152 JINNAH, PAKISTAN AND ISLAMIC IDENTITY

determined the district should go to India. Mountbatten could hardly feign

ignorance of Gurdaspur’s ultimate and real significance. The shifting of
Gurdaspur to India sealed the fate of Kashmir.
One year before Mountbatten came to India V.P.Menon was already pointing
out the significance of Gurdaspur as the only land route to Kashmir in case of a
division between a future Pakistan and India. He had already earmarked the
district for India. The problem was that it was a Muslim-majority district. If and
when Gurdaspur was shifted from a possible Pakistan to India it would have to
be done by underhand means and by violating the principles upon which a
possible division could take place. Mountbatten’s acquiescence in the summer of
1947 resulted in pressure on Radcliffe to shift the district.
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Kashmir
Kashmir was one of the biggest and most important states of India (also see
Epilogue for a discussion on Kashmir). About 80 per cent of its population was
Muslim. Apart from its religious composition, the basis of the partition, Kashmir
was geographically, economically and strategically part of the areas that would
form Pakistan. Seeing it as a prize, the Congress was determined to keep it.
Besides, Nehru, whose ancestors came from Kashmir, was passionately attached
to it. He found the Mountbattens strong allies in his fight to ensure Kashmir
came to India (see next chapter).
Mountbatten recounted the sequence of events leading to the tragedy of
Kashmir in his television series. He blamed Pakistani tribesmen for invading
Kashmir and marching on Srinagar on 24 October. This justified the use of
Indian troops. Three days later India flew in troops, since the Maharajah had
agreed to sign the Accession Instrument, thus joining India. ‘Just in time,’ added
Mountbatten. All this is now challenged by scholars (see, for example, Alastair
Lamb 1991, 1994; Schofield 1996). In the last meeting between Jinnah and
Mountbatten on 1 November Jinnah accused India of seizing Kashmir by ‘fraud
and violence’ (Wolpert 1996:420).
In fact Mountbatten ensured that Indian troops were sent to Kashmir before
the state declared its intention to join India or Pakistan, thus technically ordering
an invasion of foreign territory. He assisted in supervising the backdating of the
ruler’s signature so that the accession to India would appear legal. The ruler was
crudely threatened and found it difficult to resist the combined pressure put on
him by Mountbatten and Nehru. Mountbatten even ensured that the RAF, neutral
between the two new dominions, would fly secret sorties to Kashmir at a time
when there were hardly any planes available to India and virtually none to
Pakistan, thereby violating international law (Alastair Lamb, personal interview).
An emergency meeting was organized at Lahore between Mountbatten, Nehru
and Jinnah to resolve the Kashmir problem. Nehru feigned illness, much to
Mountbatten’s embarrassment and Jinnah’s ire. Both Mountbatten and Nehru
promised to implement several United Nations resolutions to allow Kashmir to
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choose her own fate through a plebiscite but reneged each time. The continuing
Kashmir problem is another Mountbatten legacy.
Churchill treated Mountbatten roughly over Kashmir. ‘He accused me of
having planned and organised the first victory of Hindustan (he refused to call it
India) against Pakistan by sending in British trained soldiers and British
equipment to crush and oppress the Muslims in Kashmir,’ Mountbatten
complained (Ziegler 1985:461). Churchill had warned Mountbatten ‘to get out
quickly and not involve the King and my country in further backing traitors’
(ibid).
Even Indian authors, known for their frank impartiality, fault Mountbatten over
Kashmir: ‘His partisanship of the Congress, which was due to his infatuation
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with Nehru, was blatant, and it was shown most blatantly after independence
when he actually supported Nehru over the Kashmir question. He collaborated in
giving help to the Maharajah of Kashmir, which was to make the British
dishonesty over the princely states even worse’ (Chaudhuri 1990:831). ‘Lord
Mountbatten’s complicity in the Kashmir affair created a permanent sense of
injury in Pakistan,’ wrote Chaudhuri (ibid).
Feelings on Kashmir and Britain’s role in its woes have remained consistently
high over the last half-century, as this report, which quotes an earlier report,
‘Pakistan’s distrust of Britain’ (Guardian, ‘Past notes’, 15 March 1995) shows:

Bitterness was to grow into outrage in October when East Gurdaspur, by

providing India with its only land-link with Jammu, made it possible for
Delhi to come to the rescue of Kashmir. Since then everyone in Pakistan
believes that Lord Radcliffe was made to change the boundary line in the
last minute because Lord Mountbatten wanted to do Pakistan down. (Taya
Zinkin, 15 March 1958)

The invisibility of Muslims on the Viceroy’s team

In the charged political and communal atmosphere of 1947 the lack of Muslim
staff on the Viceroy’s team working on partition and the influence of its Hindu
members became a significant issue. Muslims were quick to point out that there
was no Muslim of influence on Mountbatten’s staff. Mountbatten revealed his
contempt for Muslims when he asked ‘whether there were likely to be
sufficiently intelligent Muslim officials to administer Pakistan’ (Roberts 1994a:
85). In contrast several important posts were held by Hindus. Hamid confirms
that it was common knowledge that they were leaking sensitive information
(1986). Yet Mountbatten turned a blind eye to what was a gross dereliction of
duty and ignored its enormous consequences.
Menon became the Viceroy’s link to the Congress high command. It was only
‘when V.P.Menon…confidant of Sardar Patel, joined the group that any real
insight into day-to-day Indian thinking was vouchsafed its members,’ notes
Ziegler (1985:371). Ziegler goes on to admit, ‘The price that was paid for