1 in Re - Wenceslao Laureta

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 148 8/13/22, 8:51 AM
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta
*
March 12, 1987.
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR

DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO
LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. NO. 68635,
entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
________________
* EN BANC.
383
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 383

Constitutional Law; Contempt; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Judges;

A letter individually addressed to some Justices of the SC is not
covered by the constitutional right to "privacy of communication"
when the same pertain to their exercise of judicial functions.
·Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is
misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection
with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the
judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The
contumacious character of those letters constrained the First
Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consulta and so
that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the
Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court
that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in
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the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en
banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the unjustness
and unfairness of their accusations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court's
authority and duty to act to preserve its honor from attacks by an
irate lawyer mouthed by his client is clear and non-vindictive.
·There is no vindictive reprisal involved. The Court's authority and
duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its
honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,
mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the
legal profession. We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had
nothing to do with respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual
Justices, nor with the complaint filed before the Tanodbayan. In the
Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 11, 1986, filed by Atty.
Laureta in the main petition, he stressed: "10. The composition of
the First Division was reduced to five members. Strangely enough,
about one month later, the Honorable Court promulgated its
extended resolution with such promptitude in the entire history of
the Supreme Court, unequalled in a manner of speaking. x x x"
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Atty. Laureta had something
to do with the letters and pleadings distributed and/or filed by his
client·Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of
"undue" and "powerful influence" by Atty. Ordoñez and Justice Yap;
"distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken references";
"untenable minute resolution although extended"; "unjust minute
resolution" repeated by Atty. Laureta in his several pleadings,
echoed and re-echoed in the individual letters to the Justices, as
well as in the Complaint and the Motion for Reconsideration before
the
384
Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden hand of Atty. Laureta. The

foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of the
Court that copies of the complaint filed with the Tanodbayan were
distributed to the editors of the metropolitan newspapers in
envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard

over the radio speaking on the same complaint, and that he was
following up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of the Tanodbayan.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.·Furthermore,
respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's lawyer had
control of the proceedings. As stressed by this Court in an early
case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes should be
within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that '(a) lawyer
should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients
from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do,
particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such
wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.' " (In Re:
Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.
Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to
discharge such responsibility. For all intents and purposes, he
appears to have encouraged and abetted his client in denigrating
the members of the First Division of this Court, by baselessly
charging them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with
"deliberate bad faith," because of his stubborn insistence on his
untenable arguments which had been rejected as without merit by
the Court's First Division, whose Resolution was upheld by the
Court en banc. Worse, the dissemination in the print and broadcast
media in bold captions falsely depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING)
GRAFT CHARGES" instead of the baseless rantings of a
disgruntled litigant appear to have been timed to place them in a
bad light at the height of the Christmas season.
Certiorari; Appeals; Courts; Recall of a due course order is a
common occurrence in the Supreme Court. It should not give
occasion to a charge that the recall was unduly railroaded.·The
recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case
is a common occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if it
were only their petition which has been subjected to such recall.
They have lost all objectivity in this regard. They are hardly
qualified, and cannot presume to speak of the "entire history" of the
Supreme Court.
385
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 385
Same; Same; Same; Legal Ethics; Charge made by herein

respondents that Justice Yap was aware that Atty, Sedfrey Ordoñez
is the counsel of the other party is incorrect. The SC is faced with
numerous cases that the appearances of lawyers during
deliberations escape their attention.·But respondents continue to
claim derisively that Justice Yap could not have been "unaware" of
the appearance of Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez. They reacted by saying
"tell it to the marines" (Letters of November 3,1986 to Justices
Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8, respectively). But that was the
true and untarnished fact. With so many cases being handled by the
Court, the appearances of lawyers during deliberative sessions very
often escape attention, concentration being centered on the issues to
be resolved.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; No fault should be ascribed to the SC
for the fact that its personnel continued sending court notices and
papers to Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez (a former associate of Justice Pedro
Yap) there being no formal withdrawal yet of Atty. Ordoñez as
counsel.·Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing)
Atty. Ordoñez as counsel" for their opponents in the case. In the
same "Banc Resolution," it was clarified: "A copy of the resolution,
dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the Releasing Clerks to Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez as his name still appears on the cover page of
the Rollo. It was not necessarily because the Supreme Court 'still
recognizes him as counsel for respondents' " (at p. 4) The fact of the
matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to recognize Atty.
Ordoñez as counsel as shown by his pleadings filed before the
Court, which inevitably contained the notation "copy furnished Atty.
Sedfrey Ordoñez." No withdrawal of appearance having been
presented by Atty. Ordoñez in the main petition, his name
continues to be in the Rollo of the case and the personnel concerned
continue to furnish him with copies of Resolutions of this Court.
Legal Ethics; Appeal; Reasons why the SC referred back to the
C.A., L-50814 despite SC decision in L-46155, Nov. 9, 1977 that
decision in L-46155 is res judicata.·But respondents ask: if res
judicata were applicable, why did this Court, in G.R. No. L-50814,
refer the case to the Court of Appeals? The answer is simple. The
issue of whether the remedy of petitioners in that case was appeal
and not certiorari had to be resolved. If certiorari were proper, then

the "Macandog Decision" had not become final. If appeal, its finality
would be the consequence. The "Javellana Resolution," which
reversed the "Busran Decision," held that Certiorari was proper
when a party has been illegally declared in default. It follows that
the "Macandog Decision" had not attained finality.
386
Same; Same; The charge that the C.A. deliberately evaded the
issue that it held the trial court's decision final already, is
misleading for that C.A. decision penned by Justice Busran was
reversed by the C.A. decision on reconsideration penned by Justice
Javellana.·The penchant of respondents for making misleading
statements is again obvious. It was not in the "Javellana
Resolution" that the Court of Appeals held that "the judgment of
assail (referring to the 'Macandog Decision') had long become final."
That was in the "Busran Decision," which was precisely reversed by
the "Javellana Resolution."
Same; Same; Courts; The SC is not duty bound to render signed
decisions all the time.·The soundness of the legal conclusions
arrived at in the "Escolin Decision" and "Javellana Resolution"
commends itself. Only a disgruntled litigant and a defeated lawyer
would claim that those judgments were accepted "hook, line and
sinker" by this Court. The doctrine of res judicata is inescapably
applicable. Thus it was that the First Division, in its challenged
Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it unnecessary, after further
study, to have a signed Decision and, instead, recalled the due
course Order, which it had previously issued to give it "more time
for further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution, October 28, 1986).
Contrary to respondents' claim, the Court is not "duty bound" to
render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal
basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
Courts; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; The Supreme Court is
Supreme and no other agency of the Government, including the
Tanodbayan, may declare its decisions unjust.·Respondents' action
is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead ignorance. As aptly

declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986,
which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the
Supreme Court is supreme·the third great department of
government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private.
No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or
declare them 'unjust.' "
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Art 204 of the Revised Penal
Code on "rendering knowingly an unjust judgment" refers to an
individual judge; it has no application to members of a collegiate
court like the Supreme Court. The prosecutor cannot also pass
judgment on justness of decision of an individual judge; only the CA
or SC may do
387
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 387
so.·Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of

the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust
judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case
submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the
prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the
decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with
jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or
the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said
penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court
such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in
consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after
due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground
that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative; The theory that only SC
may pass upon the justness of its decisions is a display of arrogance
but an implementation of the rule on separation of powers.·The
Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Court's
judicial power is by no means a "display of arrogance" as per
respondents' puerile contention, but a restatement of the

fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and
balances under a republican form of government such as ours, viz.
that the three coequal branches of government, the executive,
legislative and judicial, are each supreme and independent within
the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the
performance of the duties of the other. (Forbes vs. Chuoco, 16 Phil.
534 [1910]).
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Contempt; To subject a judge or justices
to the threat of an investigation or prosecution for official acts
constitutes a subversion of their independence.·To subject to the
threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so
a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good
faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial
functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of
the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it
is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the
possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence
without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful."
(Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).
388
Same; Same; Same; Litigants cannot be allowed to claim that

members of the SC acted in bad faith or rendered an unjust
resolution.·To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution
and claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and
rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the
duty of their high office to act upon their own independent
consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to
destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such
collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the
presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such

collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and
undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all
justiciable disputes.
Same; Same; Same; Same.·In resume, we find that
respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual
Justices quoted in the showcause Resolution of this Court en banc,
particularly the underlined portions thereof; in the language of the
charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in
the same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges
against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices
concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in
her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from
this Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered
pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main
petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity
of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of
speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for
contemptuous acts against the Court.
Same; Same; Same; An attorney commits an act unbecoming of
an officer of the court where he dangles threats of bringing SC
resolutions to the "proper forum, " challenging the integrity of the CA
and SC, and assisting or not preventing his client from making
contemptuous statements.·We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has
committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of
dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to
effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of
respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of
the land by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming
that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments (Montecillo vs.
Gica, 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring, or at the very least,
assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous
statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client,
respondent Ilustre, notwith-
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VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 389
standing his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with

them, which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of
record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and
circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Court's
Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last
resort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and
other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft
and corruption" when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in
essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated
counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before this Court,
and who would readily accept anything but the soundness of the
judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent to
bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into
disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts.
Same, Same, Same; Nature of a disciplinary proceeding against
a lawyer.·In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the
Court notes that "disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaint nor a prosecutor therein. It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actions as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney." Viewed in the light of the demonstrated
persistence of grave misconduct and undermining public confidence
in the honor and integrity of the Court and its members (at a time
when the Court is exerting every effort to regain public confidence
in our courts after the trauma and debacle undergone by them in
the past regime), the Court shall impose upon him an indefinite
suspension, leaving it to him to prove at some future and opportune
time, that he shall have once again regained the fitness to be
allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of the Courts. (In

re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562)
390

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986,

personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina
M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated
22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this Court,
(incorporated herein by reference), and in feigned
ignorance of the Constitutional requirement that the
Court's Divisions are composed of, and must act through, at
least five (5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats
to effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution,
petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part:
"Please forgive us for taking the liberty of addressing you this letter
which we do hope you will read very carefully.
"It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of Case No.
G.R. 68635 entitled 'Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Hon. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al.,' by an untenable minute-resolution although
an extended one, dated 14 May 1986 which we consider as an unjust
resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the First
Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member.
"x x x xxx xxx
"We consider the three minute-resolution: the first dated 14 May
1986; the second, dated 9 July 1986; and the third, 3 September
1986, railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the
entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have
gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.
xxx xxx xxx
"Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986
which writes finish to our case before the Supreme Court (x x x

THIS IS FINAL') There is nothing final in this world. We assure you
that this case is far from finished by a long shot For at the proper
time, we shall so act and bring this case before another forum where
the members of the Court can no longer deny our action with minute
resolutions that are not only unjust but are knowingly and
deliberately promulgated. The people deserve to know how the
members of the highest tribunal of the land perform in the task of
decision making by affixing their respective signatures on
judgments that they render on petitions that they themselves give
due course.
391
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 391

"Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our

quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold responsible
members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation
of these three minute-resolutions in question. For the members
thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with
penal sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like
others, none of the division members are above the law.
"In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing injustice to
anyone, particularly the members of the First Division, providing
that they had no hand in the promulgation of the resolution in
question. That is why we are requesting you to inform us your
participation in the promulgation of these resolutions in question.
Even we who are poor are also capable of playing fair even to those
who take advantage of our poverty by sheer power and influence.
We shall then wait for your reply. If, however, we do not hear from
you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you
supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided
accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
The letter also attacked the participation in the case of

Justice Pedro L. Yap, Chairman of the First Division in this
wise:
"As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of

Resolution dated 14 May 1986 we received indicate, did not even
have the elementary courtesy of putting on record that he

voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the promulgation
of this minute-resolution, although an extended one, which he
should have done consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons
of Judicial Ethics. After all he is the law partner of 'Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez, counsel for respondents, now the distinguished Solicitor
General x x x indicative that even at this stage of the proceeding in
point of time, the Supreme Court still recognizes Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez as counsel for respondents, even as he is already the
Solicitor General. For not withdrawing from the case formally Atty.
Ordoñez has manifested his unmitigated arrogance that he does not
respect the Canons of Professional Ethics, similar to the actuation
of his law partner, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, Chairman of the
First Division of the Supreme Court, an act that further aggravates
the growing wrinkles in the domain of judicial statesmanship,
impressed as it is, with very serious and dangerous implications.
"(9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the First Division,

Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez already became the
392

Solicitor General. With such amazingly magical coincidence, Dr. Pedro

Yap, law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez in the law firm Salonga,
Ordoñez, Yap, Padlan became the Chairman of the Division.
x x x
"(11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986 when some

members of the Division were still busy putting their respective offices in
order and had possibly have no idea about the Maravilla case.
Was it possible for Chairman Yap to have convinced the Division
members that Maravilla petition is without merit, and since the members
·the new ones knew nothing about the case, readily agreed to the
dismissal of the petition by a minuteresolution·an extended one. After
all, this was the case of the Solicitor General. If this is what happened,
then we are sorry to say that you were deliberately 'had.'
After all, the 14 May 1986 untenable minute resolution although an
extended one, does not bear the signatures of the Division members. The
members should have signed the resolution, after all, the Supreme Court
had given the petition due course, indicating whether they concur,
dissent or otherwise abstain from voting."
The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state:
"We assume, of course, that you had studied the case thoroughly
since you were with the original 7-man First Division under the
chairmanship of then Justice Claudio Teehankee. We assure you
that we will bring this case before another forum to hold responsible
the members of the Division who participated in the dismissal of the
case by the unjust minute-resolutions, knowingly rendered for
intended objective that your conscience you are aware.
xxx xxx xxx
"We leave the next move to you by informing us your

participation in the promulgation of the minute-resolutions in
question. Please do not take this matter lightly for we know justice
in the end will prevail. For if we do not hear from you within a
week, we will consider your silence as your admission that you
supported the dismissal of the petition. In this way, we shall then be
guided accordingly. The moment we take action in the plans we are
completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio
coverage. Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people
should or ought to know why
393
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 393

we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice.
xxx xxx xxx
"Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this

case, that will no doubt cause nationwide attention, and there
should be anyone that will cause me harm personally, may we
request you to show this letter to the authorities concerned so that
they will know where to look, when it becomes necessary. " (Italics
supplied)
The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the

First Division of 22 October 1986, were "Noted," and
referred en consulta to the Court en banc.

On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the
background and history of the case, found no reason to take
any further action, and referred the case back to the First
Division "as set forth in the latter's resolution of October
27, 1986." In this Resolution, the First Division traced the
history of the case, clarified that Justice Yap assumed his
position in this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the
resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986, Justice
Abad Santos was the incumbent Chairman of the First
Division, and that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty.
Ordoñez was private respondents' counsel; that upon
realization thereof, Justice Yap inhibited himself from
further participation in the case; and that Justice Yap was
designated Chairman of the First Division only on 14 July
1986, after the compulsory retirement of Justice Vicente
Abad Santos on 12 July 1986. The Resolution of the First
Division (incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:
'The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study.

Because a case is resolved against the interests of a party, does not
mean that it is an 'unjust decision' or that it has been 'railroaded.'
"This Division declares without hesitation that it has
consistently rendered justice without fear or favor. YAP, J., took no
part."
On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar

letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz,
(incorporated herein by reference), excerpts from which
follow:
394

"It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our previous letter,
we never dreamed that you would rush, as you did rush for
assistance en consulta with the Honorable Court en banc. The
unfortunate part of it all is the fact that the Court en banc had to
promulgate its resolution dated 28 October 1986 which to us when
considered in its entirety, is just as untenable as the First Division
extended and unsigned minute-resolution of 14 May 1986.

"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: 'Did
you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under·
"1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"2) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
"3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
"That was all we asked. The other matters contained in our

letter were intended merely to give you the highlights of our case.
This is what we wanted to know to properly guide us when we
finally bring our case to the other forum of justice.
"Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other members of
the First Division referred our letters to the Honorable Court en
banc en consulta it was all your fault that the Court en banc had to
promulgate its unsigned extended minute-resolution that
unfortunately exposed the distinguished members of the newly
reorganized Supreme Court and, at the same time, convicted
themselves as guilty of distorting facts involved in our petition?
"This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We will show you
why·
xxx xxx
"This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before
the other forum of justice where we will soon bring this case beyond
the reach of the newly reorganized Supreme Court. We are prepared
to expose many more of this kind of judicial performance readily
constituting travesty of justice. Ponder upon this well because it is
our very firm conviction that the people deserve to know how the
distinguished members of the highest tribunal of the land perform
their duties in this most sensitive area of decision making.
"Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court en banc
(en consulta) or not, the situation remains the same. At the proper
time, as we said, we will bring this case before another forum of
justice where the members of the First Division, in fact the
Honorable Court en banc may no longer deny our action by mere
untenable and unjust minute resolutions. Better believe it that we
intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who took
part
395
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 395
in the promulgation of the untenable and unjust extended

minuteresolution that is not even signed by any of those who
promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly bereft of judicial integrity
from its very inception on 14 May 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
"Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of justice as E
va Maravilla Ilustre against the distinguished members of the First
Division, in fact against the entire membership of the newly
organized Supreme Court (because of its en banc unsigned extended
minute-resolution that is without judicial integrity, dated 28
October 1986). But do not be mislead (sic) for we are not alone in
this fight. Other lawyers, not just by their mere sympathy for me
personally and my case, but by their firm conviction that judicial
statesmanship must be maintained at all times in the highest
tribunal of justice in the land, that they have offered their free legal
services when the legal confrontation begins.
xxx xxx xxx
"Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc resolution projects
the most fantastic, most unbelievable picture of Division Chairman
Justice Yap. It states·
" 'x x x When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986, Justice Yap
was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez was private respondent's
counsel.
"The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to

swallow this statement hook, line and sinker. For Justice Yap we say:
Tell that to the marines. But more than this, we leave this matter to
the conscience of Justice Yap.
"Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of law and
procedure, but we are learning a few as we prosecute our case
within legitimate limits, we state here that both resolutions·that
promulgated by the Court en banc of 28 October 1986 and that
promulgated by the First Division dated 27 October 1986, are
nothing but a desperate attempt, when both are considered in their
respective entirety, to maneuver without success, some semblance of
justification on the untenable and unjust 14 May 1986 extended and
unsigned minute-resolution that is bereft of judicial integrity.
xxx xxx xxx
"Thus, if the members of the First Division and those of the
Honorable Court en banc think for one minute that because of their
respective 4-page minute but extended resolutions apparently im-
396

pressive for their lack of merit, deliberately unsigned that exposed

their lack of judicial integrity, that we will now give up the fight,
just forget it. Ignoramus that we are, better believe it when we say
we are prepared to carry the fight before another forum of justice.
When we do, we shall call for a press conference with TV and radio
coverage, so that we can present to the entire nation our quest for
justice against the steam-roller of power and influence and, at the
same time, to call the attention of the people to the manner in
which the members of the highest tribunal of the land perform their
respective individual and collective functions in the domain of this
most sensitive area of decision making.
"Allow us to restate our previous and now, our present inquiry, to
wit:
"Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition
under·
"a) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

b) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.' " (Emphasis
supplied).
True to her threats, after having lost her case before this
Court, petitioner filed on 16 December 1986 an Affidavit-
Complaint before the Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the
facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth
in this Court's aforecited Resolutions of the First Division
and en banc. Some Members of this Court were maliciously
charged with having knowingly and deliberately rendered,
with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution
"making" her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates.
Some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly
maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their
"unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest
and evident bad faith," when their Resolution had in fact
and law been upheld by this Court. Additionally, Solicitor
General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of this

Court were also maliciously charged with having used their
power and influence in persuading and inducing the
members of the First Division of this Court into
promulgating their "unjust extended Minute Resolution of
14 May 1986."
397
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 397

All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions

of this Court, as the tribunal of last resort, 1) upholding the
challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals; 2) dismissing
the Petition on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata
was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the Will
of the decedent but also as to the heirship of petitioner,
among others, and their right to intervene and participate
in the proceedings; and 3) finding that there was no
attempt whatsoever on the part of Justice Yap nor Solicitor
General Ordoñez to unduly influence the members of the
First Division.
The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated
herein by reference) was allegedly filed "in my quest for
justice, something that has been closed to me by the
Supreme Court forever" and specifically charged:
"CHARGE NO. ONE

Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of 1)
'persuading, inducing, influencing the members of the
newly organized First Division x x x into promulgating
their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May
1986, knowingly with deliberate intent with such unusual
hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the
Supreme Court based on insignificant issues and
deliberately evading/prevaricating the more important
substantial ones raised in my petition, in violation of
Section 3, sub-letter (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, x x x,; and
'(2) Under the same Section 3, subletter (e) of the same
Republic Act x x x for causing me and the other heirs of

Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by using their power and
influence as Solicitor General and Associate Justice,
respectively. x x x
"CHARGE NO. TWO·

"Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza and
Serafin Cuevas, members of the then FOURTH SPECIAL
CASES DIVISION, Intermediate Appellate Court·
1) For knowingly rendering their unjust

RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 in the
exercise of their functions through manifest and
evident bad faith in CA-G.R. No. SP-13680, entitled
Francisco Q. Maravilla, et al. v. Hon. Antonia
Corpus Macandog, et al.' in violation of Article 204
of the Revised Penal Code;
"2) For causing me and the other heirs such 'undue
injury' by
398

deliberately, knowingly rendering their unjust

RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 x x x in
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
Section 3 (e) thereof.
"CHARGE NO. THREE

"Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then
Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court as of
14 May 1986, and Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, Andres
Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and Pedro Yap, x x x·
1) For knowingly and deliberately rendering their

unjust, extended MINUTE RESOLUTION of 14
May 1986 dismissing my petition in G.R. No. 68635,
x x x with manifest and evident bad faith to make
the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, now the

distinguished Solicitor General, the 'illegal owners'
of the vast estates of my aunt Digna Maravilla x x
x;
"2) Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No.
3019', as amended, x x x for deliberately causing us
heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by
depriving us of our rights over my aunt's vast
estates because of their manifest and evident bad
faith in knowingly promulgating their unjust,
extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986,
deliberately intended to make the clients of Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, now the Solicitor General, the
'illegal owners' of my aunt Digna Maravilla's
estates when, under the law, these Ordoñez clients
are not entitled to own these vast properties
whether under testate or intestate succession or
mixed succession." (Emphasis supplied).
Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the

Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in
almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy
furnished this Court nor the members who were charged.
The issue of the Daily Express of 23 December 1986
published a banner headline reading:
"ORDOÑEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES"
thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this

Court and the other respondents were charged with "graft
and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a
disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her
case thrice in this Court.
399
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 399

On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)

dismissed petitioner's Complaint and decreed in the
dispositive portion of his Resolution (herein incorporated
by reference) that:
"WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this Office resolves to

dismiss the complaint against Justices Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz,
Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad
Santos, and will continue evaluating the complaint against Justices
Serafin Cuevas, Luis Javellana and Vicente Mendoza, Solicitor
General Sedfrey Ordoñez, and the private respondents."
The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the

last page:
"Copy Furnished:
DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA

Counsel for the Complainant
919 Prudencio Street
Sampaloc, Manila
In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29,

1986, it required:
"(1) Petitioner Eva Mara villa Ilustre to show cause, within ten
(10) days from notice, why she should not be held in
contempt for her aforecited statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of
the Justices concerned, which statements, unless
satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds
of propriety and undermine and degrade the administration
of justice; and
'(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show
cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him for the aforecited
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme
Court and the official actions of the Justices concerned, and
for hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client's name,
in an alleged quest for justice but with the manifest intent
to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public
confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of
justice." (pp. 383-384, Rollo).
400

(1)
In her Compliance-Answer filed on February 9, 1987,

wherein Eva Maravilla Ilustre prays that the contempt
proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, in
essence, that: (1) "there was no intention to affront the
honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters addressed to
the individual Justices were private in character and were
never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en
banc, "there (being) a constitutional mandate affording
protection to privacy of communications;" (3) if her
statements in those letters were really contemptuous, the
Court "should have immediately taken disciplinary
proceedings" against her, and not having done so, the Court
has "forfeited" that right and is now "estopped" from doing
so; this citation for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for
her having filed the complaint before the Tanodbayan, "an
action that lacks sincerity, taken not in the spirit of judicial
statemanship;" (4) she instituted the complaint before the
Tanodbayan "in my honest belief that I lost my case before
the Supreme Court not because of lack of merit or of its
own merits, assisted by attorneys who offered their services
in the prosecution of my case;" (5) the newspaper publicity
of this case "was no fault of mine; neither is it the fault of
my former counsel Dean Wenceslao Laureta," who
prevailed upon her to call off the press conference with TV
and radio coverage; that she is not a "disgruntled litigant"
who thrice lost before the Court, rather, she has challenged
the validity of the resolutions of the Court "containing
distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences"
particularly, in that (a) there is no res judicata, (b) the
Court of Appeals in its decision declared that the judgment
of the trial Court had long attained finality, so that it can
no longer be set aside, (c) her "opponents," clients of Atty.
Ordoñez, are not entitled to own her aunt's "vast
properties" whether under the law of testate or intestate
succession or mixed succession," (d) that the statement in
this Court's Resolution that the Court of Appeals had
denied intervention is an "unadulterated distortion of the
facts;" (b) the statement in the en banc Resolution that

some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly
maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their
"unjust resolution" of
401
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 401

20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a pre-judgment over a

case over which this Court does not have jurisdiction;" (7)
Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in the case before the
Tanodbayan; (8) before the latter body, she has "established
not only probable cause but has also proved the collective
culpability (of the Justices concerned) as charged;" (9) and
that her 53page Motion for Reconsideration before the
Tanodbayan is made an integral part of her Answer.
(2)
In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially

that: (1) he is not respondent Ilustre's counsel before the
Tanodbayan and that she has consulted and/or engaged the
services of other attorneys in the course of the prosecution
of her case, like Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and Atty.
Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that he just learned from other
sources that respondent Ilustre was planning to bring her
case to the Tanodbayan with the assistance 01 other
lawyers who offered her their legal services; (2) it was he
who dissuaded her from calling her intended press
conference and from circulating copies of her complaint
"not only in the performance of duty as an officer of the
court, but also as a former president of Manila III Chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a
professional lecturer in Legal and Judicial Ethics in some
Manila law schools in his desire to protect and uphold the
honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as the highest
tribunal of the land." He should, therefore, be given "a little
bit of credit for what he did" instead of taking this
disciplinary proceeding against him; that Ms. Ilustre is not
a "disgruntled litigant" who "lost her case thrice in this
Court;" (3) he did not prepare respondent Ilustre's letters to

the individual Justices, "appearances to the contrary
notwithstanding;" that these letters were "never, at any
time, considered as constituting contempt of court" in the
resolutions of this Court, otherwise, "it would have taken
immediate disciplinary action as it is doing now;" the Court
has lost its right to consider the statements in the letters
as constituting contempt and it is now "estopped" from
proceeding with this disciplinary action; (4) by doing so,
this Court has "unmistakably revealed the intent and
402

character that underlie its present action as a vindictive

judicial vengeance, inconsistent with the spirit of judicial
statesmanship by hiding behind the well-recognized fact
that the Supreme Court is supreme in the domain of the
administration of justice;" (5) "there was no disregard
intended to the Resolution of the Honorable Court, as the
tribunal of last resort, relative to its upholding the
judgment of the Court of Appeals;" he is just doing "his
duty as an officer of the court to put the records in this
regard in their proper light;" particularly (a) that the
judgment of the trial court had attained its finality long
ago, (b) the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable,
otherwise, this Court would not have remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals for review, (c) the observation in the
First Division's extended Resolution of 14 July 1986 that
Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordoñez was private
respondents' counsel "defies every vestige of human
understanding;" that Justice Yap had forthwith inhibited
himself from participating in the case is not borne out by
the record of this case. Justice Yap had "never voluntarily
entered on the record his inhibition" when he should have
done so when respondent Ilustre's petition was taken up;
Justice Yap's partner, Atty. Ordoñez, continued to be
recognized by this Court as counsel for private respondents
even as he was already the Solicitor General; (b) finally,
"appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, he has not
committed acts unworthy of his profession. The truth of the

matter is, he should at least be credited in whatever small
way for his acts and efforts taken by him to protect and
uphold the honor and dignity of the Honorable Court.''
We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty.
Laureta unsatisfactory. Their claims that they had done
nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor and
dignity of this Court dissipate in the face of attendant facts
and circumstances and "defy every vestige of human
understanding," to use their own language. Indeed, they
should not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer
multiplication of words." (Mathew 6:7).
Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication"
is misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in
connec-
403
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 403

tion with the performance of their judicial functions become

part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for
the entire Court. The contumacious character of those
letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to
the Court en banc, en consulta and so that the Court en
banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It
was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it
refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in
the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the
Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would
realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations.
The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these
proceedings. The Chief Justice had promptly announced his
Statement, dated December 23, 1986, that "the Supreme
Court will take appropriate steps on the matter upon its
resumption of sessions on the first working day of the
year.''
There is no vindicative reprisal involved. The Court's
authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It
must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the
scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client,
and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal

profession. We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had
nothing to do with respondent Ilustre's letters to the
individual Justices, nor with the complaint filed before the
Tanodbayan. In the Motion for Reconsideration, dated June
11, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta in the main petition, he
stressed:
"10. The composition of the First Division was reduced to five

members. Strangely enough, about one month later, the Honorable
Court promulgated its extended resolution with such promptitude
in the entire history of the Supreme Court, unequalled in a manner
of speaking. x x x"
In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed

by Atty. Laureta (p. 311, Rollo), the same phrases were
incanted:
"the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May 1986 was

promulgated (par. 9, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5) unequalled in
the entire history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions given
due course is concerned x x X" (Emphasis given)
404

Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters

ostensibly authored by respondent Ilustre addressed to the
individual Justices whom respondents have charged. Thus:
"We consider the three minute resolutions x x x railroaded with

such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the
Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the
limits of legal and judicial ethics" (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 2; ltr.
to Justice Herrera, p. 2; ltr. to Justice Cruz, p. 2). x x x x x x
"with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire
history of the Supreme Court" (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 5; ltr. to
Justice Herrera, p. 5; ltr. to Justice Cruz, p. 5)."
The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint

and in the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the
Tanodbayan (p. 2).

Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25,
1986, Atty. Laureta stated:
"counsel for petitioner personally inquired from Division Clerk of

Court Corazon Serevo the following:
(1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by the First

Division?
(2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?
(3) Who among the members of the Division voted for dismissal
of the petition to be promulgated by resolution and who did
not, if any?
(4) Who prepared the Resolution?" (p. 312, Rollo).
Atty. Laureta's obsession to receive the answer to his

queries surfaces again in the second letters dated
November 3, 1986 to the individual Justices under the
supposed signatures of respondent Ilustre, thus:
"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry in our first letter.

It is a very simple inquiry, to wit Did you or did you not approve the
dismissal of our petition under
1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No

2) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No
405
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 405

3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. " (Italics

original) (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to Justice Herrera, p.
1; to Justice Cruz, p. 1)
Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of

"undue" and "powerful influence" by Atty. Ordoñez and
Justice Yap; "distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken
references"; "untenable minute resolution although
extended"; "unjust minute resolution" repeated by Atty.
Laureta in his several pleadings, echoed and re-echoed in
the individual letters to the Justices, as well as in the

Complaint and the Motion for Reconsideration before the
Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden hand of Atty.
Laureta.
The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the
members of the Court that copies of the complaint filed
with the Tanodbayan were distributed to the editors of the
metropolitan newspapers in envelopes bearing the name of
respondent Laureta, who was heard over the radio
speaking on the same complaint, and that he was following
up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of the Tanodbayan.
Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent
Ilustre's lawyer had control of the proceedings. As stressed
by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever
steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and
responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal
Ethics should be reminded him that '(a) lawyer should use
his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from
doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to
do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards
courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a
client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should
terminate their relation/ " (In Re: Contempt Proceedings in
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA
1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to discharge
such responsibility. For all intents and purposes, he
appears to have encouraged and abetted his client in
denigrating the members of the First Division of this
Court, by baselessly charging them with rendering an
"unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith," because of
his stubborn in-
406

sistence on his untenable arguments which had been

rejected as without merit by the Court's First Division,
whose Resolution was upheld by the Court en banc. Worse,
the dissemination in the print and broadcast media in bold
captions falsely depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING)

GRAFT CHARGES" instead of the baseless rantings of a
disgruntled litigant appear to have been timed to place
them in a bad light at the height of the Christmas season.
We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.
They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos
(retired) then Chairman of the First Division of the
Supreme Court as of May 14, 1986, Andres Narvasa,
Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for knowingly and
deliberately rendering their "unjust, extended Resolution of
May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition in this case with
manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez (now the Solicitor General) the "illegal
owners" of the estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby causing
the heirs of Ponciano Maravilla (Digna's eldest brother)
undue injury by depriving them of their rights over the
estates of Digna Maravilla (Charge No. Three before the
Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice Yap (and Atty.
Sedfrey Ordoñez) of having "persuad(ed), induc(ed) and
influenc(ed) the members of the newly organized First
Division into promulgating their "unjust, extended minute
Resolution of 14 May 1986" (Charge No. One before the
Tanodbayan), which Resolution, (the "Division Resolution,"
for short) is herewith attached as Annex "A".
Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre
lost three times in this Court. It cannot be denied, however,
that, as stated in the Resolution of October 28, 1986 of the
Court en banc, this is the third time (in fact, the fourth, if
we include Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla, L-18799, 10
SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversy involving the estate of
the late Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. The first
was in G.R. No. L23225 (37 SCRA 672 [1971], where this
Court ruled:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below

denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit 'A') is
reversed and the said testament is hereby ordered probated.
407
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 407

Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for further

proceedings conformable to law. x x x"
As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986

(hereto attached as Annex "B", and hereinafter referred to
as the "Banc Decision") while respondent Ilustre was not a
party in that case, upon remand of the case to the probate
Court, she and other children of the deceased brothers and
sisters of the testatrix filed two Motions for Intervention.
Respondent Ilustre's participation in the estate involved,
therefore, harks back to that first case.
The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention
in CA-G.R. No. 05394, entitled "Heirs of Pastor Maravilla,
et al. vs. Hon. Ernesto S. Tengco, et al." in a Decision
penned by Justice Venicio Escolin (hereinafter referred to
as the "Escolin Decision") wherein it was categorically
ruled that there was no point to allowing intervention on
the part of respondent Ilustre, et als., "for failure to show
any right or interest in the estate in question." Thus:
"(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their counter-

petition for mandamus, seek this Court's resolution on the
petitioners' motion for intervention in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their
respective pleadings and memoranda, the parties have lengthily
discussed the issue of whether or not petitioners may be allowed to
intervene; and the same may as well be determined in the present
case, if only 'to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted
controversy' between the parties (PCIB vs. Hon. Escolin, 56 SCRA
266). A resolution of this issue should render moot and academic the
question anent the disqualification of respondent Judge.
We agree with private respondents that petitioners' motions for
intervention are devoid of merit, for failure on their part to show
any right or interest in the estate in question. There is no dispute
that the last will and testament of the late Digna Maravilla had
already been admitted to probate in a final judgment which the
Supreme Court promulgated on March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225).
In the said will, Digna instituted her husband Herminio Maravilla
as·
xxx xxx
The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of
Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and
future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as
408

collateral relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the

latter's estate through intestate succession or mixed succession.
Having no forced or compulsory heirs, except her husband, the
testatrix had the absolute freedom to institute the latter as her sole,
universal heir, and such freedom is recognized by Article 842 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
'ART. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all
his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitime of said heirs."
There is therefore no point in allowing the petitioners, who

clearly appear to have no interest in the estate, to intervene in the
proceedings involving the settlement thereof.
xxx x x x"
The aforesaid Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R.

No. L-46155 on November 9, 1977 and has become final.
That was the second case involving the estate filed before
this Court.
Respondents' contention, therefore, that the statement
in the Banc Resolution "that the Court of Appeals had
denied intervention" is an "unadulterated distortion of the
facts" is obviously erroneous and intended to mislead.
The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which
had become final, also finally foreclosed any claim that
respondent Ilustre, and those who sought to intervene with
her, may have had on the estate of Digna Maravilla. In
unmistakable terms, what the Court of Appeals held in
that Decision, affirmed by this Court, bears repeating:
'The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of

Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and
future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as
collateral relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the
latter's estate through intestate succession or mixed succession. x x

x"
409
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 409

To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or

on February 29, 1979, respondent Ilustre, with respondent
Laureta as counsel, filed a complaint for partition of Digna
Maravilla's estate and for damages against the heirs of
Digna Maravilla's husband, who had then passed away
(docketed as Civil Case No. X-404), before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City,
Branch X, presided over by Judge Antonia Corpuz
Macandog. That Court, after declaring defendants therein
(private respondents in the petition under review) in
default, ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla
mentioned in this case to go back to their trunk of origin,
the plaintiffs herein who are represented by Eva Maravilla
Ilustre and Eva Maravilla Ilustre herself' (hereinafter
referred to as the "Macandog Decision"). In addition, the
judgment awarded damages to the respondent Ilustre, et
als., (the plaintiffs therein), and the sum of P100,000.00 to
their counsel, respondent Laureta.
A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the
defeated parties (private respondents in the petition under
review) before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-58014,
praying that the lower Court's declaration of default in
Civil Case No. X-404 and all other actions or decisions
taken thereafter be declared null and void and that the
dismissal of the complaint be ordered. On January 21,
1982, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of
Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, questions of fact
being involved.
In a Decision dated January 1
14, 1983, the Court of
Appeals (Fourth Division), in AC-G.R. SP No. 13680
(hereafter called the "Busran Decision"), dismissed the
petition and denied certiorari stating in one breath that
"the judgment subject of assail had long become final" (at p.
13), and in another 'for all we know, the judgment below
had already attained finality long ago." The reason relied

upon was that petitioners therein had the remedy of appeal
but instead availed of Certiorari, which is not a substitute
therefor.
On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by
petitioners
_______________
1 Composed of Justices Busran (ponente), Coquia and Zosa, as

members.
410

(private respondents in the petition under review), in that

appealed case (AC-G.R. SP No. 13680), the
2
same Court of
Appeals (Fourth Special Cases Division) in its Resolution
of January 20, 1984 (the "Javellana Resolution"),
reconsidered and set aside the "Busran Decision" and
entered another one:
"1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon.

respondent Court dated 29 April 1980 and its
decision dated 11 August 1981; and
2. Dismissing private respondents' complaint in Civil
Case No. X-404 and ordering the Hon. respondent
Court not to take further action therein."
Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present

Petition for Review filed on October 22, 1984. This is the
third case brought before this Court involving the same
estate. Review was denied in an extended minute
Resolution by the First Division of this Court in the
challenged Resolution of May 14,1986, for the following
reasons:
'The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds.
(1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was issued in grave
abuse of discretion. The Answer was filed only one day late
besides the fact that when so filed, the Order of default had
not yet been issued by the Trial Court.
(2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a judgment by
default, Certiorari may be resorted to when a party has
been illegally declared in default (Omico Mining &
Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 300-301
[1975]), or where it is necessary to restore order to
proceedings in the Court below (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66
SCRA 462-463 [1975]).
(3) More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court, in Civil
Case No. X-404 declaring that the Testatrix's collateral
relatives have a rightful claim to her estate to the exclusion
of the husband who was designated her sole and universal
heir, nullifies the Will already probated by final judgment
and overturns the pronouncements of both the Appellate
Court and this Court on the case.
There being former judgments on the issues which have become
________________
2 Composed of Justices Cuevas, Mendoza and Javellana (ponente).
411
OL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 411

final, rendered by Courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter

and the parties, the said judgments having been rendered on the
merits, and there being between the prior and subsequent action
identity of parties, subject matter and substantial identity of cause
of action, it is clear that the complaint below in Civil Case X-404 is
barred by the principle of res adjudicata, and whatever transpired
therein are null and void ab initio and without any legal effect.
To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue on which
res judicata rests that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate
the same issue more than once, that when a right or fact has been
judicially determined, the judgment of the Court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them in law or estate (Sarabia vs. Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2 SCRA 54 [1961]).

ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and respondent
Court's judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 13080 is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED."
Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside
the due course Order and denied review in an extended
Minute Resolution instead of in a signed Decision. They
allege that said Resolution was "railroaded with such
hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the
Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone
beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics," unduly
"persuaded, induced and influenced" by Solicitor General
Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap.
Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the
"Banc Resolution"
'The petition for review was assigned to the then First Division of
seven Justices, which initially gave it due course because the
resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court had reversed a
decision originally rendered by the then Court of Appeals, and in
order to have more time f or further study.
Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3, 1985, which
can be considered as the date when this case was submitted for
resolution,
The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on the case up
to the February, 1986 political upheaval. The last incident in the
case was a motion for the early release of decision filed by petitioner
on November 19,1985.
412

When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986, the membership

of the First Division was reduced to five (5) Justices. Taking account
of the motion of petitioner for early release of decision, the new
First Division, then chairmanned by Justice Abad Santos, realizing
that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable·not only as
to the probate of the will but also as to the heirship of petitioner,
among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the
proceedings·resolved, on May 14, 1986 to dismiss the petition

through an extended resolution which at the same time recalled the
due course order. The new Division of 5 acted unanimously."
The recall of a due course Order after a review of the

records of the case is a common occurrence in the Court.
Respondents speak as if it were only their petition which
has been subjected to such recall. They have lost all
objectivity in this regard. They are hardly qualified, and
cannot presume to speak of the "entire history" of the
Supreme Court.
As to the participation of Justice Yap in the case, the
"Banc Resolution" stated:
"Justice Yap clarified that he was on official mission to Switzerland

for the Presidential Commission on Good Government after his
appointment to the Supreme Court on April 11, 1986 and did not
assume his position in the Supreme Court until his return on May
2, 1986. When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986 was
issued, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez was
private respondent's counsel.
On June 11, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was taken up by the First Division on July 9,1986 with
Justice Abad Santos still the Chairman. This time, Justice Yap,
realizing that his former partner, Atty. Ordoñez, had submitted the
pleadings for petitioner, inhibited himself and Justice Edgardo L.
Paras was designated under Special Order No. 21, dated July 9,
1986, to sit in the Division in his place. The motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality on July 9,1986.
Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on
July 14, 1986.
On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to file a second motion
for reconsideration, which was denied on September 3, 1986, entry
of judgment of the May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on
July 28, 1986. Justice Yap again took no part in the deliberation of
the case."
413
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 413

But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice

Yap could not have been "unaware" of the appearance of
Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez. They reacted by saying "tell it to the
marines" (Letters of November 3, 1986 to Justices Narvasa,
Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8, respectively). But that was the
true and untarnished fact. With so many cases being
handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers during
deliberative sessions very often escape attention,
concentration being centered on the issues to be resolved.
Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing)
Atty. Ordoñez as counsel" for their opponents in the case.
In the same "Banc Resolution," it was clarified:
"A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the
Releasing Clerks to Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez as his name still
appears on the cover page of the Rollo. It was not necessarily
because the Supreme Court 'still recognizes him as counsel for
respondents' " (at p.4)
The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued

to recognize Atty. Ordoñez as counsel as shown by his
pleadings filed before the Court, which inevitably contained
the notation "copy furnished Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez." No
withdrawal of appearance having been presented by Atty.
Ordoñez in the main petition, his name continues to be in
the Rollo of the case and the personnel concerned continue
to furnish him with copies of Resolutions of this Court.
In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First
Division of May 14, 1986, July 9, 1986 denying the Motion
for Reconsideration with finality, and September 3, 1986
denying leave to file a second motion for reconsideration
since entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 Resolution had
been made on July 28, 1986, were "unjust" and were
"railroaded," the Banc Resolution, adopting the Division
Resolution, explained:
"The aforesaid resolutions were by no means 'railroaded.' The

pleadings filed by the parties, as in any other case, were included in
the Agenda of the First Division as soon as feasible. The Division
acts promptly on all Agenda items, and the minutes of its
deliberations are released as soon as possible after Agenda day.
414

xxx xxx
"The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study.
Because a case is resolved against the interests of a party, does not
mean that it is an 'unjust decision;' or that it has been 'railroaded.'
This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently
rendered justice without fear or favor." (at p. 4)
Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is

inapplicable. In their own words "the ordered probate of the
1944 Will of Digna Maravilla by judgment of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-23225 is conclusive only as to the
genuineness and due execution of said will, but not upon
the validity of testamentary provision, particularly with
the invalid designation of Herminio Maravilla as sole and
universal heir of Digna Maravilla."
On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing
the "Busran Decision" (AC-G.R. SP No. 13680), aptly held:
'The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned decision does
not run counter to the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R.
No. L-23225 admitting the will of Digna Maravilla to probate
because the latter refers to the extrinsic validity of the will, while
the former concerns its intrinsic validity. We cannot agree with this
observation because it is quite clear from the questioned decision
that the will was in effect declared not to have been freely and
voluntarily executed by the deceased Digna Maravilla but was the
result of the evil and fraudulent machinations of her husband,
Herminio Maravilla, and sets aside said will. The declaration that
private respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased Digna
Maravilla, are entitled to her estate, is an indication that the Hon.
respondent Court has nullified the will. Private respondents are not
compulsory heirs and, in the absence of their being named legatees
or devisees in the will, they could only lay claim to the estate of
Digna Maravilla if the latter died without a will, pursuant to Art.
1003 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
'Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children

or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the f ollowing articles.'
415
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 415

"However, assuming arguendo, that the matter complained of by

private respondents referred only to the intrinsic validity of the
will, still, it was improper for them to have instituted a separate
action in a court other than that in which the probate proceeding
was pending.
xxx xxx
'lt seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is
being settled in the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding, no
ordinary action can be maintained in that court, or in any other court, by
a person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other
persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose of having the rights of the
plaintiffs in the estate determined. The very purpose of the trial or
hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those
questions, and until they are settled and determined in that proceeding
and under that section no action such as the present one can be
maintained.
Considering that the "Escolin Decision," as affirmed by this

Court on November 9, 1977 in G.R. No. L-46155, had
become final, the "Javellana Resolution" aptly observed:
"3. The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent Court dated 12

August 1981 (referring to the 'Macandog Decision') unsettles and
reviews issues which had long been laid to rest by the Hon.
Supreme Court and the then Court of Appeals."
But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why

did this Court, in G.R. No. L-50814, refer the case to the
Court of Appeals? The answer is simple. The issue of
whether the remedy of petitioners in that case was appeal
and not certiorari had to be resolved. If certiorari were
proper, then the "Macandog Decision" had not become final.
If appeal, its finality would be the consequence. The
"Javellana Resolution," which reversed the "Busran
Decision," held that Certiorari was proper when a party
has been illegally declared in default. It follows that the
"Macandog Decision" had not attained finality.

Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of
Appeals "deliberately evaded/divaricated" two important
issues:
416

(1) that the judgment of the Trial Court (in CC No. X-404)
had attained finality as in fact the Court of Appeals had
held that the "judgment of assail had long become final,"
and (2) that Digna Maravilla's husband could not be
instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife on
indestructible ground of moral impossibility and could not
inherit wife's vast estate on the ground of utter
unworthiness.''
The penchant of respondents for making misleading
statements is again obvious. It was not in the "Javellana
Resolution" that the Court of Appeals held that "the
judgment of assail (referring to the 'Macandog Decision')
had long become final." That was in the "Busran Decision,"
which was precisely reversed by the "Javellana
Resolution."
As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit
from his wife, the "Javellana Resolution" pointedly
observed:
'The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which instituted

her husband, Herminio Maravilla, as her sole and universal heir,
was admitted to probate, pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon.
Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27 February 1971. This
probate foreclosed all questions as to the age and mental capacity of
the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by
someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument
by him in the presence of the required member of witnesses who
affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. In re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 168). Yet, more than ten years later, the Hon.
respondent Court would nullify the effects of the probate by
declaring that Digna Maravilla did not voluntarily and sanely
execute the probated last will and testament, nullifying the
institution of Herminio Maravilla as her sole and universal heir,

and ordering the return of the properties of Digna Maravilla to the
trunk of origin."
The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the

"Escolin Decision" and "Javellana Resolution" commends
itself. Only a disgruntled litigant and a defeated lawyer
would claim that those judgments were accepted "hook, line
and sinker" by this Court. The doctrine of res judicata is
inescapably applicable. Thus it was that the First Division,
in its challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it
unnecessary, after further study, to have a signed Decision
and, instead, recalled the due course Order, which it had
previously issued to
417
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 417

give it "more time for further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution,

October 28, 1986). Contrary to respondents' claim, the
Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the
time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or
minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given,
depending on its evaluation of a case.
But obdurately enough, respondents have seen fit to
take their case to the Tanodbayan charging the members of
the First Division of this Court collectively with having
knowingly and deliberately rendered an "unjust extended
minute Resolution" with deliberate bad 3
faith in violation of
Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and for deliberately
causing "undue injury" to respondent Ilustre and her co-
heirs because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, 4
in
violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Respondents' action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can
they plead ignorance. As aptly declared in the Chief
Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court
hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme
Court is supreme·the third great department of
government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power
to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public
and private. No other department or agency may pass upon

its judgments or declare them 'unjust.' " It is elementary
that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early case of
Arnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) 'controlling
and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound
practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional
error, judgments of courts determining controversies
_______________
3 "ART. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment.·Any judge who

shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him
for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
4 "SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.·
x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. x x x"
418

submitted to them should become final at some definite

time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law,
so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court
which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of
fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may
have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are
organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the
questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the
respective rights of the parties.' " (Luzon Brokerage Co.,
Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly
unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so
"in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then,
it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the
"unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper

appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either
the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court.
Respondents should likewise know that said penal article
has no application to the members of a collegiate court such
as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in
consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation. It also follows,
consequently, that a charge of violation of the AntiGraft
and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a
collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
The Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the
Supreme Court's judicial power is by no means a "display of
arrogance" as per respondents' puerile contention, but a
restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of
powers and checks and balances under a republican form of
government such as ours, viz. that the three co-equal
branches of government, the executive, legislative and
judicial, are each supreme and independent within the
limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the
performance of the duties of the other. (Forbes vs. Chuoco,
16 Phil. 534 [1910]). As restated by the late Justice Jose P.
Laurel in the 1936 landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral
Commission (63 Phil. 134), our Constitution "as 'a
definition of the powers of government' placed upon the
judiciary the great burden of 'determining the nature,
419
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 419

scope and extent of such powers' and 'when the judiciary

mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments . . . but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which the
instrument secures and guarantees to them. "
As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should
realize that the cardinal principle he would grossly impair
and violate is that of the independence of the judiciary,

which the members of the bar are called upon to defend
and preserve. The independence of the judiciary is the
indispensable means for enforcing the supremacy of the
Constitution and the rule of law.
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and
prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme
Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the
regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to
subvert and undermine that very independence of the
judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive.
"For it is a general principle of the highest importance to
the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone
who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the j udge
would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom,
and would destroy that independence without which no
judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate
court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves
and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs.
Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61
Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme
Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well
settled that the enrolled bill. . . is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the
420

measure passed by Congress and approved by the

President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-
importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees]
·on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the

principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
the cornerstones of our democratic system·the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree"
is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court
orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco
Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350.
(Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1)
The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of
separation of powers calls for the executive, legislative and
judicial departments being left alone to discharge their
duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It
has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary
has a right to expect that neither the President nor
Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders
or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged
hidden forces at work that could have impelled either
coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of
separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and
between the three departments of the government. (Tecson
vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287)
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and
claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith"
and rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregard or
violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their
own independent consideration and judgment of the matter
at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and
conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to
disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance
of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would
destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot
without violating the separation of powers mandated by
the Con-
421
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 421

stitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of

this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their
adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme
Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine
and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law.
In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has
transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of
justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices
quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this Court en banc,
particularly the underlined portions thereof; in the
language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan
quoted and underscored in the same Resolution; in her
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme
Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned
and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her
unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice
from this Court. The fact that said letters are not
technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they
were submitted after the main petition had been finally
resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt
committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or
right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for
contemptuous acts against the Court.
We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts
unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of
dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper
forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution;
for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule,
the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad
faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgments (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA
234 [1974]); for authoring, or at the very least, assisting
and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous
statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his
client, respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer
that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we
find disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as
above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and
circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this
422

Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as

the Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the
Justices of this Court and other respondents before the
Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" when
the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a
tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in
a case that has been brought thrice before this Court, and
who would readily accept anything but the soundness of
the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the
manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of
the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public
confidence in the Courts.
Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is
not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that
end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. For like the Court itself, "a
lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." (Surigao Mineral Conservation Board vs. Cloribel,
31 SCRA 1 [1970]; Castañeda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 [1975]).
In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the
Court notes that "disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are
rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it
is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaint nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actions as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration

of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney." Viewed in the light
of the demonstrated persistence of grave misconduct and
undermining public con-
423
VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 423

fidence in the honor and integrity of the Court and its

members (at a time when the Court is exerting every effort
to regain public confidence in our courts after the trauma
and debacle undergone by them in the past regime), the
Court shall impose upon him an indefinite suspension,
leaving it to him to prove at some future and opportune
time, that he shall have once again regained the fitness to
be allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of the
Courts. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562)
ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is
hereby held in contempt, and is hereby fined in the amount
of P1,000.00 only, mindful that the power of contempt
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle of punishment; and
(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave
professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to the office of an attorney, and is hereby suspended from
the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to
take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts
of the country for their information and guidance, and
spread in the personal record of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-

Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
Yap, J., no part.
Notes.·An attorney's duty of prime importance is to

observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers. (People vs. Estebia; 27 SCRA
10; Cruz vs. Government Service Insurance System, 27
SCRA 174; Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,
31 SCRA 1.)
The standard of personal and professional integrity
which should be applied to persons admitted to practice
law is not
424

Republic vs. Feliciano
satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape

the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty. (Royong vs. Oblena, 1
SCRA 859.)
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 148 8/13/22, 8:51 AM

382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR

VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 383

Constitutional Law; Contempt; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Judges;

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta

Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden hand of Atty. Laureta. The

envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard

VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 385

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta

Same; Same; Same; Legal Ethics; Charge made by herein

and not certiorari had to be resolved. If certiorari were proper, then

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta

is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead ignorance. As aptly

VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 387

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta

so.·Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of

respondents' puerile contention, but a restatement of the

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta

Same; Same; Same; Litigants cannot be allowed to claim that

presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such

VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 389

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta

standing his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with

allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of the Courts. (In

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986,

which writes finish to our case before the Supreme Court (x x x

VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 391

"Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our

The letter also attacked the participation in the case of

"As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of

have the elementary courtesy of putting on record that he

"(9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the First Division,

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Solicitor General. With such amazingly magical coincidence, Dr. Pedro

"(11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986 when some

The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state:

xxx xxx xxx

"We leave the next move to you by informing us your

VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 393

we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice.

xxx xxx xxx

"Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this

The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the

referred en consulta to the Court en banc.

'The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study.

On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar

394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

extended and unsigned minute-resolution of 14 May 1986.

"1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"That was all we asked. The other matters contained in our

VOL. 148, MARCH 12, 1987 395

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta

in the promulgation of the untenable and unjust extended

"The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to

respective 4-page minute but extended resolutions apparently im-

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

pressive for their lack of merit, deliberately unsigned that exposed

"a) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.