Litch Mary, Philosophy Through Film

PHILOSOPHY THROUGH FILM Second Edition Mary M. Litch Rfoutege | [NEW YORK AND LONDON1 SKEPTICISM ‘The Matrix (1999) and Vanilla Sky (2001) Morpheus: You have the look of a man who accepts what he sees, because he is expecting to wake up. Ironically this is not far from the truth. from The Matrix McCabe: Can you tell the difference between dreams and reality? Davids I don’t know what's real from Vanilla Sky We are all used to thinking that our senses reveal a world that exists independently of our minds, but is this belief justified? What can I know about this external world? Can I be sure that what my senses report to me is accurate? Maybe my senses are giving me radically misleading information about what is going on in the world outside of my ming. Can I even know that an external world exists? Philosophers have been examining these questions for centuries. Some philosophers hold a pos tion called skepticism, according to which genuine knowledge in such matters is unattainable. As we shall see, the science-fiction virtuabreality genre is ideal for introducing this topic, and the movies The Matrix and Vanilla Sky are both excellent sources for the standard arguments supporting skepticism and for hints at how modern philosophers have reacted to these arguments. My advice is to read up to and including section 13, then to watch the movies before resuming reading the rest of the chapter, The first two sections introduce the topic of skepticism in very general terms; having it under your belt before viewing The Matrix and Vanilla Sky will help you extract more of the philosophical content from the movies. The material beginning in section 1.4 makes constant refer cence to the movies, so it would be most profitably read after viewing the1 SKEPTICISM The Matrix (1999) and Vanilla Sky (2001) ‘Morpheus: You have the look of'a man who accepts what he sees, because he is expecting to wake up. Ironically, this is not far from the truth. from The Matrix ‘McCabe: Can you tell the difference between dreams and reality? David: I don’t know what's real, ~from Vanilla Sky ‘We areall used to thinking that our senses reveal a world that exists independently of our minds, but is this belief justified? What can I know about this external world? Gan I be sure that what my senses report, to me is accurate? Maybe my senses are giving me radically misleading information about what is going on in the world outside of my mind. Can 1 even know that an external world exists? Philosophers have been ‘examining these questions for centuries. Some philosophers hold a posi- tion called skepticism, according to which genuine knowledge in such matters is unattainable, As we shall see, the science fiction virtuakreality genre is ideal for introducing this topic, and the movies The Matrix and Vanilla Sky are both excellent sources for the standard arguments supporting skepticism and for hints at how modern philosophers have reacted to these arguments. My advice is to read up to and including section 1.3, then to watch the movies before resuming reading the rest of the chapter. The first two sections introduce the topic of skepticism in very general terms; having it under your belt before viewing The Matrix and Vanitla Sky will help you extract more of the philosophical content from the movies. The material beginning in section 1.4 makes constant reference to the movies, so it would be most profitably read after viewing the movies. SKEPTICISM 1.1. What is Skepticism? In everyday discourse, to call someone skeptical is to say that that person is prone to disbelieve what others say. tis commonplace to show distrust or disbelief in what a politician is promising by stating, “I'm skeptical.” ‘The term skepticism as itis used within philosophy has a slighdy differ. ent, albeit related meaning: Someone who is skeptical about X in the philosophical sense is someone who Claims that it is impossible to know whether X is true or false. To see this more clearly, consider the following statements: SI: George Washington was the twenty-first president of the United States. ‘82: 2,356,717 is a prime number: $3: Tam not dreaming right now. Suppose I were to ask you, for each of S/, 52, and S3, whether you ‘nero with absolute certainty that that statement is true. What would your response be? Ifyou are like me, your answers were: ; know that $/ is definitely false. + Idon't know about $2, maybe it's true, maybe it’ false. IT were a math whiz or someone with some time to kill, could probably figure out, though, whether S2 is true or false. 89: mnot quite sure what to make of $3. tend to believe that I'm not dreaming right now, but I can remember times in the past when thought I wasn’t dreaming, only to wake up a few minutes later when my alarm went off. The more I think about $3, the weirder 3 seems. At least if asked whether $2 was true or false, T could think of a way to figure it out. But $3 is qualitatively different. I can'c think of a calculation I can carry out ora test can perform that would give me conclusive evidence either way. I guess the correct thing to say in this case is that I can’t know with absolute certainty whether $3 is true or false. ‘The response given in $3’ above captures exactly what philosophers mean __by skepticism: skepricism is the view that knowledgeis notattainable. Note the difference between skepticism in its everyday usage and its philosoph- al usage. According to the former, skeptics are deniers. According to “the latter, skeptics are doubters. Its possible for someone to be skeptical about some domains but “ot about others. Thus, a moral skeptic claims it is not possible to know _ Whether moral statements are true or false; however, this moral skepticSKEI ricisM may believe that knowledge is attainable in other areas. Such circum. scribed versions of skepticism will not be discussed further. The version of skepticism that this chapter deals with isallencompassing. Sometimes the term epistemological skepticism is used to distinguish this allencompassing version of skepticism from versions that involve more limited claims. (Epistemology is the name of the subarea of philosophy that studies what knowledge is and how knowledge claims are justified.) Skepticism has a ong history, which predates the advent of virtual re ity movies by some 2300 years. The first skeptics lived in ancient Gr in the third and fourth centuries 8.Cz. in the ge tial Greek philosopher Aristotle. While none of the writings from these very early skeptics survived, we are familiar with their views based on the writings of later skeptics who had had access to those original doc uments, Among the latter group, Sextus Empiricus (175-225 ) has been the most influential in defining ancient skepticism. According to the ancient skeptics, all one’s claims to knowledge are to be rejected, except for the knowledge of one’s current perceptual state. Thus, I can know that I am having a visual impression of redness right now (a current perceptual state), but I cannot know that that impression of redness is caused by, or represents, or has anything whatsoever to do with goings-on outside of my own mind. Notice that these ancient skeptics are not claiming that my by something outside of my mind (remember: skeptics are doubters, not deniers), They are “merely” claiming that I have insufficient evidence to know whether my current impression of redness is thus caused by an external object (that is, an object that is mind-independent, that exists external to the mind). The ancient skeptic, just like his modern coun- terpart, would say that active disbeli world is just as unfounded as active belief in such a world. Strange as it may sound, the ancient skeptics held that the natural psychological response to adopting skepticism would be. blissful detachment from the world, Whether the ancient skeptics were blissfully detached is anyone's guess; the modern response to skepticism has been repugnance. (Wat for the responses offered by characters in The Matrix and Vanilla Sky when the skeptical hypothesis enters the picture—do they become bliss fully detached?) Philosophers are like other people in finding something profoundly unsetding about skepticism. Indeed, much of the epistem: ‘ogy done in the modern era may be interpreted as an attempt to refute skepticism. So deep is the disdain for skepticism among some philoso phers (e., George Berkeley, whom we shall meet in section 1.6) that they will reject any assumption, solely on the grounds that it will lead to skepticism, The strain of skepticism that began in ancient Greece died out dur ing the Early Middle Ages and had no or only very few adherents in eration after the influen- current impression of redness is not caused. in the existence of an externalSKEPTICISM may believe that knowledge is attainable in other areas. Such circum- scribed versions of skepticism will notbe discussed further: The version of skepticism that this chapter deals with isall encompassing. Sometimes the term epistemological skepticism is used to distinguish this all-encompassing, version of skepticism from versions that involve more limited claims. (Epistemology is the name of the subarea of philosophy that studies what knowledge is and how knowledge claims are justified.) ‘Skepticism has a long history, which predates the advent of virtual real ity movies by some 2300 years. The first skeptics lived in ancient Greece in the third and fourth centuries 8... in the generation after the influential Greck philosopher Aristotle. While none of the writings from these very carly skeptics survived, we are familiar with their views based on the writings of later skeptics who had had access to those original doc- ‘uments. Among the latter group, Sextus Empiricus (175-225 CE.) has been the most influential in defining ancient skepticism. According to the ancient skeptics, all one’s claims to knowledge are to be rejected, except for the knowledge of one’s current perceptual state. Thus, I can know that I am having a visual impression of redness right now (a current perceptual state), but I cannot know that that impression of redness is caused by, or represents, or has anything whatsoever to do with goings-on outside of my own mind. Notice that these ancient skeptics are not claiming that my current impression of redness is not caused, by something outside of my mind (remember: skeptics are doubters, not deniers). They are “merely” claiming that I have insufficient evidence to know whether my current impression of redness is thus caused by an ‘external object (that is, an object that is mind:independent, that exists external to the mind). The ancient skeptic, just like his modern coun- terpart, would say that active disbelief in the existence of an external world is just as unfounded as active belief in such a world. Strange as it may sound, the ancient skeptics held that the natural psychological response to adopting skepticism would be ablissful detachment from the world. Whether the ancient skeptics were blissfully detached is anyone's guess; the modern response to skepticism has been repugnance. (Watch for the responses offered by characters in The Matrix and Vanilla Sky when the skeptical hypothesis enters the picture—do they become blissfully detached?) Philosophers are like other people in finding something profoundly unsettling about skepticism. Indeed, much of the epistemol- ‘ogy done in the modern era may be interpreted as an attempt to refute skepticism. So deep is the disdain for skepticism among some philosophers (e.g., George Berkeley, whom we shall meet in section 1.6) that they will reject any assumption, solely on the grounds that it will lead to skepticism. ‘The strain of skepticism that began in ancient Greece died out dur ing the Early Middle Ages and had no or only very few adherents in SKEPTICISM, Europe for over a thousand years. It was not until the religious an scientific revolutions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that inter- est in skepticism re-emerged. This re-emergence was further spurred by the republication of the writings of Sextus Empiricus in the mid- sixteenth century. The time was ripe for philosophers to grapple once again with doubt. By far the most influential writer on the topic of skepticism during this time was the French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650). In retrospect, historians of philosophy have marked his, ‘emergence as the beginning of philosophy in the modern period.! Descartes laid out skepticism in the form that it has retained to this day. Because of his influence I have allocated the whole of section 1.2 to a discussion of his views. The work by Descartes discussed in section 1.2 is reproduced in Readings from Primary Sources toward the end of this book. Skepticism remained on philosophy’s front-burner for the rest of the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries. Another highly influential philosopher of this period, David Hume (1711-1776), refined the arguments for skepticism still further, showing just what ‘would be required to justify a claim to know that an external world exists, and showing how this requirement could not be satisfied—not exen in theory. We shall discuss some of these arguments in sections 14 and 15, ‘While skepticism has been relegated to philosophy’s backburner in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it has certainly not disappeared all together. The reading list t the end of the chapter offers suggestions for those interested in pursuing what some present-day philosophers have t0 say about skepticism. 1.2. Descartes’s Formulation ‘The most influential work ever written on skepticism is the first essay in ‘Meditations on First Philosophy, originally published by René Descartes in 1641.2 In this essay, Descartes lays the framework for modern skepticism and sets the standard according to which any presumed refutation of skepticism must pass muster. In the remaining five essays that make up the Meditations, Descartes sets forth what he believes to be a refutation ‘of skepticism. While philosophers greatly admire the thoroughness and ingenuity of the arguments Descartes offers in favor of skepticism, most philosophers believe that Descartes’s “solution” to the problem of skepticism presented in the second through sixth essays doesn't work. Thus, Descartes's Meditations have become the classic source for skepticism, rather than the refutation of skepticism that Descartes had intended the ‘work to be. ‘The complete frst essay from Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy is reproduced in Readings from Primary Sources toward the end of thisSKEPTICISM book. In this essay, Descartes sets about trying to find a belief whose truth he cannot possibly doubt. He notes that his senses have deceived him in the past; thus any belief based on the report of his senses can be doubted. (Recall the distinction emphasized above between doub ing the truth of a statement and believing it to be false.) Furthermore, he recalls having experiences while dreaming that were indistinguist able at the time from experiences while awake. Thus, while close and careful examination of an object in good light is normally sufficient to dispel concerns that his senses are deceiving him, close and care ful examinatio “real” reality from the “virtual” reality created within a dream. He decides that he is looking for indubitability in the wrong place. If he has any indubitable beliefs, they are more likely to be found within the domain of pure mathematics (for example, arithmetic statements such as *2 +3 = 5"). On further consideration, however, he decides that, even here, doubt is possible. Descartes believes that an alLpowerful God exists~a God who created him and would not allow him to be massively deceived. He admits, though, that his belief in the existence of God can be doubted. Perhaps the truth is that, instead of God, an allpowerful and evil demon exists; this demon has created Descartes 50 that he constantly falls into error, even when he performs simple cal culations such as adding 2 and 3. He cannot know for sure that this is not the cas. If such an evil demon exists, then even beliefs based solely on his powers of reason are called into doubt. Descartes decides to adopt the hypothesis that just such an evil demon exists, not because this hypothesis is well founded (quite the contrary, Descartes would say), but because such a hypothesis will steel Descartes in his resolve not to allow in any belief as indubitable if that belief has the slightest shred of grounds for doubt. It is on this note of abject skepticism that his first ‘meditation ends. AAs mentioned above, Descartes believed he had refuted skepticism in the later essays. While most of the remainder of the Meditations on First Philosophy lie outside the scope of this chapter, there is one item from the beginning of the second meditation that bears remarking upon. In his search for a belief whose truth he could not possibly doubt, Descartes settles upon the statement “I exist.” He bases the indubitability of this statement on the reasoning that even ifthe evil demon exists and is constantly causing him to fall into error, Descartes could not possibly be mistaken in believing he exists as a thing that thinks~as a thing that doubts. This is because he would at least have to exist asa thing that was being deceived. Thus, Descartes formulates the arg fore, I exist” (in its original Latin, cogito, ergo sum) as showing beyond a shadow of a doubt that he exist in good light is wholly insufficient for distinguishing ment “I think; there-SKEPTICISM. book. In this essay, Descartes sets about trying to find a belief whose truth he cannot possibly doubt. He notes that his senses have deceived him in the past; thus any belief based on the report of his senses can be doubted. (Recall the distinction emphasized above between doubt- ing the truth of a statement and believing it to be false.) Furthermore, he recalls having experiences while dreaming that were indistinguishable at the time from experiences while awake. Thus, while close and careful examination of an object in good light is normally sufficient to dispel concerns that his senses are deceiving him, close and careful examination in good light is wholly insufficient for distinguishing “real” reality from the “virtual” reality created within a dream. He decides that he is looking for indubitability in the wrong place. If he has any indubitable beliefs, they are more likely to be found within the domain of pure mathematics (for example, arithmetic statements such as “2 + 3 = 5°). On further consideration, however, he decides that, even here, doubt is possible. Descartes believes that an all-powerful God exists—a God who created him and would not allow him to be massively deceived. He admits, though, that his belief in the existence of God can be doubted. Perhaps the truth is that, instead of God, an allpowerful and evil demon exists; this demon has created Descartes 50 that he constantly falls into error, even when he performs simple ca culations such as adding 2 and 3. He cannot know for sure that this is not the case. If such an evil demon exists, then even beliefs based solely on his powers of reason are called into doubt. Descartes decides to adopt the hypothesis that just such an evil demon exists, not because this hypothesis is well founded (quite the contrary, Descartes would say), but because such a hypothesis will steel Descartes in his resolve not to allow in any belief as indubitable if that belief has the slightest shred of grounds for doubt. It is on this note of abject skepticism that his first meditation ends. ‘As mentioned above, Descartes believed he had refuted skepticism in the later essays. While most of the remainder of the Meditations on First Philosophy lie outside the scope of this chapter, there is one item from the beginning of the second meditation that bears remarking upon. In his search for a belief whose truth he could not possibly doubt, Descartes settles upon the statement “I exist.” He bases the indubitability of this statement on the reasoning that even ifthe evil demon exists and is constantly causing him to fall into error, Descartes could not possibly be mistaken in believing he exists as a thing that thinks—as a thing that doubts. This is because he would atleast have to exist as a thing that was, being deceived. Thus, Descartes formulates the argument “I think; therefore, I exist” (in its original Latin, cogito, ergo sum) as showing beyond a shadow of a doubt that he exists. SKEPT! M 1.3. An Overview of the Movies THE Marnix (1999). DIRECTED BY ANDY AND LARRY WACHOWSKI. STARRING KEANU REEVES, LAURENCE FISHBURNE, ‘CARRIE-ANNE Moss ‘The Matrix is the first film released in what eventually became a movie trilogy exploring a futuristic world in which computers have enslaved humankind. The humans are farmed as an energy source and their ner- ‘yous systems are hooked into computers that create aperfect virtual world for each of them. While fancy computers are not, strictly speaking, nec- ‘essary for a discussion of skepticism (after all, Descartes managed to do just fine back in the seventeenth century by making reference only to the ‘virtual world created in normal, human dreams), bringing technology into the picture makes skepticism an easier sell. Neo, the main character in The Matrix, is asked the question “How would you know the differ- cence between [a] dream world and a real one?"® He (and we, the viewers) realizes that there is no way to tell the difference. VANILLA Sky (2001). DIRECTED BY CAMERON CROWE. STARRING TOM CRUISE, PENELOPE CRUZ, KURT RUSSELL Vanilla Shy is based on the film Abre las Os by Alejandro Amenabar and Mateo Gil. It is used as a focus film in this chapter and in Chapter 3 on personal identity. The protagonist, David Aames, is a handsome, rich, seemingly successful young man running a large publishing company. Shortly after meeting Sofia, the woman of his dreams, he is involved in a car crash that leaves his face severely disfigured. After the crash, David cuts himself off from his previous acquaintances and begins to have increasingly bizarre experiences, culminating in the murder of his lover and subsequent arrest. Both we and David are unsure what is happening. Is David suffering from derangement, as his acceptance of a farfetched conspiracy theory and apparent hallucinations indicate? Are these events really happening to him? Or is he dreaming everything ‘up? Perhaps he is still lying comatose in a hospital bed following the crash, David fears that he may be stuck in a dream world that has become a nightmare, but how can he know for sure? With the help of a psychol- Ogist evaluating him for a possible insanity defense, he is able to recall ‘enough of his waking life to piece together what has happened—and to finally wake up. The movie ends with several competing interpretations ‘of David's experiences offering divergent views about which perceptions genuine and which were mere dreams.SKEPTICISM If you are following my advice given at the beginning of the chapter, now is the time to watch The Matrix and Vanilla Sky. The Appendix entries for these two films give plot summaries and corresponding minute marks (the total amount of time that has elapsed since the opening credits began) for the major scenes, 1.4 Neo and David Aames as Embodiments of Descartes’s Problem So, you have just finished watching Vanilla Sky. What happened in the movie? Who were the main characters? What did they do? If you were like me, on initial viewing you found yourself giving radically different interpretations of events, depending on how far along in the movie you ‘were, Since much of the narrative in Vanilla Sky is in the form of flash: backs as David recounts his memories to McCabe, we need to distinguish when an event is depicted in the film from when it occurred originally for David, Imagine you had paused the movie after 105 minutes, during the scene in which McCabe visits David in the interview room for :h@@ final time, McCabe has just told David that he will argue that David suf- fered from temporary derangement when he committed the murder. Let us reconstruct the timeline of major events from David's point of view, based on what we have seen thus far. David meets Sofia at his birthday party and spends the night with her. The following morning he meets Julie in the strect outside Sofia’s apartment and gets into the car with her. Julie, distressed, drives the car off an overpass bridge, killing her- self and seriously injuring David. After the crash, David is in a coma for several weeks, but eventually wakes to discover that his face is seriously disfigured (among other ailments). David responds by cutting himself off from his previous acquaintances, until he finally decides to emerge from his exile and try to win Sofia's love; he sets up a date with Sofia ata dance club. At the club, David feels rejected by Sofia and begins a night of binge drinking. After leaving the club with Sofia and Brian, David ends up passing out on a sidewalk near Sofia’s apartment and spends the night there. Sofia wakes him the next morning and they begin a new relationship. Eventually, David’s disfigurement is remedied by doctors and David and Sofia live an almost charmed life together. In a strange sequence of events, David begins hallucinating that Sofia is Julie. At this point in the movie we are confused about what is happening: is David becoming psychotic or is Julie a part of some conspiracy, or is the narrative at this point a part of one of David’s dreams? This sequence ends with David in the police station after having beaten Julie/Sofia. David is released and has a strange encounter with a man in a restaurant, ho shows David that he can control what the people around him are doing. David returns to Sofia’s apartment and discovers that all of the picturesSKEPTICISM. If you are following my advice given at the beginning of the chapter, nowis the time to watch The Matrix and Vanilla Sky. The Appendix entries for these two films give plot summaries and corresponding minute marks (the total amount of time that has elapsed since the opening credits began) for the major scenes. 1.4 Neo and David Aames as Embodiments of Descartes’s Problem So, you have just finished watching Vanilla Sky. What happened in the movie? Who were the main characters? What did they do? If you were like me, on initial viewing you found yourself giving radically different interpretations of events, depending on how far along in the movie you ‘were. Since much of the narrative in Vanilla Sky is in the form of flashbacks as David recounts his memories to McCabe, we need to distinguish ‘when an event is depicted in the film from when it occurred originally for David. Imagine you had paused the movie after 105 minutes, during the scene in which McCabe visits David in the interview room for the final time. McCabe has just told David that he will argue that David suf fered from temporary derangement when he committed the murder. Let us reconstruct the timeline of major events from David's point of view, based on what we have seen thus far. David meets Sofia at his birthday party and spends the night with her. The following morning he meets, Julie in the street outside Sofia’s apartment and gets into the car with her. Julie, distressed, drives the car off an overpass bridge, killing her- self and seriously injuring David. After the crash, David is in a coma for several weeks, but eventually wakes to discover that his face is seriously disfigured (among other ailments). David responds by cutting himself off from his previous acquaintances, until he finally decides to emerge fim his exile and try to win Sofia’s love; he sets up a date with Sofia at a dance club. At the club, David feels rejected by Sofia and begins a night of binge drinking. After leaving the club with Sofia and Brian, David ends up passing out on a sidewalk near Sofia’s apartment and spends the night there. Sofia wakes him the next morning and they begin a new relationship. Eventually, David’s disfigurement is remedied by doctors and David and Sofia live an almost charmed life together. In a strange sequence of events, David begins hallucinating that Sofia is Julie. At this point in the movie we are confused about what is happening: is David becoming psychotic or is Julie a part of some conspiracy, or is the nar rative at this point a part of one of David's dreams? This sequence ends with David in the police station after having beaten Julie/Sofia. David is, released and has a strange encounter with a man in a restaurant, who shows David that he can control what the people around him are doing. David returns to Sofia’s apartment and discovers that all of the pictures SKEPTICISM there are actually pictures of Julie. David is attacked by Julie, who claims she mistook him for an intruder. Julie enters the kitchen and returns as Sofia. She and David have sex. Part way through, David again begins secing her as Julie and suffocates her with a pilloy. David winds up in prison charged with murder. He begins a series of conversations with a psychologist named McCabe, who is trying to figure out whether David is insane. Over the course of these conversations, we sce in flashbacks the narrative recounted above. This is how things stand 105 minutes into the movie. Both we and David are considering the possibility that at least some parts of David's experiences are not real, either because he was delusional or because he was dreaming, We have already seen two instances of dream sequences: David's initial drive and run through a deserted Manhattan (at the 2:20-4:10-minute mark (MM) and David's seeing his disfigured face in the bathroom mirror (MM 84:50-85:00). In both cases, David awakens ‘and realizes that he has been dreaming. In response to McCabe's question “Can you tell the difference between dreams and reality?” David answers, “I don't know what's real.” David, like Descartes, has discovered that “there are no reliable signs by which [a person] can distinguish sleeping from waking”: Of course, whatever I have so far accepted as supremely true Ihave learned either from the senses or through the senses. But Thave occasionally caught the senses deceiving me, and it would be prudent for me never completely to trust those who have cheated me even once. Bt, while my senses may deceive me about whats small or far way, there may still be other things taken in by the senses which I cannot possibly doubt-such as that Iam here, sitting before the fire, wearing a dressing gown, touching this paper. Indeed, these hands and the rest of my body—on what grounds might I deny that they exist?—unless perhaps [liken myself to madmen whose brains are so rattled by the persistent vapors of melancholy that they are sure they are kings when in fact they are paupers, or that they wear purple robes when in fact they are naked, or that their heads are clay, or that they are gourds, or that they are made of glass. But these people are insane, and I would seem just as crazy if were to apply what I say about them to myself. This would be perfectly obvious—if] weren'taman accustomed tosleeping at night whose experiences while asleep are atleast as farfetched as those that madmen have while awake. How often dream has convinced me that I was here, sitting before the fire, wearing my dressing gown, when, in fact, I was undressed and between the covers of my bed! But now I am looking atSKEPTICISM this piece of paper with my eyes wide open; the head that I am shaking has not been lulled o sleep; I put my hand out con: sciously and deliberately; I feel the paper and see it. None of this would be as distinct if were As if I can't remember having been deluded by similar thoughts while asleep! When I think very carefully about this, I see so plainly that there are no reliable signs by which I can distinguish sleeping from waking that I am stupefied—and my stupor itself suggests that I am asleep! What both Descartes and David have discovered is that there is noth: ing about a perception that marks it off as nongenuine—one may wake up afterwards and retroactively discount a perception experienced while asleep as unreal, but while it is happening it is indistinguishable from a waking perception. We will come back to this point a little later to discuss its ramifications for skepticism. Now, let us return to a review of the firal scenes from Vanilla Shy. Beginning approximately 105 minutes into the movie, as David begins to connect what is happening to him with the corporation LE, events unfold very quickly, causing David and us, the viewers, to radically change our interpretation of previous events. David, McCabe and the guard visit LE headquarters, where they learn more about life extension and the lucid dream, David’s vague memories of having been there before cause him to infer that he is currently “living a lucid dream”; although, for him, it has become a nightmare. He summons Tech Support and meets Edmund Venturain the lobby elevator. As the two of them travel up to the roof, Edmund explains David's contractual agreement with LE and what happened in the “real” world. Brian and McCabe join Edm roof and David learns that MeCabe does not really exist, despite ‘McCabe's earnest protestations otherwise. It is interesting to note that ‘McCabe's response, once he has accepted this news, is to reach out and. touch Brian's sleeve in amazement. Since McCabe is controlled by David's thoughts, there isqgsense in which this action may be viewed as David's response to Edmunds revelations. The movie ends with David’s decision to stop the lucid dream (despite Edmund’s promise that the software glitch that caused it to turn into a nightmare has been corrected) and return to the “real” world, now 150 years after his dead body was put into suspended hibernation, On the interpretation of Vanilla Sky that treats Edmund's revelation, as truth, all of the events that David recounted after he passed out on the sidewalk never really happened, including all of his interactions with McCabe. However, events that happened between the car accident and when he passed out did really happen. This interpretation seems to give ushope that, atleast in some cases, we can distinguish dreams from reality ndand DavidPe :__ SKEPTICISM, this piece of paper with my eyes wide open: the head that Iam shaking has not been lulled to sleep; I put my hand out consciously and deliberately; I feel the paper and see it. None of this would be as distinct if were asleep. As if can’t remember having been deluded by similar thoughts while asleep! When think very carefully about this, I see so plainly that there are no reliable signs by which I can distinguish sleeping from waking that Tam stupetiedand my stupor itself suggests that Tam asleep! ‘What both Descartes and David have discovered is that there is nothing about a perception that marks it off as nongenuine-one may wake up afterwards and retroactively discount a perception experienced while asleep as unreal, but while it is happening it is indistinguishable from a ‘waking perception, We will come back to this pointa litle later to discuss, its ramifications for skepticism. Now, let us return to a review of the final scenes from Vanilla Sky. Beginning approximately 105 minutes into the movie, as David begins to connect what is happening to him with the corporation LE, events unfold very quickly, causing David and us, the viewers, to radically change our interpretation of previous events. David, McCabe and the guard visit LE headquarters, where they learn more about life extension and the lucid dream, David's vague memories of having been there before cause hhim to infer that he is currently “living a lucid dream”; although, for him, it has become a nightmare. He summons Tech Support and meets. Edmund Ventura in the lobby elevator. As the two of them travel up to the roof, Edmund explains David's contractual agreement with LE and wha happened in the “real” world. Brian and McCabejoin Edmund and David on the roof and David learns that McCabe does not really exist, despite McCabe's earnest protestations otherwise. It is interesting to note that McCabe's response, once he has accepted this news, is to reach out and touch Brian's sleeve in amazement. Since McCabe is controlled by David's thoughts, there is a sense in which this action may be viewed as David's response to Edmund’s revelations, The movie ends with David's decision to stop the lucid dream (despite Edmund's promise that the software glitch that caused it to turn into a nightmare has been corrected) and return to the “real” world, now 150 years after his dead body was put into suspended hibernation. (On the interpretation of Vanilla Sky that treats Edmund’s revelation as truth, all of the events that David recounted after he passed out on the sidewalk never really happened, including all of his interactions with McCabe. However, events that happened between the car accident and ‘when he passed out did really happen. This interpretation seems to give ushope that, at leastin some cases, we can distinguish dreams from reality SKEPTICISM after the fact and know with certainty that our postdream experiences are real Ifthis isthe only reasonable interpretation of Vanilla Sky, then the film isnot offering usan argument for skepticism, But is this the only interpretation, oreven the most reasonable interpretation of the movie? A serious problem with this interpretation is explaining whayggacty is having the Jucid dream, Recall that David’s body has died and is being keptata tem perature too low to support brain activity, so LE cannot be generating the virtual world David is experiencing by manipulating the nerves enter ing his brain, In addition, unlike most films that take a sciencesfiction turn, Vanilla Sky is not set in the future, so we cannot explain some seemingly unexplainable events by invoking “future advances in science and technology.” There are several hints dropped very early on in the film that give us reason to suspect the reality of Davis experiences right from the beginning. Perhaps all of the narrative is someone's dream. Obviously, Vanilla Sky is a work of fiction, so it makes no sense to ask “What really happened?” In order to be an argument for skepticism, we need to be left with some uncertainty about which events are real and which are not—the possibilty of two interpretations gives us that. ‘The Matrix offers us the same sorts of jumps in interpretation as the action progresses as was offered in Vanilla Sky. We discover at MM 12.00 that everything that has happened up to that point (for exam- pile, the strange messages Neo is receiving on his computer) was dream. Similarly, when Neo awakes again at MM 21:30, we discover that the events between MM 12:00 and MM 21:30 were a dream, and that, therefore, the first twelve minutes wasa dream within dream. After thissecondawaken- ing, major events happen very quickly. Neo meets Morpheus. Morpheus begins to explain what “the matrix” is. Neo chooses to learn more, even though the truth may be very upsetting, This sequence culminates with the “real” Neo waking up in his vat, being released and flushed out into the “real” world, and being greeted by the “real” Morpheus. From this point on in the movie, the interpretation that Neo has entered the real” world is never questioned. Thus, except for the times when he re-enters the matrix to fight the (virtual) bad guys, all of his perceptions are genuine. But what does it mean to say that Neo’s post-release perceptions are ‘genuine, whereas his pre-release perceptions are not? Similarly, what does itmean to say that perceptions experienced in the context of lucid dreams ‘are not genuine? What both of these movies do so well is highlight the start- ing point of skepticism: both movies make it clear that when we perceive, ‘we are not immediately aware of external objects. Our perceptions exist only in our minds, they are not themselves external objects. It is only by dis- ishing between perceptions and external objects that sense can be ‘of (1) the virtual reality created by the matrix, (2) the virtual realitySKEPTICISM in Vanilla Sky's lucid dreams, and (8) the virtual reality found in normal, human dreams. But once itis granted that perceptions are not themsely nal objects, what then? Descartes recognized this as an important question. In the third essay of his Meditations on First Philasophy, he devel: ops a theory that I shall call the theory of representative perceptions. According to this theory, a perception is genuine if it is caused by and Tepresents the external object(s) that give rise to it. Thus, the pption of a telephone I am having right now is genuine if there really isa telephone that exists “out there” in the mind-independent world of material objects, and that telephon usally responsible for pro- ducing the perception I am experiencing right now. Furthermore, my perception must accurately depict that telephone: it must information about the telephone’s size and shape, as well as its location relative to other objects I am also perceiving at present. If these conditions are all satisfied by a perception, then that perception is said to be genuine. It is clear that many of the perceptions that David Aame and Neo have are not genuine according to these conditions. All m generated perceptions (whether in Neo or any other character hooked into the system) fail the accuracy-of-representation requirement. Thu even though the perceptions are caused by an external source (the pays- ical computer that is running the matrix program), they are not caused by the external objects they purport to represent. The same goes for David's perceptions in the context of the lucid dream. To take a par ticular example, there is no material object that causes and resembles the visual and auditory sensations David has when he (seems to) interact with McCabe, Descartes is not alone among philosophers in believing that the theory of representative perceptions (or something very much like it) is the only. way to make sense of the possibility of illusion; although he was alon among the great philosophers of the seventeenth and turies in arguing that this theory did not inexorably le: ks Descartes’s problem is explaining how a perceiver could get evid that a current perception is caused by and accurately represents an exter- ial object. Consider how charactersin The Matrix:and Vanilla Sky respond to this challenge. Neo’s response on being plugged into not the matrix butacomputer construct (MM 39: 15)is to reach out and touch a sofa and. ask in amazement, “This isn’t real?” Even though David 1 in an effort to determine whether they a 's response to learning that he is not real. (It is rat speak of McCabe as “learning” something, since he is a figment of David’s imagination; however, since McCabe is animated by David, we ‘an think of this action as indirectly being an action of David's.) In both cases, the chara spond to the challenge of Descartes's problem king tactile confirmation that, indeed, they are not experiencingSKEPTICISM in Vanilla Sky's lucid dreams, and (3) the virtual reality found in normal, human dreams. Butonce itis granted that perceptions are not themselves external objects, what then? Descartes recognized this as an important ‘question, In the third essay of his Meditations on First Philosophy, he devel- ‘psa theory that I shall call the theory of representative perceptions. According to this theory, a perception is genuine if it is caused by and. accurately represents the external object(s) that give rise to it. Thus, the visual perception of a telephone I am having right now is genuine if there really isa telephone thatexists “out there” in the mind-independent world ‘of material objects, and that telephone is causally responsible for pro- ducing the perception I am experiencing right now. Furthermore, my perception must accurately depict that telephone: it must offer accurate information about the telephone'’s size and shape, as well as its location relative (0 other objects I am also perceiving at present. If these conditions are all satisfied by a perception, then that perception is said to be genuine. It is clear that many of the perceptions that David Aames and Neo have are not genuine according to these conditions. All matrix- generated perceptions (whether in Neo or any other character hooked into the system) fail the accuracy-of-representation requirement. Thus, even though the perceptions are caused by an external source (the physical computer that is running the matrix program), they are not caused. by the external objects they purport to represent. The same goes for David's perceptions in the context of the lucid dream. To take a particular example, there is no material object that causes and resembles the visual and auditory sensations David has when he (seems to) interact with McCabe. Descartes is not alone among philosophers in believing that the theory of representative perceptions (or something very much like it)is the only way to make sense of the possibility of illusion; although he was alone among the great philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in arguing that this theory did not inexorably lead to skepticism. Descartes’s problem is explaining how a perceiver could get evidence that a current perception is caused by and accurately represents an external object. Consider how charactersin The Matrix and Vanilla Sky respond to this challenge. Neo’s response on being plugged into not the matrix buta computer construct (MM 39: 15) isto reach out and touch a sofa and ask in amazement, “This isn’t real?” Even though David never attempts to touch objects in an effort to determine whether they are real, this is McCabe's response to learning that he is not real. (It is rather odd to speak of McCabe as “learning” something, since he is a figment of David's imagination; however, since McCabe is animated by David, we can think of this action as indirectly being an action of David's.) In both cases, the characters respond to the challenge of Descartes's problem by seeking tactile confirmation that, indeed, they are not experiencing. SKEPTICISM 4 visual illusion, In his first meditation, Descartes himself describes| similar search for tactile confirmation as his initial response to the challenge. “I put my hand out consciously and deliberately; I feel the paper and see it.” But further consideration convinces Descartes and Neo that tactile sensations are just more perceptions-they do not provide unmedi- ated information about the characteristics of, or even the existence of, external objects. While tactile sensations are qualitatively insufficient to meet the challenge of Descartes's problem, there is a reason why this js Neo’s, McCabe's, and Descartes's initial response. It is commonplace that our visual sensations deceive us. Even in a waking state we have all experienced optical illusions; so, the average person is willing to occasionally distrust the visual system. Similarly, auditory illusions are relatively common, as is the corresponding willingness to distrust our hearing. ‘The sense of touch is much less susceptible to waking illusion; it seems the natural choice in testing the genuineness of our visual and auditory reports. However, as both Vanilla Sky and The Matrix demonstrate, tactile sensations cannot provide the evidence necessary to distinguish between genuiine and nongenuine perceptions. Skepticism has its source in the fact that all we directly experience are our own sensations, not the external things themselves, Neither you nor I have ever, in our entire lives, had contact with an external object where that contact was not mediated by the senses, We cannot, therefore, {justify our belief in external objects with reference to our direct contact ‘with them, ‘Are we any different in this regard than Neo and David? Admittedly, ‘we haven't gone to an establishment like LE, since such establishments do not exist-wve presume. Furthermore, we are living in the early twenty- first century, not the year 2199, as did Neo. But hold on a minute. This line of reasoning will get us nowhere. What generates skepticism is the recognition that all weare ever directly aware of are our own perceptions, not mind:independent objects in some material world. We assume such a world exists and is causally responsible for the perceptions we have, but we have no way of pecking around our perceptions to view these ‘mind independent objects to check the assumption. There is, though, fone important difference between us on the one hand, and David and Neo on the other: they have been given a reason to actively suspect the ‘genuineness of many of their perceptions, while we have not, Consider again the scene from Vanilla Sky in which David and Edmund are talking on the rooftop. Edmund has explained that David has reached a choice point: he can end the dream if he chooses, but to do so he will have to jump off the roof. David needs to decide whether his current perceptions are genuine (in which case jumping off the roof would be very bad idea) or whether, as he suspects, everything that is happening isa dream. Let us consider the evidence from David's point of view.SKEPTICIS What evidence is there that his recent experiences are all a dream? First, many of them have been highly atypical, Second, many memories of his life together with Sofia are too good to be true and are too reminiscent of relationships depicted in films he has seen, And third, he can reme ber going toa firm that specializes in providing nongenuine perceptions. What evidence does he have in favor of the theory that his current perceptions are caused by and accurately represent external objects? Not much, Admittedly, most people have a natural inclination to trust in the gem. uuineness of their perceptions, but that by itself is not evident way or the other. In stating the case this way, David has more evidence supporting the theory that his current perceptions are nongenuine; hence, jumping off the roof will not cause his death. Can a similar analysis be given for The Matrix? Let us consider the ‘two theories contending for explanation of Neos perceptions between MM 21:30 and MM $200. (This is approximately the period of time between Neo waking up for the second time and the “real” Neo waking up in his vat.) According to one theory, Neo's f of a computer stimulating his nervous system in a way indistinguishable from the way in which his nervous system would be stimulated w actually interacting with material obje all of his perceptions during this time period are nongenuin denceiis there in favor of this? First, he has the equivalent of“ experience at MM 32:30 which, at the very least, calls into question the genuineness of the preceding perceptions. Second, many of his experi- nces during this time period were highly atypical, And third, Neo has experiences throughout the rest of the film that flesh out the hows and. ;hys of the matrix. According to another theory, Neo’s perceptions during this time period are genuine. There is not much to say in favor of this theory, with the possible exception that Neo's experiences, while admittedly atypical during this time period (judged relative to those of the average human being), are no more atypical than the things he ¢ rienced both before and after this portion of the movie. There is a third theory that has some plausibility: maybe Neo is still dreaming; maybe everything that happens throughout the entire movie is a dream. After all, we are already allowing for the possibility ofa dream-within--dream. (Recall that that is what is going on during the first twelve minutes.) This alternative has one major point to recommend it: Neo has sequences of highly atypical experiences sprinkled throughout the movie—they are not just confined to the first thirty-two minutes This latter interpretation of The Matrix again raises the question originally posed by Descartes in his first meditation: Are there any reliable signs to distinguish sleeping from waking? By the end of his Meditations, Descartes believes he has found just such a reliable sign, noting that “the nts in dreams are not linked by memory to the rest of my life likeSKEPTICISM ‘What evidence is there that his recent experiences are all a dream? First, ‘many of them have been highly atypical. Second, many memories of his, life together with Sofia are to0 good to be true and are too reminiscient of relationships depicted in films he has seen. And third, he can remem ‘ber going to firm that specializes in providing nongenuine perceptions ‘What evidence does he have in favor ofthe theory that his current percep tions are caused by and accurately represent external objects? Not much, Admittedly, most people have a natural inclination to trust in the gen tuineness of their perceptions, but that by itself is not evidence one way or the other. In stating the case this way, David has more evidence supporting the theory that his current perceptions are nongenuine; hence, jumping off the roof will not cause his death. Can a similar analysis be given for The Matrix? Let us consider the ‘wo theories contending for explanation of Neo's perceptions between MM 21:30 and MM 82:00. (This is approximately the period of time between Neo waking up for the second time and the “real” Neo waking up in his vat.) According to one theory, Neo’s perceptions are the result of a computer stimulating his nervous system in a way indistinguishable from the way in which his nervous system would be stimulated were he actually interacting with material objects. Thus, according to this theory, all of his perceptions during this time period are nongenuine. What evi- denceis therein favor ofthis? First, he has the equivalent ofa “waking-up” ‘experience at MM 82:30 which, at the very least, calls into question the ‘enuineness of the preceding perceptions. Second, many of his experiences during this time period were highly atypical. And third, Neo has expetiences throughout the rest of the film that flesh out the hows and ‘whys of the matrix. According to another theory, Neo’s perceptions during this time period are genuine. There is not much to say in favor of this theory, with the possible exception that Neo's experiences, while admittedly atypical during this time period (judged relative to those of the average human being), are no more atypical than the things he expe- snced both before and after this portion of the movie. There is a third theory that has some plausibility: maybe Neo is still dreaming; maybe ‘everything that happens throughout the entire movie is a dream. After all, we are already allowing for the possibility of a dream-within-a-dream. (Recall that that is what is going on during the first twelve minutes.) This alternative has one major point to recommend it: Neo has sequences of highly aypical experiences sprinkled throughout the movie—they are not, just confined to the first thirty-two minutes. ‘This latter interpretation of The Matrix again raises the question originally posed by Descartes in his first meditation: Are there any reliable signs to distinguish sleeping from waking? By the end of his Meditations, Descartes believes he has found just such a reliable sign, noting that “the ‘events in dreams are not linked by memory to the rest of my life like SKEPTICISM those that happen while [am awake.”* Thus, for Descartes, there is nothing in the perception itself that would allow someone to say that this is certainly a genuine perception. Rather, this judgment of genuineness ‘can only be made in the context of the individual's other perceptions— past, present, and future. Other philosophers in the modern era claim that Descartes got it wrong—they hold that there is an intrinsic (non- ‘contextual) difference between genuine and nongenuine perceptions. ‘One of these dissenting philosophers is George Berkeley, who held that genuine perceptions are more intrinsically vivid than their nongenuine Counterparts.” Berkeley held that there are three criteria that distin- ggish genuine perceptions from nongenuine ones: (1) the vividness of the perception, (2) its degree of independence from our will, and (8) ts connectedness to previous and future perceptions. ‘Does the evidence of nongenuineness in some of David's and Neo's cerceptions tend to support Descartes or Berkeley? A few pages ago, we rere several attipues that led us, a viewers, as well as David and Neo, to interpret some of their perceptions as genuine and others as nongenuine. For Vanilla Sky, these attributes were: (1) the atypicalness of Some of David's perceptions, (2) their resemblance to familiar scenes in ‘David's favorite movies, and (3) his memory of having gone to firm that specializes in providing nongenuine perceptions. Are these attributes of itolated perceptions or attributes of perceptions relative to other per- ‘ceptions that the individual has? Clearly, (2) and (8) are a function, not Of current perceptions considered in isolation, but of the relationship petween a current perception and some past or future perceptions—they are strictly contextual. Even the first attribute (atypicalness) isjudged relative to the entire set of perceptions that an individual experiences during lifetime. Thusit, like the others, tends to support Descartes's contention that the only way to tell whether a perception is genuine is to consider that perception in the context of the individual's other perceptions. ‘The attributes isolated in The Matrix likewise support Descartes over Berkeley, Recall the three attributes mentioned as clues that certain of 'Neo's perceptions were nongenuine: (1) Neo's “wakingup” experience at ‘MM 32:00, which, at the very least, calls into question the genuineness of the preceding perceptions; 2) the atypicalness of some of Neo's percep- ‘tions; and (3) Neo’s experiences throughout the latter part of the movie flesh out the hows and whys of the matrix. According to the first third attributes, earlier perceptions are judged nongenuine because "something that happens later. The second attribute is one we have ‘met in the discussion of Vanilla Sky. Hlere, as there, atypicalness contextual attribute. ‘upshot from the preceding few paragraphs reinforces the claim Berkeley got it wrong: there may be nothing about a nongenuine on that marks it off as nongenuine—its nongenuineness maySKEPTICISM only be ascertained by considering the perceptions that went before and after it in an individual's stream of consciousness. This explains why it is difficult for human beings ‘ceptions in dreams as nongenuine while those per ° ssperienced. After the fact, when the abrupt discontinuity in perception occurs upon waking up, the indi Vidual has no problem at all in identifying the previous perceptions as nongenuine, Skepticism is not concerned so much with individual perceptions as it is with our entire mental lives. How can I know that I am not massively deluded about th of an external world? The p: g dis- ‘cussion provides us with a new way of describing skepticism: How can I know that I will not have perceptions in the future (for example, the ‘ypical abrupt discontinuity in perception that corresponds to waking up) that will invalidate my current perceptions and all my perceptions that have come before? The response the skeptic would give to both ways of posing the question is the same: I can't know Before we leave this section, there isan important disanalogy between lla Sky and The Matrix that bears mentioning: The Matrix never con. the possibility that there are no material objects whatsoever, nor that Neo exists in some physical form or other; whereas this is consistent with the interpretation of Vanilla Sky that explains the entire narrative asa dream, The consistent skeptic would say that you cannot be justified in claimin to know that any physical body exists anywhere, Itis possible that jou are nothing buta bunch of perceptions; tis possible that there is no phys body that corresponds to you. Recall that this is the quandary in which Descartes found himself at the end of his first meditation. He can doubt the existence of all material objects; he can even doubt the existence of his own body; but he cannot doubt his existence as a thing that thinks 1.5 Hume's Radical Skepticism Was Descartes overstepping the evidence when he pronounced his famous, “I think; therefore, I exist”? Some philosophers who came after Descartes thought even this limited claim to knowledge was unjustified. In this section, we shall consider the views of David Hume (1711-1776) who argued that not only can the existence of an external world be doubted, but even the existence of a centralized and continuous self can be doubted. Hume’s skepticism goes even deeper, since he argued that memory could not be trusted to provide us with certain information about our previous perceptions. What is the J in Descartes’s “I think; therefore, I exist"? Descartes assumed that he could perceive an unchanging self that was the entity doing the perceiving, thinking, and so on. But did Descartes really haveSKEPTICISM. only be ascertained by considering the perceptions that went before and after it in an individual's stream of consciousness. This explains why difficult for human beings to distinguish perceptions in dreams as nongenuine while those perceptions are being experienced. Afier the fact, when the abrupt discontinuity in perception occurs upon waking up, the individual has no problem at all in identifying the previous perceptions as Stepicim isnot concemed so much with individual perceptions ait is with our entire mental lives. How can I know that am not massively deluded about the existence of an external world? The preceding discussion provides us with a new way of describing skepticism: How can I know that I will not have perceptions in the future (for example, the typical abrupt discontinuity in perception that corresponds to waking up) that will invalidate my current perceptions and all my perceptions that have come before? The response the skeptic would give to both ways of posing the question is the same: I can’t know. Before we leave this section, there is an important disanalogy between Vanilla Sky and The Matrix that bears mentioning: The Matrix never con- siders the possibility that there are no material objects whatsoever, nor that Neo exists in some physical form or other; whereas this is consistent with the interpretation of Vanilla Sky that explains the entire narrative asa dream. ‘The consistent skeptic would say that you cannotbe justified in claiming to know that any physical body exists anywhere. Itis possible that you are nothing but a bunch of perceptions; itis possible that there is no physical body that corresponds to you. Recall that this is the quandary in which Descartes found himself at the end of his first meditation, He can doubt the existence of all material objects; he can even doubt the existence of his own body; but he cannot doubt his existence as a thing that thinks. 1.5. Hume's Radical Skepticism Was Descartes overstepping the evidence when he pronounced his famous, “I think; therefore, I exist”? Some philosophers who came after Descartes thought even this limited claim to knowledge was unjustified. In this section, we shall consider the views of David Hume (1711-1776) who argued that not only can the existence of an external world be doubted, but even the existence of a centralized and continuous self can be doubted, Hume's skepticism goes even deeper, since he argued that memory could not be trusted to provide us with certain information about our previous perceptions. What is the J in Descartes’s “I think; therefore, I exist"? Descartes assumed that he could perceive an unchanging self that was the entity doing the perceiving, thinking, and so on, But did Descartes really have SKEPTICISM such a perception? Do you ever have a perception of yourself as a continuous, unchanging self? I am not speaking here of a perception such as that of seeing yourself in a mirror over an extended period of time; wwe are not dealing here with issues of your bodily existence, Rather, I am asking whether you can discern some unchanging thing (your self) in the flux of thoughts and perceptions that occur. At this point, this is probably striking you as an even stranger question than “Have you ever, perceived an external object®” But, if you consider it, you may well find agreement with Hume, who argued that When I enter most intimately into what I call myself; I always stumble on some particular perception or other ... [however], Tnever can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. ... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity init at one time, nor identity... whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. ‘The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind.” ‘According to Hume, we have no evidence that an unchanging self exists, since all we are ever aware of are fleeting thoughts and perceptions. To theextent thata elf exists at all, itis nothing buta bundle of thoughtsand perceptions. Hume would say that, in pronouncing “T think; therefore, Texist," Descartes never considered the possibility that there is no; realy, all Descartes could know with certainty was that thoughts and perceptions exist. It was an unjustified leap on Descartes's part from “thoughts exist” to"Lexist.” ‘Yet things geteven weirder than that. Consider memories. Whatare the conditions fora memory’sbeing genuine? In some ways the conditions are Jess stringent than the conditions for genuineness of a perception: there sno requirement that an external object exists. Thus, [can havea genuine ‘memory of a perception I had during my dream last night. In order for ‘one of my memories to be genuine: (1) a previous perception must have ited, (2) that previous perception must be causally responsible for current memory, and (3) the current memory must accurately rep- tthe previous perception. These conditions should look familiar, they are the same conditions used for genuineness of a percep- with the phrase “previous perception” substituted for “external e der the scene in Vanilla Sky in which Brian and David are driv- the gym and are almost hit by @ truck. Brian remarks in jest that,SKEPTICISM t, David's life flashed before his ey experienced having memories of things that actually happened to Dan Ieseems reasonable to assume that Brian was trying to be humorous t that happened to someone else. Suppose | have vivid recollestions having been present at the Battle of Waterloo. T genuinely believe d Twas present at Waterloo. I can picture in my mind's eye the way t battlefield was set up, where the opposing camps the weather was like, and s0 on, These recollections are indisting able in vividness and my ability to call them up from recollections brushing my teeth this morning, While I may have the fecling of reme bering being present atthe Battle of Waterloo, Ido not have age memory of having been at Waterloo unless conditions (1) to (area isfied. Can I know that these conditions are satisfied? No, a6 Ihave way of “pecking around” my memory and judging that: was cous the genuineness of current perceptions: in both eaxes, knowecige Tent perception and something else) that is not attainable. This me radical form of skepticism, called solipsism of the present moment, the claim that all that can be known with certainty are the momenth moment perceptions and thoughts that flitby. Whether a centralized se 1.6 Responses to Skepticism ‘Skepticism is rather unsettling thesis (the ancient skeptics notwithstanc ing). If we follow the line of reasoning that begins with the claim that w are not directly aware of objects,* we sex inexorably to soli sism of the present moment. But, do we have to start down that path Two important philosophers in the modern era, George Berkeley a Immanuel Kant, argued that we do not. Their ways of avoiding that pat are the topics of this section. George Berkeley (1685: ew that our perceptions giv erience of objects. For him, the fact that Descartes's cain (that we are not directly aware of objects) leads to skepticism is reaso1 enough to reject the claim as obviously untrue.? This type of argumen is called reductio ad absurdum (reduction to a contradiction). In t m of reasoning, one assumes that a statement is true (for example assumes that Descartes's theory of representative perceptions i true), then demonstrates that that assumption implies a contradiction This shows that the original statement was false. Oftentimes, reductieSKEPTICISM for a brief moment, David's life flashed before his eyes-that is, Brian ‘experienced having memories of things that actually happened to David. Itseems reasonable to assume that Brian was trying to be humorous, but ‘one can ask the question whether I can experience memories of events that happened to someone else. Suppose I have vivid recollections of having been present at the Battle of Waterloo. I genuinely believe that T was present at Waterloo, I can picture in my mind's eye the way the battlefield was set up, where the opposing camps were located, what the weather was like, and so on. These recollections are indistinguishable in vividness and my ability to call them up from recollections of brushing my teeth this morning. While I may have the feeling of remem- bering being present at the Battle of Waterloo, I do not have a genuine memory of having been at Waterloo unless conditions (1) to (3) are satisfied. Can I know that these conditions are satisfied? No, as I have no way of “pecking around” my memory and judging that it was caused by some earlier perception. Note the similarity between skepticism with respect to the genuineness of memories and skepticism with respect to the genuineness of current perceptions: in both cases, knowledge of genuineness requires access to something (a connection between a current perception and something else) that is not attainable. This most radical form of skepticism, called solipsism of the present moment, is, the claim that all that can be known with certainty are the momentby- moment perceptions and thoughts that fit by. Whether a centralized self is experiencing those perceptions cannot be known, nor can the accuracy ‘of memories. 1.6. Responses to Skepticism ‘Skepticism is rather unsettling thesis (the ancient skeptics notwithstand- ing). If we follow the line of reasoning that begins with the claim that we are not directly aware of objects,® we seem to be led inexorably to solipsism of the present moment. But, do we have to start down that path? ‘Two important philosophers in the modern era, George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant, argued that we do not. Their ways of avoiding that path are the topics of this section. George Berkeley (1685-1758) held the view that our perceptions give us direct experience of objects. For him, the fact that Descartes’s claim (that we are not directly aware of objects) leads to skepticism is reason, enough to reject the claim as obviously untrue.’ This type of argument is called reduetio ad absurdum (reduction to a contradiction). In this form of reasoning, one assumes that a statement is true (for example, fone assumes that Descartes's theory of representative perceptions is, true), then demonstrates that that assumption implies a contradiction. This shows that the original statement was false. Oftentimes, reductio SKEPTICISM, arguments weaken the requirement that a contradiction must be impli Instead of a contradiction, all that is required to falsify the assumed state- ‘ment is to show that it implies something that is highly counterintuitive ‘or unacceptable on some other grounds. Berkeley believed that skepti- ism is sufficiently unacceptable as to falsify the assumptions that give tise to it. These assumptions are: (I) the view that we are not directly ‘aware of objects in perception, and (2) the view of genuineness that goes long with this, namely the theory of representative perceptions. Once Berkeleyhas rejected this theory, the burden is on him to say what perceptions are, ifnot representations of external (mind:independent) objects. In the next several paragraphs we will consider Berkeley's response to this challenge. Of the two movies used in this chapter, The Matrix has the closest affinity to the concerns and claims of Berkeley, so I shall be drawing most of my examples from it. Berkeley held the view known as idealism, which claims that there ‘are no such things as mind-independent objects. Rather, objects are collections of perceptions: “to be is to be perceived.” A significant portion of Berkeley's magnum opus, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, is included in the section Readings from Primary Sources. As Berkeley notes in that work, [AIIl the ... furniture of the earth ... have not any subsistence without a mind ... their being is to be perceived or known ... consequently, so Tong as they are not actually perceived by me for do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spit, they must cither have no existence at all or else subsist in the ‘mind of some External Spirit-itbeing perfectly unintelligible. toattribute to any single part of them an existence independent of aspirit.”” ‘On firsthearing this theory sounds outlandish, However, Berkeley makes the case that the theory, despite its initial strangeness, accords quite well ‘our usual way of talking about our experience of objects; hence itis, ‘to common sense than the theory of objects one finds in Descartes. Berkeley holds that the theory of representative perceptions is 1's confusion, not the view of Joe Everyman. An additional jinidealism’s favors that it avoids skepticism (atleastin itsstandard described in terms of “skepticism regarding external objects"). to idealism, objects are nothing but collections of per- . To the extent that a perception “represents” anything (as in of representative perceptions), it represents this collection cism-generating gulf between what T can know (my current states) and objects disappears; all I need to do in order to x there is really a telephone in front of me is to open myTT SKEPTICISM nd—voilal—there it is. Objects are not mind-independent th yut there,” Even though Berkeley doesn’t rely on accuracy of representation dlistinguish between genuine and nongenuine perceptions, he dow ognize a difference between the two. If this were not the case, Berleel theory would be very far from common sense indeed. We have alne inet the signs Berkeley uses to distinguish real from imaginary | ceptions in section 14. Real perceptions (1) are more vivid, (9) independently of the will, and (8) are connected to preceding « subsequent perceptions in a way that imaginary perceptions are 4 However, as our analyses of genuine v perceptions Vanilla Sky and The Matrix have made cleat, these conditions do 1 allow Berkeley to avoid all forms of skepticism. Recall how the ment from section 1.4 went. With regard to the vividness condith David's and Neo’s genuine perceptions were indistinguishable from th ongenuine ones. In addition, in both cases, the two characcers’ p ceptions arose independently of their wills. Finally, connectedne: a property that cannot be judged until the last perception is in, sin there is always the chance that an abrupt discontinuity in the etre of consciousness will occur some time in the future that will mark t preceding perceptions off as “nongenuine.” Thus, despite the fact th idealism is seen as an antidote to skepticism, it is not up to the ch, lenge. General skepticism is avoided, but Descartes’s problem is le unsolved, Berkeley's three signs of genuineness would all be satistic by many of the (clearly) nongenuine perce and Neo, Berkeley argues that there are additional reasons in favor of idealist above and beyond a desire to avoid skepticism. I shall consider here ond one of these arguments, We can sce the outline of the argument in th closing sentence of the quotation above: “it [is] perfectly unintelligible {o atribute to any single part of [objects] an existence independent of spiric™ Berkeley held that itis not possible to even conceive ofthe unped ved existence of objects, since, were Ito try, I would do so by frantin, the idea of an unperceived object in my mind. But this idea of an anpen ceived object is itself a perception (perception here and throughout dha Test of this chapter means not just sensory perception but also percep tion in thought). But now look at what I've done; Lam pe: Presumably unperceived object—a contradiction. One can in following conversation between Descartes to conceive of mind-independent objec Detcartes: Ican perfectly well think about mind-independent object, In fact, 'm doing so right now. I'm thinking about a tree deep in an uninhabited forest.SKEPTICISM, eyes and—voilal—there it is. Objects are not mind-independent things “out there.” Even though Berkeley doesn’t rely on accuracy of representation to distinguish between genuine and nongenuine perceptions, he does recognize a difference between the two. If this were not the case, Berkeley's theory would be very far from common sense indeed. We have already met the signs Berkeley uses to distinguish real from imaginary per ceptions in section 1.4. Real perceptions (1) are more vivid, (2) arise independently of the will, and (3) are connected to preceding and subsequent perceptions in a way that imaginary perceptions are not. ‘However, as our analyses of genuine versus nongenuine perceptions in Vanilla Sky and The Marie have made clear, these conditions do not, allow Berkeley to avoid all forms of skepticism. Recall how the argu- ‘ment from section 14 went. With regard to the vividness condition, David’s and Neo’s genuine perceptions were indistinguishable from their nongenuine ones. In addition, in both cases, the two characters’ perceptions arose independently of their wills. Finally, connectedness is a property that cannot be judged until the last perception is in, since there is always the chance that an abrupt discontinuity in the stream of consciousness will occur some time in the future that will mark the preceding perceptions off as “nongenuine.” Thus, despite the fact that idealism is seen as an antidote to skepticism, it is not up to the chal lenge. General skepticism is avoided, but Descartes’s problem is left unsolved. Berkeley's three signs of genuineness would all be satisfied by many of the (clearly) nongenuine perceptions experienced by David and Neo. Berkeley argues that there are additional reasons in favor of idealism above and beyond a desire to avoid skepticism. I shall consider here only one of these arguments. We can see the outline of the argument in the closing sentence of the quotation above: “it [is] perfectly unintelligible to attribute to any single part of fobjects] an existence independent of a spirit.” Berkeley held that itis not possible to even conceive of the unper= ceived existence of objects, since, were I to try, I would do so by framing: the idea of an unperceived object in my mind. But this idea of an unperceived object i itself a perception (perception here and throughout the rest of this chapter means not just sensory perception but also perception in thought). But now look at what I've done; I am perceiving this presumably unperceived object—a contradiction. One can imagine the following conversation between Descartes and Berkeley on our (in)ability to conceive of mindindependent objects: Descartes: Ican perfectly well think about mind-independent objects. In fact, I'm doing so right now. I'm thinking about a tree deep in an uninhabited forest. SKEPTICISM, Berkeley: So, even if no one is looking at this tree, at least you ‘thinking about it. Isn't that true? Descartes: Yes, like I said, 'm thinking about this tree. Berkeley: But the tree is supposed to be mindindependent. Descartes: And itis. Berkeley: But itis not independent of your mind. Descartes: I disagree. True, I am thinking about it right now, but its existence doesn't depend on that fact. Berkeley: But your thinking about it right now certainly does. How could you, or anyone for that matter, be 50 inconsistent as to say that you can think about something that is not being thought about by anyone? Isn't the patent absurdity of this claim obvious? Descartes: Okay, how about this? Iam thinking abouta tree right now that will continue to exist later, even after I have forgotten about it. Now that is a thought of a mind-independent tree. Berkeley: No, that is a confusion. What’s at issue here is whether this tree will be conceived of by you at that point. Descartes: At what point? Berkeley: At the point at which you stop thinking about it. Descartes: No, that’s what it means to say “I've stopped thinking about it.” i Berkeley: So, you admit, at that point, you won't be conceiving of an idea of this unthoughtabout tree? Descartes: That's correct. Berkeley: So we agree, then-you can’t conceive of a mind- independent object. : Deseartes: No, we don’t agree. I can’t put my finger on it, but there's something fishy here. Irrespective of whether there is “something fishy” here or not, you ‘get Berkeley's point: it is not possible to conceive of a so-called mind- ident object, because, the minute you try to do so, the original iption of the object (that itis not being perceived or conceived of anyone) is no longer correct. How, Berkeley asks rhetorically, could build a theory around a concept, that of mind-independent that no one can possibly conceive of? : t readers probably had the following reaction while reading above imaginary conversation between Descartes and Berkeley: 's theory has some really weird consequences. It is strange thought he was capturing the commonsense notion of object. Pll buy that I can't think about something that’s not being thought -ButI don't buy that these unperceived or unthoughtabout objects ist whenever they are not being thought about or perceived by If thisview were correct, then the moment I stop looking at myTT SKEPTICISM Phone—poof!—it ceases to exist. Then, when I look at it again—poo Pops ack into existence. Idon't buy this, and neither willJoc Every Berkeley himself recognized that his view seemed to be at odds with win this regard, so he worked up an explanation of ‘allow for the existence of umperceived objects. Hence, Be “jerky” existence of objectsexis tent the next, In some respects, the fame pithy summary of Berkeley's view “to be isto be perceived" is mislead, for this way of putting it does seem to imply that unperceived objects not possibly exist; but Berkeley's view is more subtle than that. Itturne that Berkeley gives two (competing?) explanations of how unperee! objects exist. In some passages,"" he states that, even if no finite rq is perceiving an object, God, who perceives everything,}? is neverthel perceiving it. According to Berkeley, itis God who not only preserves the continue existence of unperceived objects but also maintains the coherence perceptions, both within an individual and between individuals Although it may sound strange to put it this way, the matrix prog in The Matrix plays the same ro nd interindi ual Coherence and access to publicly observable objects that God pli Within Berkeley’ theory. Let us take these one by one. Neo's experiene while in the matrix are internally coherent. He turns his head and 1 field of vision changes. He turns his head back. What he now sees h not changed radically from a few moments ago. He looks down and se his hands—d hands he has seen thousands of times over in b life. Think about this for a moment. The “real” Neo is in a vat, he isn jsccing” anything, at least not with his eyes. So, this coherence with his own perceptions is not something that results from the fact that tt “real” world is not changing much from moment to moment. Rather, t ‘matrix, in feeding electrical impulses to Neo's nervous system, is takin are to do so in such a way that coherence is not sacrificed, Take anothe example. Neo's brain (in the vat) sends out electrical impulses that, in ormal human being, would cause the muscle contractions correspone ing o walking, The matrix notices thisand changes the electrical impulse feeding Neo’s sensory pathways in the brain so that (1) his field af viex changes appropriately, and (2) he receives tactile information, if kis com manded movement would have brought him into contact with anothe object. jhe matrixalso maintains interindividual coherence and accessto pub ficly observable objects. though the rationale fr thisis never explainee in the movie, the matrix program coordinates the sensory information {or fact of the human beings in vats, so that they are all participants in the same virtual world. (Actually, this shared virtual world is hevet *plicitly stated; however, several things in the movie strongly implSKEPTICISM phone—poofl~it ceases to exist. Then, when I look at it again—poofl-it pops back into existence. [don'tbuy this, and neither will Joe Everyman.” Berkeley himself recognized that his view seemed to be at odds with the commonsense view in this regard, so he worked up an explanation of how idealism did allow for the existence of unperceived objects. Hence, Berke- ley’s view is not committed to the “jerky” existence of objects—existent ‘one moment and nonexistent the next. In some respects, the famous, pithy summary of Berkeley's view “to be is to be perceived” is misleading, for this way of putting it does scem to imply that unperceived objects cannot possibly exist; but Berkeley’s viewis more subtle than that. Itturns out that Berkeley gives two (competing?) explanations of how unperceived objects exist. In some passages, he states that, even if no finite mind is perceiving an object, God, who perceives everything, is nevertheless perceiving it, ‘According to Berkeley, it is God who not only preserves the continuous existence of unperceived objects but also maintains the coherence of perceptions, both within an individual and between individuals. Although it may sound strange to put it this way, the matrix program in The Matrix plays the same role in preserving intra- and interindividual coherence and access to publicly observable objects that God plays within Berkeley's theory. Let us take these one by one. Neo’s experiences while in the matrix are internally coherent. He turns his head and his field of vision changes. He turns his head back. What he now sees has not changed radically from a few moments ago. He looks down and sees his hands—the same hands he has seen thousands of times over in his life. Think about this for a moment. The “real” Neo is in a vat; he is not “seeing” anything, at least not with his eyes. So, this coherence within his own perceptions is not something that results from the fact that the “real” world is not changing much from moment to moment. Rather, the matrix, in feeding electrical impulses to Neo's nervous system, is taking care to do so in such a way that coherence is not sacrificed. Take another example. Neo’s brain (in the vat) sends out electrical impulses that, in a normal human being, would cause the muscle contractions corresponding to walking, The matrix notices this and changes the electrical impulses feeding Neo's sensory pathways in the brain so that (1) his field of view changes appropriately, and (2) he receives tactile information, if his com- manded movement would have brought him into contact with another object. ‘The matrix also maintains interindividual coherence and access to pub- lily observable objects. Although the rationale for thisis never explained in the movie, the matrix program coordinates the sensory information, for each of the human beings in vats, so that they are all participants in the same virtual world. (Actually, this shared virtual world is never explicitly stated; however, several things in the movie strongly imply it) SKEPTICISM. ‘Thus, not only are Neo-in-the-vat’s perceptions coherent, his percepti take into account the virtual actions of other human beings in vats. He and other human beings ean interact with the same publicly observable (albeit virtual) objects. ‘Maybe, then, Berkeley would say that matrix generated perceptions are real. Would this response be wise on his part? I think not, for several reasons. First, Berkeley took himself as supporting the commonsense view of objects against the “philosopher's confusion’ view of objects that peo ple like Descartes put forward. I don't think there can be any doubt that the commonsense response is that matrix-generated perceptions are not real, no matter how vivid and intra- and interpersonally coherent they are. Furthermore, the matrix cannot guarantee continued coherence. Even within the movie (recall the double black cat scene [MM 78:30]), small glitches or changes in the matrix produce minor, local incoher- ence. Berkeley's infinite God, on the other hand, guarantees absolute coherence. ‘What is posterity’s final assessment of Berkelian idealism? The com- ‘mon view among present-day philosophers is that Berkeley's avoidance of skepticism turned out to be an illusion: while his brand of idealism ‘does avoid skepticism in its classical form (stated in terms of our knowl edge of external objects) it succumbs to a variant form. The idealist wants to maintain a distinction between genuine and nongenuine perceptions, yet, as we have seen, the three signs of genuine perceptions offered by Berkeley are not adequate: many nongenuine perceptions (for example, those experienced by Neo while plugged into the matrix) possess ll three ‘of genuineness. Dpericey' defeat did not mean the end of the struggle to refute skepti- ism. In the remainder of this section, we shall consider the views of the {great German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kantis one of the most influential thinkers in the history of philosophy. is also one of the most obscure and difficultto-read writers in the of the discipline, as even a cursory glance through his highly Gritique of Pure Reason will attest. Kant believed that no one to Jhad successfully countered skepticism, and took the failure to refute sm as a major “scandal” within philosophy. As he described it, {Mt stil remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason general that the existence of things outside us ... must be merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by satisfactory proof.'® ‘agreed with Berkeley that the theory of representative percep- inevitably to skepticism, Thus, in Kant’ reworking of a theoryaD SKEPTICISM of objects, the theory of representative perceptions had to go: whatey Perception represents itcannotbean external, mind.indepenceneat (hat Kant called a “thing in itself). But he believed that Berkeleye ory had equally fatal flaws: it did not recognize the role the actin » Plays in influencing our experience of the world. As we shall we. Ka new ing at the relationship between the mind and the we had revolutionary consequences in epistemology and, indeed, hal cussions throughout much of th will be the topic of | The most important item to know about Kant’s philosophy is that distinguished between the world of objects as revealed by experience Kant’s terminology, the “phenomenal world”) and the (perey cor tural) world of things in themselves (the “noumenal world”), Arco knowledge was restricted to the phenomenal world. He 4n cartess (and Hume's) mistake as thinking that skeptci would be refuted only if we could gain knowledge of the noumenat nat For Kant, the noumenal world always had the status of an “I know ¢ what..." One mayassume that the objectsin the phenomenal world be me relation to things in themselves, but even that must alse reme conjecta Kant’s way of approaching philosophy is often described as revo! tionary, in that it challenged what previous philosophers took be d logical order of inv. n. The similarity between Kant’s new w of looking at the world and the Copernican revolution in astroneamn sometimes remarked upon. Copernicus’s major contribution te sete ‘omy was to overturn the then-standard view of the heavens, according which the earth is at the center of the solar system. Copernicus shove that the movement of heavenly bodies could be explained in a much ee Pler fashion if one reversed the then-standard view. Thus, Coperni inferred that the sun (not the earth) was a the center ofthe solaesyeten The earth, along with several other planets, revolves around the sus Just so, Kant reversed the order of philosophical investigation. Earlig Philosophers (for example, Descartes) held a view of objects a3 ming independent entities. With this assumption in place, these philosopher would ask, “How do these mind independent objects affect the ming ane how can the mind gain knowledge of them?” Thus, the Cartesian ore of enquiry is that first you decide what objects are and then you asl questions about the possibilty of obtaining knowledge of these objects Kant, like Copernicus, asks: What happens if we switch the order? What happens if we assume we have knowledge of the world, then ask what the world must be like, given this knowledge? Since Descartes and Hume hhad so litle success in defending against skepticism with the standard approach, Kant’s attitude is: Lets give this new way a try and see what happens. As he writes, “We must ... make tial whether we may not haveSKEPTICISM of objects, the theory of representative perceptions had to go: whatever a perception represents, it cannotbe an external, mind-independent object, (what Kant called a “thing in itself"). But he believed that Berkeley's the- ‘ory had equally fatal flaws: it did not recognize the role the active mind plays in influencing our experience of the world. As we shall see, Kant’s new way of looking at the relationship between the mind and the world had revolutionary consequences in epistemology and, indeed, had repercussions throughout much of the rest of philosophy. These repercussions. will be the topic of Chapter 2. ‘The most important item to know about Kant's philosophy is that he distinguished between the world of objects as revealed by experience (in Kant’s terminology, the “phenomenal world”) and the (purely conjec- tural) world of things in themselves (the “noumenal world”), According to Kant, knowledge was restricted to the phenomenal world. He would describe Descartes's (and Hume's) mistake as thinking that skepticism would be refuted only if we could gain knowledge of the noumenal world. For Kant, the noumenal world always had the status of an “I know not, what...” One mayassume that the objects in the phenomenal world bore some relation (o things in themselves, but even that must also remain conjecture. Kant’s way of approaching philosophy is often described as revolutionary, in that it challenged what previous philosophers took to be the logical order of investigation. The similarity between Kant’s new way of looking at the world and the Copernican revolution in astronomy is sometimes remarked upon. Copernicus's major contribution to astronomy was to overturn the then-standard view of the heavens, according t0 which the earth is at the center of the solar system. Copernicus showed that the movement of heavenly bodies could be explained in a much sim- pler fashion if one reversed the then-standard view. Thus, Copernicus inferred that the sun (not the earth) was at the center of the solar system, ‘The earth, along with several other planets, revolves around the sun. Just so, Kant reversed the order of philosophical investigation. Earlier philosophers (for example, Descartes) held a view of objects as mind- independent entities. With this assumption in place, these philosophers ‘would ask, “How do these mind independent objects affect the mind and. how can the mind gain knowledge of them?” Thus, the Cartesian order of enquiry is that first you decide what objects are and then you ask questions about the possibility of obtaining knowledge of these objects. Kant, like Copernicus, asks: What happens if we switch the order? What happens if we assume we have knowledge of the world, then ask what the world must be like, given this knowledge? Since Descartes and Hume. had so little success in defending against skepticism with the standard approach, Kant's attitude is: Let's give this new way a try and see what happens. As he writes, “We must... make trial whether we may not have SKEPTIC M ‘more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects m conform to our knowledge.” ‘Kant has turned the mind/world relation on its head. Previously, philosophers had viewed the mind asa passive perceiver of realty: via per Ception, our mind receives occasional snapshots of what is “out there.” For Kant, realty isn’t “out there” at all. It is “in here” and it is something that our mind constructs. Don’t be misled: the use of spatial terms out” and “in” is purely metaphorical, since space and time themselves are also “in here.” Likewise, I (my phenomenal self) am also “in here,” along with the other objects that make up the world of experience. A. ind is like a factory. The raw materials are sense perceptions. The ‘output is the world of experience (the phenomenal world). The rules Used to forge the world out of perceptions—the cognitive machinery— are innate. A somewhat simplified version of Kant's theory is offered in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, excerpted here in Readings from Primary Sources. Kant’s method of doing philosophy is to look Deyond (to “transcend” experience in order to understand the cognitive machinery creating it. Once you understand what principles the mind tuses to construct the phenomenal world (the world of experience), you ‘will know what the necessary attributes of all experience are, such that no human being could have a conscious experience that deviated from these principles. One of these principles identified by Kant is that the ‘world is made up of objects. My mind necessarily interprets perceptions fas perceptions of ebjects—it cannot do otherwise. Whether other sorts of beings with a radically different kind of consciousness could use different principles is a question that Kant leaves open. Ata minimum, for beings Tike us with a consciousness of a coherent world filled with causally interacting objects, we could not have a conscious experience that deviated from these principles. "Within Kant's framework, the skeptic’ challenge can be reformulated: The certain that my perceptions accurately represent objects in the Kant would answer: Yes, you can, because you could not have a tion that failed to accurately represent objects in the world; how- = you should not misinterpret these represented objects as things in fs theory can help us understand what may be happening in acou- scenes in Vanilla Sky involving things that occur without David's For example, recall that the action remains briefly inthe eleva- after David has successfully escaped from the guard at the LE [MM 114], Ifthe narrative at this point in the film is David's |, what is this doing here? Is it possible to explain this fact in a is consistent with the general interpretation of this being part of ‘Kant offers usa way. A brief discussion will provide some insight the active mind plays in Kant’s theory. I think Kant wouldSKEPTICISM say that the post-splice narrative is the phenomenal world being ge ited by David's mind. The lucid dream contains many holes abe, Happens to objects (and people) while David is not actively peroet them. David's mind uses the perceptions contained in the lucid da ‘o construct a coherent narrative. Things aren't that much different, Re, Consider an everyday example. I leave outgoing mail in the * Pox in my department office at time t;. An hour later (time ts) Tc. back in the department office and note that the picce of mail| ts is now missing. Do T assume that the piece of mail has vanished | thin air? No. I “fil in the gap” by inserting a piece of narrative into phenomenal world between ty and tg that has an administrative aise Boing to the mailbox and dropping the letter in. While I may explic picture to myself the assistant’s doing this, I don’t have to. All tha necessary in order to fillin the gap in my narrative is that the assists doing this becomes part of the phenomenal world my mind censecg Similarly, just before t Left my ov office, to return shortly after te. ¢ my return, my desk telephone was just where Tefe it.I fill in th the phone’s staying put during that interval. (By the way, my deck a) faved put during that interval.) My mind does all of this automatiea) Indeed, it requires some mental exertion to even make myself avare {ie fact that my mind has filled in the gaps in my perceptions in ‘bat ve Xantls great contribution was noticing that and then describing how a mind does this. As I mentioned previously, Kant’s views have been widely influential hineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy; he is not, howev out his detractors. He, like Berkeley, cannot solve Des artes's probler Kant recognized the distinction betwe "en genuine and nongenuine pe ms; howeve us with no means of determinin, eption occurs, whether that perception genuine or not. Many philosophers have credited Kant as the sovcce the Emergence of philosophical relativism within modernism and pos modernism. We shall revisit Kant's theory in Chapter 2 and consider th charge some level against him: that he has refuted general skeptics but at the cost of making all knowledge subjective (that is: relate we single individual), 1.7 The Dangers and Lessons of Skepticism What is an appropriate response to skepticism? ‘The ancient skeptics believed that blissful detachment from the world ‘as the appropriate (and natural) response to our lack of knowledge about even the mos basic things. Few have followed them in this regard, although Cipher's traitorous act in The Matris (betraying his comrades in ordes to reenter ‘hematrixasa wealthy and powerful person) shows that atleast forsome,SKEPTICISM say that the postsplice narrative is the phenomenal world being generated by David's mind. The lucid dream contains many holes about what happens to objects (and people) while David is not actively perceiving them, David's mind uses the perceptions contained in the lucid dream, to construct a coherent narrative. Things aren't that much different with ‘me. Consider an everyday example. I leave outgoing mail in the “out” box in my department office at time t. An hour later (time tg) I come back in the department office and note that the piece of mail I left at 1 is now missing. Do I assume that the piece of mail has vanished into thin air? No. I “il in the gap” by inserting a piece of narrative into the phenomenal world between ty and tg that has an administrative assistant going to the mailbox and dropping the letter in. While I may explicitly picture to myself the assistant’s doing this, I don’t have to. All that is necessary in order to fill in the gap in my narrative is that the assistant’s doing this becomes part of the phenomenal world my mind constructs. Similarly, just before tg [left my own office, to return shortly after tg. On ‘my return, my desk telephone was just where [left it fil in the gap with the phone’s staying put during that interval. (By the way, my desk also stayed put during that interval.) My mind does all of this auromatically. Indeed, it requires some mental exertion to even make myself aware of the fact that my mind has filled in the gaps in my perceptions in that way. Kant’ great contribution was noticing that and then describing how the mind does this. ‘As I mentioned previously, Kant’s views have been widely influential in nineteenth- and twentiethcentury philosophy; he is not, however, with: out his detractors. He, like Berkeley, cannot solve Descartes's problem. Kant recognized the distinction between genuine and nongenuine per ceptions; however, his theory provides us with no means of determining, at the time a particular perception occurs, whether that perception is genuine or not, Many philosophers have credited Kant as the source for the emergence of philosophical relativism within modernism and post modernism. We shall revisit Kant’s theory in Chapter 2 and consider the ‘charge some level against him: that he has refuted general skepticism, but at the cost of making all knowledge subjective (that is, relative to a single individual). 1.7 The Dangers and Lessons of Skepticism. ‘What is an appropriate response to skepticism? The ancient skeptics believed that blissful detachment from the world was the appropriate (and natural) response to our lack of knowledge about even the most basic things. Few have followed them in this regard, although Cipher's traitorous act in The Matrix (betraying his comrades in order to re-enter the matrix asa wealthy and powerful person) shows that, atleast for some, SKEPTICISM skepticism is not something to worry oneself about. For Cipher, vir perceptions are just as good as real ones; indeed, if they are pleasant, virtual perceptions are preferable to real perceptions. Cipher’s response certainly isn't shared by Neo; however, David's motivation in opting for LE’s lucid dream option shows that, at least initially, he viewed virtual perceptions as valuable. His choice at the end of the film shows that he had changed his mind. Does it matter whether perceptions are real ‘or not, so long as they are pleasant? We have seen how many philoso- pphers in the modern era saw skepticism as a view to be wrestled with and overcome—so much so that successful refutation of skepticism became the litmus test for the correctness of a theory of objects. Which of these attitudes makes the most sense? You may be surprised to find that David Hume, the greatest defender of skepticism, was also the greatest defender of the claim that skepticism is irrelevant to real life. ‘Were someone to manage to adopt skepticism as a “lifestyle” (to put it in contemporary terms), the results would be catastrophic. As Hume has noted, [NJo durable good can come of [adopting skepticism as a lifestyle). ... [Such a person] cannot expect, that his philosophy will have a constant influence on the mind: Or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish, were his principles uni- yersally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, tll the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. "Hume thought that the chances of skepticism having this sort of impact ‘were small, because he felt no one could maintain skepticism asa lifestyle. ‘minds are wired (o accept the report of our senses as accurate, and is all there is to it. If anything, Hume thought, skepticism is what ‘when reason runs amuck. He felt that the function of human ‘was to aid in practical problem-solving: I want to accomplish A; plan should I adopt to achieve that goal? That sort of activity is the domain of our rational faculty. But sometimes, like a wayward reason escapes its natural bounds and gets into all sorts of mis- Skepticism is one sort of mischief that reason, when not properly ined, can get into.1® Hume wasn’t trying to convince us to adopt skepticism as alifestyle. then, was the purpose of his arguments? He, like many later saw a lesson that skepticism could provide to both philoso- Inonphilosophers alike. Skepticism can serve asa check againstSKEPTICISM matism ofall stripes. The skeptc’sconstantinsistence on the ques hhow do you know that?” can be a very useful refrain in the pticism can also serve as a lesson in humility. I think the g twentieth-century philosopher Bertrand Russell (18. is best: 372-1970) deseri The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very tuncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goce through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from com. mon sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind withour the co-operation or consent of his delibe on, To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are con. temptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we that even the to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty wh: true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many Possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom." iscussion Questions nning of the chapter I posed the question “Can you knc With absolute certainty that you are not dreaming right now?” Ho did you answer the question then? Was your response adequat: How would you answer the question now? 2. What are the similarities between skepticism as found in Descartes first meditation and as found in Vanilla Shy? What are the differences 5. What are the similarities between skepticism as found in Descartes first meditation and as found in The Matrix? What are the differences There are several references in The Matrix to Neo’s feeling t “something isn’t quite right,” even before MM 32:00 (when the “real Neo is “flushed out” of his vat), Would skepticism on Neo’s part hav: been rational during this time period? Would skepticism on David? Part after MM 71:00 have been rational? Would skepticism on you Part constitute rational doubt? What is the-“natural” respons ticism: repugnance, indiffer ence, or contented acceptance? Do you usually remember (at least part of) your dreams? If so, are you generally aware while dreaming that you are dreaming, ar does this recognition only come after yc In either eace evntain

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