The Philosophy of Argument

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31
The philosophy of argument
JEAN H. M. WAGEMANS
31. 1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the philosophy of argument. It describes the
conceptual and systematic aspects of logic, dialectic, and rhetoric, and illustrates how
the insights developed within these classical disciplines are reflected in approaches
within the present-day field of argumentation theory. The overview starts, in Section
31. 2, with a general introduction into the philosophy of argument, elucidating its
research questions and the characteristics of the main perspectives from which these
questions are answered. Then, in Section 31. 3, it is described how philosophers of
argument conceptualise argumentative discourse at large. The section first focuses on
dialectical taxonomies of dialogue types and communicative practices in which
argumentation plays a central role. Subsequently, it presents the classical rhetorical
theory of genres of speech. The chapter continues, in Section 31. 4, with an
exposition of the various ways in which the three perspectives conceptualise and
categorise individual arguments. In particular, it describes logical classifications of
inferences, dialectical taxonomies of argument schemes and fallacies, and the
classical rhetorical theory about the means of persuasion. Section 31. 5, the final
section of this chapter, outlines recent developments in the philosophy of argument.
They concern proposals for extending the scope of the definition of argument, the
rapidly growing research area of computational argumentation, and responses to
societal problems related to the tension between truth and persuasion. The chapter is
concluded with a short reflection about ‘digital argumentation’ as the future shape of
the philosophy of argument.
31. 2 Research questions and perspectives

This section provides a general introduction into the philosophy of argument. Section
31. 2. 1 contains an exposition of the classical idea of an ‘art’, which is at the heart of
the philosophy of argument in that it shaped the widely held view that the insights
generated within this research area can be used for three different purposes: the
production, the analysis, and the evaluation of argumentative discourse. These
applications reflect the three research questions central to the present-day field of
argumentation theory: (1) ‘How to produce argumentative discourse?’; (2) ‘What are
the characteristics of argumentative texts and discussions?’; and (3) ‘What makes a
good argument?’.
Wagemans, J.H.M. (forthcoming). The philosophy of argument. In P. Stalmaszczyk (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook of
the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2 JEAN H. M. WAGEMANS
Since the answers given to these questions depend on the theoretical perspective
from which argumentation is studied, Section 31. 2. 2 provides an overview of the
three main perspectives on argument: the logical, the dialectical, and the rhetorical
perspective.1 For each of them, it describes their historical background and
theoretical starting points, and explains the main concepts and terminology
employed.
31. 2 .1 The production, analysis, and evaluation of argumentative discourse

The main research questions addressed within the philosophy of argument can be
linked to the classical insights regarding the notion of ‘art’ (technè, ars) as an
organised set of instructions for creating something. These instructions or ‘rules of
the art’ are first and foremost aimed at helping the ‘maker’ (technitès, artifex) in
producing a ‘work’ (ergon, opus). In this way, as pictured in Figure 31. 1, knowledge
of the relevant art functions as one of the three factors for successfully producing
something – the other two being ‘talent’ and ‘training’.2
Figure 31. 1: The classical idea of an art.
Apart from their role in the production of a work, the set of instructions together
constituting an art may also be used for evaluative purposes. Once the maker has
produced the work, others may critically review it by considering the question to
what extent it complies with the normative standards provided by the rules of the art.
Since reviewers can only sensibly answer this question if they first gain an
understanding of the nature, the structure and the function of the different features
and components of the work, such a normative evaluation (aestimatio) is usually
preceded by a descriptive analysis (cognitio) of the work consisting of an
interpretation or reconstruction of the work in terms of the art’s conceptual
apparatus. According to the classical view, then, the insights belonging to a specific
art can be used for three different purposes: the production, analysis, and evaluation
of a work situated within the domain of that art.
What in antiquity used to be called an ‘art’ is nowadays more often called a
‘theory’. Although these two terms come with different connotations, the insights
that constitute them can serve the same three purposes. In the present-day field of
argumentation theory, scholars develop prescriptive instructions for the production of
argumentative discourse, descriptive models for its analysis, as well as normative
standards for its evaluation.3 These applications reflect the three main questions
1 This way of distinguishing various approaches to argument has been proposed by Wenzel (1990) and
is, to a certain extent, also followed in van Eemeren et al. (2014). The latter work also distinguishes
approaches on the basis of their methodological and geographical characteristics.
2
This explanation of the classical idea of an ‘art’ is based on Lausberg (1998: 1-8).
3
See, e.g., van Eemeren et al. (2014: 12-13).
The philosophy of argument 3
respectively directing the research in this area: (1) ‘How to produce argumentative
discourse?’; (2) ‘What are the characteristics of argumentative texts and
discussions?’; and (3) ‘What makes a good argument?’.
Production
Of the three applications just mentioned, the production of argumentative discourse
is most closely connected to the classical idea of an art as an ordered set of
instructions for making something. Knowledge about how to write an argumentative
text or how to deliver an argumentative speech is usually organised along the lines
of the various stages of the production process of the text or speech, which include
the invention of the content (inventio), its ordering (dispositio), and its wording
(elocutio).4 The arguer produces an argumentative text or speech by interpreting and
applying the instructions to the context at hand, thereby responding to a situation of
disagreement (see Figure 31. 2).
Figure 31. 2: The production of argumentative discourse.
An alternative principle of organising the instructions is to group them according to

the specific part of the discourse they pertain to (e.g., the introduction of a speech).
In classical rhetorical handbooks, both ways of organising the rules of the art can be
found.5
Analysis
In general, an analysis of an argumentative text or discussion takes place by
interpreting and reconstructing it in terms of a specific theoretical framework. This
implies that the original discourse, the ‘raw material’ of the text or discussion,
undergoes various sorts of transformations, the outcomes of which depends on the
perspective from which the analysis is carried out. A logical analysis of a text yields
a different result than a rhetorical one. When described from a higher level of
abstraction, however, there are only four basic transformations the analyst can
perform to arrive at a reconstruction of the original text or discussion (see Figure
31. 3).
4
In classical rhetoric, these three stages of the production process of a speech belong to a set of five
‘tasks of the speaker' (see, e.g., Lausberg, 1998: 112; van Eemeren et al., 2014: 123). They are also
reflected in classical dialectic, be it much less prominently (see Wagemans, 2009: 149), as well as in
present-day literature about the writing process (see, e.g., MacArthur, Graham and Fitzgerald, 2016).
5
See, e.g., van Eemeren et al. (2014: 123).
Figure 31. 3: The analysis of argumentative discourse.
The four basic transformations are: (1) deletion – parts of the original discourse that
are deemed irrelevant are left out (e.g., non-argumentative elements); (2) addition –
parts that have remained implicit are made explicit and are added to the discourse
(e.g., hidden premises); (3) substitution – parts whose argumentative function is
hidden by their form of expression are reformulated (e.g., rhetorical questions are
reformulated as assertions); (4) permutation – the order of the various elements is
brought in accordance with theoretical models (e.g., moving a standpoint expressed
at the end of a text to the beginning).6
Evaluation
As soon as the analyst has reconstructed the original text or discussion from a
specific theoretical perspective, the quality of the argumentation can be determined
by projecting norms, standards, rules, or assessment criteria onto the reconstructed
discourse (see Figure 31. 4).
Figure 31. 4: The evaluation of argumentative discourse.
Like those of the analysis, the results of the evaluation will depend on the chosen
theoretical perspective. While logical evaluations of argumentative discourse mainly
focus on the formal ‘validity’ of arguments, dialectical ones are aimed at determining
their ‘reasonableness’ (which may pertain to the discourse as well as to the arguer).
Violations of specific norms will constitute logical or dialectical fallacies,
respectively.7 In rhetorical evaluations, the emphasis is on the ‘effectiveness’ of the
discourse. This notion can be operationalised in an empirical way, in which case the
critic determines whether the speaker has succeeded in establishing or increasing the
audience’s adherence to their point of view. This operationalisation mode is the
6
These four transformations are known as the quadripartita ratio. While classical rhetoricians such as
Quintilian used them for the purpose of describing the possible variations in figures of style and
thought (see Lausberg, 1998: 217-220), present-day pragma-dialecticians use them in order to
describe how to reconstruct argumentative discourse in terms of their model of a ‘critical discussion’
(see van Eemeren et al., 2014: 535).
7
More information about the various conceptualizations of fallacies can be found in, e.g., Hansen and
Pinto (1995) and van Eemeren et al. (2014: 163-175).
preferred method in the nomothetically oriented subfield of persuasion research,

where it yields statistical knowledge about the effectiveness of various rhetorical
strategies.8 But it can also be understood in relation to the rules of the art, in which
case the critic determines whether the speaker has applied the rhetorical instructions
in a felicitous manner to the context at hand, taking into account the genre
conventions, the specific situation of disagreement and the beliefs and stylistic
preferences of the audience. This operationalisation mode is used in the subfield of
‘rhetorical analysis’ (also known as ‘rhetorical criticism’), which is an
ideographically oriented discipline that requires the analyst to qualitatively interpret
rather than quantitatively measure the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies.9 In both
cases, an unhappy argumentative move does not constitute a fallacy, but a rhetorical
blunder: it is not deemed invalid or unreasonable, but ineffective given the speaker’s
aim of persuading an audience of a particular point of view.
31. 2. 2 Logic, dialectic, and rhetoric

Before describing the main characteristics of the three perspectives on argument in
more detail, it should be emphasised that the criteria used for their demarcation have
varied over time. The classical disciplines are usually distinguished on the basis of
their specific object of study. While logic studies the quality of reasoning,
understood as the process of drawing conclusions from given premises, dialectic is
about how to engage in a debate and rhetoric about how to deliver a speech.
The present-day perspectives, in contrast, are usually distinguished based on how
they conceptualise argument. While scholars working from a logical perspective
abstract from the context in which the argumentation is put forward and study the
formal aspects of the underlying reasoning process, those working from a dialectical
perspective conceptualise argumentation as a dialogical exchange for and against a
specific point of view and aimed at testing its acceptability. Scholars working from a
rhetorical perspective also take the context into account, but a different one: they
conceptualise argumentation as speech supporting the speaker’s partisan point of
view and aimed at convincing a specific audience of its acceptability.
Although the conceptualisations of argumentation by the three present-day
perspectives recognisably reflect the objects of study of the classical disciplines, their
application is not restricted to that specific object. Present-day dialecticians develop
tools to analyse and evaluate dialogical as well as monological genres of
communication and rhetoricians apply their theoretical insights to interpret
discussions as well as speeches. While the classical disciplines thus all pertain to
their own, limited object of study, the present-day perspectives named after them all
share the same object of study, namely argumentative discourse of any type, sort,
format, or genre.
The following three sub-sections provide more insight into the main differences
and commonalities between the three perspectives. Each one includes information
about their respective origins in the classical disciplines of logic, dialectic, and
rhetoric, as well as references to specific approaches falling under these headings.
8
For more information about persuasion research see O’Keefe (2002) and van Eemeren et al. (2014:
459-462 and 689-694).
9
For more information about different approaches in rhetorical analysis and rhetorical criticism see,
e.g., Foss, Foss and Trapp (2002); van Eemeren et al. (2014: 439-442).
Logic
The historical origins of logic are usually traced back to a selection of Aristotle’s
works known as the ‘Organon’. The syllogistic developed in the Analytica priora
presents an ideal type of argument consisting of exactly two premises, one
conclusion, and three terms. In general, the notion of a ‘syllogism’ as a deduction,
which is shared by several works of the Organon (Topica, Sophistici elenchi,
Analytica posteriora), is the main model for thinking about argument across
contexts.
Inspired by the concepts and methods laid out in these seminal works, the logical
perspective on argument traditionally focuses on its underlying process of reasoning,
understood as the way in which a particular statement is inferred from one or more
other statements. The direction of this process is reflected in the terminology that is
employed to indicate the various elements of an argument. Within logic, an argument
is conceived as consisting of a number of ‘premises’ (from ‘pre-mittere’, ‘to send in
advance’), from which the reasoner draws a ‘conclusion’ (from ‘con-cludere’, ‘to
firmly close’).
From the logical perspective, the question “What makes a good argument?” is to
be answered in terms of the concept of ‘validity’. The classical notion of validity is
based on the notion of truth-preservation: a valid argument from true premises is
such that its conclusion must be true. To decide whether a given argument is valid,
the content of the premises and the conclusion is irrelevant. This is one of the senses
in which logic can be called ‘formal’: to determine the validity of the argument under
scrutiny, the logician makes abstraction from its actual content and evaluates it based
on its form.10
Depending on the characteristics of the unit of analysis, classical logic can be
subdivided into several logical systems. Among the more well-known systems are
predicate logic, which has its forerunner in Aristotle’s theory of assertoric syllogistic,
and propositional logic, which was initially developed by the Stoics.11 In order to
evaluate naturally occurring arguments from the perspective of these logical systems,
the statements that function as the premise(s) and conclusion are represented in terms
of a formal language developed specifically for this purpose. This means that the
actual wording of the statements is replaced by logical symbols (such as ‘’, which
in propositional logic stands for ‘either … or’).
Example 1 – original text

Alicia: Where is Nigel? I thought he would be here for the interview.
Bertrand: He must have gone to the pub, because the interview is cancelled.
Alicia: Or maybe he just went home.
Bertrand: No, he said that he would either give the interview or go to the pub.
As explained above, in analysing Bertrand’s argument, a logician using propositional

logic would leave the dialogical context out of consideration and replace the
statements with symbols, for instance, by substituting ‘q’ for ‘He must have gone to
the pub’, ‘p’ for ‘He gives the interview’, and ‘r’ for ‘He went home’. The statement
‘The interview is cancelled’ is then represented as ‘p’, standing for the negation of
10
For a more detailed account of the different steps in this abstraction process and a description of
various concepts of validity, see van Eemeren et al. (2014: 143-163).
11
For a historical overview of the development of logic, see, e.g., Kneale and Kneale (1962). Specific
information about Aristotle’s logic can also be found in Smith (2018), and about Stoic logic in Mates
(1961) and O’Toole and Jennings (2004).
p, and the complex statement ‘he would either give the interview or go to the pub’ as
‘p  q’.
Example 1 – reconstruction
Alicia: p
Bertrand: q, p
Alicia: r
Bertrand: r, p  q
In this case, Bertrand’s conclusion (q) follows with necessity from the premises he
put forward in different parts of the dialogue (p and p  q), which means that the
reasoning underlying his argument is logically valid.
The above example illustrates the general characteristics of the logical method of
analysis and evaluation of argumentation. Especially since the second half of the
19th century, formal logic has developed into an extremely sophisticated tool that
enables the analyst to capture many other aspects of representing statements and their
argumentative relationship than just the very basic ones that have been taken into
account in the example.12
Dialectic
Like that of the logical perspective, the historical background of the dialectical
perspective can be found in Aristotle’s Organon, in particular in his Topica. This
work contains a set of instructions that can be seen as the first systematic art of
debate, which reflects on best practices for the type of regimented discussions
between Socrates and his interlocutors that Plato portrayed in his earlier dialogues –
the so-called ‘Socratic refutation debates’. In such debates, one of the interlocutors,
who has the role of ‘questioner’, tries to refute the other’s point of view by showing
that the opposite can be derived from a set of concessions elicited during the debate.
The other participant, who has the role of the ‘answerer’, is aimed at upholding her
point of view by avoiding self-contradiction or absurdity. Although such debates are
sometimes pursued with strategies of deceptive and inconclusive argument, the
overall aim of dialectical discussions is to critically test the acceptability of a
philosophical point of view in order to see what the logical features of the best
argument for a given position are.13
Given their historical background in classical dialectic as the ‘art of philosophical
debate’, present-day dialectical approaches to argument focus on developing
procedures for conducting discussions that incorporate high standards of
reasonableness in the form of discussion rules.14 These standards do not only pertain
to the validity or soundness of the arguments, but also to the behaviour of the
participants in the discussion. This is illustrated in the following fragment:

Chloe: We should colonise the moon.
Donald: Why?
Chloe: Why shouldn’t we?
12
See, e.g., Bochenski (1961) and Kneale and Kneale (1962).
13
For more information on the historical backgrounds and further development of dialectic see van
Eemeren et al. (2014: 54-58, 61-76, 129-131).
14
Examples of such approaches are Barth and Krabbe’s (1982) formal dialectic, van Eemeren and
Grootendorst’s (2004) pragma-dialectics, and Walton’s (1998) new dialectic.
From a dialectical perspective, Donald’s question in the second turn indicates that he
does not immediately agree with Chloe’s point of view. This means there is a
situation of disagreement and Chloe has the dialectical obligation to support her
point of view with an argument. Her response, however, does not meet this
obligation. Instead, she is shifting the burden of proof to Donald, who according to
dialectical standards does not have a burden of proof because he only doubted
Chloe’s position and did not put forward a point of view himself. She can, therefore,
be accused of having committed the dialectical fallacy of shifting the burden of
proof.15
Chloe: puts forward a standpoint
Donald: raises doubt regarding the standpoint
Chloe: questions the need for grounds to justify her standpoint by raising doubt
regarding the opposite standpoint
The above example is meant to illustrate that while logical standards of argument
mainly pertain to the validity of the reasoning underlying the argumentation,
dialectical standards might also pertain to the reasonableness of the discussant’s
behaviour in view of the common aim of the discussion. This is one way in which
the dialectical approach takes into account the commmunicative situation in which
the argumentation is put forward.
Rhetoric
The third main perspective on argument, the rhetorical one, also takes into account
characteristics of the communicative situation in which people exchange arguments.
The conceptual differences between the dialectical and the rhetorical perspective can
be explained by looking at the differences between the contexts in which they
emerged. Classical dialectic is the art of philosophical debate, which means that its
instructions for producing argumentative discourse pertain to a regimented procedure
of exchanging arguments specifically aimed at promoting the philosophical aim of
finding (or getting closer to) the truth. Classical rhetoric, by contrast, emerged within
the context of public speaking, particularly, that of delivering a judicial or political
speech. While dialectical instructions were mainly developed by philosophers,
rhetorical ones were developed by sophists who trained politicians and professional
advocates, and therefore promote persuasion rather than truth. The primary purpose
of these instructions is to provide speakers in courtrooms and assemblies with a
number of strategies that may help them to convince a particular audience of their
partisan point of view. Within the judicial context, such an audience is a jury or a
judge who, after hearing two sides of a legal issue, decides on the matter. In a similar
vein, the audience present at a political gathering will decide on a specific policy
after having heard different solutions for political problems.16
Given their historical background in the institutionalised argumentative practices
of law and politics, present-day rhetorical approaches focus on studying the process
of persuasion rather than on developing norms for evaluating the validity of the
15
For this and other discussion rules and their possible violations, see, e.g., van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (2004: 123-196).
16
For more information on the historical backgrounds and further development of rhetoric see van
Eemeren et al. (2014: 58-61, 116-129, 131-134).
underlying reasoning of arguments or the reasonableness of the behaviour of the

arguers. The theories developed within the rhetorical perspective even go beyond
argumentation in the strict sense in that they also endorse the use of persuasive
strategies based on the psychological constitution of human beings such as the
perceived character of the speaker and the emotional response of the audience. The
following fragment contains an example of such a strategy:

Edward: He will probably try to sneak out, and I have been right about his
behaviour the last five times.
Edward: puts forward a claim about someone’s behaviour and refers to his track
record in predicting this person’s behaviour
By supporting his claim with a remark about the success rate of his predictions in the
past, the speaker in this example tries to establish or increase the addressee’s trust in
the speaker’s character. This is called an ethotic means of persuasion or ethos (see
Section 31. 4. 3).
In general, rhetorical analyses consist of descriptions of the particular strategies
and means of persuasion used by speakers to convince their audience. They include
detailed discussions of the contextual aspects in which a speech has been given, such
as the level of controversiality of the point of view of the speaker and the a priori
beliefs and preferences of the audience to whom the speech was addressed. Using
classical and present-day insights regarding effective ways of communicating a
particular message to a particular audience, an interpretation is given of the rhetorical
design of concrete instances of persuasive discourse.17
31. 3 Genres of argumentative discourse

People exchange arguments within a great many different contexts – varying from
informal settings such as a birthday party to highly regimented ones such as a court
case. While logical approaches make abstraction from the communicative situation
in which the argumentation is put forward, dialectical and rhetorical approaches
typically incorporate into their theories specific pragmatic insights about the aim of
the participants, the structure of the discourse, and other characteristics related to the
situation of use. As explained in the previous section, the dialectical perspective
conceptualises argumentative discourse as a discussion between two parties and the
rhetorical perspective as a speech delivered by a speaker to an audience.
Leaving out the logical perspective, the following subsections articulate this
difference in more detail. Section 31. 3. 1 focuses on present-day dialectical genre
theory and summarises two different accounts thereof. The first account is a
taxonomy of dialogue types (such as the ‘persuasion dialogue’ and the ‘inquiry
dialogue’), which are mainly distinguished based on their aim. The second one is a
taxonomy of genres of conventionalised communicative practices (such as
‘adjudication’ and ‘deliberation’), which are mainly distinguished based on the
17
Examples of rhetorical approaches are Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) new rhetoric,
Tindale’s (1999) rhetorical model of argument, and Zarefsky’s (2014) rhetorical perspective on
argumentation.
domain in which they occur. Section 31. 3. 2 expounds the framework of classical
rhetorical genre theory, which consists of judicial, deliberative and epideictic
speeches and is still very much in use today. Apart from describing the
characteristics of these rhetorical genres, the section also explains the rationale for
distinguishing between them.
31. 3. 1 Dialogue types and genres of communicative activity

Dialectical approaches study argumentation from the perspective of a theoretical
framework that is premised on the idea of two parties having a discussion that
minimally involves an exchange of arguments for and against a particular point of
view. An influential taxonomy of such discussions is the one by Walton and Krabbe
(1995), who distinguish between six different ‘dialogue types’. According to them, a
‘persuasion dialogue’ is primarily aimed at resolving or clarifying an issue, an
‘inquiry dialogue’ at proving or disproving a hypothesis, a ‘negotiation dialogue’ at
reaching a reasonable settlement both participants can live with, an ‘information-
seeking dialogue’ at exchanging information, a ‘deliberation dialogue’ at deciding
the best available course of action, and an ‘eristic dialogue’ at revealing a deeper
basis of conflict.
The concept of ‘dialogue type’ mainly serves the purpose of evaluating the
arguments put forward by the participants. For the outcome of such evaluation it
makes quite a difference whether an argument is part of, for instance, an inquiry
dialogue, which is aimed at determining the acceptability of a particular point of
view, or of a negotiation dialogue, which is aimed at making a deal that optimally
serves the interests of the parties involved. The evaluation, therefore, takes place by
first identifying the dialogue type within which the argument under scrutiny has been
put forward and by subsequently checking whether that particular argument
contributes to accomplishing the specific goal that is characteristic of that type. If it
does, the argument is evaluated as a good argument, but if it blocks achieving that
goal, it is judged as fallacious.
Another example of a dialectical conceptualisation of argumentative discourse is
van Eemeren’s (2010) theory about conventionalised argumentative practices that
links specific genres of communicative activity to the institutional goals of the
domains in which they are implemented. The genre of ‘adjudication’ is instrumental
in the domain of legal communication, that of ‘deliberation’ in political
communication, ‘mediation’ in problem-solving communication, ‘negotiation’ in
diplomatic communication, ‘consultation’ in medical communication, ‘disputation’
in scholarly communication, ‘promotion’ in commercial communication, and
‘communion’ in interpersonal communication.
Different from the concept of dialogue types, which is used for evaluative
purposes, that of communicative activity types is primarily used for providing a
contextualised analysis of concrete speech events as tokens of particular
communicative activity types that implement one or more of the genres just
mentioned. The subsequent evaluation of the contributions of the discussants to this
speech event takes place by checking whether they comply with a set of rules
specified in the ‘ideal model of a critical discussion’, which embodies a critical
rationalist view on reasonableness and is generally deemed applicable to all types of
argumentative activity.
31. 3. 2 Classical rhetorical genres of speech

Rhetorical approaches to argument stayed relatively close to the ideas about
persuasion which Aristotle wrote down in his On rhetoric. One of these is to make a
distinction between various genres of speech, in particular between speeches given
within the context of a situation of disagreement or controversy, which covers
discourse produced in the domains of law and politics, and speeches given in non-
controversial contexts, which covers a great many types of what are called
‘occasional’ speeches. Aristotle’s classification of rhetorical genres, then, consists of
three main types of speeches: judicial speeches (genos dikanikon), political speeches
(genos sumbouleutikon), and epideictic or exhibiting speeches (genos epideitikon)
(Lausberg, 1998: 30-35). Table 1 provides an overview of their main characteristics.
The rationale for this distinction reflects the centrality in rhetorical approaches of
the notion of ‘audience’. In Aristotle’s view, the aim of a speech is related to the
audience, which either has a critical role or merely that of an observer. In the first
case, the audience has to give a judgment about the acceptability of the point of view
defended by the speaker. If the topic of the speech is about something that happened
in the past, the speech belongs to the judicial genre, and if it is about whether or not a
particular action should be carried out in the future, the speech can be characterised
as a political one.
In the second case, when the audience has the role of observer, there is no need to
judge the acceptability of the point of view defended by the speaker. Instead, the
speech is about something that the audience already agrees with, and the speaker
aims to celebrate, reinstate, or confirm the audience’s a priori adherence to that point
of view in a rhetorically interesting and skilful way. This does not mean that the
audience is entirely passive and uncritical, but rather that they have a different object
of judgment. For instead of judging the acceptability of the point of view defended
by the speaker, like it is the case with judicial and political speeches, the audience
judges the rhetorical abilities of the speaker.
Table 31. 1: Characteristics of rhetorical genres.
Judicial and political speeches are usually given in an adversarial setting: there are
two parties with opposite points of view. Each of them presents their perspective on
the matter, and the audience decides. In the judicial context, the audience is usually a
jury or one or more professional judges. In the political context, and particularly that
of state politics, the audience usually consists of members of parliament or some
other kind of assembly or administrative body. Typical examples of epideictic
speeches are funeral speeches and victory speeches.
31. 4 Conceptualisations and categorisations of arguments

As indicated in Section 31. 2. 2, logicians mainly aim at developing standards for the
validity of the reasoning underlying arguments. Their conceptualisation of different
types of argument is based on the distinction between the various ways in which
people might infer a conclusion from one or more premises, depending on the type of
propositions expressed therein or on the specific inference relation between the
propositions. Section 31. 4. 1 expounds the two corresponding accounts of argument:
the one that distinguishes between deduction, induction, and abduction and the one
that classifies arguments based on the inference relation between the premise and the
conclusion.
Dialecticians mainly focus on the reasonableness of the behaviour of participants
in a discussion. They consider it unreasonable, for instance, to personally attack an
opponent in a dispute, and therefore label such an attack an ad hominem fallacy. In
their descriptions and classifications of the types of argumentation, dialecticians
distinguish between (potentially) reasonable arguments and (necessarily)
unreasonable fallacies. Section 31. 4. 2 outlines such accounts of argument types,
concentrating on classical and present-day taxonomies of ‘argument schemes’ and
‘fallacies’.
Rhetoricians, by contrast, are mainly interested in the persuasiveness of
argumentative discourse. Since a personal attack may be an effective way of winning
over an audience, they do not hesitate to describe such attacks in their accounts of the
so-called ‘means of persuasion’. These means include argumentation in a strict sense
(logos) but also techniques such as presenting the character of the speaker (ethos)
and playing upon the feelings of the audience (pathos). Section 31. 4. 3 describes the
classical rhetorical insights regarding the means of persuasion. It explains the
theoretical rationale behind this classification and sketches the general characteristics
of the persuasive techniques falling under the three headings.
31. 4. 1 Two logical accounts of argument types

In the logical tradition, two accounts of argument stand out. The first one is based on
the distinction between universal and particular propositions. Depending on the
nature of the propositions functioning as the premises and the conclusion, three
different types of argument can be constructed. While a deductive argument infers a
particular conclusion from a general premise, an inductive argument infers a general
conclusion from a particular premise, and an abductive one a particular from another
particular.
The second way of distinguishing between arguments that is prominent in logical
approaches is based on the idea that there are different relations between propositions
that might function as the ‘inference license’ of the argument. In a modus ponendo
ponens, for instance, proposition ‘q’ (the conclusion) is derived from proposition ‘p’
(the first premise) and the material implication ‘if p then q’ (the second premise,
which expresses the relation between p and q). For an argument to be valid in the
logical sense of that term, the combination of statements should meet the criterion
that it cannot be possible for the conclusion to be false under the assumption that the
premises are true.
31. 4. 2 Dialectical accounts of argument schemes and fallacies

Since the emphasis within the dialectical perspective is on developing standards for
evaluating argumentation, the individual approaches generally distinguish between
potentially reasonable arguments or ‘argument schemes’ and unreasonable
arguments or ‘fallacies’.
Present-day classifications of argument schemes go back to the lists of so-called

‘topics’ (‘topoi’, ‘loci’) constructed by classical philosophers (and rhetoricians – see
the next section).18 Generally defined as a ‘place (topos, locus) where arguments can
be found’, a topos expresses the underlying mechanism of a specific type of
argument. An example is the topos ‘from effect’, which connects a premise in which
a particular effect is mentioned with a conclusion in which the cause of that effect is
expressed. Apart from such ‘internal’ topoi, classical lists of the types of argument
also include ‘external’ topoi such as the argument from authority. In this case, the
underlying mechanism of the argument is expressed by the defeasible relationship
between the fact that some authority endorses a particular point of view and the truth
or acceptability thereof.
In the view of some dialecticians, arguments such as the argument from authority
are not reasonable but fallacious. Lists of fallacies include mistakes in the underlying
reasoning of the argument – the fact that some authority said something does not
make it true – as well as fallacies that are related to the reasonableness of the
behaviour of the participants in a discussion such as the fallacy of shifting the burden
of proof (see Section 31. 2. 2).19
31. 4 .3 The rhetorical account of the three means of persuasion

The emphasis within the rhetorical perspective is on developing instructions for
producing compelling arguments. Following Aristotle, there are three different
‘means of persuasion’. So-called ‘logical’ means of persuasion (logos) largely
coincide with the dialectical lists of argument types. Because one of the ways of
convincing an audience is to appeal to their cognitive abilities, the speaker is advised
to support his point of view with arguments that are related to the topic of the
speech.20
The audience, however, may also be influenced in their beliefs by other than
purely content-related aspects of a speech. Since people are more inclined to believe
something when they trust the person who says it, the speaker may also make
remarks that are aimed at increasing the level of trust. Such rhetorical techniques
relate to the character of the speaker (ethos) and are therefore called ‘ethotic’ means
of persuasion.21
18
Classical accounts of dialectical topoi (or loci) can be found in Aristotle’s Topica (1984), Cicero’s
De inventione and Topica (2006), and Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, (1978). Medieval
commentaries on these classical accounts are collected by Green-Pedersen (1984). Among the modern
classifications of argument(ation) schemes are the ones proposed by Hastings (1962), Schellens
(1985), Kienpointner (1992), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), Walton, Reed and Macagno
(2008); and Wagemans (2016, 2019).
19
Classical lists of fallacies include the one proposed in Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi and Rhetorica
(1984). An influential modern account of fallacies is that of four ‘ad fallacies’ as published in 1690 by
Locke (1961). Examples of modern accounts of fallacies are the ones proposed by Hamblin (1970),
Barth and Krabbe (1982), Walton (1987), Woods and Walton (1989), van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(1992, 2004), and Biro and Siegel (1992, 1995).
20
Influential classical descriptions and classifications of rhetorical topoi (loci) include the ones
proposed in Aristotle’s Rhetorica (1984) and Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, (1978); some
medieval commentaries of these classical accounts as collected by Green-Pedersen (1984). Modern
rhetorical accounts of argument(ation) schemes are the one proposed by Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1969).
21
Classical accounts of the ethical means of persuasion are provided in Aristotle’s Rhetorica (1984),
Cicero’s De oratore (2001), and by other classical rhetoricians (see Kennedy, 1994). Examples of
modern accounts of ethos are the ones proposed by Amossy (2001), Goodnight and Pilgram (2011),
and Pilgram (2015).
Finally, the speaker may appeal to the emotions of the audience in order to steer
their judgment of the case in the desired direction. Such techniques are subsumed
under the heading of the ‘pathetic’ means of persuasion, and they operate based on
the psychological fact that people judge differently on matters depending on their
mood (pathos).22
31. 5 Present-day research challenges

This final section focuses on three topics about which contemporary philosophers of
argument have formulated research challenges and presented innovative solutions.
The first one concerns the limited scope of the traditional definition of ‘argument’.
Section 31. 5. 1 presents recent proposals for extending this scope into three different
directions: narratives, visual and multimodal arguments, and polylogues. The second
topic is the development of computational models of argument and technical
applications thereof. Section 31. 5. 2 outlines the state-of-the-art in this rapidly
growing research area. The third and last challenge has been around since antiquity
but recently made its way to the centre of attention again: the poor quality of
argumentation in the public sphere. Section 31. 5. 3 describes general trends in
argumentation theorists’ responses to this societal problem. The chapter is
concluded, in Section 31. 5. 4, with a short reflection on ‘digital argumentation’ as
the next shape of the philosophy of argument.
31. 5. 1 Narratives, visual and multimodal argument, and polylogues

The mainstream approaches in the field of argumentation theory assume that an
argument consists of a limited number of constituents, one conclusion supported by
one or more premises, and that these constituents are expressed as propositions, that
is, verbally. They also assume that communicative exchanges in which arguments
play a role can be modelled as dialogues (either directly, as in dialectical approaches,
or indirectly, as in rhetorical ones). Over the last two decades, scholars have
questioned the tenability of these assumptions and have made several proposals to
extend the scope of the definition of argument.
Firstly, the observation that people use narratives for justificatory and persuasive
purposes has sparked an interest in studying the relationship between narration and
argumentation.23 Since narratives describe how various actors are involved in several
interrelated events, studying them from this perspective implies a significant
deviation from the traditional assumption regarding the constituents of an argument.
Rather than a conclusion and one or more premises, narratives typically consist of a
much larger number of elements that fulfil various functions in a complex structured
whole. As such, they might function as elaborate arguments from example or as
rhetorical techniques with a persuasive potential similar to that of illustrations.
Secondly, scholars have challenged the idea that arguments can only be expressed
in the verbal mode, that is, through propositions. Ever since the introduction of the
notions of ‘visual’ and ‘multimodal’ argument’, the intricacies of analysing and
22
Classical accounts of the pathetic means of persuasion can be found in Aristotle’s Rhetorica (1984),
Cicero’s De oratore (2001), and in the works of other classical rhetoricians (see Kennedy, 1994).
Examples of modern accounts of pathos are the ones proposed by Macagno and Walton (2010),
Manolescu (2006), and Walton (1992; 1997).
23
See, e.g., Govier and Ayer (2012), Olmos (2017).
evaluating such non-verbal arguments are the subject of extensive academic debate
centring around the questions whether such arguments exist at all, to what extent
they can or should be represented in verbal terms, and how their argumentative
quality is to be assessed.24
A third proposal for extending the scope of the definition of argument challenges
the traditional modelling of argumentative interaction as an exchange where just two
parties advance either a pro or con position while located in just one place. In
contemporary practice, communication in which arguments play an essential role
often involves the development of many positions by participants taking up a variety
of roles across a range of places. To account for these argumentative complexities,
scholars have proposed to conceptualise argument as ‘polylogue’.25
31. 5 .2 Computational argumentation

One of the major recent developments in argumentation theory is the formalisation of
logical, dialectical, and rhetorical insights about the various ways in which people try
to convince one another into formal models of argument that can be used for
computational applications. Such applications include argument diagramming,
argument mining, and the design of various types of human-machine interaction.
Examples of the latter are applications for computer-aided decision-making and chat-
bots aimed at convincing people to take measures to improve their health.26
Although the pace of these developments has increased considerably over the last
decade, only a small part of the plethora of insights developed in argumentation
theory is sufficiently formalised to be put to use. At this moment, most
computational models and applications work on the level of propositions and their
interrelations. The main challenge for the coming decade will be to develop more
fine-grained models of argument that are also able to capture insights regarding the
force of arguments on the level of individual words and regarding other aspects of
argumentation such as genre and style. One way to do this is by formalising
linguistic and pragmatic insights about argumentation in such a way they can be
implemented in digital tools for assisting humans in performing the three traditional
tasks of producing, analysing and evaluating argumentative discourse (see Section
31. 2. 1).27
31. 5. 3 Argumentation and the public sphere

Online communiction is changing the texture of participation in the public sphere
once dominated by traditional forms of mass media. This is leading to new
opportunities such as easy access to large amounts of information for citizens via the
internet, as well as challenges such as information bubbles, echo chambers, and deep
fakes, which require greater sophistication and competence in producing and
assessing arguments.
24
Some recent publications reflecting this debate are Kjeldsen (2015), Godden, Palczewski and
Groarke (2016), and Tseronis and Forceville (2017).
25
See Aakhus and Lewinski (forthcoming).
26
For overviews and surveys of the field see, e.g., Atkinson et al. (2017), Bex et al. (2017), and
Lawrence and Reed (2019). A representative sample of the latest research is collected in Modgil,
Budzynska and Lawrence (Eds.) (2018).
27
An example of such a formal linguistic approach is Adpositional Argumentation (AdArg) (Gobbo,
Benini and Wagemans, 2019).
Argumentation theorists have responded with novel research projects on

traditional concerns with argument analysis and evaluation while also embarking on
new projects aimed at designing (mainly political) argumentative discourse.28 These
developments bring the field of argumentation theory closer to adjacent fields such
as critical thinking and critical discourse analysis.29
31. 5. 4 Conclusion
The new developments, projects, and research interests presented in this section
together constitute the next shape of the philosophy of argument. In line with the
digital turn in the humanities in general and in communication studies in particular,
such research area can be labelled ‘digital argumentation’. As can be inferred from
the overview in this chapter, the future philosophers of digital argument will be able
to build on the insights articulated within the present-day logical, dialectical, and
rhetorical perspectives to find innovative ways of dealing with the age-old tension
between truth and persuasion, a tension that gave rise to the emergence of the
classical disciplines logic, dialectic, and rhetoric in the first place.
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31. 2 Research questions and perspectives

31. 2 .1 The production, analysis, and evaluation of argumentative discourse

Figure 31. 1: The classical idea of an art.

Figure 31. 2: The production of argumentative discourse.

An alternative principle of organising the instructions is to group them according to

Figure 31. 3: The analysis of argumentative discourse.

Figure 31. 4: The evaluation of argumentative discourse.

preferred method in the nomothetically oriented subfield of persuasion research,

31. 2. 2 Logic, dialectic, and rhetoric

Example 1 – original text

As explained above, in analysing Bertrand’s argument, a logician using propositional

Example 2 – original text

underlying reasoning of arguments or the reasonableness of the behaviour of the

Example 3 – original text

31. 3 Genres of argumentative discourse

31. 3. 1 Dialogue types and genres of communicative activity

31. 3. 2 Classical rhetorical genres of speech

Table 31. 1: Characteristics of rhetorical genres.

31. 4 Conceptualisations and categorisations of arguments

31. 4. 1 Two logical accounts of argument types

31. 4. 2 Dialectical accounts of argument schemes and fallacies

Present-day classifications of argument schemes go back to the lists of so-called

31. 4 .3 The rhetorical account of the three means of persuasion

31. 5 Present-day research challenges

31. 5. 1 Narratives, visual and multimodal argument, and polylogues

31. 5 .2 Computational argumentation

31. 5. 3 Argumentation and the public sphere

Argumentation theorists have responded with novel research projects on

Argumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21-24, 1994), Vol. II (pp. 286-

Kennedy, G. A. (1994). A new history of classical rhetoric. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

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