Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Informe Iran Contra Senado Usa
Informe Iran Contra Senado Usa
l/2:Serial 13744
00-1: United States Congre..,
^overnmenl
Documents
6'Lv
V «y ars i
JUL 5
?5sa
«*••»- !.
BOP"
PT
i
LI
<'^
^:
100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987
Senate Report
No. 216
IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION
APPENDIX B, VOLUME 3
DEPOSITIONS
Iran-Contra Affair
Appendix B: Volume 3
Depositions
Washington : 1988
Bnittd ^tatcB ^tnatt
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON. DC 20510-6480
March 1, 1988
available.
Sincerely,
III
:
March 1, 1988
Dear Mr . Speaker
enely yours.
Arthur L. Liman
Chief Counsel
Lance I. Morgan
Press Officer
VI
United States House of Representatives
W. Neil Eggleston
Deputy Chief Counsel
Kevin C. Miller
Staff Director
Thomas R. Smeeton
Minority Staff Director
Richard J. Leon
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel
VII
United States Senate
Arthur L. Liman
Chief Counsel
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro
Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel
to the Chief Counsel
Lance I. Morgan
Press Officer
Associate Counsels
C. H. Albright, Jr. W. T. McGough, Jr.
Committee Staff
VIII
Committee Members' Designated Liaison
Part Time*
The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was tiled but had. dunni.'
the life of the Committee, provided services
IX
United States House of Representatives
Majority Staff
W. Neil Eggleston
Deputy Chief Counsel
Kevin C. Miller
Staff Director
Minority Staff
Thomas R. Smeeton
Minority Staff Director
Richard J. Leon
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel
Associate Staff
XI
Contents
Volume 3
Preface XXI
Byrne, Phyllis M 1
Calero, Adolfo 35
Castillo, Tomas ("W") 239
Cave, George W 563
C/CATF 1077
Depositions
Volume 1
Allen, Charles.
Arcos, Cresencio.
Volume 2
Armitage. Richard.
Artiano, Martin L.
Associate DDO (CIA).
Baker, James A., III.
Volume 3
Byrne, Phyllis M.
Calero, Adolfo.
Castillo, Tomas ("W").
Cave, George W.
C/CATF.
Volume 4
Channell, Carl R.
Chapman. John R. (With Billy Ray Rcyer).
Chatham, Benjamin P.
XV
Volume 5
CIA Officer.
Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr.
Volume 6
Collier. George E.
Cole, Gary.
Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA.
Conrad, Daniel L.
Volume 7
Cooper, Charles J.
Coors, Joseph.
Corbin, Joan.
Corr, Edwin G.
Coward, John C.
Coy, Craig P.
Crawford, Iain T.R.
Volume 8
Crawford, Susan.
Crowe, Adm. William J.
Currier, Kevin W.
DCM, Country 15.
DEA Agent 1.
DEA Agent 2.
DEA Agent 3.
deGraffenreid, Kenneth,
de la Torre, Hugo.
Deputy Chief "DC".
Volume 9
Ducmling, Robert W.
DIA Major.
Dietcl,J. Edwin.
XVI
Volume 10
Farber. Jacob.
Feldman, Jeffrey.
Fischer, David C.
Floor. Emanuel A.
Former CIA Officer.
Fraser, Donald.
Fraser, Edie.
Fuller, Craig L.
Volume 11
Furmark, Roy.
Gadd, Richard.
Gaffney, Henry.
Gaffney. Henry (With Glenn A. Rudd).
Galvin, Gen. John R.
Gantt, Florence.
Garwood, Ellen Clayton.
Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C.
Gates, Robert M.
Glanz, Anne.
Volume 12
George, Clair.
Godard, Ronald D.
Godson, Roy S.
Golden, William.
Gomez, Francis D.
Goodman, Adam.
Gorman, Paul F.
Graham, Daniel O.
Gregg, Donald P.
Gregorie, Richard D.
Guillen, Adriana.
Volume 13
Hakim, Albert.
Volume 14
Hall, Wilma.
Hasenfus. Eugene.
Hirtle, Jonathan J.
Hooper, Bruce.
XVII
Hunt, Nelson Bunker.
Ikle. Fred C.
Jensen, D. Lowell.
Juchniewicz, Edward
Kagan, Robert W.
Keel, Alton G.
Kellner, Leon B.
Kelly, John H.
Kiszynski, George.
Volume 15
Koch, Noel C.
Kuykendall, Dan H.
Langton, William G.
Lawn, John C.
Leachman, Chris J., Jr.
Ledeen, Michael A.
Volume 16
Leiwant, David O.
Lilac, Robert H.
Lincoln, Col. James B.
Littledale, Krishna S.
McDonald. John William.
McFarlane, Robert C.
McKay, Lt. Col. John C.
McLaughlin, Jane E.
Volume 17
McMahon, John N.
McMahon, Stephen.
McNeil, Frank.
Makowka, Bernard.
Marostica, Don.
Marsh, John.
Mason, Robert H.
Volume 18
Meese, Edwin IIL
Melton, Richard H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Meo, Philip H.
Miller, Arthur J.
Miller, Henry S.
Miller, Johnathan.
XVIII
Volume 19
Miller, Richard R.
Volume 20
Motley, Langhorne A.
Mulligan, David R
Nagy, Alex G.
Napier, Shirley A.
Newington, Barbara.
North, Oliver L.
O'Boyle, William B.
Osborne, Duncan.
Owen, Robert W.
Pena, Richard.
Pickering, Thomas.
Poindexter, John M.
Volume 21
Posey, Thomas V.
Powell, Gen. Colin L.
Price, Charles H., II.
Proprietary Manager.
Proprietary Pilot.
Radzimski, James R.
Ramsey, John W.
Ransom, David M.
Volume 22
Raymond, Walter, Jr.
Regan, Donald T.
Reich, Otto J.
Revel! , Oliver B.
Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman).
Reynolds, William B.
Volume 23
Richard, Mark M.
Richardson. John, Jr.
Robelo, Alfonso.
Robinettc, Glenn A.
Rodriguez, Felix I.
XIX
Rosenblatt. William.
Royer, Larry.
Rudd, Glenn A.
Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney).
Volume 24
Rugg, John J.
Russo, Vincent M.
Sanchez. Nestor.
Scharf, Lawrence.
Schweitzer. Robert L.
Sciaroni, Bretton G.
Secord, Richard V.
Volume 25
Shackley. Theodore G.
Sigur, Gaston J.
Simpson, Major C.
Sinclair, Thomas C.
Singlaub, John K.
Volume 26
Slease, Clyde H., IIL
Smith, Clifton.
Sofaer, Abraham D.
Steele, Col. James J.
Volume 27
Thurman, Gen. Maxwell.
Trott, Stephen S.
Tull, James L.
Vessey, John.
Walker, William G.
Watson, Samuel J., IIL
Weinberger, Caspar.
Weld, William.
Wickham, John.
Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark).
XX
Preface
The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation.
The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings.
Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents
received separate subpoenas ordering diem to produce certain written documents.
Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc-
tions to the Select Committees.
At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals
retained their own counsel.
The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that,
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid
XXI
exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in-
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate.
The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages,
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts
and declassified exhibits. Deponents apf>ear in alphabetical order.
XXII
Publications of the Senate and House
Select Committees
XXIII
Scenographic Transcript of
^
HEARINGS J
Before the
TOPJECnET
UNITED STATES SENATE
DEPOSITION OF PHYLLIS M. BYRNE
ITY LNPORMAI.oN
^ .Unauchcjrized Disclosure
r Subject to Criminal Swictioiu
uHC'issiato
(202) 628-9300
mil liiii n rj
i ) ^ .
(1)
82-692 0-88-2
UNcussm
DEPOSITION OF PHYLLIS M. BYRNE
Washington, D.C.
UNeLftSSIHED
C M T E N T S
2 Deoosition of
3
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
UNClAiiSlhtU
PR2CEED^NGS
2 (Witness sworn.)
3
Whereupon,
PHYLT.IS M. BYRNE,
8
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE
9 COMMITTEE
to BY MR. BELNICK:
12 A. Phyllis Byrne.
17 A. Donald Gregq.
advisor?
25 then?
A. Yes.
IMfili^lfilFn
UNElASSIflED
Q. I'm ooing to show you a document which has been
7 for identification.)
9 Phyllis?
10 A. Yes, I have.
11
ft Can you describe to me what type of a document
12 this is? What is a schedule proposal?
15 Vice President.
16 ft Is it a form used when a meeting is proposed for
A. Yes, it is.
20 a meeting?
21 A. That's correct.
22 ft How are these schedule proposals typically
proposal , correct?
A. Yes.
18 A. Yes.
20 A. Yes.
22 A. Hector Irastorza.
IIMRi>&^[Ftfn
10
uNCUssm
to you from either a member of the staff or the State
Department?
A. In most cases.
A. Correct.
A. Yes.
A. Yes.
aoes to Mr. Gregcr for review, he i-itials it, and then oft to
16 A. Yes.
llHfltliStHFn
.
11
Q. Is that frequent?
5 A. Very frequent.
6 Oi Who at the State Department?
17 A. That's correct.
iMfil^SlCIFn
12
mL»IED
HOW many schedule proposals
do you complete m
gt
week?
7 the averaae durirq an average
foreign
3 A. That would fluctuate, depending on
4
visitors who are coming. It would be difficult to gu.ss.
7
the schedule proposals?
a A. Ves.
9 As far as —
me.
It's a very mechanical exercise
wit.-i
10 A.
11
Q. And you do it day after dav?
12 A. Yes.
13 ft
All the time?
14 A. Yes.
specifically
Let's then look at Byrr.e Exh>b>t
1
15 ft
19 office.
charge of the Vice
20 0, When did she cease to be in
21 President's schedulinq office?
time, but I think it's
22 A. I'm not sure of the ex .ct
months ajo.
23 been about four or five
Exhibit 1, which again
24 Then going back to t.is
0.
10
UNCtASSIFIED
there are initia.ls "DG." Did Mr. Gregq put those initials
2 there?
3 A. No, that is my writing.
4
Ql Why did you initial this document as osoosed to
5 Mr. Gregq?
6 A. Because he wasn't in the office at the time that
7
I had completed it. He knew that I was preparing it. To
8 expedite it, I put his initials on the document and noved
9
it forward.
10
Ji Did Mr. Gregg see this document before it went
11
out?
12
A. No.
13 Did you read him the contents of the document
0.
14
before it went out?
15 A. No.
16
Ql Had you ever before sent schedule proposals on
17
to the head of the Vice President's scheduling office
18
without Mr. Gregq even hearing what it contained?
19
A. Yes.
20 that something you do regularly?
Q. Is
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. How do you know whether it's authorized or not?
23 A. Because I usually have discussions with
24 Mr. Greqg prior to my preparing it.
25 Ql Did you discuss Byrne Exhibit 1 with Mr. Gregg
innVtIi
14
2 A. Yes.
12 Q. April 16?
13 A. Yes.
18 from El Salvador.
21 would like to see the Vice President for a short time. Those
ftWi^jcnnrn
15
A. r don't.
m'dmm 12
10 A. Yes.
14 times in El Salvador.
17 A. No.
24 meeting?
IMBI AHfilUZn
16
Oi
wmmmith
Did he tell you anything about the background
13
give me a phrase.
as it appears here.
17
L-;
UNCIJI'SSIFIEO
qave me into a sentence.
5 correct?
6 A. Yes.
A. No.
20 I
Q_ The date, that came from Mr. Rodriauez?
ii*»flkifi«jfirn
18
A.
\mmm
Aoproximately during that time, yes.
3
A. It is.
5
schedule proposal? •
14 A. Yes.
17 A. Correct.
19 did you know who would participate in the meeting aside from
19
16
UNCIilSSIFIED
auess, boilerplate for something like this, no remarks
5
who recommends the visit. There is some handwriting at the
7 handwriting?
A. Yes, it is.
A. Yes.
A. Yes.
18 held?
A. Yes.
that —
A. I don't know what that is.
iMPiM«ietcn
20
UNCLASSIFIED
A. It isn't anything in my writinq. I don't know what
2 that is.
5 Colonel Watson?
6 A. No.
went out?
A. No. ;
'
A. No.
'2 & You qot the information from him, typed it up,
13 and because Mr. Gregg was not there you initialed .Mr. Gregg's
initials and sent this out to Debbie Hutton?
20 for identification.)
23 requested, correct?
24 A. Correct.
TM'iSi^Witicn
21
UNCLASSIFIED
place in, correct?
2 A. Correct.
10 for identification.)
12 A. Yes.
14 A. I did.
25 President?
Hwi^AfiSifipn
22
mmFiED
A. Yes.
A. Yes.
A. That's right.
secretary.
A. Yes.
A. Correct.
A. That is ny writing.
23
20
UNCLASSIFIED
1 0- Did you show this briefing memo to Mr. Gregg
5 A. He wasn't there.
8 A. Yes.
10 to do that?
17 A. Yes.
23 memorandum?
24 A. I don't understand your question.
iflun losmrn
24
mmm
asking about the purpose of the meeting after this
A. Not to my knowledqe.
20 the documents?
^mm nrn
25
mumu 22
to vou?
iiiJOPASEeimrn
26
!ii
23
2 A. No.
there?
A. No.
COMMITTEE
BY MR. LEON:
16 right?
A. Yes.
19 A. Yes.
23 A. Yes.
mr.i«»»FiED
.
27
you know?
A. As far as I know.
that far ago, that long ago, with so many other forms between
Qi Stenographic?
dav'
A. Yes, it did.
relating
Ql Now, did your notes contain any passage
mmmm
28
25
UNIMSSn
to your conversation with Mr. Watson that day?
provide it,
person in the office who would have been able to :
it
11
Qi But I lust want to be sure of one thing. I-s
it that there
12 that you remember him saying it to you or is
you?
13 was no one else who could have said it to
14
15 he told me.
because it's
16
just wanted to be sure about that,
CL I
22 mind?
23
A. About what conversation?
25 A. No.
\\m ^mB
29
26
UNCIASSIFIED
Q. But you do recall it.
2
A. Yes, r think I do.
8 SIGNED
10
12
13
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
30
31
S CHEDULE PtOPOSAL
10: DEBBIE MUTTON
FROM: DON grecg];^
REQUEST: VP Hcttlni with Felix Rodrlguct, •
counttrlnsurgtncy txp«rt visiting
froa El Salvador.
DURATION: IS ainutas
LOCATION: OEOB
UNCLASSIFIFO
32
</28/86
"^ f
DATIi Thursday, May 1. 1916
J
TIMBi 11:30 a.B.-llilS a. a.
to ^1
LOCATION: WW
ATTBNDANCBi
3
jS SR "»
RBMARKa REQUIREOi None required
PRESS COVBRAGBi
1 *
Staff Photographer only a
COMMENTBi
SSI^b
Oon_Gregg_ 4313
CONTACTto)i „,
J L
CO r.r%r T.McSRIDt
c.rvLLta icrmvATiB M.M( R.SAILNK1T
r.RHtoow .psoas _ M.LXWU
o.cHcas T.COUAMOU S.MOC. . C. COM A WAT
S.CKAT a •TOE* O.OVCL1II-MIKO P.StADT
J.McINTtt CJVDOI usaaoi 0. 4C1CHO
j.rmctsjajt &V ALOIS
\\m ftQ^IFIFH
33
3&li^
UNtUSSIFe
82-692 0-88-3
34
Susan A. 'larrl;
, t.-.e am.
:efcre w.-.m -.-.e fcregci-g dsposit:.or. was takar., do r.erabv zartif/
:ha- r.-.e vit.-.ess v.'-.cse tastiJicr.y appears :.r. the fsrecoir.r ds = csi-i;:
counsel for, related to, nor eaplcyed by any of the parties to the
action in which this deposition was taken, and f'urther that Z a-Ts no:
NCTA.^:; ?V3i:
ONCIASSIFIED
35
mffs
M- $
021
Partially Declassified/Released on R-/T-37
under provisions of E,0. 12356
by N. Menan, National Security Council
URKASSIPir
DEPOSITION OF ADOLFO CALERO
Thursday, April 9, 1987
Opposition
Washington, D. C.
her direction.
COPIES
musswn
APPEARANCES:
PHIL BOBBITT
DEE BENSON
Counsel
KlASSlFe
38
39
P R C E£D I N G S
Whereupon,
ADOLFO CALERO
was called as a witness and, having been duly sworn by the
BY MR. LIMAN:
A Fifty-five in December.
Q You're a non-resident?
««WS«B
40
ggassster 4
had been for the last three years the spokesman for the
1982 and I could not come back because there were rumors
that they were after me. Apparently my name had been leaked
\SSWS»B
41
in Washington in February.
Q In February of 1983?
December of 1983 —
Q December of '82 or '83?
.WUiSSIEe
42
A '
Mil
82y §3?L '
tf>'g' V%
i
Vy fl^'t^fgctorate came up, the
Q What is that?
Q In the heart?
for about two months, and finally one of the members of the
A Yes.
1983, did the FDN still have both a military directorate and
a political-civilian directorate?
KIASSIFIED
43
ll««fflKT
Q And you joined the civilian directorate?
A No.
was at the head, was the chief of staff, but I would say
point.
yNCLASSIFIED
44
A
mws
My area of concentration was the political
8
believe, of 1982.
beginning ot"^%jf jF :^
mmmw
45
Q The CIA?
card.
:';0»i
Yi^jU
46
A I
mm^
don't know who did, but all I
10
that we were handed over whatever our needs were, and there
remember.
A Yes.
troops?
support .
imwssifiM.
47
IBlKfiBfc* 11
states Government.
A No.
payments?
military.
the money?
you --
nmWB
48
"
k^V«« 12
of the organization?
another ,
^^^^^^^^^1 also that we dealt with.
you that the directors were given also family support and
m^ssw
49
anyplace.
in Europe.
to the withdrawal of |
A No.
Q When did^^^^^^Hcome
A ^^^^^^^^Bcame in in 1983, but before^^^^^^^rame
in, when we came in as directors, let's say, there was
UNtussifia
. ))
50
ismi^w* 14
identification.
identification.
A Yes
DfMsra
51
Q
^mmm
And when were they prepared?
15
prepared?
were something that you prepared for the first time to give
KUSSW
52
16
taken out.
say yes.
expenditures.
A Yes.
A Yes.
Q And you can date that to the time that there were
BHCUSSIFIEP
53
mm\ 17
A Yes.
A Yes.
A Yes.
of the expenditures?
of records?
this was not drawn up every month. I mean, this was not
you received regularly that showed how much was being spent
ONCUSSlFiED
54
umssne 18
you have?
Q It's a report?
A Yes.
by .
^^^^^^^^^^^
Mr. Montes?
A Monthly.
reports?
A Sure.
UNClASSiREO
. .
S5
m^^to 19
correct?
A Yes.
A Concept, account.
A Yeah
of expense; am I correct?
A Yes.
is it?
A Yes.
other item?
DIUSSW
.
56
20
A ^^H^^^H
Q ^^^^^^^^M And that would be the family
here.
of maintenance of personnel?
A Yeah.
Then be the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B?
The ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwh i c h
let's see —
Q It's equivalent to|
A Yes.
Kiftssro
57
-i^cmie 21
is that?
A Yes.
States money.
in July of 1984.
A That's it.
A Ye4Kai#
Q And before that, before July of 1984, you also had
ptusa®
58
DinfiPftSisffir 22
A Yes.
States? ""**
earlier?
A Yes. -,--^^
Q Were you aware when you joined the FDN that the
Government?
\iimi®& 23
when you were told that there was doubt whether the United
funding?
A Yes.
Q Dispute?
mean, it was very obvious since 1983. And then came the
--
time in 1984 when there were no more funds voted, in June
May.
mm
60
mmw
States funds by May or June?
24
full year?
A Um-hum.
A Yes, definitely.
A Yes.
about, correct?
UNCUSSIFIED
61
Q
fi»
And you were told that the President of the United
A Yes.
other
one of the first that we saw about this and so many
Q He was retired.
'ijii/Ln^'
62
Yes.
North. ~=3«?
Q Independent Counsel?
correct?
him I
A Yes.
m
Washington were after that meeting
27
accompanying him?
A Yes.
continued or not^-***
bell at all?
was not --
aware of when the fiscal yea*~4B^-'*tJithe time. I
I mean, I had left the United States for such a long time.
wmsro
.
64
iHKCt^P 28
A No.
mining incident?
A No, after.
A Yes.
to say, but the thing was that, like I say, the way I
was like a pep talk, you know, that something would come
about
ones who are in bad shape. And we're the ones who have our
killed.
A Of course, of course.
Q Did they say that you still had the support of the
he wouldn't give up, that he would try and request again and
T^KiMitB 29
you were at a time when if the funds ran out you would have
question.
funding, correct?
A Definitely.
meeting^^^^^^^^H am I
A Yes.
A Correct.
\SWm«B
82-692 0-88-4
66
30
them?
we could fund our -effort, that we would get all the help
North?
said --
miAssw
67
iciiii
become a primary player in this thing. You see, I
31
would say
-- I mean, he became, after a couple of more meetings with
sometime.
meeting?
o n e ^^^^^^^^^Hy o u
Q Yes.
the top person in the group, yes. And there was someone
that meeting.
that meeting?
A I don't recall.
68
109 W^0SB 32
A No, sir.
place?
month?
A Yes.
33
bank.
A No, I don't.
remember correctly.
good news for you, that they had gotten some money?
UNWSSm
70
ymmm
money for us from, I believe,
that our men would have food, that our men would be able to
anything down. This war that I was in, you know, was
detail or to nothing.
which are the monthly balances for the six Calero accounts
the accounts that you had some authority over and they have,
as you will see, for each month the total amount of the
deposits and then the total disbursements, and then what the
balances were.
UMASSIFtfO
)
71
for identification.
is^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H in the
name °^^
The fourth account is
anothei
there was very little money that either went into the
UNCLASSIFIED
72
mm 36
A Yeah.
A Yes, sir.
million a month?
tell him how we were, what we were doing, what were our
73
And so
mMw
problems, what were everything.
General Secord?
A I don't remember.
Jackson Place?
Lafayette Park?
Q Yes.
UNCLASSIFIED
74
8t
times.
Q Where?
A In an office there.
Q And who was present when you would meet with him
at this address?
remember.
yNCUSSIFlEO
75
39
conference room.
A Yes.
after that met him in his office. So I don't know what the
accounts?
A It would be --
.nv
76
m«6»*® 40
say, there are things that I just simply did not attach that
KUSSW
77
fiMSffffiB 41
that.
government. I remember --
was asked.
recollection of my thoughts.
MR. PORTUONDO: Take your time and give the answer
events that occurred three years ago and that at the time it
wiftssife
.
78
memory and I
m^mn
don't mind his taking his time with his
42
answers.
the effort you are making and the records that you gave us.
A Oh , yes
KLUSSIFIED
79
43
Adaims.
the street from Lafayette Park, which is the park by the Hay
the Park itself are an entry for June 26, 1984, which is
when you were first told that money would be coming in?
met you at his office on June 25, 1984, and June 12, 1984.
A In Jackson Place?
B^||^,^|gAN: (Resuming)
MNMSSiFltO
.
80
44
number.
you gave him the account number and when the money first
came?
A No, sir.
coming from?
A No, sir.
state?
A No -T"-
the unit
45
accounts?
UIXULhOOIl ILU
A Then we started to buy all these things ourselves.
organization?
Q Tell me who.
A No, sir.
ammunition.
82
::i-
46
McCoy.
Q Colonel McCoy?
Equipment Company.
Q R&N?
the same time also I was speaking to General Secord, who had
from your records and maybe this will help put things in a
uNcussra
83
A Yes.
\,mMm , .w - 47
him what you needed, or did he find that out from the
commanders?
exactly was the first thing we bought from him, but we got a
UNCUSSIFIED
.
84
UMEMSSffil 48
or a broker?
Q Gretsch World?
A R&M Equipment. And it turned out, I found out
you needed?
A Bermudez
with Martin on what type of rifles you should buy and what
Martin on what type of rifles you should buy and what was a
fair price?
)-^: :. ..^-r.'
85
could be given credit and that the price was $300, which was
An oral report?
Yeah.
nnwssm
j
86
\m^^
Secord, were you seeking advice from Secord on weapons?
19, 1984. What was it for? Do you remember what your first
payment.
A Yes.
UNMSSlflEB
87
51
A Possibly in July.
Secord?
f rom^^^~
A Yes. He was not getting them directly; he was
shipment?
obtained.
^^^^^^^^^B o ne s ?
A Yes.
A Someone ir
1 .* .jLm>^
88
52
have read.
A I now know.
A Yeah.
meeting in the Hay Adams lobby with you, Rob Owen, Colonel
IMSSW
89
mu^wB 53
anc I
is _- well, I think I know who
Colonel North?
said, met him regularly. Whenever I came
A AS I I
iwssra
90
Q
mmm
Did you have any discussion that you can recall
54
position.
in
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1
Q What pictures?
O^W
.
91
55
accounts
that he used
Q Did Colonel North have a code name
with you?
A Yes, yes.
on Colonel North's
or he came to me with this proposal
do not remember. And I remember,
recommendation. I
was not
however, that the recommendation or the proposal
ONCLASSIflED
92
56
hiring an expensive --
Q An expensive PR firm?
A PR firm, yes.
Colonel North?
look like?
from Secord. How did you arrive at the price that you would
A No.
North would you tell him what you were paying for weapons?
himself.
ill^FIED
93
57
A No.
anything for us and all they would do was look after us, you
see.
to know how you were spending the money that he had raised
for you?
expenditures of money?
mmssfiffl
94
\S8(!fef^il
58
A Yes.
Q From memory?
A Yes.
him?
because it must have been after we got -- see, I did not put
Q And the big money was the $24 million that you got
exactly.
95
TfRtflSS*^ 59
accounting.
^ -^^^H|Bii^^^^elieve
Q And that showed how you were spending the money?
Q In equipment or in money?
but i-r
remember telling him, you know, we got so much money,
-- so many
remember telling him, giving him the handwritten
msM'B
96
Q
#^yP
Where do you remember giving it to him?
60
Q And did you observe that he then had that piece 'of
paper typed?
A No.
A No.
Q And what steps did you take to make sure that you
KIHSSIFO
97
wmim 61
secure?
A Yes.
don't you?
A Um-hum.
Lncc m
82-692 0-88-5
—
98
million a month.
lill»Hl
-— 62
A No one.
A No one.
told me that.
in your account?
BmmSSW
99
mmm
in February or March?
63
get between $15 million and $25 million, the one that I
notification from the bank that $24 million roughly had been
deposited?
surprised?
associated.
$24.5 million?
raise money.
mm /lecj
.
100
64
correct?
see.
down and put in a good order, becauf« the order we had put
prices, how did I know about prices. I will tell you how I
just remembered. - ^.
"*
Wft made a. bvfiHSt£^ '^"^
Q Who's "we"? -. —
^^^^^^^^^^^^^H made a budget!
mihmm
101
mm^
anmunition for about one-third of what the U.S.
-r; - ^.
'83 or beginning
will, it must have been prepared the end
of
Masterson?
A Masterson?
times.
Q For whom?
A For us.
r^nv
) )
102
66
A No.
A Not to my recollection.
for identification.
Counsel's office?
(Pause.
you can answer the question that's pending. And that is,
liillASSiFIED
)
103
«ERSS!FSD
you seen this before?
67
(Pause.
to you in writing?
it.
A Not to my recollection.
Steelhammer?
Q Fawn Hall?
uNMSsra
104
ll.Lftl
68
card.
Q other'^tharTthal?
Itnowledge of the contents but who can help carry out some of
105
m n h 69
vl« « courier?
I'm trying to z*mmiatfx if I •vmx got *ny document
A
front of them, it says: And now the best news of all. Next
between now and when the vote is taken and the funds are
turned on again.
M^SW
107
Q
mMWi
Were you told, Mr. Calero, that this money would
71
fact, for me I sort of felt bad when I didn't see any more
money coming.
Q Humanitarian aid?
anununition.
A Yes.
million in ammunition.
A Yes.
yN6LASS!F![B
) .
108
yiiSMEBT 72
A No.
A No.
that he was not satisfied with the way in which you had
for us.
IINCUSSIFIEO
.
109
A Yes.
DieswT 73
going to you and you then paying Secord or Singlaub for the
A No , no
A No.
Q And were you ever told that an air strip was going
to be built
to do with.
Q But, Mr. Calero, the one thing you knew was that
-nui^
no
•.;W
A No.
A No , sir.
A Not to my knowledge.
drops of weapons?
getting.
weren't paying?
UNCLASSIFIED
Ill
Dimi^ffiii 75
used to be experienced.
Q Did you ask who was dropping this out of the sky?
A No.
question, please.
any comment?
was.
after about the summer or fall of '85. I did not see him
UNCLASSIFIED
)
112
76
at 1:30?
go -- I
same day.
UNCUSSIRED
H *#».-. wr
)
113
77
AFTERNOON SESSION
(1:30 p.m.
Whereupon,
ADOLFO CALERO,
follows:
this document?
for identification.)
exhibit, Mr. Liman, Mr. Calero and I have talked over lunch
say it and he can confirm it, and you can follow up on it.
whether or not North ever told him who was paying for the
limSSlflED
114
mmm
North meetings, he does recall a
78
met there or if we came out of the place and sat at the park
BY MR. LIMAN:
events that occurred years ago and you've had many, many,
that.
was said?
UNCWSSIFiED
115
mmmi
problem, always. Today we have the same thing.
79
And they
were to deliver stock that we had to deliver inside
Nicaragua.
would be dropping?
Captain Cooper was the manager of the whole thing and he was
there. And he was the one who would fly the plane. But I
UNCUSSIFIED
116
80
from Secord.
Q Of what year?
A Of '85.
others?
A No , sir.
wussm
I
117
81
sake meeting.
A Yes.
Q October of '84.
lunch?
we felt, how things were, the long way we had come. You
walk that you had with Colonel North in LafayetCe Park other
UNWSSSe
118
82
Office Building was on the other side of the park, and I was
States Government?
Q No recollection?
As you can see from the items listed there, there were not
very many items that we had to get, you know. It was not a
UNDUSSffl
119
83
Q That is?
Q That's Secord?
arms because I had heard a lot about the arms dealers and
arms merchants.
recommended?
A I checked on McCoy.
had met.
Q Through North?
into this type because I had read a lot about these arms
120
DiPiWe^ 84
dealers that were, you know, not very good people and all of
"-
mean, I had a lot of confidence, blind trust, in him.
more contact I had with him, the more I appreciated him and
liked hiffl.
UNWSSiaED
121
you know.
mmm
So if you compared the two,
said. General
with the way that the FDN was running its operation? -
him that I was going to buy some rifles and some things from
going to get them for us, and I told him the price. He told
impossible.
W?l
122
UNSBlMir 86
price?
few items.
did I get those? That must have been it. But the rounds
rounded.
HNtUSSW
I
123
ymssra
87
delivered to you?
A To us, yes.
H^^Hl That's
Right.
iWSSffl
124
August, I believe.
Q In August?
A Yeah.
sealift.
arriving?
A I have no --
airlift one, airlift two, sealift one and sealift two are
iwsssffl
125
wmm^
all Secord purchases, correct?
89
A Yes, sir.
A Yes.
independent?
put that down or not. This was taken off from something
handwritten by me.
A Through.
KUSSifiEB
126
iiNai^f^ 90
from^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l fron
the Sandinistas.
take.
understand it you used the money that had come into your
A Yes.
91
the fact that it was such a good price that, you know, I
of weapons during that period after you had run out of money
nea^M*^|^^gBmnV^V^«HMWi=lMf^^e«lse the
\iHtmsm
128
92
A I'd sure love to. I wish you had them. I'd sure
we had been told that the Hinds had these heat deflectors.
So, you know, we were thinking about blowpipes. But the SA-
they would call them, start of the art, the latest Soviet
WmSintB
129
mm \m^
$160,000.
93
A Well --
Q Or anyone else?
AndMH^H
And^^^^^H But he wasn't given the support.
Which government?
From this government, the U.S. Government.
UNCLASSiriED
130
94
the money.
cut out?
him.
words, no.
liberation forces?
I say, I'm buying from one. I went and bought from the
KUSSW
131
9S
what you thought at the time. Did you associate the end of
the funding with the fact that you had done business with
Singlaub?
in May?
have been April 26, 1985, which would have been $2 million.
WIKSSW
132
mm
You know, they gave me an account number and the
96
that you mention it is the first time that that has come up.
Q With money?
were.
some-odd to
isii^ssro
133
97
convenient way and we were not charged for them by the bank.
him?
^^^ bac)<^^^|
him. And then ^'^^l^^^^l ^"^ °" '"^
reporters who, you know, said what do you say about the gun
money.
resigning and Colonel North being fired. And that was very
Q SIGNET?
98
pray to God that everything will turn out all right. And I
come out all right and God bless you. Via con Dios, he
would say all the time, via con Dios. And then that's the
because it's not against the law, but I have not done at.
NCLASSiFlEO
135
99
that.
exactly.
believe.
Q When?
President.
then we met him again after the vote when he told us --you
UNClftSSinfil
136
HgSSCIHET
y 100
too sure. And then I think we lost the vote -- no, no, when
we lost the vote in 1986, because soon afterwards we won the
vote.
A Yes.
Poindexter?
A No, 1984.
yNMSSlFIED
137
m^WB 101
remember that he was
A It was in January?
Q Yes.
Q January of 1984?
A I met him in January 1984, and then I saw him
again here once, twice, three times. When we saw the
President the first time he was there. Then I don't know if
I met him before or after I met with him.
must have told him our needs. Oh, yes. But that was --
\^ vyhi"
138
lA^iJ 102
meetings?
WUSSifO
139
mmm 103
1984J
asking him for help, and he said well, we'll see. You know,
a situation ^l^^^^^^m^^^^^^^^l
104
to do business.
that point.
an end.
you know.
A Oh, yes.
that the CIA hadn't warned you that these helicopters were
arriving?
E'LllSSire
141
rGBMStfiED
P
105
CIA and that the CIA only served their own purposes and
that
they would want to snoop on u*i^nd try to find out what we
were doing and whatgJrfe were thinking even, and that they
would give us no help at all?="^^
sympathetic to you?
would see them there, and we knew they were there, and we
knew that they were building the airport in Punta Wette and
that when that airport in Punta Wette was built that had
UNClASSiFIED
142
106
t '-J ^
But we didn't have the expertise. Yes, we talked.
This I know for a fact, that we never did, we never did any
or just —
Q Did Colonel North ever tell you that he couldn't
law?
Q On the edge?
was trying to --
UNCLASSIFIED
143
of comment?
A You see, sir, again I did not come up and say give
quest7~aflfa there are many ways to skin a cat, like you say,
DNCiSSaB
144
108
go off.
it would not go forward with the arms sale that had been
A No.
obstacles?
talk with General Secord about the end users. The end users
UNCLASSIFIED
))
145
SECRET 109
I
if you gained power in Nicaragua?
has to comply --
(Laughter.
comment.
Branch.
( Laughter .
WUSSIflEO
.
146
110
here. I visitec
A I went t
received front the Sovl«c Unioiu Did you jyer make a trip to
ealivd
Q Blowpipes?
more expensive.
DNWSSife
147
the launch^
was ^^^^^^^H
Q What happened!
Q Who?
money ts
Q If
accounts?
\1E11SSW
148
M0^^
Do you remember when that was?
112
December of '84?
Yeah.
He in^^^H?
He was in^^^H. This FDN man had already made
I
had offered. As I told you before, I used to tell
A Oh, yes.
limASSIFIED
149
113
asking him what could be done about that.
Oliver North?
A No.
mjBsatttT
114
Q Wavering?
Q Evasive?
but more for his information, I could tell, rather than for
with him?
:iiUSSIFI[D
151
iimmrn 115
high seas?
Q Or at least seize.
mrnma
152
iji&fSW 116
will tell you why I have problems and you will laugh at this
for identification.)
have seen -
A I don't remember exactly these, but I
A Yes.
Q In Virginia?
A In Virginia.
iClASSife
153
117
user certificates?
Q In Europe?
Q Did he tell you that Clines was the person who had
getting fron
uNWSsro
154
T0Rb£g88gTL 118
A No, sir.
Q With Clines?
office?
Q A CNP meeting?
— in Palm Beach.
activities?
said no, I don't remember. I've read about that. I've read
UNCUSSIFIED
155
119
about it.
ammunition?
A No.
Secord as being the one who bought them, and I remember then
weren't very happy about the small planes because, you know.
yNCL»M
156
W^^
they were very weak things.
120
them, of course.
*
Q But they were delivered; am I correct?
location.
planes?
eiL4SS!FIED
157
SSfi* 121
two of them.
best planes for what we wanted them, you know, that they
Cooper operation?
ONCLASSiFlEO
158
Q
mBm'
And who told you that?
122
benefactors?
A No, sir.
delivered in 1986?
A No, sir.
123
'85, was it --
purchases?
that.
nntussw
160
124
$30 million?
your forces?
over.
Q $1.5 million?
money?
July of '86 and November -- July and October, when the $100
to operate.
liiffiinssife
161
TOP
125
some money,
'.
^yijiiLlssit
wljai^y^j^iU'Wd' ^ITct^ from --
Q Miller?
A Miller, yes. Channel Miller associated things.
And that's how we kept alive. And then we had made a
not $27 million was what was needed for this humanitarian
relief project?
A I don't remember.
126
improved.
our troops?
period that you were getting it you were able to feed your
troops?
A Oh, yeah.
Q Now you were saying that you will need money- after
see.
Channel Miller and money that had been made on the exchange
differential.
A No, no.
HNf,U.SSir£5
163
f Ti
WB 127
$50,000 from phone calls that I made. And that was paid to
no, Ann Stone. And $75,000 that checks that were made did
not pass through our account, checks that were paid directly
to the ^^
Q Did you ever ask the NHAO office to provide you
you know, he could help us out and we did use him as a sort
wicussire
164
he saw down there, and apparently they were close. That was
was not asked, and I said "we" --me and the other two men,
r\VJ\
c%A'i
165
129
A No. I did not look to him for military advice.
Q Who did you think had raised that $24 million you
came from, but who did you think had raised it-?
got.
-w 130
from?
A No, sir.
feeling.
Q Secord?
5r whatever.
Q
A Well, I've read his name.
took it
167
131
confidence in Singlaub.
A Yes.
A Yes.
A Yes.
A Yes.
other hand, you know, this did not happen over a long period
Q But the money was fast and the orders were fast.
mm
had to wait to see if more money would come in, and that is
why you see that the payment was made later, you know.
132
it
know.
you know.
A Yes.
North schedule?
mumm
.
169
ommm
against the wall and say -- because, you know, I
133
had respect
for the person -- and I didn't say you are making a profit.
Q Mr. Calero, was Secord with you when you gave the
schedule?
A No , no
A From Secord.
Q From Secord?
here was from memory, but this was detailed. And this was
m
THE WIUJESS; llSt a i i^ 1 i f t
ft
;
170
^
iiiui.i fix
134
number two, the sealift number one, and the sealift number
A Yes.
UNCLASSIFIED
171
WǤ
dealing with General Singlaub.
sr
135
North?
wussire
.
172
mm\ 136
to.
A No , no
transmitted to you?
the time.
$27 million.
UNClKSlFitli
173
m,m3! 137
The military?
Q Just recently?
A Yeah.
Q Your lawyer?
had come from Lake Resources and that was the company that
received, did you know that $200,000 was deposited? Did you
ONCLASSIflED
174
138
A Yes.
from?
and Channel himself, and I told him myself many times and
so that was a lot of money that was not covered by the NHAO.
company called
^^^^^^^^^^^^H is a
175
Q
A
Money broker?
m
Money broker, yes.
_^
FT
139
A Yes.
A Yes, sir.
Q And RM Equipment?
found since, you know, when I asked him why was that -- I
commission or something.
AndHH^H^^B?
He was an agent?
176
A
mmm
He was an agent of ours, yes.
140
Q And Hondu?
A Hondu Carib?
Q Yes.
Q Front Line?
Q DIACSA?
transfers.
Q And Genesco?
A Fowler?
Q Forest.
$65,000?
UNCLASSJHEG
177
um^fflT 141
Q ^Hjj^^Hj ^^^^^
^^^^^^^^His an ^^'^I^^^I^^B '^^° also
Pastora was crazy and there was nothing going to happen over
Q ODOM Aircraft?
$432,000.
payment?
Swiss bank.
ILni.!"U'
178
ymm
one that went first tc land ther
142
transferred
it.
Q To Secord?
January?
UNCLASSIFIED
179
yNsasw^T 143
uncomfortable.
A Yeah.
Singlaub?
was not going to go through, you know, that that was going
to fall.
A ^SBP^ow, yeah.
another one.
Q Gadd?
A Gadd. _.. -* -
UNCLASSIFIED
180
w&isam 144
them?
Q To buy? :^ - -
^s
A To buy airplanes or to lease — bi^^or lease
airplanes. -^
Q - Did you have money at that*ljne?
A No. So nothing ceune of it. And then at one time,
at the NHAO office, I met a man who had planes, who did
something for NHAO and who seemed very familiar with Central
Gadd, could have been Dutton, could have been someone «lse,
too.
was. Another one was for uniforms. And then I sent money
So we also paid.
North?
Q Yes.
C!
181
\mWt^ 145
question until now, when you bring it up. I gave him money
Q How much?
$40,000.
Q Travelers checks?
A Yes. ^
Q And how would you check when you paid that to him?
A How what?
gave it?
Q Yes.
A In his office.
UNCLASSIFIED
.
182
146
in Lebanon?
A Pardon?
freedom --
hostages , yes
A No.
SMSSiFIE
183
UNeuts^iiOET
147
Q Today or tomorrow?
A No.
records here. I've not dealt with any real person, but, by
because
our case, it was necessary to have various accounts
one
we had to be very careful to not put all the eggs in
transfer
very big bank, so we felt okay, then better we
U'
.
184
Iji^feliittr
148
^^^ because ^^^^^H were where our men had the most access
accounts in banks I
closed down.
But it's usually for businessmen to have, but that
any questions?
BY MR. BALLEN:
(account?
account
Q Did Colonel North at any time ask you to deposit
UHCLHSSIFIEO
' . .
185
So it was dropped.
to North -- did he —
-*
I,
Mft' ^attijBBMMMfcJiiill, he told you that money was going
the money?
with the hostages. And my answer was, you know, this money
\mimm 150
record for.
to do wit^
indirectly for^^^H
THE WITNESS: So it came to me. You see, you
Uba 'j-fe---
187
151
NHAO --
NHAO people.
NHAO?
it to NHAO.
Rafael ^aiiLMH.) ?
mmmm "^-'^^'^^
188
if
MW
r met him before
before in Miami, but
or if he had been introduced to me
--my
Q Yes.
Secord?
A No.
A '84 or '85.
IINCUSSIFIEO
189
153
yes.
Q Which was?
154
from Secord?
yes, but remember that I had said before that there were
shipped?
they had arrived and I was told yes, that they had arrived.
shipped.
or later? - i*
Mmi^
.
191
155
4 , maybe
aware that those grenades and the C-4 and maybe another
was f rom^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Band
[into Nicaragua. Is that correct?
INCLASSIRED
192
156
had all their operations and all their people, they had
aware.
Oh, yeah.
OiSlilSSIFIED
193
157
those boats.
Sandinistas?
A Boats that had been purchased by the Sandinista
purposes.
Uh'CLASSIflED
194
158
159
Ramon Medina?
in a very long time. The last time that I was there was on
l^-'lUiflC^filr:/! 5-ri
196
mmmrn 160
went from the airport to a hotel and from the hotel to the
airport.
Wa a^^^^^^^^^^^^Ha t
that meeting?
and Nicaraguans.
linl
A No.
remember.
n*)ull III
197
^mmm 161
162
from^^^^^^H
Q Do you recall any discussion prior to that
to you?
you he told me, that price, $160,000 for these three state-
163
Singlaub?
.^e gotl
came to teach our people the use of those SA-7s that had
been manufactured^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^f
MR. LIMAN: And the instructor was provided by
Secord?
Secord?
.
200
yHuLnOuM 164
her?
got for us. I think somehow she let her company name be
money
recall?
given him the first one that I ever had, and then I must
have given him another one and another one so he'd have a
choice.
201
fSiHSEriiP 165
million?
everything.
A Yeah.
llHWSSffl
. -
202
oiHs^ia 166
it?
Q Who did you hear from here that was upset about
to begin with.
hear from that was upset about it -- "up here" being the
U.S. Government?
recall
ONCLASSIFIED
203
KM^IfJOfiir 167
supplies?
don't give each other orders, you know. We have taken their
it before.
Tiissasi*
204
mRmmi 168
Q 1986.
I could have told Colonel North about it. I could have told
with Mr. Abrams, although, yoxx teiow, you talk about one
which one you didn't and when and who did you tell it first
to. And it's difficult.
A Yeah, sure.
accounts?
A No.
A No.
A No.
Q No bribes?
lINCUSSSfiED
. t
205
^^^^^^^^^1 a 1 s o
Q There were certain credits that I don't know
whether they concern the Miller part of it. You might just
it up.
wmm\ 170
that's from?
could be from --
Q From Singlaub?
someone?
A $48,000?
Q $770.
A $48,770.
ONCLASSIFIEO
207
yi'WIiEIBftT 171
order ofl
A No.
Do you know?
UNCUSSifiED
— •- » »-. J
)
208
172
of finished?
for identification.
wuissra
209
iim*^*
BY MR. LIMAJM: (Resumimg)
173
you?
reading it, but I'm reading it now. It's very clear that
A Um-hum.
document?
174
obtained?
A By a friend of ours.
Q Who?
A ^^^^^HHi
Q All of them?
m\t
211
mmij 175
unsigned?
A Unsigned.
A Yes.
BY MR. PARRY:
those weapons out as needed and pay for them as they needed
the weapons.
weapons?
UNtUSSI 3 U:
212
vHMmm 176
with^^^^
MR. LIMAN: We're not suggesting there was
anything illegal.
questions that Mr. Parry was going to ask of you, you were
have done, and some of our people did take some of those
A Yeah.
yNCUSSif
213
177
know?
for that?
it's the government people that have not wanted to buy any
buy them?
i^t^jiitrn
riili
214
UNt^AgiJfe 178
that you weren't buying weapons from him that he had stored
material there.
weapons. The prices are very, very reasonable, and they are
"^^^P^*" "^
there.
darn good price. The best price that we could get from the
price. ,
have no ideology.
Indian wars, you know, that you had -- that they were
buying weapons if you had the money, even though you had
this early inventory.
THE WITNESS:
Iwe bought
mean, all our troops now have AK rifles except for the
remaining FALs and D-3s that some of them still carry. But
.T'jr"
fiC^^iVl
«Uob\
)
216
ufftenSiiS© 180
A Clutch?
Q Or Spark?
A Spark?
A No.
deposition ceased.
, 1987.
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
UNCUSS
217
CflUo £i^l
^ pas
L<^M\ei)
^\
ToTBL
Ex 00004 -&X00O ISA
218
lb pas
5101
219
^pn.'^')
UNcussm E X ooooi
MONTHLY BALANCES FOR
THE SIX CALERO ACCOUNTS
(as of 4-06-87)
06-83
07-83
08-83
09-83
10-83
11-83
12-83
01-84
02-84
03-84
04-84
05-84
06-84
07-84
08-84
09-84
10-84
11-84
12-84
01-85
',\:-
V-tV^i'-)
"
•
31'
...-
UNCLASSIRED
220
UNCUSSIFIED 00004
UNCIASSIHED
221
O
UNCIASSIHED
MONTHLY BALANCES FOR
THE SIX CALERO ACCOUNTS
(as of 4-06-87)
01-87 80,264.67
UNCUSSIHED
222
i^a r^
ONCLASSiFIED
/
My Friend;
tx-
UNCLASSIFIED Cril f- V
c
223
mmsm
N 6389
This new money will provide great flexibility we have not enjoyed
to date. I would urge you to make use of some of it for my
British friend and his services for s pecial o perations. I can
grcduca him at the end of this mont
IINCUSSIFIED
224
ICLASSra
6Z90
Warm regards,
Steelhamner
\lHtm»^
225
^ Af^ 96-
ONCLASSIFIED
As cf April 9,
Quantity
Independent Acquigition
G-3 riflei
Magazlnei
Round* 7.6 2 x SI
Rounds 7.62 x SI
Band grenades
- February 198S
Blmni grenades
60mni grenades
cal API
5
Rounds 7.62 x
Rounds 7.62 X
cRiurrage Ins., etc.
Rounds 7.62 x 39
RPG-7 grenades
Hand grenades
60nun mortars
C-4
Fuses and detonators
G-3 rifles
G-3 magazines
Cleaning kits
60mm grenades
SO cal links
Demurrage, Ins., etc.
Scalift «1 - April Arrival
RPG-7 rockets
Rounds 7.62 x 39
Rounds 7.6 2 x SI
Belt* for 7.62 x
SA-7 launchers
SA-7 rockets
M-79 grenades
s . , and other exp
M-79 grenades
./y> -
J^-r
UNCLASSIFIED ..
226
UNCLASSIFIED
Item
Cost
N
Rounds 7.62 X 39
6409
Rounds 7.62 x 51
Rounds linked 7.62
Hand grenades 51
M-79 grenades
60mm grenades
61mm grenades
6 2mm grenades
Ri'G-7 rockets
Claymore nines
50 cal API
12.7 ammo
57mm recoiless rifles
3 7mn ammo
Anti-tank mines
G-3 rifles
'rif«"in9 kits
»v^ rifles
AK
G-3 magazines
AK magazines
K magazines
Hv'^^"*
*'"79 launchers
9mm pistols
AK-39 links or
belts
Uniforms
Boots
Radio and comm equip
Air and ground transp
Military gear
Aid to southern
Aid to Misuras front
Food, family asst
upkeep of base
camps, air force
hospitals, etc.
Political activity -
offices in various
countries and cities,
travel, p.j- '
Acquisition two
transp airplanes
UNCUSSIFIED
227
N 10596
As of April 9, 1985
UNCIASSIHED
FDN Expenditures and Outlays
Quantity Cost
Independent Acquisition
G-3 rifles
Magazines
Rounds 7.6 2 x 51
Rounds 7.62 x 51
Hand grenades
81nun grenades
60nun grenades
^jLfcd--.J) 5 C'l API
Rounds 39
Rounds 51
Demurrage, Ins., etc.
Rounds 7.62 x 39
RPG-7 grenades
Hand grenades
60nun mortars
C-4
Fuses and detonators
G-3 rifles
G-3 magazines
Cleaning kits
60mir. grenades
50 cal links
'raight, 0«murrage, Ins., etc.
M-79 grenades
UNCIASSIHED
)
228
UNCIASSIHED N 10S57
FDN Expenditures and Outlays
July 1984 through February 1985 (Cont'd. . .
Rounds 7.62 x 39
Rounds 7.6 2 x 51
Rounds linked 7.62 x 51
Hand grenades
M-79 grenades
SOnun grenades
Slmin grenades
8 2nun grenades
RPG-7 rockets
Claymore mines
50 cal API
12.7 ammo
S7mm recoileis rifles
57mm ammo
Anti-tank mines
G-3 rifles
G-3 cleaning kits
AK rifles
G-3 magazines
AK magazines
Swedish K magazir.es
HK-21 machine guns
RPG-7 launchers
M-79 launchers
9mm pistols
AK-39 links or belts
C-4
Fuses and detonators
Deposit paid
Estimated cost
Miscellaneo-.:s Expenses Since July 1934
Uniforms
Boots
Radio and coma equip
Air and ground transp
Military gear
Aid to southern front
Aid to Hisuras
Food, family asst,
upkeep of base
camps, air force
hospitals, etc.
Political activity -
offices in various
countries and cities
travel, p.r.
Acquisition two
transp airplanes
UNCLASSIFIED
229
hi f^t^
lINCUSSIflEO
N 71 E5
la de febrero de 1,925.
Ser.ores:
=ate.
4^
uNcwssra
230
UNCLASSIFIED
N 7190
1H de febrero de 1,955.
Ser.ores:
INZSGY RZS0U3CES INTERNATIONAL
iJ^OKaple Ave. East
Viena, Va. 22180.,
Ser.ores:
cribirae atenteimente.
UNCLASSIFIED
231
UNCLASSIFIED
f^ 7191
14 de rebrero de 1,985.
S.aores:
ENZ3GY RZSCUHCIS INTESKATIONAL
4A0 Maple Ave. East
Viena, Va. 22180.
,
aer.ores:
umsw
232
UNCUSSiFiED
N 7192
14 de febrero de 1,985.
Sef5ores:
£:tZHGY H3SCUHCiS IKn3JN'ATI0NAL
44-0Maple Ave. East
Viena, Va. , 22180.
UNCLASSIFIED
233
UNCLASSIFIED
N 7195
iu de febrero de 1,985.
|3?.g"rZ3C'JHC£S INTEa-N'ATLVAL
t-aO .".aple Ave. East
Viena, Va. , 22180.
t
^^^. dirisiios a ustedes, Para_5a3irestarles
:-o.
deta-l^e^||^
que^por^.f!"
se. a -ei
se
"l-ste-^al que a contir.uacicnIjercito ^^^K^^^^j -'
t--^~3 -ara uso exclusive del si^nJo]
rrreex^ortalo ai veclido a otro pais,
destine fir.al:
A. 3,000 E^ar.adas ?-^-7.
B. ICO laizagraaadas RPS-/.
UNCLASSIFIED
234
yNCLASSlFIED
N 7194
14 de febrero de 1,985.
Senores:
Hi'iRGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL
^440Maple Ave. East
Viena, Va., 22180.
Ser.ores:
mm«B
235
mimm
N 7195
1* de rebrero de 1,985.
Senores:
£:JI-^GY RiSOURCES IXTESNATIONAL
**0 Maple Ave. E»st
Viena, Va. , 22180.
oenores:
ao flaal.
cribirae ateotamente.
236
yNCUSSIFIED
N 7196
1A de febrero de 1,985.
Senores:
ENERGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL
iUtOMaple Ave. East
Viena, Va. 22180.
,
Sei5ores:
cribirae ateataaente.
llNMSIflEO
237
ONCLASSIFIEO
N 71^
14 de febrero de 1985-
Sencrss:
i;os dirigimos a ustedes, para saniiestarles que por e_s'
mimm
238
M AR 000057
CEBTIPICACIOg DE DESTINO PINAL
28 da noTiembre de 1,984.
UNCLASSIFIED
'7 ?..;.•
239
uriginai
ffiRKSSIRBIEWORl)'
Stenographic transcript of
HEARINGS
Before the
... ^,
Washington. r^/-
D.C lyMIA Katkmi
^^^?Ly<«. ^
Security Coufld
SEONEr^SMBVVORD
(202) 628-9300
240
241
UNWSIEI
1 TESTIMONY OF
*^-^ONiOSOtt)
UWUiSllED
:
242
UtttiWIED
1 APPEARANCES
2 On behalf of the Senate Select Coninittee on Secret
25 Washington, D. C. 20036
uiwsiFe
243
>imwvi\
1
244
245
liNBtftSStBEO
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 SENATOR RUDMAN: If you would remain standing,
7 KjJ
]^||^^H|H|||| ^
10
18 A I decline to answer. ^
19 SENATOR RUDMAN: |Him^m ^ ^'^ going to
y "ic
246
8 under 18 U.S. Code Section 6005 (c) to defer this order for
9 20 days from the date of the Select Committee's request
22 order.
SiflEB
247
1 Aubrey E.
WMSB
Robinson, Jr.
7 gives you iDmunlty that tha lav allows and wa can now
14 order as wall.
15 (Tha document referred to was
17 for identification.)
25 Committee hearing.
lfi«EtH5S»e
248
UNeUWED
X BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming)
2 Q ^mUH^IV "^ know from the records
3 we have reviewed and %he witnesses we have interviewed
14 role was?
15 A To briefly describe it — I think we'll get
16 into it and we'll get into it certainly as my testimony
mmm
essentially to maintain contact with these people over
249
\j\\^tfSSttit^
1 whom w« had questlonabl* control at any time during thair
13 action activities,]
14
15
So, it was sort of keeping them
16
at what their
17 all together and keeping them looking
of Nicaragua,
18 primary objective was, the democratization
19 rather than —
and to keep them apart when
conflicts
23 different situation.
time did we
24 would say that virtually at no
I
\ll«8lfltB
250
\l#NWtB
1 Influanc* on than, but I was abl* to do so only to th«
2 extent that ^Hallowed it.
3
lSPIBT
251
1
\HWe^W
And, by radio h« would exercia* his — h«
10
17 political situation.
yimstfiED
252
ORD 11
2 position of Pastora.
3 Now Pastora vae the nonlnal leader. The
4 commanders inside had a dialogue with him by radio and so
5 forth, but in terms of Dllltary operations it was the
UNUmED 12
9 '
A Y*S/ he was.
13 when he left, but for the most part while I was there,
14 yes.
16 Station^"
17 A Hell, one likes to think that I was the best
20 Chief of Station?
ymsstfiEB
254
u 13
4 attack on Pastora.
1
itMWO
but It was mora of a casa of compassion on Pastora's part
14
^
7 Q
12 July of 1984?
23 Station in July that the CIA money was running out and
24 the CIA was not going to supply the Contras again for at
lirtfSIED
256
IS
8 assumed command.
9 . Q Did you have any discussions with Dewey
10 Clarridge prior to becoming Chief of Station as to how
11 the Contras were going to be supplied once you got down
12 there?
13 A No, no.
25 and that Negro and Pastora and the others would seek
iL
257
UNGUSSiED 16
9 , A No.
23 I saw may have been the DDO, Clair George, and I don't
lINCllSSStfltD
.
258
^iftmms 17
9 Station to discuss
12 future
14 A Yes, he was.
16 A Yes, he was.
17 Was^^^^^^^^^^^^B at the
20 th«r«. ,
^"^WSSIflFB
259
UNa 18
15 answer is yes.
16 Q Who else was at that meeting that was not in
17 the CIA?
19 Q Anyone else?
1 they did.
mumm 19
3 A Yes.
12 know, the fact that he was there did not seem unusual. I
llNttASStflfD
|
261
20
1 A No, sir.
4 A Yes.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
262
f^^ ^1 ^ ^^
^^J/Bd J
/) /4Z^
263
UNClASSra 24
5 him?
7 people.
12
16 at the time.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
264
;2b
1A^
f.
JJ^aJ/sD i^
'To >'^i^
265
UWWSIflED 26
10
11
12
14 w« ovar^^^^^^^^^H aspects,
15 rsmambsr bacausa that was tha thing I'd raally bonad up
2: troops?
24 overviews.
IJNttRSStflED
266
27
4 A No.
UNWSIflED
|
267
28
uNfiWSStffEfl
1 Q Had you conc«iv«d of your plan to separate
3 A No.
10 it the FDN
14 be — meaning that
15 I the FDN out of ^^^^^Band the ARDE
m*WB
268
29
4 leaders.
10 was!
23 that because it was the first time that the south had
24 ever had any kind of rapprochement with the north, with
25 the FDN, and obviously for political reasons this brought
UNttASStFIED
269
UNKAWEO 30
15 plan.
22 with them and that then that idea and the fact that
I
n.i
.
270
I
AOCIfltft
1 political typasJ
9 moment
14 go to this morning.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
271
10
11
12
13
14
15
to giv. status,
16 W. w.r. c.rtainly trying
status, to UNO. It was, aft.r all, th«
17 political
Nicaraguan r.sistanc. By
18 uBbr.lla organization of th.
Past ora a, a
19 th. sa». to)c.n, wstill had to deal with
disruptiv^nd^^dual
20 tang.ntial, influential,
21
22
23
24
on. hand trying to
25
NOW her. w. are on. th.
272
1
iiNetwe
raise the political status of UNO to say that it really
33
12 organizati
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
.
273
UNClASSIflED 34
6
And with Pastora, the
11 objectives?
14 objectives to you?
THE WITNESS: Well, some of them I initiated
15
17 cable.
23 A Well, sure
24
25
^H^B^^
274
35
9 over, two and one half years had God knows how many
14 even say, hey, we'd like to resurrect this old idea, and
21 bring out one piece of paper and try to say, you know,
22 did you have a plan —
23 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming)
25 an idea.
OWSStflEO
275
36
llNCtl«HI
1 A In my vi«v it was a concept bacaus* Pastora
6 commanders to break away from him and unite with the FDN
7 forces?
11 came out, three or four of them did, and they were of. one
17 heard they came out. They did in fact meet with Negro
Alfonso Robelo^^^H^^H|^|HH^^^^|^H^^^^H
^H^^^^^^Hjm The discussions, they
I'NfitSSSfflED
276
UNWSINil 37
11 out —
12 MR. LIMAN: What did you find out?
n
277
1 about.
W4ssn 38
4 am.
6 that understanding.
18 Chamorro and what did you find out about the commitment
19 for supplies?
um;!iiEo
278
UNGlASSIflED 39
15 suffer.
21 the commanders.
itJ
I
279
40
1
M^aSIWD
lethal aid at that point.
15 then, you know, a negative vote and you are down again.
21
'
extraordinary good faith, they decided to bring
then
22 Chamorro's troops with them back inside, or take
41
1
UNmSStFtED
BARBADORO:
BY MR. (Resuming)
6 point?
yiraranED
281
42
12 We can't give you guns and bullets but at least you will
43
21 humanitarian aid?
22 A Well, they were already in the field. They
23 had been there since 1982, and they said, as they still
24 say to this day, that with our help or without our help,
mmm
283
UNCUiSSIHED 44
3 was it not?
4 A Yes.
6 A We mediated it.
7 Q Who is we?
12 Chamorro.
15 mediated.
/I
.
284
45
llNOtftS«
1 Q Was there anything said to them about how they
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
!M1
•'Nl
285
46
iiNStftSSlflEB
1 no way to gat it in and that was tha onca you got it
3 it north.
16 south^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l
17 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H than
18 have bean from their own.
20 whereby they took — the easy path was taken. Sure, they
\imm"i^
286
47
9 they could have made it all the way down and all the way
10 back.
22 funds.
UNet.ill^lED
287
UNCLASSIFIED 48
6 all went back. One or two may have stayed behind to get
10 '
A The private benefactors, to the best of my
16 medicine that they needed and tha food that they needed?
17 •
A •
Well, wa gave them — I know when Negro
23 had been in since 1982 and they had done without, with
IfflttAmiED
288
UNGIiA^IEiJ 49
21 benefactors?
23 believe.
lEtASStFIED
289
UNfiWriED 50
4 Q Do you?
5 A Oh, yeah.
13 agreement that had been signed among what we now call the
14 non4aligned commanders, as to distinguish them from the
15 ARDE commanders and Negro Chamorro.
16 I was on the phone frequently with North, but
25 people ina
"imiKm
290
umASStnED SI
15 A Ko.
16 '
Q NO? You tell B« the date.
21 A Before.
It!
NttJCTIED
291
52
y
1 A To the best of my recollection, yes. Again, I
3 conmanders.
5 benefactors.
7 something.
15 supplies?
23 wanted to make.
1
UmWE
humanitarian assistance and the communications
53
13 the commanders when the drop was expected, and how they
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
293
\o^^ Sr te S/
^aJ/BV Ja)
/O K^L-
294
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
13
19
22 Rica? ^
23 A August of 1985?
24 Q Yes.
iiiraiss
295
/o /4^
296
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
19 A y«s, correct.
24 A Immediately
25
297
UNOAfflED 62
3 his mission in Costa *Rica was tha — what was it? -- was
8 A Yes.
10 '
A Colonel North.
12 told hlB?
13 A I don't
14
20 A No.
24 A Yes.
!INiro!F!ED
298
63
1
OmfflED
front in southern Nicaragua consistent with the
4 and I'm not sure what my thought was then, but this is my
15 understood it to mean.
limSStflED
299
10 '
A Th« Ambassador was wall awara of my efforts to
12 Pastora.
urawiE!)
300
X
wmmm
so forth and so on. But I can't specifically remember it
65
4 iTambs and I
8 with the ball and sometimes before you could reach out to
9 him and pull him back in, he had done something or other
11 brainstorming.
16 essential in my view.
17 Q Did you ever tell that to anybody?
23 know.
66
3 and came back on the 10th. Did you meet with him at that
4 time?
8 A I don't know.
14 that trip?
16 whatsoever.
North, 1985'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|
19 ^^^^^^^^H did you have any meetings with North?
20 A No.
25 call them up to say hi, how are you, why don't we get
itJ
303
1
muwm
together for a b««r.
68
4 A I don't know.
6 hara?
9 that. He'd come by on his way home from work. We'd stop
11 over to the NSC office, but I'm not sure when that took
him injj^^H^H
16 A When he travelled in December of 198 —
17 Q With McFarlane?
18 A Yea. ,
19 Q That's 1985.
22 December of 1985.
24 Q Yes.
25 A December of 1985.
'ii; J
304
UNCUSSIP 69
3 December of 1984?
4 A That is correct.
10 that^.
11 (Pause.)
15 A Of course.
22 Contras?
70
yNCtASSKO
1 meetings your belief that an airstrip needed to be
2 constimcted in Costa Rica it the southern front were to
3 be properly resupplied?
18
19 Is that right?
21 is concerned, okay?
22
23
24
1 refcflcTni^DWw"
1
'
306
1
uimmF
b* graat If, you ]cnow, w« could g«t sooathing ready now
71
10
11
22 Sandinistas.
307
72
Mmms
308
il
NWSiFi! 73
12 officer.
74
umssiFiEi
1 Nicaragua. And ther« was no secure or practical means of
4 refueled.
8 a pprehension'^
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
310
10
H
12
76
I ur« of that, okay? And I'm not sura that it was evan
3 to think about.
that point it
10 recall what happened subsequently, but at
approval, .as
II was gee, it would be great if we got their
16 it will be done.
20 A That's right.
airfield for,
21 Q But the concept was to have an
wasn't it?
22 and resupply depot for the Contra s,
23 A And
24
25
312
6 A CIA.
15 way , okay?
18 when the CIA got back into business soon it would be used
19 for resupply?
20 A
21
22
23
24
25
313
8 Contras?
10 okayl
2! to be built?
yiibWIED
314
79
ONwsifia—
1 A Sometime after this a week, two weeks, I
12 at this time?
UtimFIED
815
B 80
why don't you take a trip up there and have a look at it.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
316
1
MMSm 81
11 from Hanilton? -,
16 the site?
19 up there]
20
21
22
23
24
H IVjw <#> I B
317
UNCUSSi 82
2 halicoptar.
12 Colonel North.
16 have. But there was only one way to build it because the
IWftSStfiEB
318
83
yNi^Sii^lE
1 was totally isolated.
2 MR. LIMAN: How did you learn that Owen tooJc
8 strip?
319
84
Dapartaant
320
85
I'
24 phone
25 Did he initiate the call or did you?
321
^wmi 86
7 some import and I'd get on the phone and I'd say, you
9 is going on.
UHCriSSSIFIED
oo f?no /~\ oo 1 o
.
322
y 87
6 funds
323
88
ilNettSStflEfl
1 THE WITNESS: Patriotic Americans. Good
2 Amaricans.
12 second year.
D
324
89
1 AFTEKNOON SESSION
2 (1:33 p. a.)
3 Whereupon, vO
4
8 A BY MR. BAKBADORO:
10 had -asked you about when you first heard that this
19
20
\mmm
325
90
8 K Yes.
12 was Haskell.
17 curiosity.
l|l«»l)
326
91
ONOl^SIFIED
1 North as]c«d th« Ambassador, bscaus* th«y had contact too,
2 or h« may hav« asksd m«; I know I talkad to th«
3 Aabassador about It, but how it got to that point X don't
25
327
UNtDOTED
328
93
7 town?
18 hotels and tell them that you were fishing up country and
UNtMFIED
329
UNCLASSIFIED 94
9 trips?
10 -
A No, no. He would ba do%m there for one, two
11 days, and then he would go back, and then he'd come back,
12 and so forth.
20 told me, that Hamilton did not want to get involved with
' "idOi. Jl
330
95
10 service.
17 A NO.
UmSSIFIED
331
1 A
wsmm
No, sir. Zn fact, Z didn't haar that figure
9«
4 the $S0,000 caBe up at aoBe tiae later on, not during the
21
22
23
24
UNtCIOTED
332
UNIM»ED 97
3 place where turtles com* in and lay eggs, and it has been
4 a constant problem of poachers in the area coming and
20 that th*y w*r*, that h* was v*ry, v*ry clos* to this man.
23 it correct — but that olmstaad had lost hi* *y* and was
uimssinED
333
98
6 aftar I think thay had, and I'm not sura of this, but
20 said that tha soil was not suitabla, that tha placa was
25 airatrip?
\immm
334
99
23 A No.
imSSIflED
335
1 w«r« compl«t«d?
7 bscaus* —
8 MR. LZMAN: Spring of 1985.
13 C2m« down.
19 1985.
21 oKay.
101
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
MCTIED
337
25 Q Othar than]
|T/(
338
UNOASSiBED 103
1
^^^^^^^^1 you hadn t told headquartars anythinc^ about
'
to that^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J^^H^^^^^^^^^H
My recollection is that I probably didn't, Z don't think
hlB?
mmm
>iimmB 104
wa didn't avan hava tlna to gat all tha way Into tha city
llfiCraFIED
340
'Miumi 105
1 Oecembar?
7 Tom Wilson asked me some time back how much did all this
11 percent of my time.
oveijall^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B
with the
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ell of the other
20 operations that we had going at the time.
Withf^HH Cm
23 A 1 think it was at headquarters, and I can't
msmiED
341
iimmiBB
^
106
10 North and his family came to spend a few days with me and
liltfiSStfitD
-
342
limmaB 107
14 status of it was.
16 guarded secret?
17 (Laughter.)
23 (Laughter.)
iiftJtftSSSSD
343
1
UNiAS«D
have baen fired.
108
2 (Laughter.)
6 undertaking.
13 A Yes.
24 I saw the name and I almost choked, until I read it. You
\mmm
344
UNCiASSm 109
3 fire reconunendation.
6 of the ai£3t'^iP'
12 Rican was ripping them off, which, you know, is the cost
16 A No.
20 that nam*.
22 A That's correct.
wmmB
345
UIWISSIIIED 110
i
11 A H« mad* — oh, I don't know — nor* than fiv«,
I
2 probably less than ten, trips.
8 strip?
14 thing.
17 it?
20 Q Why not?
tRl
346
111
3 ports.
7 where you have the expertise and it's not a Mickey Mouse,
9 done that way, but where you go in with a plan and, you
10 know, you put down a strip and it's going to work because
17
18
19
20
23 could care less. Okay? 1 say all that and probably the
mmm
25 maybe others might say I
347
•mussm 112
you aslc Quintaro h«'d say oh, yaah. But lat ma tall you
just lavalad but navar fully gradad. And whan tha rainy
19 coupla tiaas^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
20
IMWmiED
048
mjmm
still had hopes, but knew that if it was
113
1 A I I
7 foot wide.
11 aircraft.
iCaSSIFIED
349
UNGUSSiEii 114
8 that number, called the DEA office and said, loo)c, would
12 So X mat with him after that and said why did they stop
20 what I had, and I said well, what was that. And with
msm&
350
UimSSiEIED lis
4 all professional.
6 A Quintero.
8 right?
12 says, can you help me get through the airport when X eome
13 that money?
23 (Laughter.)
UNttASStFIED
351
UNCUSSIHED 116
9 This fellow is
12 this letter.
14
15
16
UNCreiflEO
352
117
20 '86?
mmfm
353
UNCLASSIFIE
SECRET/CODEWORD 118
1 Q vniy not?
11 benefactors?
15 by February of '86?
23 commanders of UNO?
119
2 of the activity.
4 that?
8 on it.
14 strip.
22 was the Tower Commission — did North ever tell you about
mSSfflED
355
120
5 objectives.
13 this or there was that or that money for this was going
14 for that.
18 have used any term like that and that's the way I
20 thing. Okay?
25 who on the on* hand they would put up money to build this
yiHOTED
356
1
^mmm
air__strip; on the other, they might be giving an airplane
121
3 Okay?
4 Q As a United States Government representative
UmilSIFIED
357
1 a i
l lii ii<liiii«ii « nf activity on the part of tha resistance
7 people who were under arms; there was also a concern for
Icq
358
NOASmiEO 123
oNCLraef!
)
359
6 Pnobody
7 asked for that flight how are the commanders in the field
IS for the flight there must have been six aborts. I didn't
19 way it ran.
20 (Laughter.
yWfiSSiflED
360
1 A
yfwnD
And about what am I doing is legal.
125
Is that
22 that?
mSSIFIE
361
126
6 Q When?
127
18 the question, and they came back and they said well, no,
21 that they contact Negro Chamorro and ask him if they will
umssmED
363
1
mmB
question and yet settle the problem. Now we tried that.
128
23 time.
UNCTASSflEO
364
{/i 129
16 people^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 3"<^
23 Nicaragua.
UimSSIFiED
365
130
14 he had.
22 assume you have the money because you won't get any
liClSSmiED
366
UNCUSSD 131
2 got all the material or I've got all of the tools and the
Some guy^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^H
9 just appeared at the hotel door with this material. And
13 hotel room.
19 his room.
lliraSSIFIED
367
1
wmmm
had two cases of commercial plast ic explosive.
132
2 room.
yifCL'CTIED
368
^__ 133
1 training period.
2 Q Did you t«ll Colonel North about this episode?
4 did, no.
12 A Yes.
16 on secure telephone.
21 available at night.
22 Q The CIA didn't have its own access to a secure
23 telephone?
U
369
1 Q Okay.
NM^ED So you understood that th« purpose of
134
6 communications device?
18 hla?
22
23
^Hm A
vherever the plane was, with the Information?
No, no. Where he was. I never Jcnew that the
UNWStflED
370
135
6 to people ati
136
11 river.
l||#^iH^^!rn
yi'il»L»)»fOi8i iUJ-
.
372
137
2 (indicating)
11 call it off.
17 force?
21 me.
22 Q Sure.
NctraiD
373
IINIMSBD 138
omsstfiED
374
1 Q
ONMSm
You have just read verbatim from notes that
139
19 Q Okay.
mmm
25 they refer to things in there that are definitely
375
\iiimm.s 140
7 for idantiflcation.)
11 to?
13 gamut of things.
23 today that when you used "my objective" that you did not
!JN8t«|fiED
376
141
6 brainstorming.
7 Q Okay. Did I also hear you correctly that you
20 drop^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B
21 ^^^^marltlme deliveries, NHAO supplies to same, NHAO
22 supply to UNO/SOUTH, but with certified airworthy
23 alrcraftA, et cetera.
UmiSSIFlEO
377
142
3 position.
8 for idantiflaation.)
10 7.
-
XI (Tha docunant rafarrad to waa
BarkadHriHHJlExhibit Nuabar
13 for idantification.)
is^i^ms.
14 (Tha docuaant rafarrad to was
U for idantification.)
23 A That is corract. u)
HKCn^S?"^"
ioJi! slJ
378
UNCIA»E0 143
1 this massage.
11 next one.
20 End of ny comment.
ItEl
379
144
rafarrlng to.
MR. LIMXN: Not 7?
isn't it,||p^
yf!Et«SSin[D
,
380
UNDUSSIFIED 145
1 of a message means?
7 if I may, again —
8 MR. LIMAN: Now look at 7, which also looks
9 like it was sent addressed to you and signed BT, North,
11 (Pause.)
16 concentrate on it.
17 (Pause.)
19 mountain leprosy.
20 MR. LIMAN: Do you have any recollection of
25 received it? You may have and you may not have?
IIKSrflffl
381
UNmSSI^lEO 146
4 recollection.
5 THE WITNESS: Soma of it looks familiar, some
15 ^^^^^^H and come back to me. And I know I asked for the
16 mountain leprosy medicine. That was a constant request.
17 I would have to say that even though I don't
18 recognize this message specifically that the contents of
19 it, that in the contents there are things which I do
20 rcall receiving.
UNftMm
382
147
3 himself.
4 (Pause.)
15 inside.
T^imt
383
148
10 when — and I assume that this would have been one of the
25 I can only assume that the person who wrote this piece of
iimmifo
384
miymm
paper received two messages.
149
5 message, the part that you sent, says, in one part of it,
8 referring to?
9 A As I said earlier, it refers to that there
10 vara problems inside. I don't recall exactly what they
11 were now. The people that were going In were people from
12 the resistance support staff ^^^^^^^^H I mean, we
.iMP'^
385
u 150
4 insida.
21 there.
386
Miimm 151
14 communicated to JH^H?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes.
25 wrong.
£ WITNESS: Because
152
UNei^lFIED
1 (A discussion was held off th« record.)
5 they be aired at the RIG and that you used North as the
11 it has been just cut me off. When North came down for ^
24 contras?
|T/|
^.
388
UNCLASSIFIED 153
13 NSC?
24 both of us.
»ORD
389
UNCL^SSIte 154
8 governments?
16 had dona.
2 FDN?
25 southern front?
mmmB
390
UNCLiissn 155
7 my counterpart
19 themselves first.
20 So the people in the south were left, you
22 connected to Ollie.
23 Q How many resupply flights were there?
24 A To the best of my ability there were nine.
mm
391
1 A
W4S»D
Ammunition, grenades, mortar rounds, some
156
8 on any of these.
12 at the FDN.
15 on it?
17 Affairs Office.
23 '84.
1 A
WMMH
Excus* m«. L«t n« avan clarify that Dor*.
157
2 From th« sprln? of '84 until January 24, 1987, tha only
12 A Now?
UNCLASSra 158
6 to tham?
13 found it.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2S
394
159
10
11
12
21 he? ^
22 A H« was in the outside area there.
23 Q Had that been arranged between the two of you
24 that he would be there?
25 N
SSWED
395
160
ikASSffl
1 Q W«r« you surprised to sa« him thara?
2 A No.
5 that tima.
^
Haa thara any maating with ^^^faf tar this
6 Q
7 photo opportunity?
9 Whita Housa?
10 '
Q Yas.
19 it into the Oval Office and then brought out the blank
mmm
25 back to finish, I guess, his briefing, and so we chatted
396
161
6 [had an exchange
8 Nothing concerning
9 the air_strip, resupply — to anticipate your question —
10 or Anything else was conducted at that time.
14 day.
23 strip.
25 name mentioned?
HMflED
397
1 A
mmmm
Y«a.
162
3 mantionad?
10 '
Q That you aasociatad Sacord in any way with tha
11 airjitrip or tha raaupply?
398
mmis 163
ii
399
UNCUffifO 164
4 in the press. And Secord sat there and wrote down the
terms They a
5 f^^^^^^^^^^^^l
6 some minor points, but it was clearly ^^^Bwho was in
13
14
15
16
17
18
WSSiED I6S
13 you just — you )cnow. But Secord just sent me the worst
16 do with him.
18 explain.
UtlCUkSHIED 166
that aay w«ll hav« b««n th« cas«, but I hava no way of --
10 isn't important.
~
11 BY MR. BARBXDORO: (Resuming)
16 A
"
17
18
22 ^^^^^^H I him
24
ymsstfiEO
402
uiiwsstfe 167
4 A Of '86.
5 Q Was that the trip immediately prior to him
20 A No.
22 at all?
23 A No, ever.
NftJfflftED
403
168
1 an hour mor*.
7 unpleasant.
10 '
A The first and only time I ever met General
13 Q March of '86?
get Eden
18 to approach Eden Pastors in an attempt to
United
19 Pastors to work out his difficulties with the
as a mediator. And I
20 States Government and somehow act
dii|uade General
21 spent about ten minutes in an attempt to
was no
22 Singlaub from any such attempt, that there
he attempted to
23 interest in doing so, and that in fact if
to the best
24 do so it would probably be detrimental
oNemwD
1 I th«n left town for headquarters the next day
2 or the day after, and when I returned I found that he had
3 in fact gone to see Eden Pastora and worked out some sort
In hls^^^^^^^^Hcable endorsed.
iiwm\E
405
170
14 whatsoever.
16 done it?
21 the Deputy, and the deputy said what the hell am I going
23 message to •?
This ^^^^^^M
25 A Yes.
f. ," * •'
d <"^ I
.
406
171
(J
1 Q L«t's just mark this as^B^^H Exhibit 9.
5 for identification.)
12 be coningP
22
<imm&
407
172
1 himself
"Nftfflfe
2 (Pause.)
12 back^channel cable?
14 Q Okay.
25 that all anybody had to do was just sit back and watch
lA
408
WSUSffD 173
4 North?
5 A No.
8 A To my knowledge?
9 Q Yes.
10 '
A According to Rafael Quintaro it was only used
UNcraswiED
409
174
20 it.
If^l
mi 175
mmm
—
411
176
2 vara aona othar acrav up, thay ware to kick the material
anyway bafora cama ^^|^^^m||^H-
4 On two occasions
6 at tha airport?
9 did land. Tha first time thay want in, refueled and were
22 thay owad $60-soma, $60-80, for the oil that they had on
23 tha voucher, and ha gave ma an envelope which he said
25 I.
WMm
tOQX»the.eavfJ.aM,W<l».I '3*v* ^^ ^°l
412
177
17
18
19
20
iJIUSStflED 178
4 decided to gol
12 Q Do you knov
13 A Yes.
15 West?
18
19
20
22 there?
414
UNCUfflED 179
8 Oliver North?
9 A I don't know that to be a fact.
10
H
12 (A discussion was held off the record.)
13 BY MR. BARBADORO: (Resuming)
17
24 Ford?
415
180
wmmm
416
1 contacts, but I
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
417
lU
?^^
Q9 fiQ9 n.88.1 F.
)
418
?3
9e^<^'
^y^fJisD /^
/ T^U
419
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
24 A Who?
DI^ASSJflEO 18S
6 No, sir.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
121
-i^rm.
5 iThat was
17 nice guy.
21 No, look, I just wanted to give you ray regards. You are
187
«N«tifiSifl[0
1 Now, a lot of things have b«an said around and
6 wasn't there?
7 A Yes. However, let me back up for you to
19 predecessor.
188
IIN6HS«ED
1 thi« was th« devica I'm uilng for sacure communcations.
3 communicating?
4 A To North. I don't Icnow if I mentioned
6 Q Okay.
21 placewith^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
22 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H myself ,|^^^^^^^^H and
23 subji^ct immediately upon the door
and tha subject
25
mm
gotta fix it b%:#ij%^W'Wl'ff iWr''^'^^* communication
424
liNCUSSiED 189
U
425
190
6 could go
10
11
12
13
14
15
19 did
20
191
UmSSfflEO
thought v« had th« problaa and that w« vara going to taka
cara of It. Nov tha stand down, and, you know, tha taxt
of tha cabla.
Tha comvmlcator
aunlcai didn't go bacausa of tha stand-down
cabla. HfeHknaw
life' that tha coaaunicator didn't go. Early
Saptaabar, North
a: tails aa, ha said, wa want to claar out
UlilStFIED
427
mSSIflED 192
4 information?
said, sure, have him come down. And that's
5 I
19
also knew that
20 Q But my point to you is that you
those communications
21 you weren't supposed to be passing
22 on
23 A Why not?
ttN6t*S8!HE0
—
428
193
1 that th«y naadad to fix it, but then th«y stood down on
18 Por favor.
25 Nicaraguan.
mw#iEe
429
194
1 [Laughter]
2 Okay.
10 benefactor operation?
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
430
11^
%1 i.
^fJ/sD )^
/-; T^U
431
10
11
17 BY MR. WILSON: ^
18 Q On this business AhoMtj/j/^^got a problen,
23 Q Yes.
problem
24 A I think it was probably a political
whole
25 because everybody is pretty clear about the
UNCtftSStflED
432
Pi ^ v-^ir
197
25
WWED
aay vant to dp. » .4JAil«:wi#C>f»Atk«rv Of course, they
433
UNCUSSIflED 198
10 ,
Signature of the Witness
12 _, 1987.
13
14 Notary Public
15 My CoBBission Expires:
UHfik*SSIf!ED
434
^
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
2
20 ^ Commisaion expires, / /
21
22
UNCUSSIFIED
435
3
lJ
4 DEPOSITION OFi C I <r> mn '^ C(i "3 / / // cj
5
11 Washington, D.C.
12
16 presiding.
21
behalf of
22 on.£J*^
Partially Declasshedmeteasad 3/?o/).
23
undef D'ovisions ol E I33S6
by K Johnson. National Sacwity Counc*
s
24
25
yNWSSiFlE!!
436
1 Q
mmm
Were you aware that Robert Owen was carrying
14
3 Colonel North?
4 A No, sir.
9 that Robert Owen was some sort -- he never said that to me,
12 North?
16 asking you what the press and the rumors were that
19 behalf?
23 had drawn by the mere fact that he was always around and
DKS^ASSI^'^
1 Whereupon,
5 EXAMINATION
6 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
11 members of that committee, and Mr. Giza and Tina Westby are
25
imsm
438
umStabvis
1 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
6 privilege.
10 A That is correct.
17 seen this?
18 A Yes.
22 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Mlfflflr'
im^HEF
this order does grant him immunity from use of his statements.
He is directed to respond.
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
in this deposition.
that time the immunity order had not yet been conveyed upon
us.
may not have been covered but I would like to cover: them in
440
2 of the people with the CIA that I have had occasion to talk
3 to now. What did you do before you began with the Agency?
8 sfrgeant
10 you had at the Agency up until the time that you were
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 Central American Task Force, late 1982 until July 1984, Chief
22 of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^HJBranch,!
24
iumssiaoi.
441
1 Intelligence Agency?
2 Yes, sir.
6 That is xi
12 ask you some questions about particular areas. They are "not
16 devices?
19 reading the various files that, as you well know, have now
25 mentioned four.
it
442
^ Q I am sorry.
mrnm I meant the first of four, the first
3 April.
10 After that April flight there were, I believe, two, and then
22 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
WL^sffe
1 that it is sort of a physical device but in addition to the
10 il
11
12
13
14
22 time?
1 A I
IMflW
kept the device from the time I received it
10 in this matter.
12 box --
16 Mr. Copp — why don't I ask it this way. Who did you
17 cominunicate with --
20 A I did not.
uMfiiiism.
445
10
HNffiMffiF
I only saw him one time, which I have, of course, explained
to the committees.
mentioned a Mr. Copp or he may not have, and you don't really
recall?
A No.
Q Robert MacAlister?
A No.
Richard Gadd?
but I did not know who he was and I have never met him.
A Yes.
iim&!^i!Hf4L
446
1
Q
vmmw
Do you recall when that was?
11
9 meeting --
12 you to meet.
14 Robert Owen?
17 North.
19 Government employee?
nmm
Office of the Department of State then, of course, I
12
knew
and I were well aware that Robert Owen probably had the most
resistance.
voluntarily
him for breakfast or a cup of coffee and he would
employee, I did ask him to find out things about what was
was the
happening with that group or another group, but that
448
13
1
Q Did you know the date of his relationship with
2 Colonel North?
7 groups
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
449
1
mmm
and whatever the press reports were, I simply don't --
15
2 can't recollect.
4 A No, sir.
7 A No, sir.
21 were experience
22
23
24
25
450
2
mmm 16
10
11
12
13
14
15
24 this.
li^lEliSiimtl
451
17
^BBSIFffB
trying to bring about some sort of a coalition -- probably a
that the only way that these people could be supported was
11 I accompanied
15 North.
23
24
25
453
Q
mmw
So^^^B^^H was
apprised of the negotiations?
the one who primarily kept you
19
No,
again?
these people were doing this thing and I thought that was
funding.
IMASSIfm
454
20
DNttSSStPilT
1 I never really thought that these people could do
4 do, fine, but for operational reasons I could see that this
5 could only be carried out by our own people with the necessary
6 expertise.
18 of 1984?
22 positive.
IftSSlBEL
455
21
winter and then the first time I met ^^^^H was when he made
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
456
22
DNttlSStPifiT
1 to create an airstrip if the agency got back in military
10 heightened interest,
13
14 you are going to get the contras back inside they have to be
17 site where they could be, even though it is another place and
25
457
the airstrip?
llNHIi^aiD.-
j
458
24
ONttHSStFlfflT
1 Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams about it, or rather,
6 A Yes.
8 me covering --
15 correct.
Kiffiia
459
lIRJBl^HEffT 25
airstrip.
uiAcussm^
460
Mf^lffir 26
1
behind schedule, but it was fit into a general update of
2 the overall political military situation,
3
land other parts that had to do with non-
4
private benefactor matters.
5
Q Did --
18 was the only one who thought it was a big secret. It was a
23
24
25
461
27
IflffiB^SSPrr
^
Q In the story, Mr. Tambs refers to essentially
be the RIG.
^
taking his orders from what he considered to
"^
MR. WILSON: For the record, we are referring to
6 EGGLESTON:
BY MR.
7
Q That is correct. The far right hand column is the
was
8
story. What was it your understanding that the RIG
9
and what its function was?
Group
10 The RIG stands for Restricted Interagency
is
12
taaabl^l^ from the State Department, Eliott Abrams;
13
that correct?
14 That is correct.
A
function of the
15
Q What was your understanding was the
16
RIG?
17 It was a policy coordination body
that brought
A
on interests
18
together and discussed and made decisions
situation,
19
regarding the Central American military/political
20 spokesman for the U.S.
and that this was the main policy
21
Government.
RIG was
22 Q But I take it it was clear to you that the
23 a policy body and that you w^e - you were a CIA employee
Mumip' 28
1
A That is correct.
2
Q You didn't take orders, I would assume, from
3
Elliott Abrams?
4
A No. The Ambassador did.
5
The Ambassador did -- you would take orders from
6
7
A That is correct.
8 And Ollie North took orders from whomever?
Q
JIMCIIicciflca.
463
A
MMm
That is correct.
29
become involved!
ii[iri&si!ii[a.
464
30
4 Q Go ahead.
15 airstrip?
17 Q How did you establish his bona fides. How did you
23 of the story?
Mmi^iO^IL
465
vifiu:
iuuini:r
''
contained in the New York Times article which appears in
13 grading -- the leveling had been done but the grading had
14 not been.
18 made there and that the plane got stuck in the mud, because
20 completed.
UMPiassra^
466
ictimi^ 32
7 point.
14 arrangement.
23 purchase of the —
24 A I don't know what the arrangement was. I suppose
ii^f.1 h^mm
467
33
IMftSSIFIEe^
either a purchase arrangement with some sort of a
the figure $50,000 a year is what the lease for a year was
was $50,000.
exorbitant.
TiMMffiffl
.
468
34
ORBftSSmT
1 about the money. I didn't know if they had millions or
2 billions
4 money was coming from to pay the lease and to construct the
5 air field?
6 A No.
7 Q None?
9 there was even an event it was much later, when the name
f^^
c
18 Q Did ^^^^^^^H meetl
20 Q My next question --
23 business meeting?
24 A No.
jllilfillCJCl£inL>.
469
35
uscassfiffT
the two of them?
A No.
of the meeting.
Q Right.
A "
is what I want from you for the purpose of protecting the point
west site, the air strip. And he went through and ** said
UNSbJtSSffUlET 36
1
Q Was the letter coming from Udall Corporation?
2 A I don't recall that being discussed. It was
9 property.
11
the meeting, who did you understand Secord to be? What
15 benefactors' activities.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
mCUlSSIEIHL
471
msg^T 37
North?
he was in town.
bp-2 IWeH^FI!^ 38
9 anywhere from when they first got the control of the property
12 March.
22
thought it was a terrible place to pick for the air strip?
25
because it was isolated and not easily discovered. The
473
39
2 Q Right, which --
5 country, you have very few places where you have that kind
14 that period.
18 two conversations?
1IM04.AMU;IHU
474
IflKBISBBEffT 40
14 it then?
23 Poindexter.
IliSfLACCJIUa.
475
UWB^REffT 41
11
12
17
Did you have any role in that incident?
18
Obviously not the incident of getting it stuck, but in
19
getting it out?
20
A Yea.
and met with him in hi* hotel room, and he said, "I have
23
iUiiru£Au;u:R.
" 1
476
HmSSIFI!^ 42
2 landed at the air strip, and I think that was probably the
5 President of Costa Rica that the air strip was not being
10 Here Quintero
13 what was told to me, and he reacted the sane way I did,
17 out of here.
JiMTiTO Arupi J I* I M 1
i
477
1 11
mamw
o'clock in the morning. I actually left town about
43
19 the first one to lighten the load. Then they had to pull
u^}04^A/;«^:lcA.
478
bp-8 DHCBl^SWT 44
1 the mud?
4 el se.
6 A That is right.
13 no.
21
I will take care of it. I will see what has to be done.
25
IMUSS.l£!£a.
479
bp-9
2
A No.
No:
mms 45
3 A No.
iiKiALAHiirirB
480
HKStASSflllT 46
20 Select Committee.
24 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
lUiLCU^Eia,
481
bp-ll
WJttWffiF 47
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
482
bp-12 IINOiA^^IP
1
6 purpose intended.
11 area.
14 that poachers wouldn't get into this area; that turtle eggs
22 So I was insisting]
II Bfflffl^^^^^^
|
483
iiii»s$iniSET 49
In late August,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^t he
President had decided to announce, to call a press
llAUtUCQJDTQ.-
484
bp-14 IIMMW!ffT 50
3
^^
Shortlv thereafter, jjt/M called me and said
c_
4 I just talked to Ollie and we had ~~4H said that he
6 this and they thought that the best way to handle this
10
11
12
21
impression is now on reflex, is that the ambassador said
22
that he persuaded the President on the basis that this was
24 the bargain in that the air strip was not being used, would
25
not be used, and he didn't see the reason why it was
llMriAS£l£lfIl-
485
DttStASSIfiflT 51
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
the parts that deal with your part of the world. Let
was?
place?
bp-16
H^ASSraT 5,2
13 North about it. But how do you deal with a thing where
16 thing?
18 tanks on it?
22 fuel drums.
24
that became civil guard property in terms of whatever was
UMTi&J^lClFJl^
,
487
bp-17 UNStASSlBiftT 53
1 that
6 I know ,
13 court reporter mark them, but by giving the name and date
21 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
UMPI ACCIflTJI
488
bp-18 yNt»ssfliie^ 54
10 second sentences.
16
17
18
UKlTlUCiiUIU'ii-.
489
IMA^flf^ 55
and
the pilots might be ours and they asked the DE.^ to check,
and that is how the DEA asked me, and that is how I found
out for the first time that the plane was even in the
country.
them go finally.
bp-20
UIKSPRSfflEFT 56
1 then go finally.
5 make sure you are absolutely sure that these people are
7 "Okay, then you don't have any hold on them." They said,
11 file whatever papers they had with the FAA so these people
13 and finally they got into the plane and took off and flew
25
knew exactly what plane it was.
llMPimiflfiJ_
491
''^
unusual airplane, a fabric-covered single engine^*****
Q Carrying people?
at
problem with it, so inform them and let these guys handle
bp-2 2 KNKHSSffiBr 58
bp-2 3 iin8insaaii:T 59
know.
A Lethal supplies.
Point West?
large aircraft.
say here are these crazy gringos leveling off this land,
l!MPlllȣiorn
.
494
b-24 tlNGilA^B^ 60
12 aborts or that they couldn't get the plane off the ground
18
rest of this stuff, I cannot comment on it because I
19
don t know
'
21
with the L-100?
25
I only knew Rob Owen to be a collector of information as
IIMPLA^^EIEH.
|
495
bp-25
imssanT 61
14
18 assistance.
21
and I diverted Washington to Iliami to
A Yes.
24
bp-26 iM^iasi^
UTlUCnVVirlKi'V g2
10
11
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
yuciiSSlFM..
497
UNtume^ 63
or coiiununicated with|
A No.
whyfl^^H asked me
Let me make the point
^: ^^^ to qo
just nothing.
with their own means, with their own aircraft, could somehow
iiMoi AQQinrn
498
1
Q
uiiHir
You did not know?
64
2 A No.
3 BY MR. GIZA:
8 A Yes. ^
9 Q Couldn't^^^fB have picked up the secure phone
10 ca 1 1 ed ^^^^^^^^^^B himse 1 f ?
11 A Yes, sure.
15 A Probably.
21 close friends, have been for years, and I can say — I could
iiKioi Accincn
499
UNtttS^iaET 65
2 I won't — — " no, no. It was just, "On your way back,
4 stayed overnight, left there the next morning and went back
5 to Miami and
6 BY MR, EGGLESTON:
13 Well, go ahead.
16 the deal had been set up a long time ago, and there is a
22 A Yes.
25 is just false?
iiNcussra
500
\m^s^ 66
3 the cable.
4 Q Right.
8 I don't know of any agreement except the fact that the FDN wa
13 Okay?
20 not mine. ^
24 south.
UNtUt^Slfe 67
5 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
21 was made in the field, and it was the first time that the
23 the commanders from the FDN who were also in the upper part
iiuoi Aooinrn
502
WitlMlglr 68
1
of the commanders came out of southern Nicaragua and told
6 southern Nicaragua — and they sat down and wrote out what
7 they thought was the most substantive agreemept that had been
10 agreement that they had written in the field with the FDN
11 in the north.
14 northern commanders.
19 doing it, they said, "Maybe they can get us supplies," and
21
22
23
24
25
503
15 with me.
17 Quintero|?
18 A I am pretty certain.
22 person says.
24 Q All right.
iiMoi Aocicicn
504
Wi \wu
UNR UUII ILU
70
1
Now that you raised a doubt in my mind --
6 from Quinterol.
17 clearances.
24 you knew you had this government cassette that was highly
25 secret.
uNcussra
.
505
UNtmSPPET 71
1
Did it cause you any concern that Quintero#,
2
working for this rag-tag group of suppliers or working
3
with them, had access to and was using this, what
4
I understand to be a fairly secret and sensitive cassette?
5
A Well, you know, you have to put it in the context
6
of Oliver North. This is a National Security Council
7
deputy director, political military affairs. I mean, you
8
know, to a GS-15^^^^^H^H this guy talks to God, all
9 right?
10 knew
And he meets at a level, and, obviously, I
11
where he worked in the Executive Office Building. He has
12
got tremendous access -- which is to say, he couldn't simply
13 want clearance for Rafael
pick up the phone and say, "I
14
Quintero(f" or for John Jones or Joe Doe, you know?
15
He is outside of my area of experience, or this
17 certainly wouldn't have done it, but then this is the NSC
18 Maybe they have got special things that they do.
19 Q Okay
iiMOi Ao oinrn
506
BimsiFKr 72
7 the contra s.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
BNCUSSm
507
• 2a
UnyCflvvfrnW 73
mas 1 1
Q In a very active way. He has KL-43s which you
3 stuck in the mud you call Colonel North to get them out.
4 A Right.
^
5 Did you ever tell ^^|^^^^H that you had a KL-43?
7 When?
8 April of '86.
10
12 that?
13 A ^^^^^^^^^^^B In my
iiKini Acoiticn
508
UNWSiii&ET 74
7 ^^ and
10 it.
16
using our connnunications equipment and our
bunds
17 one-time code tnrt« , communicate with the communications
19
the same way to the private benefactors.
21
that.
Yes.
22
23
But —
24
But it is your testimony that you specifically
U
25
told m^^^^H when you met with him in April of '86 that
iiKioi Acojnrn
509
l)Nft*SSfflfflET 75
2 A In my office.
4 A That is correct.
7 Q Sorry.
11 A That is correct.
13 A I believe I did.
15 Rafael Quintero?
17 neuae to him.
21 with and that is what the problem was that we wanted to fix.
UNOttSSffiRET 76
5 And also that I had requested the flight path and hostile
20 established again.
UttClA^i^T 77
Q All right.
iiKioi Accinrn
512
l)NJblBaB»ET 78
m6 1
So to summarize I would like that understood in
6 force is the one thing I take it which you knew you could not
7 do.
12 Q Right.
iiiini Aopinrn
513
inw^sit^fiiT 79
Q Right.
IIMOl AOOinrn
514
uiKumeET 80
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
2
Q And I think that is generally true.
3
A I was very careful with the wording so I get
4
trapped by the sort of feimiliar style because after all
5
I am writing to my buddy, Ollie, and that sort of engenders
6
a certain sense of —
7
MR. LEON: Informality?
8
THE WITNESS: ~ of informality.
9
MR. GIZA; You also knew these cables were not
10
going to be subjected to the dissemination that your
11
cables that were sent to Headquarters would be
12
subjected to, right?
13
THE WITNESS: Within the general sense of my
14
relationship with Ollie, that is correct, and I want to
15
make a point about that because I am sure that at some
16
point in our discussions here today, it is going to be
17
raised.
18
What about this relationship with North and me?
19
W« were close friends. We — I saw in him a very dynamic
20
individual, someone who truly believed as I did, and I do,
21
that the cause of the people who I was in contact with on
22
an almost daily basis was a legitimate one, that I saw
23
in North a person who would not shirk from doing what he
24
could do to support these people.
25
iiNPi AQCicirn
.
515
UWBI^FIfF 81
m9 1
By the same token, I must say in all honesty
8 BY MR. GIZA:
15 represent
IIMOI Aooinrn
516
uo 1
10
11
12
13
iiMOi Acctnrn
517
WffliikT 83
mil 1
but that is essentially one form of my relationship with
2 Ollie North.
3 BY MR. LEON:
4
Q Did you ever act around ^^^^H bacic?
5 A Oh, no.
7 North's wishes?
16
518
IfWa^BFT 84
ml2 1
person supposed to assume? Certainly, I had not -- while
5 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
9 A Yes.
14 A No, sir.
19 A No.
UIKUSStHSfeT 85
4 Q Right.
7 Q Aye.
24 Q To you?
25
iiNiPi Accinrn
520
WffiHSiflFST 86
8 commanders?
18 delivered.
IIMOI AOf'Tirni
521
mis 1
fmmm
wish to deliver for you, can you receive it. They would
87
16 to raise the people inside and tell them, light the fi*ee
18 have -- they would tell us after the flight was under way
522
HNMSiEST 88
ml6 We could not dictate to them. We did not know what their
1
situation was.
2
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
3
Q I understand, but you have indicated -- actually
4
before I get into this, let me talk to Dick for a second.
5
MR. WILSON: Can we take a short break.
6
MR. EGGLESTON: Sure. Do you want to take a
7
couple minutes. I don't have that much more to go.
8
(Short recess.)
9
MR. EGGLESTON: Back on the record.
10
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
11
12
Headquarters and the ceUoles that came back that related
13
primarily to vector information, weather information,
14
and things like that.
15
What I would like to ask you though is did you
16
provide information to Headquarters that you were in
17
comnunication with the commanders in the field to inform
18
them that military supplies were available? Were they
19
aware of this type of communication that you were having
20
with Colonel North?
21
A I don't remember.
22
Q Okay
23
A I don't remember what I said in those cables.
24
I just don't remember. Just that they were the southern
25
forces were expecting a resupply flight and requested
523
ml 7
^ that information.
^^HW 89
3 essentially saying.
7 conversations or whatever?
13 Q In April?
19 it was okay and that is why I talked to^^^^f who was the
21 I
Q Do you know whether the time you spoke with
iiMoi Aooinrn
.
524
UMBISfflfflffT 90
13 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
19 any knowledge of
mini Aooiinrn
525
HNfiMSflfffffT 91
U9 1 cassette.
2 Q Right.
6 Q Okay.
16 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
--
23 recall it Quintero wanted to know how they could get
UNBBSSBffiT 92
i20 ^ there are only two ways to do it, one is by boat and the
8 and they are floating in the water along the coast, that
10 their canoes could come out from the coast and retrieve
15 and the private benefactors, and what time and all, and
22 discarded that.
24 I said —
25 Q These are conversations with Quintero now?
IlilAI ^^»mm,^^
527
m21 1
2
A
knowledge of what
mmw
With Quintero, yes, he waa asking me based on my
9 their own language, and they have their own culture which
21 coast.
22
23
24
25
528
n
wmk 94
3 and other things, and that is why they were going to bring
6 buy the boats. They didn't get the boats delivered. They
16 Maul&
21 time.
UtlillJ^iSr 95
11 deliveries.
17 this, maybe we can do that, and all the time laboring with
23 But my^^^^^^^operations ,|
IIMOI Aooinri)
530
UIWttSSBfflF 96
5 BY MR. GIZA:
7 for a half hour and if I ask you a question that you have
10 I apologize.
13 A Yes, two.
15 committee?
16 A I sure did.
19
20 A No, sir.
UNei«^ii(is^T 97
14 southern front?
20 I
handle all the Central American things, but to
24 in message traffic?
ommssiFiEF 98
13
end boyuin14
2 pin
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
-'If:
24
2S UNCUSSI iilu
533
(Klfll^^lp' 99
1
BY MR. GIZA:
4 A Yes.
7 contras?
and that
9
10
were the contras effective from the perspective of
11
Nicaraguans, the civilian populus inside Nicaragua and
12
my general lament that the cutoff was devastatiing to
13
the people in the resistance.
14
Q Did you ever have discussions with him after he
15
left position^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand
Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence?
16
he left asl
18
EXAMINATION
20
BY MS. WESTBY:
21
lltlliU^»T 100
11 and he said he would look into it. Then we had the meeting
19 information.
imCMWJF 101
6 territory to them.
13 testimony, but how did it come about that this started? Did
20 were^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H They
mini kk^cui^i'T^
sae
UKIMSHiiE' 102
7 information.
10 been reached under the $27 million humanitarian aid and the
12 between the agency and the House and the Senate, that we
24 flight.
103
14 permissible activity.
15 EXAMINATION
16 BY MR. LEON:
25 A Ouintero thought
Quintero thouaht that ^^^^^^^^^^^^H was
538
104
UNCH^RfffT
CAS-6 1 probably ripping him off ten percent, but that was well
3 Latin America.
5 any profiteering.
7 A No.
12 Singlaub?
19 umbrella.
s»iicLAQCirij:n
539
IWStASSfflST 105
13 process.
24 A I have no idea.
IIKIlM AC(i4.ll.a
540
106
iiffieissfiiF
CAS-8 1 A 1986. March -- there is a cable. The Senate has
4 came back I found that my deputy had released the cable from
7 promise that Singlaub made was that the United States will
10 went to the Ambassador and said, sir, I think you have made
iiiiAi aoo?nr:^«
541
107
^
cable, and what should be understood by this, and the
2 Senate did have this cable traffic. That was the only
^ see again -- ^
5 Do you recall North °>^^^^^H reaction to that
6 cible?
8 me, with our position that that was a terribly stupid thing
10 Pastora.
12 aspects of it.
17 to weaken him?
imCUS£iI;i^_
542
108
CAS-IO 1 A Yes.
P.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
.
543
109
WMWi
1
22 story, but because there has been too much in the press about
24 record
544
UNS»SSili8Fr 110
4 A No.
6 A I don't know.
e A No.
10 A No.
12 A I don t know
'
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
25 nickel, sir.
IINC/it'JiTii:n
545
mSgggrr 111
knew that deliveries were being made and that they were
IIMPI SOOr.rn
546
CAS- 14 1
vmmw
of lethal supplies by the contra forces?
112
2 A No.
9 that briefing. ,
11 supply of contras.
16 of the contras?
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
/
yNMSSiiitB
547
113
lawyer?
Q H|^^^p
A ^^^^Bspecifically told me that passing^ information
supplies?
A Yes.
mm ^cc:£!s:n
548
imeassspr 114
2
no — there wai never a question in my mind about humanitariar
UMTLI^II-Ii
549
imcui^ftiiT 115
jm 3
1
got to transport this communications equipment up there,
can we give them more than for a boat and the two motors so
2
they can transport it; and they said, yes. Can they take up
3
us and said since we have the boat, the motor, the communica-
5
said, why don't you ask them to ask Negro Chamorro to give
14
them the guns that they need to protect themselves while they
15
are going up the coast, and that was how we handled that
16
particular thing.
17
So we were very cautious about our position
18
concerning the legal questions involved in this.
19
UWH^FfffT 116
5 and ^^^^^^
6 Q Absolutely
15 intelligence report.
16 Q Thank you.
19 down.
21
22
23
24
25
ilLASSiOElL
551
^'
^aJ/SD J^
To 1(^1^
(^^
552
553
UNCUSSlFitD Hf^^lri
7; ;o
3[PiS:v.fNT
F OR
mmidllim A/CAT
S:a:[ for iSSiSTANT
Cf
C/L
SECRtlASr
F
:3RiMS
WHITE MOUSE fOR COLONEL OLIVER NORTH
: s s
.
'.-^i\i^ii john siNciiuS -^i
: - •
: : v-scn n
rH^JH^AT
RECJEST :r senator ,essiE i-'-.'^i
•
-
. E ; ; 'f-'in s . ; c L iu B party!
:ESERii. 5 '.:LijB CiLLEO AMBASSADOR TamBS^AND ARRiNGED
WEETINC AT EMBASSY 9931 HOURS LOCAL 2s MARCH
5*76^
'/:3Ch SINCLAuB AMD PASTCRi SlG'^EO FOl.Cw.',
u UNCLOflEO
:
554
UNCUSSIFIED N 7111
2 • : '.
: J T E : i : [ m i ? c h
h im
:«,; M[MC S "0 iCKNOiVLEDCE THE AjSEEMEs: vl:i TmS
:-f :EN£R4l
:ET.-/f[N VI; :s jomn k SiNCIALS JSA ȣT :no
::vv:sOtP EO:N PiSTORA
1 300TS
I f 000
: i'f'>:>; '
' ;
:v
- v: : ; '.£
•
[ : : 3 u 'r-i' i>:'i: : » E 5 i s E c N "
r £ •:..;.. ",
Til OE N I
CARACUt
565
fr-.-'
JKOL
N 71 12
'. - [ f :'..:' i f.
; skills
: C :vMyS I C AT I CNS
: I
SC I 'fCT F ; »[ 'E :hn I
QJES
: : vc. ' :s5 • xpl osi ve s
: l:: I
s' I
C5
i RiNCER iUiiS.NG
•
S : : N G f i
G H T I N C f : R C E
en: quote
:mment n spite cf •? .
iU
ESEHVAT :nS THAT PASTOR A Wl Ll
'
• ;
ON R E T u P N TO w 1 s H s : ';
T I on re garo i n: p;:' : = -
I'
UIAR* r STUDLEY -II.
CRA AGREED THAT ;.L
'
RAINING WILL BE li: i ':
L L BE DELIVERED J '; I L P : 5 i : p : «
ARAGUA
'.
G :
N G L 1 U 8 ? : fl T » LEFT : ' •/ i R ! H
WLOFIED
556
C r^ v)^ "V
b
d-fd : A sJuo 8S
C 3o48
Clio i50l
557
( I
LOO ts)(C,£S \
Quo 15^6
558
'
: «^.^e.
^Hn^s^ ^'(O"
2^f„b,t 4-
N x-* ^
559
4/12/86 1200
5166
1030 hour«fc-
succe«*f«4>T'
f ^,Apri 1
ff«"^«I«^«<3
12.
in 15
P«r UNO South Force, drop
air dropl
maritioM d«llv«ri«s NHAO supplies to same, NHAO air drop to UKO
South, but w/ccrtifi«d air worthy aircraft, lethal drop to UNO
fore* which can strike northwest end link-up with quiche to form
overly ambitious planning but viti| your help, believe we can pull
it off. 1
New subject. AfP story appeared in morning paper ^^^^^^^Hon
V ia^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
New subject. Ref Cruz split, vn^y not offer Cms provisional
(^10?
560
l!NCl?KSffli
^ 5167
4/l»/ii^^^70«»^
together. Also wish to note tay guys are flying without any
iOsk^o^S
iiiifl*. pfoviaons 01 E 12356 •
S77)
TOP SECRET
mmsE
561
sfes^j
msmm C 5176
UlmrTTKB^
The pilots and repair people are talking about a week to ten days
be for* tliey can u*« the C-123 again and that is only if we are
able to>flnd th* accessary part very quickly. The dual
navigatiofk systems aboard the aircraft showed them to be within 1
to 1.5 MI of the OZ for over 40 minutes. They were never able to
see zone lights and never had contact on th« radio on either
channel. The pilots never had the agreed upon proposed run-in
heading, possible enemy locations or recommended pull out
direction to avoid enemy fire. The pilots described the fire as
intense KX MG fire, probably 12. >> We are committed to
commencing drops to the FDN by C-7 tomorrow night but can del^ay
for one night to do your drop if ve can get the necessary info
for the pilots. To facilitate, have asked Ralph to proceed
immediately to your location. I do not think we ought to
contemplate these operations JM^
ut him being on scene. Too
many things go wrong that the^UKectly involve you and ma in
yt/gj^^pm^^^^m^a^^^vKl^t ua^ Jfa still don't know what
ci^VMleiH^^aM^ViK^^ aowttain leprosy. I was asked to
provide 1500 doses fo r inclusion in the drop and we don't even
know what we are supposed to b« providing. I know we can do
better; we have got to if these brave people >- the fighters and
the pilots are to survive the experience. Help. BLNORTH
^
vnoti covisions ol
E 12356
by K Jofwisofl NjiBnil
Secufiiy Council
'mmm
562
•^C> :f.vy)ft
> laportanc comdrs rttrtat to R^o San Juaaa • txp«ct cros« today. Mtn
Botto* line rupCsr* fraqile alliance ARfiC with UNO. due inability resupply.
Fore* b«li*v«« fMsIt ours they vehemently reject our reasons. Even so
we fiakinq new effor t, sending two qualified aen by boat 1 July. One to Co^nilr
Gonzo, one to Comdr lUmoi). to set up secure DZ area and organize reception.
Expect Conzo will be quickly organized. Request you coma work with us.
^llVs
'"1^1 proviswns Of £
12M^
»> H Jon,ison. Nauonal
S«cu.,ty Couna
— ,
' /
UNCLASSIFIED
- 1-(^
563
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES *
UnreTised aiwl Uii«dit«d ^
''^
Not for QooUtloo or
DupUoktloa *«*» ^^"^
/87
UNGSSSIFIED
/
DEPOSITION OF GEORGE W. CAVE
Washington, D. C.
Committee Hearingrs
of the
Wiiffly^ifi&
iINKEL/mal
11 Washington, D. C.
12
16 presiding.
b«D
ifim proiMaM o( Cb. 12356 .11
T
566
HNMSlElffiT
1 Whereupon, GEORGE W. CAVE, after having been
3 as follows:
4 EXAMINATION
5 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
IMASSIRI^
567
BNgaSSPRlT
1 A I spent -- after getting out of the Hershey
7 1951.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
568
KWU/^^igT
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
24
mnji^^rX^
569
11 Q Some Urdu?
12 A Yes.
18 A It is —
19 Q Generally.
21
25 Ghorbanifar?
OtttWrtdp^t^T
570
BNttilS6{?PT
1 A Oh, yes. Yes.
3 Mr. Ghorbanifar?
6 sights..
9 involved?
11 August 1980. I met with him one other time, I think, just
14 iis
17
18
19
20
21
7-7
571
2 on my recommendation, we
17 And —
18 And also making exorbitant demands.
19 Financial demands? ~
20
25
572
2 concerned. It is Iconcern
10 A That is correct.
wmmk
1 A Yes.
15
16
17
had provided, thSf turned out not to be truthful,
That is correct.
-^
^ I take
25 A Yes.
iiCUSSiEia.
:
574
10
ItttitASSI^BT
1 Q Are you responsible, were you responsible for
12 in September.
13
14^
15
16
22 services ?
23 A Yes.
UVli^fVMZ^iia7qi
. .
575
IIRGtA^flBIF'^ 11
6 overtones
10 nickname :n»d<|i
11
Q Let me ask you to put a. date on it. When is
12
the first time, in '85 or '86 that you learned that the"
13
United States government has renewed its dealings with
Mr. Ghorbanifar?
14
23
up or somebody up to make — not necessarily you — to
IMtl\S£ieii»T
1 this and I and the polygraph operator and the counter-
15 A Yes, I was.
20
lirlbkBiV^^^ ^WL'Ti
577
13
IRffitt^BSfcT
1 Q Let me get to the polygraph test in a second.
2 I want to show you two documents and ask you whether or not
8 this minute?
12 Headquarters.
19 document.
23 to.
24 Q Okay.
imAssiHykT
578
u
UNKIiSSWT
1 you to participate then in designing the questions for
10 about ^^^
11 A Probably. Probably^^^^H
12 Q You knew^^Hl take it?
20 for him.
(JNOA^B fT>»
579
15
wmssiREiT
A Yes, he told me about it after the fact.
''
5 to.
11 hostages?
14 That is true.
20 hostages.
25 for?
VwiilpniJllirlfcHtrn
580
ims^EifcT 16
6 A No.
8 A I don't recall.
12 thought the guy was, after having met with him, was a
13 charlatan.
16 aspect?
wMsm
25
581
17
imSSREIF^
1 terminated.
4 11th?
6 shape.
10 later.
14 then with anyone other than ^^^H Did you have conversa-
16 recall?
23 meeting?
My\&[Mit fT
582
18
IHTOBiSSBBkT
1 that meeting, Charles Allen actually meets with Ghorbanifar
2 again and has a long session with him. Did you know that
6 A That is right.
14 shock.
ig A No, I wasn't.
21
'86. Could you tell us how it was that you were brought
23 present?
H^IQU.
.
583
19
imssi^iiiT
1 what is the story? He gave me a briefing that the NSC
16 A Yes.
25 deputy chief.
WlHiblWliMrmif'T'
584
20
DNHA^IffBlr
1 Q How long --
li!iU!USi^a£IL„
585
21
HNttASS»H»T
1 aware of it, but the Israelis under the Shah had an excellent
10
11
12
14 Iran, what were your views about how the Israeli interests
15 differ and how that should affect our judgment about how
16 to proceed?
21 the Iraqi army. That was a great help for Israel during the
lumssifluk
586
22
UttGH^Ptf^T
1 Ito the Iranians and would like to
20 power in Iran.
21 Q
23
24 A
llCUiSSm.
587
23
HNt^SStWST
1 get to the groups who find Israel an anathema.
9 was the point man. And I didn't -- was not able to brief
20 the HAWK shipment, and the TOWs from earlier in the fall?
22 at that time.
588
2A
BfffiPASSfREffT
"I
A Yes. It was separate. I think I met with^^Hin
2 the morning. I can't remember when I met with Charlie. It
Q Okay
7 I can't recall.
14 accurately.
24 A That is correct.
I HHMnliiiiTrKlt!!!
589
25
BRtft^aSfeT
1 A Yes. It was a short one because Ollie was
10 strike started.
11
end mil2
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
IMASSEll.
e
590
ake «la
bp-1
UI^EA^IfiBF' 26
1 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
5 North?
6 A Yes.
8 A ^^^^^^^^^^^^H 11i
13 hotel.
22
A Caught the afternoon flight back.
lhiyEn»HnfclfcT
—
591
27
bp-2 BNttRSStlilBT
1 was discussed at that meeting?
9 Soviets^^
13 they done^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ssessment
Ghorbanifar to satisfy their faith in him. He asked me what
14
19 Q Let me
20
A They told us about that.
21
Q Let me show you what is marked as CIIN Number 251.
22
Is this your report of the meeting on March — is this a
24
A Yes. This was — when I got home that night, I
25
thought that it was a good idea — I just typed on the
OTtfWflpxnBF^
592
ySBHSHRBPT 28
1
typwriter at home. I think I did this at home. Anyway,
4 took place?
5 A Yes.
11
desperately interested in is getting spares for their Hawks .
12
He came up with this long list of 240 line items.
14
meetings at which the Hawk parts -- was it your understanding
this was the first time Ghorbanifar had come up with this
15
A Yes.
22
Q Do you know approximately how many items it was
23
at opposed to different kinds —
24
A There were 240 different items on the list. Some
25
liiiyisn'
593
;t
bp-4 29
A From!
Q Well —
A Because it was Ghorbanifar, and it was money. I
phrase is used, at the NSC was Central America and the contras?
iJEifiusiiieii:'
—
594
KffiBISSfRfffT 30
3 came back from this trip that I learned anything that was
11
from some^^^Hdeal to help out Ollie's buys in Central
12
America.
13
Were you aware of that as of this time?
14
A No.
19
in preparation for this meeting. You indicated you had done
you read?
22
A I just looked at Ghorbanifar ' s 201 to make sure
23
of the dates. When you asked me, remember, in the interview,
24
I couldn't remember the dates of when we did what. I just
25
595
;t
31
5 Q There was —
6 A In his file. I went through his file. But none
11 about financing of this deal? How much the weapons — how much
20
cone up with the money, what he was going to do?
1 got the number 251 on it, what did you do with the memorandum
2 after you wrote it up? Who would you have distributed the
3 memorandum to?
10 on
11
support the effort.
16
A I spent sometime going ove^^^^^^^^^^| — I spent
17
a lot of time in Charlie's office going over
18
everything, partly because he was usually
19
away and it was a quiet place, sometime on the Iranian branch,
20
sometime in the chief N.E. front office.
\tA
•T
597
bp-8
1 A No.
mmm' 33
8 coming to Tehran.
11
clear that the meeting that would take place would be a
12
meeting in Tehran?
14
recall later, the original venue was to be Kish Island.
.
Q Right. After you returned from this meeeting, did
15
17
A It was much later on I met with — I only met
rnkwrn
598
y
^ 34
1 Q Well, after?
2 A Yes.
6 yes. It was.
9 Q Right.
13 Paris in March?
18 I take it?
24 anything.
gmssM' 35
5 on.
12
13
14
16 in by this time?
A Yes, I was.
17
19
I don't think I went all the way back. It didn't concern me.
21
22
Q Did you have any — this is now. I am sort of
25
he ever call you during this period of time?
mmSSIri^^.IT
600
TiTi, 36
17 There were other people that felt that you had to keep him in
19 thing.
21
so that he had to be kept in it. I was more concerned that,
24 Tehran.
25
The interesting thing to me was that the Israelis
601
iraa^fiffiT 37
2 fiasco in Tehran.
11
was quite a debate. You know, I made the point I thought it
14
this issue, that the only way that you could get him out was
15
for the President to call Perez and ask him to say that he
you aware General Secord had been involved and was involved
20
in this operation?
21
II
.
602
bp-13
^L 38
6 A Yes.
12 A Yes
13 Q Okay.
15 Tel Aviv.
21
doing, why he was involved in the February meetings?
24 A I knew of him.
Hffwjyjg^
.
603
bp-14 Bsfflassfsr 39
5 accomplishment
7 Iranian businessman?
8 A Yes.
10 in this operation?
16 he was coming over on the third and had -- and also by this
19 Q Okay.
21
airport.
25
A We put him at that Renaissance Hotel in Herndon,
bp-15
Bi«tAS8l?SST 40
10 A As fai
ir as I recall ^^wasn*
, t.
18 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
20 A Yes.
23 him, then went back -^^^^^pnd I met with him and Ollie joined
isfflasfiRfflT 41
12 who he said at this meeting we would meet. I aun sure it. was
16 meeting?
19 This is mine.
mwv
—
606
IMASSiriEBT 42
14 But who said in the final analysis, no, I can't tell you.
19 Q Personal risk?
20 A Yes.
23 McFarlane?
r<r"
607
OfffiasfflHir 43
2 there.
5 discovered?
6 A That is correct.
8 out you were there, there was an excellent chance you would
9 be seized?
UtiuBlsSkTBKT
608
1
\mmw
nothing -- from that date is when we had to start timing
44
2 things, when we can pay for the Hawk s pares and the 508 TOWs
5 prepositioned.
7 understanding about the reason for the 508 TOWs? Did you know
jnr'
ll £W ft 'I (-^^ " '^-' 2 L C.J
45
7 A No.
11 Q Let me —
12 A In fact, as I recall, Ghorbanifar also took the
24 at home as well?
tdWikj\a^^!Huir
610
bp-21
1 Q
mm'
You typed this yourself, I assume?
46
7 secretary?
10 up and make copies and give them to the people that should
11 have them.
18 A Oh.
20 A TOWs.
21 Q It refers to TOWs?
22 A Yes.
t-:^
)p-22
C£BT 47
mobile radars.
A Yes.
the Israelis.'
612
bp-2 3
7 nothing about —
8 Q Central America?
9 A — Central America.
13 of it.
17 be maintained."
21
bothered us about this, what bothered me particularly is
22
there didn't seen to be much, at least as reported on the
23
Iranian side, at least as reported by Ghorbanifar, about how
nwfSteAflmnRB:'
613
MtA^f^ftflr 49
1 about that.
9
the mechanics of this meeting.
10
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE.)
11
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
wb LnqirtHpirnp
614
IIHCim»T 50
2 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
9 you indicated?
10 A Yes.
15
night of April 3 did the meetings take place?
16
A Pretty late. We had a late — Ollie got there
17
late, early — late afternoon, early evening.
18
. Q Around dinnertime?
19
A I guess maybe around 5:30, 6:00. Maybe even
like that.
22
Q Did you and Ollie leave together?
23
A No.
24
Q Did you leave first or did he leave first or
25
1
:*•? ."* ?>
fif)Kipnop>^^ g*np
615
51
11 Q Alone?
18 Q Out in California?
19 A Yes.
21
Was there any discussion at this meeting about the
22
mechanics of the delivery of the parts ai opposed to the
iLLirj.A<Lf^ir'if [i_.
616
52
WBl^BffSB^
1 the Iranians saying we have to have all the parts before
11 ask you if you can date this one for me. This is CIIN-16S.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
.
617
53
liOtM?ffi§T
1
2
--
3 You know, knowing Ghorbanifar, you have to
see, there was a lot of dumb things done. Both Nir and
4
10 change
11 Q I get you.
15
hostages released.
17
that the trip was okay,
19
the hostages.
22
23
lou are talking
24
hindsight now. Well, this is a good indication that they
25
618
MISKt^ 54
8 A No indication whatsoever.
10 could have just asked North how much it was going to be?
11
A I never asked him. In fact, the only thing we
12
ever discussed with North is what it was going to cost '
14
release the -- to ship the parts.
A No.
22
Q Was it your understanding he was setting the
23
price?
24
Yes. Because we gave it to him. He was the one
25
rv
T
619
Di^ASStPiyT 55
10
11
13
A Yes, but that didn't cor.e until the 7th of
.May .
14
15
Q Okay.
i-
16
A That was the first alarm that I had.
at the wrong note. That was around the 7th of May. That
18
MMsmu
.
620
»rj«^ri
56
3 week in May.
5 What did you do? What occurred with regard to this during
12 that were available, that we could get, but also the 508'
20 Hawk parts?
jmiSSiFM^
621
1
Mmw
Furmark on the 22nd of October, when he's talking about,
57
2 he says the price was S15 million. Did that include the
that S2 million was for, God only knows. They owed Nir.
^3 parts?
A Yes.
14
17
I mean how much money the CIA had to receive before it
18
would —
A Yes. I knew the exact figure the CIA had to
19
receive. Yes.
20
Q That became clear then during the course of
21
April?
22
A Yes. By the —
23
Q By the London meeting that was clear?
24
A Yes. A couple of weeks before that.
25
622
2
Q
mmw
Was availability pretty much established by that
58
time, too?
5 manufactured.
6 Q Now —
7 A The military agreed to give up more.
9 here. I have now forgotten when you told me. Has that
imis:yM£jL.
,
623
10 fumsm 59
4 of offices .
6 Mo .^^^^^H|^Bmyself
A NO.
e
13 meeting?
IHttUSSBilT 60
6 A Yes.
16
Ghorbanifar.
17
Q Was — okay. And was — and how long were the
18
meetings? Did they take place on both days?
meeting and that was on the 7th. Because that was the
20
21
day that Ghorbanifar told us that he had arranged for
22
the financing.
24
Churchill?
12 contrj^^d ^X)^JS^
liwiiAM.jiT^^f'r J! nil
.
626
62
1 up with?
3 with Ghorbanifar.
15 A Oh, no.
17 A No.
16 -
Q When you said it was an account controlled
22 Q Okay
23 A A Swiss account.
25
understanding that the money would go from Ghorbanifar to
UiUSSISSL
.
627
tnoe/fieggfiT 63
4 two.
6 to Nir and from Secord to the CIA and you figured in some
\mA^ itr
.
628
64
7 is nothing reallyl
9 people
10 He them ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H as
20 do that.
r»rTi
629
WBBissroT 65
1 happen when you and the one pallet would arrive, that they
5 would arrive.
7 A Three pallets.
13 stood.
16 half of them?
19 directly witt
20 A Withl
22 occasion?
8.:-t::2 0C..9
630
66
7 A H€
11
12
13
14
15
18 itself.
23 of April.
25 the pre-meeting?
mmm ^s*
631
18 67
iaiHSIfiSfT
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
IS!3USS2£?
632
68
1 like that?
2 Q I think --
1eas
7 t ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 y o u
8 were concerned that there had been a fairly hefty
11
A Yes.
12 Q Did you -- who did you talk to? What did you^.
13
do?
14 to^^^^^^^^H He
15
may have also brought iwap with Ollie. I think Ollie
16
said he would check -- talk to Nir about it.
18
and ^^^^^^^^^^^- what was the discussion you and
fn
633
rii
69
3 meeting?
10 did or not.
15 Q Were you —
16
A Oh, one other thing I might add. While we were
17
in London, as I recall Ghorbanifar said that he has
18
already spent just on this specific thing $350,000 of
19
his own money and that he had already on this overture,
/^T3pi?T
.
634
70
21
5?t8k/ISi!5ffiiT
1 going off about where this overcharge might be going?
14 A No.
ieasafiEF 71
2 the contras supplied for the two years that there was no
18 A Yes. Frankfurt.
25
four days in Rome and got called in^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand
lH?Wii«fulfiblrfn
.
636
\mm 72
2 anyway.
8 was
10 him?
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
637
73
iiu il
4 Q What did he —
5 A The first — the way it came up is the airplane
9 about it.
13 airplanes?
17 one other person I didn't ask you about. Did you discuss
19 did.
21
'Sifi^T
1
amount Ghorbanifar was charging for the 240, but you couldn't
2 really tell for sure?
3 A The problem you get into with Ghorba -- he was
12 of money.
14 concerns about your trip to Tehran? Did you have any concern
22 with Ghorbanifar.
25 them?
\
S^^lrti
639
75
4 Tehran.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 Q Did —
19 A Incidentally, that was one of the key reasons why
23 Q This is —
24 A while we were in Tehran.
r'Pt'q*
»
640
76
12 communicators.
14 there because of the clearances they have and the time that
19 Q Okay.
m \^ ^ ij t» i^
641
77
1 evening and then take off for Tehran. The flight route
2 from Tehran, of course, is all the way down the Red Sea,
8 A At Mehrabad airport.
11 correct.
14 A Yes.
21 there.
24 the government?
642
1
The only conclusion that I can arrive at is that Ollie North
2
relied very heavily on Dick Secord. They were very close
3
friends.
4
Q Did you have an understanding of what Secord '
5
job was or what he was doing for a living, whether he was
6
getting paid out of this, just what his role was? He was
7
retired by this time.
8 A Oh, yes. He was retired and I went under the
9
assumption he was doing some sort of -- he was a consultant
10
of some sort for the NSC for Ollie.
11
By the time we went to Tehran, I was pretty sure
12
that he was heavily involved in the private financing of the
15 A Yes.
19 of —
20 Q Of Secord?
21 A -- of Secord.
24 private fundraising?
25
643
iiRoa^^T
1 I assumed that he was involved in the -- had some role in the
3 Q Did —
4 A I couldn't give you any -- I have no idea of what
11 A Yes.
13 Resources?
iiibnouirikir^
644
mag8 80
J 4^1
1
don't really recall well, because you are concentrating on
7 translate.
11 Q Probably more?
12 A Yes.
13 Q Okay.
19 Q The two --
22 Q You did?
24 citizen as translator —
25 Q One of the reasons for you getting involved was to
.
645
81
!Wft§§Psr
1 get --
to go -- that
6 what transpires in them that it was an attempt
to try to convince —
9 is apart from the Ghorbanifar channel
13 guts of it here.
because we
18 A This kept changing on a daily basis,
deposit in the CIA
19 couldn't set the date until we got the
20 account
date that we
24 a week. Then we were able to set the precise
25 would arrive.
\\\m AC
'tlT^ rp
646
magi
82
1
Q Is It your recollection that Ghorbanifar then was
10 until we got the money in our account, we could not give any
12 account, we could.
18 would take us that much to get the ship to get the material
19 in place in Israel.
21 plane that arrived, you said you took one of four pallets.
25 pallet.
SlWs!^ii.m
647
83
8 released, despite the fact that the delegation and the parts
9 have arrived?
18 kind of hostile. In fact, the guy that they brought who was
magl2 84
2 that they would consider the deal for two hostages and the
3 H^j^ spares, and then they would work on getting the other
7 dialogue.
20 land the Rev Guard guy showed up, and we told them
21 we were leaving.
25 th€ aircraft.
UmASIIiiiAp
649
85
1
So, we were able to take off. But I was the last
2
one on the plane. I talked to the two Iranians. They said
3
that they really weren't prepared for us.
4
Why, after all that had gone on -- I don't know
5
whether you can blame it on Ghorbanifar or what. One of the
6
things that came out during the meeting, they showed me all
7 kinds of documentation from Ghorbanifar. He was lying
6
to both sides. He had painted this to the Iranians as the
11
cameras, spare parts for the helicopters, si]ff^f.ittf.fi- missiles
12 large number of TOWs, 20 radars, a lot of other things.
14 A Yes.
16 North?
17 A Yes, I did.
20 of the day you left struck his own deal with Ghorbanifar,
21 ordered the planes to arrive with the rest of the parts, and
650
86
IQflET
1
A Not that I know of. The plane never left the
2 ground
3 Q So you think that story is not true?
12 thing.
18 A Oh, yes.
19 Q Do you recall —
20 A This is very interesting. Why, he approached —
21 Ghorbanifar said to me, "I want to talk to you." We went
23 He said, "They are going to ask you about the pricing, and
imn «n
651
87
In fact, he
9 all the expenses Ghorbanifar had up to this.
of
10 had to pay a large amount of bribes to a whole raft
16 A Yes.
18 up? What is it that they said to you and what did you
19 respond?
these
22 know anything about the logistics, the pricing of
magi 6
WJt
1 A Yes. It was -- is this accurate?
6 thing that they did raise is that the head, the senior
8 had written, giving them all this stuff that we had never
14 thought we had copies of. But I could never find the damned
16 clear Ghorbanifar was telling the Iranian side one thing and
20 was —
21 A Twenty-four and a half.
24 Hawk parts?
25 A I don't know.
653
mag 1 7 3 9
Pffil^ffRifiT
1 The way Nir said, he said, "Hey, look, that
10
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ There was this
11 conversation.
15 much money?
mag 18
BRttP^ffiBT
1
Q Was —
2
A I don't know whether we talked about this in Tehran
3
or right after. I can't recall.
4
Q Let me make sure that is everything I wanted to
5
ask you about the Iran trip.
6
MR. PEARLINE: Could we take a couple minutes
7
break?
6
MR. EGGLESTON: We are going to have to have
9 lunch at some point, because am not about to end.
I
10
What I was going to do is get you back — we can
11
go off the record.
12
(Discussion off the record.)
13 MR. EGGLESTON: We can go back on the record.
14 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
24 A No.
9^
BJJStfS
ET 91
2 A No.
8 States?
17 to stay a night in Tel Aviv. So, I had dinner that night witli
18 Nir and his wife and then flew back the next morning.
23 A No.
25 A Yes.
656
92
1
Q Was your wife aware you had gone off to Tehran?
2 A No.
4 24 hours later?
6 next morning.
13 people.
19 thing
24 A Yes. .. .^ --^ -^
rp
657
93
mag 21
1 A Yes.
trip?
11 Q What was your impression of his view of the
19 cancel it."
mML^
658
94
mag22
6 maintaining a dialogue.
9 out at the most. Two more, I think we can count on. Maybe
15 the intermediary?
659
95
1
Are there meetings during that time about whether or not to
7 Jenco
10 A Yes.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 "';>
l''•^^»^^
T
.
660
96
DKKtASSffiEl^
1
AFTERNOON SESSION
2 1:35 p.m.
5 as follows:
7 Mr. Cave.
9 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
11 had just finished the trip to Tehran in late May and the
19 515 and — why don't I give you — I will start with 515.
20 A Okay
iM:ui££j:i£[L
^ucv^ "CtiUuftl
661
97
DNKASSm^
m2 1 about the pricing is on the 20th, isn't it?
5 to this.
in Tehran.
15 between Nir, Ghorbanifar, and the Iranians
Ghorbanifar. It
16 NOW when we refer to our friend, that is
22 getting back?
m3
HOtUt^W' 98
1 by^^^^^^H
on a request by It was passed through by
2 Ghorbanifar.
14 A Yes.
20 Q Let me just ask you how often did you meet with
MCL^lEltiL
663
ni4 1
mm^
couple of meetings. But once we had the meetings with
99
4 and the time of the new channel, the meetings are not very
5 often?
8 A Yes.
23 know that you need to review it, but I just wonder if this
•^isHMlL
664
m5 1
A Yes.
mmms
This is a follow-up of the other one in
100
6 at the end you indicate once again that you have doubts that
15 truth.
17 admit to you in Tehran that they did not have control over
18 the hostages?
19 A Yes.
24 they thought that they could get — were pretty sure they
101
iiIi£LI&i^^-i
.
666
102
m7 1 thousand were not that important and they had to return the
2 other materials."
6 Q Right.
10 returned.
13 A Yes.
16 to the TOWs?
23 Q He's not?
24 A No
667
103
m8
1 Alt was awful
3 A Yes.
6 rhino hide.
7 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
10 engaged during this time was really not you and people at
11 the Agency but the people who were active were Ghorbanifar
12 and Nir?
668
m9 1 going
^mm^ 104
3 just ^^^I^^^H
4 A But via Ghorbanifar.
17 A Yes.
22 Q Four million?
mmm
with Ghorbanifar.
103
said only $1 million of lit was for the HAWK spares and
A Unrelated, yes.
put some accountants onto it, which they did. They said they
Wi&li^ilpr 106
mil 1
Q Letting Ghorbanifar?
2 A Yes.
7 prices with regard to the amount that the HAWK parts had
14 referring to.
24 conversation?
DELASSIM,
-
671
ims»a&feT 107
7 it, send it. And we eventually got it, but even much later
6 than this.
13 from?
19 sent to Iran or how they got them. But actually they are
24 excessed.
108
3 later use with the new channel, was that the price was a
6 Q I am sorry?
8 turer's cost.
10 I
receive the list, if you recall? This is late — last
11 day of June.
12 A Sometime in July.
13 Q Sometime in July?
14 A Yes.
109
liflKJfiflHFT
ml4 1 the prices. There must have been some concern that the
3 they are just going to kill the hostages as revenge for them
9 about it. But the basic position we took with them was that
11 was the man that actually sold the stuff to them. This
12 is one of the reasons why when we met with the new channel
15 and say what in the world is going on? We gave you items
25 Q This
'^T^
2-692 0-88-23
674
no
SNffii^ffffiT
ml5 1
A It was just basically meetings with Colonel North,
4 would do.
9 A Well, I don't —
10 Q Is it serious?
13 captors.
16 give them up; and the Iranians had other long-term goals
18 I don't think they would allow that to deter them from their
19 long-term goals.
22 say two meetings on July 10th and 11th of 1986. The dates
24 notes?
675
111
3 A Ten July?
9 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
12 showed you two documents, 169 and 170. Could you describe
16
that^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^had been
18
Rafsanjani was interested in a discrete contact with the
19
Americans. For some reason, ^^^^^^^^^^^^also wanted to
21
brought^^^^^^^H^Hjj^m-- they
24
THE WITNESS: ^^^^^^Hto the United States. We
112
BNtt^fflffiT
117 1 MR. LEON. Who is we?
5 from me.
8 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
9 Q Okay.
16 Q Thank you.
20 A On my home computer.
113
BNttfSSifSfiT
il8 1 A Oh, yes. I wish Charlie hadn't given him my
5 what the hell was going on. She knows some Persian. Yes.
13 Q That who —
14 A The Iranians hadn't succeeded.
16 released?
17 A Yes.
18 Q
inforTnatior^^H|H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H but
22 we got from Nir and Ghorbanifar was that there was efforts
25 trying.
mmm
678
wfsm 114
2 that on July 21st, you met with Nir. ¥ou must have gone
8 significant events ?
9 A No.
11 July 21st.
14 was one of those typical North trips where you g<»t off
15 the plane for six hours and are supposed to get back on
679
115
to be released.
meeting in Frankfurt?
A Yes.
iliiij'iiJi
.
680
116
ONttfSStPIItT
in21
1 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
9 Q Couple of hours?
10 A About an hour-and-a-half
15 did.
iimCTEiT
681
117
iKtASSfflffiT
Jencko.
A No.
A No.
Let me ask, you indicated — this is the first time you met
is that correct?
682
m23
Wt 118
7 what have you, and that there was a letter — had sent a
9 Q Right.
13 letter.
14 Q I do.
18 changed.
jMLmihitL^
.
683
119
Frankfurt
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
is released?
the 26th and you were going to meet North and Secord in
120
7 the hostages, I mean when they were released. That was all
9 Q Right.
12 clear. Do you think around this time there was only one
18 two ways. It was the day before, something was along the
25 Whether w^ pe^ r
685
121
Q I get It.
Ollie was very busy sending K/\-47 messages abou t how to ry^
handle the — Jenclp when he was released. Didn't they
(^
55.?.
m uiL
686
«3A
magi WI^^PT 122
1
Q You mean held him without revealing that he had
2 been released?
5 would be released?
7 that.
9 people?
11 of getting more.
16 public.
20
m
25 not attend.
-
.1 •
687
ifflttASiaiftT 123
Q I understand that.
A Oh, man.
is the number of the document about which Mr. Cave was just
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
689
#3B
125
mas 1
1
call. In this call, he indicates that they were prepared
2
to settle their accounts with Ghorbanifar as soon as
mmm
690
126
\mssnw
m2 1 I forget the exact date of the meeting, but it
6 Iranians.
14 channel?
23 channel.
ltiyClJQ£iCl£lL„
.
691
m3 1
mmm§
words, when they got together back there and said what are
127
11 A Wit
12 Q Yes. -
^ ^- '
19 seen it.
22 Ghorbanif ar
128
UBflSOTffT
m4 1 from the new channel.
16 decisions?
129
6
^^^^^^^^^^1 we spent a lot of time discussing this, how
8 ideas.
17 lot until after we got into the second channel and then
23 have very many people who were cut in. So when you wanted
130
UNCa^FSF
1
away on trips, Dewey would take over his role in this
2 operation.
5 A Yes.
9
lin late August and then I take it there is a meeting
10
in Washington with the second channel on the 19th and 20th
of September?
11
12
A That is correct.
13
Q Were there any meetings with either Ghorbanifar,
131
8 and was obviously trying to find out how much of all the
11 with the war and with the proposed offensive against Iraq
14 two countries.
24 the meeting.
HffllSSKP,
696
132
ASSIFIED
1 subsequent meeting that he said that they might bring
10 involved?
14
17 discussion.
20 substantive discussions.
25 talked.
UNAU^SSiEP,
697
m9 Q Without Hakim?
1
A Ollie's theory was that Hakim could then handle
2
wanted.
the business end of things such as they
3
Q By this time — it struck me that some of the
4
early meetings|||K^^attended way back in the
5
spring of '86. By this time he is not attending any
6
meetings. Is there a reason that he's not attending?
7
A No. I guess they decided to let me handle them.
8
NSC initiative.
We still considered this basically an
9 why he
Q I wonder if there was a decision about
10
wouldn't be there. Particularly with the new channel which
11
seemed to be promising, I wonder if there was discussion
12
in?
about someone else should be brou.nt
13
A No.
14
Q There was also a discussion — actually I inter-
15 the 19th.
rupted you. YOU told me about the meeting of
16
the same place and the
was the meeting on the 20th in
17
same players, substantially?
18
A Yes. It was -- we gavej
19
20th.
briefing on the Soviets on the
20
Q Is that —
21
A I did that.
22 that happened on the
Q is that substantially all
23
20th?
24 discussions.
A I think there were some other
25
UNOAiSJ^m
698
mlO 1
mfimm
follow-up discussions. Ollie told him that for the time
13J
4 possible steps.
10 discussed.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
OCO^
uNcuasimiL
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE P RESIDENT
2
699
135
3 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
4 Q Yes.
13 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
15 know the person by name prior to the time you had met him?
We of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hbut
18 not him.
22 A Yes.
»mujl.mi:jj:a.
700
136
3 they might be able to expect that they could get from us.
15 resumption?
19 going to get all the hostages out. I know a lot about ^^|
20 They are one of the most
23 respond?
*!»^j^j 137
.ml 3 1 but they would never release all of them until they got some
8 French hostages.
18 formulated?
25 at that time.
iWKIiASSIfm,
702
138
•^^gLfBSJRft*
ml4 Q That is right. Two had been released and there
by this time?
Q The seizure —
A This is after they released Jenclfo. Damn. I
date of that.
end mas
UNCLftSSlFlEO
—
703
»3c
bp-1
oiffiBisaffif^ 139
4 of weapons?
5 A Oh, yes.
7 A TOWs is my recollection.
9 in Frankfurt.
22 contacts.
704
wBtimfflr 140
9 away.
11 that the State Department was being kept fully apprised by the
'
12 NSC about what was going on. Because the Iranians were
17 October.
20 We give a brief —
21
They give us a brief and a huge
23
24
Mmm.
25
705
ttNCtHSglPKSi' 141
8 A Secord.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
They talked
24
bp HNtASSIFe'^ 142
6 they realize once the war was over they had to rebuild the
7 country and the only way they could turn was to the West.
11 Oh, what came out was that on ending the war, in addition to
12 the fact that they had — they said the rationale behind- the
17
18
19 The one worry they had was that once the war was
22 negotiated end to the war, and then findput they would not
viVtiLfig|vui^lUl.'i
707
143
the bible?
said
to the Senate, because they asked about the cake, and
went together.
occurred
bible came in the United States or whether the bible
in Frank^^t?
IINELASSIFIE.
.
708
3 this meeting?
4 A Which meeting?
12 A No
19 going to cost.
22 out —
23 A We are discussing with the Iranians. The Iranians
tMS^ASstRer 145
that was.
cut Ghorbanifar out of the loop and maybe Nir with him.
A No. No. No. They would pay — they would deal with
iNCUMJED.
710
146
1 Hakim.
9 A Okay.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
wmm.
711
91H'
(Discussion held off the record.)
147
BY MR. EGGLESTON: j^ _
Q Let me ask you, you have a meeting withi
in late October?
A That is correct.
A Furmark.
A It was in Mainz.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^H from —
A The two — the Iranian in London, the two Iranians
148
13 They told us when McFarlane was in Tehran, they did not know
14 him. The only one they knew was me. They could not locate
22
know, no one has picked it up. He warned us the thing was
UNCLASSKiEOn
713
Q
MiggiW
Who were responsible for what?
149
Q Okay.
plane was in the air. He took off to make sure that one —
that the hostages would be released.
IfNfSMSfiiEfff^
714
bp-4
UN^I GT
150
5 to me there.
7 in lajB October?
8 A No.
11 Jacobsen?
12 A Second of November.
16
over there?
17
A Yes. I had to clean up a couple of things in
18
FrankfJ^rt and I think I took a day off and saw my grand-
19
A.
20
back. I can't remember. I think it was a Sunday. Then
21
I ceune back on Monday.
23
have a conversation — do you call Tehran or anything?
A Yes.
24
Q Where were you when you called Tehran?
25
lUlfiLASSlElEflL
715
^_^ 151
7 Q On the second?
9 the second.
13 A Back here.
15 A ^^^^^^^^^
Q ^^^^^^^^^1 What was the purpose of that
16
17
conversation?
18
A To findout where the hell the other hostage was.
WKl^SS^m
716
2 a with|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hin
9 A Yes.
17
meetings?
19
more deunned messages back to — this is why the cowboy thing -
20
everything he did, he sent a message back to Poindexter.
21
Q This is why you don't believe the rogue staffer
22
theory?
uMhSSiTM? 153
1 A Yes.
9 a message.
13 end.
16
A In short the Iranians wanted to continue the
17
dialogue, but thought maybe the best thing to do was leave
19
down. They were hopeful that we, on our side, could arrange
Faint
20 it so there would be as little notjp-iety as possible.
21 hope.
UNfilASSlEimi.
718
2 time.
6 this.
12 that right?
16 well?
17 A I don' t know.
22
UNCIAS£I£1E0,
719
1 A
^mwM
It was basically to pass a message to the Iranian
155
3 what happened.
6 with Furmark?
8 away.
16 A Yes.
720
156
I
1 and hear him out completely, which was what our >nhiivb^ was
3 and had a long dinner with him in New York in which Charlie
4 and I just sat there and listened to him and took notes.
8 you recall, what was the focus of what he was telling you?
12 it from the beginning when the Israelis started it, and •then
14 deal and how it had been arranged and what the dangers were,
18 Casey at home and told him — we didn't tell him much on the
20 get the first shuttle out the following morning and come
uvaAssiBB^
721
OWRifi^flQg^ 157
2 of meetings.
10 yourself?
14 security problems?
16
focus about what happen if this surfaced. He had the
21
than most people. I can't see anyone that is owed $9 million
22
trying to go to court the way he said he would go to court
UKClASSI^IiD..
722
wstmi^ 158
2 A Yes.
7 figures.
11 you let him sell an additional 1,000 TOWs and that will
12 even thingaap, let him get back in flush again and this Is
13 what the Iranians tell us is that they figure they owe him
21
the same. Furmark tells you of all the excess here that he
'•n^'K^ n
723
ON^AiSffeT 159
20 t° thM atoatras.
22 heard what you heard in the spring, and I know you have been
23 asked this before, but you also knew Secord and North were
25 Yes.
UNCLASSIFIED
724
fllttlliEOfllS'
160
4 Ollie and say, "Ollie, you and Dick were the money guys in
16
A I haven't seen him since then. So I never asked
17
him about it. I figured that if it was really true, he
- 19
Q Did you suspect it might be true?
O
!
25
A Yes. The thing that always — I could never
(weEftisffw 161
8 A Yes.
15 deal.
20 tank.
21
Qljl Did you have any knowledge of whose ship it was?
24 ship somewhere?
162
5 and Secord?
11 Q Let's go to redirected.
15 vague, and you didn't pay much attention to this, but did you
17 A I don't know.
19 you to —
20 A No. It was in the Mediterranean.
22 contra operation?
l)ILfiS$]Pii 163-164
7 press.
10 Not well.
14 of times.
18 anything.
21
A No.
ui!ISKs^ffn^' 165
7 the guy is. I imagine there are people that know him that
14 with anybody.
16
find Ollie had associated with Tom Clines?
17
A I was surprised when he just brought the name up
19
not — I never had any precise knowledge of what he was
20
doing with hira.
21
Q And you don't recall it was in connection with
don't know.
25
UNCLASSIFIED
729
smi^EnREir 166
7 who did some work with him, if you recall, or have any
8 knowledge?
21
A Yes.
23 about?
UNCLASSIFIED
1
730
OKtCflS^flRI^ 167
7 for the --
10 other channel?
lid?
25
llllPIHSgJFlEP
731
UHGiA^CJIlT 168
5 Q That is —
6 A This is their man who wasl
10 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
19
A No.
21
October 14 at 3:30 in the afternoon. At 4 o'clock it appears
22
Ollie met with the director.
UNCLASSlElEOi
.
732
UN0KASSi3£JliET 169
7 Colonel North leaves for London. This would have been right
10 A No.
12 A No
13 Q And —
14 A Might have been to meet Nir. I remember Nir at
19
Did you accompany him on this trip to Geneva?
4/
20 A Yes. I don't think we went on the stne plane.
21
Maybe we did. But that was the trip where we went to see
23
because they had — in the hotel they had CNN and his picture
25
Q Now we are really up to the time period where —
UNAiJftSSIFrl^^
733
DlA^ffSSH^mEEiT 170
13 his^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l guy
21 channel open.
UNCa^FJID T-irr
734
171
UNCIAS
1 that the speech writers then boiled down into the President's
2 speech.
4 begun?
10 present?
12 Ollie was there. The secretaries were there, and also his
16 on the chronology.
what exact role you played. I hope you didn't work very hard
25
uTU&EndvH^tijMT
735
SECRET 172
UNtlASSIRED
1 on it.
3 hard on the —
4 Q He is referring to Wednesday, November 19th.
7 conference.
11 3:30 or so.
thinfc,
12 A Because a lot of people came over from, I
14
LEON :hH^^^^^|
15
THE WITNESS: ^^^^^^H He
16
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
17
Who ^^^^^^^^^^H
of the DDO's
18 A He is sort of the executive director
19 office.
there?
21
anybody from the Department of Justice
A No.
22
Q Chuck CoopeEi^Ed_Med3fe^_^^nybody^Ii
23
A No.
24
Q that meetingl
happened at tnac
What happenea meetAny.
25
.
736
umSSfPRST 173
4 that you decide on one thing one day and the next day it
8 meeting
14 correction.
17 A There was one thing that disturbed me: the one thingi
24 thing I recall.
UHCI^^AHr.
,
737
(lj(^flSS(Hrar 174
12 the next day Casey begins to testify. Did you have any ifole
14 21st.
23 with questions?
24 A No.
25 Q No?
u(i]cyi$»^d.
82-692 0-88-25
—
738
bp-2 8
u?ia9k^fi6^ 175
4 A No.
13 didn't see where they could have found that much money; not
14 when you are dealing with people like Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi
15 They were not going to let you get away with that much money.
17
but the amounts were too large?
18
A Yes.
20
time period in late November discuss with Ollie whether or
21
not there might have been a diversion?
22
A No.
23 Q And do you recall when the last time was that you
24
talked to North?
UMCLiSSLFP-.
)
739
2 Q
mw^
called to wish me a merry Christmas.
He called you?
IFIED
176
4 right after New Year's, asked him how he was. That was all.
10 (Recess.
11 EXAMINATION
12 BY MR. LEON:
16 going along I would like to ask you about. Bear with me,
17 if you will.
23 and a person nc
24 A
iiiimjissiEJEa-
740
2 A I
mMm
if so, what was -- what was the purpose of it?
5 Yes.
7 About?
13 idea.
23 Q Who is
UNCBSSlPSfi'RET 178
A Clairf George.
this date? ^
A I think it was before this date. It was sometime
after we came back from the March visit that North told me
Government?
Q Who is they?
UMPU^Filil.
742
179
12 Q By who?
22 diinension of it?
25
full of initiative.
T?ibr*^H!Wfrr
743
OKA/ffiUKEEr 180
18
brought into the picture, the hundred-million-dollar vote
19
on the contrasf took place.
20
I don't know if you can recall that, but it was a
21
major legislative effort. Wednesday, March 19 was the vote.
m«§§)fm.
744
2
MME
rescheduled because he was working hard on the vote.
7 A No.
16 be around him much that it doesn't come up, but how does
20 said -- -V
21 Q Father >iiniii?- J
He would never go
25
.
745
182
Q May 6?
early. So —
Q Would it be possible thatl
George?
A Yes.
uNULftSSinRr
.
746
183
7 there.
17 Teh*ran.
w
18 BY MR. LEON:
20
21 A No.
747
on that?
Q
u Mm^
Well, let's see. May 22nd.
184
matters
A No.^^^^^^
[there's two different
Valley and the 9i»«wt» of the south. The guys in the Bekaa
A
mASSIFSED
748
185
13 Tehfran.
749
11 it?
15
16
19
Allen was specifically told to limit dissemination.
Poindexter's office.
22
Q And did Charlie tell you that himself?
23
A Oh, res. But *ll^"^ McFarlane swore that he
24
kept the Secretary of State fully briefed on everything
25
LilCLii^'Mf^A^
.
750
^j(^S5lBKi^ 187
4 Q Okay
13 Zur, Z-u-r?
14 A No.
16 July 10?
17 A No.
18
"
Q On the July 17 meeting you testified to before,
21
A Hakim, yes.
23
that time frame, were you aware of any efforts on the
UMCUl^^m,
751
UNCLASSIFIED
1
that I can recall is when he was in Tel Aviv. I don't
11 the meeting took place between the Vice President and Nir
14 meeting.
17 Vice President?
l^Nt'LASSIRUP
752
^ 189
9 1986?
10 A No.
22 once?
24 November, yes.
'n"fi'f x*r7^'''H3T?rn
753
190
yvRRte^EinBr
William Zucker?
A No.
anything?
-
Q Do you know where it was? In a hotel?
A No.
context --
UNClASSlflED
754
IMMLlKSIREir 191
3 A No.
7 second channel.
9 meeting?
14 highly of him.
17 story or not.
E^MCUssicifa^
.
755
'&ii^mms& 192
1 at Seven Corners.
5 in Iran^
7 A In Iran, right
15 time frame.
16 A Yes.
20
l"NCJ.ft3SlfiEflUn
756
193
9 promising.
11 22nd, which was a Monday, and on the 24th when there was
15 A No.
17 A No.
19 him?
21
22
23
24
25
UNCLASSIFIED
mi'N'rfc riT-1/^T^T'wn
757
SECRET 194
ASSfFfED
1
Q On October 9th, North's calendar indicates he
4 A Yes.
5 Q B-A-H-M-A-N —
6 A He works here.
8 A-D-E-H.
10 Q He does?
13 at the meeting?
15 it.
758
2
A
Q
I
mmm
wasn't at that meeting, no.
3 A No.
6 A No.
9 D_u_p_R_i_s?
10 A Mark Dupris?
11 Q Yes.
17 A Who?
22 S-O-N.
23 A No
(fJ(i;i/IXi(fi£n-
759
19,6
ufflsSW
course, there was the DOJ meeting at 4:00 o'clock with
at 2:15 and the meeting with the whole group to go over the
TQ 197
1 A Yes.
u
2 Q Were you aware that if Furmark met with Casey
4 A I think so.
23 Q What happened?
m^issm 198
A Yes.
A That is right.
might have talked to Gates and Charlie Allen about it, but
from Langley and he had already met with Furmark and they
NSPG meeting.
UNCLA$aiO£i)„
.
762
199
ifflffhSSfffHT
1 to visit Casey.
8 specific date.
10 telling you after that time period that he had met with
12 was being —
13 A I recall there was one period after that that he
19 meeting?
20 A No
763
COMMITTEE
is that correct?
A That is correct.
» rfrMTY^t'l^f ^lihW 1
I
764
om/^fH^gf 201
1
A It was mainly after the fact. One of the big
3 the Star of David was on nine of the 18 Hawjcs, and the fact
4 that the Iranians didn't accept them, they were the wrong
6 to Israel.
11 the disclosure? . .
12 A The disclosures.
19 the NSC had arranged for — with Israel for the shipment
23 referring to?
iiWHt^uHnDJ p ilu U
765
202
UU^lftSBBfifeT
1 Q Can you recall anything else they might have
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24 82-L92 U.uj
25
766
omn^Si^ 203
1
Q I understand. But it occurs to me when you were
15 what you were told on that subject when you were briefed
20 go through.
24 equipment, and the problem evolved when the crew, after the
UHCLAaSJElEa.
767
204
uira^^fliiT
wasn't oil field equipment they were carrying.
artillery.
Q Do you recall —
A But that was about the end of my — the brief.
UNCLASSIPiD
768
205
7 Q On what basis?
18 place they could reasonably hold them where they could have
22 desalinization plant had broken down and the runway had not
25 They said we would stand out like sore thumbs and the only
u(I£USSie:ed,„
769
206
um^^REo^'^
logical alternative was for us to first come to Tehran.
the risks?
A No, I can't.
liNClAaSll^yi.
'««
770
207
1
type of decision?
2 can't believe -- it would have had to go higher
A I
3 than him.
4
Q As I understand it, when Mr. McFarlane arrived in
5 Tehran -- let me back up and try one other sort o* related
6 subject first.
7 You said that it is your understanding that the
8 reason that there was no preparatory meetings in Tehran
9 itself was concern over the security risks that are
10 entailed.
HMCLJlSMJiL-
771
msi^sskET 208
big risk and a big financial risk that I thought that the
these lines, but not that he had made three specific press
guidances.
know.
ilMfiESlEl£i
772
209
unisussimb'^
1 why a capable private citizen could not have been adequately
10 him indispensable?
17 weren't you?
18 A Yes.
20 in as well?
23 Q Okay.
ummico,
773
UWU^^T 210
Q Thank you.
about the nature of the deal going into the Tehran trip
in May 1986.
him about sort of on each of the trips what was the under-
of it.
»" «• Wj*^t*OT^rPTOi?^',Tra'''
774
mBmmsh: 211
1
each stage.
9 Mr. Ghorbanifar.
16 that ground.
22 series of proposals.
24 standing with the Iranians for one reason or another had not
212
imtH^RE^T
have occurred -- that is, the hostages had not been
sent the rest of the spare parts and so on. Is that basically
correct?
released.
were turned down without any question about whether that was
counter offer?
UNtlASSIFe.
776
10 asked for time to get two — the two hostages under their
12 aircraft with the rest of the Hawk spares within, you kiiow,
14 agreed.
18 thi"s morning somewhat, but I wanted to ask you what were the
24 all of that.
25
MimiFBn
777
SB
wmmSiET 214
A No.
778
p6 l\S
TDT-y\u
779
UHOASnT 216
10 to make money.
13 truthful.
im Tim
780
217
yN|»SStg(icr
1 interested, we could probably developed as we eventually did
13
14 [did you
16 you sort of said, gee, you know, and then you described
19 better sources?
25 Ghorbanifar
781
218
\IRBftSKBHfeT
1
'
3 A In competitive analysis?
6 A Yes.
13 we are tracing.
15
w
17
19
20
21
oo
23
24
25
782
219
\IRK^S9^'
virtually nil.
^SSIRHfeT
1
11 After all, you put him on the burn list. Would that
18 mijtute, please?
21 record.
23
24
25
nT^i^-Dipr^
784
221
\)OGtd(SSIB&T
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
18 COMMITTEE
19 BY MR. WOODCOCK:
222
IHtfiMSSIBE&T
this is an official inquiry of the committee.
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
223
UHttftSSiBEk'
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
end
mag
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
w
787
DEKlEl)
TdTAU
788
225
BHfltlSSfftaT
10
This would be December of 1985.
12
embassy case. One of the big bugaboos on that was the r.
13
Iranians insisting on the release of the embargoed arms
14
which, depending on who we listened to, was anywhere from
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
??
23
24
25
CTr^DTPnn
789
p& m
tNlEj)
OTAU
790
10
11
12
13
14
19 A Yes.
iiiil^yC^iiCiiJ-.^
791
228
trntuffistR^
1 said something once to him that he hadn't paid much
2 attention to.
15 copy of it.
17 A Yes.
19 Nir or Ghorbanifar?
20 A No. ,!-.«•'
22 that?
muu^Aaainra.
792
UHStA^Mb 229
6 A That's correct.
10 A In what way?
11
Q Well, that's what I eun asking you. In any
12 way?
16
17
18
19
So the hostage location force was very much
21
22
^3
24
25
iirWrl fcflAflFuuvii
793
230
IttfiUSSIEEBT
1 A But by and large, the hostage location foi
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
rnoptfybiF'
794
«6
HNWWEIt 231
5 A Yes.
10
11
.2.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
miiS^HEi.
795
232
imSSIBEftr
in2 1 under a very tight reign. For instance, when we met in
17 financial difficulties?
18 A I assumed that.
ii\ifi»^^i^.!l_
796
233
2 That —
3 That the Israelis were helping Ghorbanifar
4 financially?
9 assistance to Ghorbanifar.
12 telephone conversations?
15 office for taping conversations with Nir. Not with Nir, but
20 with Ghorbanifar.
22 to you?
234
MISSffS
m4 1 Colonel North.
6 assetl
8 call him — on him, but I don't think you could ever call
12
13
14
15
21 reach?
»miissii;iFfirp
798
m5 Q
m^^^^
When you say we, you mean the CIA collectively?
235
iammt
-
799
m6 1 Q
«msm
When you got the HAWK list from Ghorbanifar in
236
7 Office of Logistics to then take the list and find out the
14 A Right.
22 A That is correct
25 that right?
Ml^ML
800
1
A
Q
mm^
That is correct.
2
encompass all the things the Iranians had requested?
3
A No. There were several items that were no longer
4
manufactured and there were several items on which we did
5
not have the number on the shelf that they requested.
6
Q Now did you understand that of some of those items
7
that either were not in Israel or were not on your pallet
8
in Iran, that they might become available in the future?
9
A Yes. We had an idea. Some of them, the
10
manufacturing process was very low. We would have had
11
to speed it up to get them.
12
Q Let me ask you, the $24.5 million figure, did you
13
have any understanding that that might also encompass
14
parts yet to come?
15
A Oh, no.
16
Q So your understanding was —
17
A Not that I knew of, no.
18
Q So your understanding of that was that that
19
covered the parts waiting in Israel and the parts you
20
brought with you and no other parts; is that right?
21
A On that ship^^But Ghorbanifar told me this is
22
what they owe me. They are going to ask you what the cost
23
is and there are other things involved in this that you
24
don't know about. Tell them that that is the right
25
mi^^nffip
801
UNOMSSKHsIt 238
that that covered only the parts in Israel and the parts
North about it and asked him what the hell was going
WUS^lflED.,
802
239
URRiltSSWElET
ra9 1 out how high — the high figure that was being suggested
2 for the HAWK parts -- and this is even before you arrived
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
18 is high.
19 A Higher. "
fiiHsWbmwHF^b IFip
803
IWeiA^Bftr 240
problem?
Lng of
tjfinkir producing a document which showed that FMS
than the Israelis pay for TOWs. On the thousand TOWs Nir
241
WKUSSIEIHkT
^11 1 MR. EGGLESTON: Because it was too low?
3 BY MR. WOODCOCK:
7 Edwin Wilson?
14 in him.
20 understanding, when you met with Roy Furmark for the first
23 that right?
25 another thousand TOWs that would get him out of the hole
iiM£ii^:mu;jk
805
242
DNOtl^KfiT
and solve the whole problem.
this thing.
f ron^^^^
Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about that.
mmm' 243
inl3 1
6 position?
13 operation.
15 later?
16 A A month later.
18 aware of that?
25 facturer.
m^\ h
l-rsVjf T^T-im
807
W^Wi 24-1
3 lists are.
13 Q North did?
17
Actually, you can't.
18
Q
19
your home at one point from^^^^^H is that right?
21
Charlie Allen gave him my home phone number.
SML
808
2.45
HNOtASStHilT
\15 1 A He was able to get the number, you know. I
4 to him.
7 hostage in July?
14 with him.
in#^-^%'-jCT!n^fffti STH
i t ill
809
246
ig^B^SStBilkT
in London that one could be gotten out if we sent in the
Washington.
specifically.
a lot of time.
North but North had cut Nir off for a period of time?
he could on Charlie.
^imSSlElEH.
810
mmsiRKT 247
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
811
um»ssmpT 248
he called up his man and gave him the check and two days
••A.l2»
812
249
UMfiHi^tHS^T
ml9 1 Q But your understanding was as far as the CIA
24 A No. What the Swiss banks can do, they can arrest
25 y°^ ^"'^ hold you until you make good on your obligations.
h¥ii » *%T%lr€dT'l
813
250
DNt»SSIffr
That is obviously what they did with Ghorbanifar. He
A Not to me.
met him.
iiMi5;5:i£i£a,
814
y/msssi^' 251
^21 ''
Q The quote goes on, "An NSC consultant reported to
9 girl/friend either.
12 you weren't sure that at the time you knew the name of ft^e
15 When it came up, when they made the offer of the tank,
16 that is the first time I ever was aware that there was a
18 they had this boat that was in the Mediterrfmean and they
22 Erria?
_jimASSiffia„
815
UNGiW&T 252
A Yes.
that was killed, but one of them was still alive. It was
253
tlH%KSSKfi&'
m23 1 Ghorbanif ar; is that right?
2 A Yes,
4 right?
8 think that the biggest thing he had going for him was the
14 A Yes.
18 attention?
19 A I did.
24 started.
missm 25-1
2 opinion of Ghorbanifar?
12 over before the last trip to Geneva, that is the 8th through
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
72
23
24
25
818
UHQASSIB^T 255
m25 1
3 Department of Defense?
4 A I didn't, no.
6 in —
7 A ^^^^^^^^^H dealt with, what was his ncune,
9 logistics.
12 BY MR. WOODCOCK:
15 i.n the event that you were seized and held captive?
256
UHGUSSIBlEftiT
m26 1 THE WITNESS: The Iranian comments on this are
8 were there.
10 or after?
is
^/
why we didn't see anyone becaus'no senior Iranian would
15
20 BY MR. WOODCOCK:
23 A Yes.
25 and arms?
PfJiSSIflED..
820
257
DNtmffiiT
A Yes. They denied it.
is that right?
li^usmim-.
821
258
VNilUSSIfKiT
n28 1 to the plane, the Iranians were begging us to stay.
4 BY MR. WOODCOCK:
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
]M£U£SMa.
822
823
:>pics
UNCLASSIFIED
824
Kussife
1 EXAMINATION OP GEORGE CAVE BY MR. WOODCOCK:
2 w. Mr. Cava, l«t m« cover soma of th« aarly ground h«r«
3 with you when you first became involved in the Iran initiative.
A Mr. Cave, we have come across entries that Col. North made before
8 interpreter. For the record, could you state whether you would
18 w. And I take it from your answer that you were not asked
»'^?r,iASSife
825
1 C. That's correct.
mussLJ
That's corract.
8 as Z racall, Z also mat Charlas Allan, but did not gat much of a
9 brlaflng from him at that tima. Zt was only latar, aftar I got
14 Air^f^- *<"f' Cava, Z'd Ilka you to racall tha maatlng wlthj
mmim
826
1 sine* I
wussra
was an annuitant, it didn't matter. ^ yv ^ I
4 C. Well, they agreed that, you know, that this was a high-
5 risk operation. And I think every attempt was made to keep the
18 comes from the testimony of Clair George where he states, and I'm
23 taken out of context, and I'm not really sure what Clair's Intent _.
26 and more involved in it. And though I think Col. North relied
BUSSSatD
,
827
lIHCmSuO
1 more and more on m* as It went on, because of my understanding of
4 D i re ctor Case y
Bl^SSIflB
828
UNtlASSIFiEO
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
23 deal. NOW, understanding that you came on the scene after this
ilHSUSSffl
829
1 ^^^^H
uNCUissra
in his tastifflony b«for« th« Towar Board •xpc«ss«d th«
4 Ghorbanlfar and othars hava takan tha position that tha 1000 TOWs
5 was a good faith makaup for tha abortlva HAWK shlpmant of
6 out some of this and see what tha Iranian position is.
'
ONCL^SSiFIED
830
UNCUSSIFIED
1 went along these lines: that the Iranians were now convinced by
2 the TOW, the TOW shipment, excuse me, the TOW shipment that we
3 had good intentions, and that they were now prepared to meet with
6 we'll sell them the HAWK spares, to sort of cement the deal. And
7 that's when he turned over the list of 240 line items. But
8 that's about how it went. I mean, we had, the, the 1000 TOWs had
9 established the U.S.'s good intentions, and the Iranians were now
16 say?
20 correct?
22 that we went immediately from the airport to the hotel, end we met
23 initially with Amiram Nir, and then he went out and brought
24 Ghorbanifar in.
y{«s::B
1 W. Did North have a reaction to Ghorbanlfar's statement
2 t'hat the 1000 TOWs had simply shown that the United States was
3 serious?
5 damn well should have shown him that we are serious, something to
6 that effect.
10 great disappointment on our end, about not — the 1000 TOWs not
12 exact words at this point, and I didn't make any notes on that.
13 w. Let me — I'm going to quote from what now is known as
23 with those who would take the position that the 1000 TOWs was a
24 good faith gesture on the part of the United States, but did not
nblh
— —
832
UNCUSSiHEO
1 C. It's a difficult question for me to answer, because,
2 you know I was brought in after the fact. But I do recall, there
5 recall the exact words and who said them, but I know among the
6 people who were involved that there was some disappointment that
8 The Iranians just took the 1000 TOWs and that was it. And it
10 explanation. And this is where the idea of this, you know, good
12 W. From Ghorbanifar.
14 w. From Ghorbanifar.
15 C. — yes from Ghorbanifar, saying that we had established
16 our good intentions with the Iranian government and that he had
25 that correct?
26 C. That's correct.
10
UNCLASSIFIED
833
wiASSife
1 I b«li«v« on the second day, an Iranian official by the
4 with.
10
11
^^^^^^^^^^_^^^^^^^^^
12 M. And he --^^^^^I^H^^^*^ became a name that was
15 C. That's true.
16 w. Old you realize at the time — Z know you realized It
17 later — but did you realize at the time that the Iranians did
w3Mvm
>-692 0-8«-98
.
834
ytliASSlFlti)
1 every year. It's really bad when It's during the hot months,
2 because you Icnow they can't drink water or eat all during — and
4 frazzled, you know, when we had a meeting during the day. By the
5 time it was over they were pretty frazzled since they couldn't
13 [ laughter ]
16 that McFarlane sent out of Tehran. Were you familiar with how
22
23
24
26
nimSSlFlED
835
ustmsw
/:) Tfi,U
[8>!:r
1
16 straighten that out. And it turns out that the reason why the
17 Iranians wanted everyone off was that they wanted to go over the
la plane with a fine-tooth comb, which they did. And then after
19 that everything was all right.
21 parts?
22 C. No. They removed the HAWK parts on the day we arrived,
23 immediately. Oace the plane was taxied over, over to the
24 military side of the aircraft, the three — the four crew members
25 that were on the plane said that they just came and unloaded the
26 plane. Wasn't much they could do about it. So they told us that
14
yNCUissra
837
UNCLHSSira
1 wben thay showed up at th« hotel. They said they have already
8 crisis?
15 when we had our initial meeting in the hotel and said, "you've
16 sent us used parts." And so, I said, you know, I got mad at that
17 and said, "you know you weren't supposed to unload them until
22 only had, we had to fly so many hours that we could only take a
24 the funny thing was, is when the crew showed up and I told -- you
26 And they said they took them off. And I said, "well, what did
15
IINH! lij;jJ.IF!Fn
838
yiUSSlFlEB
1 they do with them." He says, "well, when we left they were still
16
llllASSinED
839
1
mmim
Ghorbanlf»r, you know, several times on mistakes that he had
2 'made, which made, made what the Iranians say a little bit
24 us seeing any senior official, and quite possibly the fact that
17
yNCUlSSIFlES
"
840
ffiaifiSitiB
the second day. And then after he, after we began to see all the
8 when McFarlane said, "O.K., I'll give you until 7:00 tomorrow
9 morning .
w. That'sl
C. Yeah.
22 get the cars? We don't want you hanging around the lobby." So,
23 McFarlane — we all stormed down, and they arranged for cars, and
mmE
nm
18
841
UHCUSSlFiED
1 W. Mr. Cave, w« took a momentary diversion here ta change
2
A
the tape, using the word in it's more comnonly-lenown sease. You
3 were saying that you were not certain whether anything ted
4 happened In Tehran, but that you noticed that they took you to
7 route, a kind of like a super highway that you can take from the
8 hotel that goes right out to where the big, the big moisnent is.
9 And then It's directly Into the airport. We went throu^ back
10 streets all the way from the hotel to the airport. I doK't know
16 entitled "The Big Sting." And I think that In that article they
17 also postulated that a group of dissidents was looking far you to
18 seize you and embarrass the regime. I gather you haven't been
19 able to confirm that one way or the other.
24 discussing the problems about —with the second channel abcut the
26 McFarlane was, that Khomenl had not kno«m that we were la town.
19
flliSSlrlED
. —
842
iJCUSSIFlEO
1 We went into some other things liJce that, and one of the things
2 that came — they didn't Icnow, or else they just weren't going to
3 tell us, that anything happened. But they just said, there was
6 C . No
10 pill story came about — there was a proposal that North and"^© in
12 the Iranians. And there was some talk then that, you know,
13 that's pretty risky, and especially since what North and you
20 in his testimony Col. North said that in fact he did have such
20
UHCLASS!F!EO
843
1 -CI don't--
ONCUSSIHEO
2 T. I thought he said he had one, too. I thought that he
6 w. Let me just note for the record that this new voice is
7 Jaclc Taylor.
8 T. Yes.
15 C. No, not that I know of, and, I was never offered one.
16 I just remember that the discussion came up, you know, maybe we
20 believe also in your, in your notes, you came back from the
24 that correct?
21
iiNi)! mmn
844
yNGlASSlFlED
1 you know, wholesale release of hostages was the Oa'wa prisoners.
2 In line with that I also told them that from my talks with the
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
21 did you also apprise him of your opinion, and I think you've
22 testified to this in other depositions, that the hostage holders
22
—
845
UNCLASSIFIED
1 I — there are two separate Shl'lte communities in Lebanon. And
2'
the—
3 w. I think you did describe the one in the valley, in the
e
4 B^kka Valley, and then there is the Urban group, is that the
5 correct distinction?
10 Lebanon, the area, would say the same thing, so — since no one
11 else has ever been able to fully control those people, I don't
12 see how the Iranians could.
16 that he had with his Southern Lebanese army. I gather from what
17 you are saying that since those Shi'ites were probably from a
20
21
22
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
23 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1/ The
24 interesting thing though is the hostages held by the Phlange, or
25 the prisoners held by the Phlange that were Shl'lte — the Iranians
23
iiNd! mMn
846
1 out.
KUSSKD
They weren't too interested in any motion, you know in
2 getting those people released. They said the Phlange and the
9 with that a ab cae and are you familiar with where he picked it up.
10 C. This came about after the second channel, and he did
14 Albert Hakim--I thliik it was Albert Hakim that sort of gave him
15 that 8eiHP«e, the monster. And he's a very hard negotiator. But
23 breakthrough. In fact, he's the one that told me —I was the last
25 and they emphasized, look, you know if this thing falls through
24
IINCUSSIRE!)
847
UNCUSbiritO
1 w. Hakim /also r«f«rr«d to^HH|Hfs the angina. And
7 arguments on the American side about who was tha more Important
15 who was more important. I think that one of the, one of the
16 Important things though was — he was the sole person we saw at the
17 last meeting.
21 November. And then ha also came out for the meeting in December
25 break here for everyone to stretch his legs. We are now back on
26 tha record. Mr. Cave, I want to see if you can reconcile what Z
25
UNCLASSIFIED
848
UNCUSSIFitO
1 think is an inconaiitcncy in th« reports that %r«r« mad* on tha
8 point and you quote North as saying that the United States would
10 where Kuwaiti due legal process had been carried out. Is that
13 w. Now, the Tower Report has one of the note- takers taking
15 over the lack of complete agreement, what can you say about the
23 possible."
24 C. That's accurate except for the release part.
26 wrong?
26
AJj^iFltU
849
UNCLASSIFIED
1 C. Y«s I do. What North said. Is as I said bafora, wa
12 now been known as the second channel into Iran. Were you
14 to be?
17 they said, if you guys insist on using it, it^s all right with us.
2
3^^^^^^^^^
24 ^^^^^H And we met with him on the lOth and llth of July in
25 Washington.
27
IINOiiSSIREI
850
UNCLASSIFIED
1 you said, we decided to seek a second channel, who Is the "we"
11 But we did actively look for a second channel, and that was done
14 to look for the second channel, is that what you are telling me?
28
UNCLASSIFIED
— —
851
IINCLASSiFIED
1 I — the action paopl* In looking for It was cartalnly. you Icnow,
11 guy, because he had reported to Albert that the relative had come
12 out and asked for an American contact, and we assumed that this
19 back you up even further than that. You said, "we made contacts
20 who then located the people who had the connection to the
21 relative." Who, when you say "we", is that CIA, or
24 business. And in talking to him found out that this guy was
25 associated with these two firms In London. And found out about.
29
BNCUSSiTffl
|
852
UNClASSfiED
1 this official, when w« brought him to Washington to talk to him,
3 with the relative the next time he came out. And that was
4 handled by General Secord and Albert Hakim. They met with him in
8 C. That's correct.
9 W. And, were you aware at the time that Hakim had proposed
14 business when you don't pursue something it goes from your mind.
IS But Z think you, you in fact, showed me one of the cables that Z
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
853
.fjn
WUlSSlM
1
2
^^^^^^
3 w. Now, whan ha cama to tha Unltad Stataa, ona of tha
6 that that was among tha plans whan ha arrivad. Is that correct?
26 reliability of the test. Were you ever made aware that that test
31
siadoinuL*
854
llNCLASSi. lEO
1 was not a ral labia tast?
2 c. No.
5 because the word I got from Hakim, that he passed the test.
6 W. Uh—
7 C. As a point here, most polygraph tests are Inconclusive,
14 have from which to formulate your questions, because you can then
15 let the subject know that you know an awful lot about them.
32
yiLKSinEo
855
4 that we had too many outsiders that knew an awful lot about it or
9 going on.
10 w. The reason I pursue that —I think within the American
11 government it was considered to be a very sensitive operation.
16 for the record. I'll stop right here and change tapes.
17
26 matter?
33
iiMoi AQ<jinFn
856
3 business deals before, and they know each other. We didn't have
11 even more strongly th^t you or someone else in the CIA or the NSC
25 opportunity.
26 w. Did you, and I'm speaking personally now, did you have
34
\\m m\B
857
iiNtiASsro
1 enough confldenc* In Hakim to f««l comfortabl* In trusting him
5 had at that time. Remember, I had only taken part In the meeting
6 In Paris, and the trip Into Tehran. And, at the time of this
7 polygraph had not done much with regard to the Iran Initiative.
8 Nothing much had happened. As you recall It wasn't until — this
9 was the beginning of the second channel, and we did not have the
11 was, at the beginning of all this. They did not occur until the
12 end of July. And what period you are talking about now Is the
18 don't recall.
35
llNCUSSffl
858
llHCUSSifiED
1 W. But th« question really is, did you have confidence in
2 Albert Hakim?
3 C. Oh, Z have found out in dealing with Albert, that when
4 he says he will do something, he does it. And you can trust him
5 on that. My only concern about the use of Albert in this whole
17
24 W.
muSsiFO
859
UNCLASSIFIED
1 with th« Stat* Dapartfliant. Z gava tham, you Icnow, a full rundown
9
^^^^^^
10 w. Lat ma bring somathing to your attantlon and lat me as)c
17 w. Do you have any idea why ha would have bean looking for
18 a biography ofl
26 W.
i»RSS!f!lB
860
e
^^^^^^
9 W. I'm gonna go through this particular entry In North's
10 noteboo)cs and ask you If you have any information on this. The
12 "Meeting with Abe." It notes the computer at the white House has
18 Defex. Going back to Australian^ on July 18. 1986, and the l ast
entry ^^.^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^
20 don't close." Let me go through that with you Mr. Cave. Do you
21 have any id«« what they are talking about with this legitimate
38
iiNH! mmii
861
tlNCLASSlFlEO
1 C. NO.
12 7 D-E-P-E-X.
13 C. D-E-P-E— O.K.
14 W. There are, I think, at least two large companies that
16 Indep.
20 C. O.K.
22 but there is a Jose Garnell. Does he, excuse me. Does that name
39
mMmm
1
12 C.
13
14
16
17
25 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ And
40
863
UNCiASSiFIED
1 W. You are speaking
2 C
3 contact had be«n brokered
4
10
12 C. No.
17
20
21
41
ONClASSinEO
864
HNCUSSife
1 tribesmen — unusual for a tribesman to be a clergyman.
6 W. And—
7 c. And I think that Is the one he met In Hamburg. I'm not
8 sure.
13
That's correct.
And I—
Although, one thing that might be — I think at one point
UNClASSIFItg
1 dressed a guy up lllce an Ayatollah and had him talk to Shackley.
2 But I don't Icnow whether this Is tnUil ieh fl l or not. But It's
9 Shackley.
11 moments. You recall last time we met, which I think was back In
21 ever happened — you know, I never paid any great attention to that
25 know.
26 C. I knew that, oh, uh, that Albert had been- -had known
43
mmm. J
82-692 0-88-29
866
'OlD.
imtmsiritb
1 Ed, Ed Wilson, yeah. But I still to this day don't know what
3 w. And when would you have known that. That Hakim had
4 some background with Ed Wilson?
10 look at the file after I knew that Albert was in the loop, so to
11 speak, on this operation.
14 last year.
17 with Ed Wilson?
24 w. Did you pursue this with him at all? Did you ask him,
44
UNCLASSIREI
—
867
^9mfV^%\
UNtLfcSSihLll
1 thing he ever did was getting Involved with Ed Wilson.
5 W. Let me Just put these two things together and aslc you
6 and I'm just speaking on a — you know, your own personal reaction.
7 Did the combination of all this knowledge about Hakim having had
9 with Wilson. Did that cause you any misgivings about the
10 participation of these two men and the very secret and sensitive
11 initiative?
16 they wouldn't do it. They realize it was a dumb thing to do, and
17 they are working to basically now prove themselves. Albert wants
18 to really — one of the things, I'll never forget — North told me,
45
868
bi^uLftboiii .u&>
1 you, and North in Europe. Is that correct?
3 I remember correctly.
4 w. Now, at that meeting, if I recall correctly, he advised
8 that meeting, because North took all the notes. Nir was there.
9 I think that — as far as I recall the commitment was for the rest
11 else.
12 w. Now these are the same — when you say the rest of the
13 spare parts, these are the spare parts that were planned to be
26 that letter. We didn't get that letter until after the fact, as
46
WNWSS!f!ED
869
I!
1 you are aware.
2 w. And If you would for the record, just relate how It was
5 Col. North.
8 C. That's correct.
13 release?
15 the mechanics. That the policy decisions were made at the white
16 House. And the way they wanted to do it was all right with me.
26 the spares are sitting in Israel. The Israelis don't want them.
47
UNClliSSIFIEe
870
BNWSSiatB
1 We can't take them back. If they want to keep the initiative
2 going they might as well send them, send the damn things in.
4 hook for an awful lot of money. And he's not going to be able to
9 you can't have any of these, any more of these, until the
10 hostages are released, and then at the end of July with one
11 hostage released, gl,ving them all over to the Iranians?
12 C. I'm trying to recall. After the — in the immediate
19 a meeting also with Nir before the meeting with Ghorbanifar. And
21 was Ghorbanifar. Because Nlr was speaking from the letter. And
23 some of the comnitments that he had made in that letter. But not
25 he had said he could make, and which ones he did not authorize.
48
«HClllSS!F![9
— —
871
ONGUSSIHEO
1 in London, is that correct? Or arc wa still in lata July?
3 in London?
4 W. That is Nir?
11 hazy in my memory now when it was. I was not sure whether we met
12 Nir before and than —Z gat dizzy trying to — we met — it was Nir
13 and Ghorbanifar and North and I at the end of — because that was
14 I was called up from Geneva to meet with them. I had Just met
21 whether that fmi hava been a meeting that you would have gone to?
49
—
872
iiNCUSsra
1 adopting a sequential release policy. Were you at any time
4 of these discussions with Poindexter and what they were — what the
5 white — you know, I guess the white House or the NSC, had decided
6 on.
11 thing here has been approved because the position we took with
18 perhaps the sequential idea is the best way. They do this and we
20 That's the way I understood it. But, I was not involved —a lot
25 those meetings until after the second channel. I think there was
50
irii
LRduSrSLU
3
873
uNCUSsra
1 iimedlately after. That oo« I remember clearly on the 24th of
2 September.
5 baclc and forth on some subjects here, so fasten your safety belt.
6 Reports came out of the meeting with, the first meeting with the
7 second channel, that is a relet ive,^^|mon August 2Sth, that
16 were getting that this deal was going dotm, that it was a
17 spurious deal.
18
19
^^^^
20 w. Do you recall when they reached that conclusion?
22 had had word that supposedly the stuff had been shipped and our
24 picked it up.
51
« —
874
gt.
2 we have this report. And Customs was never able to develop any
12 -we never, I don't think we ever got any concrete evidence that
21 was one of the things we were authorized to deal with them with.
52
875
UNCLASSIFIED
1 W. Do you know whether the existence of this possible TOW
10 wrote. And in Mr. Allen's memo he had the observation that, and
11 I'll quote this, "more and more we suspect that some Hizballah
16 because there are no, they were no closer to securing the release
17 of Da'wa prisoners than they were in March when they kidnapped
20 where the hostage holders were becoming frustrated that they were
21 not making any progress on the Da'wa, and perhaps were willing to
22 settle for the Shi'ite who are held prisoner in Southern Lebanon.
23 Was that, firat was that an opinion that you were aware of, and
24 second was it one that, at that time— and this would be early
UNCLASSIFIED
876
10
11
12
13
14
15 w. O.K. Would you have agreed with what Mr. Allen wrote
16 on September 8 then?
19
21 certainly what Mr. Allen wrote was entirely plausible, and fit in
22 with things as we understood them at the time.
23 w. Do you recall being aware that he submitted that
26 a bell that something like that went forward. And, go off the
54
UNCIASSIREO
. .
877
1 record ONCUSSIHED
2 W. O.K. wa arc bac)e on tha record. Mr. Cava, during this
9 holders
10 C.
11 there was nothing that I could really have provided them with.
13 information.
14 Not on that
15
16
17
18
20 experience in the area, I thought that the hostage takers and the
21 Iranians are going to have to make pretty, pretty iron-clad
22 guarantees that there would be no more operations run against the
23 royal family in Kuwait before there would be any motion on the
24 Da'wa prisoners.
SS
UNCLASSIFIEO
—
878
UNtUSSffi
1 shadowy as the Da'wa glv« to a, basically to a governmant on
5 argue for, is that, look, the Iranians are going to have to deal
6 directly with the Kuwaitis on this, because they are the only
7 ones that have the influence to make the guarantees and how the
10 the whole damn day. It was almost entirely devoted to the Da'wa
13 O.K.
14
15
20 note of that, and we will definitely get to that. The next thing
21 I want to ask you about, is there was an article that appeared in
22 between the two meetings in Germany. One was on October 6-8, was
23 the Frankfurt meeting, and then there was a meeting in Meinz on
56
ONCUSSIFiEO
879
UNCUSH
1 actually cama out aarllar than that, and It contained the
25 So its hard to tell. But it gets a little bit close to home, you
57
880
UNClASSinED
1 w. It was quite close to home at that point, wasn't It?
5 that right?
8 W. Now there are — the white House put out some press
9 guidance on this, which was dated October 14, and the press
10 guidance said that the, it had a series of questions that posed
11 and then answered itself, and in response to the central theme of
12 the article, which was that if only three Lebanese Shi'ltes were
25 now, because it's a long time ago. But there is one thing that
26 this has jogged my memory on. One of our concerns was the three
58
UNMSIREO
881
UNCLASSIFIED
1 condemned to death. Because we Icnew that they were never going
2 to get out. And we were worried about that. It was someone else
9 C. Frankfurt negotiations.
10 w. And the Frankfurt negotiations resulted in what Albert
12 known as the nine-point plan, which maybe that's a term you would
13 prefer.
24 They will take this plan to the Hizballah as their idea (face-
25 saving gesture) with the Hlzb." Do you recall that being part of
59
HMniKCfpcn
882
*'
^ Vr :'
'
."
-
'
3 the plan that we finally game them was what had come up at the
4 November 9 meeting in Geneva, with which you guys have gotta piclc
5 up the ball and run with it. We've done everything we can. Now
6 the only thing that I know of that was done — excuse me a minute
7 while I take a look at this. I don't know if it was this
8 meeting, but at some point what the Iranians told us was that
9 they were concerned about the five that got the short terms. Of
10 these seventeen, three were sentenced to death. Nine got medium
11 to long prison terms, and five got very short prison, I think it
12 was just four years or something like that. What they were
13 concerned about, is that the Monies people, was that the five
14 would not be released when their terms were up. Now, the only
15 commitment that I can recall that was made to the Iranians was
16 that Col. North said that he or Admiral Poindexter would talk to
18 in fact the Kuwaiti's would release these guys when their term
23 what I have handed to Mr. Cave and what he has read as a PROF
24 note, dated 10/10/66 with the, and the time of the PROF note is
26 has a page 213 up in the upper right-hand corner. Now, Mr. Cave,
60
OlLSSSiFlED
883
wmaflt?
1 I'm going to return to the subject of the negotiations In
2 Frankfurt later on this afternoon, but the reason I put that PROF
3 note In front of you Is that that PROF note Is based on the
12 Da'wa.
16 on October 10. The article appears not long after that because
17 the press guidance on It Is dated October 14. Do you know
19 was leaked In order to support the effort that had been made In
21 Da'wa prisoners?
61
UNCLASSIFIED
884
1 Inltlatlva. uNuUSsm
2 C. I know nothing about that, no.
12 C. No, this was when — we'd never met the man until we
13 arrived In Tehran.
14 w. Were you not aware that he participated In the
15 Frankfurt meetings In February of '86?
16 C. Oh, no, no. X wasn't aware of that, that this was the
17 same guy. No. No. I mean, when I first — the first time I knew
18 anything about him was when ha was introduced to me In Tehran.
19 And Ghorbanlfar on the side said that this Is an Intelligence
20 officer. And I think that's the first time that we were told
21 that he had any kind of an Intelligence function.
62
yNClASSIRFO
885
parson.
advised us that the man he called the engine was present at the
15 is that right?
18 '
W. Now, the revolutionary guard is distinct from the
63
yNClASSiflFI
886
yNClASSiFlEO
1 Trotsky to replace the regular military organization, and what is
8 and these guys were organized you know, initially for political
9 purposes. They were the arm, they were the executive arm of the
10 revolution, so to speak.
16 this to the HAvnc spares. Do you recall who was getting, or did
17 you know who was getting the HAWK spare parts? whether they were
19 Revolutionary Guards?
25 military approached and said we hear you guys got some TOWs, we
26 need them. And they didn't give them to them. In fact, they
64
IJNCLfi.l^lFIF!
887
were saying If when this whole deal goes through, if we get all
the TOWs, we are going to sell some of them to the military.
C.
14 1984 they began to see that unless the United States gets back in
19 October shipment?
22 this when we made the arrangements for the final 500 shipment at
23 the end of October. Even aside he said, you know — he had a good
25 approached us some time ago when they heard we had gotten some
26 TOWS, and they wanted some." He says, "well, when this whole
65
UNCIASSIFI
888
l)NClASSin[0
1
d"l goes through we are planning on selling
them some.- At
2 exorbitant prices, I might add.
3 [END OF SIDE 4]
66
UNCUSSIFIE
1 3IDE3 S AND 6 -
||NCUSSIFi[
TCW/)
10 based on?
11 c. Not until after the fact. I was told about the finding
12 when Z was brought in^ But there was a finding. Z don't Icnow
20 further with this. Did you consider that the people you were
67
UNCLASSIFI
890
icidssire
1 C. Wall I think modarat* is an unfortunata word, but tha
2 paopla that wa had to daal with, and wa'ra willing to daal with,
3 yes, that's who wa ware daaling with.
68
UNCLASSIFIEI
891
s
1 among th« R«v Guards.
11 pilot training.
12 w. The, just for the record, the note does sa^^Hlwants
13 to build an airwing, but Z think that that's a minor point.
18 in Germany?
22 10 November meetings.
69
UNCUSSlflFii
892
UNCUSSlf-
1 arms to th« representatives of the Revolutionary Guard was
3 that at all?
12 said this is that they thought maybe the radical faction was
13 trying to create more problams for the moderates. He says, you
14 know, there is no — in Tehran it's well known that Rafsanjani was
15 against the taking of hostages. And, since^^^^^^lwas involved
16 in this, and is also a member of the radical faction, he may have
22 during the Meinz meeting that he said that they hadn't come up
23 with anything.
24 W. Were they undecided, or were they — or they had
70
Mimim^m
3 . I
893
UNCUSSIBE
1 that nothing h as come of the Investigation.
2I
1
I^^^^^Hr ^^'^ he s no actor , sounded really astonished
'
15 meeting you don't contain — you don't Inject any editorial comment
25 and we think this may have happened. Now, I think that they,
71
UNCLASSiF!
894
UNWSSlflEl
1 and I had a big go around wlth^^^^^^Hon this — and h« told us
15 didn't —I never saw that memo. I never — Col. North didn't send
16 us copies of his memos. We sent him copies ear ours, but he
17 never sent us copies of his.
18 w. But you are not aware of what he might be basing that
19 statement on?
20 C. I can't, Z can't recall at the moment what he's basing
21 that statement on. Other than what I'm talking — you know, we
24 hostages or not.
72
«i;lii?;^irfFn
895
UNCLASSIFIED
In that meeting, according to notas that G«n*ral Secord
16 that they didn't gat him any medical attention that was worth
17 anything. Uh, the great concern about — cause he told us that
18 /they had 400 pages of interrogation that he had been put through
19 while he was being held captive. And also ha made the comnitment
24 that the relative was giving them— was basically jerking their
73
["JS-fc
\\\L0
896
liHClASSIFiED
Icnow. wall, w« understand he's b««n subject to serious, you
recall a rejoinder?
C. Yeah, there was. And that, oh, uh, we were very much
those there.
74
897
10
11
12
13
14
15
17 Revolutionary Guards?
18 C. That's correct.
19 W. Let me ask you this. Did you, did you pose to the, to
21 Buckley was lifted from Lebanon and brought to Iran, and tortured
22 in Iran?
75
ONSIASSIREB
898
UNClASSIFieO
1 that — a story that might b« placed in lieu of that story. And
2 that is that rather than having been taken to Iran and tortured
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 1
26
899
UNCLASSIFIti)
WNMSIf/fB
I
900
C. No.
13 was.
16
26
mmmm
901
Mmim
UNCUSSIFIEO
1
4
^^^^^^^^^^
5 ^^^^^^^^^H we were very alarmed about the pricing.
6 T. Uh-huh.
9 the total cost for the two high-powers, and all of the spare
10 parts and the 508 TOWs only came to about $10 or $11 million.
11 T. Right. Afl we, I think there was about $12—
12 C. Well, that was for everything.
14 C. We never did ship the two radars. But the price for
15 the radars and the TOWs and the spare parts — I think the total
24 C. No, I don't.
26 in Washington, D.C.?
87
UNCLASSiflO
903
UNClASSlFitO
1 C. wall th« only thing that I participated in was what w«
11 ever recall any — the only thing that Z recall about pricing
12 with Nir and North are two things. One was about the 1000 TOWs.
13 when we met in Paris, Nir complained that North had sold them too
14 cheaply.
23 We knew that the expenses for all this stuff were being paid out
25
26
904
UNCUlSSIFiE
iii^sim
905
ziCLiSlfP
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
26 Una, for tha saka of my raport again, and tha accuracy of it.
mmm
91
906
lii^GLASSiFIED
1 Did you Indicate that early on In the operation you had suggested
3 should have as few service officers — is that the phrase you use?
4 C. Serving officers.
7 anyone at any time that you should not be present when pricing
8 was discussed?
10 on the serving officers was that this was a — there were two
12 one, was the sensitivity of the operation, and the fact that it
13 was very high risk. And the kind of thing that when it blows up
19 pricing, but there may have been conversations where you just
24 And then North would deal with Nir and Ghorbanifar on the prices.
92
KNCUS'lEO
.
907
s IFi
1 off lean pr«s«at. Ones th«y got th« prlc* that thay had to pay
thosa
26 briafly tha morning of tha 4th bafora ha took off to saa his
— —
908
UNCUSSiriED
1 girlfriend in California.
9 T. O.K. That was the same figure you just discussed with
10 me now.
11 C. Yes.
23 when
25 T. End of April?
94
909
UNClASSIFe
1 T. And thttr* was soma, th«ra was a plan to, I think at one
2 traveled to Tehran.
4 C. Well, what the meeting wlthJ^^^^^Hwas decided as
6 believe that this guy could speak with any authority, given his
7 level of intelligence. There was a lot of discussion about North
9 private jet and we'd all fly in and we could talk for, you know,
10 one day, and fly back out. That was, that was scotched, Z think
12 too dangerous.
16 considered?
17 C. Yeah. That was, that was, it was really a proposal
25 T. O.K.
95
910
uNtussre
1 M. This is Tim woodcock again. Hr. Cava, what was it that
6 know the only guy on the other end you know, *'*3^^^^^H^ *^'^'
11 course, centered oo Kish Island, but the plans for the meetiiig in
19 memoranda that, that go all the way through March and April that
20 place the meeting, the one that McFarlane was going to
21 participate in, as being imminent within a week or ten days, and
22 it keeps receding on the horizon.
23 C. Yeah.
96
911
UNCIASSIFIEO
1 C. Wall, I don't, Z don't, I was not awar* of th«
3 Because that was done over at the NSC or the white House. I
4 wasn't privy to that. Cause all I got from North is that they
5 decided not to do it, and that we'd go ahead with the regular
6 meeting based on the guarantees that I was getting over the phone
7 from Ghorbanifar, one channel, and also from North via Nir. I
8 mean from Ghorbanifar and Nir via North on the other side. And
11 the party.
20 didn't come off with — yeah, we kept telling them that we can't,
22 for the parts, because, you Icnow, one of the proposals was that
23 they release the hostages and we bring in the parts. And then,
24 well that no — you gotta come in first with the parts, then we'll
25 release the hostages, and then we got down to O.K., well we'll
97
UNCLASSIFIED
I
912
1
_
_ _li JLaJ
th«n you guys raleas* lh« hostag«s, and than wa'll bring tha rest
2 of tha parti In. No, no, you ara corract in that, and tha delay
5 thinJc it was. And then we had to take the time, you know, to
6 ship the material to — pre-position the material in Israel.
7 w. O.K. I'm not going to dwell on this, but where you are
8 losing m« on this is that from the notes and memoranda, it seems
9 as though money — the lack of money is holding up the McFarlane
trip, and that with money tha McFarlane trip could have happened
98
UNCLAS Mi li.U
— —
913
UNCLASSIFIED
1 to your recollection, when, and by whom?
10 C. I don't know.
26 according to the Tower Report and PROP notes that we have, was
99
mmm
.
914
A to hlft face that the U.S. was affiliated with that initiative.
11 don't know.
12 T. Jack Taylor back. I sounded like a sportscaster,
13 right? \
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
26
100
UNCLASSIFIED
—
915
UNCUSSIFIE
1
^^^^^^
2 C. Th«r« was a disconnect between — the only way I can
101
wmmiB
916
UNCUSSIFIED
1 TAPE SEVEN -- TCW/sl
4 which I'll try and do my best at. The first question [laughter].
5 The first question deals with the ODI Analysis of the Iran
18 about the moderate versus the radicals and the line 1,2,3 and
19 your own perception of that. Did you agree with the analysis as
22 1985?
23 T: Yes.
102
917
UNClASSiriED
1 T: Did you, th«r« waa a later, one latar, prepared though,
3 C: I would have a hard time now, you know, this far down
4 the road. I didn't pay much attention to a lot of the analysis
6 those days.
7 T: Okay.
14 accurate and good Intelligence and was conveyed to NSC and other
15 recipients or users of that Intelligence, uh, that was explained
19 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vy«s.
20 T: Okay. So, you would agree at that time. At that tlire,
25 I'll hear about it later but that's about the only thing Z have
26 along that line unless you have some yourself. Okay, the second
103
918
UNCUSSIFIED
1 Una of questioning deals with th« uh, relationship between
4 to hear your point of view regarding how North used the chain of
2 Information on thli?
3 C: Yes. First, let me say this. North was religious In
7 o'clock at night and he's sitting there with that damn RI.-43
104
UNCLASSIFIED
919
l
li
1 it was on* of th« times wh«n Jenco was relaasad, w«'d go in and
9 the initiative rather than pull out. Are you familiar with that
10 particular one?
11 C: I am not familiar with that particular one. I was
24 we or should we not send in the rest of the HAWK spares that were
UNCIA^SFIEO
920
UNCLASSIFIED
1 to welgh-ln uh, with Admiral Polndexter that w« should go ahead
6 exactly what the issue was now, but I Icnow it was right about
16 not because I know I went and talked to Casey about it. I can't
19 W: Thank you.
20 T: Those are only questions I believe I have, if you want
21 to switch.
26 those meetings and I'm going to show you uh, two exhibits, one
106
omssra
921
UNCLASSIFIED
1 has b««n marked as lA and one has bean marked as 2A and ask you
6 correct?
7 C: That's correct.
10 interview, that Mr. Hakim had suggested that you have business
13 at his office.
17 working with him. And, the cards were printed to cover that.
24 C: Yes, I did.
25 W: What did you tell him your capacity was with the United
26 States?
107
UNCLASSIFIED
922
UNCUSSIFe
1 C: Uh, Z forgat th« axact words I us«d. Z trl«d to lc««p
2 It as vagus as possible because he knew what my association was
3 and z just let him go along with the assumption Z was still with
A the same people.
5 W: So, for all you know, his assumption would hav« been
7 C: That's correct.
12 C: vaguely.
26 better stuff for them. The other thing is he had in the back of
108
UNCLASSIFIE
923
1
mtssxB
his mind. Is that h« wanted all of th« employees of his previous
8 whatever he can to help us with It, but he's going to pursue his
9 commercial Interests also.
10 W: In the first memorandum, the first In time, July 10,
16 capitalize on the trade part using contacts in the USG with whom
17 they will coordinate their actions. Now, let me ask you based on
19 commercial activity?
22 activities with Iran. Then or now. That was part of the cover
23 story for what we were doing. And also it fitted in, because Abe
24 was going to get in, not Abe, but you know, Albert Hakim. Uh, I
109
UNCLASSlfiED
924
UNCUSSIFIE!
1 CIA. HOW does that fit In?
your name^^^^^^^^^H^
6 C: Yes, he would 've.
13 a couple hundred of them and I don't Icnow where they are to this
14 day.
22 Robert McParlane stating that "we still have no response from JMP
110
'iTirn
&.i«UUil tf^i
925
1
UNCUSSIFiE
the sequential release to Casey's attention so that Casey would
4 Casey.
8 release.
11 under a meeting with Polndexter and then the entry also mentions
12 the need to talk to' Joshua, which I believe was North's code name
13 for President Reagan. Oo you recall the sequential delivery
20 President and got approval but, you know, I only had It on, his
21 word.
22 W: Let me shift gears slightly and show you what has been
ill
UNCUSSIFiED
926
UNCUSSIFIED
1 not b« 8ucc«t9ful. If you take a mlnuta Hr. Cava and axamlna
7 was but wa had to start gattlng soma of tha Information that had
14 community as naadad?
tmJAJS
15 C: That's corract. Uh. . . both ^^^^^^^B and I wara
112
wmm
927
4 C: Yes.
9 W: And the...
1 numbers for the«i. But this was the last major offensive that
2 they launched.
5 C: That's correct.
26 W: why don't you spell out the acronym for the record?
113
UNCI kmm
928
UNCLASSIFIED
10
929
UNCUSSIFIEO
1 Is you know, uh, tha um.^^^^^^was trying to find out what was
4 putting him off to anything wrong, etc. etc. And, never, never
5 conceding anything to him, you know, the thing on the parts has
6 to do with the 67 things that were bad that he was demanding that
13 Casey Is about.
14 W: I think that...
the provldlng^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V
19 C: Yeah, there was a lot of things that were discussed.
20 But what we, what we did was, to get our security people to make
22 oh, on setting up, we had the, we just had the visas Issued.
115
UNCLASSiF![fl
930
UNCLASSIHED
1 time for you, one day before, the very day before Polndexter met
2 with President Reagan and put the second channel on the agenda
9 and the basic thing Is we've come this far, we might as well go
18 [PAUSE]
19 C: Okay.
21 C: Yes.
25 had the preceding day with Lt. Colonel North, uh, were you aware
116
uNCUSsra
931
I
HNCUSSIFe
think so, I must have been
2 W: Let me direct your attention to
uh, paragraph 2 and the
3 uh, and the third insert
117
UNCLASSIFIED
.
932
UNClASSIFlEi
I TAPE WINE
9 statement
10 C: I don't recall that. There was a, during this period,
11 this Is Immediately before the meeting with the second channel,
12 there was a lot of talk about Ghorbanlfar— How you get him out
13 and still of the operation and still preserve the secrecy In the
24 bit of money.
118
ONCLASSIFIED
.
933
2 correct?
3 C: That's true.
6 uses the name, why does Ollie North have to come up with four
11 remember any. I think that what he means, Ollie' s not, but Ollie
13 somehow, you know, four million bucks, to pay off this guy. But,
14 uh, I mean, there was a lot of talk about how you get rid of him
16 W: I ask..
21 first Maule. And then they later, on the 27th of August, he told
24 his account. And, that they had agreed with him that all their
119
lELteSlfIt!
934
UNWS
1 him about It said, "no" that Ghorbanlfar also got a 6 million
2 dollar payment from them, which would fit in with that letter
7 June went for the HAWK spares and only 5 million out of the 8
8 million dollar payment. And then he used that to... and this
9 fits in with the amount that he paid the creditors, cause he only
13 he was speaking with North (and that conversation was the basis
15 the money to pay-off Ghorbanlfar and North said to him, "I guess
16 I'm going to have to get it out of the reserves." And Allen told
22 last one denied because Charlie was pretty good about telling me
120
UNCLASSIFIE
935
UNCUSSIfiEi
1 calculations, he had a conversation with Richard Kerr, uh the
4 least part of the HAWK spare price and that some of the excess
on One ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
7 another was the Involvement of Secord and Hakim, a third was the
10 real microfiche price list that they had uncovered. Uh, do you
14 about what was going on because of the people who were Involved
18 responsible for Inflating the price and that there was a possible
25 quite a while. And uh, I would only come In when something came
121
llNfiUSf^^nFO
936
1 went by and I wasn't there, quite often I would never even see it
2 or be aware of it.
5 lines. Uh, I thinlc it was on October 22nd you and Charles Allen
6 went and visited with Mr. Roy Furmark. Uh, Purmarlc had earlier
8 C: With Charlie.
9 W: and with Charlie, and uh, and had on different days, he
14 might say that there had been an inflation of price and a uh, and
19 on the pricing and the money and everything for sometime. And,
20 the first time that I remember Charlie saying anything about the
23 the memo 'K signed by him we both wrote because Z was taking
24 off uh for the meeting in Mainz . And, Furmark pretty much laid
25 out the whole thing in that Ghorbanlfar had told him the reason
26 for the high price to him, 15 million dollars was, that was
122
UNCUSSIrl!
937
1
ICUSSIflED
charged to him of 15 million dollars b«caus« th« rast of tha
10 W: You say that you and Charlie Allen had been suspicious
11 for sometime. Let me ask you two questions about that. One,
12 what made you suspicious and two, how did you become aware that
15 Ghorbanlfar would raise the price so damn much. Z mean uh, what
16 threw us off was the 22 April arrest, because Ghorbanlfar was
25 but, once we heard, you know, once I heard that from Pumark, I
26 was from that day, you know, fully aware, Z accepted that. It
123
UNCLASSIFIFH
938
F
1 just fit in too much, Z mean, bacaus* if you read that carefully
1 aircraft, all this, tha boat, what have you. we didn't know how
2 much that waa, so it was more logical for us to suspect at that
3 point Khashoggi and, and oh uh Ghorbanifar. Now, another thing
124
IIMW iJCCinrn
939
UNClASSIHti
1 don't have any money uh, I'm thinking of charging CIA for the
20 C: Suspicions of what?
23 memo after I got back. The one he wrote on the 14th of October.
24 W: Alright.
125
UNCLASSiFIE!)
940
1 this in tiitw.
UNOmSSlFiED
2 C: Okay, thli would b« about, I saw tha mamo on about tha
3 15th of Octobar.
4 w: Okay, but what I'm trying to, what I'm trying to placa
9 on tha scana?
11 know, what North was tailing ma. Uh, but aftar I got, all thosa
14 Charlla's mamo and, I was from that point, you know, strongly
16 gouging us.
17 W: Lat ma uh, uh changa topics bara for a momant.
19 suspicions that sotna, but you know wa, thara was nothing you
20 could point to. Othar things saamad mora llkaly than that, up
21 until tha aarliar fall.
23 droppad and tha sacond ona has fallad to drop, uh, and uh, at
24 laast tha way tha notas raad. And, lat ma dascrlba this
126
sMsra
1 vl«w of Iraq, Its rtglme?" There's no response noted in there,
2 uh, the uh status of the regime In Iraq was uh, was an Item of
25 discussions?
26 C: Yes. What they, what um, what they insisted upon was
127
;i As.^inFi]
942
oirirn
1 that they w«r« prepared uh, to drop all of theiX demands on Iraq
2 uh except for the one^^ who were, that one that uh bac)ced the
3 government had to go and. Sadden Hussein had to go. They had
4 made you Icnow, they had made quite a number of demands. They
5 were prepared to drop all those but that they would not negotiate
8 Germany, did they later or did they try to enlist in Teheran the
11 w: Not in Teheran?
12 C: Also that's the enlisting of U.S. support in removing
13 Hussein, is a bit, is a bit overblown.
16 Germany, the one in Frankfurt. Uh, the uh, there were a series
18 gather would be your second meeting with <ih, (uh, let the record
19 reflect that was Oavid Pearline sneezing) [LAUGHTER] Uh, the uh,
20 this would be your second meeting with^^^^^^^^^His that
24 W: And this is the first time you would have met him in
128
UNCLASS
943
yfiCUSSflED
1 W: Thar* uh, uh at the Pranltfurt meeting uh, there Is
2 discussion of the uh list of arms that uh, that uh,lHH||Hhas
3 brought up in Washington, which was an extensive list of arms
8 provision of arms was that they uh should not Include items that
9 would allow or encourage the Army of the Revolutionary Guards to
10 seize Baghdad. Do you recall that?
13 want to rule out anything at that point In time. But at the same
14 time he didn't want to make a commitment to deliver anything,
18 sales to Iran until the Peace was signed and hadn't resumed
25 C: The uh, what uh, the position that North took is that
129
u ilASSIflEO
.
944
IINWSSIREO
1 not uh, be inaugurated until we had uh, re-established normal
4 latter point.
9 peace
12 the United States could assists the uh, Iranians on the Ho w i stf
14 look the other way, was the way he put it. As Iran purchased the
15 How43£^r, U ow iate r and the Ilalll s ter barrels uh North had pointed
16 out earlier that the problem with the number of Ho w iste r barrels
19 that?
24 anything in particular?
26 long winded discussions I think these were just things that were
130
ONCLASSiFlE
945
1 thrown out.
UNCUSSIFIEO
2 W: North has uh, testified in his public testimony that,
3 that uh, he was consistently lying to the Iranians uh in his
4 statements to them. Was that something that you were aware of?
9 know the whole purpose of this is to keep the contact going and
10 uh, there were certain things that we could supply them uh, and
17 and I quote it to you: "I lied to the Iranians every time I had
19 C: Let me, let ma put it this way, he told them things uh,
23 I'm going now to the subject of Saddam Hussein uh. North stated
24 that uh, that the United States was "seeking a peace" between
131
UNCLASSIRE
946
1 everybody that the guy who was causing th« problem is Saddam
5 that the American side agreed with the Iranian side that there
7 olcay, we accept your contention that you can't make peace as long
14 done but, this was one of the things that came out in our
15 discussions with 'em.Korth said, we will make it clear ^o^^^^^f
16 ^^^^^^^^^H that there can be no peace as long as Saddam Hussein
132
UNCLASSIFIE
]
947
[ LAUGHTER
UNCLASS!
2 C: NO. No, that's where there's a certain, and the tapes
10 did take some action on this. Now, what they did I don't know.
17 Minister.
UNCLASS U
133
948
UNCLASSIr
1 TAPE TEW
2 W: Mr. Cav«, w«'re bade on the record now uh, just to put
3 the Hussein matter In context uh, the uh, you've made it clear
4 that the, that what the United States was undertaking to do was
6 correct?
7 C: That's correct.
W: Now, was that the, was that the route that was being
^^^^Hon this
134
\imwm
949
1 Iran first.
UHCUSSIFIED
2 C: Oh, oh, Nhat, what wai r«pr«s«nt«d to Iran was that w«
5 that uh, we were, we were convinced that this was the Iranian
6 position and uh, basically, what are you guys going to do about
7 it?
9 suggests that the United States enter a secret dialogue with uh,
10 H^^^m^^^H states currently aiding Iraq. That was the words
18 know is, they were going to, they said that they were going to
19 take this up. Now, whether they did, Ollie at one point, as I
20 recall told me that they had had some discussions but, we never
21 got memos of anything that took place and I don't know if any
22 memos exists.
23 W: None that I know of. Uh, Mr. Cave uh, there came a
26 said to the Iranians, and this is the way the tape reads: "Saddam
135
mm^m
UNCLASSIFIED
1 Hussaln is a expletive* and uh Hakim aslced North If he really
2 wanted him to translate that and North who was attributing the
9
^^^^^^^
10 W: In the uh, again, in the uh FranJcfurt negotiations, the
11 subject of the Dawaa prisoners came up. And, on that subject uh,
12 the uh, uh, fellow whom Hakim called the 'Engine' uhl
22 that discussion?
23 C: 7es Z do. What, what he said was is that, in essence,
26
136
DMcmre
951
UNCUSSiFIE
1 W: Nor would the U.S. criticize them for having released
2 them?
3 C: That's correct.
4 W: Is that consistent with your recollection of...?
10 C: Uh, not so, well, not entirely, what, what he said is,
11 is that certain of the prisoners uh, with lesser terms uh, the
21 C: Yea.
137
UNCLASSIFIED
952
UNClASSlFlEfl
1 there are three different categories of sentences. There are
2 three guys that are sentenced to death. They are Lebanese. Two
3 of them, I thinJe. Two out of the three and, then there are nine
4 others that have oh uh, lesser, have pretty heavy sentences, and
5 then there are five that have, I thinlc, Just four years. So,
7 that the Iranians were worried about is that these, the Kuwaiti's
8 would not release the five when their sentence was up.
12 released when their sentence was up. So, when, when you're
138
UNCUSSiHE
953
UNCUSSIFi
1 put anything In my notes about it but, I am convinced that what
2 we were talking about was the five guys who were due to get out,
3 I think it*s this year and maybe one or two of the others. But,
16 Iranians, at least on tape, and says to them -- the three who are
22 uh. North said that he would not interfere with the processes of
23 uh, of uh, Kuwait. But, in Frankfurt that same sentiment did not
139
UNCIASSIF
954
in
UNCLASS
M
1 prisoners under death sentence.
3 tapes or anything, but, I'm certain that - that came up. That we
4 just couldn't do anything about, nothing can be done about the
14 guarantees with you, and the only way you're going to ever get
15 anywhere with the Kuwaiti f*s is by going down there yourself and
16 talking to them. And they finally agreed to that.
17 W: Okay. Okay, but I don't want to, I don't want to go to
18 November yet.
19 C: Okay.
140
955
^T?
6 Laughter]
9 W: The, the tapes read as though uh, much was missed. The
11 tapes also caught quite a bit and that uh, there's just no where
23 we, anything that could be done, we were talking about the people
141
956
uNcussre
1
.
957
1 opinion on th»t?
wi»w«
2 C: I'd hav* to loolc at tham.
3 W: Okay, lat m« hold off just a minuta hara, and I'll pull
5 momant
6 [PAUSE]
9 [PAUSE]
1 this?
4 in Taharan.
5 W: Right.
uh,jH|^^^H
• C: That's right. And, you'ra corract wa will was
9 what ha was rafarring to, tha othar row of itans on tha list.
W: Now, Albart Hakim uh, in his daposition, idantifiad
25 uh, and I think that's whara soma of tha uh languaga comas from
143
958
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
19
tl.. top Of »5« .hxch r^.. .« ^„„^ 3. ^„,^„ __^^ ^^
B.li.v. .. c„ h.lp .,t.r .6. t.cl.. ,0,.
.Mch .. . .. ,.„„.. ,,
20 "|^|o»tag*3, I would aaaum^
21
22
144
UNCUSSIFIED
959
UNCLASSIFIED
1 W:
2 C:
3 W: Now, th« tap«s show, and I think th« uh, uh, th« recent
4 uh tape transmissions...
5 C: I have a confession to make. I didn't want to tape
6 those meetings, [LAUGHTER] I've always found that tapes are very
7 bad uh, because you never get everything and uh, they're also
12 uh, there comes a point where North uh, departs the meeting and
13 uh, what he says is, "why don't you guys hold this discussion
14 after I'm gone* and then he refers to the Seven Point uh document
25 same time North did. And, Hakim brought the rough copy of the
145
iiNHi hmm
]
960
T'>. f-
UNCUSS
1 W: Alright, now I want to show you what uh, I have marked
2 here as. Hold on, I'm going to go off the record for a moment.
3 Back on the record. I'm going to show you what's been marked as
5 the Farsi original of the Nine Points cwo-page document and the
9 [ PAUSE
15 Which half?
19 me the Farsi too, and I don't know whether I translated this or,
20 or what.
UNCLASSIFIED
1 W: Hakim did?
6 But what I did with it, is beyond me. But this is, yeah, this is
7 the first draft as I note down here they're available at the NSC
11 said there was a coyple other things that might be changed based
13 W: With whom?
17 correct?
23 in Kuwait?
26 can tell you is that was in talking to the Iranians they agreed,
147
UNCLASSIFIED
82-692 0-88-32
. .
962
UNCLASSIFIED
1 they agreed to this wording because if you go forward in history
6 the three guys condemned to death, it was made clear that nothing
7 could be done about them and that the hope was for the five guys
8 with the lesser sentences and some of the others who had varying
9 sentences
10 W: why is there any doubt that the people who have already
11 received determinant sentences aren't going to be let go in, at
12 the end of their period of time?
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 W: I'm going to show you again the uh, PROF note dated
m hmm 148
]
963
1
wussm
Points and uh, there's uh, there's a reference here, an entry
3 original Seven Points and aslced DlcJt If there was any way he
C: j^^^H^
6 W: Take - take a look at the uh, uh first paragraph of uh,
8 [ PAUSE
15 modifications made uh, Mr. Cave uh, Albert Haklm has negotiated a
16 Nine Point Plan with the Iranians uh, that plan is transmitted,
17 it^s dated October 8 on the English translation that we marked as
18 uh, I think uh, 17A. This is two days later, the Iranians
19 presvimably have departed from the scene and this looks like a
23 final, this Is just a draft version, and the final version will
149
ONCLASSIRFfl
.
964
UNCUSSiflED
1 C: I uh, all of the negotiation from this point was
10 to have to do this for the record. When you say from this, to
11 this, to this, you're talking, you're referring first to 17A,
Okay.
22 the TOW missiles, uh, if you note on the top, the first point is
23 they're going to pay 3.6 million dollars for the TOW missiles,
150
965
UNCLASSIFlEi
1 C: Reduced from what?
2 W: Reduced from the price that the United States had been
4 thousand a piece.
6 arrived at this figure. I did not know what the price was at the
11 that uh, by lO/ip/86, they had a price that was in the area of
12 3.6 million dollars, which is a lower price since Its 500 TOWs
13 than the 10 thousand per TOW uh, that had been charged up to that
17
18
19
20
UNCLASS
151
966
UNCUSSlFIEfl
SIDE ELEVEN - TWC/hgp
W. Uh, Mr. Cave did you hear that portion of Lt. Col.
here we may as well get some credit for them" and I think by that
he meant get the release of some hostages.
10
11
12
13
14
16 that Copp and Sam are going to help prepare a plan for
17 approaching the Kuwait«|fs to guarantee no more terrorism against
18 the Amir and by which the Amlr« will use a religious occasion to
21 point 3?
25
152
I'i'i^w
J
967
UNCUSSiFiE
1 we were not going to, and never contemplated, you know, direct
4 release, uh, these people when their terms were up Is get the
5 Iranians talking to the Kuwalt-«es and try and come up with some
6 reasonable proposals, uh, that might give them some negotiating
*
16 C. That's correct.
18 Dakwa he said that the idea was that General Secord could
25
26
153
968
154
>!Fi[S
969
UNCUSSIFIED
1 W. Olcay, now let me move HAnthe.
12 No.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Anyone else?
155
970
utJtU^SiED
1 to congratulate him for his great works he had done^ whatever they
concern Is that
correct?
Ghorbanlfar.
10 credence to that?
11
18 Iran.
notJ^^H|_
23 w. I think that was in Washington, when asked to name the
156
inu
971
because he knew his way around but he would not, we had the four
members of the team.
c. It could be but.
12 and what I want you to do is see if you can shed light on whether
15 point. North listed among the steps the United States has taken
16
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
17 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Do you know whether that the
18 C. I don't know.
22 you recall beyond just that those talks were represented to have
157
972
mmsife
1 has talked to these people. That 1 the KuwaltoBs
6 being tied up to the Oao|wa problem and the fact that the Iranians
7 were very much interested in improving relations with the Gulf
8 neighbors.
11 C. Well, 'I would say, publicly yes, but I think that what
21 power.
25 C. There was for them but one of the things that they, the
lOis^sro
973
1
uNtussm
don't want it, we don't care if there's an Islamic government or
2 not we are willing to go along with the government that is
7 Hussein was removed the pot might be boiling enough in Iraq that
8 Iran would be tempted to seek through its own agents to influence
12
n
22 w. Okay, but you would have been concered in the event
26 next regime.
159
mm f^^mn
974
6 shut' off the Iraqi pipeline that flows to the Red Sea when ^^H
7 ;aid that North said that's us doing that, in other
8 words influencing the Iraqis to cut off the pipeline to the Red
10
11
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
23 you know whether when North said "that's us" d^ing the meeting^
24 whether "that's us" influencing the cut off of the Red Sea oil
26 statement?
lINCLMSiHEB
975
r\
5 C. Yes I do.
19 technician, correct?
20 C. That's correct.
22 technician?
24 analyzing the request for spare parts no one can figure out why
26 them they didn't need us and they said no their technicians said
161
.
976
UNCLASSIFIED
1 they needed them and we said well you know If you're ordering ten
3 (laughter)
4 w. Long war.
6 get someone in there that could look over their logistics, they
7 probably had a lot of the stuff and just didn't know how to find
8 it.
15 these offensives they call everyone they can think of all over
16 the country. How many 105 rounds have you got, how many
17 recoilless rifle rounds you have got, just to find what they'd
21 had been identifiad and there was even some talk about him coming
26 been discussed with Nlr about the possibility, you know there's
162
uNCiASSire
977
UNCIASSIFIEO
1 alLot of Iranian Jews in Israel and maybe among them could be
12 The way the tape reads that he had spent seven days putting
16 that.
21 I've never b«ard to him as His Holiness, just to say the Ima^ is
26 that?
163
yNClASSlFIED
978
1 w. I
UNMSK
don't have it right with me but there was a KL-4 3
10 not?
11 C. Yeah.
20 law.
25 lot less ice among the Lebanese now since the money isn't flowing
26 as freely.
164
wM\m
979
UNCIASSIFIED
1 w. And when you say he you mean the Ayatollah?
3 w. His Holiness.
12 early I think.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
.
980
liNtUSSIflED
1 W. Let me show you I'm going to mark this as 18-A this is
5 says he didn't write it, he says you did-would you take a look at
6 it7
13 why it was. The only thing I can think of, it... what he did as
14 you know from reading my memos they're all full of typos and
15 misspellings and . .
17 regard.
21 that's how It got that way. That's why it's not recognizable as
24 w. Not anymore.
25 C. Okay.
166
ilNMSSIFIEQ
981
thing got pretty far down the way. All the hostages would have
I couldn't see all of the Sta*aW» releasing all of the people and
we weren't going to do most of this stuff unless that happened.
commission, that's down on the bottom of the same page you re '
167
UHClASSiFlEO
982
iiNoussife
1 w. Now I've got to aslc you a question Mr. Cave. If you
4 channel meeting.
8 C. That is correct.
9 w.
H^^^^H^^ ^^® main contact point for Ghorbanifar in
10 Iran so and then these people all show up on the joint commission
16
19
20
21
22
23
168
.
983
UNCIASSIFIE
1 W. The question pending Is aren't we really dealing with
2 the same cast of characters even though we've switched from
Ghorbanlfar ^°^^KKKL,
4 C. I aslc<^ similar question and put It In a different way
5 to him when he brought these names up.
12 to Bud McFarlane the second day. Now when you get Into some of
13 the, what about^^^^^^^| now you told us this was not a
23 correct?
25 know they said some things about Khomeini and then when we were
26 alone he said don't to all this he's a very good man, very
169
984
UNCUSSIFlEy
9
:
985
9 talking it was Ollie talking, we had the one whole day we talked
14 received.
16 willing to talk to you and you've got to take it from there kid.
17 w. Okay, but what when, your memorandum says you've done
23 took part.
25 six step Kuwaiti plan, do you know what he's writing about
26 there?
171
n i?^ ^
986
umnssw
1 C. No I don't.
13 Iranians and the other, that is the Islamic Jihad being less
14 susceptible to influence by the Iranians. And then he has an
21 going to get many released and I remember the long talks we had
22 withH^^^^^I I think that the last guy we got out was the
23 last guy we were going to get out, Jacobsen and I think that's
172
\\m m::M
987
y
However, I go Into some of the things, the differentiation
C. Not necessarily.
w. where do you fall to endorse his description?
C. I don't think we know about, I think when they're going
w.
C. I think so
that much Influence. But you don't accept their influence being
173
\XM\
988
UNCIASSIFIEO
1 or waning on that particular point.
io|
18 C. That is correct.
19 w. That Is a meeting that was arranged by Albert Hakim.
20 C. Yeah we had to go thrj^Tiim to get tol
21 w. Did you try earlier to set up the meeting through
22
174
wmwE
989
uEUSSife
1 w. Before the meeting began you ran into Hakim in the
2 hotel lobby and he informed you that he wasn't going to show up
13 w. Did you know Charlie Dunbar before this meeting you had
14 in December?
15 C. No.
19 fact...
26 one look at them and told Charlie that if, my understanding from
175
mmm
990
rDjI"^
il!«SlfilD
1 the NSPG meeting on the 24th November is the President wanted
5 oJcay write me a memo on it and I will call Don Regan and I had to
15 ^^^^^^^B-s
16 C. No the revised ones were conveyed to him.
176
ONCLASS'IIEO
991
UNCLASSIFIED
1 W. Now If you'll take a moment and distinguish where you
4 gone behind his back to get the instruction changed so that arms
8 is peace and normal relations between Iran and the United States.
16 the same.
18 should be marked for the record. First Mr. Cave, you had pulled
22 believe that Is the memorandum that you had early testified you
24 that correct?
177
UNCUSSIFIE
.
992
UNCUSSIHED
1 December which was sent over by the state Department which as far
2 as we could tell went against the President's explicit
14 correct?
15 C. That's correct.
16 w. And you had compared before I went off and copied these
18 A, first before you compare the two again, 21-A is the cable that
23 amended.
26 bracketed paragraphs.
178
UNCLASSIFIED
993
UNCLASSiHED
1 C. The original on exhibit 20-A, the original
18 correct?
20 Frankfurt.
179
UNCLASSIHED
S2-fi92 0-88-33
994
1 c.
9 do you think?
11 didn't get into- a great lot of detail about what had transpired.
12 I didn't have that much time actually. Once I found out that he
13 didn't know about alot of things and didn't have much of a brief
14 I did my best to brief him on what had fully transpired.
20 insisted that you told us that the President had agreed to the
21 nine point plan are you going to go through with it or not? And
22 that's mhmn came up the hassle when the President said he never
24 w. I'm going to finish one point on that and then ask you
25 another question and then I'll let you go. First one of our
180
UNCLASSIFIED
995
UNCLASSIFIED
1 the things that Interested him about^^^^^H|that he was quite
2 unemotional about his response about the bad news that there were
3 going to be no more arms until there was a real dramatic change
7 unemotional but I think that the only part where his emotion
8 showed was when he asked about the nine point program. Are you
11 emotional.
13 ^^^^^^^H
"^^^^^^" to Id him you ought to go back to Washington to get
Does
14 briefed on this you obviously don't understand where we are. %
15 that comport with your recollection?
23 over and have lunch and I talked a little bit in general terms.
25 about this time and you were supposed to have overstayed and
181
UNCLASSl
996
NClASSiFIED
1 rep, what's the story on that?
4 going to rush back the next morning which was Sunday and I said
5 okay but I'm going to stay over and I will come bade Monday
9 much as I could and he left. Now when I got back to the hotel
12 gave me the phone number, he said call our friend, he's received
17 he left this morning. And he said well I've just got this brief
24 ^^^^M^l
25 w. It wasn't the last you heard of that encounter I gather.
182
UNCLASSIFIED
997
UNCUSSIflED
1 w. Par be It from me to counsel you at this point Mr.
2 Cave.
4 and Polndeter both testified that the nine point plan in some
20 he had seen the nine point plan and he had approved it.
21 w. I have to ask you Mr. Cave, this nine point plan that
25 knowledge, yes.
26 w. Which in the prof note has seven points in it, but that
183
iiN(;ij.<;.<;iFiFfl
998
UNCLASSIFIE
1 would be referred to as the nine point plan?
2 C. That's correct.
4 long day since I'm going back to Maine which means you've
5 probably seen the last of me which means you've probably seen the
7 you again. Thank you Mr. Pearline, thank you Mr. Moffett as well.
ONCUSSIFIE
184
999
/v^ r.
/; •
Partially eciass.l.ed.Rei-Jsed en ) jF£gfe£
UNCLASSIFIED by K
under proniions oi C
Jotiiistm
M:V\
National Secjriiy .'.unci!
I stiqla 1indeper,dence)
(
.-i
BBBU^f inally arrived and after sone small
talk we depa.'-ted for the ^^^^^wr.i le still at the airport, Gorba
inforired us that everything was going well and the Iranians had already
dispatched a representative to secure the release of the hostages.
wy.ile on the plane Mcfarl^nd, Goode and O'neil rehearsed a discussion
of the briefs which we would run through m the hotel for the benefit of
Iranian coverage of the American delegation. In short the play acting
was designed to give the brief good sourcing. We expressed our concern
out loud that the Iranians would not believe the Soviet invasion plan.
We worried hat we could not indicate the real source of the information
due to said source'; sensitivity. The sensitive source, dubbed
"Vladimir" by Goode was described as a Major General who had taken part
m two of the war games on the invasion of Iran. O'neil subsequently
gave ^^^m a brief glance at the briefing book to whet his appetite and
give them something to which they could tie their audio age. None
of the three briefs were given. /^ oon of 2#C
The first substantive meeting too)^^lace late in the'
May. The Iranianside consisted of (flnPH*' named
whom
Gorba described as being in their intelligence service, itial
meeting was hostile with the Iranians listing past sins of Ihe United
States etc. The meeting ended with what appeared to be little chance of
any progress. Basically the American side insisted on adherence^, to the
'
^7-r/v 'V^V
UNCllSSIf "tD @)
1000
UMCLRSS'J'iD
insisted on removing th* en* cr*w Member who was stsyinf on the plsne.
They insisted thst we hsd agreed to this at the earlier swetinQ.
Mcfarland's response to th is was thatjw e pack up and leave. O'neil
consulted wiUu^yjMmg aan AHIBHil who stayed in the hotel with us
during the yfflZ^ySrhlii been intrduced to us as the one person to
contact to yplyt any^ l^*»» whict night cose up. 4Bllpi was very
"
!P:i?
i
ONClASSIfc'ED
1001
ijhclass!f:ed
bar^in. This upset ^H^PWho said that NcFarland was very fira an^
stern(ton4-ro) and thayas Iranians liked to negotiate in a aore
gentle (nara) ataosphere. Mhat was encouraging about aonday's aeetings
w«> that the were far acre friendly than on Sunday.
By thl ar that McParland was not going to aeet any of
the prlnc en aentioned by Corba. NcParland then told
the Iran Id continue negotiations with the Aaerican
staff back t^VfiPwhen some kind of agreenent was reached.
issue of the problems our presence in Tehran caused
thea. HI ted'that a senior official could not afford the political
risk of arland. He pointed out that it was Barergan's
•eetlng at brought down the Bazergan governaent.
Based on, 't we can take it as a certainty that Khomieni
was T\px. esence or our mission. He would have to give
his blessii senior official would dare to meet wih a senior
American official . We ran into the same problem i n our diBcjjssj_on£ with
the Bazergan governent. Gorba also let drop that(JmH|^HHHiB °"^
of the senior personages that he had supposedly ar^nged for us to meet
was also not aware of our presence.
Tuesday was a day of marathon negotiations with the Iranians stalling
for time and trying to get the most out of the American delegation. The
American delegation stuck by the terms of the original agreement and
insisted that after the terms of tJ^.^Frankf urt agreement were met, we
would meet and discuss in detail their needs and the outline of our twc
countries' future relations. The American delegation proposed a
specific timing for a subsequent meeting. During the late afternoon it
was agreed that the American tear would draw up an agreement which would
be discussed later in the eveninc. To save time O'neil begar. working on
a translation which was later completed by he and Gcrba.
During tuesday's negotiations, %1 1 the demands of the hostages
holders evaporated except foV the demand for the release of the Shi'ite
prisoners in Kuwait. Goode handled this part of the negotiations by
firmly stating that the United States would not interfere in the
internal affairs of Kuwait, particularly m an instance where Kuwaiti
due legal pocess had been carried out. We would however seek to better
the condition of Shia prisoners through the good offices of
international organizations such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent.
Goode warned that as far as the well being of the Shi'ite prisoners in
Kuwait is concerned, there had better not be any more terrorist activity
directed at the Royal family in Kuwait.
The draft agreement was the subject of intense negotiations with the
Iranians making some counter proposals which were desi
more time. Talks broke off around midnight with the I
saying it wanted to caucus. For the nexi;^j^h^^,
were held within the Iranian delegation. ^1^^^^
that the other would be responsible if nothing come
a
UNCLASSIFIED
/?/.
.
1002
rused to Mke
.aU-l-Zlic «*ct th.t Corb. did not
othTr than
accompanied the
J^>*| j
to the Airport.
'
departed at 0900.
^^eil s ol^ne
odUxne ^erecollection of what transpired
^^^
The above account is ^^ ^^ ^^^^^.
and may differ somewhat from what 9^J"^ to sense.
'^'3ir.;e.
make
O'neil's comments and recomendation
COKV.ENTS; ---
hi^
,. H Gorba does
appear, we -St press '^1^^^^^^
xdentification of the people eteninTr
alias
-^l\r^^°lZUllTone
during the course^or^
actually forget his that^the^otne^^jj^^
^.^^ ali ases, ^^
only ij-^stea n
under the' ii'prels^rth^t we were they tried so n to do
hostages. This would explain why i.e. .the and the
more in exchange for the Postages,
18 additional hipar radars.
was ^^«";° U ^^^^ ^ ave a
^'NCL4SSIF}£D
/7//^/ />//.c/
. .
1003
tLU
/,f to 'thc^roblcB caused by/K>t b«in^ ablt to ••• %^^B^^^^^^^^
• p«opl« wc wer^/ncflollA^A9 vlth wtrt •
The fact th«nH|H|B breath could
p •Ithtr. On the poffFTvealde waa the change In the attitude of
the Iranian deUaation. By tuetday they were begging a* to atay.
4. Mft^flBteve the problea of a dlahoneat interlocutor. The
ar that they were upaet with Gorba. On tueaday,
ne of the problena in our negotiationa was the
Tact tha^^Kr to d^^Aeting, Gorba gave each aide a different picture
of the iJ^Kure of th^eal. O'neil Mde the point tof^mLhat the
letters^^Hrecieved were froa Gorba. not the O.S. governaent. Me will
have to^HB heavily on Gorba in ±h^^utiirc,^^S
ba and iBHH^^*"<3 ^** *''• • *®^ *' aoney
out of tin^^al, th^^VetuMbly will work hard to bring it off. Gorba
hat very ^^^^^^^^RV for seeing that the deal goes through. The
serious DraH^HHWBTaddress is whet her the Ira^n ians can gain control
the hoEtafiH^flHBHilHI^HH^I^^I^^tf' ^^^^ °^^
real problem. The Iranians side may be most willing, but unable to gain
control
RECOMENDATION
Through hindsight it would have been better for Goode and O'neil to
have gone In first to handle the i negotiations. We should not
have subjected a senior U.S. offic the indignities he was forced
to endure. We have made the point e Iranians that the draft
agreement must be finally negotiat senior responsible officials
frofr both sides. If we have a sub t response from the Iranian side
it is strongly recorr.ended tho*. Goo O'neil meet with the Iranian
side somewhere in Europe to contin negotiations
«NCUSSIFIE0
d/Z/i/ o/^</
1004
UNCLASSIFIED
C//a/ /^^
'7oV\U
fell"^
UHCUSSmiB
&
1005
5115
nzTAL^M^
1006
UNCUSSinED
MEETING NITHI^^^H^HVaNDS ALBERT BAKIM ON 11 JOLY 1986
SIM
Johii-,0.;, ..-."
hdlor;: ;.• '^-
HC niCHT SO TO
••)> SAX> TNAT CVCrrTMZMC MAS «RRANCC». HC SAIl tma
« .MMTCtA
•» SM> _*H>
_ _
TO KHJM NHO «OUL> tC COINC TO TCHRAN. TOL> Nin HACrAKLANt,
PX«. _ _ . . . _
1. DC TOL) HXn THAT «t >II NOT MANT TO CO XHTO KTAILS AX THIS HAS COOt'X
SHON «N> NC HOULI CIPLAIN tVCRYTHINC THIS ArCRTNOON. HC >I> SAY THAT
HC nUST PLAY A rCY HHICH HC HILL tXPLAIM TO Hid IN GRCAT SCTAIL THIS
TCHRAN XnnOIATLY AFTCR HC LCFT TO CXPLAIN THAT HC HCRE LIHING UP ALL THE
»UCtS.
COULI nCNnON on LCAVIK hut THCY COULI RCLY on ^^ on this case. tHONtCR
HON nuCH THIS IS COINC T« COST THC ISRACLIS>.
LCAICRS LINC
'flHU^I^^I^^^I^mH^Bi^^V
flH^HPIHHI^^^^^HHHJ^^foir FARAZI ACCORtINC TO OUR
i R RCCORIS>> aV SAII THAT NT HAI ARCUCI HITH THCH THAT THIS HAS i CREAT
= Ob
'cc OPPORTUNITY. THCY ARC COINC TO CCT INTO POHCR AFTCR KHOniCNI COCS^ SO
THA^ THC CROUP ALSO HCCT HITH PCOPLC FROtl LIV MC HHICK HC COULI ARRANGE.
AS AN ASIICHC tAIt THAT HuSAVI IS BlC PROBLb» t» Tl^T Ml RCiLLY lOCSN'T L
1008
V KM- ^
i
i WCUSSfflEO
KmCULTIY
^. Mz T«iJPfntiuT yrMAtjic* iTRAICHTEH OUT THE
to Str, OVER
Whe »tRtCT Phone CAULS TO MHM "tol» hxr that the call mas
CONVERSATION. ':" - - -
" :-.-.'-.- J .- -'
I -• •
WE nuST BE IN KALING WITH THESECtlTS AN» HOW WE' NEESEB SUCH a' PERSON AS
W. HE ALSO PROPOSE* THaVw'E USE' PRiflTS FROn THESE SEALS Ti ANB OTHERS
NICARAUiSRA.
'J -.h.^-.'-
_.«i
i.
c:ir/y ^^^sl
"
,, jPam^A' ^/jl.
1009
i-
f VtAUfilSI
noi:
Attadaent as Stated
0*— J.C
3^0
^.^**^'
til
<^//MCiS^//
-
1010
A^Ilt^Jrt
Ii« taa tkat It
U^^ KllSt;* U%. iir! S.t k. fot^^.rjrtklM.Tifl't.^l
•l»o wrott
• f Ivt P»l» »«portlB •&! llsk vhick vat
._
option. y^
^ that we wouldn't although a aaall ttaplt is an
^ 5. they agenda for the discussion
with the other 'if* *«^ «5?^""*
^include fyyi«^/;t^-J::*;
«i.i^;/SiU KTiil roni;iJM'|r2?co.p.ny
1011
X'
key vol* 1b Bakiat/ft all verk.
inclaSsired
after leaf iMffliaf , kt afr*»a to yrtitn,
tlia aclitdul*to if as ovtllatd 1^ w. «• kava get take a fraseat, la
ftddltioa to koraa»» it Blfbt kt a good idaa to tati all Vu.%
•para partt^g^^t valt vitk vs. and prasaat tliia as a prasaat. v*
told gorb^^^^Rir vith tkaa about tb* availabldlitr of fiiactiOBiat
tost and i^PH^MUAuipatat aad tba tacbaical abtll tolasa
OQUlPJ*^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^•T^fosslbl^b^astladlcatloa tbat «a Bitbt ba iftl
aoaewbaro Is tbat towards tbt ond, gorba btgaa aiscusslai bis cut.
good* told bis tbat b* could add on wbatavar ba tbinb» iribt for bis
cut to tb* final prico. ba said that ba bad spent S00,000 dollars
alread/ to grease tbe akids etc. be also discussed bis acheae to use
t be profits to aupport ffhan rebels , etc. it would appear that
be BOW feels tbat the deal is entering its final atages.
UNCLASSIFIED
1012
/^c
s (/NCLASS:.%D
)9eJ*x
-— UO l)SSe?|3b/P3lll55E|M0 kW^A
sm,VkSS«*»
a//Aj osj^
1013
liHClASSlf'.W
fttfttajaai** coBcnts m the Ubanoa art prtttjr ^tra I titt forward •>
/ thty Frtttjr suck tquar* with the facts. The Iranian relationship with
the Aaal is »roha ly aoaewhat worse than he states and the realationihip
with the tUflflBft set as cood as he daias.
Rafseai^^HPBBaftts(the initial ones) en relations with the west
are Bost nVestteg. This is the first tine I can recall that a
Iranian •file ial as aanior as Rafsenjani has coaaented on U.S. by
saying that we aeek cordial and friendly relations and are workinj
to astahlish better relations.
Kafsaalani's -rehash of aaerican crises later in the text is the
standard bill of atOBaaent for the United States. In reality this
is pretty atandard Basaar bargininf tactics. After rehashing "criBes",
Rafsenjani states that Irani reaains suspicious of the United States,
But if it can be aroved that they (US) no longer wanted to cause trouble,
we can have relations with then.
It is alBost as if he wants the bargining to begin.
uHCUSS\nto
• I C » B T tENSXTZVB
raONB CALL A06UST
C//A/ os/<^
^
1015
thet thla waa within their cepabilltiea. Be aaid thet if w8'^iad .^tayed Ir
Dubai a few dava longer they could have dallvered 2 oillion iomadla
_
Be eophaaixed in enawer to an O'neil question that they could not
specif icolly say exactly %fhen the j «ii«»**t w,tuM k« »i-a««f^r»i<. ju»«^»h««
waa Btill in their power, deapite the feet that the aituation ^jb^a th* 4
II I Ion ar» hald was continually deteriorating. The ^MMMPMt urged tFat
we .try to do this oeai aa aoon ai ^fttlble, ao that our two companies
could heve a Beaningfull future relationaihp. O'neil aaid that he would
cell back at aoDroxlaatalv the Mfa ti— nr ^* •^«<*«
^~ll continue llylpoke of the aarloua pro>^^«n>« »*» » n'^n?
c onauw^r thla <beel Wit t iualng hJA 4M fcH ^olle aguea. Be urged
iiu ewiiei w* Mimiiii lu mi mm —n
« u b liih . would try to
contact theMTChant iftUdielely ie provide as anich backround aa possible.
'^*4MMPN|^" several eccaaiona said that there were c onsidereablt
-forces arrayed egainat thia deel and he cywldarad |yi»aalf ^jaowagSnqcr-
Boat intereating note is that during thia cenveraation the^HMHHK^~'4
inaiated that they .want to ao through with deal. Although lie bordared en
the inarticulate st tiaes, long peuaea and sooe relapaea into hia old aong
end dance, h* did not relect ou r poaition outright. O'neil *s
reccoaendation ia Uial Ul 111 UUBU SilU Lim it oui with hia in in person,
we Bay get aore out of thi^,^an the transaction we are intereated in.
prlcini ..they vere not oreS.r.S "J^ 2"* *";*"» "»* *• <»»«• «»» J}
•P_»Udth£the
-^
and 600L iJe irdMo J«uSi!'#" *»Pr«"ion on §
S» .1$
In the iirsl pi»ci-T--4 I.id thet 112^1! f*' '"''*"« reco.eoled the dea
W.S osn his ond. sirSid "O'* trouble than he
th.rli IlrUM".??
1017
UNCLA3S!F:ED
CJOL TO m Oil JOLT 12*
f: provisions 01
t I235S
K.^ii 'Son. Nii;(ji;,-,l S.:.j ;'v Council
ti«a^««**
REVIEWED FOR RELEASE (
Date -JliiLML.
enpooid
)
1018
17JUN8& S-SAM
(AFTER GREETINGS)
^^&mia
S-I TALKED WITH OUR OFFICIALS THEY SAID THAT OUR DEAL MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THAT AGREEMENT WHICH WE WROTE IN DUBAI
/y j^ciA'fc
Byes 51
s-. and they art not willing to change it.
"Wer pro
""^erprows,oP3oreo
"VK Johnson, ,sff^^^
S-YES THAT'S THE REASON WE WROTE THAT AGREEMENT. WE ARE WILLING TO DEAL IN
ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT WE WROTE. BUT IF WE COME AGAIN TO DUBAI. OUR FOUR
MILLION MUST BE TURNED OVER TO OUR BANK THE SAME DAY THAT WE ARRIVE. THEN
WE WILL DELIVER THE REST OF THE 240 IMMEDIATELY. AND THE TWO GHUTIS WILL
COME A LITTLE LATER. AND WE WILL REMAIN IN DUBAI UNTIL THE TWO GHUTIS COME.
TALKED WITH OUST OFFIC I ALS. THEY SAID THAT THIS IS HOW
IT HAS TO BE. V: "s
S-VERY GOOD THEN IT'S UP TO YOU AND Y0U|| COMPANY ((COUNTRY)). IF YOU WANT
TO CONTACT ME, I 'LL GIVE YOU A PHONE NUMBER.
Hhuh?
and my name is sam o'neil.
^'.^^
^
^•-' >
S-SAM O'NEIL ((REPEATS SEVERAL TIMES. SJ^^B^P HAS A HARB.;'TI»« UNDERSTANDING
JUST GIVE MY NAME, AND I 'LL CONTACT YOU IMMEDIATELY '•'
SOMETHING FOR YOU. YOU DO SOMETHING FOR US WHEN YOU HAVE DONE
THIS THING FOR US. WE'LL DO SOMETHING FOR YOU .s-/ -
THIS WAY, AND THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS
S-YES, YES. YdU MUST CONFER WITH THE OFFICIALS THERE, AND IF THEY CHANCE
THEIR MINDS- CONTACT ME PLEASE.
I^FINE.
S-COODBYE.
Cll/VAf^:2y
1020
UNCLASSIFIED Au^
''^Ci45S/f/£o
. h t
1021
"'^'^^^2396
: (^. .-. .J •
ly 'oscr i.T^T" "i? sources.
I. 1 Ms sf'**'--! th.i ' he r->^.is a : ;
radio hrc'^dcasts. Hp also tai:<s to exiles, se°s lot f Ir»n;ans wno -i .-^
tr3Vr>l -!ir< ani forth ro Ir^n, •maintains soorir*!-: conta ct with for .!«» r
CO l-»-i "j-^s V-.; r^~-iin
1 m
Iran, ^ut norhass His n',-?' v.-np ortar.t so^rc^
^f :n:or~.i". or, jre the renr^sentat ives of impor'art In mans .-.^o
.
-Tirr
1
:'''.'' or. iiii.t i.-igs' T'".-? "^cst innor-.in': o' -..~,?s-r IS t"9 "'a-
. .-.
San and Abe tolc^Bthat ther^ '-.'as an interest 'on the part of
2.
I'SG m
trymq to u se tra^e to Tradually re-estaol ish re la ions wit",
Iran. Sa-n and Abe olanned to capitalize on tne trade pa rt usi-i-
contacts in the U SG with whom they will coordinate the ir actions,
This of course req uires apolitical decision at the hi5 hest lev?: or
the Iranian govern ment. ^Bsaid that he is certai- that the vast
-a]ority of senior Iramaffl want to re-establish soT^e d egree of
political re^tion s with USG with tne single exception of t e t h 1 r .-.
line pople. (^Bsai d that the current proble-n is that Xh omien: woul
'P2.se ar.i socn ac tion as long as he lives. Grour.dwor-c
:nat '.e .nan 1 51 a 1 1 s CO-.-. act
suqgestej tn?.-
e tne we cor.sic fr sencm^ m a non- irTca.h to do soTie
contacting after around work has heen done.
(© A^,
v^
. t
1022
^cK^b'fe ^-'A
y/j*i<fo
Ch\J^
Non-Log
NATIONAL SECUnrrV OOUNOL
3903
August 5, 1986
f or O BC KW
The OSG met on Tuesday, August 5, from 1:30-2:45 p.m. with LTCOL
Ollie North, An\bassador Bob Oakley, Richard Armitage, LTGEN John
Moellering, Charlie Allen, Dewey Clarridge, Buck Revell, and
Craig Coy attending. The following topics were discussed:
MnHHUMCWaam 8-/7-f?
1
IMJULJSB
1024
''"
!' •
.^ ^. ,^
wmm
1025
.Soces on Dissem concerning Irajrs~vrievr-tnar It "ciam^ot win a war with Iraq "Their
for an "honorable Peace," and their fear that the upcoming offensive may not be
success full.
N 2866
1. Iran now concludes that it can not win a war with Iraq. The economic infastructu:
j^can no longer support the effective waging of the war against Iraq. In addition Irania.-
^ logistics are in a shambles. There are also political reasons which dictate the quick c
elusion of a* peace with Iraq. About 2 years ago the iranians began loUcing at
the rebuilding of Iran after a peace with Iraq is concluded. In a postwar world, Iran
hould have to do sorae re-arming of their military. They would also have to rebuild the
industry and econoery. 1 Since both the military and the ec onomy are weste rn oriented, :t
2. The Iranian govemnent wants to conclude peace with Iraq, but has a problem in tha
it nust be able to present the end of the war as a "Victory" for Iran. Were this not
to be the case, the moderate and conservative factions in the government would be
victimized by the radical wing, which would attenpt to dominate the government. The
fear of the moderates and conservaties is that this would upon up Iran to increased
'
Soviet influence. In order to present the Iranian people with a xzsXMZ)D("victory,
2 o J
the Iranians have planned one last offensive. THe purpose of this offensive ^s to
1 l'^
1>
government as to whether Iran can reasonably expect to 1 make any sizeable gains by
Ob
launching such an attack. They are critically aware of the tremendous price they
will have to pay in hianan lives, because of the well prepared Ira
the fire power superiority of the Iraqis.!
82-692 0-88-34
1026
^
1027
Nam*
Age: " 2804
Place .of bir Partially Dedassified/Released
on^Jid/S^
Education undlf provisions of EO.
12356
by B. I^ir. National
Marital Sta Security Councif
UNCLASSIFIED
:
1028
Irecoaaendatlons
a. The Hague
b. Military Aid
UNCLASSIFIED
1029
(^
1030
fl
2395
'--»i.
^^ {Ti C
^c^^^^
£^Nb.t ?-A
lt»JBff|^^^H|>OPGRN/N0aaiBM«^ «aBN
on_^iki9i7
\^ Partially Declassified /Released
under provisions of LO. 12356
by 3. Reger. Notional Security Council
"• Tv«*J
^t(,ea4tl ; «»««va,i d^4^:
UNCUSSIFIEILm
1032
Hon-Lo9
NATIONAL SeCURlTy COUNOL
WASfWOTON C M406
N 9099
October 2, 1986
TC SENSITIVE
ACTION
bS^iyssllya^AD
\l»^lt9 fir^
V .A
oy 8. ji^
1033
9". 00^ ^
T©f-9f€*ET- SENSITIVE
rm^^
^has said he is bringing a Koran for the President. As a
^^TB^procal oeature, we have purchased a Bible which we would
present to^ipijfor him to take back to Tehran with him.
Given our earlier discussions (see transcript), it would be
very helpful if the President would inscribe a brief note
citing a particular biblical passage (T&b III) in the front
of the Bible. This particular excerpt is important in that
it is a new testament reference to Abraham, who is viewed by
Moslems, Jews, and Christians as the procenitor of all the
world's nations. It would be most effec-ive if the President
hand wrote the inscription and initialed/signed it without
addressing the note to any particular person.
TOP^SECKT"-—
mmmm
From «n operational perspective, the current conununications
arrangements are a command and cpntrol/OPSEC nightmare
JJab IIIj^ Nir essentially contfbir'buf'''access to both
([iJPI^BBPdnd Ghorbanifar and, thus, we often find ourselves
reacting to his well intentioned efforts. He believe that
we now have an opportunity to change the relationship in
auch a way that Mir ia placed in a supporting role rather
than acting as a primary source of control. He also
recognize that Israel's participation in this activity is
both politically and operationally important. In altering
Nir's status, we need to do so in such a way that he and
those officials in his government who are cognizant continue
to perceive that this is still a 'joint venture.*
The steps above are designe d to give us a chance to raaKe the new
relationship through the(;jlBMM^ function without destroying the
Ghorbanifar^^H|HV channel. We would, in ef fe ct.^ put
Ghorbanifar^HHt on "hold" until we see what ^il^ produces.
Please note that when Copp briefs Nir in Tel Aviv on Sat urda y, he
will ngt rev eal that he is enroute to Frankfurt to meet (^Bb
Given^^iBB) strong antipathy toward the Israelis and our
uncertaini^ as to whether or not he )cnows that Nir (aka Miller)
is Israeli, we would tell Nir on Si^da^i^^ht that we were going
to a hastily arranged meeting with ^H^m^H|which he (Nir) will
be unable to ma)ce due to lack of connectTn^nights to Frankfurt.
UBVhas already told us, that shortly after the October 6 meeting,
will b^_a follow-on meeting of the 'joint committee' in
'tfiier*
which BH^BB^^I^ ^>* * participant. Unless we are convinced
that tdTe Iranians would recognize Mir as an Israeli, we would
intend to invite Nir to this follow-on meeting.
A Bwmo from you to the President has not been prepared for
obvious reasons. It is hoped that between now and 3:00 p.m.
Friday you will have an opportunity to privately discuss this
with the President and obtain his approvals/signatures on the
steps indicated above.
1««&^ SENSITIVE
^ .
1085
UNCLASSIFIED
vefseener-
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That you initlaJ^the travel authorization theet at Tab I.
Approve ^- Diaapprove
2. That you tell Director Casey to prepare an appropriate
intelligence package by Saturday, October *, for the meeting with
<W^>on Monday (departure Sunday evening)
Approve Disapprove
3. That you have the President inscribe the attached Bible with
the passage at Tab III (a card is paperclipped at the appropriate
place in the Bible)
Approve Ul^ Disapprove
4. That you approve the talJting points at Tab IV for use by Coop
with Nir on Saturday, October 4.
Approve Q"' .>^ ' Disapprove
5. That you obtaih a Presidential signature on the letter to
Prime Minister Peres^at Tab V.
Approve
^
(\ Disapprove
Attachnenta
Tab I - Travel Authoriiation Sheet
Tab II - Diagram
Tab III - Bible (for Presidential inscription)
Tab IV - Copp TalJcing Points
Tab V - Presidential Itr to PM Peres
"'
iMtn
DATE : ^jOctqb^Q-^, Wftc
4. HOOE OF TRANSPORTATION:
CCV AIR COMMERCIAL AIR XX pov RAIL OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
$1872.00 „y
TP.i_VSPORTATION PER DIEM ^^ OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST_
9. I" SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler,
Describe Source and Arrangements) ; s/A
XI. REMARKS (Use This' Space to Indicate Any Additional Itens You Would
LiX* to Appear on Your Travel Orders) :
UNCLASSIFIED
1037
September 30, dk
UNfitlASmD N 9104
COMMUNICATIONS HETS
EUROPE
Fron «n OPSEC perspective, there ere toe wny chennels into (end
out froa) the U S. He cen't hope to have this neny players speek
with one voice no matter how 'good* they ere individually.
N 9105
UilUSSIflED
INSCRIPTION BY PRESIDENT:
Galatians 3:8"
UNCLASSIFIED
1039
.
1040
We are also concerned that the two new hostages (or at least
Cicippio) represents a clear violation of the 'understanding*
we have had with the Iranians on anti-O.S. terrorism since
June of last year.
TOP CECRET-
Declassify: imeissiFiED
.
1041
tof-seewCT-
Ul^eLl$8lflE0
SENSITIVE
N 9108
Aside fro« this very strong policy objection to continuing,
we have, as you know, had repetitive financial and communica-
tions difficulties with Ghorbanifar. While we could debate
as to whether or not Ghorbanifar had received all that was
due hiffl by the Iranians, the aost important factor is
potential OPSEC risk.
that
The President has directed that we will not proceed with any
further receipt of funds from Ghorbanifar nor deliveries to
3111^^^ until we resolve these issues.
TOP SCCRPf
wmmn SENSITIVE
1042
^r sccncr 3 sensitive
wittQ^^^B^
there must be a meeting
any further; ^'•«~ ^ before we proceed
lEMfflEO
1043
jPOP C ECnCT -
UMSHD N 9170
SENSITIVP
Approved
Doconcnf
''"'"
HI III
Oelelecl in
its Ertfitretu
1045
\^^%l
^NCLASS
c ; c •.
J
1046
^vb^n^JSjiU^
•^fT'
^1
I 0137
a
J'
SI
Si
P2 111 f n u w CO
n
M b «>
<->
t M ^O f •M
w ff
r. c <*. C c > w »i
- — o « a ^e
—i >
D.
tl.
w *j
•^
e
^ <M ^
<-i
-^
w o
•)b
f^^SSgesE^n^R^il^
u ss
out
«H*2
»- Ul
»-2
lu ISt!' (O a
NCLASSIFiED
1 1
1047
UntLHd5irlrcu -
I 018S
cassation of hostaga-taking;
UNCtRSSintlr 0189
•ecus* th« C>iorb«n'ir« hann«l« w«g vi«w«d ••
•low and unr«liabl«. tiM Nhit«< ncourt9«4 by Mccord
•na Haliia —
bM turntd to • now c h«nnol. Th« n«w ch* nn«i t<i)
involves an individual purporting ^^^HHI^HHHi<^''''<=^^ 'axsic/1
(-0 Itafsanjani, Speaker .of th« Majlis and socond most powerful aan
in Iran.
r<«<^«
future.
i iMPiiig^iFBPn
1049
IHlULIIUOffffTLIr'
he rkc round :
.^ -ii
forthcoming.
S
UNCLASSIFIED
1051
0192
B»pprochwent with Iran:
j: c!ic; e-.-. Ce:>. h.e'.d cfticr.: o.'. hov t. accc-Tj 1 1 tj. ihj* art
he cJt
r Itc cc-c by .
The Ghorbanifar-
UNfilASSifJED
|
1052
UlivLfiUJII ILU
I 0195
UNCLASSIFIED
1053
d J scred
J t an^^re^^Ri ions by Ghorbanifar; he has too much
documentary evidence that implicates US officials.
UNCLASSIFIED
.
1054
CWa^ Ni.^fe5»vu2iV«^5
.o^ssi
UNCUtSSinED (0 l^hc^
END
<^^ SECRET
UNCUSSIFIEO
.
1055
[-6
mmm^
Obi«ctlvs of th« ProqfiH !
05
r NOV ««
^386
£ai5i^
J -1-
mmmt Coyy
1056
uimsiftEf N 06
B«cauf« th« GhorbanlfarvB^^mpchann*!, *>*» viewed ••
slow and unreliable, the white House-? encouraqed by Seccocd
and Hakim -- haa turned to a new channel^^Th^new channel
Involves an individual purporting to be ^0H||HiH|oC
RaCsanjanl, Speaker of the Majlis and second most powerful man
in Iran.
V.
IM^SlflED'
A
1057
IJNW» 07
Background !
mssm
1058
gumgi
uNwra N 08
Brussels «'i^>)||H^HHH^^^^^^|i^BMajlis
R^^^njanl. mis,
S peAkei
In
turn, led to two meetings between|
^^and VS officials, one meeting
InFraflkfurt.
in Washington, the ocnet
X
mitmB
:
1059
BNGtASSfFlffi N 09
X
.
1060
DNetASSIFIED N 10
Recommendations !
ther^
.
1061
UNCLASSIU
N 11
Develop Press Guidance In the Event of an Exposure
(B) .
msstfito
1062
t: :t::s ""mmmmn
\mmn *-*"'-i^3
^ I 0195
1. Qiarles Allen and George cave went to New York on 22 October 1986 to
meet with Roy Furmark. This was an extremely interesting meeting in that it
revealed that the financial backers of Ghobanifar have been aware of the
operation since its inception and may actually have played a key role in
getting it moving, possibly for altruistic reasons, but alinost certainly Cor
their own profit. Roy himself admitted several times during the evening -that
profit was certainly a motive but that the group did see their efforts as
leading towards stability in the region and the release of the hostages. Roy
appeared to be very open during the course of the evening and everything he
told UA tracked with what we know. The only doubtful answer he gave was in
/ reply to a question as to whether some of the principals were involved in the
sting operation. Roy said that none of the principals were involved, however,
one of the players, lawyer Sairuel Evans, was the major indictee and is free on
$4.5 million bond. Roy claims that Bvans owes him $200,000.
r* "^ tS.3536-86
'
Partially Copy 1 of 2
Cpc,-.;'.;r"i.:r.:D--^a\*,<Jl3r7 .
L
UllClASSmED
1063
mtmin
said that "h€ has known Khashoggx since 1966 and trusted hun. Roy added that
SchiJtr«r ^'^ Khashoggi are close. Roy thinks this points up Khashoggi's
breadth of vision. Roy pointed out that Schiiimer had actually returned from a
visit to China to make the August meeting.
3. Bie first transaction was in Septeinber 1985 and was for 500 TOWs. The
cost of the TWs was $5 million. Khashoggi put up the money because he
believes in Ghobanifar. The cost to Iran was $6 million. This allowed for $1
million to cover profit and expenses. The first shipment of TTMs was
defective, so a second shipment was sent. There was a subsequent $5 million
deal that went off in the November-Decentier timeframe. Khashoggi told Roy
that they were no: involved, but Roy is certain that this was a
Khashoggi/Qiooapifar organized deal. I U QA
ni
1 -^ O
A. Roy said that prior to the next deal, there was a meeting in the Pans
airport hotel; he forgets or never knew exactly who was involved in this
meeting. The meeting concerned Hawk spare parts. The deal for the Hawk spare
parts began to be put together in April 1986. Khashoggi raised $15 million to
cover the deal $5 million from an Arab financier, and $10 million fron twj
Canadians. Khashoggi raised the money on 15 May. A group of Americans went
to Tehran and took with them seven percent of the Hawk spare parts which
consisted mainly of nuts and bolts, with regard to this deal, the financiers,
Qiobanifar, and Nir met and agreed that $3 million would be added to the price
to cover profit and expenses and also another $ 2 million would be added to
cover monies owed to Nir. The price to the Iranians would then be $20
million. (Why did Qxjbanifar charge $24.5 million and with Nir's knowledge?)
Neither Roy nor the financiers apparently know anything about the raise in the
price by Ghobanifar, although they are aware that the Iranians objected
Strenuously to the price. Qiobanifar told Roy and Khashoggi that he believed
yy the bulk of the original $15 million price tag was earmarked for Central
In this regard, Oiobanifar told Roy that he was relieved when the
America.
$100 million aid to the Oontras was passed by Congress.
6. Roy said that Ghobanifar told them that he received two payments, one
for $3 million and the other for $5 million. As originally agreed upon, the
Arab investor was supposed to get back $6 million for his cut and the
Canadians would get back $11 million. The other $1 million was to go to
Khashoggi. Q^obanifar's cut was to come out of the $1 million. To the $8
million that Ghobanifar received, he added $100,000 of hit own funds. The
Arab investor was paid off ($5 million), the two Canadians received $1.1
lllion. Roy was not sure but presumabiy the $2 aillion went to tiic.
iiNHi Afifiinrn
1064
/
/
ONClftSfflED 0197
Originally/ the Canadians were given a check by Khashoggi in the amount of $11
million to cover the $10 million they provided Khashoggi. Bie monies to cover
the fSawk shipnent were paid into an account of a conpany called Lakeside which
is an off -channel company. The Canadians believe that the money was stolen
and this is giving Khashoggi heartburn. (Note: This does not square with
what we know. We know that Ghobanifar received $4 million from the Iranians
in July. He also received $8 million into his Swiss bank account on
21 August. These two payinents were cash. He may also have received a check
for $6 million in between these two payments. The Iranians raised a big stink
about the price of the Hawk spa*«^^t^and Ghobanifar offered them a $6
million deduction. According ^^nfl|^9^ ^^^^ ^8 million payment on
21 August sc-jarei?^^eiraccojnts witnaiooa-.ifac by mutual agreerenc. In
fact, accorcirc ^°Vffl|i^ *' million covered the rerainder of the deal, !.'-,•=
Sincerely,
wmm 24 r«bru«ry
C
1M7
4019
Cav*
•nd tooth Asia Division
^
';
i
Gaor^a N. Cava
ower pfonsFOr.s o» £
I235S
6/ K Jonnson. KaiKjnal Sicumy
Council
KARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOORCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
ji^j4^/}
—
1066
C 0^532
Tkt Oumar rfCoiiral iMtflifcacc
Vi*ai«.OC SHI
NIC 05623-66
12 Oeceaiber 1966
of Central Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence
nCM: es E. Allen
tional Intelligence Officer for Cotnterterroris
(@)
CiiNJ M033
llWdASSlElEE^^^^^ S
1067
UNCLASSIHEB
^ 0-9533
18.224-18,228
UNCUSSIHED
1068
«— _ t<.^>— '*ae^>^>^^
:
-) ^^ Vs^^jsc^^,^
W..^.v ^^««..«a^
SHS^
Partially De:l3Ssitied.'Released
unde' ofovisions ol E
oo
123bS
^ I ^-
Council
by K Johnson. National SecjMlv
UNCLASSIFIED
1069
ONCLASSra
1070
-....ONcussife
%A
Translation by Albert Hakim of
the Parse Original of the "9 Points'
Note: The date is the 16th day of the 7th month of the Iranian
year which I believe corresponds to 8 October 1986, but
needs to be checked. It also indicates the discussions
started in the afternoon and lasted until late at night.
Nine working days from now the 500 TOWs and the Hawk
spare parts (if accepted by Iran) and the gifted
medicines will be delivered to Iran.
Before executing Item 4 below, Albert will provide the
plan for the release of the Kuwaitis (17 persons).
^®
.
1071
UNCLASSIRED (o/^M
8 October, l^l'W
Eveninc until aidnight
END
CiJ^K
SECRET
ONCUSSIFIED
1072
UimSlflED
NIC 05060-46
3 Nov«nt>ci 1986
wm t^xn]\
1073
r 3.
c*rt«in politicdl actions,
y<' UNCUSSIHED
imin^f th« talks
Ollj* North Mid that sine* the btgimin^t
/m L^IHI*^
curt£ilin9 agsa fcilait to yaq. wt havt optnt^ofloiMlons
""""'^~' TP
ulks wt htvt taktn
havt ulkcd t^|^Hand prtMurtd thM> intfl^
thtHHjBB
'MtToTinMlons with thtl
Mid that thtft wtrt four isauts that
Cin, but firat ht wanttd to aay that nxxntini has
a gts
^^
art prisoners. 'S^i.% haa ehangtd tht attitudt of tht Lebanese captors. ^11 C^
saitf that tbiy wish to tablt tht following points for discussion:
A. How to procttd with our rtlations, and rtlations with othtr statts
in tht arta.
'/SPSJTI^
Wii
ATTiAi ^n:iUiL
1074
mm
if th« policy miee—iiM, all will shart. On th« samthAnd ff it
ftilt »ll
will 4l»o chart to no on« can conplain. Iha problta is on* of
coordination
b«tw««n nmi tr iiiM ^1 atattd that tha last shipntnt of TOte^
•llminacas thtfWMI^^BHchannal and tstablishts his 9roup.
that tha Iraqi Information was vary wall ractived in l^hran.
akTaid
ihjs anablas
th«n to fore* th* cabinat to focus on th* hosta^* situation.
B»r* is '
howevsr, sow confusion in Tehran.
ly fanatical Bii
____,
radical, and wtit*^; stay publifiiad a
^_ ^^*
naw^apac in tihich
gtcup is Mall, vary
thay ravcalcd that
tha Phi tad Statas and Iran art eooparating in 9*ttin9 th* hosta9es r*l*as*d.
^^I^said that at th* Bonant they hav* no bard infomatlon on y*>o took tha
othar two boctagas, but b* susp*cts that it could b* this radical Hizballah
group.
C-
8. In on* of his nany asidas to Clarka^^pF aaid that ba tfas conccrnad
about North 'a dasand for rclaasa of all th* hostages. Ihis could b* a problem
- -. t y / ^D
L
1075
10. In another aside,^^ stated to Clarke that they feel they must have
pilotlcss drones to give them the kind of intelligtncc coverage they need. He
wondered i f they could buy som from the Israelis, this may be afynni|^or
Illr^JHklso told us abou^^^HHBradars they are buying fr^HHB
I^^^HAlthou^h they are supposed to oe deployed to cover the Soviet union,
TnaSnihe technicians are installing tbea along the Iraqi border.
11. ^S said that a feur-aan comittee has been foraed in Tihran to
oversee thaic relations with the Qhited States. Sicy are as follws:
Otarlaa B. Allan
/I TTk\^O^f»*^ ;^?l£LiiU'iHS
1077
STENOGRAPHIC MINLTES
'^
N«t for Qootmtloo or ^ fSp HSITS 0<^^^ fZt
UHCflSSIFIED
Deposition of
Committee Hearings
of tk«
URCLASSlFk
1
4 Deposition of
11
12
13
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
UNCLASSIFIEI^
1079
DNCtllSmHIIfiL'
1 Whereupon,
5 EXAMINATION
6 RV MR. BARBADORO:
7 Q' Could you state your full name for the record,
8 please?
9 A
14 ^^^m|HH|^^|^^^^^^^^Hf used
15 with the Nicaraguans and for travel outside of Nicaragua
17
21 [alias?
24 A Yes.
iiUCLASSIEJR
1080
li^^iSS^ff
1
2 To me or to other people?
3 In your presence.
6 Task Force?
10 routine inspection o
12 A
19 A No.
23 A No.
JlMCl ASSKISA
1081
'GflffLASSSffilS'
1 in the United States Government to provide money for
3 A No.
)r discussed
10 I have
16 around town.
23 big bucks.
lUJ^Mvl. *«rwiiCslLtl'
1082
lim«§im»
1
18 funding.
20 witfl^^^^B which has a lot of money, but you can only do that
4iAClAS5IH£ft
1083
i9mis$i^i
1 might be a government to approach for aid to the contras.
7 mentioned that.
g 1984 or 1985?
^g countries?
21
Q What is the basis of that understanding?
imfil A&SJCICA.
1084
imcixssiPiii
1 third countries would be legal?
7 do.
23 Q Let me —
24 A No one has told me and I don't have any reason to
lUMIN iieMEWHta
1085
lWeLX5fll«l
this or that or can you do the other thing,
19 until a few days ago and have never heard it from the
20 officer himself.
processed the papers and he said did you know that, (lipid I
25
IIUAJ ffcoiriri^
1086
1
Q Okay. That isi
2 A Yes.
15 and then when the Director took sick and the investigations
/»« i*
> UNCI LCJUEICA.
1087
10
2 the legislation had been signed into law because there was
9 A Not in my presence.
11 os^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bto for
12 the contras?
16 from^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vfrom January
17 October of 1985?
25 that.
UNCLASSIF'.EO
«'>'/v.'i^si??i;n
1089
4'*|i^»A^Stfi£0
I
' V w ^ k r
Tii-'g-T-
2c:
s
2»i
i»-u e- JU£^' ^ p
'
Z^M^^
">* ir :
~~ -" r :ur. •>
zaPE = r:_"s
Xtjdszscss
r-nm-^ - ,-Tg
a ten _::
S
S
WOSBBXl ^3BC^-3K 11' ""
^TjTT-rr- ae
ElCJlt^srea
1092
'mimm 15
J( another assignment; and I said can you tell me what it is' and
4 to be^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vand two or
5 three days later I was called by Clair George and told I was
10 it was sort ,of said that I was a person that had the
21
iiUCl isu£ii:n
1093
iN^i^smiff 16
'
That is an interesting question. The day Boland was passed
3 cable, which you probably have which says from this point
6 them.
14 clear.
^^Z no; and the reason was that while each one could be
imA" A/^CACICA. 5-
1094
17
'OWlffSSffilV
And there we developed our operational philosophy
e on the resistance.
16 decision about the contras and every decision taken from that
21
24 instances
illllU ACAiriCA.
1095
umi^siniir 18
1|
7 alwaysf^^^^^^^^^^^^^B wit
12 appropriated money.
23
iiyiM ftfi^ucucn
1096
ii#iai»»nE]r 19
6 February of 1985.
1(H|^^^H^|^|^|y c o n f i r me d
11 Q Did you have an idea where the money was coming
12 from?
23 look at that, they have got money. The way it came around
I
24 was, oh, my, took at that, they are not starving to death and
25 they are operating. That means they have got money. And
1097
vmissmis' 20
1 then how much money. Look at the arms purchases coming in,
10 intermediary.
17 for that.
asked him. That was up until some time in 1986. Some time
25
JJMCJ ftCUEJCn.
1098
21
6 forces.
imi^mi^ 22
5 A No.
7 ^H^^v^^^ discussed?
11 and then —
12 A Where he said I will take care of it, yes.
16 at the meeting?
23 the equation, and Ollie with NSC. And it met more in those
uflCLHssinEir 23
^^
.
r<torr\
r<oorr\
was -- the RIG really was rn \ % wm , reactivated in January of
2 198 5 as we went into the end of the six month period and
6 was discussion.
10 Q When?
..-..MurijissiEirjih
1101
SmiS^lff
BY MR. BARBADORO:
/
\/io A Ytes. A, I didn't believe it; and B, I didn't •
and how they were going to get what they needed to survive?
nu^r^^^Citicn
-
1102
WeiXSSIFKf 25
4 what the Central America*! Task Force did was track their
11 their supply.
24 A Yes.
jiMM.iei^fricil
?
1103
l»^iS3^i 26
1
A Either late September or October of 1984.
2 Did you meet him in your capacity as the Chief of
Q
3 the Central American Task Force?
13 as we 1 1
16 I didn't even meet with him that often. It was not often
21 so on.
mirj Acsjurn
1104
IWtLiS^S 21
1 A Yes.
11
^^^^2 an intelligence report signed by Clair George concernir
17 BY MR. BARBADORO:
19
22 BY MR. BARBADORO:
UII0»S»»E9T 28
3 A Yes.
29
It. I didn't want to get involved and I must tell you that
10 A Yfes.
11
Q In March of 1985, did you have any idea that
13 contras?
16 contras.
iiiiAJ 1 ftriinrn
,
1107
30
IfiGLiKflAlir
1 observations of things, conunents made by Ollie.
5 and had a major role to play during that time frame with
7 than the FDN, co-equal to and perhaps even greater than any
16
17
18
-19
|21
22
23
24
>5
Iliin iccirp^»»
1108
31
from?
Q ^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V d i d you
/
10
almost vg*^^^^^^^^^^^^^Wand
e i iai wgfc it would amount to,
11
is coming in at this point in time with this on it and we
12
are going to do this with it, status of their forces, in
16 probably only one who knew where the funding was coming
17 from, Calero.
JMMt^ AeOJCUBJB.
1109
32
VmiSfllAEff'
1
Arabian Peninsula Branch Chief and he tried to convince
2
6 Affairs.
9 It was a stupid idea and I told him so. And from that
11 as I recall.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
iiuri iccinrn
1110
33
ffi)SLi@»i»§r
that. The next time I saw General Secord was in
walked up the elevator with me. I shook his hand and said
'
I didn't know him well and it was not a cordial
° relationship.
''3
that he complained about me to Casey. I know from being told
^^ about you?
21 those complaints?
24 BY MR. BARBADORO:
Uliiy A.C£l£JUt
nil
URCIi M>«l3.''M 34
3 A No.
6 Eatsco matter?
14 may in the recess of my mind have known that Tom Clines was
jqnd I know they are bad news and that they also were
25 to go to the contras?
im«^Rl^ 35
15 A No.
21 .
Force?
22 A A mess.
25
i^^wi»i iccicim
1113
msms
one believed hi3-4. tLV>imL%4q or what he was telling us.
'
'
My
guess is, and I think the estimate that we used, was about
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
p?)iMtf8''.f*oirjtiL
1114
UNCLASSiF^EE)
I
1115
bp-3 imi^flmir 39
10
21 him in any way, and we would just move him to the side,
23
24
25
1116
bp-4 vfnai^^jAiff 40
12 him.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
41
6 No.
7 By CIA officials
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23 the CIA could get back into the business and fund these
iiM^pjiccicicn
1118
im/^miff
it would have
the law.
bp-7 VmifSffilD' 43
2 Q you your^^^^^^^^^^^^^lto
3 make any representations to ^^^^^^^^^^^Habout supplying
4 them?
14 1 will give you communications and I will tell the FDN you
^^ feont?
iKGne^mEr 44
14 years ago. Back what I told you when I came to the task
19
23
45
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
82-692 0-88-37
.
1122
bp-lO owamifiBr 46
6 who were sent into the fiald in early 1986, and were
10 1986?
16 about that, but you can't let those things cloud your
17 judgment.
!9 supplied until the CIA got back in the gameT because even
22 supplied?
JJIifillftfilPWA
1123
bp-ll ^SL%$»ft% 47
1 Q And if you —
2 A And I sort of didn't -- I would not -- didn't
6 get going and get back inside and was chafing at the bit.
10 sources.
14 Nicaragua?
DNSIiirafFIBir 48
A Yes.
15 help them. You have to share what you have with them.
'.
* «»i MiMri iLMincn
1125
bp-13 0N^i^(Hfflr 49
9 A Yes.
15 law said.
16 Q Okay.
20
Q Your^^^^^^^^^^l^Phas me assumed
24
«v«'9A«iC;QIEIHL
1126
QNBEflSSifJ^ 50
7 f rom^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bwhere they
9 within^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V and
22
23
24
25
APBu^r^rv^frirn
1127
UROEI^gSfflEBT
A Yes.
a Southern ^ont?
A No. /
21
f^d there wasn't very much tine because he was leaving that
25
1128
3-16 iid^D^SSIiatr 52
9 southern front.
10 Q That was the only time you met him before he went
11 down there?
19
bp-17 ll^^^fl^ffffiDT 53
3 an admiral.
4 Q Okay.
10 there that subject was not discussed at the RIG, was it?
12 Q Summer of 1985.
in
22 the fall of 1985 there was considerable discussion
because
23 the RIG about what to do about the southern front
that he was
24 Eden Pastora was jumping up and down screaming
that it was
not getting any of the humanitarian aid|^ and
1130
(«£til^»|3rsfr 54
24 It is CII-Number
ONvens^ffi^ 55
5 as^^^^Loepositions Exhibits
6 5 and 6, respectively)
7 BY MR. BARBADORO:
9 A Yes.
10 Q '
Do you recall having received^^^^HExhibit '5?
13 did.
16 A Yes, it was.
19 drafting that.
25
IMAI aAi^*'
1132
(|K^)^(n«}r 56
10 these?
21 would it not?
22 A Yes.
23 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^c o n s t r u c t i o n
24 of air field.
A Yes.
25
lUiAJ
1133
57
bp-21
I don't remember.
that air
11 A My specific first recollection about
heard
12 field, and I do not discount the possibility that I
of -- Decer^ber 9,
13 about It earlier, even in between December
was on December 9
14 1985 and the date of those cables,
Pomdexter
15 during a trip to Central America with Admiral
Security advisor
as he was about to become the JJitional
om/g^ffffiKr 58
stay away from it. Make sure you stay legal. Stay within
«fl<-y :
iJHCl LC£1C1£II
1135
bp-2 3 unai^ifitEir 59
1 A Yes.
3 North in December?
in the
13 in the 7th floor of the State Department
22 and tried to —
were
Q Who was present when the photographs
23
24 shown around?
General Moller, I think, was present.
A Oh, gee.
25
^^ ^ - uyai t^ciucA
1136
oneEi^^istr 60
6 Q Yes.
7 A Ollie did.
16 of the field.
.Y9M.V ^JT.^ ,^lif ' v^'c"^, SSl*^ showing it and I don't know why you
1137
b-2 5
61
2 it.
14 on.
19 used?
22 know now that it was used and the aircraft were stuck there,
..IIW*.<*CQIE1EII
1138
ncLKKmEir 62
the time that they were flying short haul flights in there
and it landed there and got stuck in the mud and all that,
hell-of-a lot.
^^^jciMl
1139
bp-2 7 1Ni(H.ISS]tl£ff
63
to break.
18 A Yes.
23 Q Okay.
Jlliri ftRSIFIFf)
1140
bp-28
DNttil^Dliatr 64
the air field. You have got to stop it. You can't let it
was^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^L ^nd
22 A No.
24 care of.
JlMiy JLMPJrirJ^
1141
(MRie^lHinr 65
bombasts.
He says he
16 ^°^^^^^^^^^^^^^m
17 I don't know.
21
progr2un was to have been one of providing assistance,
JU4M iccirirn
1142
DfoiieKiBflr 66
3 figuring out what the law meant and how to do it took some
4 SIX weeks.
^0 A Ad^ n gi^sqiim .
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ks a
XJn There was another problem after that, but they *^mim place
19 Q Tell it please.
l3MOIJiJ<!^l^lCim
1143
bp-31 UWfti^IGlBr 67
9 flights."
10 •
They said, "No more flights." This was a •
11 decision j^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m it
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
I3AIAI i^^^'-^-^m^
1144
inaff^Ofiiff'
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
25 was February.
JUICI^ACAWtfli
.
1145
DNCt/I^IFrSir 69
Okay
supply. go through^^^^^^^w
Q Who came up with the idea to us
that^H^^^mH^l^would go along
Q Do you recall --
as being a contact he had down there who could get you access
as Felix Rodriguez?
A Yes.
uiiiUuefiiucA.
"
1146
UNOi^ASSffliB^ 70
7 signed , "N.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
. )
1147
BOYUM/mag
magi
WflffSSIRCf
1 MR. BARBADORO: Why don't you read that and then
3 (Recess.
5 BY MR. BARBADORO:
7 A I have.
9 A No.
13 maintained
16 Felix Rodriguez?
20 worked or _
23 Q Okay.
omiis;5ffiia[r
1 North and Rodriquez have a relationship concerning the
6 use of^^
7 Q What did North tell you at that time about Felix
8 Rodriquez anc
10 the RIG meeting and his putting forward the position that
25
1149
4 Rodriguez.
/ 8
ktrans-shipment for NHAO affairs, CIA couldn't,' and
13 too much.
19 A Yes, it developed —
20 Q In the spring of 1986.
1150
74
for identification.)
highlighted the ones that I will ask you about, but feel free
BY MR. BARBADORO:
October of 1985?
oNa/coiRsr
1 with refugees; NHAO can funnel medicine and food through
17 forth.
21
and they looked around and there were a series of
23 for this.
1152
UmitQistEir
1 Project Hope, to get them to provide the expertise, the
8 name
13 to th^^^^^^^^^^Vair
15 assumption.
21 A Yes.
DWA/e^fiffS^
A No. I could, but none of them would make any
A No.
conversation wit
about the air strip, I remember him saying, "The air strip is
Wt6^ASS(fj®r
1
A I don't remember.
7 BY MR. BARBADORO:
remember it, \Hf\d you show me that paper, and I don't remember
1155
79
ONCIflffiffffi^
1 recall
4 may have been discussions about the air field which I heard
7 Q Okay.
16 could use, who they couldn't use, what was good, what was
that
22 of people that can get boots or clothes or this or
ONR/e^IFM' 30
2 A Yes.
4 suppliers?
6 per se. They would ask you whether this is a good guy or
11 miPUfiSlKffiD
on Gadd.
4 operators and all the permits needed to fly and found out
14 hin?
23 A No.
VHCL/e^^l^
1 A Charge too much-for the flights and subcontract
4 Transport?
7 we talked to him and got into it and^^B probed him about how
12 were?
^^4 probed, the more he got very mystic; and he made a lot of
16 so on and so forth.
1^0 operator*" phd when the alarm bells went off in my head*
21 I never met with Mr. Gadd again, because I figured that was
iiuAi cciricn
1159
33
VttlH.ISSIISS'
1 involved in his operation?
6 up.
11 A No.
18 aircraft.
•)g Q Did you talk to him after he had had the Caribou
20 down there?
22 The first one to go down was the one that almost crashed
ONCCisranlto 84
9 Q To
16 and^^^^^^^B t<
19
^otstfsmws^
Nicaragua? and I knew when they were not hauling NHAO stuff
/'
2 that they were probably shuttling lethal aid between
3 fnd|
e
March.
10
benefactors, right?
11
A I knew that Gadd turned into one of the private
12
benefactors. I suspected — I smelled that he might be
14
want to get involved and backed away from it.
that that was much too close for me and backed away from it.
16
UBCfASSKlBT 36
1
approved this operation," but I came away with the distinct
2 impression that he and Ollie knew each other pretty well
3 and that Ollie knew what he was doing.
10
17 shipment.
23 of these meetings?
llN6^ASStlJQ)r 87
1
that he receivecfl^^H Exhibit 7 on September 29, 1985,
2 that he, after receiving the letter, called Oliver North and
3 said, "I agree to do what you ask," and North said, "Await
4 the instructions from someone who will call and identify
7 who said, "I work with Mr Green, and I have a flight coming
17 something different?
22 doing that, yes, and I knew about it, I would remember that.
18
oiu&ft^tn^ 38
1
Q Do you recall going to| [with Oliver North
6 A Bill Walker.
7 Q Yes.
8 A And myself.
11 Q Not a Jetstar?
21 as I recall.
jjum ktifMCiKf^
1165
UND^SfitEKiT 39
'
10 It was at that point that I delivered the first of two
15 As I remember, I told
21
23 flown intc
p:*»^i fl.Oiuc'tr'^
1166
90
IMS^ASSfflfiDr
1 flown in.
3 A No.
13 in December?
22 assistance shipments?
25
—
recall talking in specific terms about as a matter of
IIMCJ.A^CICICn
1167
91
invAAi^iPii
1
fact, Z didn't talk to him that Z can recall about moving
6 with Ollie.
10 Did you have any idea that there was a plan that involved —
11 A No.
17 that.
liyiy ICMrprA
-
1168
r224 v'»4*-
92
y 2
flying from the States into the Southern Jfont to get some
7 it was too hard for NHAO to do, and they didn't try it again
8 Q So, you did one drop. And what was the plane
10 1 1 wa s a ^^^^H
11 Q Whose plane was it?
12 F r o iT^^^^^^^^^^^^^I -
14
17 A Yes.
20 Q Yes
v<Ha«ssmi9'
A
2
McFarlane shared and asked the conferees to attend*
C^.e^.ey,
20 A No.
22 by NHAO?
Ulilil l.C£l£JCJl.
1170
24
IW^dSSMf 94
1
the fall of the year about whether or not to put Rob Owen
6 A Yes.
7 Q Ollie North?
8 A Yes.
14 Owen?
16 so on and so forth.
17 Q Okay.
19 the topic.
25
'miffsisi^ff
1 he was a count -- the Miskito Indians and other
areas. He
2 was a person who had contacts and so on and so
forth.
3 In that time frame, I really didn't know what he
4 did. I developed someplace in 1985 an understanding that
8 that relationship?
15 and putting him on board, and that sort of put the rest cf tne
16 package together.
19 payroll?
22 with that and didn't know that while he was on NHAO payroll
25 A I can try.
^iUI^IACCiriCA
1172
^-
IWCl/lgSIRii I
1
Q Go ahead.
8 this IS a war -- must they always fly with NHAO when they
11 discussion.
v<1
"16 others on the oversight committee^ and they talked about t.his
21 material.
23 pin the date down or the time or the specifics of it. They
24 talked about, well, what does that mean, and outcomes; well
....jiii^i acririrn .
1173
nnjiiSgjiiir
1 discussed and then us sort of relaying it down there in
2 our verification role that you can't have more than -- make
4 particular flight.
"
16 sensitive .
25 right?
1174
l»fLllSS}RI§' 9d
21 focusing on it.
9jtj^M(^i^/^f%Mritf\
1175
IKOIIffiUfitEir 99
1
MS. MCGINN: I object to the form of the
2 question.
3 BY MR. BARBADORO:
4 You can answer that.
Q She is just putting on the
7 Q Sure.
e Is It fair to say —
9 A I heard the objection.
12 knew that the same people who were providing the humanitarian
13 aid and shipping the humanitarian aid were also shipping the
14 lethal aid?
24 stuff all over creation, and I knew the Caribous, that the
C-7s, were when they were making that trant Bliipiimi^t flight.
v/25
1176
QNSI/iSiS(FW
were available for contract when not otherwise working for
the NHAO contracts to carry over stuff for the FDN, and
Q Okay.
You knew t.hat Gadd was the one that was leasing
A Yes.
Q And you knew that Gomez was the one who was used
A Yes.
and North was one of the people who was pushing Gadd as a
A Yes.
1986?
31
io;
twciifissmior
It IS fair to say that I instructed^
people; and you decided at that point that yon didn't want
I was just not going to get involved with it. .My job was
14 I did.
16 else backed away and stayed away from places where we saw
17 potential grief.
18 Now, all that said, I did not try to put all these
22 look at it.
25 North about what his precise connection was and who these
J^uri Accinrn
1178
tHOLiWIlEir .02
1
people were and who was funding them, etc.?
2
A I didn't ask Ollie North questions that I knew
3 or thought might put me someplace I didn't want to be.
4
Frequently, I did not like -- I wouldn't give
5 Ollie a chance to talk to me about those things. I certain:
6 didn't ask him where the noney was coming from and what ail
7 this stuff was and how all this was goi.-.g down and tried to
11
A Yes -- well, I had a confrontation in that ti.Tie
15 situation?
22 did.
I ^•'A-mHIIH^^B ^ reviewed^^^B
iiuAi. Mocicicn
1179
the same brouhaha*, and they will close down the flights
11
16 going?"
18
They said, "No, it's not. If it goes there it
19
destroys the whole procedure."
23
was -- and I said, "Where is that going?" And they said,
25
IfilAI AO^n^urj^*^
1180
"
"Felix.
6 airplane up.
12 It wasn't ammunition.
14 boxes.
21 Felix. I shook his hand, said, "Hello," told him who I was.
23
24
25
IIIIAI AOI^iri*-*^
1181
Boyum
bp-1 vwaffssiFiEir 105
"
12 ;;ust can '
t go.
25
from being imperiled.
ifRRie^miir 106
operation?
listen to me.
to Ollie.
BY MR. BARBADORO:
16 A March maybe.
18 A Reporting from!
21
for southern flights.
22
A Yes.
24
got that information or request for flight vector informa-
7
tion for the flight'.
i:iLM jg c r rn
i i
1183
DttcmssiREir 10-
the operation?
15 right people.
17 yes.
20
4UIAI il4eCM;iCA
1184
stopping.
A Yes.
7 and that they were making stops and staging out of there.
10 planes to refuel!
12 Q Yes.
13 A No.
15
21 Q What is DAO?
8 10, respectively.)
12 BY MR. BARBADORO:
18 receiving them?
21
g Having read the cables, do you remember the
22
flight?
23
A I remember — now I know from after the fact that
24
an L-lOO or I have seen after the fact that — allegations
f.v"^i l^ftlUCA
1186
bp-6 110
2 in time.
to southern firont?
Q Okay.
H^^^B^and^^^^Hand^^^^^^^Bare Southern
^Pront commanders?
16 A No.
19 A No.
25
was marked for identification as
vRcimnRiS' 111
5 I ask?
10 BY MR. BARBADORO:
13 we know from --
18 It does.
112
6 t.he way I dealt with all this stuff, the very most I
^ont.
21
^^^^Hhas approved?
.wiJlMN . ^_^^*^i^'^^'^'
1189
DimAmM^ 113
1 Q Go ahead.
7 BY MR. BARBADORO:
12 A No.
travel record is,* but I was not with them on that trip.
21
A I recall sometime in the spring of the year
UMTJimiClFJ).
1190
BttOt/I^MVi' 114
1
CIA personnel that I an aware of.
11 information directly?
12 A No.
14 Wel^^^^^^^^^^^took the
20 not to do.
24 been a problem.
UMTimiCltA.
1191
oKttwe'^^ 115
4 away from Dick Gadd and much the same way we backed away
6 said, I knew that this was potential dynamite and that we,
9
We felt that that direct contact was, and
10
passing j.nformation was too close, too much involvement
11
and laid ourselves open to either criticism politically,
12
which is what we were most concerned about, or worse.
13
So therefore we once again reiterated, ar.d
16
^^^^^^^^^^^H I
21
issue became — when we started to investigate the issue
--
UMnLmicim
1192
DNGtJISSfFiBT 116
2 he had had these contacts and these phone calls had taken
4 fc iii
i i iil l Tambs told me the same thing. I came
11 Q Okay.
16 A Did I?
17 Q Yes, in 1984.
21
or were using?
contras?
iiKim A£f>ini!iL
1193
BNttiffiffer
A Certainly not before the law changed in December
where.
agents. Could have gotten them from the DOD, too. They
IMimiClffl.
1194
WfOtWM 118
4 at it.
5 Big maps?
19 task.
21 A No.
imigmF 119
1 to them?
llMPlAi^irirn
1196
BNftil9Sffffi§T 120
8 A No.
15 A Don Gregg.
18 such.
..<**i(?-
1197
:just
mmm
can't remember. Vaguely I remember he was, but I
121
wrong list.
BY MR. BARBADORO:
i«MOiiis<UElfJL
1198
BOYUM/mag
Q
mmm
And what happened at the meeting?
negative agency
up severely by Don Gregg about the
who was real!
attitude about Maximo Gomez, Felix Rodriguez,
a good guy and not a bad guy and who had the best interests
19 I do now.
that were
20 Q Who was the disreputable characters
21 discussed?
on that. He didn't
22 A He didn't go into great detail
DNttASSfflEF
discussion was going. It was obvious that they were leanmo
in on me to ma)<e some declaration about what we were goinc
A Yes.
aircraft?
A July-ish.
IIMOIilOPjrFrn
1200
tfKfti^ffiBr
1 back in this operation we want good equipment. He was the
8 Q In
12
13
14
15
16
20 to thet.
23 airplanes?
24 A No.
IIKini I^Omrtr^
1201
have^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B "
12 benefactor.
18
year.
22 until things started to unfold in the fall of the
mini AOiynrn
1202
JMOTFIfflr
1
stealing one of the aircraft and th
2 was upset about the way Felix was being treated and that the
19 to be at.
iwpjjicoicicn
1203
MI^HW
1 Q Did Greqg mention Ollie North's connection with
14 that.
about
15 Q What other decisions were made or discussed
Felix Rodriguez
21 talking in terms of the importance of the
IIMQI AQCICIFJL
1204
BNttJI^ffSlT 12?
Q Would rather not have been at. And you can recall
from It.
A Yes,
imni Aooinrn
1205
1 A I
mms
knew that I — I knew from the very beginning
3 from harm's way and backed away from things that were, in
IIMPI AOCirirn
1206
BNBti^fflHT
^' to have anybody tell you that directly, ^o you wanted to get
9 and you didn't want to have anybody confront you with it?
13 BY MR. BARBADORO:
14 Q Give me an answer.
21 supporting it.
llMPiA££lCL[Jl_
1207
1
mmm
discussion of what Ollie North or anybody else — Felix
18 thing.
21 it. And that is, you look through the testimony from October
UNdA^lElfa^
1208
nfieiiraffiF
1
Q You knew that Ollie North had a pre-existing
3 A Yes.
6 NHAO contract.
8 a proponent.
11 flights.
16 strip?
17 A Yes.
19 several occasions?
20 A Yes.
'J^^Ht^ ^ imAKAfiMCI£B<m
1209
1 November of —
mm§'
early December-January of 198 5 that 01 lie
14 what was going on, and I knew he knew the details. And
17 want to know."
21 hear.
22 Q We have reached —
23 A I said to myself, wrong meeting, wrong time, wrong
UMPUJt&lHEft.
1210
1
1
I have to break if I am going to make my flight.
10 adjourned..)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
i
22
23
24
25
ujom^^jctffiqi
1211
pSITlON OF _-
Dl^'
Monday, May 11, 1987
U. S. House of Representatives,
Washington; D. C.
Committee Hearings
«f tks
U^ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (^
S 5^
W Partially
Dec.'assified/fie/eased
under proWjionj
en
of £.0.
^3.Reger.i;ctiona|SepurityConcH
JlW^f fi
m^T^^^
^.."^^c^^i.
1212
BOYUM/mag
4 CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF
5 c/b/^rF
6 Monday, May 11, 1987
7
Select Committee to Investigate
8
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran,
9
U. S. House of Representatives,
10
Washington, D. C.
11
12
21
22
23
24
25
.-^,w& ^^^^^^^HfcBjfiroctnggpi
1213
tlD^Jl^m^
MR. EGGLESTON: H^^^^^R as you Icnow by now,
3 Select Committee.
16 for you.
17 Whereupon,
18
21 EXAMINATION
22 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
.
-»it« ^m^ ^^"?'AftCM|gftn
.
1214
liMSLaSSMH-
1 about some — I guess they are Hind helicopters that at that
3 Nicaragua
4 Do you recall, first, being asked any questions
9 about It.
11 1984, there came a time when the agency learned that Hind
13 Nicaragua?
18 scenario.
20
21
22
23
24
25
j^Mfhf ^ArjFjcn
1215
^^ftfiiSf^f-
MIG-21S
H^^^H^HHI^IHiiHHB ^^'^^^^^'
of certain actions.
»re was an
wife,
14 go off to sort of an election evening party with my
what we
19 discussion was whether or not MIG-21s were coming,
so on
20 would do about it, what reactions could be done, and
JiNCIA«ftWJP^
1216
wstrn^s-
1
I learned of at that meeting, still valid, which called for
8 "lad delivered
10
11
^^^^^^^ It would have been some
20 capabilities.
24 was very clear from that point that the agency's position
1^;1^^§§#?IB~
therefore, the previous scenarios that we had discussed
considered.
and so,
be done."
expertise to do it
equipment.
1218
'smiss^f^
So,
H^l^^^^^lii^^^^^^^l ^^^^ were not
the Hinds?
fact, true.
other things?"
position in the White House and his position as the NSC focal
Q I understand.
•
Let me just asJc about a similar incident about
March 1985.
Q Right.
1220
2 1985.
4 Q Sure.
5 A
HmggSRig 10
connection to it.
respond.
Colonel North?
A Yes.
the dates.
what would be done with them, so that was one of the places
A Yes.
o
1222
WfflJISSJRE^
Q In the most restricted time period.
A Yes.
•
See, it is important to know that from almost
21 A No.
'
CMBUaBGa^ilh 12
Q Yes.
things.
and just ask you whether you have any recollection of this
Again —
MR. PEARLINE: Off the record.
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
to.
We have heard that there was a plan for the flight to drcp
1224
it>i^ m^geg&- 13
s^' pick up the arms and make a drop to the Southern front.
17 that flight.
25 record and our files, and it is clear that during that time
1225
TCH>jaCGB3aB
frame there was traffic going back and forth about a supply
benefactor flight.
but it talked about a flight to the south and the fact that
We instructed^^^^^^^^^^^l^^H^Bto
with — tell the FDN that they should support that flight,
should support that, and that he should press upon the F3M
1226
15
1
That is what we did in that particular instance,
2
and ^H^^^^^^^^^^^H ^^ s under that
3
we considered to be consistent with the modified guidelines
4
of 1985.
5
But we didn't approve the flight. We didn't
6 to my knowledge,
get involved, nor did we instruct anybody
7
to get involved in actually breaking things out or telling
8
specifics of what should be provided, but just saying
9 in a generic sense that you, the FDN, should share what you
10 have and try to assist the south, because it is in your
11
best interests to do so, and try to faciliate communication
12
and cooperation between you two.
13
Q Was It at the time that these instructions were
14
toH^^^l^^mf^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^B-
15 clear that it was going to be lethal material that the south
p-ont?
20 telling them to share what they had. And the problem was
TSMBiaSGJMg- 16
1
It talked about being able to provide, deal in
10 knowledge, specifically.
16 process, yes.
American^ask ffcrce.
20 A Yes.
21 Was ^h^^^i^miB
22 A It might still have beerHH^^^at that point
17
have been aware of it, and they would have given me advice
I would refer it to them. They JUt all the traffic and had
A I did.
time this meeting took place — were you aware that the
i
1229
'
WdiM^^Sm 18
Q Right.
A No.
A NO.
1230
19
t^^ftSf^f^
forward we developed a policy of ignoring Eden Pastora,
damage he did then during the NOHA days and the attendant
him.
that you just can't deal with this man. You can not.
1231
rilMH
'
Bft^a.asgjPi g 20
aisles, but a little bit further out to the right and left,
21
IJ^fi^i^faif
Bill Walker and State Department had a
opposite.
wtMmm- 22
substance.
A Absolutely, yes.
that.
DflflgggKElF 23
came up?
rang hot and heavy there, and there was probably — Eden
fflgiaSSPRIB^
-
24
February or so of 1986.
A 1986, yes.
Q And --
iwimssiRey- 25
that^^^^
And the decision is not taken yet. That is the
General Singlaub.
I didn't know why, and I even think one time I asked, said
I take it?
A Yes,
General Singlaub?
t^OR.agGCfag'
I said, "Jesus, Ben, you got to do what you got to
with Ben,' and Ben came down and said he was going to do it,'
guess.
may have testified about this* and if you have, let me lust
1238
27
^Efi^ffSSRey
go through it again — in the sununer of 1986, it is my
A Yes.
incident?
A Sure.
time. You probably have the minutes from it. I know the
Tower --
level meeting.
that time we were pretty clear that it might not happen until
DJatflftaBKED^ 28
the money in that bank account, and then the money can be
"P^SB^iii^ 29
guy, and we work very closely with him, and State does, too.
law, because the law says, you know, you can solicit for
over it.
that?"
I said, "Yes."
bank account.
1241
^aassa^ 30
of what it is.
Q Yes.
very much .
provide funds?
'i^iV^t^S^i^fca^
you were here larst time Ambassador Tambs had a long piece
A Yes.
of the RIG.
Q Okay.
on the article.
32
benefa^ctors is wrong.
8 absolutely accurate.
22 nature.
T^ftl^^?®^ 33
misunderstandings.
was involved.
attended a meeting that you really wished that you had not
'tOtBil^GRgB - 34
Felix Rodriguez.
was discussed.
meeting?
A Generally, yes.
Q I understand.
1246
''t9Kt^^S&^ 35
instructions would have otherwise have had him be,* but still
law.
absolutely accurate.
36
"•
that.
•^
A And I said to Congressman Brown that so far as
5 back to the United States and U.S. persons and U.S. money.
7 is where I was,.
"pg^iascaCT-
words?
Intelligence Agency.
President has done it, the Secretary has done it, and .
TOP.SECKEff - 33
2 Q I understand.
4 lay it out there I was ]ust grateful the question was not
5 directed to me.
13 off the shoals and clean, and made decisions that were
the agencijf. J, didn' t know and would not speak about the
17 U.S. Government.
19 question.
21
EXAMINATION
22 BY MR. GIZA:
23
continuing on the same line of
T< aJSBSKEir
ii>
33
much knew in the winter and spring of 1986 that people like
in this,* and you had some sense that those same individuals
Oliver North.
identification.)
IJORGCCKE^ <:
BY MR, GIZA:
A Yes.
A Yes.
Q At the time —
A Yes.
Q -- that It occurred?
A Yes.
operation.
1252
41
A Okay.
identification.
^(MRIjasC^jOgfr 42
BY MR. GIZA:
A Yes.
not know, and again, when the Chairman asked secondly, you
A Yes.
know?"
^^^^^^^^^^1 We do
airplane.
of the airplane was, but you did, in fact, know a good deal
operation a
1254
w^i^ism^ 43
about how that operation ran, who was behind it, and whose
point in time.
1255
jm 1
E^itSIISI^ 44
were, I did not know. If he had asked me, do you know who
2
4
and that would have been a different set of answers.
Intelligence Agency.
15
TQi^^GECjiigff
A That is my understanding, yes. But I think that
hired him?
who hired him and the people for whom he worked. It didn't
IQ t GEQRPP
'
jni 3
46
known names of other individuals who were involved, Richard
1
3
MS. "cGIMN: Are you asking a question?
BY MR. GIZA:
5
1258
^^StK^iti^f- 47
1
MR. GIZA: I would like to enter the
2
following exhibit as number 14, into the record again from
3
the October 14, 1986 testimony before the Intelligence
4
CoiTL-ni ttee
5 Exhibit^^Hl4
(The document referred to was marked as
6
for identification:)
7 INSER'^ la - 1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1259
IQ^^-gggRSff
1 MS. McGINN: If you are going to put this into
2 the record, I would as)c that you put the whole testimony into
12 entire transcript.
16
transcript into the record?
17
.MR. GIZA: If you would like it, we would be happy
to do that.
18
.MS. McGINN: Yes ; why don't you make the whole cr.e
19
-^£QBtS^Q^^^ 49
BY MR. GIZA:
1
page asked that you provide the committee with the information
3
4
the intelligence the CIA had concerning the resupply
operation?
5
A Yes.
6
7
Q Since the f"nding cut off — that information was,
15
Intelligence Agency's memos to^f^m^^f were not provided
JM 7
-"^mim^mr 50
1
read those reports when they go out. To my mind it wa
. 2
everything. It was only when the matter came up, I think soini
3
months later you brought it up in somewhat irritated fashion,
reports?
13
14
A HH^H^H
Q ^^^^^^^^^H I believe you aware that the
15
51
jm 8
1
not providing you the memos t^^^^^| because to my
Q T'hank you.
3
A No.
6
7
Q Have you ever met with someone named .Robert
A No.
9
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1263
1264
jn 11
1
10
11
12
the wisdom, the fidelity of the United States and their wisdom
15
22
is — there are two pertinent elements from that. A, CIA
-^Oiiaiucauitf
ss
jn 12
provide information «ad advic« on r«aistanc« supply efforts
oparatlons.
opinion of tha general counsel such advice was not, did not
u^r argument with you; but obviously the two Select Committees
with, not just by the CIA, but by members of the NSC staff/
6
start — maybe this will be my final remarks — my job
y
of bringing para-nilitary pressure to bear on Nicaragua to
23
24
25
RnSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
illillllil
382 9
3 9999 06313