CASE DIGEST

Submitted by: 1-C Students

Submitted to: Prof. Stefanie Rei Picar
MALONZO, Jastine Ann B.
AMURAO, Jericho M.
DUE PROCESS
Ichong v Hernandez, G.R. NO. L-7995, May 31, 1975

FACTS: The petitioner, Lao H. Ichong and in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships who are greatly affected in the Republic Act. 1180, entitled “An act to
regulate the retail business” The petitioner explains that the act: (1) the alien residents are denied of equal
protection of laws and impoverished of their liberty and property without the due process of law; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) it violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission
by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. With this, they stated that
the act is unconstitutional and instruct the Secretary of Finance including the city and municipal staff to
make an altercation for the act.

ISSUE: The act is Unconstitutional because it violates the right and also, denies the equal protection of
laws and due process as said in the constitution

RULING: NO -The Act is not unconstitutional and the law was just enacted to remedy the potential
threat and danger to the economic status of the state. With this, the Filipinos are also given a chance to
take control in retail business in order to have a more income. In result, the petition was denied.
Borja Jr., Claro Cortez
Cabrera, Wyeth Nathaniel
DUE PROCESS
Ynot v. IAC, G.R. NO. 74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626, effective October 25, 1980. On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner
questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering
the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality
issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the
ruling of RTC.

ISSUE: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

RULING: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The
supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of
the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them. The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The
executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment,
which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos
were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of Php 12,000.00. The measure struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
MALONZO, Jastine Ann B.
AMURAO, Jericho M.
DUE PROCESS
Alonte v. Savellano, G.R NO. 131652

FACTS: The Petitioner was accused of raping a juvenile named Juvie-lyn Punongbayan..Concepcion
allegedly became acquainted with Juvie and persuaded her to Alonte's rest house in Sto. Tomas, Biñan,
Laguna. According to the child who submitted the case. Concepcion handed her a drink that made her feel
sick to her stomach and made her feel weak. The case was assigned to the Binan Regional Trial Court.
The case has been on hold due to a change of venue. Juvie signed an affidavit of desistance. The case was
pursued further by the prosecutor. J Savellano of the Manila Regional Trial Court was assigned to the
case. After establishing probable cause, Savellano arrested Alonte and Concepcion. The prosecution next
presented Juvie, who attested to her voluntary withdrawal, claiming that it was due to media pressure and
that they would want to start a new life somewhere else. Savellano sentenced Alonte and Concepcion to
reclusion perpetua after hearing the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied due process in a criminal case.

RULING: The Supreme Court decided that Savellano should avoid making any further decisions.Due to
conflict between him and the parties, he was unable to work on the case. Alonte did not waive his right,
according to the evidence.
DEJUMO, Patrick
VALENCIA, Emil Antonio
DUE PROCESS
Aniag v. COMELEC

FACTS:

• The COMELEC issued two resolutions in preparation for the synchronized 1992 national and
local elections.
• The first resolution is Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban.
• The second resolution Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike
forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
• Pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives,
wrote petitioner who was then a Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return
of the two (2) firearms3 issued to him by the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: NO. It was an invalid warrantless search conducted by the PNP.

RULING: There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special
strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of
Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid.It may be
argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied waiver of
petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the
firearms.While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that
"guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the
implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be
determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under
Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323."
DEJUMO, Patrick
VALENCIA, Emil Antonio
DUE PROCESS
People v. Alicando, G.R. NO. 117487, December 12, 1995

FACTS: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor,
four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A
neighbour, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim`s body and the parents and the police were informed.
Appellant was living in his uncle’s house some five arm’s length from Penecilla`s house. Appellant was
arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confesses his guilt without the assistance of
counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police to
know and recovered from appellant`s house, Khazie Mae`s green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri
mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He
was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiqiuera of tha PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The
RTC convicted him. Hence a automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.

RULING: No. The records do not reveal that the information against the appellant was read in the
language or dialect kwon to him. The information against the appellant was read in the English language.
It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is
understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the information couched in English was
translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guild. The RTC violated section 1(a) of
Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law.
It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life
is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be presumption. The court must be
sure
BACARISAS, Jhon
BANTULAY, Renz
LUBATON, Ruben
EQUAL PROTECTION
People v Vera, G.R. NO. 45685, November 16, 1937

FACTS: In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was
referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for
probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution
opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is
presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation
because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in
provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if
construed as a province, has no designated probation officer – hence, a Manila court cannot grant
probation.

ISSUE: 1. May the State question its own laws? 2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

RULING: 1. Yes. There is no law that prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using an
invalid law. 2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
BACARISAS, Jhon
BANTULAY, Renz
LUBATON, Ruben
EQUAL PROTECTION
Villegas v Hiu Chiong, G.R. NO. L-29646, November 10, 1978

FACTS: Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila
Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be
employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit
will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for the prohibition against the said
Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of
registration and that it fails to prescribe’ any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus,
violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI
ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537.

RULING: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion
or standard to guide the mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power
ABAD, Leandro
DOCTOR, Christian
EQUAL PROTECTION
Villegas v Hiu Chiong, G.R. NO. L-29646, November 10, 1978

FACTS: Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on
the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation
applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue
measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in
nature.
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN
ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA
WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA;
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

ISSUES: It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived
of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968
rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF
TAXATION.
II RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE
DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW
IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION

RULING: According to 1987 Philippine Constitution Article III BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3.
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding
Therefore, decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate
and local governments and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.
BACARISAS, Jhon
BANTULAY, Renz
LUBATON, Ruben
EQUAL PROTECTION
Dumlao v COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392

FACTS: Petitioners Dumlao, et.al assailed the constitutionality of certain portions of BP Blog. 52,
specifically section 4 which provides for disqualification of any retired elective city or municipal official
upon reaching 65 y.o and that filing of charges for the commission of the crimes enumerated in the same
section before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact. Dumlao specifically alleged that the classification contained in the statute was
discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process of the Constitution for such classification
was based on purely arbitrary grounds.

ISSUE: W/N the impugned sections of BP Blog 52 violated due process and equal protection.

RULING: The impugned sections of BP Blog 52 did not violate due process and equal protection. SC
ruled that the groupings in Section 4 of BP Blg 52 were based on reasonable and real differentiation;
hence one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. Accordingly, there was a
reason to disqualify Dumlao from running for the same office because of the need for new blood to
assume relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work was present and what was significant
was that the retired employee had already declared himself tired and unavailable for government work
CORDERO, Sherwin
PORTOS, Felamae
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57

FACTS: The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, traveled to Manila Packaging and
export forwarders on August 14, 1987, to ship items to Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes received it and
asked if she may inspect the items. Shirley resisted at first, but eventually persuaded Anita to seal the
package and prepare it for transportation. As part of usual operating protocols, Job Reyes, Anita's
husband and the owner of the courier firm, inspected the item before sending it out for delivery. When he
opened the package, he detected a strange stench, prompting him to take a sample of the item within. He
informed the NBI and allowed agents to see the package at his workplace. Job Reyes opened the
suspicious package in front of the NBI agents and discovered dry marijuana leaves within. In breach of
R.A., a case was filed against Andre Marti 6425, and the court a quo found him guilty. Andre appealed to
the supreme court, arguing that his constitutional right to privacy had been infringed and that the evidence
obtained from his package was inadmissable in court.

ISSUE: Is it possible to enforce the constitutional Right to privacy against private individuals

RULING: Based on commissioner Bernas' comments, the top court decided that the Bill of Rights
governs the individual-state relationship. As a result, the constitutional prohibition on illegal searches
and seizures applies solety to the government and its agencies tasked with enforcing the law. It is not
intended to be used against private individuals. Mr Job Reyes, it will be remembered, was the one who
opened the box in front of the NBI agents in his place of business, the mere prescence of NBI personnel
does not turn Mr. Reyes' Legitimate search into an unwarranted search and seizure, as the constitution
prohibits. It is not a hunt to simply observed and look at what is right in front of you. The conviction was
AFFIRMED, finding the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the felony charge.
ABAD, Leandro
DOCTOR, Christian
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57

FACTS: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila
Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita
Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal
the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of
Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard
operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took
sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to
inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and
found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and
was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.

ISSUE: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

RULING: The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state. The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals. It will be recalled that Mr. Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the
NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the constitution. Merely
to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. The judgement of conviction finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
BACARISAS, Jhon
BANTULAY, Renz
LUBATON, Ruben
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383

FACTS: Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against

petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to
seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets, and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as "the subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can effectively attack a search warrant against the company.

RULING: As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the number of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality
of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity
Borja Jr., Claro Cortez
Cabrera, Wyeth Nathaniel
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

FACT: Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon
City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be
in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum”
newspaper, were seized. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-
quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the
hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col.
Abadilla and his witnesses. In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held “that the executing officer’s prior knowledge as to
the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing
officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who
issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant
as to the place to be searched.”It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned
documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a
warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether general description of the things to be seized is enough to constitute probable cause to
validate the issuance of a search warrant and seizure

RULING: No, Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating
with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in of the respondent’s application that petitioner
“is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and
other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended …” is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. Equally insufficient as basis
for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M.
Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, “that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the
premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal
organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6
Movement.”In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, … after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of
the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. this Court ruled that “the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.” As
couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court.
CORDERO, Sherwin
PORTOS, Felamae
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463

FACTS: The Butuan City Fiscal and his assistants filed a number of documents, all of which were
certified by the investigating fiscals. Following receipt of said information, the respondent judge issued an
order establishing a hearing date for the criminal cases in order to determine the appropriateness of
issuing the related arrest warrants. Following the hearing, the reapondent judge issued orders requesting
petitioners to provide affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documented evidence in support of the
allegations to aid him in exercising his judicial review power over petitioners' determination of probable
cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the investigating fiscal's conclusions oblige the court to issue an arrest warrant.

RULING: NO. There is no doubt that the court may rely on the fiscal's certification of probable cause
and issue an arrest warrant based on that certification. However, such certification does not obligate the
judge to issue the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not merely a ministerial act; it requires the issuing
magistrate to exercise judicial judgement.
IBAÑEZ, John Vincent
LAODENIO, John Direck
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
People v. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174

FACTS:

• An informer informed the Western Police District that three suspicious-looking individuals were
present near the intersection of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila.
• A plainclothes surveillance team was immediately despatched to the location.
• Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan described seeing two men "looking from side to
side" with one of them grasping his abdomen. They approached these individuals and announced
themselves as cops; the two attempted to flee but were unable to do so since additional cops had
surrounded them. After then, the suspects were searched. One of them was discovered with a.38
caliber Smith and Wesson handgun loaded with six live bullets, which turned out to be the
accused-appellant.

ISSUE: WON the arrest was lawful

RULING: NO, the Supreme Court ruled that a person must be arrested after committing or attempting to
commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officer under par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. In the case at hand, these prerequisites have not been demonstrated. The accused was only
"looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" at the time of the arrest in question. In their
presence, there appeared to be no offense that had just been done, was being committed, or was being
attempted by Mengote. The Court notes that the arresting officers' suspicions were based solely on
Mengote's darting eyes and his body language.
IBAÑEZ, John Vincent
LAODENIO, John Direck
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220

FACTS: Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, along
with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal
property in Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga on the evening of March 2, 1982. Based on
information provided by informants, the surveillance operation was focused not just at those who would
commit misdemeanors at the location, but also at people who might be involved in serious drug
trafficking. Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag acting suspiciously around 9:30 p.m.
and confronted him. Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan asked the person to open the red traveling bag, but
the subject resisted, only to agree afterwards.

ISSUE: Even in light of the Court's opinion in People vs. Aminnudin, whether the unwarranted search
incident resulted in a valid arrest.

RULING: A search incident to a legitimate arrest is one of the exceptions to the general rule that requires
a search warrant. Thus, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Section 12 (Search incident to
a lawful arrest), states that "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a), states that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When the person to be arrested has committed, in his presence, the following
CONCEPCION, Maria Cristia A.
DOLENDO, Cyril D.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
People v. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325

FACTS: The Coastguard got intelligence from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran on or about July 8,
1992, at about 6:00 a.m., that a suspected "shabu" courier named Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV
Doa Virginia, which was coming in Dumaguete City at the time. CPO Tolin, the Coastguard head officer,
instructed them to intercept the suspect after receiving the information. CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and
Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM positioned themselves at the
gate of Pier 1 with a mixed squad of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard troops. At 6:00 a.m.,
the MV Doa Virginia docked. that same morning in Dumaguete City's Pier 1. Alvaro Saycon alighted
from the boat carrying a black suitcase and proceeded to the Philippine Coastguard checkpoint, where he
was identified by NARCOM police officer Winifredo Noble. After that, Saycon was invited to the
Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier. He eagerly agreed to accompany them. The coastguard asked
Saycon to unzip his luggage at headquarters, and he did so freely. It contained personal items as well as a
maong wallet. There was a Marlboro pack with the suspected "shabu" inside that maong wallet. Saycon
simply lowered his head when police officer Winifredo Noble questioned if the Marlboro pack containing
the suspected "shabu" was his. Saycon, his suitcase, and the alleged "shabu" were then taken to the
NARCOM office for questioning. The NARCOM operatives did not have a warrant of arrest when they
apprehended Alvaro Saycon. The PNP's Forensic Analyst testified in court that she had examined the
specimens and discovered that they contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as "shabu,"
weighing 4.2 grams in total.

ISSUE: Whether or whether the search without a warrant was legal.

RULING: Because the accused was a passenger in a motor vehicle, the warrantless search was legal.
There was reason to think the accused was in possession of illegal narcotics. Narcotics Command agents
had purchased methamine hydrochloride from him three weeks prior. The accused would be arriving on
board the vessel carrying methamphetamine hydrochloride, according to a Narcotics Command agent.
Drug couriers do not carry a sign on their vehicle indicating that they are transporting illegal substances.
This has to be considered while evaluating probable cause.
ERMITA, Jhon Erick
FLORIA, Ernest Jhon C.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE
People v. Albofera (152 SCRA 123 [1987])

FACTS: Lawi-an informed Albofera that the forester was in the area compiling a list of those involved in
«caingin.» Albofera then urged Esma to accompany him in pursuing the forester. Albofera immediately
wrapped his arm around Carancio's shoulder and invited him to accompany them to the upper area, where
they would be doing something. During the trial, the prosecution presented witness Rodrigo Esma with a
letter written in the Visayan dialect by accused Alexander Albofera while in custody, a few days before
the latter testified on October 20, 1982. The accused «Albofera and »alias Junas killed the victim,
according to Rodrigo Esma's affidavit, which was revealed in the letter dated July 21, 1981.

ISSUE: Whether the Accused's letter to the prosecution witness, which violates his right to privacy in
communication and correspondence, is admissible in evidence against him.

RULING: According to Philippine laws article 248 Any person who, not falling within the provision of
the article 246, shall kill another,shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death if commited with any of the following attendant circumstances. No, the submission is
untenable. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and
seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Besides, there is
nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor.
AMPOLOQUIO, Mico P.
CARNITES, Jomar
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Near v. Minnesota (238 U.S. 697)

FACTS: The Saturday Press published attacks on local officials. The Press claimed that the chief of
police had “illicit relations with gangsters.” Minnesota officials obtained an injunction in order to abate
publishing of the Press newspaper under a state law that allowed this course of action. The state law
authorized abatement, as a public nuisance, of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” newspaper, or
other periodical. A state court order abated the Press and enjoined Defendants, publishers of the Press,
from publishing or circulation such “defamatory and scandalous” periodicals.

ISSUE: Whether a statute authorizing such proceedings is consistent with the conception of the liberty of
the press as historically conceived and guaranteed.

RULING: No. Judgment of the state court reversed. The fact that the liberty of press may be abused by
miscreant purveyors of scandal does not affect the requirement that the press has immunity from previous
restraints when it deals with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is
the appropriate remedy, consistent with the constitutional privilege. Therefore, a statute authorizing such
proceedings is not consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and
guaranteed and is thus, unconstitutional. The statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact
that the publisher is permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is
published with good motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld, could lead to a complete
system censorship. Thus, the statute is a substantial infringement on the liberty of the press and in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
AMPOLOQUIO, Mico P.
CARNITES, Jomar
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Gonzales v. Comelec (27 SCRA 1[1992])

FACTS: The revised Election Code under RA 4880 was ammended to include two new sections which
prohibits the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan
political activity. Petitioners, Cabigao who was an incumbent Councilor in the 4th District of Manila and
the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila and Gonzales, a private individual, a
registered voter of Manila and a political leader of his copetitioner, alleges that RA 4880 is
unconstitutional because its enforcement would prejudice basic rights such as freedom of speech, freedom
of assembly and the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law, guaranteed
under the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the right of expression of speech is susceptible of any limitation.

RULING: Yes. Freedom of expression is not absolute. Two tests may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the “dangerous tendency” rule.
The scope of the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed by the
recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the
electoral process. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed and denied.
ERMITA, Jhon Erick
FLORIA, Ernest Jhon C.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Reyes v. Bagatsing (125 SCRA 553 [1983])

FACTS: This Court, in this case of first impression, at least as to some aspects, is called upon to
delineate the boundaries of the protected area of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceable assembly,
against an alleged intrusion by respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing. Petitioner, retired Justice JB L.
Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful
march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public
park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open
space of public property, a short program would be held. During the course of the oral argument, it was
stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last
day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All
Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of
its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. The march
would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. There was likewise an
assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all
the necessary steps would be taken by it to ensure a peaceful march and rally." The filing of this suit for
mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on October 20, 1983 was
due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on
behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On October 25, 1983, the answer of respondent Mayor was filed
on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo G. Montenegro. It turned out that on October 19,
such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail.
The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the
advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." To be more specific,
reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal elements
to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to
attend." Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police
authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other
enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured." The
oral argument was heard on October 25, 1983, the very same day the answer was filed. The Court then
deliberated on the matter. That same afternoon, a minute resolution was issued by the Court granting the
mandatory injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. On this point, the Court was
unanimous, but there was a dissent by Justice Aquino on the ground that the holding of a rally in front of
the US Embassy would be violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila. The last sentence of
such minute resolution reads: “This resolution is without prejudice to a more extended opinion." Hence
this detailed exposition of the Court's stand on the matter”

ISSUE: Voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that the holding of the rally in front of the US
Embassy violates Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila.

RULING: The Chief Justice's opinion of the Court reaffirms the doctrine of Primicias vs. Fugoso 1 that
"the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions
of democratic countries" and that the city or town mayors are not conferred "the power to refuse to grant
the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public
places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held." The most recent graphic
demonstration of what this great right of peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances could
accomplish was the civil rights march on Washington twenty years ago under the late assassinated black
leader Martin Luther King, Jr. (whose birthday has now been declared an American national holiday)
which subpoenaed the conscience of the nation, and awakened the conscience of millions of previously
indifferent, Americans and eventually (after many disorders and riots yet to come) was to put an end to
segregation and discrimination against the American Negro.
DULA, Argelyn Feye
PASCUA, Mark Freddieric T.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Malabanan v. Ramento (129 SCRA 359 [1984])

FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the
university. On the scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and
held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their
opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed
under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral
defamation. They were suspended for one academic year. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.

ISSUE: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed,
there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.

RULING: Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a
rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place
in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is
discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."The rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to
discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous
restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a
substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is
accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an
assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever
grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly
is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions
as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
GONZALES, Kenneth
IMPERIAL, Mark Anthony

FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Aglipay v. Ruiz (64 PHIL. 201 [1937])

FACTS: The Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, Gregorio Aglipay, requests a writ of
prohibition from this court prohibiting the respondent Director of Posts from printing and selling postage
stamps commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. The Director of Posts stated
in the Manila daily in May 1936 that he would order the printing of postage stamps honoring the
celebration in Manila of the Roman Catholic Church's Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
Despite the petitioner's attorney's protests, the respondent publicly claimed that the postage designs for
the petitioner had been shipped to the United States.

ISSUE: Is the separation of religion and state principle being violated?

RULING: The respondent Director of Posts appears to have issued the postage stamps in question under
the Act in the case at hand. The Philippine Legislature passed Bill No. 4052.No religious objective is
mentioned in Act No. 4052. It grants the Director of Posts the authority to consider when issuing special
postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the
Government" does not authorize constitutional violations. It prohibits the use, profit, or support of a
particular sector church by the appropriation, use, or application of public funds or property. However, in
this case, the Director of Postage Stamps issued the postage stamps in question.
GONZALES, Kenneth
IMPERIAL, Mark Anthony

FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Garces v. Estenzo (104 SCRA 510 [1981])

FACTS: The constitutionality of four resolutions passed by the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc
City, addressing the purchase of a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be utilized in the celebration of
his annual feast day is at issue in this case. The aforementioned barangay council passed Resolution No. 5
on March 23, 1976, "reviving the historic socio-religious celebration" of Senior San Vicente Ferrer,
Valencia's patron saint, every fifth day of April.Celebrations in 1976. The barangay's projects included (1)
the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shelter. The funds
for the two projects would be raised through ticket sales and cash donations. On March 26, 1976, the
barangay council passed Resolution No. 6, which stated that, by Eastern Leyte practice, Councilman
Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or Hermano mayor, would be the Chairman or Hermano mayor. The
picture of San Vicente Ferrer would be cared for by the chairman of the fiesta for one year and until the
election of his successor as chairman of the next feast, day Funds were raised through solicitations and
financial gifts from barangay residents and those from adjacent towns in Valencia. The waiting shed and
the wooden picture of San Vicente Ferrer were built with those monies. The barangay council bought the
image for 400 pesos in Cebu City. After the mass, the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused
to return the image to the barangay council, claiming that it was the property of the church because it was
purchased using church monies. Because Father Osmea refused to grant Cabatingan's request for custody
of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council passed Resolution No.
10 on May 12, 1976. approving the hire of an attorney to initiate a replevin case against Father Osmea to
reclaim the image (Exh. C or. The barangay council enacted Resolution No. 12 on June 14, 1976, naming
Veloso as its replevin representative (Exh. D or 9). Later, he and three other people, Andres Garces of the
Aglipayan Church and Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, both Catholic laymen, filed a lawsuit against
the barangay council. And its members (save two) filed a complaint in Ormoc City's Court of First
Instance, asking for the resolutions to be annulled. The complaint was thrown out by the lower court. The
resolutions were upheld by the court.

ISSUE: WON the Barangay Council has the right over the custody of the Relic

RULING: The resolutions under consideration do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, limit
religious liberty, or appropriate public funds or property for the benefit of any sect, priest, or clergyman.
The photograph was bought using personal dollars rather than public funds. The acquisition of the
wooden picture coincided with the barrio carnival commemorating the patron saint, San Vicente. Ferrer,
and not to promote any one religion or to interfere with religious concerns or the religious beliefs of
neighborhood residents. The liturgy was one of the fiesta's highlights. As a result, when the mass was
celebrated, the patron saint's picture had to be placed in the church. If there is nothing unconstitutional or
criminal about conducting a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity meant to aid
the patron saint's worship is legal. It is impossible to label the acquisition and display of a saint's image as
criminal. To avoid any appearance that it is favoring the Catholic Church, the barangay council named a
layman as the curator of the wooden figure. There is no doubt that the image in question is the property of
the barangay council. The council has the authority to implement Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12 to reclaim
control of the image not every government activity that includes the use of public funds and has a
religious component violates the constitutional principles governing the separation of church and state,
freedom of worship, and the prohibition on the use of public funds or property.
DULA, Argelyn Feye
PASCUA, Mark Freddieric T.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Board of Education v. Allen (392 U.S. 236 [1968])

FACT: A Minnesota statute that provides tax deduction for parents of school aged children for school
related expenses is to alleged to be unconstitutional under Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
of the constitution as it applies not just to public schools, but to private school as well. The appeals court
ruled that statute did not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution and the Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court) affirmed. The Supreme stated that it rejects the argument that any
government program that in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation violates the
Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court instead stated the rule in Lemon, whether the statute has the
primary effect of advancing the sectarian aim of the non-public schools was the more appropriate test.
The Supreme Court found the Minnesota statute in question did not have primary effect of advancing
sectarian aims, as the deduction is available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, applying to
those who attend nonsectarian private schools and those who attend sectarian private schools. The
Supreme Court also stated that there was not excessive government entanglement in religion under the
third inquiry of the Lemon test.

ISSUE: Whether a Minnesota income tax deduction available for expenses incurred in sending children
to public as well as non-public schools violates the Establishment Clause of Constitution.

RULING: The statute does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the
Constitution. In Board of Education v. Allen, there are several locals boards of Education Challenged the
constitutionality of a state statute permitting school authorities to loan textbooks free of charge to children
enrolled in parochial schools.
CONCEPCION, Maria Cristia A.
DOLENDO, Cyril D.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
American Bible Society v. City of Manila (101 PHIL. 386 [1957])

FACTS: Throughout the Philippines, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel sections thereof, as well as translating them into many Philippine dialects (save during the
Japanese occupation). On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila notified plaintiff
that it had been conducting a general merchandise business without the necessary Mayor's permit and
municipal license since November 1945, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances
Nos. 2529, 3028, and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license fees, as
well as a compromise covering the period, within three days.

ISSUE: WON whether or not the provisions of those ordinances apply to the matter at hand.

RULING: Corporations or associations founded and run purely for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes are exempt from taxation under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466, or the National
Internal Revenue Code or for educational purposes. Provided, however, that income of any kind and
character derived from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any profit-making activity,
regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed by this Code. The
price demanded for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was, in some cases, slightly higher than the
actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. As a result, the Ordinance cannot be applied because
it would restrict American Bible Society's free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship, as well as its rights of dissemination.
CHUA, Ryan Jefferson
FLORES, Jordan
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Pamil v. Teleron (86 SCRA 413 [1978])

FACTS: Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of Municipal Mayor of
Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filled by
petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, of his disqualification based on this Administrative Code
provision. “In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastic, soldier in
active service, person receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors
for public works of the municipality”. The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of
Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was implied
repealed by the Election Code 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his
contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus, was specific
question raised.

ISSUE: Won the disqualification of the respondent based on Administrative Code Provision
Constitutional.

RULING: The challenged Administrative Code Provision certainly in so far as it declares ineligible
ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office is on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Here being an
ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is
thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code Provision relied upon by petitioner and an
express constitutional mandate.
CHUA, Ryan Jefferson
FLORES, Jordan
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Fonacier v. Court of Appeals (96 PHIL. 417 [1955])

FACTS: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independente, represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo
Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration of all the temporal
properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme bishop of IFI. Isabelo
De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme as the Supreme Bishop.Petitioner claims that he was not
properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there
was an accounting of his administration and was turned over to bishop Jamias. Also that Isabelo De los
Reyes and Bayaka have abandoned their faith and formally joined the Protestant Episcopal Church of
America. CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme
Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his administration. CA affirmed the
decision of the CFl

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.

RULING: Supreme court affirmed CA’s decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De
los Reyes Jr. The supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop De los Reyes as the
Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws.
ESQUIVEL, Marc Joseph
TAPAR, Marlo
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals (142 SCRA 149 [1986])

FACTS: Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was a major owner in Trans-Insular Management Inc. and Manotoc
Securities Inc., a stock brokerage firm. He spent some time in the United States. He returned home to
submit a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the appointment of a
management committee for both enterprises. The SEC asked the Commissioner of Immigration not to
clear Manotoc for departure pending the outcome of the case, and the Commissioner issued a
memorandum to that effect. Meanwhile, six Manotoc Securities Inc. clients have filed separate criminal
complaints against the firm for estafa. In every case, Manotoc posted bail. He then filed motions in each
trial court seeking permission to leave the country, citing his wish to travel to the United States as
justification.

ISSUE: Whether a court has the authority to prevent someone who has been granted bail from leaving the
Philippines and Whether a court has the authority to prevent someone who has been granted bail from
leaving the Philippines.

RULING: A court can order a person who has been granted bail not to leave the country. Because of the
structure and function of a bail bond, this is an unavoidable consequence. The definition of bail under
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is "the security necessary and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, that he will come before any court where his attendance may be required
as agreed in the bail bond or recognizance." The requirement that petitioner be available at all times if the
court requests his attendance acts as a lawful restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused was
allowed to leave the Philippines without a good reason, he would be in serious trouble.
ESQUIVEL, Marc Joseph
TAPAR, Marlo

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL

Marcos v. Manglapus {177 SCRA 668[1989])

FACTS: The Supreme Court voted 8-7 on September 15, 1989, to dismiss the Marcos family's appeal to
allow former President Ferdinand Marcos' return to the Philippines from Honolulu, Hawaii. The Court
found that President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily or with significant abuse of discretion in
finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family poses a threat to the national interest and
welfare at the present moment and under the current circumstances.President Corazon Aquino had
previously refused to allow the remains of former President Ferdinand Marcos to be returned to the
country, fearing instability and security difficulties. She made the following statement:"In the interest of
the safety of those who will interpret Mr. Marcos' death in widely and passionately divergent ways, and
for the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought
into our country until the government, whether under this administration or the next, decides otherwise.
As a result, this Motion for Reconsideration has been filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not President Aquino has the authority to prevent Marcos' remains from being
returned and whether or not President Aquino's unwillingness to allow Marcos' remains to be returned is
akin to dictatorship.

RULING: Unlike the petitioners, it cannot be denied that the President, who has executive power, has
unstated residual powers that are indicated by the grant of executive power and are required for her to
fulfill her constitutional obligations. The President's powers are not confined to those expressly
mentioned in the Executive Department article and other articles of the Constitution. This is true despite
the members of the Constitutional Commission's stated intention to limit the President's powers in
response to Mr. Marcos' abuses, because the result was a limitation of the President's specific powers,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a reduction in the general grant of
executive power. The President's oath of office requires him (or her) to defend and promote the people's
interests and welfare, which is one of his (or her) responsibilities under the Constitution. Her decision to
prevent the Marcoses and, later, Mr. Marcos' remains from being returned at this time and under these
circumstances is in accordance with this binding agreement.
CANOY, James

COBILLA, Dominic C.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993])

FACTS: An information was filed against the petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The arrest warrant was issued, and the bond for release was set at
Php. 15,000, therefore she filed a request for acceptance of cash bail bond. The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution on the same day enabling the petitioner to deposit a cash bond in the sum of Php.15, 000,
which was later filed. Her arraignment was set, but the petitioner requested that her bail bond be revoked
and she is released on her recognizance. It was postponed by the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
issued a stay departure order against the petitioner due to her declaration that she would be traveling for
the United States to pursue a fellowship at Harvard. In the current motion, she filed before S.C. She
claims that her right to travel is being violated.

ISSUE: Whether or even if the petitioner's right to travel is violated.

RULING: The petitioner does not dispute and has already said publicly, that she has every intention of
leaving the country to seek higher education overseas. The court affirms Sandiganbayan's decision to take
judicial notice of petitioners' pal's intention to go overseas and the subsequent issuance of a sua sponte
hold departure order is just an exercise of the respondent court's inherent jurisdiction to maintain and to
keep its jurisdiction over the case and the accused's person effective. In addition, when she posted a bail
bond, the petitioner accepted liabilities. She submits herself to the orders and processes of the court at all
times. She may be legally barred from leaving the country while the lawsuit is pending.
CANOY, James
COBILLA, Dominic C.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (247 SCRA 127 [1995])

FACTS: Former First Lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty of breaching Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act by the Sandiganbayan's First Division. Following her conviction, she filed a
"Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic testing and treatment from Chinese practitioners
of oriental medicine. Another motion to depart was made for treatment of many heart problems in the
United States and Europe, claiming that the tests were not accessible here. The presiding justice requested
a "professional opinion on coronary medicine" from Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the
Philippine Heart Center. The court determined that there was no merit in granting the petitioner's request
to depart and refused all of the petitions.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad because
it ignored the medical findings it contacted a third party on its initiative, requesting the latter to provide an
opinion on the petitioner's motion and medical results stated that there was no need to seek medical
treatment in another country.

RULING: The petitioner's assertion that it was illegal to contact the third party and ask the latter to
render an opinion on the petitioner's motion and medical results was incorrect. It should be noted that the
petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country since she was facing accusations before the
courts in multiple cases, two of which she was convicted even though the judgment is still under review.
The burden was on her to demonstrate that there was a need for medical care in other nations due to the
threat to their health, if not her life.
ANGELES, Mcjim
CORDOVEZ, Argie
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Legaspi v. CSC (150 SCRA 530 [1987])

FACTS: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a
special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The
standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be
informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide
actual interest to secure the information sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar.

RULING: The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of
public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness
while a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to
their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the
result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one
that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil
eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.
LORIEGO, Ferdinand S.
NAVARRO, Cedrick Klein
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. (170 SCRA 256 [1989])

FACTS: Petitioners in this special civil actions for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray they respondent be directed to furnish petitioners the list of names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP- Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession /marginal note of the first lady
Imelda Marcos and or to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of documents evidencing their
respective loans and or to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. Such a
request was on the premise that Art. IV, Sec.6 of the constitution provides. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions, shall be afforded the citizen
subject to such limitation as maybe provided by law. On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news
item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular batasang Pambansa, including
ten (10) opposition members were granted housing loans by the GSIS. Separate comments were filed a
consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their
memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision. In his comment
respondents raises procedural objections to insurance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that
petitioners have no cause of actions.

ISSUES: Whether or not this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondents to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be
done, in pursuance of their right information.
Whether petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.

RULING: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitation as maybe provided by law.
LORIEGO, Ferdinand S.
NAVARRO, Cedrick Klein
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato (203 SCRA 515 [1991])

FACTS: In February 1989, Carmen Aquino-Sarmiento petitioner herself member of respondent Movie
and television review and classification board (MTRCB) wrote a letter and requesting and she allowed to
examine the board record pertaining the votings slips, accomplished by the individuals after reviewing the
Movie and Television productions and some says some of the films are either banned, or its either cut of
classified accordingly and Carmen Aquino-Sarmiento secure prior clearance of respondent Manuel
Morato, because Morato is the chairman os MTRCB to have gain access to the records and the petitioners
request suddenly denied by Morato while petitioners argues on the other hand that the record, she wishes
to test public, in character and other than providing for reasonable condition regulating the manner and
hours of examination Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny citizen seeking board
record on February 27, 1989, Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss the issue
raised by petitioner in said 17 members who board voted to declare the individual voting record and again
Morato denied the pretitioner Carmen Aquino- Sarmiento request to examine the voting slips on July 27,
1989 respondent board issued resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential private and personal
decision and Carmen Aquino-Sarmiento brought the attention of the executive secretary turn in refused
the same respondent Morato for the appropriate comment and yet he still denied the request of petitioner

ISSUE: Manuel Morato always refused the request of petitioner Carmen Aquino Sarmiento.

RULING: The issue is raised from the petitioner Carmen Aquino-Sarmiento but still the respondents
refual the pretitioner to examine the records.