw at will from the construction of the
work (Art. 1725.) but not the contractor.
700 LEASE Art. 1724
(1) General rule. — If the building of a structure or any other

work is for a stipulated price in accordance with agreed plans and
specifications, the contractor cannot withdraw from the contract,
or demand an increase in the contract price even if the cost of labor
or materials should increase. Neither can he claim a reasonable
value of the work done based on quantum meruit. The contract
being for a definite work at a stipulated price for the cost of the
construction, the contractor assumes the risk that the cost might
go up arising from increase in cost of labor and materials.
(2) When increase in price justified. — It is justified when there
has been a change in the plans and specifications, subject to two
(2) conditions:
(a) The change has been authorized in writing by the pro-
prietor; and
(b) The additional price to be paid to the contractor has
been agreed upon by both parties, also in writing.
Under the old Civil Code (Art. 1593 thereof.), the authoriza-
tion need not be in writing and there may be a recovery on quan-
tum meruit. (Tiu vs. Habana, 45 Phil. 707 [1924].) There was no
condition for the recovery of the additional price that said price
be agreed in writing. Article 1724 apparently revokes the ruling
in Hamano vs. Papa (54 Phil. 264 [1929].) that the contractor may
recover for extra labor and materials although the changes in the
plans and specifications were not in writing. The contractor who
has no such written authorization cannot recover additional price
and is not justified in suspending the construction upon the re-
fusal of the owner. (Santos vs. Cruz, 4 C.A. Rep. 1192.)
(3) Purpose of written authorization. — According to the Code
Commission, the two (2) conditions have been added “to avoid a
misunderstanding between the parties.’’ (Report, p. 148.) The
evident purpose is to prohibit oral testimony and prevent litiga-
tion for additional costs incurred by reason of additions or changes
in the original plan.
The requirement for a written authorization is not merely to
prohibit admission of oral testimony against the objection of the
adverse party. This can be inferred from the fact that the provi-
sion is not included among those specified in the Statute of Frauds.
(Art. 1403.) As it does not appear to have been intended as an

extension of the Statute of Frauds, it must have been adopted as
a substantive provision or a condition precedent to recovery. (San
Diego vs. Sayson, 2 SCRA 1175 [1961]; Weldon Construction Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 618 [1987].) This is true even if
the changes have benefited the owner. The contractor cannot re-
cover. (Marquez vs. Cruz, [C.A.] 54 O.G. 2547.)
(4) Applicability of Article 1724. — The provision refers to con-
tractors who undertake “to build a structure or any other work’’
and contemplates disputes arising from increased cost of labor
and materials. It does not apply to an architect claiming payment
for his professional services as such. (Arenas vs. Court of Appeals,
169 SCRA 558 [1989].)
It cannot apply to work done upon a vessel, which is not
erected on a piece of land, like the conversion of a yatch into a
passenger and cargo vessel. The additional work done on the
vessel may be orally authorized. Regarding this matter, the ap-
plicable rules are the general rules on contract. As a general rule,
a contract may be oral or written. (Royal Lines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 143 SCRA 608 [1986].)
ART. 1725. The owner may withdraw at will from

the construction of the work, although it may have
been commenced, indemnifying the contractor for all
the latter’s expenses, work, and the usefulness which
the owner may obtain therefrom, and damages.
(1594a)
Right of owner to withraw.

Article 1725 provides an exception to the general rule in con-
tracts, that after a contract is perfect, the parties are bound by their
agreement and neither party may withdraw therefrom (Arts. 1159,
1345.); otherwise, the aggrieved party is entitled to demand for
specific performance or rescission with damages in either case.
(Arts. 1170, 1191.) It grants the owner the exceptional right to
withdraw from a building contract, provided he indemnifies the
contractor for all the latters’ expenses, work, and the usefulness
he obtained therefrom, plus damages.
702 LEASE Art. 1726
The right of the owner to withdraw from a building contract

is absolute. The contractor cannot insist upon completing the con-
tract and enforcing payment of the full amount of the contract
price. The right of the owner to desist being absolute, it follows
that its exercise cannot be made to depend upon whether the con-
tract price has or has not been paid in advance, wholly or par-
tially. If the total amounts paid the builder at the time the owner
elects to abandon the projected building are more than sufficient
to reimburse him for his outlay and to indemnify him for the loss
of his prospective profit, the builder must be subject to an action
for the recovery of the difference between the amounts received
by him and those which he would have been entitled to recover
under Article 1728 had no payment been made him at the time of
the abandonment of the project by the owner. (Adams vs. Sociedad
Naton, 39 Phil. 838 [1919].)
ART. 1726. When a piece of work has been en-

trusted to a person by reason of his personal
qualifications, the contract is rescinded upon his
death.
In this case the proprietor shall pay the heirs of
the contractor in proportion to the price agreed upon,
the value of the part of the work done, and of the ma-
terials prepared, provided the latter yield him some
benefit.
The same rule shall apply if the contractor cannot
finish the work due to circumstances beyond his con-
trol. (1595)
Rescission of contract.
The present article provides for two instances:
(1) Death of contractor. — When a piece of work has been en-
trusted to a person by reason by his personal qualifications, and
that person dies before the completion of the work, the contract
is rescinded. (see Javier Security Special Agency vs. Shell Craft &
Bulton Corp., 7 SCRA 198 [1963].) The obligation arising out of
such contract is personal in nature; hence, it is not transmissible
to the heirs but is extinguished by death. (Art. 1311.) In this case,
the proprietor shall pay the heirs of the contractor as provided in

the second paragraph of Article 1726 the proportionate value of
the work done.
(2) Unavoidable circumstances. — The rule applies if it has be-
come impossible to finish the work beyond the control of the
contractor.
ART. 1727. The contractor is responsible for the

work done by persons employed by him. (1596)
Liability of contractor for work done

by his workers.
The contractor is liable for any damage to the work caused
by persons employed by him. For breach of contract (culpa con-
tractual), the defense of due diligence in the selection and super-
vision of his employees charged to do the work is not available to
the contractor although it may mitigate his damages. (see Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Compania Transatlantica, 38 Phil. 875 [1918].)
The fact that the contractor failed to comply with his contrac-
tual obligation, is sufficient basis for affixing liability for damages.
ART. 1728. The contractor is liable for all the claims

of laborers and others employed by him, and of third
persons for death or physical injuries during the con-
struction. (n)
Liability of contractor for death

or physical injuries.
The present article make the contractor liable for damages
arising from death or physical injuries, claimed by laborers and
others employed by him, and by third persons. Note that the li-
ability is limited to death or injuries “during the construction.’’
Under Article 1711, employers are obliged to pay compensa-
tion for the death of, or injuries to, their laborers, workmen, me-
chanics or other employees, if such death or personal injury arose
out of and in the course of the employment, even though the event
may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous
event.
704 LEASE Art. 1729
ART. 1729. Those who put their labor upon or fur-

nish materials for a piece of work undertaken by the
contractor have an action against the owner up to the
amount owing from the latter to the contractor at the
time the claim is made. However, the following shall
not prejudice the laborers, employees and furnishers
of materials:
(1) Payments made by the owner to the contrac-
tor before they are due;
(2) Renunciation by the contractor of any amount
due him from the owner.
This article is subject to the provisions of special
laws. (1597a)
Subsidiary liability of owner to laborers

and materialmen.
The contractor is primarily liable for the payment of the com-
pensation of his laborers and the price of materials he uses. The
owner has no direct contractual relation with the contractor’s
laborers and suppliers of materials.
Article 1729 gives two (2) instances when laborers and
materialmen have a right of action not only against the contrac-
tor but also directly against the owner. It is intended to protect
the laborers and materialmen from being taken advantage of by
unscrupulous contractors and from possible connivance between
the owner and the contractor. Under Article 2242(3) and (4), the
claims of laborers and materialmen enjoy preference among the
creditors of the owner. (Velasco vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 616
[1954].)
Special laws regarding contractor’s bond.

(1) Act No. 3688 provides that “any person, * * * or corpora-
tion entering into a formal contract with the Government of the
Philippine Islands for * * * the prosecution and completion of any
public work, * * * shall be required, before commencing such work,
to execute the usual penal bond, with good and sufficient sure-
ties, with the additional obligation that such contractor or his or
its sub-contractors shall promptly make payments to all persons

supplying him or them with labor and materials in the prosecu-
tion of the work provided for in such contract. x x x.’’
The claim of the government under the Act enjoys priority
over other claims. (Bautista vs. Auditor General, 97 Phil. 244
[1955].) The remedy of a person who furnished materials in the
construction of a public building is to intervene in the action of
the Government on the contactor’s bond. If the government does
not institute such suit, he may file an action in the name of the
Government against said bond. (New Manila Lumber Co. vs.
Republic, 107 Phil. 824 [1960].)
(2) Act No. 3959 makes it obligatory for any person, company,
firm or corporation owning any work of any kind executed by
contract to require the contractor to furnish a bond guaranteeing
the payment of the laborers and provides penalties for its viola-
tion. Where the builder did not require the contractor to furnish
a bond in an amount equivalent to the cost of labor and to execute
an affidavit showing that the wages of the laborers employed in
the work have been paid, he is solidarily liable with the contrac-
tor for the payment of such wages. (David vs. Cabigao, 96 Phil.
163 [1954].)
Article 1729 which provides that its provisions are subject to
special laws, is not applicable to the University of the Philippines
(U.P.) which is subject to Act No. 3688, a special law for the pro-
tection of persons furnishing materials and labor for the construc-
tion of public works. (U.P. vs. Gabriel, 154 SCRA 684 [1987].)
ART. 1730. If it is agreed that the work shall be

accomplished to the satisfaction of the proprietor, it
is understood that in case of disagreement the ques-
tion shall be subject to expert judgment.
If the work is subject to the approval of a third per-
son, his decision shall be final, except in case of fraud
or manifest error. (1598a)
Satisfactory completion of work.

(1) If the work is to be performed to the “satisfaction of the
706 LEASE Art. 1731
proprietor,’’ the question shall be referred to a person who is an

expert on the matter for decision in case of disagreement.
(2) If the work is subject to the approval of a third person, his
decision shall be final except in case fraud or manifest error.
(a) The certificate of the architect, who had been ap-
pointed by and represented the owner of the buildings, that
the buildings had been completed, was sufficient to show the
completion of the contract and to entitle the builder to the right
to recover the balance due under his contract. The owner of
the buildings was bound by the certificate of his own archi-
tect as to the completion of the buildings. (Takao vs. Belando,
49 Phil. 957 [1926].)
(b) When it is not expressly agreed in the contract that the
materials furnished and the labor performed shall, before ac-
ceptance, be passed upon by a third person, such approval
by a third person can not be insisted upon. Thus, where an
ordinance of the City of Manila provides that before a steam
boiler shall be permitted to operate within the city limits, it
shall be passed upon and approved by a particular city offi-
cial, the approval of such official is not a condition precedent
to the enforcement of the contract with respect to the collec-
tion of the amount due under the agreement for the materials
furnished and the labor performed, unless the terms of the
contract expressly provide therefor. If it was not agreed that a
third person had to approve the work, no third person may
decide upon the fulfillment of the contract. (Taylor vs. Pierce,
70 Phil. 103 [1911].)
ART. 1731. He who has executed work upon a mov-

able has a right to retain it by way of pledge until he is
paid. (1600)
Mechanic’s lien.
The right of a worker to be paid for work done on a movable
is in the nature of a mechanic’s lien. He has a right to retain it by
way of pledge until he is paid. The laborer’s wages shall be a lien
on the goods manufactured or the work done. (Art. 1707.)
(1) Where the vendee of a truck brought it to the vendor’s

shop for repairs, the latter has the right to retain the truck until
the cost of the repair had been paid. (Bachrach Motor Co. vs.
Mendoza, 43 Phil. 410 [1922].)
(2) Where the mortgagee in a chattel mortgage covering an
automobile personally delivers the automobile, which has suf-
fered great damage by reason of an accident, to a mechanic for
repairs, requests that they be made and superintends and advises
at various times during the progress of the repairs, he is person-
ally liable for the value of the repairs made. (Bachrach vs. Man-
tel, 25 Phil. 410 [1913].)
(3) Where the mortgagor of a chattel retains possession of the
property with the right to use the same, the cost of any repairs
made thereon by an artisan, to the extent reasonably necessary to
the continued use of the chattel, will, under Article 1731, consti-
tute a lien on the chattel superior to the mortgage, so long as the
person making such repairs retains the chattel in his possession.
A person who buys the chattel at a sale made to enforce this lien
will obtain a valid title. (Bank of the Phil. Islands vs. Walter A.
Smith & Co., 55 Phil. 533 [1931].)
(4) The repair man is not a party to the terms and provisions
in a chattel mortgage to the effect that the mortgagor cannot en-
cumber the auto for subsequent repairs without the written con-
sent of the mortgagee, and in the absence of personal knowledge
of their existence, he is not legally bound by such provisions in
the chattel mortgage. (Phil. Trust Co. vs. Smith Navigation Co.,
64 Phil. 830 [1937].)
(5) Article 1731 is not applicable to salaried employees. Where
a lumber company sold and delivered lumber to a bank, which
attempts to export it but is prevented by the employees of the
lumber company who have done work on the lumber and have
not been paid for their work, the bank has a right to an injunction
to restrain the employees of the lumber company from interfer-
ing or impeding the bank in the exportation of lumber. (Chartered
Bank vs. Constantino, 56 Phil. 717 [1932].)
— oOo —
Comments and Cases
on
SALES and LEASE
By
HECTOR S. DE LEON
Ll.B., University of the Philippines
Author: Philippine Constitutional Law:
Principles and Cases (2 vols.); Comments and Cases on
Succession; Comments and Cases on
Credit Transactions; The Corporation Code
of the Philippines Annotated; The Insurance Code of the
Philippines Annotated; etc.
Co-Author: Comments and Cases on Property; Comments
and Cases on Obligations and Contracts; Comments and Cases
on Partnership, Agency and Trusts; Comments and Cases
on Torts and Damages; Administrative Law:
Text and Cases; The Law on Public Officers
and Election Law; The Philippine Negotiable Instruments Law
(and Allied Laws) Annotated; The Fundamentals of Taxation;
The National Internal Revenue Code Annotated
(2 vols.); etc.
SIXTH EDITION
2005
Published & Distributed by
856 Nicanor Reyes, Sr. St.

Tel. Nos. 736-05-67 • 735-13-64
1977 C.M. Recto Avenue
Tel. Nos. 735-55-27 • 735-55-34
Manila, Philippines
i
www.rexinteractive.com
Philippine Copyright, 2005
by
HECTOR S. DE LEON
ISBN 971-23-4292-1
No portion of this book may be copied or

reproduced in books, pamphlets, outlines or notes,
whether printed, mimeographed, typewritten, cop-
ied in different electronic devices or in any other
form, for distribution or sale, without the written
permission of the author except brief passages in
books, articles, reviews, legal papers, and judicial
or other official proceedings with proper citation.
Any copy of this book without the correspond-

ing number and the signature of the author on this
page either proceeds from an illegitimate source or
is in possession of one who has no authority to
dispose of the same.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

BY THE AUTHOR
No. ____________
Printed by
84 P. Florentino St., Quezon City
ii • 712-41-01
Tel. Nos. 712-41-08
PREFACE
This volume is primarily intended to provide law students

with a basic text in the study of the Civil Code provisions on
SALES (including Barter or Exchange) and the Bulk Sales Law.
This sixth edition now includes the Civil Code provisions on
LEASE (except Contract on Labor and Common Carriers).
It attempts to explain in a simple manner, the law and
principles governing the subject so that they may be easily
understood. To help the student in the proper interpretation of
legal provisions and to show their practical application in specific
situations, it gives illustrations based on everyday life and on
actual cases which have been reduced to their bare essentials. It
includes the doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court up to
its latest available decisions.
Members of the Bar and the Bench will find the book a
useful reference.
HECTOR S. DE LEON
July 2005
iii
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ......................................................................................................... iii
Part I
SALES
(Title VI, Arts. 1458-1637)
Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
1. Governing law ..................................................................................... 1
2. Sources of our law on sales ............................................................... 1
Chapter 1. — NATURE AND FORM OF THE CONTRACT
Article 1458 ..................................................................................................... 4

1. Concept of contract of sale ................................................................ 4
2. Characteristics of a contract of sale ................................................. 5
3. Essential requisites of a contract of sale ......................................... 8
4. Natural and accidental elements ...................................................... 10
5. Effect of absence of price/non-payment of price ......................... 12
6. Transfer of title to property for a price, essence of sale .............. 13
7. Kinds of contract of sale .................................................................... 14
8. Contract of sale and contract to sell with reserved
title distinguished ....................................................................... 17
9. Contract to sell and conditional sale distinguished ..................... 22
10. Other cases of contract to sell ........................................................... 24
Article 1459 ..................................................................................................... 25

1. Requisites concerning object ............................................................. 25
2. Kinds of illicit things .......................................................................... 26
3. Right to transfer ownership .............................................................. 27
Article 1460 ..................................................................................................... 30

1. Subject matter must be determinate ................................................ 30
Article 1461 ..................................................................................................... 34
v
1. Sale of things having potential existence ....................................... 34
2. Sale of a mere hope or expectancy .................................................. 34
3. Sale of thing expected and sale of hope itself distinguished ..... 35
4. Presumption in case of doubt ........................................................... 36
Article 1462 ..................................................................................................... 37

1. Goods which may be the object of sale .......................................... 37
2. Future goods as object of sale ........................................................... 38
Article 1463 ..................................................................................................... 39

1. Sale of undivided interest in a thing ............................................... 39
Article 1464 ..................................................................................................... 39

1. Sale of an undivided share of a specific mass ............................... 40
Article 1465 ..................................................................................................... 42

1. Sale of thing subject to a resolutory condition .............................. 42
Article 1466 ..................................................................................................... 42

1. Sale distinguished from agency to sell ........................................... 43
2. Contract creating both a sale and an agency relationship .......... 45
Article 1467 ..................................................................................................... 45

1. Sale distinguished from contract
for a piece of work ...................................................................... 46
Article 1468 ..................................................................................................... 47

1. Sale distinguished from barter ......................................................... 47
2. Sale distinguished from lease ........................................................... 49
3. Sale distinguished from dation in payment .................................. 49
Article 1469 ..................................................................................................... 50

1. When price considered certain ......................................................... 50
2. Effect where price fixed by third person designated ................... 53
3. Effect where price not fixed by third person designated ............ 54
Article 1470 ..................................................................................................... 54

1. Effect of gross inadequacy of price in voluntary sales ................ 54
2. Effect of gross inadequacy of price in involuntary sales ............ 57
Article 1471 ..................................................................................................... 58

1. Effect where price is simulated ........................................................ 58
Article 1472 ..................................................................................................... 60

1. Price on a given day at particular market ...................................... 60
Article 1473 ..................................................................................................... 60
vi
1. Fixing of price by one of the contracting parties,
not allowed ................................................................................... 60
Article 1474 ..................................................................................................... 61

1. Effect of failure to determine price .................................................. 61
2. Concept of reasonable price .............................................................. 62
3. Determination of fair market value ................................................. 62
Article 1475 ..................................................................................................... 63

1. Perfection of contract of sale ............................................................. 63
2. When definite agreement on manner of payment essential ....... 68
3. Effect of failure to pay price ............................................................. 72
4. Right of owner to fix his own price ................................................ 75
Article 1476 ..................................................................................................... 75

1. Rules governing auction sales .......................................................... 76
2. Right of owner to prescribe terms of public auction ................... 78
Articles 1477-1478 .......................................................................................... 78

1. Ownership of thing transferred by delivery .................................. 78
2. Exceptions to the rule ......................................................................... 79
Article 1479 ..................................................................................................... 81

1. Kinds of promise treated in Article 1479 ........................................ 81
2. Effect of unaccepted unilateral promise ......................................... 81
3. Meaning of option ............................................................................... 82
4. Nature of option contract .................................................................. 82
5. Effect of accepted unilateral promise .............................................. 83
6. Full payment of price not necessary for exercise
of option to buy ........................................................................... 85
7. Article 1479 and Article 1324 compared ......................................... 86
8. Effect of bilateral promise to buy and sell ..................................... 103
Article 1480 ..................................................................................................... 103

1. Risk of loss or deterioration .............................................................. 104
2. Scope of Article 1480 .......................................................................... 104
Article 1481 ..................................................................................................... 110

1. Sale of goods by description and/or sample ................................ 110
2. Meaning of bulk of goods ................................................................. 112
Article 1482 ..................................................................................................... 112

1. Meaning of earnest money ................................................................ 112
2. Earnest money and option money distinguished ......................... 113
Article 1483 ..................................................................................................... 114

1. Form of contract of sale ..................................................................... 114
vii
2. Sale of real property or an interest therein .................................... 116
3. Modes of satisfaction of the Statute of Frauds .............................. 117
4. Statute of Frauds applicable only to executory contracts ........... 118
5. Legal recognition of electronic data messages and
electronic documents .................................................................. 119
6. Legal recognition of electronic signatures ...................................... 121
7. Communication of electronic data messages and
electronic documents .................................................................. 122
Article 1484 ..................................................................................................... 123

1. Remedies of vendor in sale of personal property
payable in installments .............................................................. 124
2. Remedies alternative .......................................................................... 124
3. Applicability of Article 1484 ............................................................. 125
4. Right of vendor to recover unpaid balance
of purchase price ......................................................................... 125
5. Meaning of certain terms as used in Article 1484 ........................ 129
6. Recovery of deficiency after foreclosure prohibited .................... 136
7. Sale or financing of real estate on installment
payments ....................................................................................... 137
Article 1485 ..................................................................................................... 139

1. Lease of personal property with option to buy ............................ 140
Article 1486 ..................................................................................................... 141

1. Stipulation authorizing the forfeiture of installments
or rents paid ................................................................................. 142
Article 1487 ..................................................................................................... 142

1. Expenses for execution and registration ......................................... 142
Article 1488 ..................................................................................................... 144

1. Expropriation of property for public use ....................................... 144
Chapter 2. — CAPACITY TO BUY OR SELL
Article 1489 ..................................................................................................... 145

1. Persons who may enter into a contract of sale ............................. 145
2. Kinds of incapacity ............................................................................. 145
3. Liability for necessaries of minor or other
person without capacity to act ................................................. 146
4. Sale by minors ..................................................................................... 146
Article 1490 ..................................................................................................... 146

1. Relative incapacity of husband and wife ....................................... 147
2. Reason for prohibition under Article 1490 ..................................... 147
3. Persons permitted to question sale .................................................. 148
viii
Article 1491 ..................................................................................................... 148
1. Incapacity by reason of relation to property ................................. 149
2. Reasons for prohibitions under Article 1491 ................................. 149
3. Prohibition with respect to guardians ............................................. 150
4. Prohibition with respect to agents ................................................... 150
5. Prohibition with respect to executors and administrators .......... 151
6. Prohibition with respect to public officials and employees ....... 153
7. Prohibition with respect to judges, etc., and lawyers .................. 154
8. Other persons especially disqualified ............................................. 157
9. Effect of sale in violation of prohibition ......................................... 157
10. Nullity of prohibited contracts differentiated ............................... 158
Article 1492 ..................................................................................................... 158

1. Prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption, etc. ................. 159
Chapter 3. — EFFECTS OF THE CONTRACT WHEN THE

THING SOLD HAS BEEN LOST
Article 1493 ..................................................................................................... 160

1. Effect of loss of thing at the time of sale ........................................ 160
2. When a thing considered lost ........................................................... 161
Article 1494 ..................................................................................................... 161

1. Effect of loss in case of specific goods ............................................ 161
Chapter 4. — OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR
Section 1. –– General Provisions
Article 1495 ..................................................................................................... 163

1. Principal obligations of the vendor ................................................. 163
2. Obligation to transfer ownership and deliver ............................... 163
Article 1496 ..................................................................................................... 166

1. Ways of effecting delivery ................................................................. 166
2. Ways of effecting constructive delivery .......................................... 167
Section 2. –– Delivery of the Thing Sold
Article 1497 ..................................................................................................... 169

1. Concept of tradition or delivery ...................................................... 169
2. Importance of tradition ...................................................................... 169
3. Actual delivery of the thing sold ..................................................... 171
Article 1498 ..................................................................................................... 172

1. Execution of a public instrument or document ............................ 172
ix
2. Symbolic tradition ............................................................................... 180
Article 1499 ..................................................................................................... 180

1. Traditio longa manu ........................................................................... 181
2. Traditio brevi manu ............................................................................ 181
Article 1500 ..................................................................................................... 181

1. Traditio constitutum possessorium ................................................. 181
Article 1501 ..................................................................................................... 181

1. Quasi-traditio ....................................................................................... 182
2. Intention to deliver and to accept a transfer
of possession ................................................................................ 183
Article 1502 ..................................................................................................... 184

1. Contract of sale or return, and of sale on trial
or approval or satisfaction ......................................................... 185
2. “Sale or return” distinguished from sale on trial ......................... 187
Article 1503 ..................................................................................................... 187

1. When ownership not transferred upon delivery .......................... 188
2. Transfer of ownership where goods sold delivered to carrier ... 189
3. Where seller or his agent is consignee ............................................ 189
4. Where seller’s title only for purpose of security .......................... 190
5. Significance where title held merely as security ........................... 190
6. Where buyer or his agent is consignee but seller
retains order bill of lading ......................................................... 191
7. Where a third person who retains the bill is consignee .............. 192
8. Where bill of lading sent forward with draft attached ............... 193
9. Distinctions in regard to the form of the bill of lading ............... 194
Article 1504 ..................................................................................................... 194

1. Risk of loss generally attends title ................................................... 195
2. Risk of loss by fortuitous event after perfection
but before delivery ...................................................................... 195
Article 1505 ..................................................................................................... 199

1. Sale by a person not the owner ........................................................ 200
Article 1506 ..................................................................................................... 207

1. Sale by one having a voidable title .................................................. 207
Article 1507 ..................................................................................................... 208

1. Definition of terms .............................................................................. 208
2. Nature and function of documents of title .................................... 208
3. Most common forms of documents of title .................................... 209
4. Laws governing documents of title ................................................. 209
x
5. Classes of documents of titles .......................................................... 210
Article 1508 ..................................................................................................... 210

1. Negotiation of negotiable document by delivery ......................... 211
Article 1509 ..................................................................................................... 211

1. Negotiation of negotiable document by indorsement ................. 211
Article 1510 ..................................................................................................... 212

1. Negotiable documents of title marked “non-negotiable” ........... 212
Article 1511 ..................................................................................................... 213
1. Transfer of non-negotiable documents ........................................... 213
Article 1512 ..................................................................................................... 213
1. Persons who may negotiate a document ........................................ 213
Article 1513 ..................................................................................................... 214
1. Rights of person to whom document has been negotiated ........ 214
Article 1514 ..................................................................................................... 215
1. Rights of person to whom document has been transferred ....... 216
2. Attachment of goods covered by document transferred ............ 216
Article 1515 ..................................................................................................... 216
1. Transfer of order document without indorsement ....................... 217
2. Rule where document subsequently indorsed .............................. 217
Article 1516 ..................................................................................................... 217
1. Warranties on sale of documents ..................................................... 218
Article 1517 ..................................................................................................... 219
1. Indorser not a guarantor .................................................................... 219
Article 1518 ..................................................................................................... 219
1. When negotiation not impaired by fraud, mistake,
duress, etc. ................................................................................. 219
Article 1519 ..................................................................................................... 220

1. Attachment or levy upon goods covered by a
negotiable document .................................................................. 221
2. Where depositor not owner .............................................................. 221
Article 1520 ..................................................................................................... 221
1. Creditor’s remedies to reach negotiable documents .................... 222
Article 1521 ..................................................................................................... 222
xi
1. Place of delivery of goods sold ........................................................ 223
2. Time of delivery of goods sold ......................................................... 224
3. Delivery of goods in possession of a third person ....................... 224
4. Hour of delivery of goods sold ........................................................ 225
5. Duty of seller to put goods in deliverable condition ................... 225
Article 1522 ..................................................................................................... 226
1. Delivery of goods less than quantity contracted .......................... 226
2. Delivery of goods more than quantity contracted ....................... 228
3. Delivery of goods mixed with others ............................................. 229
4. Effect of indivisibility of subject matter ......................................... 229
5. Application of usage of trade, special agreement,
or course of dealing ................................................................. 229
Article 1523 ..................................................................................................... 230
1. Delivery to carrier on behalf of buyer ............................................ 231
2. Seller’s duty after delivery to carrier .............................................. 231
3. Definition of shipping terms ............................................................. 232
4. Presumption arising from payment of freight .............................. 233
Article 1524 ..................................................................................................... 233
1. Delivery, simultaneous with payment of price ............................. 233
2. When delivery must be made before payment
of price ........................................................................................ 234
Article 1525 ..................................................................................................... 235
1. Meaning of unpaid seller ................................................................... 235
2. Where whole of price has not been paid ........................................ 235
Article 1526 ..................................................................................................... 236
1. Special remedies of an unpaid seller of goods .............................. 236
2. Nature of unpaid seller’s possessory lien on the goods ............. 237
3. Unpaid seller’s lien on the price ...................................................... 237
4. Basis of rights of unpaid seller ......................................................... 237
Article 1527 ..................................................................................................... 238
1. When unpaid seller’s possessory lien may be exercised ............ 238
2. Unpaid seller as bailee for the buyer .............................................. 239
Article 1528 ..................................................................................................... 239
1. Lien generally not lost by part delivery ......................................... 240
Article 1529 ..................................................................................................... 240
1. When unpaid seller loses possessory lien ...................................... 240
2. Revival of lien after delivery ............................................................ 241
Article 1530 ..................................................................................................... 241
1. Right of seller to stop goods in transitu .......................................... 241
xii
2. Requisites for the exercise of right of stoppage
in transitu ..................................................................................... 242
3. Basis and nature of right of stoppage in transitu .......................... 242
Article 1531 ..................................................................................................... 243
1. When goods are in transit ................................................................. 244
2. When goods considered no longer in transit ................................ 244
3. Attornment by the bailee ................................................................... 244
4. Effect of refusal of carrier to attorn or deliver
the goods ....................................................................................... 245
5. Delivery to a ship, etc. chartered or owned by buyer ................. 245
6. Effect of partial delivery .................................................................... 245
Article 1532 ..................................................................................................... 246
1. Ways of exercising the right to stop ................................................ 246
2. Effect of outstanding bill of lading .................................................. 247
Article 1533 ..................................................................................................... 247
1. Unpaid seller’s right of resale .......................................................... 248
Article 1534 ..................................................................................................... 250
1. Unpaid seller’s right of rescission ................................................... 250
Article 1535 ..................................................................................................... 251
1. Effect of sale of goods subject to lien or stoppage
in transitu .................................................................................... 251
Article 1536 ..................................................................................................... 252
1. Right of vendor to withhold delivery in sale on credit ............... 252
Article 1537 ..................................................................................................... 253
1. Condition of thing to be delivered .................................................. 253
2. Right of vendee to the fruits ............................................................. 254
Article 1538 ..................................................................................................... 255
1. Rules in case of loss, deterioration, or improvement
of thing before delivery ........................................................... 255
Article 1539 ..................................................................................................... 257
1. Sale of real property by unit of measure or number ................... 258
2. When vendee entitled to rescind sale of real property ............... 258
Article 1540 ..................................................................................................... 259
1. Where immovable of a greater area or number ............................ 259
Article 1541 ..................................................................................................... 259
1. Application of Articles 1539 and 1540 to judicial sales ............... 259
xiii
Article 1542 ..................................................................................................... 260
1. Sale of real estate made for a lump sum ........................................ 260
2. Conflict between area stated and boundaries ............................... 265
Article 1543 ..................................................................................................... 266
1. Prescription of actions ........................................................................ 266
Article 1544 ..................................................................................................... 267
1. Rules as to preference of ownership in case of a double sale ... 267
2. Possession of property sold .............................................................. 269
3. Registration of immovable sold ....................................................... 269
4. Requirement of good faith ................................................................ 273
5. Other rulings on application of rules .............................................. 286
Section 3. –– Conditions and Warranties
Article 1545 ..................................................................................................... 291

1. Meaning of condition ......................................................................... 291
2. Effect of non-fulfillment of condition ............................................. 292
Article 1546 ..................................................................................................... 294
1. Meaning of warranty .......................................................................... 294
2. Terminology used by parties not controlling ................................ 294
3. Kinds of warranty ............................................................................... 294
4. Meaning of express warranty ........................................................... 295
5. Effect of express warranty ................................................................. 295
6. Effect of expression of opinion ......................................................... 296
Article 1547 ..................................................................................................... 298
1. Meaning of implied warranty ........................................................... 298
2. Implied warranties in sale ................................................................. 298
3. Nature of implied warranty .............................................................. 300
4. When implied warranty not applicable .......................................... 300
Subsection 1. — Warranty in Case of Eviction
Article 1548 ..................................................................................................... 302

1. Meaning of eviction ............................................................................ 303
2. Essential elements of warranty against eviction ........................... 303
3. Trespass contemplated by warranty against eviction .................. 304
4. Vendor’s liability is waivable ........................................................... 304
Article 1549 ..................................................................................................... 304
1. Vendee has no duty to appeal from judgment .............................. 304
Article 1550 ..................................................................................................... 305
1. Effect of prescription .......................................................................... 305
xiv
Article 1551 ..................................................................................................... 306
1. Deprivation for nonpayment of taxes ............................................. 306
Article 1552 ..................................................................................................... 306
1. Liability of judgment debtor ............................................................. 306
Article 1553 ..................................................................................................... 307
1. Stipulation waiving warranty ........................................................... 307
Article 1554 ..................................................................................................... 307
1. Kinds of waiver of eviction ............................................................... 307
2. Effect of waiver by vendee ................................................................ 308
3. Presumption as to kind of waiver ................................................... 308
Article 1555 ..................................................................................................... 308
1. Rights and liabilities in case eviction occurs ................................. 309
2. Right of second purchaser to whom warranty assigned ............. 311
Article 1556 ..................................................................................................... 312
1. Alternative rights of vendee in case of partial eviction .............. 312
2. Remedy of rescission not available in case of total
eviction ....................................................................................... 313
Article 1557 ..................................................................................................... 313
1. Final judgment of eviction essential ................................................ 313
Article 1558 ..................................................................................................... 313
1. Formal summons to vendor essential ............................................. 314
Article 1559 ..................................................................................................... 315
1. Vendor to be made co-defendant ..................................................... 315
Article 1560 ..................................................................................................... 316
1. Where immovable sold encumbered with non-apparent
burden .......................................................................................... 316
Subsection 2. — Warranty Against Hidden Defects of,

or Encumbrances Upon, the Thing Sold
Article 1561 ..................................................................................................... 317

2. Requisites for warranty against hidden defects ............................ 318
3. When defect important ...................................................................... 319
4. When defect hidden ............................................................................ 319
5. Where defect patent or made known .............................................. 321
Article 1562 ..................................................................................................... 322
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1. Implied warranties of quality ........................................................... 322
2. Warranty of merchantability distinguished from
warranty of fitness ...................................................................... 324
3. Fitness for a particular purpose and merchantability ................. 325
Article 1563 ..................................................................................................... 325
1. Sale under a patent or trade name .................................................. 325
Article 1564 ..................................................................................................... 326
1. Effect of usage of trade ...................................................................... 327
Article 1565 ..................................................................................................... 327
1. Merchantability of goods sold by sample ...................................... 327
Article 1566 ..................................................................................................... 328
1. Responsibility of vendor for hidden defects ................................. 328
2. Doctrines of “caveat venditor” and “caveat emptor” .................. 328
Article 1567 ..................................................................................................... 330
1. Alternative remedies of the buyer to enforce warranty .............. 330
Article 1568 ..................................................................................................... 330
1. Effect of loss of thing sold on account of hidden defects ........... 330
Article 1569 ..................................................................................................... 331
1. Effect of loss of defective thing sold ............................................... 331
Article 1570 ..................................................................................................... 332
1. Warranty in judicial sales .................................................................. 332
2. Right of purchaser in judicial sales ................................................. 333
Article 1571 ..................................................................................................... 334
1. Prescription of actions in cases of implied/express
warranty ..................................................................................... 334
Article 1572 ..................................................................................................... 334
1. Sale of two or more animals together ............................................. 335
Article 1573 ..................................................................................................... 335
1. Sale of two or more things together ................................................ 336
Article 1574 ..................................................................................................... 336
1. Sale of animals at fairs or at public auctions
or as condemned ....................................................................... 336
Article 1575 ..................................................................................................... 336
1. When sale of animals void ................................................................ 336
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Article 1576 ..................................................................................................... 337
1. What constitutes redhibitory defect of animals? .......................... 337
Article 1577 ..................................................................................................... 337
1. Limitation of action in sale of animals ........................................... 337
Article 1578 ..................................................................................................... 338
1. Responsibility of vendor where animal dies ................................. 338
Article 1579 ..................................................................................................... 338
1. Liability of buyer in case sale of animal is rescinded .................. 338
Article 1580 ..................................................................................................... 339
1. Alternative remedies of vendee in sale of animals ...................... 339
Article 1581 ..................................................................................................... 339
1. Form of sale of large cattle ................................................................ 339
Chapter 5. — OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDEE
Article 1582 ..................................................................................................... 340

1. Principal obligations of vendee ........................................................ 340
2. Pertinent rules ...................................................................................... 341
3. Liability of vendee for obligations of company
bought out .................................................................................. 342
Article 1583 ..................................................................................................... 344
1. Rules governing delivery in installments ....................................... 344
Article 1584 ..................................................................................................... 346
1. Buyer’s right to examine the goods ................................................ 346
Article 1585 ..................................................................................................... 347
1. Modes of manifesting acceptance .................................................... 348
2. Delivery and acceptance, separate acts ........................................... 349
Article 1586 ..................................................................................................... 349
1. Acceptance, not a bar to action for damages ................................. 349
2. Notice to seller of breach of promise or warranty ....................... 350
Article 1587 ..................................................................................................... 350
1. Where buyer’s refusal to accept justified ....................................... 350
Article 1588 ..................................................................................................... 351
1. Where buyer’s refusal to accept wrongful ..................................... 351
Article 1589 ..................................................................................................... 352
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1. Liability of vendee for interest where payment
is made after delivery .............................................................. 352
Article 1590 ..................................................................................................... 353

1. Right of vendee to suspend payment of price .............................. 353
2. Right of vendee to demand rescission ............................................ 354
Article 1591 ..................................................................................................... 355

1. Right of vendor to rescind sale of immovable property ............. 355
Article 1592 ..................................................................................................... 355

1. Rule where automatic rescission of sale of immovable
property stipulated ..................................................................... 356
2. Right of seller to rescind not absolute ............................................ 357
3. When Article 1592 not applicable .................................................... 359
Article 1593 ..................................................................................................... 362

1. Rule where automatic rescission of sale of movable
property stipulated ..................................................................... 363
2. Reason for the rule with respect to movable
property ......................................................................................... 363
Chapter 6. — ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

OF SALE OF GOODS
Article 1594 ..................................................................................................... 365

1. Provisions governing breach of contract of sale of goods .......... 365
2. Actions available ................................................................................. 365
Article 1595 ..................................................................................................... 366

1. Seller’s right of action for the price ................................................. 366
2. Where ownership in goods has not passed ................................... 367
3. Recovery of price payable on a day certain ................................... 368
Article 1596 ..................................................................................................... 368

1. Seller’s right of action for damages ................................................. 369
2. Measure of damages for non-acceptance ....................................... 369
3. Measure of damages for repudiation or countermand ................ 371
Article 1597 ..................................................................................................... 371

1. Seller’s right of rescission before delivery ..................................... 371
2. Giving of notice required ................................................................... 372
3. Seller’s right of rescission for breach of contract .......................... 372
Article 1598 ..................................................................................................... 373

1. Buyer’s right to specific performance ............................................. 374
xviii
Article 1599 ..................................................................................................... 374
1. Remedies of buyer for breach of warranty by seller .................... 376
2. Remedies alternative .......................................................................... 376
3. Recoupment in diminution of the price ......................................... 376
4. Action or counterclaim for damages ............................................... 377
5. Recoupment and counterclaims, distinguished ............................ 377
6. When rescission by the buyer not allowed .................................... 378
7. Rights and obligations of buyer in case of rescission .................. 378
Chapter 7. — EXTINGUISHMENT OF SALE
Article 1600 ..................................................................................................... 379

1. Causes of extinguishment of sale ..................................................... 379
Section 1. — Conventional Redemption
Article 1601 ..................................................................................................... 380

1. Conventional redemption defined ................................................... 380
2. Subject matter of conventional redemption ................................... 380
3. Nature of conventional redemption ................................................ 380
4. Option to buy and right of repurchase distinguished ................. 382
5. Right to redeem and right of repurchase distinguished ............. 383
Article 1602 ..................................................................................................... 383
1. Equitable mortgage defined .............................................................. 384
2. The “pacto de retro” problem ........................................................... 384
3. “Pacto de retro” and mortgage, distinguished .............................. 386
4. Subsequent sale of property by vendor a retro ............................. 389
5. When contract with right to repurchase presumed an
equitable mortage ........................................................................ 389
7. Intention to execute mortgage may be fairly inferred ................. 394
8. Price in pacto de retro sales usually lower .................................... 402
Articles 1603-1604 .......................................................................................... 403
1. Presumption in case of doubt ........................................................... 403
2. Effect where contract held as an equitable mortgage .................. 406
3. “Pacto de retro” sales not favored ................................................... 407
Article 1605 ..................................................................................................... 407
1. When vendor may ask for redemption ........................................... 407
Article 1606 ..................................................................................................... 408
1. Period for exercise of right of redemption ..................................... 408
2. When Article 1606, par. 3, not applicable ....................................... 413
3. Date from which period is reckoned ............................................... 415
4. Effect of stipulation extending period of repurchase ................... 416
5. Reason for limiting period of redemption ..................................... 416
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6. Validity of penal clause providing automatic
termination of redemption period ........................................ 416
Article 1607 ..................................................................................................... 417
1. Judicial order for recording of consolidation of ownership ....... 418
2. Action to consolidate ownership ..................................................... 419
Article 1608 ..................................................................................................... 420
1. Nature of right to redeem .................................................................. 420
Article 1609 ..................................................................................................... 421
1. Rights acquired by vendee a retro ................................................... 421
Article 1610 ..................................................................................................... 421
1. Right of vendor’s creditors to redeem ............................................ 421
Article 1611 ..................................................................................................... 422
1. Redemption in sale of part of undivided immovable ................. 422
Articles 1612-1613 .......................................................................................... 423
1. Redemption in joint sale by co-owners/co-heirs
of undivided immovable ........................................................... 423
2. Effect of redemption by co-owner of entire property .................. 424
Article 1614 ..................................................................................................... 426
1. Redemption in separate sales by co-owners
of undivided immovable ......................................................... 426
Article 1615 ..................................................................................................... 426
1. Redemption against heirs of vendee ............................................... 426
Article 1616 ..................................................................................................... 427
1. Obligations of vendor a retro in case of redemption ................... 427
2. Offer to redeem and tender of payment generally
required ......................................................................................... 430
3. Consignation of price generally not required ............................... 431
Article 1617 ..................................................................................................... 431
1. Right of parties as to fruits of land ................................................. 432
Article 1618 ..................................................................................................... 433
1. Right of vendor a retro to recover thing
sold free from charges ................................................................ 433
Section 2. — Legal Redemption
Article 1619 ..................................................................................................... 435
xx
1. Legal redemption defined ................................................................. 435
2. Transfer of ownership by onerous title ........................................... 435
3. Dation in payment defined ............................................................... 435
4. Nature of dation in payment ............................................................ 436
5. Basis and nature of right of legal redemption ............................... 436
6. Instances of legal redemption ........................................................... 437
Article 1620 ..................................................................................................... 442
1. Right of legal redemption of co-owner ........................................... 442
2. By whom and against whom right may be exercised .................. 444
3. When right cannot be invoked ......................................................... 444
4. Price of redeemption .......................................................................... 445
5. Purpose of the grant of right to co-owners .................................... 446
Article 1621 ..................................................................................................... 446

1. Right of legal redemption of adjacent owners
of rural lands ................................................................................ 447
2. Meaning of rural lands ....................................................................... 449
3. Use of property a determining factor ............................................. 449
4. Preference as between two or more adjacent owners
of rural lands ................................................................................ 449
5. Purpose of the grant of right to owners of adjoining
rural lands .................................................................................. 450
Article 1622 ..................................................................................................... 451

1. Rights of pre-emption and legal redemption
of adjacent owners of urban lands .......................................... 451
2. Meaning of urban land ...................................................................... 453
3. Urban and rural lands distinguished .............................................. 453
4. Meaning of “to speculate” ................................................................. 454
5. Purpose of the grant of right to owners of adjoining
urban lands ................................................................................ 455
Article 1623 ..................................................................................................... 455
1. Exercise of right of preemption or redemption ............................. 456
2. Period for exercise of right ................................................................ 456
3. Notice by vendor or prospective vendor ....................................... 458
4. How right exercised ............................................................................ 464
Chapter 8. — ASSIGNMENT OF CREDITS AND OTHER

INCORPOREAL RIGHTS
Article 1624 ..................................................................................................... 470

1. Assignment of credit defined ........................................................... 470
2. Nature of assignment of credit ......................................................... 470
3. Perfection of contract for assignment of credit ............................. 471
4. Assignment distinguished from other terms ................................. 472
xxi
Article 1625 ..................................................................................................... 472
1. Binding effect of assignment ............................................................. 472
Article 1626 ..................................................................................................... 473
1. Consent of debtor to assignment not required ............................. 473
2. Effect of payment by debtor after assignment of credit .............. 473
Article 1627 ..................................................................................................... 474
1. Extent of assignment of credit .......................................................... 474
Article 1628 ..................................................................................................... 474
1. Warranties of the assignor of credit ................................................ 475
2. Liabilities of the assignor of credit .................................................. 475
Article 1629 ..................................................................................................... 476
1. Duration of assignor’s liability where debtor’s
solvency guaranteed ................................................................... 476
2. Reasons for the rule ............................................................................ 477
Article 1630 ..................................................................................................... 478
1. Sale of successional or hereditary rights ........................................ 478
Article 1631 ..................................................................................................... 479
1. Sale of whole of certain rights, rents, or products ....................... 479
Article 1632 ..................................................................................................... 480
1. Liability of vendor of inheritance for fruits received .................. 480
Article 1633 ..................................................................................................... 480
1. Liability of vendee for debts of and charges on estate ................ 480
Article 1634 ..................................................................................................... 481
1. Legal redemption in sale of credit or other
incorporeal right in litigation .................................................... 481
2. Purpose of grant of right to debtor ................................................. 484
Article 1635 ..................................................................................................... 484
1. Exceptions to debtor’s right to legal redemption ......................... 485
Chapter 9. — GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1636 ..................................................................................................... 487

Article 1637 ..................................................................................................... 489
1. Sale of immovable subject to registration law .............................. 490
xxii
BARTER OR EXCHANGE
(Title VII, Arts. 1638-1641)
Article 1638 ..................................................................................................... 491
1. Barter defined ...................................................................................... 491
2. Perfection and consummation of the contract ............................... 491
Article 1639 ..................................................................................................... 493
1. Effect where giver not lawful owner of thing delivered ............. 493
Article 1640 ..................................................................................................... 493
1. Effect of eviction .................................................................................. 493
Article 1641 ..................................................................................................... 494
1. Applicability of provisions on sales ................................................ 494
THE BULK SALES LAW

(Act No. 3952, as amended.)
Section 1 .......................................................................................................... 495

1. Purpose of the law .............................................................................. 495
2. Scheme of the law ............................................................................... 495
3. Constitutionality of the law .............................................................. 495
4. Construction of the law ..................................................................... 496
Section 2 .......................................................................................................... 496
1. When sale or transfer in bulk ........................................................... 496
2. When sale or transfer in bulk not covered
by the Bulk Sales Law ................................................................ 497
3. Meaning of stock ................................................................................. 497
4. Meaning of merchandise ................................................................... 497
5. Meaning of fixtures ............................................................................. 498
Sections 3-5 ..................................................................................................... 498
1. Protection accorded to creditors by the law .................................. 500
2. Creditors contemplated by law ........................................................ 500
3. Waiver and estoppel of creditors ..................................................... 501
4. Effects of false statements in the schedule of creditors ............... 501
5. Effect of violation of law on transfer .............................................. 502
6. Remedies available to creditors ........................................................ 502
Sections 6-7 ..................................................................................................... 503
1. Acts punished by law ......................................................................... 503
Sections 8-12 ................................................................................................... 503
xxiii
APPENDICES
1. The Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective
Decree (P.D. No. 957, as amended by
P.D. No. 1216 and No. 1344) ..................................................... 505
2. Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act
(R.A. No. 6552) ............................................................................. 522
3. Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) ...................................................... 523
4. Consumer Act of the Philippines (R.A. No. 7394) .......................... 525
5. Manufacture, Importation, Distribution and Sale
of Laundry and Industrial Detergents Containing
Hard Surfactants (R.A. No. 8970) ............................................. 548
6. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
(R.A. No. 9165) ............................................................................. 550
7. Chain Saw Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9175) ............................................. 555
8 Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9211) ................. ........... 557
Part II
LEASE
(Title VIII, Arts. 1642-1699, 1713-1731)
Chapter 1. — GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1642 ..................................................................................................... 560

1. Concept and nature of contract of lease ......................................... 560
2. Kinds of lease according to subject matter .................................... 561
3. Characteristics and elements of the contract ................................. 561
Article 1643 ..................................................................................................... 562
1. Lease of things .................................................................................... 562
2. Estoppel against lessee ....................................................................... 574
3. Lease distinguished from sale .......................................................... 575
4. Conditional sales of goods ................................................................ 576
5. Lease distinguished from commodatum ........................................ 576
6. Lease distinguished from mutuum ................................................. 577
7. Lease distinguished from usufruct .................................................. 577
8. Lease distinguished from deposit .................................................... 578
9. Lease of chattels distinguished from employment ....................... 579
10. Service as driver under the boundary system ............................... 579
Article 1644 ..................................................................................................... 580

1. Lease of work or service .................................................................... 580
xxiv
2. Lease of work or service distinguished from agency .................. 581
3. Lease of work or service distinguished from partnership .......... 586
4. Compensation in lease of work or service ..................................... 586
Article 1645 ..................................................................................................... 589
1. Lease of consumable goods ............................................................... 589
Chapter 2. — LEASE OF RURAL AND URBAN LANDS
Section 1. — General Provisions
Article 1646 ..................................................................................................... 590

1. Rural lands distinguished from urban lands ................................. 590
2. Persons disqualified to become lessees .......................................... 591
3. Lease of real property by aliens ....................................................... 591
Article 1647 ..................................................................................................... 592
1. Proper authority required if leased to be recorded
in Registry of Property ............................................................ 592
Article 1648 ..................................................................................................... 593

1. Effect of registration of lease of real estate .................................... 593
2. Leases of personal property .............................................................. 594
3. Effect of actual notice of unregistered lease by purchaser ......... 594
Article 1649 ..................................................................................................... 595

1. Assignment of lease of lessee ........................................................... 595
Article 1650 ..................................................................................................... 596

1. Sublease by lessee of thing leased ................................................... 596
Article 1651 ..................................................................................................... 600

1. Direct liability of sublessor to lessor ............................................... 600
Article 1652 ..................................................................................................... 600

1. Subsidiary liability of sublessee to lessor ....................................... 601
Article 1653 ..................................................................................................... 602

1. Warranty of the lessor ........................................................................ 602
2. Lessor’s warranty distinct from his liability for damages .......... 602
Section 2. — Rights and Obligations of the Lessor

and the Lessee
Article 1654 ..................................................................................................... 604

1. Obligations of the lessor .................................................................... 604
xxv
Article 1655 ..................................................................................................... 608
1. Effect of destruction of thing leased by fortuitous event ............ 608
Article 1656 ..................................................................................................... 609

1. Right of lessor to continue same business or industry
engaged in by lessee ................................................................ 609
Article 1657 ..................................................................................................... 609

1. Obligations of the lessee .................................................................... 609
Article 1658 ..................................................................................................... 612

1. Suspension of the payment of rent .................................................. 612
Article 1659 ..................................................................................................... 613

1. Alternative remedies of aggrieved party ....................................... 613
2. Rescission of lease contract ............................................................... 614
Article 1660 ..................................................................................................... 617

1. Dwelling place or building dangerous to life or health .............. 617
Article 1661 ..................................................................................................... 618

1. Alteration of form of lease ................................................................ 618
Article 1662 ..................................................................................................... 619

1. Rule in case of urgent repairs ........................................................... 619
Article 1663 ..................................................................................................... 620

1. Obligation of lessee to notify lessor ................................................ 620
Article 1664 ..................................................................................................... 622

1. Rule in case of mere act of trespass ................................................. 622
Article 1665 ..................................................................................................... 624

1. Return of thing leased upon expiration of lease ........................... 624
Article 1666 ..................................................................................................... 625

1. Presumption of receipt of thing leased in good condition ......... 625
Article 1667 ..................................................................................................... 626

1. Responsibility of lessee for deterioration or loss
of thing leased ........................................................................... 626
Article 1668 ..................................................................................................... 627

1. Deterioration caused by others ........................................................ 627
Article 1669 ..................................................................................................... 628
xxvi
1. Lease made for a determinate time ................................................. 628
2. Extension or renewal of lease ........................................................... 629
Article 1670 ..................................................................................................... 635

1. Implied new lease ............................................................................... 635
2. Instances when implied renewal not applicable ........................... 637
Article 1671 ..................................................................................................... 638

1. Continuous possession by lessee over lessor’s objection ............ 638
2. Damages in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases ............. 638
Article 1672 ..................................................................................................... 639

1. Effect of implied new lease on accessory obligations
contracted by a third person .................................................. 640
Article 1673 ..................................................................................................... 640

1. Causes for judicial ejectment of lessee ............................................ 640
2. Expiration of the period ..................................................................... 641
3. Lack of payment of stipulated rental .............................................. 642
4. Violation of any condition agreed upon ......................................... 643
5. Improper use of the leased property ............................................... 644
6. Regulation of rentals of certain residential units .......................... 644
7. Rental Reform Act of 2002 ................................................................. 646
Article 1674 ..................................................................................................... 650

1. Preliminary mandatory injunction to restore possession
pending appeal ......................................................................... 650
Article 1675 ..................................................................................................... 652

1. Use by lessee of legal period ............................................................ 652
Article 1676 ..................................................................................................... 652

1. Termination of lease by purchaser of leased land ........................ 653
2. Unrecorded lease ................................................................................. 653
Article 1677 ..................................................................................................... 654

1. Where sale subject to right of redemption ..................................... 654
Article 1678 ..................................................................................................... 655

1. Right of lessee with regard to useful improvements
and ornamental expenses ........................................................ 655
2. Right of lessee over necessary repairs ............................................ 657
Article 1679 ..................................................................................................... 658

1. Place and time for payment of lease ............................................... 658
xxvii
Section 3. — Special Provisions for Leases
of Rural Lands
Articles 1680-1681 .......................................................................................... 659

1. Reduction of rent in rural leases ...................................................... 659
2. Fortuitous events ................................................................................. 661
3. Percentage of reduction ..................................................................... 662
Article 1682 ..................................................................................................... 663
1. Duration of rural lease ....................................................................... 663
Article 1683 ..................................................................................................... 664
1. Obligation of outgoing/incoming lessee or lessor ....................... 664
Articles 1684-1685 .......................................................................................... 665
1. Rules governing law tenancy on shares ......................................... 665
2. Special laws on land tenancy ............................................................ 665
3. Extinguishment of leasehold relation .............................................. 666
4. Causes for dispossession of leasehold tenant ................................ 666
Section 4. — Special Provisions for the

Lease of Urban Lands
Article 1686 ..................................................................................................... 668

1. Kind of repairs on urban property by lessor ................................. 668
Article 1687 ..................................................................................................... 669

1. Duration of lease depending on period at which
rent payable ............................................................................... 669
Article 1688 ..................................................................................................... 673
1. Lease of premises together with furniture ..................................... 673
Chapter 3. — WORK AND LABOR
Section 1. — Household Service

New provisions .............................................................................................. 674
Article 1689 ..................................................................................................... 674
1. Scope of household service ............................................................... 674
2. Reasonable compensation for household service ......................... 675
Article 1690 ..................................................................................................... 675
1. Obligations of head of the family .................................................... 675
2. Medical attendance ............................................................................. 676
Article 1691 ..................................................................................................... 677
xxviii
1. Opportunity for at least elementary education ............................. 677
Article 1692 ..................................................................................................... 677
1. Duration of household service ......................................................... 677
Article 1693 ..................................................................................................... 677
1. Clothes of the house helper .............................................................. 677
Article 1694 ..................................................................................................... 678
1. Treatment of house helper ................................................................. 678
Article 1695 ..................................................................................................... 678
1. Ten-hour a day work .......................................................................... 678
2. Vacation leave ...................................................................................... 679
Article 1696 ..................................................................................................... 679
1. Funeral expenses ................................................................................. 679
Article 1697 ..................................................................................................... 679
1. Termination of household service .................................................... 679
Article 1698 ..................................................................................................... 680
1. Notice to terminate service relation where no period fixed ....... 680
Article 1699 ..................................................................................................... 681
1. Written statement from head of the family .................................... 681
Section 2. — Contract for a Piece of Work
Article 1713 ..................................................................................................... 682

1. Contract for a piece of work distinguished from
lease of service .......................................................................... 682
Article 1714 ..................................................................................................... 683
1. Material furnished by the contractor .............................................. 683
Article 1715 ..................................................................................................... 683
1. Remedy of employer in case of defects .......................................... 684
Article 1716 ..................................................................................................... 686
1. Agreement waiving or limiting contractor’s liability
for defects ................................................................................... 686
Article 1717 ..................................................................................................... 686
1. Risk of loss where material furnished by contractor ................... 687
Article 1718 ..................................................................................................... 687
xxix
1. Risk of loss where contractor furnished only his work .............. 687
Article 1719 ..................................................................................................... 688
1. Effect of acceptance by the employer .............................................. 688
Article 1720 ..................................................................................................... 689
1. Time and place of payment of price or compensation ................ 689
Article 1721 ..................................................................................................... 693
1. Default of the employer ..................................................................... 694
Article 1722 ..................................................................................................... 694
1. Non-completion attributable to employer ..................................... 694
Article 1723 ..................................................................................................... 694
1. Liability of engineer or architect/contractor for collapse
of building constructed ........................................................... 695
Article 1724 ..................................................................................................... 699
1. Right of contractor to withdraw or ask for increase in price ..... 699
Article 1725 ..................................................................................................... 701
1. Right of owner to withdraw ............................................................. 701
Article 1726 ..................................................................................................... 702
1. Rescission of contract ......................................................................... 702
Article 1727 ..................................................................................................... 703
1. Liability of contractor for work done by his workers ................. 703
Article 1728 ..................................................................................................... 703
1. Liability of contractor for death or physical injuries ................... 703
Article 1729 ..................................................................................................... 704
1. Subsidiary liability of owner to laborers and materialmen ........ 704
2. Special laws regarding contractor’s bond ...................................... 704
Article 1730 ..................................................................................................... 705
1. Satisfactory completion of work ...................................................... 705
Article 1731 ..................................................................................................... 706
1. Mechanic’s lien .................................................................................... 706
— oOo —
xxx
505
APPENDICES
1. THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM
BUYER’S PROTECTIVE DECREE*
(P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216

and No. 1344)
REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISION LOTS AND CONDO-

MINIUMS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF.
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the

requirements of decent human settlement and to provide them with
ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdi-
vision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on
their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems,
and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and
safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swin-
dling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous sub-
division and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to de-
liver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and
to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision
lots to different innocent purchasers for value;
*Executive Order No. 648 (Feb. 7, 1981) transferred the regulatory functions of the
National Housing Authority under the Decree and other related laws to the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission, which was renamed Housing and Land Use Regu-
latory Board (HLURB) by Executive Order No. 90 (Dec. 14, 1986).
P.D. No. 957 was promulgated to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions
and condominiums. It is aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the
HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of its provisions and the
enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category or real estate may take
recourse. (Arranza vs. B.F. homes, Inc., 128 SCAD 119, 333 SCRA 799 [2000]; AMA Com-
puter College, Inc. vs. Factora, 378 SCRA 121 [2002].)
505
506 SALES Secs. 1-2
WHEREAS, these acts not only undermine the land and housing
program of the government but also defeat the objectives of the New
Society, particularly the promotion of peace and order and enhancement
of the economic, social and moral condition of the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, this state of affairs had rendered it imperative that the
real estate subdivision and condominium businesses be closely super-
vised and regulated, and that penalties be imposed on fraudulent prac-
tices and manipulations committed in connection therewith.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
do hereby decree and order:
Title I
TITLE AND DEFINITIONS
SECTION 1. Title. — This Decree shall be known as THE SUBDIVI-

SION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYER’S PROTECTIVE DECREE.1
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. — When used in this Decree, the follow-
ing terms shall, unless the context otherwise indicates, have the follow-
ing respective meanings:
a) Person. — “Person” shall mean a natural or a juridical per-
son. A juridical person refers to business firm whether a corpora-
tion, partnership, cooperative or association or a single proprietor-
ship.
b) Sale or sell. — “Sale” or “sell” shall include every disposi-
tion, or attempt to dispose, for a valuable consideration, of a subdi-
vision lot, including the building and other improvements thereof,
if any, in a subdivision project or a condominium unit in a condo-
minium project. “Sale” and “sell” shall also include a contract to sell,
a contract of purchase and sale, an exchange, an attempt to sell, an
option of sale or purchase, a solicitation of a sale, or an offer to sell,
directly or by an agent, or by a circular, letter, advertisement or oth-
erwise.
A privilege given to a member of a cooperative, corporation,
partnership, or any association and/or the issuance of a certificate
or receipt evidencing or giving the right of participation in, or right
1
R.A. No. 4726, the Condominium Act, defines condominium, establishes require-
ments for its creation, and governs its incidents. (see Comments and Cases on Property,
1993 ed., by De Leon & De Leon, Jr.)
Sec. 2 1. THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM 507
BUYER’S PROTECTIVE DECREE
to, and land in consideration of payment of the membership fee or

dues, shall be deemed a sale within the meaning of this definition.
c) Buy and purchase. — The term “buy” and “purchase” shall
include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire for a
valuable consideration a subdivision lot, including the building and
other improvements, if any, in a subdivision project or a condo-
minium unit in a condominium project.
d) Subdivision project. — “Subdivision project” shall mean a
tract or a parcel of land registered under Act No. 496 which is par-
titioned primarily for residential purposes into individual lots with
or without improvements thereon, and offered to the public for sale,
in cash or in installment terms. It shall include all residential, com-
mercial, industrial and recreational areas, as well as open spaces and
other community and public areas in the project.
e) Subdivision lot. — “Subdivision lot” shall mean any of the
lots, whether residential, commercial, industrial, or recreational, in
a subdivision project.
f) Complex subdivision plan. — “Complex subdivision plan”
shall mean a subdivision plan of a registered land wherein a street,
passageway or open space is delineated on the plan.
g) Condominium project. — “Condominium project” shall mean
the entire parcel of real property divided or to be divided primarily
for residential purposes into condominium units, including all struc-
tures thereon.
h) Condominium unit. — “Condominium unit” shall mean a
part of the condominium project intended for any type of independ-
ent use or ownership, including one or more rooms or spaces located
in one or more floors (or part of parts of floors) in a building or
buildings and such accessories as may be appended thereto.
i) Owner. — “Owner” shall refer to the registered owner of the
land subject of a subdivision or a condominium project.
j) Developer. — “Developer” shall mean the person who de-
velops or improves the subdivision project or condominium project
for and in behalf of the owner thereof.
k) Dealer. — “Dealer” shall mean any person directly engaged
as principal in the business of buying, selling or exchanging real
estate whether on a full-time or part-time basis.
l) Broker. — “Broker” shall mean any person who, for commis-
sion or other compensation, undertakes to sell or negotiate the sale
of a real estate belonging to another.
508 SALES Secs. 3-4
m) Salesman. — “Salesman” shall refer to the person regularly

employed by a broker to perform, for and in his behalf, any or all
the functions of a real estate broker.
n) Authority. — “Authority” shall mean the National Housing
Authority.2
Title II
REGISTRATION AND LICENSE TO SELL
SEC. 3. National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Au-

thority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.
SEC. 4. Registration of Projects. — The registered owner of parcel of
land who wishes to convert the same into a subdivision project shall
submit his subdivision plan to the Authority which shall act upon and
approve the same, upon a finding that the plan complies with the Sub-
division Standards and Regulations enforceable at the time the plan is
submitted. The same procedure shall be followed in the case of a plan
for a condominium project except that, in addition, said Authority shall
act upon and approve the plan with respect to the building or build-
ings included in the condominium project in accordance with the Na-
tional Building Code. (R.A. No. 6541.)
The subdivision plan, as so approved, shall then be submitted to
the Director of Lands for approval in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Section 44 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as
amended by R.A. No. 440.): Provided, That in case of complex subdivi-
sion plans, court approval shall no longer be required. The condominium
plan, as likewise so approved, shall be submitted to the Register of Deeds
of the province or city in which the property lies and the same shall be
acted upon subject to the conditions and in accordance with the proce-
dure prescribed in Section 4 of the Condominium Act. (R.A. No. 4726.)
The owner or the real estate dealer interested in the sale of lots or
units, respectively, in such subdivision project or condominium project
shall register the project with the Authority by filing therewith a sworn
registration statement containing the following information:
a) Name of the owner;
b) The location of the owner’s principal business office, and
if the owner is a non-resident Filipino, the name and address of his
2
Now, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
Sec. 4 1. THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM 509
agent or representative in the Philippines authorized to receive

notice;
c) The names and addresses of all the directors and officers of
the business firm, if the owner be a corporation, association, trust,
or other entity, and of all the partners, if it be a partnership;
d) The general character of the business actually transacted or
to be transacted by the owner; and
e) A statement of the capitalization of the owner, including the
authorized and outstanding amounts of its capital stock and the pro-
portion thereof which is paid-up.
The following documents shall be attached to the registration state-
ment:
a) A copy of the subdivision plan or condominium plan as ap-
proved in accordance with the first and second paragraphs of this
section.
b) A copy of any circular, prospectus, brochure, advertisement,
letter or communication to be used for the public offering of the sub-
division lots or condominium units;
c) In case of a business firm, a balance sheet showing the
amount and general character of its assets and liabilities and a copy
of its articles of incorporation or articles of partnership or associa-
tion, as the case may be, with all the amendments thereof and exist-
ing by-laws or instruments corresponding thereto.
d) A title to the property which is free from all liens and en-
cumbrances: Provided, however, That in case any subdivision lot or
condominium unit is mortgaged, it is sufficient if the instrument of
mortgage contains a stipulation that the mortgagee shall release the
mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit as soon as
the full purchase price for the same is paid by the buyer.
The person filing the registration statements shall pay the registra-
tion fees prescribed therefor by the Authority.
Thereupon, the Authority shall immediately cause to be published
a notice of the filing of the registration statement at the expense of the
applicant-owner or dealer, in two newspapers of general circulation, one
published in English and another in Pilipino, once a week for two con-
secutive weeks, reciting that a registration statement for the sale of sub-
division lots or condominium units has been filed in the National Hous-
ing Authority; that the aforesaid registration statement, as well as the
papers attached thereto, are open to inspection during business hours
510 SALES Secs. 5-7
by interested parties, under such regulations as the Authority may im-

pose; and that copies thereof shall be furnished to any party upon pay-
ment of the proper fees.
The subdivision project of the condominium project shall be deemed
registered upon completion of the above publication requirement. The
fact of such registration shall be evidenced by a registration certificate
to be issued to the applicant-owner or dealer.
SEC. 5. License to sell. — Such owner or dealer to whom has been
issued a registration certificate shall not, however, be authorized to sell
any subdivision lot or condominium unit in the registered project un-
less he shall have first obtained a license to sell the project within two
weeks from the registration of such project.
The Authority, upon proper application therefor, shall issue to such
owner or dealer of a registered project a license to sell the project if, af-
ter an examination of the registration statement filed by said owner or
dealer and all the pertinent documents attached thereto, he is convinced
that the owner or dealer is of good repute, that his business is finan-
cially stable, and that the proposed sale of the subdivision lots or con-
dominium units to the public would not be fraudulent.
SEC. 6. Performance Bond. — No license to sell subdivision lots or
condominium units shall be issued by the Authority under Section 5 of
this Decree unless the owner or dealer shall have filed an adequate per-
formance bond approved by said Authority to guarantee the construc-
tion and maintenance of the roads, gutters, drainage, sewerage, water
system, lighting systems, and full development of the subdivision
project or the condominium project and the compliance by the owner
or dealer with the applicable laws and rules and regulations.
The performance bond shall be executed in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines and shall authorize the Authority to use the proceeds
thereof for the purposes of its undertaking in case of forfeiture as pro-
vided in this Decree.
SEC. 7. Exempt transactions. — A license to sell and performance bond
shall not be required in any of the following transactions:
a) Sale of a subdivision lot resulting from the partition of land
among co-owners and co-heirs.
b) Sale or transfer of a subdivision lot by the original purchaser
thereof and any subsequent sale of the same lot.
c) Sale of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit by or for
the account of a mortgage in the ordinary course of business when
necessary to liquidate a bona fide debt.
Secs. 8-9 1. THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM 511
SEC. 8. Suspension of license to sell. — Upon verified complaint filed

by a buyer of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit or any interested
party, the Authority may, in its discretion, immediately suspend the
owner’s or dealer’s license to sell pending investigation and hearing of
the case as provided in Section 13 hereof.
The Authority may motu proprio suspend a license to sell if, in its
opinion, any information in the registration statement filed by the owner
or dealer is or has become misleading, incorrect, inadequate or incom-
plete or the sale or offering for sale of the subdivision or condominium
project may work or tend to work a fraud upon prospective buyers.
The suspension order may be lifted, after notice and hearing, the
Authority is convinced that the registration statement is accurate or that
any deficiency therein has been corrected or supplemented or that the
sale to the public of the subdivision or condominium project will nei-
ther be fraudulent nor result in fraud. It shall also be lifted upon dis-
missal of the complaint for lack of legal basis.
Until the final entry of an order of suspension, the suspension of
the right to sell the project, though binding upon all persons notified
thereof, shall be deemed confidential unless it shall appear that the or-
der of suspension has in the meantime been violated.
SEC. 9. Revocation of registration certificate and license to sell. — The
Authority may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint filed by a buyer
of a subdivision lot or condominium unit, revoke the registration of any
subdivision project or condominium project and the license to sell any
subdivision lot or condominium unit in said project by issuing an or-
der to this effect, with his findings in respect thereto, if upon examina-
tion into the affairs of the owner or dealer during a hearing as provided
for in Section 14 hereof, it shall appear there is satisfactory evidence that
the said owner or dealer:
a) Is insolvent; or
b) Has violated any of the provisions of this Decree or any ap-
plicable rule or regulation of the Authority, or any undertaking of
his/its performance bond; or
c) Has been or is engaged or is about to engage in fraudulent
transactions; or
d) Has made any misrepresentation in any prospectus, bro-
chure, circular or other literature about the subdivision project or
condominium project that has been distributed to prospective buy-
ers; or
e) Is of bad business repute; or
f) Does not conduct his business in accordance with law or

sound business principles.
Where the owner or dealer is a partnership or corporation or an
unincorporated association, it shall be sufficient cause for cancellation
of its registration certificate and its license to sell, if any member of such
partnership or any officer or director of such corporation or association
has been guilty of any act or omission which would be cause for refus-
ing or revoking the registration of an individual dealer, broker or sales-
man as provided in Section 11 hereof.
SEC. 10. Registers of subdivision lots and condominium units. — A record
of subdivision lots and condominium units shall be kept in the Author-
ity wherein shall be entered all orders of the Authority affecting the
condition or status thereof. The registers of subdivision lots and condo-
minium units shall be open to public inspection subject to such reason-
able rules as the Authority may prescribe.
Title III
DEALERS, BROKERS AND SALESMEN
SEC. 11. Registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen. — No real estate

dealer, broker or salesman shall engage in the business of selling subdi-
vision lots or condominium units unless he has registered himself with
the Authority in accordance with the provisions of this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and
has complied with the applicable rules of the Authority, including the
payment of the prescribed fee, he shall register such applicant as a dealer,
broker or salesman upon his filing a bond, or other security in lieu
thereof, in such sum as may be fixed by the Authority conditioned upon
his faithful compliance with the provisions of this Decree: Provided, That
the registration of a salesman shall cease upon the termination of his
employment with a dealer or broker.
Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-first
day of December of each year. Renewal of registration for the succeed-
ing year shall be granted upon written application therefor made not
less than thirty nor more than sixty days before the first day of the en-
suing year and upon payment of the prescribed fee, without the neces-
sity of filing further statement or information, unless specifically re-
quired by the Authority. All applications filed beyond said period shall
be treated as original applications.
The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, bro-
kers or salesmen shall be recorded in a Register of Brokers, Dealers and
Salesmen kept in the Authority which shall be open to public inspec-

tion.
SEC. 12. Revocation of registration as dealers, brokers or salesmen. —
Registration under the preceding section may be refused or any regis-
tration granted thereunder, revoked by the Authority if, after reason-
able notice and hearing, it shall determine that such applicant or regis-
trant:
1) Has violated any provision of this Decree or any rule or
regulation made hereunder; or
2) Has made a material false statement in his application for
registration; or
3) Has been guilty of a fraudulent act in connection with any
sale of a subdivision lot or condominium unit; or
4) Has demonstrated his unworthiness to transact the business
of dealer, broker, or salesman, as the case may be.
In case of charges against a salesman, notice thereof shall also be
given the broker or dealer employing such salesman.
Pending hearing of the case, the Authority shall have the power to
order the suspension of the dealer’s broker’s, or salesman’s registration:
Provided, That such order shall state the cause for the suspension.
The suspension or revocation of the registration of a dealer or bro-
ker shall carry with it all the suspension or revocation of the registra-
tions of all his salesmen.
Title IV
PROCEDURE FOR REVOCATION OF
REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE
SEC. 13. Hearing. — In the hearing for determining the existence of

any ground or grounds for the suspension and/or revocation of regis-
tration certificate and license to sell as provided in Sections 8 and 9 hereof
the following shall be complied with:
a) Notice. — No such hearing shall proceed unless the respond-
ent is furnished with a copy of the complaint against him or is no-
tified in writing of the purpose of such hearing.
b) Venue. — The hearing may be held before the officer or of-
ficers designated by the Authority on the date and place specified
in the notice.
c) Nature of proceedings. — The proceedings shall be non-liti-

gious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities
obtaining in courts of law. The Rules of Court shall not apply in said
hearing except by analogy or in a suppletory character and when-
ever practicable and convenient.
d) Power incidental to the hearing. — For the purpose of the hear-
ing or other proceeding under this Decree, the officer or officers des-
ignated to hear the complaint shall have the power to administer
oaths, subpoena witnesses, conduct ocular inspections, take depo-
sitions, and require the production of any book, paper, correspond-
ence, memorandum or other record which are deemed relevant or
material to the inquiry.
SEC. 14. Contempt. —
a) Direct contempt. — The officer or officers designated by the
Authority to hear the complaint may summarily adjudge in direct
contempt any person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so
near the said hearing officials as to obstruct or interrupt the proceed-
ings before the same or of refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so. The person found guilty of direct contempt un-
der this section shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Fifty Pe-
sos (P50.00) or imprisonment not exceeding five (5) days or both.
b) Indirect contempt. — The officer or officers designated to hear
the complaint may also adjudge any person in indirect contempt on
grounds and in the manner prescribed in Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
SEC. 15. Decision. — The case shall be decided within thirty (30) days
from the time the same is submitted for decision. The Decision may order
the revocation of the registration of the subdivision or condominium
project the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the license to sell
and/or the forfeiture, in whole or in part, of the performance bond
mentioned in Section 6 hereof. In case forfeiture of the bond is ordered,
the Decision may direct the provincial or city engineer to undertake or
cause the construction of roads and other requirements for the subdivi-
sion or condominium as stipulated in the bond, chargeable to the
amount forfeited. Such decision shall be immediately executory and
shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from the date of receipt of
the Decision.
SEC. 16. Cease and Desist Order. — Whenever it shall appear to the
Authority that any person is engaged or about to engage in any act or
practice which constitutes or will constitute a violation of the provisions
of this Decree or of any rule or regulation thereunder it may upon due

notice and hearing as provided in Section 13 hereof issue a cease and
desist order to enjoin such act or practice.
SEC. 17. Registration. — All contracts to sell deeds of sale and other
similar instruments relative to the sale or conveyance of the subdivi-
sion lots and condominium units whether or not the purchase price is
paid in full shall be registered by the seller in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of the province or city where the property is situated.
Whenever a subdivision plan duly approved in accordance with
Section 4 hereof, together with the corresponding owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, is presented to the Register of Deeds for registration,
the Register of Deeds shall register the same in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended: Provided, however,
That if there is a street, passageway or required open space delineated
on a complex subdivision plan hereafter approved and defined in this
Decree, the Register of Deeds shall annotate on the new certificate of title
covering the street passageway or open space a memorandum to the
effect that except by way of donation in favor of a city or municipality,
no portion of any street passageway or open space so delineated on the
plan shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner
without the requisite approval as provided under Section 22 of this
Decree.
SEC. 18. Mortgages. — No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made
by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the au-
thority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the
proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the
condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been
provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit
covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof if
any shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may at his
option pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee
who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebt-
edness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view
to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after
full payment thereof.
SEC. 19. Advertisements. — Advertisement that may be made by the
owner or developer through newspaper, radio television leaflets, circu-
lar or any other form about the subdivision or the condominium or its
operations or activities must reflect the real facts and must be presented
in such manner that will not tend to mislead or deceive the public.
The owner or developer shall be answerable and liable for the fa-
cilities, improvements, infrastructures or other forms of development
represented or promised in brochures, advertisements and other sales

propaganda disseminated by the owner or developer or his agents and
the same shall form part of the sales warranties enforceable against said
owner or developer jointly and severally. Failure to comply with these
warranties shall also be punishable in accordance with the penalties
provided for in this Decree.
SEC. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer shall con-
struct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other
forms of development including water supply and lighting facilities
which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condo-
minium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any
form of advertisement within one year from the date of the issuance of
the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other
period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. — In cases of subdivision lots or con-
dominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this De-
cree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivi-
sion or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its
obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from
the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or
unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Sec-
tion 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations
under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a violation
punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of this Decree.
SEC. 22. Alteration of Plans. — No owner or developer shall change
or alter the roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use
and/or other form of subdivision development as contained in the ap-
proved subdivision plan and/or represented in its advertisements with-
out the permission of the Authority and the written conformity or con-
sent of the duly organized homeowners association or in the absence of
the latter by the majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.
SEC. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made
by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit
he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or devel-
oper when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, de-
sists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer
to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.
Such buyer may at his option be reimbursed the total amount paid in-
cluding amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests with

interest thereon at the legal rate.3
SEC. 24. Failure to Pay Installments. — The rights of the buyer in the
event of his failure to pay the installments due for reasons other than
the failure of the owner or developer to develop the project shall be
governed by Republic Act No. 6552.
Where the transaction or contract was entered into prior to the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6552 on August 26, 1972, the defaulting
buyer shall be entitled to the corresponding refund based on the
installments paid after the effectivity of the law in the absence of any
provision in the contract to the contrary.
SEC. 25. Issuance of Title. — The owner or developer shall deliver
the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or
unit. No fee except those required for the registration of the deed of sale
in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the issuance of such title.
In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of
the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall re-
deem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six
months from such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot
or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance here-
with.
SEC. 26. Realty Tax. — Real estate tax and assessment on a lot or unit
shall be paid by the owner or developer without recourse to the buyer
for as long as the title has not passed the buyer: Provided, however, That
if the buyer has actually taken possession of and occupied the lot or unit
he shall be liable to the owner or developer for such tax and assessment
effective the year following such taking of possession and occupancy.
SEC. 27. Other Charges. — No owner or developer shall levy upon
any lot or unit buyer a fee for an alleged community benefit. Fees to
finance services for common comfort, security and sanitation may be
collected only by a properly organized homeowners association and
only with the consent of a majority of the lot or unit buyers actually
residing in the subdivision or condominium project.
SEC. 28. Access to Public Offices in the Subdivision. — No owner or
developer shall deny any person free access to any government office
3
As the law vests upon the buyer the option to demand reimbursement or to wait
for development of the subdivision, the buyer who opted for the latter alternative may
not be ousted from the subdivision. (Relucio vs. Brillante-Garfin, 187 SCRA 405 [1990];
see Casa Filipina Realty Corporation vs. Office of the President, 58 SCAD 773, 241 SCRA
16 [1995]; Eugenio vs. Drilon, 67 SCAD 78, 252 SCRA 106 [1996]; Rancel Realty Corp. vs.
or public establishment located within the subdivision or which may

be reached only by passing through the subdivision.
SEC. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. — The owner or developer of a
subdivision without access to any existing public road or street must
secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of way
must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the
government authorities concerned.
SEC. 30. Organization of Homeowners Association. — The owner or
developer of a subdivision project or condominium project shall initi-
ate the organization of a homeowners association among the buyers and
residents of the projects for the purpose of promoting and protecting
their mutual interest and assist in their community development.
SEC. 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open Spaces. — The owner as
developer of a subdivision shall provide adequate roads, alleys, and
sidewalks. For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or more, the owner
or developer shall reserve thirty percent (30%) of the gross area for open
space. Such open space shall have the following standards allocated
exclusively for parks, playgrounds and recreational use:
a) 9% of gross area for high density or social housing (66 to 100
family lot per gross hectare).
b) 7% of gross area for medium density or economic housing
(21 to 65 family lot per gross hectare).
c) 3.5% of gross area for low-density or open market housing
(20 family lots and below per gross hectare).
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use
shall be non-alienable public lands and non-buildable. The plans of the
subdivision project shall include tree planting on such parts of the sub-
division as may be designated by the Authority.
Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority, the roads,
alleys, sidewalks, and playgrounds shall be donated by the owner or
developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the
local governments to accept: Provided, however, That the parks and play-
grounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the project
with the consent of the city or municipality concerned. No portion of
the parks and playgrounds donated thereafter shall be converted to any
other purpose or purposes. (as amended by P.D. No. 1216.)
SEC. 32. Phases of Subdivision. — For purposes of complying with
the provisions of this Decree, the owner or developer may divide the
development and sale of the subdivision into phases, each phase to cover
not less than ten hectares. The requirement imposed by this Decree on
the subdivision as a whole shall be deemed imposed on each phase.
SEC. 33. Nullity of waivers. — Any condition, stipulation, or provi-

sion in contract of sale whereby any person waives compliance with any
provision of this Decree or of any rule or regulation issued thereunder
shall be void.
SEC. 34. Visitorial powers. — This Authority, through its duly author-
ized representative may, at any time, make an examination into the
business affairs, administration, and condition of any person, corpora-
tion, partnership, cooperative, or association engaged in the business
of selling subdivision lots and condominium units. For this purpose,
the official authorized to do so shall have the authority to examine un-
der oath the directors, officers, stockholders or members of any corpo-
ration, partnership, association, cooperative or other persons associated
or connected with the business and to issue subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum in relation to any investigation that may arise therefrom.
The Authority may also authorize the Provincial, City or Munici-
pal Engineer, as the case may be, to conduct an ocular inspection of the
project to determine whether the development of said project conforms
to the standards and specifications prescribed by the government.
The books, papers, letters, and other documents belonging to the
person or entities herein mentioned shall be open to inspection by the
Authority or its duly authorized representative.
SEC. 35. Takeover Development. — The Authority may take over or
cause the development and completion of the subdivision or condo-
minium project at the expense of the owner or developer, jointly and
severally, in cases where the owner or developer has refused or failed
to develop or complete the development of the project as provided for
in this Decree.
The Authority may, after such takeover, demand, collect and receive
from the buyers the installment payments due on the lots, which shall
be utilized for the development of the subdivision.
SEC. 36. Rules and Regulations. — The Authority shall issue the nec-
essary standards, rules and regulations for the effective implementation
of the provisions of this Decree. Such standards, rules and regulations
shall take effect immediately after their publication three times a week
for two consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation.
SEC. 37. Deputization of law enforcement agencies. — The Authority
may deputize the Philippine Constabulary4 or any law enforcement
agency in the execution of its final orders, rulings or decisions.
4
Now, Philippine National Police (PNP).
SEC. 38. Administrative Fines. — The Authority may prescribe and

impose fines not exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations of the
provisions of this Decree or of any rule or regulation thereunder. Fines
shall be payable to the Authority and enforceable through writs of ex-
ecution in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 39. Penalties. — Any person who shall violate any of the pro-
visions of this Decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued
pursuant to this Decree shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of
not more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and/or imprison-
ment of not more than ten years: Provided, That in the case of corpora-
tions, partnerships, cooperatives, or associations, the President, Man-
ager or Administrator or the person who has charge of the administra-
tion of the business shall be criminally responsible for any violation of
this Decree and/or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto.
SEC. 40. Liability of controlling persons. — Every person who directly
or indirectly controls any person liable under any provision of this De-
cree or of any rule or regulation issued thereunder shall be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action.
SEC. 41. Other remedies. — The rights and remedies provided in this
Decree shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that
may be available under existing laws.
SEC. 42. Repealing clause. — All laws, executive orders, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 43. Effectivity. — This Decree shall take effect upon its approval.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of July, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-six.
———— ———— ————
NOTE: Presidential Decree No. 1344 (dated April 12, 1978) vests in
the National Housing Authority (NHA), exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide certain cases. Its provisions are hereunder reproduced:
“SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real es-
tate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
P.D. No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive ju-
risdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
a) Unsound real estate business practices;

b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub-
division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and
c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condo-
minium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker, or sales-
man.
SEC. 2. The decision of the National Housing Authority shall be-
come final and executory after the lapse of 15 days from the date of its
receipt. It is appealable only to the President of the Philippines and in
the event the appeal is filed and the decision is not reversed and/or
amended within a period of 30 days, the decision is deemed affirmed.
Proof of the appeal of the decision must be furnished the National Hous-
ing Authority.
SEC. 3. As soon as the decision has become final and executory, the
National Housing Authority shall on motion of the interested party, is-
sue a writ of execution enforceable in accordance with the provisions
of the Rules of Court of the Philippines.
SEC. 4. This Decree shall take effect immediately.”
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344, expanded the jurisdiction
of the NHA, now the HLURB, under Presidential Decree No. 957 to
include:
(1) any claims filed by condominium buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman, and
(2) cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyer of condominium unit against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Corollarily, a transaction to “buy’’ and “purchase’’, under Presiden-
tial Decree 957 has been defined as “any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire for a valuable consideration x x x a condominium unit
in a condominium project.’’ The term “buyer’’ is not limited to those
who enter into contracts of sale. Its concept is broad enough as to in-
clude those who “acquire for a valuable consideration’’ a condominium
unit. Thus, a buyer of said unit seeking to enforce the performance of
an obligation arising from such transaction, or claiming damages
therefrom, may bring an action with the HLURB. (AMA Computer
College, Inc. vs. Factora, 378 SCRA 121 [2002].)
522 SALES Secs. 1-4
2. REALTY INSTALLMENT BUYER

PROTECTION ACT
(R.A. No. 6552)
AN ACT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO BUYERS OF REAL ESTATE
ON INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS
SECTION 1. This Act shall be known as the “Realty Installment

Buyer Protection Act.”
SEC. 2. It is hereby declared a public policy to protect buyers of real
estate on installment payments against onerous and oppressive condi-
tions.
SEC. 3. In all transactions or contracts involving the sale or financ-
ing of real estate on installment payments, including residential condo-
minium apartments but excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings
and sales to tenants under Republic Act Numbered Thirty-eight hun-
dred forty-four as amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixty-three
hundred eighty-nine, where the buyer has paid at least two years of
installments, the buyer is entitled to the following rights in case he de-
faults in the payment of succeeding installments:
(a) To pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments
due within the total grace period earned by him which is hereby
fixed at the rate of one-month grace period for every one year of
installment payments made: Provided, That this right shall be exer-
cised by the buyer only once in every five years of the life of the
contract and its extensions, if any.
(b) If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the
buyer the cash surrender value of the payments on the property
equivalent to fifty percent of the total payments made and, after five
years of installments, an additional five percent every year but not
to exceed ninety percent of the total payments made: Provided, That
the actual cancellation of the contract shall take place after thirty
days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the
demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full
payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
Down payments, deposits or options on the contract shall be in-
cluded in the computation of the total number of installment payments
made.
SEC. 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid,
the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days
Secs. 5-9 3. ANTI-FENCING LAW 523
from the date the installment became due. If the buyer fails to pay the
installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may
cancel the contract after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the
notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a
notarial act.
SEC. 5. Under Sections 3 and 4, the buyer shall have the right to sell
his rights or assign the same to another person or to reinstate the con-
tract by updating the account during the grace period and before ac-
tual cancellation of the contract. The deed of sale or assignment shall
be done by notarial act.
SEC. 6. The buyer shall have the right to pay in advance any
installment or the full unpaid balance of the purchase price any time
without interest and to have such full payment of the purchase price
annotated in the certificate of title covering the property.
SEC. 7. Any stipulation in any contract hereafter entered into con-
trary to the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6, shall be null and void.
SEC. 8. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitu-
tional, no other provision shall be affected thereby.
SEC. 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
APPROVED: August 26, 1972.
3. ANTI-FENCING LAW
(P.D. No. 1612)
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that there

is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties;
WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become profitable on
the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buy-
ers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties;
WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be prosecuted only as
an accessory after the fact and punished lightly;
WHEREAS, it is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons
who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitu-
tion, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land the fol-
lowing:
524 SALES Secs. 1-4
SECTION 1. Title. — This decree shall be known as the “Anti-Fenc-

ing Law.”
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. — The following terms shall mean as
follows:
a) “Fencing” is the act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
b) “Fence” includes any person, firm, association, corporation
or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing.
SEC. 3. Penalties. — Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished
as hereunder indicated:
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property in-
volved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if
the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty pro-
vided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos, but the total pen-
alty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the acces-
sory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code
shall also be imposed.
b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maxi-
mum periods, if the value of the property robbed or stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos.
c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and me-
dium periods, if the value of the property involved is more than 200
pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.
d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property in-
volved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos.
e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such
value is over 5 pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos.
f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period, if such
value does not exceed 5 pesos.
SEC. 4. Liability of Official of Juridical Persons. — If the fence is a part-
nership, firm, corporation or association, the president or the manager
Art. 2 4. CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES 525
or any officer thereof who knows or should have known the commis-
sion of the offense shall be liable.
SEC. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere possession of any goods,
article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
SEC. 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Secondhand Articles. — For pur-
poses of this Act, all stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy
and sell of any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained
from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the
same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from
the station commander or the Integrated National Police in the town or
city where such store, establishment or entity is located. The Chief of
Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police shall prom-
ulgate such rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this sec-
tion. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required
by this section or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder shall upon conviction be punished
as a fence.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. — All laws or parts thereof, which are in-
consistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity. — This Decree shall take effect upon approval.
DONE in the City of Manila this 2nd day of March, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.
4. CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES

(R.A. No. 7394)
xxx xxx
ART. 2. Declaration of Basic Policy. — It is the policy of the state to
protect the interests of the consumer, promote his general welfare and
to establish standards of conduct for business and industry. Towards
this end, the State shall implement measures to achieve the following
objectives.
a) protection against hazards to health and safety;
b) protection against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable
sales acts and practices;
c) provision of information and education to facilitate sound
choice and the proper exercise of rights by the consumer;
526 SALES Art. 15
d) provision of adequate rights and means of redress; and

e) involvement of consumer representatives in the formulation
of social and economic policies.
xxx xxx
ART. 15. Imported Products. — a) Any consumer product offered for
importation into the customs of the Philippine territory shall be refused
admission if such product:
1) fails to comply with an applicable consumer product qual-
ity and safety standard or rule;
2) is or has been determined to be injurious, unsafe and dan-
gerous;
3) is substandard; or
4) has a material defect.
b) Samples of consumer products being imported into the Philip-
pines in a quality necessary for purposes of determining the existence
of any of the above causes for nonadmission may be obtained by the
concerned department or agency without charge from the owner or
consignee thereof. The owner or consignee of the imported consumer
product under examination shall be afforded an opportunity to a hear-
ing with respect to the importation of such products into the Philippines.
If it appears from examination of such samples or otherwise that an
imported consumer product does not conform to the consumer prod-
uct safety rule or in injurious, unsafe and dangerous, is substandard or
has a material defect, such product shall be refused admission unless
the owner or the consignee thereof manifests under bond that none of
the above grounds for nonadmission exists or that measures have been
taken to cure them before they are sold, distributed or offered for sale
to the general public.
Any consumer product, the sale or use of which has been banned
or withdrawn in the country of manufacture, shall not be imported into
the country.
c) If it appears that any consumer product which may not be as
modified that it can already be accepted, the concerned department may
defer final determination as to the admission of such product for a pe-
riod not exceeding ten (10) days, and in accordance with such regula-
tions as the department and the Commissioner of Customs shall jointly
promulgate, such product may be released from customs custody un-
der bond for the purpose of permitting the owner or consignee as op-
portunity to so modify such product.
Arts. 16, 18 4. CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES 527
d) All modifications taken by an owner or consignee for the pur-

pose of securing admission of an imported consumer product under
paragraph (c) shall be subject to the supervision of the concerned de-
partment. If the product cannot be so modified, or if the owner or con-
signee is not proceeding to satisfactorily modify such product, it shall
be refused admission and the department may direct redelivery of the
product into customs custody, and to seize the product if not so
redelivered.
e) Imported consumer products not admitted must be exported,
except that upon application, the Commissioner of Customs may per-
mit the destruction of the product if within a reasonable time, the owner
or consignee thereof fails to export the same.
f) All expenses in connection with the destruction provided for
in this Article, and all expenses in connection with the storage cartage
or labor with respect to any consumer product refused admission un-
der this Article, shall be paid by the owner or consignee and, in default
of such payment, shall constitute a lien against any future importation
made by such owner or consignee.
xxx xxx
ART. 16. Consumer Product for Export. — The preceding Article on
safety shall not apply to any consumer product if:
a) it can be shown that such product is manufactured, sold or
held for sale for export from the Philippines, or that such product
was imported for export, unless such consumer product is in fact
distributed in commerce for use in the Philippines, and
b) such consumer product or the packaging thereof bears a
stamp or label stating that such consumer product is intended for
export and actually exported.
xxx xxx
ART. 18. Prohibited Acts. — It shall be unlawful for any person to:
a) manufacture for sale, offer for sale, distribute in commerce,
or import into the Philippines any consumer product which is not
in conformity with an applicable consumer product quality or safety
standard promulgated in this Act;
b) manufacture for sale, offer for sale, distribute in commerce
or import into the Philippines any consumer product which has been
declared as banned consumer product by a rule in this Act;
c) refuse access to or copying of pertinent records or fail or
refuse to permit entry of or inspection by authorized officers or
employees of the department;
528 SALES Arts. 19, 40
d) fail to comply with an order issued under Article 11 relat-

ing to notifications of substantial product hazards and to recall, re-
pair, replacement or refund of unsafe products;
e) fail to comply with the rule prohibiting stockpiling.
ART. 19. Penalties. — a) Any person who shall violate any provision
of Article 19 shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not less than
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) but not more than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than two (2) months but not
more than one (1) year, or both upon the discretion of the court, if the
offender is an alien, he shall be deported after service of sentence and
payment of fine, without further deportation proceedings.
b) In case the offender is a naturalized citizen, he shall, in addi-
tion to the penalty prescribed herein, suffer the penalty of cancellation
of his naturalization certificate and its registration in the civil register
and immediate deportation after service of sentence and payment of fine.
c) Any director, officer or agent of a corporation who shall author-
ize, order or perform any of the acts or practices constituting in whole
or in part a violation of Article 18, and who has knowledge or notice of
noncompliance received by the corporation from the concerned depart-
ment, shall be subject to penalties to which that corporation may be
subject.
In case the violation is committed by, or in the interest of a foreign
juridical person duly licensed to engage in business in the Philippines,
such license to engage in business in the Philippines shall immediately
be revoked.
xxx xxx
ART. 40. Prohibited Acts. — The following acts and the causing
thereof are hereby prohibited:
a) the manufacture, importation, exportation, sale, offering for
sale, distribution or transfer of any food, drug, device or cosmetic
that is adulterated or mislabeled;
b) the adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device,
or cosmetic;
c) the refusal to permit entry or inspection as authorized by
Article 36 to allow samples to be collected;
d) the giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Arti-
cle 41(b) hereof which guaranty or undertaking is false, except by a
person who relied upon a guaranty or undertaking to the same ef-
fect signed by, and containing the name and address of, the person
residing in the Philippines from whom he received in good faith the

food, drug, device, or cosmetic or the giving of a guaranty or un-
dertaking referred to in Article 41(b) which guaranty or undertak-
ing is false;
e) forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely representing
or without proper authority using any mark, stamp, tag, lable, or
other identification device authorized or required by regulations
promulgated under the provisions of this Act;
f) the using by any person to his own advantage, or reveal-
ing, other than to the Department or to the courts when relevant in
any judicial proceeding under this Act, any information concerning
any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protec-
tion;
g) the alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or re-
moval of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of
any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if
such act is done while such product is held for sale (whether or not
the first sale) and results in such product being adulterated or
mislabeled;
h) the use, on the labeling of any drug or in any advertising
relating to such drug, of any representation or suggestion that an
application with respect to such drug is effective under Article 31
hereof or that such drug complies with the provisions of such arti-
cles;
i) the use, in labeling, advertising or other sales promotion,
of any reference to any report or analysis furnished in compliance
with Section 19 of Executive Order No. 175, series of 1987;
j) the manufacture, importation, exportation, sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or transfer of any drug or device which is not reg-
istered with the Department pursuant to this Act;
k) the manufacture, importation, exportation, sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or transfer of any drug or device by any person
without the license from the Department required in this Act;
l) the sale or offering for sale of any drug or device beyond
its expiration or expiry date;
m) the release for sale or distribution of a batch of drugs with-
out batch certification when required under Article 34 hereof.
ART. 41. Penalties. — a) Any person who violates any of the provi-
sions of Article 40 hereof shall, upon conviction, be subject to imprison-
ment of not less than one (1) year but not more than five (5) years, or a
530 SALES Art. 46
fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) but not more than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000), or both such imprisonment and fine, in the
distribution of the Court.
Should the offense be committed by a juridical person, the Chair-
man of the Board of Directors, the President, General Manager, or the
partners and/or the persons directly responsible therefor shall be pe-
nalized.
b) No person shall be subject to the penalties of sub-article (a) of
this Article for: (1) having sold, offered for sale or transferred any prod-
uct and delivered it, if such delivery was made in good faith, unless he
refuses to furnish on request of the Department, the name and address
of the person from whom he purchased or received such product and
copies of all documents, if any there be, pertaining to the delivery of
the product to him; (2) having violated Article 40(a) if he established a
guaranty or undertaking signed by, and containing the name and ad-
dress of, the person residing in the Philippines from whom he received
in good faith the product; or (3) having violated Article 40(a), where the
violation exists because the product is adulterated by reason of contain-
ing a color other than the permissible one under regulations promul-
gated by the Department in this Act, if such person establishes a guar-
anty or undertaking signed by, and containing the name and address,
of the manufacturer of the color, to the effect that such color is permis-
sible, under applicable regulations promulgated by the Department in
this Act.
xxx xxx
ART. 46. Prohibited Acts. — It shall be unlawful for any person to:
a) introduce or deliver for introduction into commerce of any
mislabeled hazardous substance or banned hazardous substance;
b) alter, mutilate, destroy, obliterate or remove the whole or
any part of the label of a mislabeled hazardous substance, or banned
hazardous substance, if such act is done while the substance is in
commerce or while the substance is held for sale, whether or not it
is the first sale;
c) receive in commerce any mislabeled hazardous substance
or banned hazardous substance and the delivery or preferred de-
livery thereof of cost or otherwise;
d) give the guaranty or undertaking referred to in paragraph
(b) of Article 93 and paragraph (b) of Article 45 if such guaranty or
undertaking is false, except by a person who relied upon a guaranty
or undertaking which he received in good faith;
e) introduce or deliver for introduction into commerce or re-

ceive in commerce and subsequently deliver or preferred at cost or
otherwise, or a hazardous substance in a reused food, drug, cosmetic
or device container or in a container which, though not a reused
container, is identifiable as a food, drug, cosmetic or device con-
tainer, by its labeling or by other identification. The use of a used
food, drug, cosmetic or device container for a hazardous substance
does not diminish the danger posed by the hazardous substance
involved, therefore, such substance shall be deemed a mislabeled
hazardous substance.
ART. 47. Penalties, exception. — a) Any person who violates any of
the provisions of Article 46 shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine
of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) or an imprisonment of not
less than six (6) months but not more than five (5) years or both upon
the discretion of the Court.
b) No person shall be subject to the penalties of paragraph a) of
this Article for: (1) having violated paragraph (c) of Article 46 unless he
refuses to furnish, upon request by the Department or his representa-
tive, the name and address of the person from whom he purchased such
hazardous substances; and (2) having violated paragraph (a) of Article
46, if he establishes a guaranty or undertaking signed by, and contain-
ing the name and address of, the person from whom he received in good
faith, the hazardous substance to the effect that the hazardous substance
is not a mislabeled hazardous substance or banned hazardous within
the meaning of that term in this Act.
xxx xxx
ART. 50. Prohibited Against Deceptive Sales Act or Practices. — A de-
ceptive act or practice by a seller or supplier in connection with a con-
sumer transaction violates this Act whether it occurs before, during or
after the transaction. An act or practice shall be deemed deceptive when-
ever the producer, manufacturer, supplier or seller, through conceal-
ment, false representation or fraudulent manipulation, induces a con-
sumer to enter into a sales or lease transaction of any consumer prod-
uct or service.
Without limiting the scope of the above paragraph, the act or prac-
tice of a seller or supplier is deceptive when it represents that:
a) a consumer product or service has the sponsorship, ap-
proval, performance, characteristics, ingredients, accessories, uses,
or benefits it does not have;
b) a consumer product or service is of a particular standard,
quality, grade, style, or model when in fact it is not;
c) a consumer product is new, original or unused, when in fact,

it is a deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed or second-hand
state;
d) a consumer product or service is available to the consumer
for a reason that is different from the fact;
e) a consumer product or service has been supplied in accord-
ance with the previous representation when in fact it is not;
f) a consumer product or service can be supplied in a quan-
tity greater than the supplier intends;
g) a service or repair of a consumer product is needed when
in fact it is not;
h) a specific price advantage of a consumer product exists
when in fact it does not;
i) the sales act or practice involves or does not involve a war-
ranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms or other
rights, remedies or obligations if the indication is false; and
j) the seller or supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affili-
ation he does not have.
ART. 51. Deceptive Sales Acts or Practices by Regulation. — The De-
partment shall, after due notice and hearing, promulgate regulations
declaring as deceptive any sales act, practice or technique which is a
misrepresentation of facts other than those enumerated in Article 50.
ART. 52. Unfair or Unconscionable Sales Act or Practice. — An unfair
or unconscionable sales act or practice by a seller or supplier in connec-
tion with a consumer transaction violates this Chapter whether it oc-
curs before, during or after the consumer transaction. An act or prac-
tice shall be deemed unfair or unconscionable whenever the producer,
manufacturer, distributor, supplier or seller, by taking advantage of the
consumer’s physical or mental infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, lack of
time or the general conditions of the environment or surroundings, in-
duces the consumer to enter into a sales or lease transaction grossly
inimical to the interests of the consumer or grossly one-sided in favor
of the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier or seller.
In determining whether an act or practice is unfair and unconscion-
able, the following circumstances shall be considered:
a) that the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier or
seller took advantage of the inability of the consumer to reasonably
protect his interest because of his inability to understand the lan-
guage of an agreement, or similar factors;
b) that when the consumer transaction was entered into, the

price grossly exceeded the price at which similar products or serv-
ices were readily obtainable in similar transaction by like consumer;
c) that when the consumer transaction was entered into, the
consumer was unable to receive a substantial benefit from the sub-
ject of the transaction;
d) that when the consumer transaction was entered into, the
seller or supplier was aware that there was no reasonable probabil-
ity or payment of the obligation in full by the consumer; and
e) that the transaction that the seller or supplier induced the
consumer to enter into was excessively one-sided in favor of the
seller or supplier.
ART. 53. Chain Distribution Plans or Pyramid Sales Schemes. — Chain
distribution plans or pyramid sales schemes shall not be employed in
the sale of consumer products.
ART. 54. Home Solicitation Sales. — No business entity shall conduct
any home solicitation sale of any consumer product or service without
first obtaining a permit from the Department. Such permit may be de-
nied, suspended or revoked upon cause as provided in the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Department, after due notice and hear-
ing.
ART. 55. Home Solicitation Sales; When Conducted. — Home
solicitation sales may be conducted only between the hours of nine
o’clock in the morning and seven o’clock in the evening of each work-
ing day: Provided, That solicitation sales may be made at a time other
than the prescribed hours where the persons solicited has previously
agreed to the same.
ART. 56. Home Solicitation Sales; By Whom Conducted. — Home
solicitation sales shall only be conducted by a person who has the proper
identification and authority from his principal to make such solicita-
tions.
xxx xxx
ART. 62. Sealing and Testing of Instruments of Weights and Measures.
— All instruments for determining weights and measures in all con-
sumer and consumer related transactions shall be tested, calibrated and
sealed every six (6) months by the official sealer who shall be the pro-
vincial or city or municipal treasurer or his authorized representative
upon payment of fees required under existing law: Provided, That all
instruments of weights and measures shall continuously be inspected
for compliance with the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 63. Use of Metric System. — The system of weights and meas-
ures to be used for all products, commodities, materials, utilities, serv-
ices and commercial transactions, in all contracts, deeds and other offi-
cial and legal instruments and documents shall be the metric system.
In accordance with existing laws and their implementing rules and regu-
lations.
The Department of Trade and Industry shall also adopt standard
measurement for garments, shoes and other similar consumer products.
PROHIBITED ACTS
ART. 64. Fraudulent Practices Relative to Weights and Measures. — The

following acts relating to weights and measures are prohibited:
a) for any person other than the official sealer or his duly au-
thorized representative to place or attach and official tag, seal,
sticker, mark, stamp, brand or other characteristic sign used to in-
dicate that such instrument of weight and measure has officially
been tested, calibrated, sealed or inspected;
b) for any person to imitate any seal, sticker, mark, stamp,
brand, tag or other characteristic sign used to indicate that such
instrument of weight or measure has been officially tested, cali-
brated, sealed or inspected;
c) for any person other than the official sealer or his duly au-
thorized representative to alter in any way the certificate or receipt
given by the official sealer or his duly authorized representative as
an acknowledgment that the instrument for determining weight or
measure has been fully tested, calibrated, sealed or inspected;
d) for any person to make or knowingly sell or use any false
or counterfeit seal, sticker, brand, stamp, tag, certificate or license
or any dye for printing or making the same or any characteristic sign
used to indicate that such instrument of weight or measure has been
officially tested, calibrated, sealed or inspected;
e) for any person other than the official sealer or his duly au-
thorized representative to alter the written or printed figures, let-
ters or symbols on any official seal, sticker, receipt, stamp, tag, cer-
tificate or license used or issued;
f) for any person to use or reuse any restored, altered, expired,
damaged stamp, tag certificate or license for the purpose of mak-
ing it appear that the instrument of weight or measure has been
tested, calibrated, sealed or inspected;
g) for any person engaged in the buying and selling of con-

sumer products or of furnishing services the value of which esti-
mated by weight or measure to possess, use or maintain with inten-
tion to use any scale, balance, weight or measure that has not been
sealed or if previously sealed, the license therefor has expired and
has not been renewed in due time;
h) for any person to fraudulently alter any scale, balance,
weight or measure after it is officially sealed;
i) for any person to knowingly use any false scale, balance,
weight or measure, whether sealed or not;
j) for any person to fraudulently give short weight or meas-
ure in the making of a scale;
k) for any person, assuming to determine truly the weight or
measure of any article bought or sold by weight or measure, to
fraudulently misrepresent the weight or measure thereof; or
l) for any person to produce the commission of any such
offense above-mentioned by another.
Instruments officially sealed at some previous time which have re-
mained unaltered and accurate and the seal or tag officially affixed
thereto remains intact and in the same position and condition in which
it was placed by the official sealer or his duly authorized representa-
tive shall, if presented for sealing, be sealed promptly on demand by
the official sealer or his authorized representative without penalty ex-
cept a surcharge fixed by law or regulation.
ART. 65. Penalties. — a) Any person who shall violate the provisions
of paragraphs (a) to (f) and paragraph (l) of Article 64 or its implement-
ing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of
not less than Two hundred pesos (P200.00) but not more than One thou-
sand pesos (P1,000.00) or by imprisonment of not more than one (1) year
or both upon the discretion of the Court.
b) Any person who shall violate the provisions of paragraph (g)
of Article 64 for the first time shall be subject to a fine of not less than
Five hundred pesos (P500.00) or by imprisonment of not less than one
(1) month but not more than five (5) years or both, upon the discretion
of the Court.
c) The owner-possessor or user of instrument of weight and meas-
ure enumerated in paragraphs (h) to (k) of Article 64 shall, upon con-
viction, be subject to a fine of not less than Three hundred pesos (P300.00)
or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) year, or both, upon the discre-
tion of the Court.
536 SALES Arts. 67-68
xxx xxx
ART. 67. Applicable Law on Warranties. — The provisions of the Civil
Code on conditions and warranties shall govern all contracts of sale with
conditions and warranties.
ART. 68. Additional Provisions on Warranties. — In addition to the
Civil Code provisions on sale with warranties, the following provisions
shall govern the sale of consumer products with warranty:
a) Terms of express warranty — Any seller or manufacturer who
given an express warranty shall:
1) set forth the terms of warranty in clear and readily un-
derstandable language and clearly identify himself as the war-
rantor;
2) identify the party to whom the warranty is extended;
3) state the products or parts covered;
4) state what the warrantor will do in the event of a de-
fect, malfunction or failure to conform to the written warranty
and at whose expense;
5) state what the consumer must do to avail of the rights
which accrue to the warranty; and
6) stipulate the period within which, after notice of defect,
malfunction or failure to conform to the warranty, the warran-
tor will perform any obligation under the warranty.
b) Express warranty — operative from moment of sale. — All
written warranties or guarantees issued by a manufacturer, pro-
ducer, or importer shall be operative from the moment of sale.
1) Sales Report. — All sales made by distributor of prod-
ucts covered by this Article shall be reported to the manufac-
turer, producer, or importer of the product sold within thirty (30)
days from date of purchase, unless otherwise agreed upon. The
report shall contain, among others, the date of purchase, model
of the product bought, its serial number, name and address of
the buyer. The report made in accordance with this provision
shall be equivalent to a warranty registration with the manu-
facturer, producer, or importer. Such registration is sufficient to
hold the manufacturer, producer, or importer liable, in appro-
priate cases, under its warranty.
2) Failure to make or send report. — Failure of the distribu-
tor to make the report or send them the form required by the
manufacturer, producer, or importer shall relieve the latter of
its liability under the warranty: Provided, however, That the dis-
tributor who failed to comply with its obligation to send the
sales report shall be personally liable under the warranty. For
this purpose, the manufacturer shall be obligated to make good
the warranty at the expense of the distributor.
3) Retail. — The retailer shall be subsidiarily liable under
the warranty in case of failure of both the manufacturer and dis-
tributor to honor the warranty. In such case, the retailer shall
shoulder the expenses and costs necessary to honor the war-
ranty. Nothing therein shall prevent the retailer from proceed-
ing against the distributor or manufacturer.
4) Enforcement of warranty or guarantee. — The warranty
rights can be enforced by presentment of a claim. To this end,
the purchaser need only to present to the immediate seller ei-
ther the warranty card or the official receipt along with the prod-
uct to be serviced or returned to the immediate seller. No other
documentary requirement shall be demanded from the pur-
chaser. If the immediate seller is the manufacturer’s factory or
showroom, the warranty shall immediately be honored. If the
product was purchased from a distributor, the distributor shall
likewise immediately honor the warranty. In the case of a re-
tailer other than the distributor, the former shall take responsi-
bility without cost to the buyer of presenting the warranty claim
to the distributor in the consumer’s behalf.
5) Record of purchases. — Distributors and retailers covered
by this Article shall keep a record of all purchases covered by a
warranty or guarantee for such period of time corresponding
to the lifetime of the products’ respective warranties or guar-
antees.
6) Contrary stipulations; null and void. — All covenants,
stipulations or agreements contrary to the provisions of this
Article shall be without legal effect.
c) Designation of warranties. — A written warranty shall clearly
and conspicuously designate such warranty as:
1) “Full warranty’’ if the written warranty meets the mini-
mum requirements set forth in paragraph (d); and
2) “Limited warranty’’ if the written warranty does not
meet such minimum requirements.
d) Minimum standards for warranties. — For the warrantor of a
consumer product to meet the minimum standards for warranty, he
shall:
538 SALES Art. 69
1) remedy such consumer product within a reasonable

time and without charge in case of a defect, malfunction or fail-
ure to conform to such written warranty;
2) permit the consumer to elect whether to ask for a refund
or replacement without charge of such product or part, as the
case may be, where after reasonable number of attempts to rem-
edy the defect or malfunctions, the product continues to have
the defect or to malfunction.
The warrantor will not be required to perform the above
duties if he can show that the defect, malfunction or failure to
conform to a written warranty was caused by damage due to
unreasonable use thereof.
e) Duration of warranty. — The seller and the consumer may
stipulate the period within which the express warranty shall be
enforceable. If the implied warranty on merchantability accompa-
nies an express warranty, both will be of equal duration.
Any other implied warranty shall endure not less than sixty (60)
days nor more than one (1) year following the sale of new consumer
products.
f) Breach of warranties. — 1) In case of breach of express war-
ranty, the consumer may elect to have the goods repaired or its
purchase price refunded by the warrantor. In case the repair of the
product in whole or in part is elected, the warranty work must be
made to conform to the express warranty within thirty (30) days by
either the warrantor or his representative. The thirty-day period,
however, may be extended by conditions which are beyond the
control of the warrantor or his representative. In case the refund of
the purchase price is elected, the amount directly attributable to the
use of the consumer prior to the discovery of the nonconformity
shall be deducted.
2) In case of breach of implied warranty, the consumer
may retain in the goods and recover damages, or reject the
goods, cancel and contract and recover from the seller so much
of the purchase price as has been paid, including damages.
ART. 69. Warranties in Supply of Services. — a) In every contract for
the supply of services to a consumer made by a seller in the course of a
business, there is an implied warranty that the services will be rendered
with due care and skill and that any material supplied in connection
with such services will be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is
supplied.
Arts. 70-73 4. CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES 539
b) Where a seller supplies consumer services in the course of a

business and the consumer, expressly or by implication, makes known
to the seller the particular purpose for which the services are required,
there is an implied warranty that the services supplied under the con-
tract and any material supplied in connection therewith will be reason-
ably fit for that purpose or are of such a nature or quality that they might
reasonably be expected to achieve that result, unless the circumstances
show that the consumer does not rely or that it is unreasonable for him
to rely, on the seller’s skill or judgment.
SEC. 70. Professional Services. — The provisions of this Act on war-
ranty shall not apply to professional services of certified public account-
ants, architects, engineers, lawyers, veterinarians, optometrists, phar-
macists, nurses, nutritionists, dietitians, physical therapists, salesmen,
medical and dental practitioners and other professionals engaged in
their respective professional endeavors.
ART. 71. Guaranty of Service Firms. — Service firms shall guarantee
workmanship and replacement of spare parts for a period not less than
ninety (90) days which shall be indicated in the pertinent invoices.
ART. 72. Prohibited Acts. — The following acts are prohibited: a) re-
fusal without any valid legal cause by the local manufacturer or any
person obligated under the warranty or guarantee to honor a warranty
or guarantee issued;
b) unreasonable delay by the local manufacturer or any person
obligated under the warranty or guarantee in honoring the warranty;
c) removal by any person of a product’s warranty card for the
purpose of evading said warranty obligation;
d) any false representation in an advertisement as to the existence
of a warranty or guarantee.
of Article 67 shall be subject to a fine of not less than Five hundred pe-
sos (P500.00) but not more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or an
imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more than two
(2) years or both, upon the discretion of the Court. A second conviction
under this paragraph shall also carry with it the penalty of revocation
of his business permit and license.
b) Any person, natural or juridical, committing any of the illegal
acts provided for in Chapter III, except with respect to Article 67, shall
be liable for a fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) but
not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or imprisonment for a
540 SALES Arts. 76, 81-83
period of at least one (1) year but not more than five (5) years, or both,
at the discretion of the Court.
The imposition of any of the penalties herein provided is without
prejudice to any liability incurred under the warranty or guarantee.
xxx xxx
ART. 76. Prohibited Acts on Labelling and Packaging. — It shall be
unlawful for any person, either as principal or agent, engaged in the
labeling or packaging of any consumer product, to display or distrib-
ute or to cause to be displayed or distributed in commerce any consumer
product whose package or label does not conform to the provisions of
this Chapter.
The prohibition in this Chapter shall not apply to persons engaged
in the business of wholesale or retail distributors of consumer products
except to the extent that such persons:
a) are engaged in the packaging or labeling of such products;
b) prescribe or specify by any means the manner in which such
products are packaged or labeled; or
c) having knowledge, refuse to disclose the source of the
mislabeled or mispackaged products.
xxx xxx
SEC. 81. Price Tag Requirement. — It shall be unlawful to offer any
consumer product for retail sale to the public without an appropriate
price tag, label or marking publicly displayed to indicate the price of
each article and said products shall not be sold at a price higher than
that stated therein and without discrimination to all buyers: Provided,
That lumber sold, displayed or offered for sale to the public shall be
tagged or labeled by indicating thereon the price and the corresponding
official name of the wood: Provided, further, That if consumer products
for sale are too small or the nature of which makes it impractical to place
a price tag thereon price list placed at the nearest point where the prod-
ucts are displayed indicating the retail price of the same may suffice.
ART. 82. Manner of Placing Price Tags. — Price tags, labels or mark-
ings must be written clearly, indicating the price of the consumer prod-
uct per unit in pesos and centavos.
ART. 83. Regulations for Price Tag Placement. — The concerned de-
partment shall prescribe rules and regulations for the visible placement
of price tags for specific consumer products and services. There shall
be no erasures or alterations of any sort of price tags, labels or mark-
ings.
xxx xxx
of Title III, Chapter IV of this Act, or its implementing rules and regula-
tions, except Articles 81 to 83 of the same Chapter, shall be subject to a
fine of not less than Five hundred pesos (P500.00) but not more than
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than
three (3) months but not more than two (2) years or both, at the discre-
tion of the Court: Provided, That, if the consumer product is one which
is not a food, cosmetic, drug, device or hazardous substance, the pen-
alty shall be a fine of not less than Two hundred pesos (P200.00) but not
more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or imprisonment of not less
than one (1) month but not more than one (1) year or both, at the discre-
tion of the Court.
b) Any person who violates the provisions of Articles 81 to 83 for
the first time shall be subject to a fine of not less than Two hundred pesos
(P200.00) but not more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or by im-
prisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more than six (6)
months or both, at the discretion of the Court. A second conviction un-
der this paragraph shall also carry with it the penalty of revocation of
business permit and license.
xxx xxx
ART. 97. Liability for the Defective Products. — Any Filipino or for-
eign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be laible for re-
dress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by de-
fects resulting from design, manufacturer, construction, assembly and
erection formulas and handling and making up, presentation or pack-
ing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate infor-
mation on the use and hazardous thereof.
A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully
expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, includ-
ing but not limited to:
a) presentation of product;
b) use and hazardous reasonably expected of it;
c) the time it was put into circulation.
A product is not considered defective because another better qual-
ity product has been placed in the market.
The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held
liable when it evidences:
a) that it did not place the product on the market;
542 SALES Arts. 98-100
b) that although it did place the product on the market such

product has no defect;
c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault.
ART. 98. Liability of Tradesman or Seller. — The tradesman/seller is
likewise liable, pursuant to the preceding article when:
a) it is not possible to identify the manufacturer, builder, pro-
ducer or importer;
b) the product is supplied, without clear identification of the
manufacturer, producer, building or importer;
c) he does not adequately preserve perishable goods. The
party making payment to the damaged party may exercise the right
to recover a part of the whole of the payment made against the other
responsible parties, in accordance with their part or responsibility
in the cause of the damage effected.
ART. 99. Liability for Defective Services. — The service supplier is li-
able for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consum-
ers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for
insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards
thereof.
The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the con-
sumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into
consideration, including but not limited to:
a) the manner in which it is provided;
b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of
it;
c) the time when it was provided.
A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduc-
tion of new techniques.
The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven:
a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;
b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.
ART. 100. Liability for Product and Service Imperfection. — The sup-
pliers of durable or nondurable consumer products are jointly liable for
imperfections in quality that render the products unfit or inadequate
for consumption for which they are designed or decrease their value,
and for those resulting from inconsistency with the information pro-
vided on the container, packaging, labels or publicity messages/adver-
tisement, with due regard to the variations resulting from their nature,
the consumer being able to demand replacement to the imperfect parts.
If the imperfection is not corrected within thirty (30) days, the con-
sumer may alternatively demand at his option:
a) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind,
in a perfect state of use;
b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with
monetary updating, without prejudice to any losses and damages;
c) a proportionate price reduction.
The parties may agree to reduce or increase the term specified in
the immediately preceding paragraph; but such shall not be less than
seven (7) nor more than one hundred and eighty (180) days.
The consumer may make immediate use of the alternatives under
the second paragraph of this Article when by virtue of the extent of the
imperfection, the replacement of the imperfect parts may jeopardize the
product quality or characteristics, thus decreasing its value.
If the consumer opts for the alternative under sub-paragraph (a) of
the second paragraph of this Article and replacement of the product is
not possible, it may be replaced by another of a different kind, mark or
model: Provided, That any difference in price may result thereof shall be
supplemental or reimbursed by the party which caused the damage,
without prejudice to the provisions of the second, third and fourth para-
graphs of this Article.
ART. 101. Liability for Product Quantity Imperfection. — Suppliers are
jointly liable for imperfections in the quantity of the product when, in
due regard for variations inherent thereto, their net content is less than
that indicated on the container, packaging, labeling or advertisement,
the consumer having powers to demand, alternatively, at his own op-
tion.
a) the proportionate price;
b) the supplementing of weight or measure differential;
c) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind,
mark or model, without said imperfections;
d) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with
monetary updating without prejudice to losses and damages, if any.
The provisions of the fifth paragraph of Article 99 shall apply to this
Article.
The immediate supplier shall be liable if the instrument used for
544 SALES Arts. 102-106
weighing or measuring is not gauged in accordance with official stand-

ards.
ART. 102. Liability for Service Quality Imperfection. — The service
supplier is liable for any quality imperfections that render the services
improper for consumption or decrease their value, and for those result-
ing from inconsistency with the information contained in the offer or
advertisement, the consumer being entitled to demand alternatively at
his option:
a) the performance of the services, without any additional cost
and when applicable;
b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with
monetary updating without prejudice to losses and damages, if any;
c) a proportionate price reduction.
Reperformance of services may be entrusted to duly qualified third
parties, at the supplier’s risk and cost.
Improper services are those which prove to be inadequate for pur-
poses reasonably expected of them and those that fail to meet the pro-
visions of this Act regulating service rendering.
ART. 103. Repair Service Obligation. — When services are provided
for the repair of any product, the supplier shall be considered implic-
itly bound to use adequate, new, original replacement parts, or those
that maintain the manufacturer’s technical specifications unless, other-
wise authorized, as regards to the latter by the consumer.
ART. 104. Ignorance of Quality Imperfection. — The supplier’s igno-
rance of the quality imperfections due to inadequacy of the products
and services does not exempt him from any liability.
ART. 105. Legal Guarantee of Adequacy. — The legal guarantee of
product or service adequacy does not require an express instrument or
contractual exoneration of the supplier being forbidden.
ART. 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation. — The stipulation in
a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating or reducing the obliga-
tion to indemnify for damages effected, as provided for in this and in
the preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than one
person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly li-
able for the redress established in the pertinent provisions of this Act.
However, if the damage is caused by a component or part incorporated
in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the
person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable.
Arts. 107, 110-111 4. CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES 545
ART. 107. Penalties. — Any person who shall violate any provision
of this Chapter or its implementing rules and regulations with respect
to any consumer product which is not food, cosmetic, or hazardous
substance shall upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more than one
(1) year or both upon the discretion of the Court.
In case of judicial persons, the penalty shall be imposed upon its
president, manager or head. If the offender is an alien, he shall, after
payment of fine and service of sentence, be deported without further
deportation proceedings.
xxx xxx
ART. 110. False, Deceptive or Misleading Advertisement. — It shall be
unlawful for any person to disseminate or to cause the dissemination
of any false, deceptive or misleading advertisement by Philippine mail
or in commerce by print, radio, television, outdoor advertisement or
other medium for the purpose of inducing or which is likely to induce
directly or indirectly the purchase of consumer products or services.
An advertisement shall be false, deceptive or misleading if it is not
in conformity with the provisions of this Act or if it is misleading in a
material respect. In determining whether any advertisement is false,
deceptive or misleading, there shall be taken into account, among other
things, not only representations made or any combination thereof, but
also the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal material facts
in the light of such representations, or materials with respect to conse-
quences which may result from the use or application of consumer prod-
ucts or services to which the advertisement relates under the conditions
prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are cus-
tomary or usual.
ART. 111. Price Comparisons. — Comparative price advertising by
sellers of consumer products or services shall conform to the following
conditions: a) Where the comparison relates to a former price of the
seller, the item compared shall either have been sold at that price within
the ninety (90) days immediately preceding the date of the advertise-
ment, or it shall have been offered for sale at least four (4) weeks during
such ninety-day period. If the comparison does not relate to an item sold
or offered for sale during the ninety-day period, the date, time or sea-
sonal period of such sale or offer shall be disclosed in the advertisement.
b) Where the comparison relates to a seller’s future price, the fu-
ture price shall take effect on the date disclosed in the advertisement or
within ninety (90) days after the price comparison is stated in the ad-
vertisement. The stated future price shall be maintained by the seller
546 SALES Arts. 112-113
for a period of at least four (4) weeks after its effective date: Provided,
That compliance thereof may be dispensed with in case of circumstances
beyond the seller’s control.
c) Where the comparison relates to a competitor’s price, the com-
petitor’s price shall relate to the consumer products or services adver-
tised or sold in the ninety-day period and shall be representative of the
prices similar consumer products or services are sold or advertised in
the locality where the price comparison was made.
ART. 112. Special Advertising Requirements for Food, Drug, Cosmetic,
Device, or Hazardous Substance. — a) No claim in the advertisement may
be made which is not contained in the label or approved by the con-
cerned department.
b) No person shall advertise any food, drug, cosmetic, device or
hazardous substance in a manner that is false, misleading or deceptive
or is likely to create an erroneous impression regarding its character,
value, quantity, composition, merit, or safety.
c) Where a standard has been prescribed for a food, drug, cosmetic,
or device, no person shall advertise any article or substance in such a
manner that it is likely to be mistaken for such product, unless the arti-
cle complies with the prescribed standard or regulation.
d) No person shall, in the advertisement of any food, drug, cos-
metic, device, or hazardous substance, make use of any reference to any
laboratory report of analysis required to be furnished to the concerned
department, unless such laboratory report is duly approved by such
department.
e) Any businessman who is doubtful as to whether his advertise-
ment relative to food, drug, cosmetic, device, or hazardous substance
will violate or does not conform with this Act or the concerned depart-
ment’s pertinent rules and regulations may apply to the same for con-
sideration and opinion on such matter before such advertisement is
disseminated to the public. In this case, the concerned department shall
give its opinion and notify the applicant of its action within thirty (30)
days from the date of application; otherwise, the application shall be
deemed approved.
f) No person shall advertise any food, drug, cosmetic, device, or
hazardous substance unless such product is duly registered and ap-
proved by the concerned department for use in any advertisement.
ART. 113. Credit Advertising. — No advertisement to aid, promote,
or assist, directly or indirectly, any extension of consumer credit
may:
Arts. 114-115, 123, 147, 173 4. CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES 547
a) state that a specific periodic consumer credit amount or

installment amount can be arranged, unless the creditor usually and
customarily arranges credit payment or installments for that period
and in that amount; and
b) state that a specified down payment is required in exten-
sion of consumer credit, unless the credit usually or customarily
arranges down payment in that amount.
ART. 114. Advertising of Open-end Credit Plan. — In case of an open-
end credit plan, the rate of interest and other material features of the
plan shall be disclosed in the advertisement.
ART. 115. Special Claims. — Any advertisement which makes spe-
cial claims shall:
a) substantiate such claims; and
b) properly use research results, scientific terms, statistics or
quotations.
xxx xxx
SEC. 123. Penalties. — a) Any person, association, partnership or
corporation who shall violate any of the provisions of Articles 110 to
115 shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not less than Five hun-
dred pesos (P500.00) but not more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
or an imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more than
six (6) months or both upon the discretion of the Court.
xxx xxx
ART. 147. Penalties. — Any creditor who is connection with any credit
transaction fails to disclose to any person any information in violation
of this Chapter or the implementing rules and regulations issued there-
under shall be liable to such person in the amount of One thousand pe-
sos (P1,000.00) or in amount equal to twice the finance charges required
by such creditor in connection with such transaction, whichever is greater,
except that such liability shall not exceed Three thousand pesos
(P3,000.00) for any credit transaction and actual damages with the non-
disclosure of the required information. Action to recover such penalty
may be brought by such person within one (1) year from the date of the
occurrence of the violation in any court of competent jurisdiction.
xxx xxx
ART. 173. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days from
the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. (Published on June 15,
1992, Vol. 88, No. 24, pp. 3639-3715.)
Approved, April 13, 1992.
548 SALES Secs. 1-3
5. MANUFACTURE, IMPORTATION, DISTRIBUTION

AND SALE OF LAUNDRY AND INDUSTRIAL
DETERGENTS CONTAINING HARD
SURFACTANTS
(R.A. No. 8970)
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared a policy of

the State to protect, secure and safeguard the citizenry from the danger
and harmful effects of pollution as seen from the influx of imported de-
tergents containing hard surfactants, a substance found to be a water
pollutant; for their physical and mental well-being and, in the end,
pursue a vigorous campaign against the manufacture, importation, dis-
tribution and sale of laundry and industrial detergents containing the
harmful substance; and finally provide for its complete prohibition.
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
(a) “Hard Surfactants” shall refer to surfactants with low biode-
gradability rate including chemicals such as hard or branded alkyl
benzene, hard or branched alkyl benzene surfactants, hard or
branded dodecyl benzene sulfonates, branched dodecyl benzene,
their sodium or potassium salts and other technical names referring
to the same chemical compound;
(b) “Industrial detergent” shall refer to any cleaning product not
designed for laundering different fabrics in the family wash but is
mostly used in the manufacturing industry, such as but not limited
to the beverage industry, textile industry, meat, fish and fruit can-
ning, dairy product processing and food processing industry;
(c) “Laundry detergent” shall refer to a product containing a sur-
factant and other ingredients, formulated to clean and care for the
many different fabrics in the family wash; and
(d) “Natural oleochemical” shall refer to chemicals derived from
processing plant-based natural oils such as but not limited to coco-
nut, palm, palm kernel, sunflower, and grapeseed.
Sec. 3. Labels. — In addition to the requirements for the labeling of
products pursuant to Republic Act No. 7394, otherwise known as “The
Consumer Act of the Philippines,” all laundry and industrial detergent
labels must contain the following information legibly written or printed
with indelible ink: (a) name of product; (b) name of trade name and
address of the person or company producing, importing or marketing
Secs. 4-6 5. MANUFACTURE, IMPORTATION, DISTRIBUTION AND SALE 549
OF LAUNDRY AND INDUSTRIAL DETERGENTS CONTAINING
HARD SURFACTANTS
the product; and (c) statement of the manufacturer or importer that the
product does not contain hard surfactants.
Sec. 4. Prohibition. — The manufacture, importation, distribution
and/or sale of laundry and industrial detergents containing hard
surfactants are hereby declared prohibited. The Bureau of Product Stand-
ards shall review and revise the mandatory Philippine National Stand-
ard for “Surface Active Agents-Synthetic Detergents for Laundry Use”
in accordance with this Act and monitor compliance therewith.
For this purpose, the Bureau of Product Standards shall inspect laun-
dry and industrial detergents, whether imported or locally-manufac-
tured, to ensure that they are free from hard surfactants.
Sec. 5. Administrative Sanctions. — Any violation of this Act shall con-
stitute a violation of a trade and industry law subject to the provisions
of Executive Order No. 913 dated 7 October 1983, as amended. The Bu-
reau of Product Standards shall have the authority recommend, pursu-
ant to Executive Order No. 913, as amended, the imposition of the ad-
ministrative sanctions enumerated therein against the manufacturer,
importer, distributor, and seller of laundry and industrial detergents
containing hard surfactants.
In addition to the administrative sanctions imposable under Execu-
tive Order No. 913, as amended, the Bureau of Product Standards is
hereby authorized to recommend the imposition of the fines in case of
violation of this Act as set forth in the following schedule:
(i) First Offense, a fine of Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00);
(ii) Second Offense committed within one (1) year from the first
offense, a fine of Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); and
(iii) Third offense committed within one (1) year from the sec-
ond offense, a fine of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
The imposition of the foregoing administrative sanctions shall be
without prejudice to the cancellation of the manufacturer’s license to
operate and/or the Product Standards Quality Mark pursuant to Re-
public Act No. 4109, as amended.
Sec. 6. Penalties. — Any person who manufactures, imports, distrib-
utes or sells laundry and industrial detergents found containing hard
surfactants shall be penalized by imprisonment of less than one (1) year
nor more than five (5) years and/or fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos
(PhP1,000,000.00), at the discretion of the court: Provided, That if the
violator is a corporation, firm, partnership or association, the penalty
550 SALES Sec. 4
shall be imposed upon the president or the manager or any officer

thereof who knows or ought to have known the commission of the
offense: Provided, finally, That in case the guilty officer is a foreigner, he
shall be immediately deported after service of sentence.
Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. — The Bureau of Product Standards,
in consultation with the relevant departments or agencies of the national
government such as, but not limited to, Environment Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Re-
sources, Bureau of Customs (BOC), Bureau of Trade Regulations and
Consumer Protection (BTRCP), shall issue the rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of this Act. Without prejudice to the con-
stitutional right of every citizen to be safe from unreasonable search and
seizure, the rules and regulations shall include the authority to conduct
a product check and inspection of establishments involved in the manu-
facture, importation, distribution and sale of laundry and industrial de-
tergents containing hard surfactants. Product check and inspection of
establishments shall be conducted during business hours and the in-
spection team shall be accompanied by two (2) responsible officers of
the manufacturers.
Sec. 8. Fiscal Incentives. — The Board of Investments (BOI) may grant
fiscal incentives to local manufacturers and processors who develop and
modernize their processing plants to produce coconut-based and other
natural oleochemical biodegradable surfactants. This shall not be lim-
ited to assistance and incentives in the exportation of their products.
xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspa-
pers of general circulation, whichever comes earlier.
Approved, October 31, 2000.
6. COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS

ACT OF 2002
(R.A. No. 9165)
xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten mil-
lion pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
Sec. 5 6. COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002 551
unless authorized by law, shall import or bring into the Philippines any
dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity and purity involved, includ-
ing any and all species of opium poppy or any part thereof or substances
derived therefrom even for floral, decorative and culinary purposes.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless author-
ized by law, shall import any controlled precursor and essential chemi-
cal.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be im-
posed upon any person, who, unless authorized under this Act, shall
import or bring into the Philippines any dangerous drug and/or con-
trolled precursor and essential chemical through the use of a diplomatic
passport, diplomatic facilities or any other means involving his/her
official status intended to facilitate the unlawful entry of the same. In
addition, the diplomatic passport shall be confiscated and canceled.
posed upon any person, who organizes, manages or acts as a “finan-
cier” of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who acts as a “protector/coddler” of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.
Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribu-
tion and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regard-
less of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any
of such transactions.
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless author-
ized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
552 SALES Sec. 6
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled pre-

cursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transac-
tions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribu-
tion or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precur-
sor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters
from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated indi-
viduals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity
directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precur-
sors and essential chemical trade, the maximum penalty shall be im-
posed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated
individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor
and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the
proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty pro-
vided for under this Section shall be imposed.
posed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a “financier”
of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
Sec. 6. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort. — The penalty of life im-
prisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be im-
posed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain a den,
dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used or sold in any form.
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons
who shall maintain a den, dive, or resort where any controlled precur-
sor and essential chemical is used or sold in any form.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be
imposed in every case where any dangerous drug is administered,
delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such a
place.
Secs. 17, 20 6. COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002 553
Should any dangerous drug be the proximate cause of the death of

a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the penalty of death
and a fine ranging from One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) to Fifteen
million pesos (P15,000,000.00) shall be imposed on the maintainer, owner
and/or operator.
If such den, dive or resort is owned by a third person, the same shall
be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government: Provided, That
the criminal complaint shall specifically allege that such place is inten-
tionally used in the furtherance of the crime: Provided, further, That the
prosecution shall prove such intent on the part of the owner to use the
property for such purpose: Provided, finally, That the owner shall be in-
cluded as an accused in the criminal complaint.
posed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a “financier”
of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.
The penalty twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Maintenance and Keeping of Original Records of Transactions
on Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
— The penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1)
day to six (6) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any practitioner, manufacturer, wholesaler, importer, distributor, dealer
or retailer who violates or fails to comply with the maintenance and
keeping of the original records of transactions on any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical in accordance with
Section 40 of this Act.
An additional penalty shall be imposed through the revocation of
the license to practice his/her profession, in case of a practitioner, or of
the business, in case of a manufacturer, seller, importer, distributor,
dealer or retailer.
xxx xxx
Sec. 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the
Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal
Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
— Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading,
554 SALES Sec. 30
administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or

manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources
of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other
laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture,
in favor of the government, of all the proceeds and properties derived
from the unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the
particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the property of
a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but those which are not of
lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay pursuant
to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate crimi-
nal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the
confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the
assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in
the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be mani-
festly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That
if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not
later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no prop-
erty, or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and for-
feited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be
in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated
or forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses
incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and
maintenance of the property pending disposition, as well as expenses
for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above
expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against
illegal drugs.
xxx xxx
Sec. 30. Criminal Liability of Officers of Partnerships, Corporations, As-
sociations or Other Juridical Entities. — In case any violation of this Act is
committed by a partnership, corporation, association or any juridical
entity, the partner, president, director, manager, trustee, estate admin-
istrator, or officer who consents to or knowingly tolerates such viola-
tion shall be held criminally liable as a co-principal.
The penalty provided for the offense under this Act shall be imposed
upon the partner, president, director, manager, trustee, estate admin-
Secs. 2-3 7. CHAIN SAW ACT OF 2002 555
istrator, or officer who knowingly authorizes, tolerates or consents to

the use of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment or other facility, as an
instrument in the importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensa-
tion, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture of dangerous
drugs, or chemical diversion, if such vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment
or other instrument is owned by or under the control or supervision of
the partnership, corporation, association or juridical entity to which they
are affiliated.
Sec. 31. Additional Penalty if Offender is an Alien. — In addition to the
penalties prescribed in the unlawful act committed, any alien who vio-
lates such provisions of this Act shall, after service of sentence, be de-
ported immediately without further proceedings, unless the penalty is
death.
xxx xxx
Sec. 102. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days upon
its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circu-
lation.
Approved: June 7, 2002.
7. CHAIN SAW ACT OF 2002

(R.A. No. 9175)
xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. –– It is the policy of the State, consistent
with the Constitution, to conserve, develop and protect the forest re-
sources under sustainable management. Toward this end, the State shall
pursue an aggressive forest protection program geared towards elimi-
nating illegal logging and other forms of forest destruction which are
being facilitated with the use of chain saws. The State shall therefore
regulate the ownership, possession, sale, transfer, importation and/or
use of chain saws to prevent them from being used in illegal logging or
unauthorized clearing of forests.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. –– As used in this Act, the term:
(a) “Chain saw” shall refer to any portable power saw or simi-
lar cutting implement, rendered operative by an electric or internal
combustion engine or similar means, that may be used for, but is not
limited to, the felling trees or the cutting of timber;
556 SALES Sec. 7
(b) “Chain saw dealer” shall refer to a person, natural or juridi-

cal, engaged in the manufacture, importation, distribution, purchase
and/or sale of chain saws;
(c) “Department” shall refer to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources; and
(d) “Secretary” shall refer to the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
xxx xxx
Sec. 7. Penal Provisions. ––
(1) Selling, Purchasing, Reselling, Transferring, Distributing or Possess-
ing a Chain Saw without a Proper Permit. –– Any person who sells, pur-
chases, transfers the ownership, distributes, or otherwise disposes or
possesses a chain saw without first securing the necessary permit from
the Department shall be punished with imprisonment of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day to six years or a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) but not more than Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) or both at the discretion of the court, and the chain
saw/s confiscated in favor of the government.
(2) Unlawful Importation or Manufacture of Chain Saw. –– Any person
who imports or manufacture a chain saw without obtaining prior au-
thorization from the Department shall be punished by imprisonment
of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months and a fine
of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Four
thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
(3) Tampering of Engine Serial Number. –– Any person who is found
to have defaced or tampered with the original registered engine serial
number of any chain saw unit shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months and a fine of
not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Four thou-
sand pesos (P4,000.00).
(4) Actual Unlawful Use of Chain Saw. –– Any person who is found to
be in possession of a chain saw and uses the same to cut trees and tim-
ber in forest land or elsewhere except as authorized by the Department
shall be penalized with imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to
eight (8) years or a fine of not less than Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or both
at the discretion of the court without prejudice to being prosecuted for
a separate offense that may have been simultaneously committed. The
chain saw unlawfully used shall be likewise confiscated in favor of the
government.
Secs. 2-3 8. TOBACCO REGULATION ACT OF 2003 557
If the violation under this Section is committed by or through the

command or order of another person, partnership or corporation, the
penalties herein provided shall likewise be imposed on such other per-
son, or the responsible officer(s) in such partnership or corporation.
If the offender is a public official or employee, in addition to the
above penalties, he shall be removed from office and perpetually dis-
qualified from holding any public office.
The chain saws confiscated under this Section shall be sold at pub-
lic auction to qualified buyers and the proceeds thereof shall go to the
Department.
xxx xxx
Sec. 15. Effectivity. –– This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two national
newspaper of general circulation, whichever comes earlier.
Approved: November 7, 2002.
8. TOBACCO REGULATION ACT OF 2003

(R.A. No. 9211)
xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Policy. — It is the policy of the State to protect the populace
from hazardous products and promote the right to health and instill
health consciousness among them. It is also the policy of the State, con-
sistent with the Constitutional ideal to promote the general welfare, to
safeguard the Interests of the workers and other stakeholders in the to-
bacco industry. For these purposes, the government shall institute a
balanced policy whereby the use, sale, and advertisements of tobacco
products shall be regulated in order to promote a healthful environment
and protect the citizens from the hazards of tobacco smoke, and at the
same time ensure that the interest of tobacco farmers, growers, work-
ers and stakeholders are not adversely compromised.
Sec. 3. Purpose. — It is the main thrust of this Act to:
a. Promote a healthful environment;
b. Inform the public of the health risks associated with ciga-
rette smoking and tobacco use;
c. Regulate and subsequently ban all tobacco advertisements
and sponsorships;
d. Regulate the labeling of tobacco products;

e. Protect the youth from being initiated to cigarette smoking
and tobacco use by prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to mi-
nors;
f. Assist and encourage Filipino tobacco farmers to cultivate
alternative agricultural crops to prevent economic dislocation; and
g. Create an Inter-Agency Committee on Tobacco (IAC-To-
bacco) to oversee the implementation of the provision of this Act.
xxx xxx
Sec. 9. Minimum Age Sales. — Under this Act, It shall be unlawful:
a. For any retailer or tobacco products to sell or distribute to-
bacco products to any minor;
b. For any person to purchase cigarettes or tobacco products
from a minor;
c. For a minor to sell or buy cigarettes or any tobacco prod-
ucts; and
d. For a minor to smoke cigarettes or any other tobacco prod-
ucts.
It shall not be a defense for the person selling or distributing that
he/she did not know or was not aware of the real age of the minor.
Neither shall it be a defense that he/she did not know nor had any
reason to believe that the cigarette or any other tobacco product was
for the consumption of the minor to whom it was sold.
Sec. 10. Sale of Tobacco Products Within School Perimeters. — The sale
or distribution of tobacco products is prohibited within one hundred
(100) meters from any point of the perimeter of a school, public play-
ground or other facility frequented particularly by minors.
Sec. 11. Signage. — Point-of-Sale establishments offering, distribut-
ing or selling tobacco products to consumers, shall post the following
statement in a clear and conspicuous manner: “SALE/DISTRIBUTION
TO OR PURCHASE BY MINORS OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS IS UN-
LAWFUL” or “IT IS LAWFUL FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS TO BE
SOLD/DISTRIBUTED TO OR PURCHASED BY PERSONS UNDER 18
YEARS OF AGE.”
Sec. 12. Proof of Age Verification. — In case of doubt as to the age of
the buyer, retailers shall verify, by means of any valid form of photo-
graphic identification containing the date of birth of the bearer, that no
individual purchasing a tobacco is below eighteen (18) years of age.
Sec. 41 TOBACCO REGULATION ACT OF 2003 559
xxx xxx
Sec. 41. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette and at least two (2) newspapers of
national circulation.
Approved: June 23, 2003.
— oOo —

Law of Sales by Hector de Leon

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Law of Sales by Hector de Leon

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1

Sources of our law on sales.

*Unless otherwise indicated, refers to article in the Civil Code.

In incorporating some provisions of the Uniform Sales Act of

NATURE AND FORM OF THE

ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the con-

Concept of contract of sale.

thing sold. The Commission considers the theory of the

Characteristics of a contract of sale.

delivery of lumber was not duly proved because counter-receipts is-

2. To secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of

Subsequently, B revoked the authority granted by him to S

Essential requisites of a contract of sale.

determinate or at least capable of being made determinate because

The absence of any of the above essential elements negates

Natural and accidental elements.

ise to sell. There was merely an acknowledgment of the sum

2. Buyer did not sign draft of Contract to Sell because it cov-

even bother to tender and make consignation of the installments

Effect of absence of price/non-

Transfer of title to property for a price,

2,500 shares of stock equivalent to 55% majority in the corpora-

Kinds of contract of sale.

(a) Absolute. — where the sale is not subject to any condi-

However, a sale denominated as a “Deed of Conditional

Contract of sale and contract to sell

veys unto the VENDEE x x x” the property in question as of

2. The sale of scrap iron is subject to the condition that the

bound itself to sell the scrap iron upon the fulfillment by B of

poration may totally rescind, as it did in this case, the contract.’’

Romero, J., dissenting:

(4) The transaction is an absolute contract of sale and not a con-

Contract to sell and conditional sale

transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act

buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the sale.

Other cases of contract to sell.

report of the appraisers did not contain any segregation of the

ART. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor

Requisites concerning object.

Kinds of illicit things.

is well-settled that the mortgagor (or pledgor) continues to be the

Right to transfer ownership.

tract, it is perfected by mere consent (see Art. 1475.), and owner-

action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for

ART. 1460. A thing is determinate when it is par-

Subject matter must be determinate.

cars owned by him. The subject matter is determinable; it becomes

price certain (P3,000.00) a specified quantity of sugar (600 piculs)

relates. Such a sale would be void for want of a determinate

ART. 1461. Things having a potential existence may

Sale of things having potential existence.

Sale of a mere hope or expectancy.

Sale of thing expected and sale of hope

the second, the contract relates to a thing which exists or is present

Presumption in case of doubt.

but such party anticipates performance by the other from the

ART. 1462. The goods which form the subject of a

Goods which may be the object of sale.

palay from a ricefield), or acquired (like the sale of a definite par-

Future goods as object of sale.

ART. 1463. The sole owner of a thing may sell an

Sale of undivided interest in a thing.

ART. 1464. In the case of fungible goods, there may

a definite number, weight or measure of the goods in