570 Phil.

58
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, vs. THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law
has a prospective, not retroactive, effect.[1] However, penal laws that favor a
guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. 1-a
These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of
laws.

Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang

parusa ng bagong batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na
hindi pusakal na kriminal.

We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with
modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding
petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm.

The Facts

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the
Criminal Investigation Division, Central Police District Command, received a
dispatch order[2] from the desk officer.[3] The order directed him and three (3)
other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest [4] issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador
against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with
ransom.[5]

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner,

checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. [6] Eventually, the team
proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat,
Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. [7]
SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. [8] They put him under
 arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. [9]
Found tucked in his waist[10] was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number
52315[11] with five (5) live ammunition.[12]

Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.[13]

A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at

Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[14] Epifanio Deriquito, the records
verifier, presented a certification[15] to that effect signed by Edwin C. Roque,
chief records officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division.[16]

Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,[17] as amended. The Information
read:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her
custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 “Charter Arms” revolver bearing Serial No.
52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the
proper authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.

(Sgd.)
GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP
Assistant City Prosecutor[18]

With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on October 9, 1996. [19] Trial on the merits
ensued.

SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner stated
above.

Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined
testimonies of petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol,
Jr. and Adrian Yuson.
Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding
house of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon
City.[20] He was roused from his slumber when four (4) heavily armed men in
civilian clothes bolted the room.[21] They trained their guns at him[22] and pulled
him out of the room. They then tied his hands and placed him near the faucet. [23]
The raiding team went back inside and searched and ransacked the room. [24]
SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him. [25] Moments later, an operative
came out of the room and exclaimed, “Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa
loob!”[26]

Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that “we are authorized to shoot you
because there’s a shoot to kill order against you, so if you are planning do so
something, do it right now.”[27] He was also told that there was a standing
warrant for his arrest.[28] However, he was not shown any proof when he asked
for it.[29] Neither was the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.[30]

According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The
gun seized from him was duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He
was, however, unable to present the documentation relative to the firearm
because it was confiscated by the police. Petitioner further lamented that when
he was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of a counsel.
Neither was he allowed to see or talk to his family.[31]

Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still
with the Narcotics Command, he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales
to white-wash a drug-related investigation involving friends of the said police
officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the head of the
unit that conducted the search in his boarding house.[32]

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to

petitioner a Memorandum Receipt dated July 1, 1993[33] covering the subject
firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction of Col.
Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature[34] on the said receipt.[35]

Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was

arrested, testified that on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered his
room as he was preparing for school.[36] They grabbed his shoulder and led him
out.[37] During all those times, a gun was poked at him. [38] He was asked where
petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioner’s room.[39]

Four (4) policemen then entered the room.[40] He witnessed how they pointed a
gun at petitioner, who was clad only in his underwear. [41] He also witnessed how
they forcibly brought petitioner out of his room.[42] While a policeman remained
 near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went back inside the room. [43]
They began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker, [44]
which yielded the subject firearm.[45]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866
as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years,
2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine
in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. Let the same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the
PNP.

SO ORDERED.[46]
Petitioner moved to reconsider[47] but his motion was denied on August 27,
1998.[48] He appealed to the CA.

On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC
disposition. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is
modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as
maximum.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty,

the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[49]
His motion for reconsideration[50] having been denied through a Resolution
dated August 3, 2004,[51] petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule
45.

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

 SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW IN SUSTAINING THE
LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED
THEREFROM DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT
THE SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT UPHOLDING THE
REGULARITY AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING THE
ISSUANCE OF THE MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH PROVES HIS INNOCENCE
OF THE CRIME CHARGE (SIC).[52] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden
of proving the twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and
ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same
does not have the corresponding license for it.[53]

The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.

The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established
through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco. [54] Defense witness Yuson also
identified the firearm.[55] Its existence was likewise admitted by no less than
petitioner himself.[56]

As for petitioner’s lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified

that a verification of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315
with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that the
seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a
certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. [57] As proof, Deriquito
presented a certification signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the same
office.[58]

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a

representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any
firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms.[59] The prosecution more than complied when it
 presented both.

The certification is outside the scope

of the hearsay rule.

The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows
of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception.
[60]
Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable for being hearsay.[61]

On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an
exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the
performance of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by
a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
It may be true that the contents of said certification are only prima facie
evidence of the facts stated there. However, the failure of petitioner to present
controverting evidence makes the presumption unrebutted. Thus, the
presumption stands.

Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less
than an acquittal.

The assessment of credibility of

witnesses lies with the trial court.

First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was invalid. The
search was conducted after his arrest and after he was taken out of the room he
was occupying.[62]

This contention deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner’s version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the factual
findings made by the trial court and its calibration of the credibility of
witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago in People v.
Rivera:[63]
x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge
who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess
their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on record.
The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact
and fancy or evince if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his
teeth. We have consistently ruled that when the question arises as to which
of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy of
belief, the assessment of the trial courts are generally viewed as correct and
entitled to great weight. Furthermore, in an appeal, where the culpability or
innocence of the accused depends on the issue of credibility of witnesses
and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the
highest degree of respect if not finality.[64] (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief. We
find no compelling reason not to accept its observation on this score.

Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only
claims to be highly decorated, [65] but have effected a number of successful
arrests[66] as well. Common sense would dictate that he must necessarily be
authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that framing up petitioner would have been a very risky proposition.
Had the arresting officers really intended to cause the damnation of petitioner
by framing him up, they could have easily “planted” a more incriminating
evidence rather than a gun. That would have made their nefarious scheme
easier, assuming that there indeed was one.

The pieces of evidence show that

petitioner is not legally authorized to
possess the subject firearm and its
five (5) ammunition.

Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the subject

firearm and its ammunition on the basis of the Memorandum Receipt issued to
him by the PNP Narcotics Command.[67]

Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like

policemen are accorded presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official duties,[68] it is only a presumption; it may be overthrown by evidence to
the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it proved
that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was anything but
regular.

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner
based on the verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno. [69]
However, a reading of Timbol’s testimony on cross-examination [70] would
reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to
petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic
constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under questionable
circumstances.
Failure to offer an unlicensed
firearm as evidence is not fatal
provided there is competent
testimony as to its existence.

Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition should have
been excluded as evidence because they were not formally offered by the
prosecution[71] in violation of Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[72]

We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of
the Memorandum Receipt and, at the same time, for the exclusion in evidence
of the subject firearm and its ammunition. Petitioner’s act may result to an
absurd situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while the
subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by the
Memorandum Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the
Memorandum Receipt useless.

In any case, petitioner’s contention has no leg to stand on.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the subject firearm [73] and its five (5) live
ammunition[74] were offered in evidence by the prosecution.[75] Even assuming
arguendo that they were not offered, petitioner’s stance must still fail. The
existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even
without its presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,[76] the non-presentation
of the pistol did not prevent the conviction of the accused.

The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.[77]

As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live
ammunition were established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco. [78]
Yuson also identified said firearm.[79] Petitioner even admitted its existence.[80]

We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm
is presented during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous
event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long as there is
competent testimony as to its existence.

Penal and civil liabilities

Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
 amended. It provides that “[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part
of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.”

P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner
committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended
P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997,[81] during the pendency of the case with the trial
court. The present law now states:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to
be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – The penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of
similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Underscoring
supplied)
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they
acquire the character of an ex post facto law.[82] An exception to this rule,
however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr.
Chief Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of the offender, “but founded on
the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based
on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict
justice.”[83]

Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the

same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is
lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period[84] from reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua[85] under P.D. No. 1866.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum

which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which is
prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and
one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2] months).[86] Hence, the penalty
imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance with the Court’s
ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals[87] and Barredo v. Vinarao.[88]
As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper
disposition should be made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code [89]
which provides, among others, that the proceeds and instruments or tools of the
crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is

AFFIRMED in full.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and

Nachura, JJ., concur.

[1]
New Civil Code, Art. 4.

1-a
Revised Penal Code, Art. 22 provides: Retroactive effect of penal laws. –
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule
5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws
a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

[2]
Exhibit “D.”

[3]
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4-5, 9.

[4]
Exhibit “B.”

[5]
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.

[6]
Id. at 11.

[7]
Id. at 3. INP is now Philippine National Police (PNP).

[8]
Id. at 4.

[9]
Id. at 5-6.

[10]
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 14-15; TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 10.
[11]
Exhibit “E.”

[12]
Exhibits “E-1” to “E-5.”

[13]
TSN, November 6, 1996, p. 6.

[14]
TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.

[15]
Exhibit “C.”
PNPFED
12 Jul[y] 1996

CERTIFICATION

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that [the] Revolver, Charter Arms, Cal. 38 with serial number
52315 is registered to RAUL PALENCIA SALVATIERA of Sampaloc,
Manila, acquired thru transfer f[ro]m Wilburn Irwin Lucasan per index card
d[a]t[e]d 10 December 1990.

This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve.

FOR THE CHIEF, FED:

EDWIN
C[.] ROQUE (Sgd.)
P/Sr.
Inspector
Chief,
Records Br[.]

[16]
TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 19-20.

[17]
Entitled “An Act Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession,
Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition
or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms,
Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain
Violations Thereof, and for Relevant Purposes.” This law was issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 29, 1983. See Zuño, Sr. v. Dizon, A.M.
No. RTJ-91-752, June 23, 1993, 223 SCRA 584, 598.

[18]
Rollo, p. 35.

[19]
Id. at 38.

[20]
TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 19-21.

[21]
Id. at 21.

[22]
Id.

[23]
Id. at 22.

[24]
Id. at 3, 6.

[25]
TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 5.

[26]
Id. at 4.

[27]
Id. at 10.

[28]
Id. at 11.

[29]
Id. at 12.

[30]
Id. at 14.

[31]
Id. at 21-22.

[32]
TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 22-26.

[33]
Exhibit “1.”

[34]
Exhibit “1-A.”

[35]
TSN, June 4, 1996, pp. 2-6.

[36]
TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 7.
[37]
Id. at 8.

[38]
Id.

[39]
Id. at 8-9.

[40]
Id. at 9.

[41]
Id. at 10.

[42]
Id.

[43]
Id. at 11.

[44]
Id. at 12.

[45]
Id.

[46]
Rollo, p. 44.

[47]
Exhibit “E.”

[48]
Exhibit “F.”

[49]
Rollo, p. 31.

[50]
Exhibit “I.”

[51]
Exhibit “B.”

[52]
Rollo, p. 125.

Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269 SCRA
[53]

402; Mallari v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110569, December 19, 1996, 265
SCRA 456; People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992, 212 SCRA
547.

[54]
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
 [55]
TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.

[56]
TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.

[57]
TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.

[58]
Id. at 19-20.

People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219;
[59]

Ungsod v. People, G.R. No. 158904, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 282;
People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 112090, October 26, 1999, 317 SCRA 435, citing
Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269 SCRA 402;
Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 106229-30, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA
123; People v. Orehuela, G.R. Nos. 108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82.
See also Mallari v. Court of Appeals, supra note 53; People v. Solayao, G.R.
No. 119220, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA 255.

[60]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 36.

The United States Federal Rule of Evidence defines hearsay as “a statement,

[61]

other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Cleary, E.W.,
McCormick on Evidence (1984), 3rd ed., p. 729, citing Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(c). Accordingly, hearsay evidence is objected to due to the
following reasons:
Oath. Among the earliest of the criticisms of hearsay, and one often
repeated in judicial opinions down to the present, is the objection that the
out-of-court declarant who made the hearsay statement commonly speaks
or writes without the solemnity of the oath administered to witnesses in a
court of law. The oath may be important in two aspects. As a ceremonial
and religious symbol it may induce in the witness a feeling of special
obligation to speak the truth, and also it may impress upon the witness the
danger of criminal punishment for perjury, to which the judicial oath or an
equivalent solemn affirmation would be a prerequisite condition. x x x

Personal presence at trial. Another objection early asserted and repeated of

late is the want of opportunity, in respect to the out-of-court declarant, for
observation of his demeanor, with the light that this may shed on his
credibility, that would be afforded if he were a witness on the stand.
The solemnity of the occasion and possibility of public disgrace can
scarcely fail to impress the witness, and falsehood no doubt becomes more
difficult if the person against whom directed is present.
Moreover, personal presence eliminates the danger that in the oral reporting
of an out-of-court statement that the witness reporting the statement may
do so inaccurately. It seems probable that the reporting of words spoken is
subject to special dangers of inaccuracy beyond the fallibility common to
all reproduction from memory of matters of observation, and this seems a
substantial danger in the admission of hearsay. x x x

Cross-examination. It would be generally agreed today that noncompliance

with the third condition is the main justification for the exclusion of
hearsay. This is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross
examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is reported by
the witness. x x x In perhaps his most famous remark, Wigmore described
cross-examination as “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.” (Underscoring supplied) (Id. at 727-
728.)
[62]
Rollo, pp. 8, 136.

433 Phil. 343 (2002), citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45,
[63]

January 25, 1999, 302 SCRA 21; People v. Librando, 390 Phil. 543 (2000);
People v. Deleverio, G.R. Nos. 118937-38, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 547;
People v. Zaballero, G.R. No. 100935, June 30, 1997, 274 SCRA 627.

[64]
People v. Rivera, id. at 352.

[65]
Rollo, p. 61.

[66]
TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 25.

[67]
Rollo, pp. 11-12, 138.

Gutang v. People, 390 Phil. 805, 817-818 (2000), citing People v. William,
[68]

G.R. No. 93712, June 15, 1992, 209 SCRA 808; People v. Rumeral, G.R. No.
86320, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 194. See also RULES OF COURT, Rule
131, Sec. 3(m).

[69]
TSN, June 4, 1997, pp. 3-6.

[70]
Id. at 7-11.

FI I am asking you why your office likewise

S issued [a] Memo Receipt if he [i.e., Colonel
C Angelito Moreno] normally issue (sic) a
A firearm for [an] officer of the PNP?
L:

A: Because our office has also authorized us to

issue.

Q: And who authorized your office?

INTERPRETER:

Witness cannot answer.

Q: Where does the Commanding Officer derive

his authority?

A: What I know is that the Commanding Officer

is authorized to [issue] firearm that will be
issued to a PNP Officer but I do not know who
gave the authority to our officer.

xxxx

Q: As such, do you keep inventory of such

supplies?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Do you have the inventory of this particular

gun, the original?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Do you have that inventory with you, that

inventory of such gun, the Memo Receipt?
 A: That firearm was not in my custody.

Q: But you said a while ago it is with you, which

is which, do you have or do you not have the
listing of such inventory?

A: None, Sir.

xxxx

FI Mr. Witness, other than this case, were there

S any instances where you issued Memo Receipt
C as verbally directed by your alleged
A Commanding Officer Moreno?
L:

A: Yes, Sir, I'm only a RSO since November

1993.

Q: Precisely, 1991 to 1993, for a period wherein

you claimed you hold an office of RSO, has
(sic) this the only time you issued?

A: Many time[s], Sir.

C Let's clarify this. The Court understands to

O (sic) your previous answer that this is the first
U time that you have done this procedure of
R issuing guns to an officer. Are you changing
T: that this is the first time and not many times?

A: That is the only first (sic) time, as instructed

by the Commanding Officer, Your Honor.
(Underscoring supplied)

[71]
Rollo, pp. 11, 137-138.
 Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has
[72]

not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.

[73]
Exhibit “E.”

[74]
Exhibits “E-1” to “E-5.”

[75]
TSN, February 19, 1997, p. 14.

[76]
G.R. Nos. 108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82, 95-96.

As Mr. Justice Feliciano held for the Court:

x x x Upon the other hand, we note also that the allegedly unlicensed
murder weapon was not presented in evidence by the prosecution. What the
prosecution did present to show absence of a license or permit to possess
the firearm used to kill Teoberto, was a certification issued by the Bohol
Regional Headquarters of the Integrated National Police, dated 20
December 1989, x x x:

xxxx

We consider that the certification was adequate to show that the firearm
used by Modesta Orehuela in killing Teoberto Cañizares was a firearm
which Orehuela was not licensed to possess and to carry outside his
residence on the night that Teoberto Cañizares was shot to death. That that
firearm was a .38 caliber pistol was shown by the testimony and report of
NBI Ballistician Bonifacio Ayag. When the above circumstances are taken
together with the testimony of the eye-witness that Modesto Orehuela was
in fact in possession of a firearm and used the same to kill Teoberto
Cañizares, we believe that accused Orehuela was properly found guilty of
aggravated or qualified illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
(Underscoring supplied)
[77]
G.R. No. 128148, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 34. See also People v.
Taan, supra note 59; People v. Taguba, 396 Phil. 366 (2000).

[78]
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.

[79]
TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.

[80]
TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.
 [81]
People v. Lazaro, supra note 59.

Mejia v. Pamaran, G.R. Nos. L-56741-42, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 457,
[82]

472. An ex post facto law is one which:

1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act;

2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when committed;

4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense;

5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty
or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and

6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has

become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.

People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 408 (1923), citing Fiore, Irretroactividad e

[83]

Interpretacion de las Leyes.

Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 2001 ed., p. 1021. PRISION
[84]

CORRECCIONAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD. - 4 years, 2 months and 1 day

to 6 years

Mini 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 4 years, 9

mum months and 10 days
:

Medi 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 5 years, 4

um : months and 20 days

Maxi 5 years, 4 months and 21 days to 6 years

mum
:

Id. at 1026. RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO

[85]

RECLUSION PERPETUA. – 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua

 Mini 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years
mum and 8 months
:

Medi 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years

um :

Maxi Reclusion perpetua

mum
:

Id. at 1021. PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN ITS MEDIUM PERIOD. – 2

[86]

years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months

Mini 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 2 years, 11

mum months and 10 days
:

Medi 2 years, 11 months and 11 days to 3 years,

um : 6 months and 20 days

Maxi 3 years, 6 months 21 days to 4 years and 2

mum months.
:

[87]
343 Phil. 297 (1997).

[88]
G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007.

[89]
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the
crime. – Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with
it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in

favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable
for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce
shall be destroyed. (Underscoring supplied)