Millar vs. Nadres, 74 Phil.

307)

OPINION:

Plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant had a contractual relationship as seller and

purchaser, respectively. For these purposes, the redemption date had passed, a final
conveyance deed had been signed, and Plaintiff-Appellee had received a new certificate of title
and, In November 1934, defendant-appellant charged P200 for the purchase price, followed by
another P200 in November 1935. There was a perfected contract of purchase and sale, not just
an opportunity to repurchase the two parcels of land in question.
Regardless of whether the contract in this case was a perfected sale or merely an option to
repurchase, Defendant-Appellant has forfeited his rights under the contract under Article 1504
because plaintiff-appellee had already rescinded the contract by suing defendant-appellant for
the recovery of certain parcels of land before defendant-appellant could complete payment of
the purchase price. According to the article, the courts cannot grant the defendant-appellant a
new settlement period because the plaintiff-appellee has already chosen to revoke the sale by
bringing the case to reclaim the lands. In fact, by waiting nearly four years after the first date
decided upon, which ended on December 31, 1934, plaintiff-appellee has been exceptionally
generous to defendant-appellant. He finally began legal proceedings to reclaim the parcels of
land in question after waiting too long first before the justice of the peace court on November 9,
1938, and then before the Court of First Instance on March 26, 1940. He was perfectly justified
in taking this stance in the end.
As a result, it makes no difference if defendant-appellant got the letter granting him a new
extension until April 30, 1938. Plaintiff-appellee brought suit to reclaim the lots after making the
second payment of P200 in November 1935, but before defendant-appellee could pay the full
purchase price.
On November 16, 1938, defendant-appellee promised to pay what he said was the balance, but
this bid came after the ejectment proceedings in the justice of the peace court of Tayabas had
been started on November 9, 1938.
This perspective on the case forces me to disagree with the majority opinion's decision that a
factor was needed for the opportunity to repurchase and the extensions thereof. Since the billing
date has expired, the purchaser is entitled to an extension under Article 1504. There is no need
for further thought since the legislation establishes the new date.