Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Broqueza, G.R. No.

178610, November 17, 2010

Editha Broqueza was an employee of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and also a member
of the HSBC Staff Retirement Plan. She was able to obtain loans from the HSBC-SPR which were paid
through automatic deductions from her salary.

However, Broqueza was terminated which causes her inability to pay the monthly amortizations of her
loans.

The supreme court ruled that her due to her dismissal, Broqueza’s loans became pure obligations
demandable at once. Hence, she is obliged to pay the HSBC-SPR her remaining dues.

Tomimbang v. Tomimbang, G.R. No. August 2009

Petitioner and respondent are siblings. Their parents donated an eight-door apartment to petitioner
failed to obtain a loan from PAG-IBIG Fund to renovate the apartment, hence, respondent offered to
extend a credit line to petitioner on particular conditions, one of which for the petitioner to start paying
the loan after the completion of the renovation.

Due to a conflict between the sibling, they came to a new agreement whereby petitioner was to start
making monthly payments on her loan. Petitioner made monthly payments from June to October of
1997 totaling P93, 500.00. Later on, the petitioner disappeared on her siblings and also stopped making
the monthly payments.

Hence, a complaint was filed against the petitioner demanding payment of the loan plus interest where
she contended that the loan is not yet due and demandable because the renovation of the apartment is
not yet complete.

The Court ruled that the loan is already due and demandable due to the subsequent agreement entered
in to by the parties pursuant to Article 1291 of the Civil Code which provides that obligations may be
modified by changing their object or principal conditions. Since the petitioner complied with the
modified agreement, the original agreement has been novated.

Gonzales v. Heirs, G.R. No. 131784 September 16, 1999

Paula Cruz together with the respondents entered into a contract of lease with petitioner Gonzales of a
half portion of a land. Included in their Terms was a stipulation that Gonzales shall purchase the
property for 1 million pesos after the period of the contract which is 1 year. Another stipulation is that
the lessors shall undertake to obtain a separate and distinct T.C.T. over the herein leased portion to the
LESSEE within a reasonable period of time which shall not in any case exceed four (4) years.

Under the contract, Gonzales paid the rental fees but did not choose to exercise the option of paying the
one million purchase price. A letter was issued by one of the heirs to rescind the said contract following
breach and ordered Gonzales to vacate the premises within ten days. Gonzales did no vacate. A few
days later Paula Cruz died. A case was launched in Court by the heirs of Paula Cruz.
The court ruled that respondents cannot rescind the contract, because they have not caused the
transfer of the TCT to their names, which is a condition precedent to petitioner’s obligation. This Court
has held that “there can be no rescission (or more properly, resolution) of an obligation as yet non-
existent, because the suspensive condition has not happened”

Hermosa v. Longara, G.R. No. L-5267 October 27, 1953

The intestate Fernando Hermosa Sr. died in 1944. Longara in 1948 claims credit advances made to the
intestate from 1932 to 1944, to the son Francisco Hermosa, and to the grandson, Fernando Hermosa, Jr.
from 1945 to 1947. Claimant had testified without opposition that the credit advances were to be
"payable as soon as Fernando Hermosa, Sr.'s property in Spain was sold and he receive money derived
from the sale."

The issue is whether or not the said condition is a potestative condition therefore null and void, in
accordance with article 1115 of the old Civil Code. The Court ruled that that the condition of the
obligation was not a purely protestative one, depending exclusively upon the will of the intestate, but a
mixed one, depending partly upon the will of intestate to sell his property and partly upon the chance to
make the sale.

Trillana v. Quezon Colleges, G.R. No. L-5003 June 27, 1953

Damasa Crisostomo applied for 200 shares of stock worth PhP100.00 each at Quezon Colleges, Inc.
Within her letter of application, she stipulated that she will pay her dues after she has harvested fiish.
Damasa died on October 26, 1948. Since no payment was rendered on the subscription made in the
foregoing letter, Quezon College presented a claim of PhP20,000.00 on her intestate proceedings.

The court ruled that the letter has not ripened into a contract doe to lack of acceptance by Quezon
Colleges Inc. The need for express acceptance on the part of the Quezon College, Inc. becomes the more
imperative, in view of the proposal of Damasa Crisostomo to pay the value of the subscription after she
has harvested fish, a condition obviously dependent upon her sole will and, therefore, facultative in
nature, rendering the obligation void. Under the Civil Code it is provided that if the fulfillment of the
condition should depend upon the exclusive will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void.