Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Sustainable Production and Consumption

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/spc

Bioeconomy as a societal transformation: Mentalities, conflicts and

social practices
Dennis Eversberg∗, Martin Fritz
BMBF Junior Research Group, Mentalities in Flux” (flumen), Institute of Sociology, Friedrich Schiller University, Leutragraben 1, 07743 Jena, Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: In this article, we argue that a comprehensive understanding of the kinds of societal change envisioned
Received 15 July 2021 and contested in the bioeconomy debate requires broadening the view beyond policy debates and stake-
Revised 24 January 2022
holder positions. We use representative German survey data from 2018 to explore social conflicts and
Accepted 24 January 2022
coalitions for and against bio-based, post-fossil transformations within the general population. Mapping
Available online 26 January 2022
different socio-ecological mentalities in a relational analysis, we find that tensions between growth- and
Editor: Dr. Wenling Liu sufficiency-oriented, high-tech-focused and techno-skeptical as well as between fossilist and post-fossil
visions shape the current ‘socio-ecological space of possibilities’ for transformations in Germany.
Keywords:
Bioeconomy Results show most of the population to broadly align along a continuum between ’less is more’ views
Post-fossil transformation skeptical of both growth and technology and visions of ’technoeconomic advance’ that favor both. In ad-
Sufficiency dition, a more openly conflictual confrontation surfaces between a ’sufficient progress’ view that looks
Socio-ecological conflict to reconcile sufficiency with democratically checked technology use and a ’growth as usual’ imaginary
Mentalities openly opposed to any kind of post-fossil transformation. These tensions correlate with social inequal-
Relational sociology ities: Women and the materially disadvantaged tend to favor ’less is more’ views, men and the more
affluent those of ’technoeconomic advance’. Moreover, starkly contrasting patterns of environmentally rel-
evant practices emerge along the growth and fossilism dimensions. We conclude that issues surrounding
bio-based, post-fossil transformations are more contested among the population than in policy debates,
entailing significant potential for social conflicts. The core challenge will be to establish ecologically sus-
tainable and socially just transformation pathways in democratic and participatory ways.
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Institution of Chemical Engineers.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

1. Introduction
The bioeconomy has emerged as a policy concept since the
early 20 0 0s, evolving out of debates in biotechnology policy on the
one (OECD, 2004) and sustainable development on the other hand
(e.g. Wetzel et al., 20 06). In 20 07, the European Union introduced
the concept of a ‘knowledge-based bioeconomy’ (German Presi-
dency to the European Union, 2007) as an attempt to combine
both original strands in a single policy approach, which was subse-
quently developed into a comprehensive strategy (European Com-
mission, 2012) aimed at using Life Science knowledge for de-
veloping broader uses of biomass as renewable raw material
(Patermann and Aguilar, 2018; Bugge et al., 2016). Since then, the
debate on bioeconomy has further broadened toward ideas of a
more far-reaching ‘circular bioeconomy’ that includes closing the
∗
Corresponding author at: Institute of Sociology, Friedrich Schiller University
Jena: Friedrich-Schiller-Universitat Jena, Humboldtstr. 34, 07743 Jena, Thuringia,
Germany.
E-mail address: dennis.eversberg@uni-jena.de (D. Eversberg).
carbon cycle not only through photosynthesis but also technically
through cascading and recycling (European Commission, 2018;
Kardung et al., 2021; Stegmann et al., 2020).
In recent years, the discussion around the idea of such a post-
fossil bioeconomy among scientists, experts and policymakers has
often circled around the question of whether and what kind(s) of
societal transformation it implies or requires. Initial promises of al-
most unlimited biotechnology-driven economic growth have been
exposed as exaggerated or unfounded (Birch, 2019; Eversberg and
Holz, 2020; Grunwald, 2020). As a result, alternative concep-
tions of bioeconomic transformation relying on agro-ecology rather
than biotechnology and on sufficiency rather than economic
growth have received increasing attention (Bugge et al., 2016;
Levidow et al., 2019).
The bioeconomy, which initially appeared as a technological
magic bullet, holding the key to solving many of mankind’s vi-
tal problems and opening the door to limitless further increases
in wealth and well-being, seems to be shrinking to size: It in-
creasingly appears as one piece in a much larger puzzle of soci-
etal, not only economic and technological, solutions to the chal-

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2022.01.021
2352-5509/© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Institution of Chemical Engineers. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
lenges of combating climate disaster, preserving biodiversity, and
ensuring justice and equality on a global level (Zeug et al., 2021;
Heimann, 2019; Urmetzer et al., 2020). Coming to terms with these
challenges is a genuinely political issue, which democratic soci-
eties cannot, at peril of losing legitimacy, delegate to markets and
companies. The broader post-fossil transformation that a multiply
humbled, ‘reality-checked’ bioeconomy (Eversberg and Holz, 2020)
will be but a part of must be both socially just and environmen-
tally sustainable on a global level if it is to succeed. The crite-
ria for justice and sustainability cannot be imposed by scientists
and politicians, by some seemingly unavoidable technological fate
or ’the invisible hand of the market’, but need to be the matter
of open and inclusive societal debate and political contestation.
Hausknost et al. (2017) have proposed an analytical approach to
studying these political dimensions of the bioeconomy that fore-
grounds the existence of alternatives and processes of contestation
in a multidimensional ‘techno-political option space’.
In this paper we build on this line of inquiry to provide a soci-
ological lens for exploring perspectives of bioeconomic and, more
broadly, post-fossil change. We focus on the views and evaluations
of bioeconomic and related transformations present at the level of
the population as a whole. Analyzing representative survey data
from Germany to achieve this, we gain insights into how different
segments of the population think and feel about the prospect of
societal transformation as such, and into which kinds of transfor-
mation are envisaged within the debates around the bioeconomy
in particular. This, however, requires opening up our understanding
of ‘the bioeconomy debate’ to include people’s views and consid-
erations around post-fossil socio-ecological change more broadly
(e.g. concerning renewable energy, different forms and patterns of
mobility, etc.). To most people’s minds ‘bioeconomy’ is not a spe-
cific topic that could be separated from these broader concerns. It
needs to be considered in the context of more general conceptions
of change, so that Hausknost et al.’s ‘techno-political option space
of the bioeconomy’ opens into a larger socio-ecological space of pos-
sibilities.
And this is no less a terrain of contestation: Ultimately, the
prospects for the far-reaching transformation that is necessary de-
pend on the balance of power in society. Assessing what options
for a post-fossil, bio-based re-making of economy and society are
not just technologically feasible, but socially and politically viable
means asking questions of power. Transformation is not a matter
of policymakers acting in line with some definite scientific truth,
but a crucial issue for democratic deliberation and transformative
struggles for visions of a just and sustainable future that must be
compatible with biophysical reality. Transformative pathways only
open up if they are established as achievable and desirable in pro-
cesses of political contestation and through experiences of change
in social practices (Wright, 2010).
The paper is organized as follows: After a discussion of exist-
ing work on the views and attitudes of the broader population
within bioeconomy research, and especially of the limitations of
so-called ‘acceptance studies’, we propose to overcome those lim-
itations by introducing a more theoretically grounded perspective,
based on the relational sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, focused on
the mentalities and structured patterns of practice typical to dif-
ferent social groups (section 2.1). As an extension to Hausknost
et al.’s option space, we then propose and discuss what we call
the socio-ecological space of possibilities of social-ecological trans-
formation (section 2.2). Section 3 introduces the data and the rela-
tional methods used in analyzing it. We then go on to present the
results obtained by locating the mentalities, practices and socio-
demographic characteristics of respondents within the space of
possibilities, and discuss the indications of underlying societal con-
flicts that this reveals (section 4). In conclusion, we point out the
need for both research and transformative policy to more carefully
974
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
consider the conflicts and tensions around bioeconomic transfor-
mations, as well as the social inequalities that they are associated
with (section 5).
2. Literature review and conceptual framework
2.1. From ‘acceptance’ to mentalities
Since the inception of the first official bioeconomy strategies
around 2010, a broad and diverse field of research has emerged
on how the bioeconomy is viewed by different groups of actors,
or ‘stakeholders’. In a recent review of this work, Dieken et al.
find that ‘most research on stakeholder perceptions is concerned
with well-established expert groups’ from research, industry and
government, while ‘general, non-expert society is less often ana-
lyzed’ (Dieken et al., 2021, p. 1708). Moreover, they find that when
the views and opinions of citizens are investigated at all, ‘research
on their perceptions is limited to the acceptance and adoption of
specific products and processes, i.e. consumer acceptance’ (ibid.:
1709).
2.1.1. The blind spot of acceptance research: people as political
citizens
Indeed, ‘acceptance research’ is to date the dominant strand
of work on how the broader public relates to the bioeconomy.
Rather than viewing people as social and political agents ac-
tively involved in shaping societal change, the vision underlying
such research tends to depoliticize the role of citizens. Normally,
the perspective and methods deployed are those of consumer re-
search. People are reduced to ‘rule takers’ that merely choose be-
tween different ready-made products or policy options offered to
them by companies or political parties. Typically, acceptance stud-
ies try to gauge factors that foster or inhibit openness to the
purchase and consumption of bio-based products (Hempel et al.,
2019a, 2019b; Lynch et al., 2017; Rudolph, 2018; Sijtsema et al.,
2016) or assess the degree to which contemporary scientific and
technological developments are seen as desirable (ZIRIUS, 2020).
Sijtsema et al. (2016), for instance, is a typical study of this kind,
investigating consumers’ perceptions of bio-based products. The
authors find that their interviewees
• lacked familiarity with such products,
• exhibited both positive and negative and sometimes mixed feel-
ings toward them,
• tended to associate environmental concerns with the notion of
‘bio-based’,
• and, most importantly, were much more interested in getting
the best product in terms of ‘convenience, looks and price’ than
in whether it was bio-based or not (Sijtsema et al., 2016, p. 67).
From this they conclude that marketing should stress the ‘per-
sonal benefits’ of bio-based options rather than their origin, and
that the products must be superior in these regards to be suc-
cessful. This type of ‘marketing’ approach reduces people’s percep-
tions and orientations to ‘preferences’. From a sociological point of
view, this cannot capture the complexities of how people, as cit-
izens rather than consumers, position themselves within the pro-
cesses of societal negotiation and conflict surrounding the social-
ecological transformations at stake in the bioeconomy discourse.
In a broader study on perceptions of the bioeconomy in Ger-
many, Hempel et al. (2019a, 2019b) find a high degree of het-
erogeneity regarding opinions about bioeconomy, techno-political
preferences as well as environmentally relevant habits and prac-
tices among their respondents. They, too, diagnose a ‘lack of infor-
mation’ among the population and conclude that more ‘dialogue’
and an ‘open debate’ regarding potential risks and limits of the
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
bioeconomy is necessary to gain greater acceptance (ibid.: 30). Us-
ing Q methodology, they distinguish between three basic views
on the bioeconomy, called ‘sufficiency and close affinity to nature’,
‘technological progress’ and ‘not at any price’ (Hempel et al., 2019a,
p. 25). From the differences between them, they conclude that dif-
ferent forms of political communication are necessary and that ad-
equate solutions should be offered to address the differing expec-
tations. Again, respondents are not viewed and addressed as real or
potential political actors here, but as ‘consumers’, albeit not only of
products, but also of policies.
Moreover, the three basic views they find among the public do
not fully overlap with the visions typically found among bioecon-
omy experts and stakeholders. In fact, only two of them do: The
‘sufficiency and close affinity to nature’ type may be seen as sup-
porting a ‘bio-ecology vision’ (Bugge et al., 2016) of bioeconomy,
and the ‘technological progress’ type apparently gravitates toward
a ‘bio-technology vision’ (Bugge et al., 2016). The third type, ‘not
at any price’, however, does not seem to be in favor of any kind of
bioeconomic transition at all (Hempel et al., 2019a, p. 30). Instead,
it clearly prioritizes the maintenance of the given mode of living
at all costs and rejects any kind of change that could jeopardize
this, presenting an obvious obstacle to pretty much any vision of
bio-based transformation.
The literature review by Dieken et al. also refers to the ‘vi-
sions’ distinguished by Bugge et al. as a frame for interpreting the
existing research on ‘citizens & consumers’. It tends to find rela-
tively strong support both for ‘bio-ecology’ and for ‘bio-technology’
ideas among them, with Bugge et al.’s third, ‘bio-resource’ vision
nearly irrelevant (Dieken et al., 2021, pp. 1710–11). However, a high
share of findings could not be clearly related to one of the visions
(ibid.: 1712). This indicates that there may be both a broader spec-
trum of skeptical or critical views and attitudes on bioeconomy-
related issues and a relatively strong current supporting the dom-
inant techno-optimistic vision within the general population. Po-
litical actors (who according to Dieken et al. are strongly associ-
ated with the ‘bio-technology’ vision) could then be seen to repre-
sent only the techno-optimistic subsection of the population, while
groups that favor alternative bio-ecology ideas seem insufficiently
represented.
These findings indicate that the ‘perceptions’ of non-experts on
a topic such as the bioeconomy follow a different logic than those
of experts, and support the assumption that among the lay public,
questions related to the bioeconomy are not seen and evaluated in
isolation. People do not assess the bioeconomy as a specific topic
according to ‘bioeconomy-specific’ criteria, as do experts. Rather,
such questions are interpreted within more general schemes of
perception and evaluation habitually deployed in relation to eco-
nomic, ecological and social issues. That is, citizens are arguably
more political than experts in their views of the bioeconomy, in-
sofar as they do not base their judgments on technical and eco-
nomic details alone. Rather, they seem to assess the desirability
of bioeconomy concepts in light of more general societal and eco-
logical concerns. Interpreting this as evidence of a ‘lack of knowl-
edge’ about the bioeconomy that could threaten ‘acceptance’ and
‘participation’ (Dieken et al., 2021, p. 1713), however, turns the ac-
tual problem into its opposite: In identification with the experts’
views, reservations regarding the bioeconomy are not seen as ex-
pressions of actual, serious objections, but as irrational antipathies
of ill-informed people. As a consequence, political debates about
the benefits and downsides of different bioeconomy visions are
considered less than the rather apolitical strategies of marketing,
communication and education. Willingly or unwillingly, such a per-
spective lends itself to a ‘post-democratic’ mindset that grants cit-
izens only some symbolic or ‘simulative’ participation in the gov-
ernance of what researchers and politicians claim to know to be
necessary (Blühdorn, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2011).
975
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
2.1.2. Contested bioeconomy and the role of mentalities
Beyond acceptance research, social scientific work on the so-
cially specific ways of perceiving, evaluating and practically con-
tributing to (or counteracting) processes of change toward bio-
based and post-fossil ways of producing and living is scant.
Most immediately relevant are studies on socio-ecological in-
equalities and conflicts around local manifestations of the bioe-
conomy, mostly in the Global South. They give rich accounts
of what the agro-industrial production systems that ‘bioecon-
omy’ stands for in those countries imply for inequalities of work-
ing conditions, income and social security or workers’ and res-
idents’ health. Highlighting global dependencies and power re-
lations, these qualitative studies show how reservations, oppo-
sition and open resistance against the practices and technolo-
gies promoted under the rubrum of the bioeconomy are often
not expressions of irrational aversions, but the product of collec-
tive social experiences of communities directly confronted with
the consequences of ‘bioeconomic’ change in their everyday lives
(Backhouse and Lehmann, 2019; Puder, 2019; Tittor and Back-
house, 2019; Tittor and Toledo López, 2020). What such work ren-
ders very clear is that in many cases, affected citizens and lo-
cal grassroots movements advocate post-fossil and sustainability-
oriented transformations – against the organized power and en-
trenched interests of the companies often portrayed as the key ac-
tors of the bioeconomy.
In affluent European societies, such open contestation so far
mostly remains the exception rather than the norm. Yet here too,
the different ways people perceive and practically engage with
manifestations of ‘the bioeconomy’ are not a matter of individual
‘preferences’. Rather, they are expressions of embodied collective
experiences that need to be understood as position-takings in the
ongoing conflict around these societies’ future trajectory. Social and
political tensions around post-fossil transformations, for example
in relation to energy transitions (Eversberg, 2020) or the imple-
mentation of just climate policies (Fritz and Koch, 2019), are brew-
ing and at times escalating (Eichenauer, 2018; Eichenauer et al.,
2018; Neukirch, 2018, 2016; Weber and Cabras, 2017), and
bioeconomy-related issues are unlikely to be exempt from this.
Sociological research that aims at a fuller understanding of
the dynamics of contestation around the bioeconomy as part of
a broader post-fossil transformation needs to systematically con-
sider these looming and mounting tensions between the attitudes
and practical habits of different social groups. The first step to-
wards this is to suspend the assumption that people’s perceptions
or opinions concerning the bioeconomy or some bio-based product
can be neatly separated from the broader ways they relate to na-
ture and the social world, and measured in isolation. From the per-
spective proposed here, the opinions voiced and the actions taken
in relation to these issues are expressions of incorporated dispo-
sitions, or schemes of perception, evaluation and action acquired
in the course of socially specific biographical experience. In their
totality as a ‘syndrome’, these dispositions make up what we call
mentalities. Our usage of this term draws on a long tradition in
German sociology (Geiger, 1972; Vester et al., 2001), and is also
theoretically guided by Bourdieu’s (1990, 1984) understanding of
habitus, with which it is largely synonymous.
As habits of seeing, feeling and acting acquired through lived
experience under certain socially typical conditions of existence,
mentalities normally function as the generative principle of rou-
tine practices. But in providing tried and tested rules for dealing
with the world, they also enable creative, yet structured verbal and
practical responses to novel, unfamiliar questions and situations.
If we want to understand the tensions and conflicts that arise
around societal transformation projects like the bioeconomy, we
thus need to find out how these projects are interpreted and dealt
with from within the logic of the different mentalities present
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
among the population. We also need to relate these mentalities to
the different socioeconomic contexts for which they are typical to
show how the differences and tensions between them play out in
social interaction. Most people do not deploy specific knowledge
and opinions when asked about ‘bioeconomy’, but general disposi-
tions that reflect their experience in life and their relationship with
the social and natural world more broadly. Therefore, stances taken
on specific bioeconomy-related questions are expressions of where
they stand in relation to socio-ecological issues in general, and the
way they position themselves toward these broader concerns is in
turn an indicator of how they are likely to evaluate questions of
bioeconomy. Research on bioeconomy-related mentalities is there-
fore part and parcel of ongoing research efforts on processes of
social-ecological transformation (Chan et al., 2020; D’Amato et al.,
2017; Eversberg, 2020; Görg et al., 2017).
2.2. Mentalities and bioeconomy transformations: The
socio-ecological space of possibilities
The analysis of the multilayered bioeconomic ‘option space’
provided by Hausknost et al. (2017) is a helpful point of depar-
ture for our intention to come up with a more nuanced and sys-
tematic account of how people in the general population men-
tally and practically relate to the social-ecological transformations
that the bioeconomy constitutes a part of. Hausknost et al. eval-
uated 1) the strategic orientations of different bioeconomy strat-
egy papers from governments and industry, and 2) the stances
taken by Austrian bioeconomy stakeholders from government, in-
dustry, research and NGOs. They then located each view within a
two-dimensional space in which the common distinction between
biotech-based and agroecologically oriented conceptions (vertical)
is juxtaposed with a dimension that represents a continuum from
capitalist growth-oriented strategies to ones based on sufficiency
ideas (horizontal, see Fig. 1). Additionally, they plotted 3) possible
trajectories of a future bioeconomy into this space that they de-
termined through biophysical modeling. This spatial heuristic re-
veals the disconnect between the promises made by governments,
the visions promoted by different stakeholder groups and the ac-
tual possibilities for bioeconomic transformation as indicated by
biophysical models. It also provides a more nuanced account of
differing visions of the bioeconomy than the tripartite typology
suggested by Bugge et al. (2016): The ‘bio-technology’ and ‘bio-
ecology’ visions are located in the top right and bottom left cor-
ners of the space, and the actors expressing ‘bio-resource’ ideas
align in between on the diagonal, but closer to the bio-technology
pole. In addition, the framework allows for a strategy of low-tech,
agroecologically enabled growth (as exemplified by the ideas of the
European Technology Platform TP Organics) as well as a concept
of bioeconomy based on the politically negotiated and controlled
use of advanced technology for the purposes of a sustainable no-
growth economy. The latter version corresponds most closely to
the scenarios suggested as biophysically feasible in the modeling
exercise.
In that the axes are conceived of as continua, this framework
also lends itself well to the relational perspective proposed here.
It therefore seems worthwhile to introduce the different types
of socio-ecological mentalities present within the population as a
fourth analytical level into this conception by also locating them
along these two axes: Where are the ideas shared by majorities
today located in the option space, and how do they relate to the
policy concepts, the positions of stakeholders and the biophysi-
cally feasible pathways? While it would produce little more than
artefacts to directly ask people for their opinion on the abstract
concept of ‘bioeconomy’ in a survey, adding the mentalities of the
broader population to this space as a fourth level offers an idea
of what visions of ‘bioeconomy’ are seen as desirable or undesir-
976
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
able among different factions of the population. In what follows,
we show how this can be done using representative survey data
that provides sufficiently broad information as to allow for the re-
construction of respondents’ socio-ecological mentalities as com-
prehensive syndromes of dispositions in relation to nature and so-
ciety.
Mentalities are expressed in the ways people view and com-
ment on the world as well as in their habitualized patterns of ev-
eryday practice, or modes of living. They cannot be directly mea-
sured, only indirectly reconstructed by identifying socially typical
patterns in the views and attitudes expressed and the practices re-
ported. In the relational perspective of Bourdieu’s sociology, they
gain their meaning and relevance only from the commonalities and
differences, proximities and distances between the different types,
which is why this approach routinely comes up with spatial repre-
sentations of the social world (Blasius et al., 2019; Bourdieu, 2018,
1989; Flemmen et al., 2017). As in Bourdieu’s (1984) account of the
‘social space’ of French society, there are always three different, in-
terrelated layers to this spatiality: the layer of social positions in
which experiences are made and incorporated, the layer of the dis-
positions and mentalities resulting from this, and the layer of prac-
tical position-takings in which the dispositions are deployed under
conditions typical to the respective position in specific patterns of
practice. Because of this mediating function of practice and the rel-
ative durability or ‘hysteresis’ (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 59–62) of incor-
porated dispositions, Bourdieu (1998) presumes homology between
the spatial layers of positions, dispositions and position-takings.
To see how people relate to the technological, economic and
ecological dimensions that constitute different visions of future
socio-ecological transformation, i.e. to proceed from the bioeco-
nomic option space towards the socio-ecological space of possi-
bilities, we apply these three layers to the spatial representation
offered by Hausknost et al. (2017). Combining Bourdieuian rela-
tional sociology with the heuristic provided by Hausknost et al.,
we aim to identify the proponents of change and the agents of re-
sistance to post-fossil transformations, and to reconstruct their re-
lations towards each other. The distances observed along the two
intersecting dimensions (and a third dimension representing fos-
silism, which we will introduce as a result of our analysis) indi-
cate what aspects of bioeconomic and post-fossil transformation
are contested in these conflicts. In the remainder of this paper, we
explore these for the case of Germany in 2018.
3. Material and methods
We use the dataset of the survey Environmental Consciousness
in Germany 2018, the most recent publicly available installment
of a biennial survey commissioned by the Federal Ministry of the
Environment (BMU) and the Federal Environmental Agency (UBA)
(Rubik et al., 2019). The representative survey (n = 2.017) includes
a range of questions concerning socio-ecological attitudes, socio-
environmentally relevant practices, and sociodemographic data, as
well as a number of items concerning respondents’ stances and
practices regarding questions of energy and the German energy
transition (Energiewende).
Applying the conception of mentalities as socially typical pat-
terns of dispositions, we analyzed the responses to the com-
plete set of 36 statements on socio-ecologically relevant attitudes
that survey participants were asked to rate (see Table 1). Top-
ics include environmental cognitions and emotions, attitudes to-
wards environmental policy and climate change as well as personal
orientations and beliefs on different social and political issues.
We followed the principles of structured data analysis (Roux and
Rouanet, 2004). Firstly, the data was described and summarized
with explorative methods of data analysis allowing the identifi-
cation of latent variables (dispositions) and clusters of individu-
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
Fig. 1. Two-dimensional ’option space’ (figure taken from Hausknost et al., 2017: 17). Governmental strategies are plotted in orange, stakeholder positions in black, and
biophysical modeling scenarios in green.
als sharing similar mentalities. Secondly, these clusters were 1)
analysed statistically with regard to differences in age, education
and other socio-structural variables (Eversberg, 2020a) and 2) lo-
cated within the three-dimensional socio-ecological ’option space’.
Rather than an effort to establish clear causal relations between
‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables, this procedure is intended
as an exercise in ‘quantitative storytelling’ (Saltelli and Giampi-
etro, 2017): We intended to use quantitative survey data in uncon-
ventional ways to adapt to Hausknost et al.’s qualitative relational
logic and uncover new and surprising ‘alternative readings’ (ibid.)
of what is at stake in the bioeconomy debate.
In the first step, we carried out a principal component analy-
sis (PCA) with varimax rotation to detect the linear relations be-
tween the 36 variables included to uncover latent factors – or dis-
positions – underlying the typical response patterns. The Kaiser–
Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.909, represent-
ing a very good factor analysis. Only factors with eigenvalues ≥ 1
were considered (Kaiser, 1960). Applying Kaiser’s criterion and sub-
stantial interpretation of the factors empirically justified retaining
six factors with eigenvalues exceeding 1, which together account
for about 45 percent of the total variance. Factor loadings were in-
terpreted to understand what basic dispositions the factors express
(see Table 1), and factor scores for each respondent were saved as
variables for the second step of analysis.
In the second step, we identified mentalities, as typical over-
all constellations of those dispositions, by applying cluster analy-
ses to the factor score variables to group respondents according
to the similarities in their dispositions. Each cluster thus provides
a statistically generated representation of an ideal typical mental-
ity prevalent among (but not homogenously present in each of)
the respondents grouped in the cluster, or in other words: a styl-
977
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
ized dispositional pattern that characterizes a certain subsection of
the space in which respondents are continuously (not discretely)
distributed. To prevent arbitrary results and gain a gauge for the
relative strength of cohesion of the clusters, we performed and
compared several cluster solutions gained through different pro-
cedures.
One solution was obtained in SPSS by first performing a hier-
archical cluster analysis (using the Ward method and squared Eu-
clidean distances as a criterion) and, after a first interpretation, us-
ing the cluster centres for the 10-cluster step as starting points for
a k-means cluster analysis. The other two were generated using the
‘Mixed Clustering’ procedure of the SPAD software package, which
initially uses an agglomerative procedure to generate a large num-
ber (here: 100) of small, relatively homogeneous clusters and then
continues by hierarchically merging the most similar of these. Be-
cause this procedure starts from random initial points, it generates
stronger variation in its outputs. Therefore, it was conducted twice
using different random seeds for initialization. This way we arrived
at three different ten-cluster solutions, which were then compared
to identify and describe stable and less stable clusterings across
the solutions, and the clusters with the most overlap were mutu-
ally assigned to get to a total of eleven recurring types of mental-
ities (see Table 2). These, we found, could be grouped into three
broad ‘camps’ (Eversberg, 2020a, pp. 89–90) :1
1
For a detailed description of the procedures and a comprehensive account of
the results, see Eversberg (2020a). Further details and data about the cluster anal-
yses can be obtained from the authors upon simple request. For a comparable ex-
ercise using the dataset of the same survey’s 2016 edition, see Eversberg (2020b,
2021).
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987

Table 1
Principal component analysis, factor loadings.

Components/factors
Item in German Environmental Consciousness Study
1 2 3 4 5 6

I am troubled by the thought of the environmental conditions that future generations will .66 −.19 .11
probably have to live in.
Climate change threatens our livelihoods also here in Germany. .64 −.25
Man-made environmental problems like deforestation or plastic in the oceans outrage me. .69
Environmental problems are greatly exaggerated by many environmentalists. −.28 .64 −.25
More environmental protection also means greater quality of life and health for all. .66 −.18
I am happy about initiatives that simply try out sustainable ways of living, e.g. eco-villages, .54 −.22 .34
slow food movement.
It annoys me when others try to dictate that I should live in an environmentally conscious way. −.31 .55 .15 −.26
It makes me angry when I see that Germany is failing to meet its climate protection targets. .64 −.30 .24 .11
We need more economic growth in the future, even if it puts a strain on the environment. −.27 .48 −.13 .21
There are natural limits to growth that our industrialized world has long since reached. .53 .15 .13 −.23
For the sake of the environment, we should all be willing to cut back on our current standard of .63 −.21 .28
living.
For a good life, other things are important than the environment and nature. −.33 .48 .11 .11 .13
Each and every individual bears responsibility for leaving a livable environment to future .63 −.11
generations.
We should not consume more raw materials than can be regrown. .60 .42
We need to find ways to live well independent of economic growth. .55 .17 −.20
It is important to me to be able to contribute new ideas and impulses. .70
I live with the feeling that I can always start again. .34 −.42 .22 .32
I am willing to spend more for environmentally friendly products. .40 −.22 −.25 .31 .30
I trust in the forces of the free market. The market will ensure that what needs to change will −.22 .50 −.11 .32
change.
I am not worried about my future. .40 −.60 .14
There is little chance for the likes of myself to be successful these days. .091 .15 .72
I am in favor of equal treatment for homosexuals in all areas of life. .15 −.37 .19 .23
Sometimes I deliberately afford myself the very best quality. .12 −.12 .38 −.11 .23
I am busy enough dealing with my own problems, I can’t take care of others on top of that. −.14 .31 .52 −.22 .14
I want to advance in professional life. For this I am also willing to work in my spare time. −.12 .60 .14
It often happens with me that I get strongly involved in social or environmental issues. .30 −.16 −.70 .52 .29 −.12
I have the impression that I have to try harder and harder to avoid sliding down socially. .77 .11 −.12
Owning my own car means a lot to me. .28 −.51 .14
I make it a point to always have the latest technology (e.g., in computers or smartphones). −.13 .25 −.16 .59
I want to make a difference in life, having power and influence is part of that. .63 .26
What happens in politics is meaningless to my life. .39 .24 −.31 .37 .21
My diet is mainly vegetarian or vegan. .16 −.17 .63
When shopping, I always look out for the best bargain. .26 .32 −.17 −.13 .12
I make it a point to wear clothes according to the latest fashion. .71
Whenever possible, I buy products that come from ’fair trade’. .31 .23 .52 −.11
One of the most important things in life for me is to travel and see other countries. – .60

1 An ecosocial camp, comprising around a third of the pop- sition. None of the kinds of societal vision offered by the bioe-
ulation, which encompasses clearly pro-ecological and pro- conomy discourse are therefore likely to find much support in
transformative mentalities mostly skeptical of economic this camp.
growth. People in this camp tend to identify with far-reaching
As these brief descriptions suggest, the comprehensive patterns
ideas of a post-fossil transformation broadly in line with Bugge
of mentalities discovered in these analyses provide an overarching
et al.’s ‘bio-ecology’ vision.
logic according to which we can formulate at least reasoned ex-
2 A liberal-escalatory camp of around 40%, holding mostly con-
pectations about how people will perceive and evaluate different
tented and optimistic views, consumerist attitudes and positive
ideas about future societal transformation as discussed in the bioe-
stances on economic growth. Although the dominant self-image
conomy debate, even though questions directly addressing specific
is one of openness to progress and change, ideas about trans-
aspects of the bioeconomy were not asked in the survey. Despite
formations that could impact on one’s personal mode of liv-
this obvious limitation, the data thus allows for a first assessment
ing are eyed with reluctance. Prospects of changes in the ma-
of how socio-ecological mentalities are linked to different versions
terial and institutional makeup of European societies are only
of the bioeconomy. Future surveys, however, should improve on
seen as acceptable if they promise to come with ongoing eco-
this by also including more specific aspects directly related to the
nomic growth and increasing material prosperity, making this a
bioeconomy, such as different agricultural methods, biotechnology
key constituency for narratives of ‘green growth’ and the ‘bio-
or the substitution of plastics with bio-based materials.
technology’ vision.
Finally, we plotted the mean points for all 30 clusters yielded
3 And an authoritarian-fossilist camp that comprises up to a quar-
by the three analyses as well as for the three camps into the (now)
ter of the population. Mentalities in this camp are dominated
three-dimensional socio-ecological space of possibilities. The di-
by feelings of loss and the perception of omnipresent threats as
mensions of technology, growth and fossilism were operationalized
well as by fervent opposition to any kind of change. The ideal
using PCA, to minimize measurement errors and get more robust
these groups aspire to seems to be the unconditional preserva-
results than from simple additive indices:
tion of the status quo, or even a return to outdated economic
and social models of the 20th century – visions that are of 1 The technology dimension is constructed of four items: ’It is
course largely irreconcilable with any kind of bio-based tran- important for me to always have the latest technology (e.g.

978
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987

Table 2
Overview of cluster solutions.

Type of mentality Cluster solution 1 (SPAD) Cluster solution 2 (SPSS) Cluster solution 3 (SPAD)
ecosocial camp

1. active ecosocial civic active ecosocial active ecosocial ecosocial transformative

2. voluntaristic-
individualistic
3. contented-ecosocial
liberal-escalatory camp
4. contented-inert
5. contented-consumerist
6. active
anti-transformative
civic
7. egocentric ignorant
authoritarian-fossilist camp
8. precarious-defensive
9. pseudoaffirmative-inert
10. anti-ecological
citizenship 1 (11 percent)
individualist alternative
milieu (9 percent)
ecosocial contentment
(13 percent)
inert contentment
(11 percent)
contented unsustainability
(13 percent)
ecosocial ignorance
(8 percent)
overstrained regression
(9 percent)
pseudoaffirmative inertia 2
(8 percent)
ideological anti-ecologism
(8 percent)
citizenship 2 (11 percent)
quotidian eco-voluntarism
(10 percent)
ecosocial
contentment/optimistic
privatism (12 percent)
contented inertia
(11 percent)
status consumerist affluent
liberalism (15 percent)
anti-ecological success
orientation (6 percent)
apolitical nonecologism
(9 percent)
regressive inertia
(7 percent)
pseudoaffirmative inertia 3
(8 percent)
– regressive anti-ecologism
optimism (7 percent)
voluntaristic alternative
milieu (12 percent)
optimistic privatism
(11 percent)
proecological center
(11 percent)
unbudging center
(13 percent)
ruthless defense of
privilege (7 percent)
egocentric ecosocial
ignorance (7 percent)
overstrained desire for
stability (12 percent)
pseudoaffirmative inertia 1
(10 percent)
(9 percent)

Unassigned type, not clearly associated with any of the camps

11. precarious openness to conservative precarious prosociality –
change environmentalism (11 percent)
(11 percent)

PC or Smartphone)’, ’I use digital technology to control my taxes for climate-damaging products’. PCA again provided a
household appliances’ ’Importance of increasing energy effi- unidimensional solution, with all items loading on one factor
ciency through innovative technology to achieve the goals of – post-fossilism vs. fossilism.
the energy transition’, and a question on whether respondents
have their own installation for generating renewable energy at
4. Results and discussion: From clearly structured expert
home or can imagine obtaining one. PCA led to two latent fac-
discourse to socially differentiated complexity
tors, where the two variables on digital technology load on the
first factor and the two items on energy technology on the sec-
Fig. 2a indicates the mean positions of the different types of
ond. Both factor scores were added up and divided by two,
mentalities found in our cluster analyses,2 as well as of the three
yielding individual scores for each respondent on the technol-
broad camps they were grouped into, within the space constructed
ogy dimension.
based on respondents’ views on growth and technology. One thing
2 The growth dimension includes five items: ’We need more eco-
is immediately evident: The diagonal ‘milky way’-like structure
nomic growth in the future, even if it puts a strain on the en-
that Hausknost et al. (2017) found for the visions expressed in offi-
vironment’; ’There are natural limits to growth that our indus-
cial bioeconomy strategies as well as by experts and stakeholders,
trialized world has long since reached.’; ’We need to find ways
which signaled a close correlation between stances on technology
to live well independent of economic growth’; ’For the sake of
and on growth, replicates itself only partly when assessing the cor-
the environment, we should all be willing to cut back on our
responding mentalities among the broader population.
current standard of living.’ and ’I trust in the forces of the free
On the one hand, the relative positions of the ecosocial and
market. The market will ensure that what needs to change will
liberal-escalatory camps indicate a tension between orientations
change’. PCA yielded a unidimensional solution: only one fac-
supporting high-tech, growth-focused models of ‘sustainable cap-
tor was extracted, indicating the general disposition towards
ital’ in the top right and critics advocating sufficiency- and
growth.
agroecology-based ideas of ‘eco-retreat’ in the bottom left corner.
3 The fossilism dimension captures the degree of attachment to
In the relation between these two camps, the basic ‘milky way’
a mode of living based on fossil fuels and of (un)willingness
structure found in the bioeconomy discourse is thus replicated,
to support measures departing from it, based on seven items
exposing a broader societal conflict concerning the different ap-
directly related to climate change and de-fossilization: ’Impor-
proaches to dealing with socio-ecological challenges, which un-
tance of phasing-out fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas, and
folds between an economistic, techno-scientifically centered and
changing to renewable energy, for example from the sun or
an ecosocial, political vision of societal change.3
wind’; ’Importance of limiting global warming to well below 2
°Celsius in the long term’; ‘Climate change threatens our liveli-
hoods also here in Germany’; ’It makes me angry when I see 2
The 30 subcategories included here are displayed merely to indicate the overall
that Germany is failing to meet its climate protection targets.’; distribution and the degree of spread along both axes within each of the camps.
’Importance of policy: reduction of climate-damaging subsi- Characterizations for all of them cannot be provided here for lack of space, but are
available in Eversberg (2020a). The colors indicate which camp they were assigned
dies’; ’Importance of policy: making CO2 emissions rights more
to.
expensive (resulting in higher prices for companies when they 3
Hausknost et al. (2017) seem to be concerned that the effectively one-
emit climate-damaging gases)’; ’Importance of policy: Higher dimensional structure of actual discourse within the option space may also be a

979
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
Fig. 2a. Mentalities as located within the socio-ecological space of possibilities (growth and technology axes) – centers of gravity for 30 clusters and three broad camps.
Interestingly, the different subcategories of both the
authoritarian-fossilist and the liberal-escalatory camp spread out
very far along both axes, while those of the ecosocial camp appear
rather tightly bundled in the lower left. This suggests a greater
degree of coherence and commonality among the mentalities
making up that camp as compared to the other two: the ecosocial
camp is apparently overwhelmingly critical of both growth and
technology, while the others seem more divided.
4.1. More diverse views among the population than among experts
In contrast to Hausknost et al.’s account, a number of out-
liers to the milky-way-like structure indicate that views within
the broader population are in some respects more diverse than
those of experts: For example, the ’eco-social transformative op-
timism’ in the upper left combines skepticism toward growth
with a certain affinity for technology – a mentality mostly found
among very young and highly educated respondents with a pen-
chant for eco-activism. Finding this group in the quadrant that
Hausknost et al. (2017) label ‘planned transitions’ does seem to fit
in with the calls of the new climate movement for strong state ac-
tion and a much more political and planned mode of dealing with
the ecological crisis.
Conversely, in the lower right there are a couple of mentali-
ties in which pro-growth attitudes combine with skepticism to-
ward technology. The mentalities that clearly diverge in this direc-
tion are primarily those we classify as ‘anti-ecological’: highly pro-
growth attitudes shaped by, and openly intent on preserving, the
social order of fossil-driven industrial society. They are overwhelm-
problem for serious political debate around the question what kind of socially em-
bedded use of biotechnology may be acceptable or necessary even for a society that
consciously embarks on a democratically planned sufficiency-oriented transforma-
tion. This concern seems similarly valid at the level of the broader population.
980
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
ingly found among men of all age groups and often linked to de-
liberately unsustainable practices such as high meat consumption
and intense automobility. The negative values on the technology
index are probably deceptive here: Rather than opposing technol-
ogy in general, people exhibiting such mentalities are more likely
to specifically eschew renewable energy technology. This indicates
the limits of Hausknost et al.’s model of the ‘option space’ when
looking at the broader population: not much seems to signal the
existence of a constituency for the kind of ‘Eco-Growth’ option as-
sociated with this quadrant. Rather than proponents of agroecolog-
ically based growth, what seems to concentrate here are mentali-
ties reminiscent of the ‘not at any price’ type described by Hempel
et al. (2019): Mindsets not preferring any model of bioeconomy
at all, but the preservation of established and accustomed fossil-
based modes of living that appear cheaper and more convenient
and attractive. The low positions on the technology axis are not
to be read as indicating a distance from technology as such (as
may be assumed further to the left), but rather a preference for the
fossil-based technologies associated with an earlier stage (combus-
tion engines, large-scale power plants, industrialized agriculture)
as compared to the digital and renewable technologies reflected in
the index.
This has two consequences for our analysis. One is that the la-
bels given to the quadrants of the bioeconomic option space by
Hausknost et al. do not quite fit the orientations within the socio-
ecological space of possibilities mapped out here. Considering the
different visions of socio-ecological change associated with each,
we suggest to call the growth- and techno-optimist upper right
sector ‘technoeconomic advance’, the opposed lower left ‘less is
more’, the lower right ‘growth as usual’ and the upper left ‘suffi-
cient progress’ (Fig. 2a).
The other is that the presence of such orientations, which were
excluded by definition from the sample of bioeconomy experts
surveyed by Hausknost et al., suggests adding a third dimension
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
Fig. 2b. Mentalities as located within the socio-ecological space of possibilities (fossilism and technology axes) – centers of gravity for 30 clusters and three broad camps.
to complement the spatial model: namely, a fossilism dimension.
This dimension charts the continuum from mentalities that em-
phatically affirm the necessity of de-fossilization and prioritize the
protection of the climate as an overarching concern to those that
oppose de-fossilization once it impinges on business as usual, or
even in principle. It highlights a rather fundamental tension that
is largely absent from expert debates on bioeconomy, but – as our
data show – highly relevant when looking at non-experts.4
4.2. Uncovering fossilist mentalities
In order to gain a more nuanced picture of the distribution of
fossilist orientations, Fig. 2b plots the mentalities and camps in the
socio-ecological space of possibilities with regard to fossilism and
technology.
This exercise reveals a deep divide between the mentalities of
a broad majority that mostly accepts de-fossilization as a necessity
(left of and around the center) and a minority that clearly sets it-
self apart by prioritizing growth and the maintenance of prevailing
modes of living much higher. In terms of the mean positions of the
camps, this dimension shows a rather clear opposition between
the ecosocial camp at the post-fossilist pole and both other camps,
located to almost the same degree on the fossilist side of the spec-
trum.5 The divide seems to run through both the liberal-escalatory
and the authoritarian-fossilist camps: In addition to the openly
anti-ecological mentalities, fossilist orientations are also associated
with highly individualist, career-centered mindsets geared to the
defense of one’s own privileges and found mostly among parts
of the societal elites (‘anti-ecological success orientation’, ‘ruthless
4
In principle, this third dimension could also be applied to the levels of inves-
tigation addressed by Hausknost et al. themselves: Short of open rejection of any
kind of bioeconomy, it would then represent a continuum between advocacy for
fossil-based bioeconomies or bioeconomies based on fossil business models (e.g.
fossil-powered sugar refineries or industrialized agriculture and forestry) on the one
side and clearly post-fossil concepts conceiving bioeconomy as a necessary element
of climate neutrality on the other.
5
It may still be surprising that the authoritarian fossilist camp, despite its name,
has a mean point slightly to the left of the liberal-escalatory camp. This is partly
due to the effects of a strong acquiescence bias in the response patterns of the
‘pseudoaffirmative inertia’ clusters, which make these, and the whole camp, appear
somewhat less fossilist than they can be assumed to be. Also, the relative position
of the liberal-escalatory camp reflects the existence of liberal, non-authoritarian
forms of fossilism.
981
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
defense of privilege’). Also included are self-centered mentalities
intent on maximizing personal enjoyment while ignoring any neg-
ative consequences for others or for non-human nature (‘egocen-
tric ecosocial ignorance’). These are the same types of mentality
that can also be seen as strongly favoring growth in Fig. 2a. All in
all, while fossilism and growth-mindedness are closely correlated,6
this display shows that mentalities located in the technology-
friendly section of the space tend to be ‘less fossilist’ than they
are growth-optimistic, while conversely, those skeptical of (green
and digital) technology are usually somewhat ‘more fossilist’.
In terms of how the interrelations of the different levels of
the space are to be conceived of theoretically, it can be con-
cluded that the bioeconomic option space should not be thought
of as depicting a subsector of this greater socio-ecological space of
possibilities (for instance, a zoomed-in subsection located in the
lower left), but as a relatively autonomous, yet homologous field
(Bourdieu, 1996a, 1996b; Martin, 2003). Here, debates, political
contestation and decision-making about possible bio-based trans-
formations take place among a limited set of actors and according
to their own logic, but not in total disconnection from the relations
of power prevailing in the broader political field and among the
population as a whole. Within the bioeconomic field, positions all
across the spectrum from the most growth- and techno-pessimist
to the most optimist mentalities on both counts are represented.
The common belief that unites all actors in that field (or, in Bour-
dieu’s terms, the illusio) is that some kind of bio-based transfor-
mation is desirable or necessary. This excludes from the option
space of the bioeconomic field the fossilist and anti-transformative
‘business as usual’ options openly or tacitly supported by most of
the authoritarian fossilist and also by parts of the liberal-escalatory
camp.
4.3. Social factors associated with mentalities
Figs. 3a and 3b indicate how support for and opposition to
the different possible scenarios of socio-ecological change are dis-
tributed among different socio-demographic categories. Looking
6
There is a strong positive correlation between the growth and the fossilism in-
dex (r = 0.6, p<0.001). Growth and technology are only weakly positively correlated
(r = 0.1, p<0.001), while there is no significant correlation between fossilism and
technology.
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987

Fig. 3a. The socio-ecological space of possibilities in the German population (growth and technology) – selected sociodemographic attributes.

Fig. 3b. 3b: The socio-ecological space of possibilities in the German population (Fossilism and technology) – selected sociodemographic attributes.

982
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
first at the space defined by growth- and technology-related dis-
positions (Fig. 3a), significant differences play out mostly along the
diagonal from lower left to upper right. The ‘Less is more’ option is
typically more in line with the orientations of women, retired per-
sons and older age groups (over 60), people in part-time employ-
ment, and those with low household incomes (under 20 0 0 €). At
the other end of the spectrum, ideas of ‘technoeconomic advance’
are more often favored among men, the very young7 (and espe-
cially those still in education) as well as those in full-time employ-
ment, and in high-income households. Significant differences are
also evident regarding the place of residence, with villagers tend-
ing to endorse both technology and growth, East Germans8 favor-
able and inhabitants of the biggest cities critical toward growth.
In terms of education, the more highly educated generally tend to
hold more favorable views on technology.
Among the latter, however, nothing indicates that techno-
optimist visions of a solar- and biotech-based post-fossilism play
a greater role than mentalities that prioritize growth and techno-
logical progress regardless of the material base on which it may be
achieved or of the ecological and social costs.
The picture changes somewhat when substituting fossilism for
growth on the horizontal axis (Figure 3b): Most importantly, the
youngest respondents under 20 years of age and those that have
never been in gainful employment now appear in the upper left
quadrant, indicating that the relatively frequent pro-growth incli-
nations of this age group are not necessarily connected to fos-
silist dispositions. In contrast, the strongest fossilist tendencies are
found in the age groups from 30 to 39, among East Germans, vil-
lagers, men, those working full-time, and manual workers. Post-
fossilism seems to come in two varieties: a techno-optimist one
associated not only with the young, but also with highly educated
professionals and the self-employed, and a techno-skeptical vari-
ant more prevalent among part-time workers, women, older and
retired people and those on low incomes.
4.4. Linking mentalities to everyday social practices
Finally, Figs. 4a and 4b show where a number of socio-
ecologically relevant practices reported in the survey are located
on the axes. The pictures are almost identical: Significant dif-
ferences play out mostly on the horizontal axes, i.e. are much
more closely linked to peoples’ stances on growth and fossilism
than to those on technology. Post-fossil orientations and outspoken
skepticism toward growth are correlated with all kinds of inten-
tionally pro-ecological activities. This ranges from voting for pro-
environmental parties through donating money to environmental-
ist groups and always buying organic food to eating no meat. Prac-
tices that have a low ecological impact, but are often determined
by other considerations or restrictions (using public transport, buy-
ing energy-efficient appliances, not flying) are located closer to
the middle. The right, pro-growth and fossilist half of the space
is similarly segmented into two zones: Firstly, a zone of ‘practical
7
Considering the recent wave of climate protest led predominantly by young
people, this appears counterintuitive. One reason for this result is probably that
young people are generally more open to new technologies than their elders, struc-
turally shifting them upward (and older age groups downward) here. Also, their
relatively stronger inclinations toward growth are not necessarily a sign of anti-
ecological dispositions, as their location on the fossilism axis (Figure 3b) shows.
Rather, in modern societies positive connotations around growth are partly a gen-
eral characteristic of the mentalities of young people, reflecting the experience of
youth as a phase of intense personal development and discovery of possibilities.
8
East Germany is comprised of those parts of Germany that formerly constituted
the socialist German Democratic Republic. People born and living there often expe-
rienced the negative consequences of a weak economy. The system change towards
democratic capitalism in the 1990s brought a significant rise in the material stan-
dard of living and may have contributed to the formation of pro-growth orienta-
tions among larger parts of the East German population.
983
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
unsustainability’ relatively close to the middle,9 where resource-
intensive modes of living are basically a product of material af-
fluence (flying several times a year, owning three cars and more,
eating a lot of meat) or external constraints (not subscribing to
renewable electricity, never using public transport). Secondly, the
categories located further out toward the pro-growth/fossilist pole
can be interpreted to express an ‘ideological unsustainability’ that
ostentatiously rejects any ecological concerns: never buying or-
ganic food, energy efficient products or ones bearing an environ-
mental label, not claiming to promote environmental values or
even to try to avoid environmentally destructive everyday behav-
ior.
Fossilist orientations and support for economic growth are also
significantly associated with higher CO2 footprints. This highlights
another aspect of the underlying societal line of conflict: A rec-
onciliation between growth and environmental protection and the
suppression of the fact that fossil resources are ecologically prob-
lematic are typically mental coping strategies of those whose
resource- and emissions-intensive modes of living would most
likely be strongly impacted by the more radical, agro-ecological
and sufficiency-oriented concepts of a transformation. The mean
CO2 footprint calculated for people in the liberal-escalatory camp
is 6.7 tons, that of respondents in the ecosocial camp clocks in at
5.4 tons, and the authoritarian-fossilist camp lies in between at 5.9
tons. As these average CO2 footprints and the locations of the three
camps within the space suggest this ‘hard’, interest-based dimen-
sion of the conflict primarily plays out between the materially af-
fluent and socially secure groups gathered in the liberal-escalatory
camp and the more economically precarious and socially burdened
segments of the ecosocial camp.
All this shows that the tension between ideas of transforma-
tion centered around sufficiency and social adaptation and imagi-
naries of technology- and growth-based solutions correlates with
inequalities of gender and socioeconomic status, and maps onto
clearly distinct patterns of everyday practice, or modes of living. As
may be expected from the CO2 footprints, people expressing more
growth-critical and post-fossil attitudes are much more likely to
engage in all kinds of resource-light and ecologically compatible
activities, both of the intentional type (active involvement, ethi-
cal consumption) and of the kind more often imposed by mate-
rial restrictions (no flights, no car, low electricity consumption).
Conversely, the pro-growth/fossilist sector displays a similarly seg-
mented concentration of particularly high-impact practices (fre-
quent flights, driving, high meat consumption), explicit rejection
of pro-ecological involvement, and consumer choices in explicit
disregard of eco-social consequences. In other words, what these
findings indicate is that there seems to be a deeply rooted con-
flict around the issue of potential changes to the established fossil-
based modes of living that runs through German society (and may
be expected in a similar form for other wealthy Northern nations).
This conflict cannot be reduced to a cultural or ideological ‘cleav-
age’, but gains its intensity from its embeddedness in the (in-
fra)structural conditions and the socially unequal determinations
and restrictions of everyday life.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
The policy debate around concepts of the bioeconomy has in
recent years become a site of more far-reaching contestation con-
cerning the extent and the forms of a transformation toward sus-
tainable, post-fossil societies. As we have argued here, the dif-
ferences between various “visions” of bioeconomy (Bugge et al.,
9
But, due to the relative rarity of the respective practices, significantly further
away from it than the more common forms of ‘practical sustainability’ in the center-
left.
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987

Fig. 4a. The socio-ecological space of possibilities in the German population (growth and technology) – significant socioecologically relevant practices.

Fig. 4b. The socio-ecological space of possibilities in the German population (Fossilism and technology) – socioecologically relevant practices.

2016) present in this field reflect more deeply rooted tensions
and conflicts within society at large that need to be taken into
account when assessing the viability, achievability and desirabil-
ity (Wright, 2010) of those visions. To account for this broader
dimension, we have suggested analyzing the mentalities and vi-
sions present in the general population as a fourth level of what
Hausknost et al. (2017) call the bioeconomic ‘option space’. To
provide an initial analysis of this space of possibilities of social-
ecological (rather than narrowly bioeconomic) change, we have
drawn on representative data from the survey ‘Environmental Con-
sciousness in Germany 2018 . Applying the principles of Bour-
dieuian relational sociology, we have reconstructed the relations
between different socially typical mentalities, socio-structural po-
sitions and patterns of routine practice within this space.
Our results show that the ultimate one-dimensionality, i.e.
the close correlation of views on growth and technology, that

984
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
Hausknost et al. (2017) found in most of the expert discourse on
bioeconomy, holds only partly for the general population: On the
one side, we do find a polar tension between perspectives sup-
portive or skeptical of both growth and technology. Here, the di-
vide between visions of ‘bio-technology’ (or ‘sustainable capital’,
as per (Birch et al., 2010)) and ‘bio-ecology’ (or ‘eco-retreat’) that
characterizes debates in the bioeconomic policy field appears as a
manifestation of a larger, homologous conflict in society at large
(Eversberg, 2021; Görg, 2004).
On the other side, we found that combinations both of 1)
techno-optimism with skepticism toward growth and 2) pro-
growth attitudes with critical views on technology seem to be
more common in the general population than in bioeconomic ex-
pert discourse. This indicates both the presence of a constituency
for technologically based visions of ‘sufficient progress’ toward a
sustainable post-growth society and the existence of support for
further ‘growth as usual’ without a significant amount of techno-
logical innovation.
The conflict around the necessity and possible shape of trans-
formation actually appears even more pronounced when consider-
ing the visions of ‘sufficient progress’ and ‘growth as usual’. While
the politically transformative intentions captured by the former
seem to be most typical of young climate activists, the latter in-
dicate the continuing presence of openly fossilist, anti-ecological
orientations. These mentalities embody a refusal to recognize the
necessity of any type of bio-based economy at all, digging ever
deeper into unsustainable quotidian habits and beliefs as a source
of identity and defiant self-affirmation.
Bioeconomy policymakers are increasingly aware that any
kind of sustainable bioeconomy will require a reduction of re-
source use ‘to a level that is ecologically sustainable’ (BMBF and
BMEL, 2020, p. 4) and a transformation toward ‘new ways of pro-
ducing and consuming’ (European Commission, 2018, p. 4) that
is ‘holistic’, ‘addresses all people and reaches the center of society’
(Bioökonomierat, 2021, p. 2). But the deep structural entrenchment
of fossilism in the minds and daily lives of significant parts of the
population, and particularly parts of the affluent elites, suggests
that solving this looming societal conflict will be the greatest chal-
lenge to any sustainable bioeconomy. The extremely strong asso-
ciation between fossilism and pro-growth orientations revealed by
our analyses suggests that a decoupling of growth from fossilism
has so far not occurred in the prevalent mentalities and modes of
living, and that its feasibility at these levels may be equally doubt-
ful as it is with respect to the global economy (Giampietro, 2019;
Haberl et al., 2020; Ward et al., 2016; Wiedenhofer et al., 2020).
Moreover, it is a significant challenge to the growth-oriented con-
ceptions that continue to dominate current bioeconomy debates
that mentalities explicitly favoring green growth seem to be rather
uncommon in the population.
The relevance of these forces of inertia is exacerbated by
the fact that the average views of the population on technol-
ogy, growth and fossilism are not neutral, but markedly skepti-
cal on all three counts. This mirrors the findings from specifically
bioeconomy-related survey research, which consistently diagnose
overwhelming support especially for the ecological, sustainability-
related goals and aspects of a bio-based economy (Hempel et al.,
2019a; ZIRIUS, 2020). Yet, it seems possible that the ostensi-
ble majorities for ecological transformation conceal more deep-
seated structures of unsustainability and persistently ‘fossil’ pat-
terns at the level of infrastructurally embedded practices (‘attitude-
behavior gap’) as well as in the inner structure of contemporary
subjectivities (Blühdorn et al., 2020). The relational approach we
propose provides a holistic perspective from which to assess these
incongruencies and uncover persistent, and arguably escalating,
tensions. These only become evident when considering the over-
all structure of mentalities, their mutual differences and distances
985
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
within societal constellations, as well as the ways in which they
are connected to resiliently fossilist practical modes of living.
The findings presented here are based on secondary analy-
ses of a general survey of environmental consciousness and en-
vironmentally relevant practices. Future research should be based
on more specific survey data designed to combine some of the
broader issues and orientations covered in such research with a
more systematic consideration of the specifically ‘bio-based’ as-
pects of social-ecological transformation.
In conclusion, three core insights with important implications
for future transformative policies arise:
1 Given that a transformation towards a post-fossil, bio-based
economy will require not only technological innovations, but
also changes to currently prevailing modes of production and
living, the mentalities most likely to lend broad support to such
a transformation are those associated with the ‘less is more’
vision, and particularly the ecosocial camp. That support, how-
ever, is not unconditional and probably depends on strategies
based on principles of sufficiency and a sober assessment of
possibilities, rather than on promises of unlimited growth. Con-
versely, resistance to any kind of effective transformation is
likely to arise from mental traditions that are firmly attached to
imaginaries of ‘technoeconomic advance’ and ‘growth as usual’,
i.e. certain segments of the liberal-escalatory and authoritarian-
fossilist camps.
2 The tensions between different concepts and imaginaries of
possible future socio-ecological trajectories are structured by
several lines of social inequality: There is a gendered tension, a
tension between situations centered around paid employment
and ones at the margins or outside the labor market, as well
as a tension between the affluent and the materially disadvan-
taged.
3 What our analysis has demonstrated in a number of respects
is that questions of inequality and justice are no less im-
portant for the prospects of bio-based and post-fossil trans-
formation than the technicalities of how it is to be imple-
mented (Backhouse and Tittor, 2019). This, however, requires
that transformation is pursued as a democratic, participatory
and adaptive process, rather than as the result of democratically
unchecked market forces that often interfere with a fair distri-
bution of both gains and burdens. Inequality and injustice block
transformation, and equal participation can only be achieved
politically. In this respect, any concept for bioeconomic trans-
formation should explicitly address the social and political di-
mensions of these processes, and reflect the needs of affected
citizens – both today and in the future, locally as well as in
distant regions linked up by supply chains.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest. We have no known
competing financial interests or personal relationships that could
have influenced the work reported in this paper or the conclu-
sions drawn from it. Also, the agency that provided the funding
had no influence on the conception, creation or contents of the
manuscript, nor on the decision to publish it.
Acknowledgement
The work for this paper was funded by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research as part of the work of the
junior research group ‘Mentalities in Flux’ (flumen) (2019–2024,
Grant Number 031B0749).
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
Supplementary materials
Supplementary material associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.spc.2022.01.021.
References
Backhouse, M., Lehmann, R., 2019. New ‘renewable’ frontiers: contested palm oil
plantations and wind energy projects in Brazil and Mexico. J. Land Use Sci. 15
(2–3), 373–388. doi:10.1080/1747423X.2019.1648577.
Backhouse, M., Tittor, A., 2019. Für eine intersektionale Perspektive auf globale
sozial-ökologische Ungleichheiten. In: Dörre, K., Rosa, H., Becker, K., Bose, S.,
Seyd, B. (Eds.), Große Transformation? Zur Zukunft Moderner Gesellschaften:
Sonderband des Berliner Journals Für Soziologie. Springer Fachmedien, Wies-
baden, pp. 297–309. doi:10.1007/978- 3- 658- 25947- 1_16.
Bioökonomierat, 2021. Feedback On the Roadmap for the Bioeconomy Progress
Report „European Bioeconomy Policy: Stocktaking and Future Developments“.
Bioökonomierat, Berlin.
Birch, K., 2019. Neoliberal bio-economies? The Co-Construction of Markets and Na-
tures. Palgrave, Macmillan, Cham.
Birch, K., Levidow, L., Papaioannou, T., 2010. “Sustainable capital? The Neoliber-
alization of nature and knowledge in the European “Knowledge-based Bio-
economy””. Sustainability 2, 2898–2918. doi:10.3390/su2092898.
Blasius, J., Lebaron, F., Roux, B.L., Schmitz, A, 2019. Empirical Investigations of Social
Space, Methodos Series. Springer International Publishing, Cham doi:10.1007/
978- 3- 030- 15387- 8.
Blühdorn, I., 2014. Post-ecologist governmentality: post-democracy, post-politics
and the politics of unsustainability. In: Wilson, J., Swyngedouw, E. (Eds.), The
Post-Political and Its Discontents: Spaces of Depoliticisation, Spectres of Radical
Politics. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp. 146–166.
Blühdorn, I., Butzlaff, F., Deflorian, M., Hausknost, D., Mock, M., 2020. Nachhaltige
Nicht-Nachhaltigkeit. Warum die ökologische Transformation Der Gesellschaft
nicht Stattfindet. transcript Verlag, Bielefeld.
BMBF, B.M.E.L., 2020. National Bioeconomy Strategy. Berlin Bundesregierung.
Bourdieu, P., 2018. Social space and the genesis of appropriated physical space. Int.
J. Urban Region. Res. 42 (1), 106–114. doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12534.
Bourdieu, P., 1998. Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Polity Press, Cam-
bridge.
Bourdieu, P., 1996a. The Rules of Art. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Bourdieu, P., 1996b. The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power. Polity
Press, Oxford.
Bourdieu, P., 1990. The Logic of Practice. Polity Press, London [et al.].
Bourdieu, P., 1989. Social space and symbolic power. Sociol. Theory 7, 14–25.
Bourdieu, P., 1984. Distinction. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Bugge, M.M., Hansen, T., Klitkou, A., 2016. What is the bioeconomy? A review of the
literature”. Sustainability 8, 691. doi:10.3390/su8070691.
D’Amato, D., Droste, N., Chan, S., Hofer, A., 2017. The green economy: pragmatism
or revolution? Perceptions of young researchers on social ecological transforma-
tion. Environ. Values 26 (4), 413–435. doi:10.3197/096327117X14976900137331.
Dieken, S., Dallendörfer, M., Henseleit, M., Siekmann, F., Venghaus, S., 2021. The
multitudes of bioeconomies: a systematic review of stakeholders’ bioeconomy
perceptions. Sustain. Prod. Consumpt. 27, 1703–1717. doi:10.1016/j.spc.2021.04.
006.
Eichenauer, E., 2018. Energiekonflikte – Proteste gegen Windkraftanlagen als Spiegel
demokratischer Defizite“. In: Radtke, J., Kersting, N. (Eds.), Energiewende. Poli-
tikwissenschaftliche Perspektiven, Energietransformation. Springer, Wiesbaden,
pp. 315–342.
Eichenauer, E., Reusswig, F., Meyer-Ohlendorf, L., Lass, W., 2018. „Bürgerinitiativen
gegen Windkraftanlagen und der Aufschwung rechtspopulistischer Bewegun-
gen“. In: Kühne, O., Weber, F. (Eds.), Bausteine Der Energiewende, RaumFragen:
Stadt – Region – Landschaft. Springer, Wiesbaden.
European Commission, 2018. A Sustainable Bioeconomy for Europe: Strengthening the
Connection Between Economy, Society and the Environment. European Commis-
sion, Brussels.
European Commission, 2012. Innovating for Sustainable Growth: A Bioeconomy for
Europe. European Commission, Brussels.
Eversberg, D., 2021. The social specificity of societal nature relations in a
flexible capitalist society. Environ. Values 30 (3), 319–343. doi:10.3197/
096327120X15916910310581.
Eversberg, D., 2020a. Who can challenge the imperial mode of living? The terrain
of struggles for social-ecological transformation in the German population. In-
novation 33, 233–256. doi:10.1080/13511610.2019.1674129.
Eversberg, D., 2020b. Bioökonomie als Einsatz polarisierter sozialer Konflikte? Zur
Verteilung sozial-ökologischer Mentalitäten in der deutschen Bevölkerung 2018
und ihren Unterstützungs- und Widerstandspotentialen gegenüber Bioökonomie
als gesellschaftlichem Wandel. Working Paper of the BMBF Junior Research
Group „Mentalities in Flux” (flumen). Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena.
Eversberg, D., Holz, J., 2020. Empty Promises of Growth: The Bioeconomy and its Mul-
tiple Reality Checks, Working Paper of the BMBF Junior Research Group “Flumen,
2. Friedrich Schiller University, Jena.
Flemmen, M., Jarness, V., Rosenlund, L., 2017. „Social space and cultural class divi-
sions: the forms of capital and contemporary lifestyle differentiation. Br. J. So-
ciol. 69 (1), 124–153. doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12295.
986
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
Fritz, M., Koch, M., 2019. Public support for sustainable welfare compared: links be-
tween attitudes towards climate and welfare policies. Sustainability 11, 4146.
doi:10.3390/su11154146.
Geiger, T., 1972. Die Soziale Schichtung des Deutschen Volkes: Soziologische Gegen-
wartsfragen. Wissenschaftliche. Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt.
German Presidency to the European Union, 2007. En Route to the Knowledge-Based
Bio-Economy. Cologne.
Giampietro, M., 2019. On the Circular Bioeconomy and Decoupling: implications
for Sustainable Growth. Ecol. Econ. 162, 143–156. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.
05.001.
Görg, C., 2004. The construction of societal relationships with nature. Poiesis Praxis
3, 22–36. doi:10.1007/s10202- 004- 0066-5.
Görg, C., Brand, U., Haberl, H., Hummel, D., Jahn, T., Liehr, S., 2017. „Challenges for
social-ecological transformations: contributions from social and political ecol-
ogy”. Sustainability 9, 1045. doi:10.3390/su9071045.
Grunwald, A., 2020. „Bioeconomy: key to unlimited economic and consumption
growth?”. In: Pietzsch, J. (Ed.), Bioeconomy for Beginners. Springer, Berlin, Hei-
delberg, pp. 203–209.
Haberl, H., Wiedenhofer, D., Virág, D., Kalt, G., Plank, B., Brockway, P., Fishman, T.,
Hausknost, D., Krausmann, F.P., Leon-Gruchalski, B., Mayer, A., Pichler, M., Schaf-
fartzik, A., Sousa, T., Streeck, J., Creutzig, F., 2020. A systematic review of the
evidence on decoupling of GDP, resource use and GHG emissions, part II: syn-
thesizing the insights. Environ. Res. Lett. 15 (6), 036002. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/
ab842a.
Hausknost, D., Schriefl, E., Lauk, C., Kalt, G., 2017. „A transition to which Bioecon-
omy? An exploration of diverging techno-political choices. Sustainability 9, 669.
doi:10.3390/su9040669.
Heimann, T., 2019. Bioeconomy and SDGs: does the Bioeconomy support the
achievement of the SDGs? Earth’s Future 7, 43–57.
Hempel, C., Will, S., Zander, K., 2019a. „Societal perspectives on a Bio-economy in
Germany: an explorative study using Q methodology. Int. J. Food Syst. Dyn. 10
(1), 21–37. doi:10.18461/IJFSD.V10I1.02.
Hempel, C., Will, S., Zander, K., 2019b. Bioökonomie Aus Sicht der Bevölkerung. Thü-
nen-Institut für Marktanalyse, Braunschweig.
Kaiser, H.F., 1960. The application of electronic computers to factor analysis. Educ.
Psychol. Meas 20 (1), 141–151. doi:10.1177/0 013164460 020 0 0116.
Kardung, M., Cingiz, K., Costenoble, O., Delahaye, R., Heijman, W., Lovrić, M., van
Leeuwen, M., M’Barek, R., van Meijl, H., Piotrowski, S., Ronzon, T., Sauer, J., Ver-
hoog, D., Verkerk, P.J., Vrachioli, M., Wesseler, J.H.H., Zhu, B.X., 2021. Develop-
ment of the Circular Bioeconomy: drivers and Indicators. Sustainability 13, 413.
Levidow, L., Nieddu, M., Vivian, F.-.D., Béfort, N., 2019. „Transitions towards a Eu-
ropean Bioeconomy: life Sciences versus agroecology trajectories. In: Allaire, G.,
Daviron, B. (Eds.), Ecology, Capitalism and the New Agricultural Economy: The
Second Great Transformation. Routledge, London, pp. 181–203.
Lynch, D.H.J., Klaassen, P., Broerse, J.E.W., 2017. Unraveling Dutch citizens’ percep-
tions on the bio-based economy: the case of bioplastics, bio-jetfuels and small-
scale bio-refineries. Ind. Crops. Prod. 106, 130–137. doi:10.1016/j.indcrop.2016.
10.035.
Martin, J.L., 2003. What is field theory? Am. J. Sociol. 109 (1), 1–49. doi:10.1086/
375201.
Neukirch, M., 2018. Die Energiewende in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1974 –
-2017) – Reform, Revolution, oder Restauration? Makroperspektive auf einen
Dauerkonflikt“. sozialpolitik.ch, Art. 1, 3.
Neukirch, M., 2016. „Protests against German electricity grid extension as a new
social movement? A journey into the areas of conflict. Energy Sustain. Soc. 6
(1), 1–15. doi:10.1186/s13705- 016- 0069- 9.
OECD, 2004. Biotechnology for Sustainable Growth and Development. Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
Patermann, C., Aguilar, A., 2018. The origins of the bioeconomy in the European
Union. N. Biotechnol. 40, 20–24.
Puder, J., 2019. Excluding migrant labor from the Malaysian bioeconomy: working
and living conditions of migrant workers in the palm oil sector in Sabah. Aus-
trian J. South-East Asian Stud. 12 (1), 31–48.
Roux, B.L., Rouanet, H., 2004. Geometric Data Analysis: From Correspondence Anal-
ysis to Structured Data Analysis. Springer, Dordrecht.
Rubik, F., Müller, R., Harnisch, R., Holzhauer, B., Schipperges, M., Geiger, S.,
2019. Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2018. Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativen
Bevölkerungsumfrage. Umweltbundesamt, Dessau-Roßlau.
Rudolph, K., 2018. Barriers to acceptance of bio-based substitutes: how schema in-
congruity can hinder the purchase of bio-based products. In: Leal Filho, W.,
Pociovălișteanu, D.M., Borges de Brito, P.R., Borges de Lima, I. (Eds.), Towards
a Sustainable Bioeconomy: Principles, Challenges and Perspectives. Springer,
Cham, pp. 117–133. doi:10.1007/978- 3- 319- 73028- 8_7 World Sustainability Se-
rieshttps://doi.org/.
Sijtsema, S.J., Onwezen, M.C., Reinders, M.J., Dagevos, H., Partanen, A., Meeusen, M.,
2016. „Consumer perception of bio-based products—an exploratory study in 5
European countries”. NJAS - Wagening. J. Life Sci. 77, 61–69. doi:10.1016/j.njas.
2016.03.007.
Stegmann, P., Londo, M., Junginger, M., 2020. The circular bioeconomy: its elements
and role in European bioeconomy clusters. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. X 6, 10 0 029.
doi:10.1016/j.rcrx.2019.10 0 029.
Swyngedouw, E., 2011. Depoliticized environments: the end of nature, climate
change and the post-political condition. R. Inst. Philos. Suppl. 69, 253–274.
Tittor, A., Backhouse, M., 2019. „Ungleiche Pestizidbelastung in der glob-
alen Bioökonomie: das Beispiel Glyphosat“. In: Fischer, K., Brandner, M
(Eds.), Globale Ungleichheit. Über Zusammenhänge Von Kolonialismus, Ar-
D. Eversberg and M. Fritz
beitsverhältnissen und Naturverbrauch. Mandelbaum Verlag, Wien, pp. 321–
325.
Tittor, A., Toledo López, V., 2020. Struggling against the consequences of
bioethanol production. Narratives of a local environmental justice move-
ment in Córdoba, Argentina. DIE ERDE – J. Geographic. Soc. Berlin 151, 142–
153.
Urmetzer, S., Lask, J., Vargas-Carpintero, R., Pyka, A., 2020. Learning to change:
transformative knowledge for building a sustainable bioeconomy. Ecol. Econ.
167, 106435. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106435.
Vester, M., Oertzen, P.von, Geiling, H., Hermann, T., Müller, D., 2001. Soziale Milieus
im Gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt.
Ward, J.D., Sutton, P.C., Werner, A.D., Costanza, R., Mohr, S.H., Simmons, C.T., 2016.
„Is Decoupling GDP growth from environmental impact possible? PLoS ONE 11
(10), e0164733. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164733.
Weber, G., Cabras, I., 2017. The transition of Germany’s energy production, green
economy, low-carbon economy, socio-environmental conflicts, and equitable so-
ciety. J. Clean. Prod. 167, 1222–1231. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.07.223.
987
Sustainable Production and Consumption 30 (2022) 973–987
Wetzel, S., Duchesne, L.C., Laporte, M.F., 2006. Bioproducts From Canada’s Forests:
New Partnerships in the Bioeconomy. Springer Science & Business Media, Dor-
drecht.
Wiedenhofer, D., Virág, D., Kalt, G., Plank, B., Streeck, J., Pichler, M., Mayer, A.,
Krausmann, F.P., Brockway, P., Schaffartzik, A., Fishman, T., Hausknost, D., Leon-
Gruchalski, B., Sousa, T., Creutzig, F., Haberl, H., 2020. A systematic review of
the evidence on decoupling of GDP, resource use and GHG emissions, part
I: bibliometric and conceptual mapping. Environ. Res. Lett. 15 (6), 065003.
doi:10.1088/1748-9326/ab8429.
Wright, E.O., 2010. Envisioning Real Utopias. Verso, London.
Zeug, W., Mittelstädt, N., Bezama, A., Thrän, D., Kluson, F., 2021. Results from a
Stakeholder Survey on Bioeconomy Monitoring and Perceptions on Bioecon-
omy in Germany. Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung, Leipzig UFZ Discus-
sion Paper 8/2021. Department of Bioenergyhttps://doi.org/ doi:10.13140/RG.2.2.
35521.280 0 0.
ZIRIUS, 2020. TechnikRadar 2020. Was die Deutschen über Technik denken.
acatech/Körber-Stiftung, München/Hamburg.