TITLE: FLORESCA VS PHILEX

[G.R. No. L-30642]

April 30, 1985 | Ponente: MAKASIAR, J. | STATCON: JUDICIARY ROLE IN STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION / JUDICIAL LEGISLATION

PETITIONERS:

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S.
FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA,
MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;

LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA,
ROMEO, ANTONIO, JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS
MARTINEZ;

SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
ESTELA, JULITA, SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;

LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA,
GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;

DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR., all surnamed LANUZA;

EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,

vs.

RESPONDENTS:

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of
First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

A civil complaint was filed by the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex, who while working died
as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. It is alleged that Philex failed to
comply with the rules and regulations of the government negligently and failed to take the precautions
for the protection of the lives of its men. Philex filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the accident
falls under Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and outside Court of First Instance’s jurisdiction.
Respondents invoke Section 5 of the WCA which states:

Exclusive right to compensation — xx entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee xx

Because other heirs have already received compensation, they are no longer entitled to a damage suit.

CFI issued an order dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction. – YES

2. Whether the petitioners can only avail of WCA action or have a choice between WCA action
and civil damage in regular court or can avail of both WCA and civil damage? – Choose
either one but not both.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case.
WHEREFORE, although other petitioners had received benefits from WCA, the case be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings for civil damages under Civil Code.

RATIO:

For the second issue, generally, petitioners must choose between a WCA action and civil suit. This is
what the Section 5 of the WCA provides and what has been applied in various court decisions. But the
court decided to render leeway to the petitioners given the peculiarity of the instances. Petitioners
have already received compensation under WCA. Afterwards, they learned of the true cause of the
accident which was Philex’s negligence. And then they filed a civil suit. The court reasoned that had
the petitioners learned of the cause much sooner, petitioners would have filed for a civil suit instead.
Petitioner’s’ initial resort to WCA action, the court said, is based on ignorance and mistake of fact.
Because petitioners where not informed of the true cause, they had not the choice between a WCA
and civil suit. This then creates an exception to Section 5 of WCA. Hence, court remanded the case to
lower court for proper judgement. In effect, CFI now has jurisdiction because the court’s making an
exception to Section 5 of WCA.

The topic, limitation on the power of courts to construe, can be found within court’s discussion of the
second issue. The two dissenting opinions posit that a careful reading of Section 5 of WCA would
demonstrate that when a complainant has already availed of compensation via WCA, his/her right to
sue in civil or other courts are understood to have been extinguished. After passage of WCA,
legislature had plenty of occasion to modify relevant provision but did not do so. This, according to
dissent, is manifest of legislative’s continuing intent to retain the exclusivity provided therein. In the
majority opinion’s decision to allow petitioners to file case despite having received their WCA
compensation, dissent argues that the court has exercised a power outside of its capacities, i.e. that it
has legislated.

To this, the majority opinion enunciates that it has not legislated. What it did was a mere
implementation of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Secs. 6, 7, and 9 of Art. II of 1973
Constitution guarantees social justice, establishes adequate services in employment, and protects
labor. With these provisions, the present court only gave effect to the rights petitioners are entitled to.
No legislation occurred, because the principles are already present and need only be applied.

It is unquestionable that the ordinary statute shall not override a constitutional provision.

Dissenting opinion: the courts cannot legislate.

In certain cases, the court exercises Judicial legislation. To fill in the gaps in the law because the mind
of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot conceive all possible cases the
law may apply.