IMF Blocks

ToContents
AFFFFFF 2
A2 Global Econ Stability Up 2
A2 Trade Liberalization Up 4
A2 Globalization via Trade Up 5
A2 Women Empowerment Up 7
A2 Climate Finance 7
A2 Global Poverty Reduction 10
A2 Anti Corruption 12
A2 Alleviate Econ Crises 15
A2 Food Insecurity Down 17
A2 Sub Saharan Africa 18
A2 COVID 20
A2 Surveillance 22
A2 Stops Predatory Lending 24
A2 Stops Risky Behavior 24
A2 Has reformed 25
NEGGGGGG 26
A2 Poverty Up 26
A2 Worse Econ Long Term 27
A2 Austerity/Cut Spending Bad 29
A2 Income Inequality Up 30
A2 Neoliberal 31
A2 Bad 4 Ecuador 32
A2 Bad 4 Human Rights 34
A2 Loan Conditionality Bad 36
A2 Surveillance Bad 37
A2 Excessive Risk Taking 38

A2 US Dominance Bad 39
A2 Worse than Alt 39
A2 Not Transparent 40
A2 Aids Corruption 42
A2 Industr Up Climate Ch Up 44
A2 Not Represent World 46
A2 Not Relevant / IMF Failures 47
A2 Helps Dictatorship 50
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A2 Global Econ Stability Up
1. T. Hessler 18 reports the IMF actually decreases economic stability because it’s bailouts worsen
debt crises as seen in Mexico and Asia.
a. In 1995, after paying a $52 billion bailout. Three years later, Mexico's citizens suffered a
sharp decline in real per capita income, regressing to a level last seen in 1974. From the
end of 1994 to the end of 1996, Mexico added $560 billion to its total external debt
because the government bailed out commercial banks by buying all their bad loans.
b. The IMF treated the late 1990s Asian crisis like other emergency situations, giving
assistance only in exchange for structural adjustment policies. The Fund instructed
governments to cut spending, with deepened the economic slowdown.
i. In South Korea, a country whose income approaches European levels,
unemployment skyrocketed from approximately 3% to 10%. "IMF deaths
[suicides]" became common among workers who had lost their jobs and dignity.
ii. In Indonesia, the worst-hit country, poverty rates rose from an official level of
11% before the crisis to 40 to 60 %, and GDP declined by 15% in one year.
iii. Malaysia stood out as a country that refused IMF assistance. While the IMF
mocked this approach when adopted, the Fund later admitted that it succeeded.
2. M. financial and economic stability isn’t solely on the IMF to maintain. Nagpal 21 finds IMF
bailouts are not insurance against economic crises and their effectiveness depends on certain
factors.
a. First, the nature of the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals [including
outward-looking policy or inconsistent weak fundamentals]
b. Second is the nature of the economy’s growth model: [growth driven by domestic
savings or foreign capital, reliant on the manufacturing sector or natural resources —
which determines its vulnerability to external shocks. ]
c. Third is the degree of political stability [and quality of governance which are directly
correlated to effectiveness of policy response.]
3. T Helfer 98 finds Global moral hazard or risky behavior rises when institutions like the IMF
encourage potential borrowing countries to pursue policies that make them more vulnerable to
currency runs and other crises. He quantifies global moral hazard created by IMF has played a
major role in the nearly 100 banking crises in the last 15 years. He says that without these
rescues, banks would have behaved far more prudently.
Hessler 18 - Mexico Asia failure

Hessler, Uwe ( Strategy development for research and technology • Acquisition of nationally and European funded R&T programs •
Chairing of national and European committees and associations) “IMF bailouts — roads to stability or recipes for
disaster?” DW, Apr 2018 https://www.dw.com/en/imf-bailouts-roads-to-stability-or-recipes-for-disaster/a-45338114
In 1995, Mexico was hailed as a shining example of the IMF's new policy, as the country had repaid a baiilout package to the tune of $52
billion (€45 billion). But it would take only a few years that its failures became obvious.
Mexico's citizens suffered a sharp decline in real per capita income, which in 1998 had fallen back to a level last seen in 1974. From the end
of 1994 to the end of 1996, Mexico added $560 billion to its total external debt because the government bailed out mainly commercial banks
to the tune of $545 billion by buying all their bad loans.
Some economists even regard the legacy of the bailouts in Latin America as the beginning of the financial crisis in Asia in the late 1990s. They
claim that the IMF had sent a clear signal to the world that if anything goes wrong, the lender would come to the rescue of investors.
Asia crisis made worse
The late 1990s Asian financial crisis was caused in large part by South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and
Indonesia's heavy reliance on short-term foreign loans and openness to hot money. When it became apparent in 1997 that private
enterprises would not be able to meet their payment obligations, international currency markets panicked and Asian currencies plummeted.
The IMF treated the Asian meltdown like other emergency situations, giving assistance only in exchange for structural adjustment policies. The
Fund instructed governments to cut spending, with the result that this deepened the economic slowdown.
In South Korea, for example, a country whose income approaches European levels, unemployment skyrocketed from approximately 3 percent
to 10 percent. "IMF suicides" became common among workers who had lost their jobs and dignity.
In Indonesia, the worst-hit country, poverty rates rose from an official level of 11 percent before the crisis to 40 to 60 percent, and GDP
declined by 15 percent in one year.
Malaysia stood out as a country that refused IMF assistance and advice. Instead of further opening its economy, Malaysia imposed capital
controls, in an effort to eliminate speculative trading in its currency. While the IMF mocked this approach when adopted,
the Fund later admitted that it succeeded.
Nagpal 21 - bailouts not insurance

Nagpal, Phalasha (Researcher, Oxford Policy Management/ Policy analyst (formerly), Economic Advisory Council to the PM) “IMF
bailouts: Are they really effective?” Hindu Businessline. May 2019.
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/imf-bailouts-are-they-really-effective/article27352471.ece
IMF bailouts are therefore not insurance against economic crisis and their effectiveness depends on
certain factors. First, the nature of the country’s macro-economic fundamentals: outward-looking policy driven by growth strategies or
does it have inconsistent weak fundamentals fuelled by macro-economic populism? Second is the nature of the economy’s growth model:
growth driven by domestic savings or foreign capital, reliant on manufacturing sector or natural resources — which in turn determines its
vulnerability to external shocks. Third is the degree of political stability and quality of governance which are directly correlated to effectiveness
of policy response.
Helfer 98 - moral haz up

Ricki Tigert Helfer. (Vice Chair, US Grameen Foundation engaged in economic development programs for the poverty alleviation,
Member, Board of Directors of the Citizens Committee for Children of New York City)“Rethinking IMF Rescues”. Brookings. 1998.
https://www.brookings.edu/research/rethinking-imf-rescues
Global moral hazard arises when
In fact, the Asian crisis has highlighted two types of moral hazard: global and domestic.
lending by the IMF or individual countries (such as U.S. lending to Mexico in 1994-95) encourages
potential borrowing countries to pursue policies that make them more vulnerable to currency runs
and other crises. Allan Meltzer argues that the global moral hazard created by IMF rescues has played a major role
in the nearly 100 banking crises that have occurred in the developing world in the last 15 years. He
says that without these rescues, banks would have behaved far more prudently. Other participants suggested,
however, that most of these banking crises were not associated with the IMF, had purely domestic origins, and were often caused by poorly
implemented financial liberalization policies.”
A2 Trade Liberalization Up
1. Banton 21 Trade liberalization can pose a threat to developing nations or economies because
they are forced to compete in the same market as stronger economies or nations. This challenge
can stifle established local industries or result in the failure of newly developed industries there.
a. One example is india Topalova 07 finds that trade liberalization led to an increase in
poverty rate and poverty gap in the rural districts where industries more exposed to
liberalization were concentrated. The effect is quite substantial. According to the most
conservative estimates, a district experiencing the mean level of tariff changes saw a 2
percent increase in poverty incidence and a 0.6 percent increase in poverty depth. This
setback represents about 15 percent of India’s progress in poverty reduction over the
1990.
2. economics help. Structural unemployment. Trade liberalisation often leads to a shift in the
balance of an economy. Some industries grow, some decline. Therefore, there may often be
structural unemployment from certain industries closing. Trade liberalisation can often be
painful in the short run, as some industries and some workers suffer from the decline in
uncompetitive firms. Though net economic welfare improves, it can be difficult to compensate
those workers who lose out to international competition.
3. https://www.twn.my/title/negat-cn.htm even if they point to a "modest" positive effect of
liberalization or openness on growth, "such conclusions cannot possibly hold for all the countries
included in the sample." Other surveys, such as those of Sebastian Edwards (1993), Dani Rodrik
(1995) and Gerald Helleiner (1995), broadly conclude that trade policy changes do not matter
very much. Helleiner, in particular, argues that a stable, and preferably weak, exchange rate is
the best single explanation of successful trade performance not trade liberalizaiton.
a. African economies, whose comparative advantage lay in peasant production,
were expected to show an improvement because of trade liberalization, they
have experienced a worsening in income distribution.
4. T. O’Neill 21 reports that free trade is bad and has disadvantaged workers in many developed
countries, including the United States, and these market-based approaches have proven
inadequate in tackling global crises such as climate change.
5. DL. Liberalization doesn’t matter if the countries the IMF is helping are doing worse in the long
term. Li et al 15 reports most studies find that IMF bailouts result in worse economies in the long
term which increases poverty.
a. Bordo and Schwartz (2000) analyzed the annual data from 11 Latin American and 13
Asian countries for the period 1973–1998 and found that the performance of recipient
countries was worse after they received IMF assistance.
b. Dreher (2006) analyzed data from 98 countries over the period 1970–2000 and found
that the overall impact of an IMF bailout is negative due to either the provision of
inappropriate advice by the IMF or the occurrence of moral hazard issues as a result of a
bailout.
c. Barro and Lee (2005) analyzed data from 130 countries over the period 1975–1999, also
reported that the IMF bailout has a negative impact on the economic growth of
bailed-out countries.
d. More recently, Jorra (2012) analyzed data from 57 developing and emerging economies
for the period 1975 to 2008, argued that an IMF program cannot improve the economic
performance of bailed-out countries. Furthermore, his empirical evidence shows that
IMF bailouts significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by
approximately 1.5–2%.
ONeill 21 - free trade hurt workers

ONeill, Shannon 9) “Protection Without Protectionism” Foreign Policy, Feb 2021
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-12-08/protection-without-protectionism?utm_medium=email_notifications&utm_s
ource=reg_confirmation&utm_campaign=reg_guestpass
For two decades, the free movement of goods, services, and capital was the world’s guiding principle, crystallized in the so-called Washington
consensus. Although countries didn’t always live up to these ideals or implement laissez-faire policies, most aspired to do so. They had to
explain, justify, and limit their deviations from this consensus, at least in theory. The vast majority of the world’s countries signed on to
multilateral institutions that promoted and enforced this view—such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
Yet the era of the Washington consensus is now over—and despite what some commentators have argued, the COVID-19 pandemic is not the
cause of its demise. Developing countries started pushing back against the consensus in the early years of this century. Mature economies began
to sour on its tenets after the 2008 global financial crisis. Today, advanced countries and developing ones alike are embracing “industrial policy,”
a catchall term for government interventions in certain industries and in the broader economy. This shift is apparent even in the United States.
The Trump administration ignored and attacked the liberal world order that the United States has led for decades. But its approach partly
reflected a new conventional wisdom in Washington in favor of an economic path that relies much more on active government involvement.
The policies of the Washington consensus spurred growth and development all over the world. But they had clear downsides, as well. Free
trade disadvantaged workers in many developed countries, including the United States, and
market-based approaches proved inadequate in tackling global crises such as climate change. Redressing
the faults of the Washington consensus, however, does not mean the United States should embrace protectionism, which would spell economic
disaster. Global supply chains are here to stay, and U.S. workers will be left behind if American companies can’t take advantage of them. A U.S.
industrial policy built on more global cooperation and competition, better U.S. access to international markets, and public investments at home
can mitigate the shortcomings of the Washington consensus and avoid the pitfalls of protectionism
Li et al 15 - IMF bailout bad
Li, Larry, Malick, Sy, Mcmurray, Adela (RMIT University Melbourne) “Insights into the IMF bailout debate: A
review and research agenda” Science Direct, Sep 2015
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0161893815001003
In contrast, most
studies find that the IMF bailout has a negative effect on the economic performance of
recipient countries. For example, Bordo and Schwartz (2000) analyzed the annual data from 11 Latin American and 13 Asian countries for
the period 1973–1998 and found that the performance of recipient countries was worse after they received assistance from the IMF. Analysing
data from 98 countries over the period 1970–2000, Dreher (2006) found that the overall impact of an IMF bailout is negative. Such a negative
impact might be due to either the provision of inappropriate advice by the IMF or the occurrence of moral hazard issue as a result of the IMF
bailout. Drawing on data from 130 countries over the period 1975–1999, Barro and Lee (2005) also reported that the IMF bailout has a negative
impact on the economic growth of bailed-out countries. In addition, they found that the IMF's decisions on which countries will be given a loan
are highly politically driven. Loans tend to be larger, and more frequent, if the recipient country: (1) has a bigger representation among IMF staff;
and (2) is more politically and economically connected to the US and major European countries. More recently, analyzing data from 57
developing and emerging economies for the period 1975 to 2008, Jorra (2012) argued that an IMF program cannot improve the economic
performance of bailed-out countries. Furthermore, his empirical evidence shows that IMF bailouts significantly increase the probability of
subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1.5–2%.
A2 Globalization via Trade Up

1. T. Farrell 20 writes that globalization plays a part in causing crises as it has become more fragile
and riddled with vulnerabilities, and the last decade provides painful evidence of the fragility of
a globalized economic system that promoted efficiency and the power of markets. One example
is the 2008 financial crisis which was the product of an interconnected banking system that
rewarded short-term thinking, created risky new financial products, and was badly regulated at
the national and global levels. Because so many firms were too big to fail, globalization itself had
to fail. Farrell concludes that the current model of globalization is unsustainable, as a result it
creates unacceptable levels of risk both for citizens and states.
2. DL. Globalization doesn’t matter if the countries the IMF is helping are doing worse in the long
term. Li et al 15 reports most studies find that IMF bailouts result in worse economies in the long
bailout.
Farrell 20 - glob fragile

Farrell, Henry ( professor in the government department and the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University) Newman,
Abraham (Stavros Niarchos Foundation Agora Institute professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.)“This Is
What the Future of Globalization Will Look Like” Foreign Policy, Jul 2020
https://foreignpolicy.com./2020/07/04/this-is-what-the-future-of-globalization-will-look-like/
But behind the soothing stories about the benefits of the global marketplace, globalization was quietly becoming more
fragile and riddled with vulnerabilities. In some sectors, suppliers had become concentrated in geographically dense clusters,
while in others the demand for efficiency drove companies to rely on just one supplier that could provide a necessary component. Apparent
flexibility disguised the development of new rigidities.
The last decade provides painful evidence of the fragility of a globalized economic system that promoted efficiency
and the power of markets. The 2008 financial crisis was the product of an interconnected banking
system that rewarded short-term thinking, created risky new financial products, and was badly
regulated at the national and global levels. Because so many firms were too big to fail, globalization itself had to
fail. A few key suppliers became bottlenecks, and systemic risks increased dramatically—including the possibility of pandemics—but global
institutions had not kept pace. Instead, states have exploited whatever vulnerabilities they can as they try to protect their own populations and
pursue their broader geostrategic interests.
Powerful states had always wriggled out of the shackles of market discipline when their security was at stake. Most notably, the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and growing U.S.-China competition led U.S. policymakers to realize that they could use their control over businesses that had made
themselves irreplaceable in the global economy to hurt adversaries and coerce unwilling firms, organizations, and even states by threatening to
exclude them from the global marketplace.
The current model of globalization is unsustainable. It is creating unacceptable levels of risk both for
citizens and states. The future of globalization will depend on the decisions of political leaders as well as businesses. The United States
faces a particularly stark choice, as it decides on a new president amid a pandemic.
If Donald Trump succeeds in setting the agenda, America’s future direction is clear. The fragility of the global system will give economic
nationalists more reason to do what they want to do anyway, which is to shift from global free trade to harnessing the power of the
nation-state. The globalized economy would shrink, as more production takes place inside national borders, reducing reliance on foreign
components. The United States is the primary guarantor of the current global system. If it shifts to economic nationalism, other countries are
likely to shift too, either because they want to or in self-defense. China’s Xi Jinping would respond with his own form of economic nationalism.
Europe and a few other midsize economies might try to maintain the ectoplasmic remnant of a multilateral system among themselves, but their
efforts would be doomed without support from other great powers.

In contrast, most
A2 Women Empowerment Up
1. LR. The IMF can only suggest and advocate for such gender equity policies, it cannot actually
place them on a country or finance projects to improve equities as it’s not a world bank. There
are alternate reasons why gender equality is going up like increased education and awareness
around the world.
A2 Climate Finance
1. T. Welch et al 18 writes economic programs such as IMF loans often result in unnecessary
environmental degradation because they fail to consider environmental costs and benefits. The
IMF fails to recognize the inseparability of economic stability and environmental well-being.
Welch continues that the IMF's model of economic growth that tends to be based on primary
commodities, whose prices are notoriously unstable and whose extraction is environmentally
hazardous.
2. T. Seabury 20 continues despite IMF rhetoric in favour of increasing public spending, it continues
to lock developing countries into decades of austerity, putting the achievement of the
Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris climate agreement in jeopardy which will harm
climate change advances.
3. T. Picolotti et al 20 finds IMF loans typically include conditions that worsen climate policies. For
example, IMF macro reforms often decrease government spending for education, social
programs and conservation while increasing exports of natural resources, which can adversely
impact social resilience and accelerate the climate crises.
4. M. Cochrane 20 finds Whether international institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund should appoint themselves to take on climate policy--or other important social,
environmental, or political cause--without a clear mandate to do so from politically accountable
leaders. The Western world faces a crisis of trust in our institutions, a crisis fed by a
not-inaccurate perception that the elites who run such institutions don't know what they are
doing, are politicized, and are going beyond the authority granted by accountable
representatives. The IMF’s mandate is not aimed towards climate change and it is not the IMF;s
role.
5. NU. In addition, how much can the IMF actually aid climate change? Leahy 19 of NatGeo reports
that irreversible changes in Earth’s climate systems are underway meaning we are already
marching past the point of no return.
Welch et al 18 - econ growth hurt enviro

Welch, Carol (director of Strategy, Planning and Management, and chief of staff to Rodger Voorhies. She brings an array of experience to
her new role with Global Growth & Opportunity. Carol joined the foundation as a senior program officer supporting Mark Suzman on the Global
Development Policy & Advocacy team.)
Durbin, Andrea (Director at City of Portland's Bureau of Planning and Sustainability)
“Greening the Bretton Woods.” The Institute for International Policy Studies, Sep 2018
https://ips-dc.org/greening_the_bretton_woods_institutions/#:~:text=Any%20typical%20IMF%20stabilization%2Fadjustment,consider%20envir
onmental%20costs%20and%20benefits
Stabilization and adjustment have become virtually synonymous at the IMF. Any typical IMF stabilization/adjustment program—including budget
cuts, tax increases, and trade and investment liberalization—has environmental costs and benefits.
IMF economic programs often
result in unnecessary environmental degradation because they fail to consider environmental costs
and benefits. The IMF fails to recognize the inseparability of economic stability and environmental
well-being. Only in 2001 has the IMF begun a pilot project to assess social, though not environmental, impacts in a few countries.”
The IMF explains that as a macroeconomic institution it deals solely with short-term economic issues and has no mandate to address the
environment. While
it is true that the purpose of the IMF is to address economic stability and short-term
liquidity problems, the fund has inappropriately involved itself in longer-term restructuring of
economies, often with negative environmental results. In addition, the IMF plays an even broader role by bestowing a
“seal of approval” on countries that follow its prescriptions. This seal is often a precondition for other donor assistance, debt relief, and private
investment. TheIMF’s model of economic growth is based on export-led growth rather than domestic
productive capacity. This export-led growth has tended to be based on primary commodities, rather than
manufactured or processed goods, whose prices are notoriously unstable and whose extraction is
environmentally hazardous.”
Seabury 20 - aust harms SDG + Paris Climate

Seabury, Chris ( been working in the financial services industry for over 20 years. This includes writing and operating an advisory firm. )
"Can The IMF Solve Global Economic Problems?," Investopedia. Sep. 2020.
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/international-monetary-fund-imf.asp
Second, the response to the crisis has vividly exposed the inequalities between countries, something that the IMF has not shied away from. As
IMF’s Managing Director put it, “some were able to do more than others. For advanced economies, it is whatever it takes. Poorer nations strive
Despite IMF rhetoric in favour of increasing public spending, it continues to lock
for whatever is possible.”
developing countries into decades of austerity, putting the achievement of the SDGs and the Paris
climate agreement in jeopardy. As both Eurodad and Oxfam research showed last week, the IMF is still playing a very problematic
role in developing countries. According to Eurodad’s figures, 72 out of 80 countries that have received IMF financing are projected to begin a
process of fiscal consolidation as early as 2021, which “could result in deep cuts to public healthcare systems and pension schemes, wage
freezes and cuts for public sector workers such as doctors, nurses and teachers, and unemployment benefits, like sick pay”
Picolotti et al 20 - condit cause cc

Picolotti, Romina (former Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development of Argentina (2006 – 2008)) and Prize, Sophie
(winner for outstanding contribution to sustainable development (2006).) Miller, Alan (a former climate change officer in the International
Finance Corporation (2003-13) and climate change team leader, Global Environment Facility (1997-2003))"Debt-for-Climate Swaps
can Help Developing Countries Make a Green Recvoery." International Institute for Sustainable
Development. Nov 2020.
https://www.iisd.org/sustainable-recovery/debt-for-climate-swaps-can-help-developing-countries-make-a-green-recovery/
For poor countries, the need for debt relief is increasingly urgent. A report by the World Bank on poor country debt in October, the most
detailed and disaggregated such report ever produced, found the debt burden in 73 of the poorest countries climbed to a record $744 billion in
2019. This was a pace of debt accumulation almost twice that of other low and middle-income countries that year. Climate change exacerbates
the problem, as the IMF has found that the greater vulnerability of poor countries increases the cost of borrowing.
The revenues generated by debt-for-climate swap projects could be used to replenish a cyclical fund to buy and install climate-friendly
technologies. The climate actions undertaken with such swaps would be based on a pathway to hold global temperature rise to 1.5°C, in line
with the science set out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. They could and should be included in both creditor and debtor
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) required from each country under the Paris Climate Agreement.
Without debt relief, IMF loans typically include conditions that worsen climate policies. For example,
IMF macro reforms often decrease government spending for education, social programs and
conservation while increasing exports of natural resources, which may adversely impact social
resilience and accelerate the climate crises.
Cochrane 20 - not mandate

Cochrane, John (Rose-Marie and Jack Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is also a research associate of the National
Bureau of Economic Research and an adjunct scholar of the CATO Institute.) “Central Banks And Climate: A Case Of Mission
Creep” Hoover Institution, Nov 2020
https://www.hoover.org/research/central-banks-and-climate-case-mission-creep
The question is whether the European Central Bank (ECB), other central banks, or international institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development should appoint themselves to take on climate policy—or other important social,
environmental, or political causes—without a clear mandate to do so from politically accountable leaders.
The Western world faces a crisis of trust in our institutions, a crisis fed by a not-inaccurate perception that the elites who run such institutions
don’t know what they are doing, are politicized, and are going beyond the authority granted by accountable representatives.
Trust and independence must be earned by evident competence and institutional restraint. Yet central banks, not obviously competent to target
inflation with interest rates; floundering to stop financial crisis by means other than wanton bailouts; and still not addressing obvious risks lying
ahead; now want to be trusted to determine and implement their own climate change policy? (And next, likely, taking on inequality and social
justice?)
Leahy 19 - climate ch inev

Leahy, Stephan“Climate change driving entire planet to dangerous 'tipping point‘” National Geographic
Nov 2019. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/earth-tipping-point
“Evidence that irreversible changes in Earth’s climate systems are underway means we are in a state of
planetary emergency, leading climate scientists warn. A cascade of tipping points could amount to a global tipping point, where
multiple earth systems march past the point of no return, they say. That possibility is “an existential threat to civilization,” write Tim Lenton and
colleagues in this week’s Nature.
Such a collapse of Earth’s systems could lead to “hothouse earth” conditions with a global temperature rise of 9 degrees F (5 degrees C), sea
levels rising 20 to 30 feet, the complete loss of the world’s coral reefs and the Amazon forest, and with large parts of the planet uninhabitable. A
global emergency response is required to limit warming to 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit (1.5 degrees Celsius), they warn. “The stability and resilience
of our planet is in peril,” they say. “It’s
a nasty shock that tipping points we thought might happen well into the
future are already underway,” say
A2 Global Poverty Reduction

1. T. The IMF empirically increases poverty.
a. One example is Ecuador in which Weisbrot 19 reports Ecuador signed an agreement to
borrow $4.2bn from the IMF over three years, provided that the government would
adhere to a certain economic program which involves an enormous tightening of the
country’s national budget – about 6% of GDP over the next three years. This will result in
firing tens of thousands of public sector employees, raising taxes that fall
disproportionately on poor people, and making cuts to public investment. The overall
impact of this tightening will push Ecuador into recession.
b. Arendar 20 reports 80% of IMF Covid-19 loans will push austerity on poor countries,
which is bad because 115 million more people are projected to fall into poverty and
Arendar explains “At a time when the progress against poverty is being set back decades,
this is exactly the wrong instruction for the IMF to be giving poor countries… Millions
more people are likely to be left without healthcare or income support while they search
for work, thwarting any hope of a sustainable recovery.” This austerity drive will hurt the
countries it claims to help and flies in the face of the fund's own research findings,
showing it worsens poverty and inequality.
2. T. Li et al 15 reports most studies find that IMF bailouts result in worse economies in the long
bailout.
3. T. Staff 19 finds attaching conditions to loans make it harder for poor countries to repay them,
furthering the cycle of poverty because they find that contrary to IMF’s stated commitment to
streamlining its conditionalities, conditions for loans have been on the increase. Staff quantifies
“26 programmes together had 227 quantitative conditions (i.e. an average of 8.7 per
programme) and 466 structural conditions (i.e. an average of 17.9 per programme).”
Weisbrot 19 - Ecuador recession

Weisbrot, Mark (Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC. He received his Ph.D. in economics from
the University of .)"The Imf Is Hurting Countries It Claims To Help," Guardian, Aug 2019
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/27/imf-economics-inequality-trump-ecuador To see what the problem looks like,
March, Ecuador signed an agreement to borrow $4.2bn from the IMF over three
consider a recent IMF loan. In
years, provided that the government would adhere to a certain economic program spelled out in the
arrangement. In the words of Christine Lagarde – then the IMF chief – this was “a comprehensive reform program aimed at modernizing
the economy and paving the way for strong, sustained, and equitable growth”. But is it? The program calls for an enormous tightening of the
country’s national budget – about 6% of GDP over the next three years. (For comparison, imagine tightening the US federal budget by $1.4
include firing tens of thousands of
trillion, through some combination of cutting spending and raising taxes). In Ecuador, this will
public sector employees, raising taxes that fall disproportionately on poor people, and making cuts to
public investment. The overall impact of this large fiscal tightening will be to push the economy into
recession.
Arendar 20 - COVID loans bad

Arendar, Ana (Oxfam Head of Inequality Policy) "Over 80 per cent of IMF Covid-19 loans will push austerity on
poor countries," ReliefWeb, Oct 2020
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/over-80-cent-imf-covid-19-loans-will-push-austerity-poor-countries
Comes after the World Bank projected that up to 115 million more people will fall into extreme poverty this
year, the first increase in more than two decades. Ana Arendar, Oxfam Head of Inequality Policy said: "At a time when the progress
against poverty is being set back decades, this is exactly the wrong instruction for the IMF to be giving
poor countries. It is nothing short of unacceptable that the IMF is using its power to make life harder for people already struggling to
survive. Millions more people are likely to be left without healthcare or income support while they
search for work, thwarting any hope of a sustainable recovery. "This austerity drive will hurt the
countries it claims to help and flies in the face of the fund's own research findings, showing it worsens
poverty and inequality. The IMF must not repeat the mistakes it made in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, where ordinary
people paid the price for austerity measures. Instead, it should press countries to boost investments in universal health and education and
ensure the richest individuals and large corporations pay their fair share of tax." Countries which receive loans are being encouraged to roll back
social protections put in place since the beginning of the p

In contrast, most
Staff 19 - IMF conditionality bad

Staff Writer. “IMF conditionalities promote unhealthy conditions”. Public Services International. 2019.
https://www.world-psi.org/en/imf-conditionalities-promote-unhealthy-conditions
“The focus of this EURODAD research was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) practice of attaching
policy conditions to its loans, particularly for crisis-hit countries. It investigated the conditions attached to IMF loans
for 26 country programmes that were approved in 2016 and 2017. Its findings were compared to those of a previous study of the Network
covering IMF programmes approved in 2011 to 2013. Contrary to the IMF’s stated commitment to streamlining its
conditionalities and limiting these to considerations of macro-critical resilience, conditions for loans and reviews of
loans have been on the increase. The 26 programmes together had 227 quantitative conditions (i.e. an
average of 8.7 per programme) and 466 structural conditions (i.e. an average of 17.9 per programme).
Meanwhile, the average number of conditions per loan between 2011 and 2013 was 19.5..”
A2 Anti Corruption
1. T. The IMF actually increases corruption via involvement and support in questionable
governments, as Pettinger 21 corroborates “The IMF has been criticised for supporting military
dictatorships in Brazil and Argentina, such as Castello Branco in 1960s received IMF funds denied
to other countries”
2. T. IMF programs worsen governance outcomes, Walwema 13 confirms that IMF loan programs
take money from social services. Structural adjustment has therefore forced many countries to
divert funds from public health initiatives and to the increased trade capability. For example, in
1964, Nigerian industrialization was said to cost 676.8 million pounds ($926 million). These
expenditures could’ve been used for roads and transportation, as well as the building of dams
and electricity.
3. T. The IMF is literally influenced by certain shareholders. Reinhart 16 explains The voting
structure of the IMF is based on the size of “quotas” or financial resources devoted to the Fund,
which are in turn linked to the size of national economies, so the US and major economies of
Western Europe have IMF quotas that have traditionally granted them considerable power over
IMF decisions. She continues that studies finds that political factors and voting alignments with
the United States are significant in explaining the probability of getting an IMF loan for example.
a. Hickel 20 furthers The IMF is structurally undemocratic, causing massive inequality and
suffering for oppressed nations. Take Bangladesh and Nigeria, both of which were British
colonies. In the IMF, a British person’s vote today is worth 41 times more than a
Bangladeshi’s vote, and 23 times more than a Nigerian’s vote. And this is the 21st
century; many decades after the end of colonial rule. In any national political system, we
would reject the notion that rich people should have more voting power than poor
people, and more influence over economic policy decisions. We would see this as
corrupt and morally repulsive. And yet such plutocracy is normalised in the IMF.
Pettinger 21 - support dictatorships

Pettinger, Tejvan (Tejvan Pettinger studied PPE at LMH, Oxford University) “Criticisms of IMF” Economicshelp
https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/imf-criticism/
“In Korea the IMF insisted that all presidential candidates immediately “endorse” an agreement which they had no part in drafting or
negotiating, and no time to understand. The situation is out of hand…It defies logic to believe the small group of 1,000 economists on 19th
Street in Washington should dictate the economic conditions of life to 75 developing countries with around 1.4 billion people.” source
7. Supporting military dictatorships

The IMF has been criticised for supporting military dictatorships in Brazil and Argentina, such as
Castello Branco in 1960s received IMF funds denied to other countries.
Walwema 13 - divert funds

Walwema, Tabisa (Columbia Law School) “Adjusting Structural Adjustment: The Role of the Structural
Adjustment Program in Africa’s Development”. African Law Reporter. Apr 2013.
http://jurisafrica.org/docs/landtenure/adjusting-structural-adjustment.pdf
“In an analysis surveying adjusting and non-adjusting countries at this time, results indicate that adjusting countries reduced
potential
contributions of households to education, reduced public education expenditures, and finance
ministers disproportionately cut their funds relative to other areas of government.90 Ultimately, the IMF and World Bank fail
to take into consideration the costs associated with an uneducated population.”
Structural adjustment has therefore forced many countries to divert funds from public health
initiatives and to the increased trade capability. Money is needed to increase a country’s infrastructure and its trading
capabilities—especially if a country is to compete on the national stage. For one to truly understand how much is taken away from public
services, one also needs a baseline as to how much it costs to industrialize and provide minimum processing infrastructure. There is a large price
tag for countries to compete on the international stage. For example, in 1964, Nigerian industrialization was said to cost £676.8
million.80 The expenditure would be used for roads and transportation, as well as the building of dams and
electricity
Reinhart 16 - western influence

Reinhart, Carmen M. (Professor of the International Financial System, Harvard Kennedy School of Government) Trebesch,
Christoph (Asst. Professor of Economics, U. of Munich, Germany), JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, EconLit,
Winter 2016 https://www.aeaweb.org/full_issue.php?doi=10.1257/jep.30.1
p. 21. The voting structure of the IMF is based on the size of “quotas” or financial resources devoted to the Fund, which are in turn linked to the
size of national economies, so the United
States and major economies of Western Europe have IMF quotas that
have traditionally granted them considerable power over IMF decisions. (For instance, the United States has a large
enough share of total votes that it can exercise veto power over any substantial IMF decision, while the Managing Director of the IMF has always
been a European.)
p. 21. Indeed, there is a compelling range of evidence to support the conclusion that politics plays a role in IMF lending decisions (usually at the
country level). We have already alluded to some of these findings (for example, the Barro and Lee 2005 study). There are other studies.
Thacker (1999), for instance, finds that political factors and voting alignments with the United States
are significant in explaining the probability of getting an IMF loan (although his results vary across sample periods).
Stone (2004) discusses the political economy of IMF loans in Asia. Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2009) find systematic evidence that UN Security
Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs.
Hickel 20 - undemoc
Hickel, Jason (an academic at the University of London and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts)"Apartheid in the World Bank
and the IMF." Al Jazeera. Nov2020.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/26/it-is-time-to-decolonise-the-world-bank-and-the-imf.
Not only is there minority control over global economic policymaking, there is also a clear racial imbalance at play: on average, the votes of
people of colour are worth only a fraction of their counterparts. If this was the case in any particular country, we would be outraged. We would
call it apartheid. Yet a form of apartheid operates right at the heart of international economic governance today, and has come to be accepted
as “normal”.
In some cases, the differences between countries are particularly striking. Take
Bangladesh and Nigeria, both of which were
British colonies. In the IMF, a British person’s vote today is worth 41 times more than a Bangladeshi’s
vote, and 23 times more than a Nigerian’s vote. And this is the 21st century; many decades after the
end of colonial rule.
The inequalities that characterise voting power in the World Bank and the IMF have their roots in the colonial period. After all, these institutions
were founded in 1944. Countries that were colonies at the time (like India) were integrated into the system on unequal terms, subordinated to
their colonisers. Other colonies were not allowed to join until after independence, in some cases well into the 1970s and 80s. These institutions
were designed under colonialism and they remain in key respects colonial in character.
Voting power in the World Bank is allocated according to each country’s financial shares. In the IMF, it is primarily according to gross domestic
product (GDP), with some consideration also given to a country’s “market openness”. As a result, the countries that became rich during the
colonial period now enjoy disproportionate power when it comes to determining the rules of the global economy. Inequality begets inequality.
Defenders of this system argue that this is a legitimate approach: it makes sense, they say, that bigger economies should have more power over
decisions related to the global economy.
But think of the implications of this claim. In

any national political system, we would reject the notion that rich
people should have more voting power than poor people, and more influence over economic policy
decisions. We would see this as corrupt and morally repulsive. And yet such plutocracy is normalised
in the World Bank and the IMF.
A2 Alleviate Econ Crises

1. T. Even if they bail out economic crises in the short term, Li et al 15 reports Most studies find
that the IMF bailout has a negative impact in the long term. For example,
bailout.
2. T. Johnson 97 corroborates “IMF lending is more likely to create long-term dependency than to
act as short-term assistance. A review reveals an increasing reliance on the Fund by less
developed countries.” He quantifies between 1965 and 1995, 137 countries received loans from
the IMF. For 81 of these countries, the number of times they borrowed from the IMF between
1981 and 1995 increased an average of nearly 50% over the number of times they borrowed
between 1965 and 1980.
3. T. In the current pandemic crisis, the IMF isn’t doing enough. Goodman 20 reports Poor and
developing countries went into the pandemic facing alarming levels of debt and Promised aid
from international institutions like the International Monetary Fund have proved disappointing
while private creditors have withheld debt relief.
a. Beams 20 confirms An even greater concern right now is that much of the new IMF and
other cash going into these countries is going right out again without doing much to
bolster their domestic economies, let alone expand health services and other critical
social programs for the poor. Most of the governments receiving the new cash have little
choice but to use it to pay interest on their existing foreign debts. [to hedge funds,
private equity funds, pension funds and the millions of investors in sovereign bonds].
Even where money is provided by the IMF, in many cases it is not being used to finance
health and other necessary measures to deal with the pandemic, but to pay off
private-sector lenders.
b. Beams 20 quantifies, the IMF is in breach of its own rules, as 28 countries with a high
risk of debt default used $11.3 billion to pay private-sector debt holders. The head of
policy at the organisation, Tim Jones, said IMF funding “was effectively bailing out
private lenders by enabling poor countries to maintain payments.
4.

In contrast, most
Johnson 97 - IMF incr dependence

Johnson, Bryan (Heritage Visiting Fellow) “The International Monetary Fund: Outdated, Ineffective, and
Unnecessary” Heritage Foundation, May 1997
https://www.heritage.org/report/the-international-monetary-fund-outdated-ineffective-andunnecessary
IMF lending is more likely to create long-term dependency than to act as short-term assistance. IMF
lending, as defined by its articles, is supposed to be short term. But according to economist Doug Bandow, most countries actually become
long-term users of IMF loans.14 A review of IMF lending activities reveals an increasing reliance on the Fund by less developed countries.
between 1965 and 1995, 137 countries received loans from the IMF. For 81 of these
For example,
countries, the number of times they borrowed from the IMF between 1981 and 1995 increased an
average of nearly 50 percent over the number of times they borrowed between 1965 and 1980. Only 44
countries reduced the number of times they borrowed during the same periods; 12 maintained activities at similar levels.15 This means the IMF
is extending loans to more countries with greater frequency than it has in the past, thereby involving greater total amounts of assistance than
was the case before 1980.16 Thus, the IMF has not been able to ensure that its loans to less developed countries are indeed in the short term.
Instead, these loans have been more likely to create long-term dependence
Goodman 11 - $ in $ out
Goodman, Peter (European economics correspondent for The New York Times, based in London. He was previously a national economic
correspondent, based in New York, where he played a leading role in award-winning coverage of the Great Recession. ) “For the World
Economy, a Grim Slog Tempered by New Hopes”, NYT, Nov 2020
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/business/coronavirus-global-economic-outlook.html
Poor and developing countries went into the pandemic facing alarming levels of debt. Promised aid
from international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have proved
disappointing. Private creditors have withheld debt relief.
Some argue that the pandemic should be the impetus for new economic models that create jobs through a transition to green energy while
spreading the gains more equitably.
Beams 20 - quantif
Beams, Nick (affiliated to the International Committee of the Fourth International He retired as national secretary of the SEP in 2010, after
having served in that position for 35 years.) “The fraud of IMF-World Bank “debt relief” for poor countries”
International Committee of Fourth International WSWS, Nov 2020
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/11/04/imfb-n04.html
According to a report issued in July by the anti-poverty organisation Jubilee Debt Campaign, the
IMF is in breach of its own rules,
as 28 countries with a high risk of debt default used $11.3 billion to pay private-sector debt holders.
The head of policy at the organisation, Tim Jones, said

IMF funding “was effectively bailing out private lenders by
enabling poor countries to maintain payments.”
Jones noted that the level of government spending on debt payments in poorer countries last year had risen to more than 14 percent of
government revenue, the highest level since 2003, an increase of 110 percent since 2010. In Kenya and Ethiopia, debt servicing reached up to 50
percent of government revenues last year.
Seeking to justify the use of IMF funds for private profit rather than necessary health and social services, while maintaining that “our overriding
objective right now is to save lives and livelihoods,” IMF spokesman Gerry Rice said the issue was complicated.
A2 Food Insecurity Down
1. T. Sonkin 20 finds that the IMF policy contributes to the financialization of food and agriculture.
[This has resulted in land-grabs, exposure of small-holder farmers to high price volatility, the
concentration of power in agricultural business and the expansion of climate-damaging
industrial agriculture.] She stresses financialisation drives inequalities within and between
countries, its relationship with rising food insecurity within lower-income countries and
population groups cannot be ignored.
a. For example, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) noted, the number of
undernourished people in Africa increased by 8% after the price swings in key staple
foods between 2007 and 2008.
2. NU. There are many organizations working to alleviate food insecurity, the IMF is not essential.
For example, the HRC 20 reports “The World Food Programme (WFP) is one of the largest UN
agencies helping 86.7 million people in around 83 countries every year, and delivering food
assistance in places of emergencies, as well as working with communities to build resilience and
improve nutrition.” HRC also names 29 other programs which aid food insecurity including Care,
Hunger Project, Bread for the World, Clean Cooking Alliance, and more.
Sonkin 20 - financialization
Sonkin, Flora (Society for International Development (SID)) “Recipe for disaster: The IMF and World
Bank’s role in the financialisation of food and agriculture” Bretton Woods Project, Apr 2020
https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2020/04/recipe-for-disaster-the-imf-and-world-banks-role-in-the-financialisation-of-food-and-agricultur
e/
IMF policies have provided key support for the financialisation of food and agriculture. This
Past and present World Bank and
has resulted in land-grabs, exposure of small-holder farmers to high price volatility, the concentration
of power in agricultural business and the expansion of climate-damaging industrial agriculture. These
trends decrease policy space for states in a key area of life and the economy
The long-term food security implications of the financialisation of agriculture not only affects farmers or people directly dependent on the land.
Commodity-dependent and net food-importing countries, in particular their low-income populations, whose position in the global economy
originates in no small part from the structural adjustment programmes implemented by the World Bank and IMF in the 1990s, now find
themselves increasingly at the mercy of volatile international food prices, which become even more unstable in the context of the global climate
emergency. As the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) noted, the number of undernourished
people in Africa increased by 8 per cent after the price swings in key staple foods between 2007 and
2008. The 2019 edition of FAO’s flagship publication, The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World, revealed a continuously worrying
scenario: “more than 820 million people in the world were still hungry in 2018,” especially in low-income countries. As financialisation
drives inequalities within and between countries, its relationship with rising food insecurity within
lower-income countries and population groups cannot be ignored.
HRC 20 - UN food insec down

Human Rights Careers. "30 Organizations Working to End Hunger," Human Rights Careers. 2020.
https://www.humanrightscareers.com/magazine/organizations-end-hunger/
The World Food Programme (WFP) is one of the largest UN agencies helping 86.7 million people in
around 83 countries every year, and delivering food assistance in places of emergencies, as well as working with
communities to build resilience and improve nutrition. The WFP is an emergency-responder, with 5.600 trucks, 20 ships and 92 planes on the
move every day, delivering food assistance to people struck by conflicts, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes and other natural disasters.The
organization implements projects focusing on nutrition while targeting mothers and children and malnutrition in developing countries. It also
imp
A2 Sub Saharan Africa

1. T. African countries will actually be harmed by IMF
a. one example is South Africa, where Mutize 17 explains the reason for the current
economic predicament is a loss of investor confidence. Mutize continues an IMF bailout
won’t address these problems. Hopping onto the IMF programme would disturb South
Africa’s commitment to reforming the global multilateral financial world.
b. Wilhem 18 corroborates IMF loans will not solve the root cause of Africa’s issues
because "African countries are generally indebted because they export raw materials
and import the rest," and in order to fix this, it would mean providing the room for
African countries to develop their own agriculture and industry. "And that means not
accepting the agenda of free trade advanced by the IMF.”
2. M. Hauman 18 writes “the specific correlation of IMF program participation to sovereign bond
performance and investor sentiment is less clear-cut, in part because of the wide range of factors
that must be taken into account, as well as the relative "youth" of the sub-Saharan African
sovereign debt market.” meaning it is unclear how positive of an effect the IMF has had and will
have in Sub Saharan Africa.
3. NU. Wilhem 18 also finds the IMF and World Bank are no longer the only potential financial
backer for African governments. The emergence of China, a major investor, has altered the
financial circumstances in Africa.China's arrival offered new financing opportunities for African
countries. Wilhem quotes Ndongo Sylla, a Senegalese economist who says "China offers African
countries the opportunity to escape, from time to time, the grip of the IMF and the World Bank
because China is not demanding conditionalities." meaning they don’t require political and
economic reforms in exchange for loans.
Mutize 17 - South Afr

Mutize, Mishek (Lead Expert: Country Support on Rating Agencie) "Why South Africa shouldn't turn to the IMF for
help," Conversation. Aug. 2017 https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-shouldnt-turn-to-the-imf-for-help-82027
First, historical evidence suggests that IMF administered rescue programmes are actually a recipe for disaster. They worsen rather than rescue
the situation. Second, to suggest that South Africa’s problems are financial in nature is a dangerous misdiagnosis. It will distract the
government from the critical issues it needs to address which have little to do with the finances. Third,one of the main driving
factors of the current economic predicament is a loss of investor confidence. This is linked to other factors like
policy uncertainty, political instability within the ruling party and mismanagement of public resources mixed with corruption. An IMF
bailout won’t address these problems. And lastly, hopping onto the IMF programme would disturb the
country’s commitment to reforming the global multilateral financial world. South Africa is part of the BRICS bloc
which is grooming a new and perhaps alternative multilateral development finance institution called New Development Bank. If anything, South
Africa must look to BRICS if it needs financial rescue
Wilhem 18 - root cause of Afr prob

Wilhem, Jan Phillip (Freelance Editor and Producer. Deutsche WelleThe London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE))
"The IMF comeback in Africa," DW, Aug 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/the-imf-comeback-in-africa/a-45489734
Sylla argues that China's willingness to hand over money does not change the problem, the concentration of African economies on natural
resources. African economies on "African countries are generally indebted because they export raw materials
and import the rest," he said. In the 1980s and 1990s, the falling prices of commodities such as oil, cocoa and diamonds, coupled with
rising interest on external debt, drove African countries into crisis. "We have to address the indebtedness problem at its
roots,” said Sylla. That would mean providing the room for African countries to develop their own
agriculture and industry. "And that means not accepting the agenda of free trade advanced by the IMF,
the World Trade Organization and also by the European Commission," he said. Chinese credit on the basis of commodity concessions is actually
not a solution to Africa's debt problems in the long-run, the Angolan example shows. Experts estimate that the country has racked up debt of 25
million dollars to China, secured through oil revenue. But, according to a report by the Financial Times, this possibility is largely exhausted: That
amount of oil has already been set aside for credit repayments. Angola's appeal to the IMF for assistance is a sign that in the future Africa also
cannot renounce the controversial organization in Washington
China opened the playing field
Effectively it was a learning curve for the IMF, said Thiele. Dealings with recipient countries now sees much more emphasis placed on matters
such as good governance and social concerns than in the past.
A possible reason for this change: the IMF and World Bank are no longer the only potential financial
backer for African governments. Some countries can meanwhile now support themselves using regular
capital markets. And the emergence of a major investor has altered the financial circumstances in Africa: China.
China's arrival offered new financing opportunities for African countries, Ndongo Sylla, a Senegalese economist at the Rosa Luxembourg
Foundation in Dakar, told DW. "China
offers African countries the opportunity to escape, from time to time, the
grip of the IMF and the World Bank because China is not demanding conditionalities." China does not want
political and economic reforms in exchange for loans. It asks for business, natural resources and access to markets instead.
Hauman 18 - benefits unclear

Hauman, Mindy (professional support Counsel in the Firm's Capital Markets Practice in London.) “The IMF in sub-Saharan
Africa," White & Case Llp.Feb. 2018.
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b530b713-164d-4cf3-8689-d0263828e02a&__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=35f35648c419547d709ab692
441b2f66e6dc317d-1615181374-0-AQjw43_T8t-TEuI9UBdpdGNeoXFnEYMTgsJ6ilkxDinub5m345FZfPx8cxGGqKDwl1rQcr0HWmO0LtPVC4MuY8P
TE9GpyylU1iuyHN_Agz6S1Htehj7U9fjLneSeo9IGamorkoQZeCAtKWlKTbGGs-gEscjHYdaQ-jlbScfcFcBiIz_qWvgcqWHt2pWAcgjQzdJ8PsiaHowp378d
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yrva62tq1klmFS8TD8uxrEU78y3RMbj04lY2RPlllealsY8SpZ-cOZ2QkK_kz2lnNxpMZSgJRRAarnhNVSMg
The impact of a country's participation in an IMF program on the yield on its sovereign bonds may be more complicated still. Research on bond
issues in emerging markets since 1991 has found that spreads are typically lower in countries participating in an IMF program. However,
the existence of an IMF program may, rather than mollify investors, instead signal to them that the
relevant country's credit is riskier, particularly where debt-to-GDP ratios are high. Indeed, when debt-to-GDP
ratios are above 60 percent, the positive impact on spreads has been shown to disappear, even in the presence of IMF lending.4 The possibility
of default is generally considered higher for sovereigns participating in an IMF program with high debt ratios as compared to sovereigns not
participating in a program, given countries requiring IMF support already face long-term vulnerability and support programs are not always
sufficient to eliminate associated risks of default. By way of example, the coupons on Ghana's sovereign bonds issued before the IMF extended
its first ECF to Ghana in 2015 (when the country's gross public debt as a percentage of GDP stood at approximately 71 percent) were actually
lower than the coupons on sovereign bonds issued subsequent to the IMF's intervention in the country, including, notably, Ghana's October
2015 eurobond, which benefited from a partial World Bank guarantee. Unsurprisingly, the fact that a country benefits from IMF support is rarely
sufficient to lift the rating of its sovereign bond out of sub-investment-grade status. Indeed, every African country with outstanding eurobond
issues currently has at least one sub-investment-grade rating from the major rating agencies. The IMF has for years played an important role in
the evolving economies of sub-Saharan Africa. However,
the specific correlation of IMF program participation to
sovereign bond performance and investor sentiment is less clear-cut, in part because of the wide
range of factors that must be taken into account, as well as the relative "youth" of the sub-Saharan
African sovereign debt market.
A2 COVID
1. T. Ratcliff 20 finds “Over 80% of the IMF’s Covid-19 loans recommend poor countries hit hard by
the economic fallout from the pandemic adopt tough new austerity measures” that will push for
belt-tightening that can result in deep cuts to public healthcare systems that are needed to solve
COVID. This means that the IMF loans push against healthcare systems spending and harm
COVID response relief.
a. She continues that millions more people are likely to be left without healthcare or
income support while they search for work, thwarting any hope of a sustainable
recovery.
2. M. Goodman 20 reports that the IMF has failed to fulfill its lending promises. At the IMF,
Georgieva, the managing director said she would not hesitate to tap the institution's $1 trillion
lending capacity. But the IMF has lent out only $280 billion which is only 3% of the IMF’s actual
potential lending in the COVID crisis. Stubbs 21 confirms this sentiment In March 2020, the G20
declared that ‘We commit to do whatever it takes and to use all available policy tools to
minimize the economic and social damage from the pandemic, restore global growth, maintain
market stability, and strengthen resilience. To date, these words have not been met with equally
bold action. At time of writing, the IMF and all major RFAs [regional financial arrangements] have
virtually the same lending capacity as they did in 2018, only the conditions of access have
occasionally changed.
a. More specifically, Stubbs says Taken together, adjustments to the IMF’s financial
architecture since the Covid-19 joint statement—the temporarily increased access limits,
the new Short-Term Liquidity Line, and revamped Catastrophe Containment and Relief
Trust—are underwhelming. The only genuinely fresh funding is the $285mil committed
to the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, a mere fraction of existing lending
firepower and far short of the acknowledged $2.5trillion needed.
3.
Ratcliff 20 - aust hurts health

Ratcliff, Anna ( Employee Resource Director at ERC (Enhanced Resource Centers)) "IMF paves way for new era of austerity
post-COVID-19 ," Oxfam International. Oct 2020.
https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/imf-paves-way-new-era-austerity-post-covid-19
Over 80per cent of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Covid-19 loans recommend poor countries
hit hard by the economic fallout from the pandemic adopt tough new austerity measures in the
aftermath of the health crisis, Oxfam warned today. New research shows that since the pandemic was declared in March, 76 out of
91 IMF loans -- 84 per cent - negotiated with 81 countries push for belt-tightening that could result in deep cuts to public healthcare systems
and social protection. It comes after the World Bank projected that up to 115 million more people will fall into extreme poverty this year, the
first increase in more than two decades. Ana Arendar, Oxfam Head of Inequality Policy said: "At a time when the progress against poverty is
being set back decades, this is exactly the wrong instruction for the IMF to be giving poor countries. It is nothing short of unacceptable that the
IMF is using its power to make life harder for people already struggling to survive.
Millions more people are likely to be left
without healthcare or income support while they search for work, thwarting any hope of a sustainable
recovery
Goodman 20 - not enough lending

Goodman, Peter ( European economics correspondent for The New York Times, based in London. He was previously a national economic
correspondent, based in New York, where he played a leading role in award-winning coverage of the Great Recession. ) “How the
Wealthy World Has Failed Poor Countries During the Pandemic”, NYT, Nov 2020
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/01/business/coronavirus-imf-world-bank.html
At the I.M.F., Ms. Georgieva said she

The World Bank Group intends to respond forcefully and massively,” Mr. Malpass said.
would not hesitate to tap the institution’s $1 trillion lending capacity. “This is, in my lifetime, humanity’s darkest
hour,” she declared.
But the I.M.F. has lent out only $280 billion. That includes $31 billion in emergency loans to 76 member states, with nearly
$11 billion going to low-income countries.
“We have really stepped up in terms of quick disbursement to be able to support countries that are in need,” Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, director of the
I.M.F.’s Strategy Policy and Review department, said in an interview.
Stubbs 21 - g20 liarz

Stubbs, Thomas (Dept. of Politics & International Relations, U. of London) “Whatever it takes? The global financial safety
net, Covid-19, and developing countries” WORLD DEVELOPMENT, Jan 2021
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7462525/
p. 105171 In March 2020, the G20 declared that ‘We commit to do whatever it takes and to use all
available policy tools to minimize the economic and social damage from the pandemic, restore global growth,
maintain market stability, and strengthen resilience’ (Wintour & Rankin, 2020, emphasis added). To date, these words have not been met with
equally bold action. At time of writing, the IMF
and all major RFAs have virtually the same lending capacity as they
did in 2018, although conditions of access have occasionally changed. This section examines the evolution of global
financial safety net activities since the onset of the pandemic, drawing on official pronouncements from the IMF and RFAs.
2.1. The International Monetary Fund

Member-countries can access IMF lending facilities on either concessional or non-concessional terms.1 Non-concessional financing is accessed
through the General Resources Account: half of it is funded by a quota system that reflects countries’ relative position in the world economy
(e.g., the United States quota is 17.45% while Burundi’s is 0.03%); the rest is funde
Stubbs 21 - IMF specific

Stubbs, Thomas (Dept. of Politics & International Relations, U. of London) “Whatever it takes? The global financial safety
net, Covid-19, and developing countries” WORLD DEVELOPMENT, Jan 2021
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7462525/
Taken together,adjustments to the IMF’s financial architecture since the Covid-19 joint statement—the
temporarily increased access limits, the new Short-Term Liquidity Line, and revamped Catastrophe
Containment and Relief Trust—are underwhelming. The only genuinely fresh funding is the $285mil committed to the
Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, a mere fraction of existing lending firepower and far short of the acknowledged
$2.5tn need.
EMDEs [Emerging Market and Developing Economies] need a rapid $2.5trillion
It is widely acknowledged that
to meet their liquidity needs. According to the data presented here, the institutions of the global financial safety
net fell short in approving and disbursing liquidity so that EMDEs could fight the virus, protect the vulnerable, and mount a
recovery—providing just over $89.56billion in loans and two currency swaps totaling $550million. These outlays represent only 12.6% of
available financing for EMDEs across these institutions.
A2 Surveillance
1. DL. IMF economic monitoring is ineffective. Historical precedent proves:
a. In Portugal, Eichenbam 05 explains the IMF “gave too little attention to the possibility
of a painful sudden stop in capital flows to Portugal” and neglected “the role of private
sector borrowing in making Portugal” which was vulnerable to a sudden stop.
b. The IMF also failed in Greece, Mohan 10 explains “In the run-up to the financial crisis,
the IMF’s surveillance failed to capture the build-up of risks in the Eurozone crisis (which
began as a domino effect from Greece) he concludes the surveillance lost effectiveness
because of a lack of analytical depth, rigor, and the failure to highlight sufficiently the
need for stronger action.
c. IMF surveillance didn’t detect the 2008 recession, one of the biggest economic crises of
our time. Gutner 15 confirms “However, the IMF’s newfound importance was not a
result of past excellent performance” and that the IMF couldn’t even foresee the crisis,
and only took control because of“ its position as the “go-to” institution in times of
economic trouble.”
Echenbaum 05 - Portugal surv

Eichenbaum, Martin “The Portuguese Crisis and the IMF.” Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF. 16
Feb. 2005
https://fronteirasxxi.pt/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/EAC__BP_16-02_05_The_Portuguese_Crisis_and_the_IMF-v2.pdf
We evaluate the IMF’s role in the 2011 program for Portugal and its surveillance of the Portuguese economy in the preceding decade. Our
most important criticism of the Fund’s surveillance is that it gave too little attention to the possibility
of a painful sudden stop in capital flows to Portugal and to the role of private sector borrowing in
making Portugal vulnerable to a sudden stop. A major success of the IMF program is that it helped to re-establish Portugal’s
access to international capital markets. However, the sustainability of government debt remains fragile. Restructuring this debt was never
seriously considered. If the IMF continues to view debt restructuring as being off the table, then the international community must develop
institutions to regulate international lenders. If debt restructuring is on the table, then the international community must develop institutions to
preemptively stop sudden stops.
Mohan 10 - Greece surv

Mohan, Ram (is an Independent Director on the Board of REC since November 13, 2015. He is a B.Tech from IIT, Mumbai; PGDM from IIM,
Calcutta)"How the IMF Bungled the Greek Debt Crisis," Wire. Apr. 2010.
https://thewire.in/economy/imf-and-greece-crisis
Before the launch of the euro in January 1999, the IMF’s public statements tended to emphasise the advantages of the common currency more
than the concerns about it that were being expressed in the broader literature. How a monetary union could be effective without a fiscal,
banking or political union is an issue that was flagged in the literature. The IMF ought to have made a technical analysis of
this crucial question. It failed to do so. In the run-up to the financial crisis, the IMF’s surveillance failed to capture
the build-up of risks in the Eurozone which was signalled by widening current account deficits of several countries. The IMF staff
did not view matters with objectivity. The IEO makes some damning observations: Lack of analytical depth, rigor, or specificity
and the failure to highlight sufficiently the need for stronger remedial action in a currency union were
among the factors that undermined the quality and effectiveness of surveillance. At the euro area level, IMF staff’s
position was often too close to the official line of European officials, and the IMF lost effectiveness as an independent
assessor. The IEO report highlights “groupthink and intellectual capture”, a “culture of complacency”, “ad hoc task forces” and the
non-availability of crucial documents.
Gutner 15 - 2008 surv

Gutner, Tamar (esearch and teaching interests include global governance, international organizations, international political economy,
the World Bank, IMF, and AIIB. Her research focuses on the performance and effectiveness of international organizations, particularly
international financial institutions)
“Evaluating the IMF’s Performance in the Global Financial Crisis.”
American University. Dec. 2015
https://www.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/PEIO9/102_80_1443647577194_Gutner30Sept2015.pdf
The global financial crisis of 2008 triggered a rapid response by powerful states and their central banks, and resulted in moving the IMF back
onto the center state of global economic governance after a period of declining demand for its lending and advice. However, the IMF’s
newfound importance was not a result of past excellent performance, but its position as the “go-to”
institution in times of economic trouble. It was the recipient of a large infusion of resources and became a crisis manager,
quickly moving billions of dollars out the door to countries in need. But its output performance following the crisis was mixed in key areas. It
dropped the ball in terms of foreseeing a crisis. After the crisis hit, the IMF responded quickly and effectively. It created new
instruments, streamlined old ones, reformed its governance structure, and even adjusted some of its long-standing views on appropriate
economic policies. While it is too early to evaluate the impact of some of its changes, one particularly positive note is that IMF actions in the
third category reflect its intention to adapt and learn following its failure in the first category.
A2 Stops Predatory Lending

1. LR. This doesn’t matter because the IMF is corrupt and it’s bailouts have shown to fail.
2. Li et al 15 reports most studies find that IMF bailouts result in worse economies in the long term
which increases poverty.
bailout.
3. Hickel 20 furthers The IMF is structurally undemocratic, causing massive inequality and suffering
for oppressed nations. Take Bangladesh and Nigeria, both of which were British colonies. In the
IMF, a British person’s vote today is worth 41 times more than a Bangladeshi’s vote, and 23 times
more than a Nigerian’s vote. And this is the 21st century; many decades after the end of colonial
rule. In any national political system, we would reject the notion that rich people should have
more voting power than poor people, and more influence over economic policy decisions. We
would see this as corrupt and morally repulsive. And yet such plutocracy is normalised in the
IMF.
A2 Stops Risky Behavior

1. T. Helfer 98 finds Global moral hazard or risky behavior rises when institutions like the IMF
encourage potential borrowing countries to pursue policies that make them more vulnerable to
currency runs and other crises. He quantifies global moral hazard created by IMF has played a
major role in the nearly 100 banking crises in the last 15 years. He says that without these
rescues, banks would have behaved far more prudently.
Helfer 98 - moral haz up

Ricki Tigert Helfer. (Vice Chair, US Grameen Foundation engaged in economic development programs for the poverty alleviation,
Member, Board of Directors of the Citizens Committee for Children of New York City)“Rethinking IMF Rescues”. Brookings. 1998.
https://www.brookings.edu/research/rethinking-imf-rescues
Global moral hazard arises when
In fact, the Asian crisis has highlighted two types of moral hazard: global and domestic.
lending by the IMF or individual countries (such as U.S. lending to Mexico in 1994-95) encourages
potential borrowing countries to pursue policies that make them more vulnerable to currency runs
and other crises. Allan Meltzer argues that the global moral hazard created by IMF rescues has played a major role
in the nearly 100 banking crises that have occurred in the developing world in the last 15 years. He
says that without these rescues, banks would have behaved far more prudently. Other participants suggested,
however, that most of these banking crises were not associated with the IMF, had purely domestic origins, and were often caused by poorly
implemented financial liberalization policies.”
A2 Has reformed
1. The IMF will not reform – it has an internal review but it has no influence. BWP 19 explains the
IThe IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) was set up in 2001 to conduct evaluations of the
policies and functionalities of the institution with the aim of enhancing the learning culture,
strengthening credibility, and supporting institutional governance yet a third independent
evaluation of the IEO itself, published in 2018, found that the IEO’s recommendations continue
to “lack traction” within the Fund. This echoes the findings of previous evaluations of the IEO,
amidst accusations of ‘groupthink’ at the IMF, which the IEO deemed partially the cause of the
Fund not foreseeing the 2008 global financial crisis, arguably its most important job and clearest
recent failure.
Bwp 19 - doesn’t reform

BWP "What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and IMF?" Bretton Woods Project. Jun 2019.
https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/#_Toc10127392.
2.4 Weak ability to learn from past mistakes
The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) was set up in 2001 to conduct evaluations of the policies
and functionalities of the institution with the aim of enhancing the learning culture, strengthening
credibility, and supporting institutional governance and oversight. On the World Bank side, the
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) was created in 2006, integrating several individual accountability mechanisms, and is
charged with evaluating the activities of the entire World Bank Group and determining what works, what doesn’t and why.
However, the Bank and Fund have been criticised for failing to implement the recommendations of the IEG
and IEO, respectively. In the case of the Bank, this reflects larger criticisms of staff incentives being misaligned with its twin goals, and the
Bank having an insular, self-referential approach to knowledge production, which – according to the landmark Deaton Report published in 2006
third independent evaluation of the IEO itself,
– sometimes borders on ‘parody’ (see Observer Summer 2018). Meanwhile, a
published in 2018, found that the IEO’s recommendations continue to “lack traction” within the Fund
(see Observer Autumn 2018). This echoes the findings of previous evaluations of the IEO, amidst
accusations of ‘groupthink’ at the IMF, which the IEO deemed partially the cause of the Fund not
foreseeing the 2008 global financial crisis, arguably its most important job and clearest recent failure
(see Update Issue 74).
NEGGGGGG
A2 Poverty Up
1. T. Hayashikawa 08 finds the IMF allows for trade liberalization which as a result, decreases
poverty. IMF (2007) analyses found that trade liberalization reduces income inequality, both in
developed and developing countries. Hayashikawa 08 quantifies during the last two decades,
the average real income of the poorest segment of the population has increased across all
countries and income groups.
2. NU. Hayashikawa 08 continues that income inequality has risen in most countries and regions
over the past two decades due to technological progress which increases the wages of the skilled
relative to the wages of the unskilled rather than attributing it to the IMF.
3. NU. COVID is an alternative cause to poverty. Williams-Grut 20 writes that COVID has decreased
poverty reduction efforts quantifying it removed 30 years of progress and can push as many as
90 million people into poverty.
4. DL. Bird 19 reports there’s no link between the IMF and an increase in poverty. He finds no
strong and universally negative association between Fund programs and a wide range of key
social indicators that he examined.
Hayashikawa 08 - tralib decrease pov

Hayashikawa, Masato “Trading Out of Poverty How Aid for Trade Can Help”, OECD, Nov 2008
https://www.oecd.org/site/tadpd/41231150.pdf
Put differently, although the poverty elasticity of growth can vary significantly between countries and across time (see e.g. World Bank, 2005),
there is no evidence-based support for a consensus that liberalised trade has an „adverse‟ impact on the poor. Cashin et al. (2001) examined the
relationship between macroeconomic policies and improvements in a human development index for a given rate of per capita GDP growth and
found no robust evidence that any openness variable was associated with either pro-poor or anti-poor growth. Cling (2006) also concludes, on
the basis of a comprehensive literature review, that trade is not the main factor determining the evolution of poverty and inequality within
countries. However, the IMF (2007) analyses found that trade openness actually reduces income inequality,
both in developed and developing countries. In fact, during the last two decades average real income of the poorest
segment of the population has increased across all countries and income groups. Rather, as the study points out,
income inequality has risen in most countries and regions over the past two decades due to technological
progress which increases the wages of the skilled relative to the wages of the unskilled.
Williams-Grut 20 - COVID pov

Williams-Grut, Oscar (senior city correspondent in London, covering banking and finance. He was formerly a senior reporter at Business
Insider and worked for the London Evening Standard and UK Independent newspapers before that.) "IMF: COVID-19 'will erase 30
years of progress fighting poverty'," Yahoo, Oct 2020
https://sports.yahoo.com/imf-covid-19-poverty-world-economic-outlook-october-2020-growth-economy-142127336.html
The COVID-19 pandemic could reverse 30 years of progress made fighting global poverty, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned. The IMF said on Tuesday said that as many as 90
million people could be plunged beneath
into extreme poverty this year, meaning they will be forced to survive on less than $1.90 a day. “The pandemic will reverse the
progress made since the 1990s in reducing global poverty and will increase inequality,” the IMF wrote in its bi-annual World Economic Outlook
report. The agency said day labourers and migrant labourers were particularly vulnerable to falling into poverty. “People who rely on daily wage
labor and are outside the formal safety net faced sudden income losses when mobility restrictions were imposed,” the report said. “Among
them, migrant workers who live far from home had even less recourse to traditional support networks.” The IMF said emerging market countries
and developing economies would suffer more severe downturns than developed economies as a result of COVID
Bird 19 - no link pov

Bird, Graham (Department of Economic Sciences, Claremont Graduate University and Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies,
Claremont, CA, USA) “The effects of IMF programs on poverty, income inequality and social expenditure in low
income countries: an empirical analysis” Taylor and Francis Online, Nov 2019
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17487870.2019.1689360?journalCode=gpre20
common caricature of the IMF’s involvement in low income countries is that its preoccupation
However, a
with macroeconomic stabilization implies that IMF programs will have severe negative effects in the
form of increasing poverty, increasing income inequality and cutting social expenditure by the
government. This caricature has been reinforced by empirical studies that claim to have identified negative consequences, and, despite the
nuances of some of these results, this image of the effect of IMF programs has become something of a conventional wisdom. Our findings
suggest that this image of IMF programs needs to be re-assessed. We attempt to deal with a potential selection problem by adopting a
propensity score matching approach which allows us to compare countries with and without IMF programs, but with approximately similar
probabilities of participating in one, based on their underlying economic circumstances. Our
analysis does not find any strong
and universally negative association between Fund programs and a wide range of key social indicators
that we examine. Instead, the effects are highly nuanced and contingent on country and program
characteristics; the estimated treatment effects exhibit considerable variance.
A2 Worse Econ Long Term

1. T. Orszag 20 finds The IMF increases nation’s access to credit and Arabaci et al 14 furthers that it
improves borrower countries’ access to international financial markets. Arabaci says “Although it
is not stated in the IMF’s Articles of Agreements, enhancing members’ access to international
capital markets has been regarded as an important objective since the early 1990s (Mody and
Saravia, 2003).”
2. M. The IMF is not supposed to be a long term plan. In fact, Reinhart 16 finds that the IMF acts as
an international lender of last resort and Arabici 14 furthers that the impact of IMF programmes
is in general to reduce short-term debt flows.
3. T. An international institution lets countries cooperate on economic development, which leads to
stability. IMF 19 explains that its broad membership makes it uniquely well suited to facilitate
multilateral discussions on issues of common concern to groups of member countries, and to
advance a shared understanding of policies needed to promote stability
Oszag 20 - better credit

Orszag, Peter (CEO of Financial Advisory at Lazard.) “Memo to the IMF on how to respond to sovereign debt
challenges in the wake of the pandemic” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Nov 2020
https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/memo-imf-how-respond-sovereign-debt-challenges-wake-pandemic
PRIORITY 4: PROMOTE EFFICIENCY IN DEBT NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRIVATE CREDITORS
Over recent decades,
the IMF has played a key role in promoting a collaborative and efficient participation
of private creditors in debt restructurings. Part of that role involves promoting the standardization of collective action clauses
(CACs) in debt contracts to limit the ability of litigating creditors to block a restructuring
Arabaci 14 - access 2 intern trade

Arabaci, Mehmet C. (Ministry of Economy, Turkey) & Sencer Ecer (Dept. of Economics, Istanbul Technical U., Turkey),
“The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Catalytic Effect: Do IMF Agreements Improve Access of
Emerging Economies to International Financial Markets?” THE WORLD ECONOMY, Nov 2014, EconLit,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/twec.12145
p. 1576. Although it is not stated in the IMF’s Articles of Agreements, enhancing members’
access to international capital markets has been regarded as an important objective since the early
1990s (Mody and Saravia, 2003). Capital flows have become an important element of economic development in the 1990s as the global
integration of financial markets increased. ‘As the fluctuations in countries’ capital accounts acquired greater importance – and sometimes even
dominated current account fluctuations – the IMF increasingly came to view the facilitation and maintenance of capital flows to developing
countries as one of its essential functions’ (Bordo et al., 2004, p. 423).
Reinhart 16 - last resort

p. 3-4. However, the emergence in 2007–2009 of the deepest and most synchronous financial crisis in the world’s largest
economies since the 1930s put an end to the notion that the IMF was redundant. As Kindleberger (1978) had wisely observed decades earlier,
financial crises are “a hardy perennial.” By practically any metric, the post-2008 IMF programs to several European economies are the largest in
the IMF’s 70-year history. As Figure 1 shows, in 2010 the new programs to the wealthier borrowers brought total IMF commitments, measured
as a share of imports, close to their historical peak in the early 2000s, while as a share of world GDP, IMF commitments hit an all-time peak.
p. 6. While there are numerous development banks, the IMF is the one institution that is sometimes
described as a central bank for countries or lender of last resort to the world (for example, see Fischer 1999 in this journal,
and the essays in Bank of International Settlements 2014).
Arabaci 14 - short term debt

p. 1578. Given these facts, if a country under an IMF programme lowers its country risk due to the existence of the
programme, then creditors may reflect this increase in perceived credit-worthiness by making longer term loans. In fact, Mina and
Martinez-Vazques (2002) find that the impact of IMF programmes is in general to reduce short-term
debt flows relative to total debt flows.
IMF 19 - stability
IMF 19 “How the IMF Promotes Global Economic Stability.” International Monetary Fund, Mar 2021.
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/22/How-the-IMF-Promotes-Global-Economic-Stability
B- Overseeing the bigger picture The IMF also closely monitors global and regional trends. The IMF’s periodic reports, the World Economic
Outlook, its regional overviews, the Fiscal Monitor, and the Global Financial Stability Report, analyze global and regional macroeconomic and
financial developments. The IMF’s
broad membership makes it uniquely well suited to facilitate multilateral
discussions on issues of common concern to groups of member countries, and to advance a shared
understanding of policies needed to promote stability. In this context, the Fund is helping the Group of Twenty advanced
and emerging economies by providing regular assessments of current developments in G20 Surveillance Reports and progress towards common
goals in the annual G20 Report on Strong, Sustainable, Balanced, and Inclusive Growth. The Fund has reviewed its surveillance mandate in light
of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). It has introduced a number of reforms to improve financial sector surveillance within member countries and
across borders, to enhance understanding of interlinkages between macroeconomic and financial developments, and stimulate debate on these
matters. The IMF has also strengthened its analysis of macro-critical structural reforms to the macroeconomy to help countries promote durable
and inclusive growth. To further improve traction of Fund surveillance and support members in the face of emerging challenges, work has
started on the 2020 Comprehensive Surveillance Review and the 2020
A2 Austerity/Cut Spending Bad

1. M. Giles 20 reports the IMF has modified its demands for austerity. The fund’s advice is a
reversal of the message given in the same publication a decade ago at the equivalent stage in
the financial crisis. Then, it warned that “many countries face large retrenchment needs going
forward”. The fund’s internal auditor subsequently assessed that it had been too quick to
advocate austerity in 2010-11, and the IMF has now substantially revised its guidance. This time
around, countries that have the choice to keep borrowing are likely to be able to stabilise their
public debt by the middle of the decade, Vitor Gaspar, head of fiscal policy at the IMF says it
would mean they would not have to raise taxes or cut public spending plans.
2. M. In addition, even if austerity measures cause certain cuts in spending, it’s better than total
financial system collapse. Mann 98 explains that The bottom line is that the IMF is the only
supra-national institution that can coordinate action when sovereign nations are involved, and
when fast moving global financial crises demand large and immediate injections of credit. It is
essentially a lender of last resort, not a preventative measure.
Giles 20 - not cutting spending

Giles, Chris (economics editor for the Financial Times in October 2004, having previously served as a leader writer. His reporting beat covers
global and UK economic affairs and he writes a UK economics column fortnightly.) “IMF says austerity is not inevitable to ease
pandemic impact on public finances” FINANCIAL TIMES (United Kingdom), Oct 2020
https://www.ft.com/content/722ef9c0-36f6-4119-a00b-06d33fced78f
Most advanced economies that can borrow freely will not need to plan for austerity to restore the health of their public finances after the
coronavirus pandemic, the IMF has said in a reversal of its advice a decade ago. Countries that have the choice to keep
borrowing are likely to be able to stabilise their public debt by the middle of the decade, Vitor Gaspar, head of fiscal policy at
the fund, told the Financial Times. That would mean they would not have to raise taxes or cut public
spending plans.
The fund’s advice is a reversal of the message given in the same publication a decade ago at the
equivalent stage in the financial crisis. Then, it warned that “many countries face large retrenchment
needs going forward”.
The fund’s internal auditor subsequently assessed that it had been too quick to advocate austerity in
2010-11, and the IMF has now substantially revised its guidance.
This time around, more needs to be done to foster a strong recovery before considering the health of countries’ public finances, the IMF
emphasised.
“We believe there is a risk of prematurely withdrawing fiscal support and policymakers that have a choice would be well-advised to be very
gradual and to maintain fiscal support until the recovery is on a sound footing and the long-run scarring impacts from Covid-19 are perceived to
be under control,” Mr Gaspar said.
Mann 98 - lend last res

Mann, Catherine L. (global chief economist at Citi, a position she started in 2018. She was also the Chief economist at the OECD.) “An
International Lender of Last Resort and the International Financial Markets.” Peterson Institute for
International Economics. Apr 1998.
https://www.piie.com/commentary/testimonies/international-lender-last-resort-and-international-financial-markets
Increasingly the IMF is being called an international lender of last resort. What does it mean to be a lender of last resort (LOLR)? What
supporting structures are required to effectively play that role? Central banks in national financial systems can (and some do) intervene to
support some participants in the financial system in times of crisis. What can we
learn from national LOLR experience for the occasions under which a LOLR might take action, the instruments the LOLR might use, and what
supporting structures might be necessary for a LOLR to be effective in balancing the risks of financial crisis against the risks of moral hazard. If
indeed the IMF is being called upon to act as an international LOLR, does it have (or can it be given) the instruments and supporting structures
which appear to be necessary in the national context? If not, what are the consequences of the IMF playing with only
half a deck, and is there another way out? The
bottom line is that the IMF is the only supra-national institution
that can coordinate action when sovereign nations are involved, and when fast moving global financial
crises demand large and immediate injections of credit. The foundation for growth in an increasingly
global world is through international financial
intermediation—a collapse of the international financial system cannot be risked. However, the IMF operates
without key supporting institutions and mechanisms that are integral to the environment of the national LOLR and which
mitigate moral hazard. The IMF has neither a constant supervisory presence nor a fiscal redistributive authority. Consequently, IMF intervention
in the current international financial environment magnifies moral hazard. The recommendations contained in the recent communique from G-7
Finance Ministers, to improve transparency and disclosure and to strengthen national financial systems, clearly are necessary—but they are not
enough. The proposed "international supervisor of the national supervisors" could help to some degree. But supervisors, to be effective, must
be ever-present and have enforcement powers; authorities not given over lightly to supra-national entities. So, even as we bolster the IMF's
credit line for when needed, we must seek ways to limit the occasions we resort to it. We must focus on market-oriented solutions. The private
financial market has the technical ability to create financial instruments that mitigate moral hazard and diversify risk t
A2 Income Inequality Up
1. T. Taylor 19 writes that the IMF has advocated progressive policies, naming it one of three key
methods for tackling inequality in 2017. In addition, social spending policies had a part to play,
noting that allocating funds to areas such as education, health care and pensions can help to
reduce wealth inequality.
2. NU. Tetlow 17 finds that technological changes are responsible for rising income inequality. She
says “Policymakers in advanced economies should look to technological change, rather than
globalisation, for the main explanation of why workers have failed to benefit fully from past
economic growth” [Across the majority of advanced economies, workers have received a
declining income since the early 1990s, while a growing share of productivity gains has been
captured by the owners of capital. About half of this decline can be attributed to the impact of
technological progress, which has made it easier to automate routine tasks.]
Taylor 19 - tackle ineq

Taylor, Chloe (news assistant at CNBC.) “IMF chief calls for tax hikes on the wealthy to reduce inequality,”
CNBC, Oct 19 https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/08/imf-chief-calls-for-tax-hikes-on-the-wealthy-to-reduce-inequality.html
However, she was optimistic that policymakers had the power to deliver real change, despite the political difficulty of implementing reforms.
Firstly, Georgieva suggested governments needed to rethink their policies and consider progressive taxation. “Progressive taxation is a key
component of effective fiscal policy,” she said. “At the top of the income distribution, our research shows that marginal tax rates can be raised
without sacrificing economic growth.” The
IMF has long advocated progressive tax policies, naming it one of three
key methods for tackling inequality in 2017. Another way policymakers could address inequality was through “gender
budgeting,” Georgieva said. Gender budgeting is a strategy to achieve equality between women and men by focusing on how public resources
are collected and spent, according to the EU. It can be applied at either central or local government level and may include steps such as
restructuring budgets and policies or increasing female participation in the budget process. “While many countries recognize the need for
gender equality and women’s empowerment, governments can use gender budgeting to structure spending and taxation in ways to advance
gender equality even further — increasing women’s participation in the workforce and, in turn, boosting growth and stability,” Georgieva said in
her blog. She also suggested
that social spending policies had a part to play, noting that allocating funds to
areas such as education, health care and pensions could help to reduce wealth inequality.
Tetlow 17 - alt tech prog

Tetlow, Gemma (chief economist at the Institute for Government, working across the Institute's programme areas. She joined the
organisation in April 2018. Between 2016 and 2018, Gemma was economics correspondent at the Financial Times, reporting on and analysing
economic developments in the UK and globally.)
"Blame technology not globalisation for rising inequality, says IMF,"
Financial Times, Apr 2017 https://www.ft.com/content/cfbd0af6-1e0b-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c
Policymakers in advanced economies should look to technological change, rather than globalisation,
for the main explanation of why workers have failed to benefit fully from past economic growth,
according to the International Monetary Fund. Across the majority of advanced economies, workers have received a declining share of national
income since the early 1990s, while a growing share of productivity gains has been captured by the owners of capital. About
half of this
decline can be attributed to the impact of technological progress, which has made it easier to
automate routine tasks, according to new analysis from the IMF. This has been more important than globalisation in affecting how
much workers have benefited from economic growth. Because capital tends to be concentrated among the wealthy, a falling share of income for
workers and vice versa for capital owners is likely to lead to rising income inequality, the study concludes.
A2 Neoliberal
1. [T. Neoliberalism is good Loeb 17 finds neoliberal policies have the potential to lower inequality
because Neoliberals support progressive taxation, land value and inheritance taxes to improve
equality, the idea that a minimum standard of living should be provided, and Tuicakademi 19
finds that it can enhance cooperation and reduce the risk of war or conflict as well.]
2. DL. Donnnon 18 reports the IMF is reversing this and rethinking its neoliberal past
3.
Loeb 17 - lower inequality

Loeb, Marc David (University of Chicago, Research Assistant at American Museum of Natural History) "Neoliberalism has done
the most good for the most people of any economic system in human history," Medium, Jun 2017
https://medium.com/@marcdloeb/neoliberalism-has-done-the-most-good-for-the-most-people-of-any-e
conomic-system-in-human-history-9a9bd91eda4c
Other neoliberal policies have the potential to lower inequality. The American federal tax code is over 11,000
pages long (and jumps to 70,000 if you include supplementary Our regulatory code is orders of magnitude larger. The
complexity of these systems inherently benefit the wealthy. Large corporations and rich people can afford expensive lawyers to
find every exemption and tax break. This gives large incumbent companies and advantage over their smaller rivals, decreasing
economic dynamism, pushing up prices and down wages. Another tax neoliberals wish to get rid of, corporate income taxation,
is primarily a tax on the wages of workers and the pockets of consumers, not the wallets of the CEO or shareholders. By radically
simplifying our tax and regulatory system we can re-level the playing field. The Safety Net However capitalism is not a perfect
system. What separates neoliberals from libertarians is that neoliberals recognize that markets sometimes fail when left
completely unsupervised. Anti-trust regulations are needed to maintain competition and protect consumers. Externalities such
as pollution and CO2 should be taxed, to return their costs to the people who created them. A good education system is
essential to promoting opportunity and growth. Government intervention in the market is also needed when there is limited or
no consumer choice (such as infrastructure and emergency care [people usually don’t take the time to shop hospitals if they are
having a heart attack]). The rights of minorities (sexual, religious, racial, ethnic) also need to be protected. Capitalism creates
unparalleled prosperity, but sometimes doesn’t distribute income and opportunity fairly (though I maintain that it provides the
most fair baseline). Neoliberals support progressive taxation (preferably progressive consumption
taxation), land value and inheritance taxes to improve equality. Neoliberalism also supports the idea
that a minimum standard of living should be provided, preferably through cash grants to the poor (slowly trailing
off as income rises), instead of our current tangled web of 126 welfare programs, which don’t cooperate, allow people to fall
through the cracks and disincentivize increasing one’s own income.
Tuicakademi 19 - coop up conflict down

EditöR, "Neoliberalism on Regional Conflicts," TUİÇ Akademi, Feb 2019
https://www.tuicakademi.org/neoliberalism-on-regional-conflicts/
But in this regard, it is possible to say that, international institutions can promote the international cooperation and assure the development of
cooperation. They also may put pressure on states to comply with the international agreements. However all neoliberalists accept and
acknowledge the importance of the international cooperation which is one of the main principles of this theory. And the theory indicates that
institutions enhance the cooperation and reduce the risk of war and conflict. Neoliberalism specifically looks at this solution: it argues that
international cooperation limit the effects of anarchy.[4] Besides, neoliberalists focus on domestic relations too, tackling the domestic policy
issues and the influence of the political regimes and political systems to the state’s foreign policy in particular and to international relations in
general.[5] Although some theories ignore the role of domestic policies in international relations, neoliberalism indicates that the political
systems, domestic policies should not be neglected, democratic and non-democratic states would act and interact differently. Democratic peace
theory advocates the premise that democracies solve the conflicts without using the military sources. Neoliberals tackle the policy tools and
diverse resources available for states, they are underlying the importance of the economic sources and propound that power cannot be
absorbed only in military and political terms, but also
Donnan 18 - imf no like lib

Shawn Donnan, 5-26-2016, "IMF economists put ‘neoliberalism’ under the spotlight," Financial Times,
https://www.ft.com/content/4b98c052-238a-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d
three of the IMF’s top economists cautiously suggest that the
In an article published this week in its flagship magazine,
“neoliberal agenda” may have been less successful than intended — and led to increased inequality. Headlined
“Neoliberalism: Oversold?”, the article is more a reflection of the vigorous debates under way inside the IMF than a brutal takedown of the free
market policies the fund has long advocated. Still, even the use of the term “neoliberalism” is provocative. It is normally used by critics of the
free market economics advocated by Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. As the “Socialist Worker” newspaper railed this week: “The IMF uses
debt as a weapon to force vicious neoliberal reforms on to elected governments.” The new IMF work examines two specific elements of the
so-called neoliberal agenda: capital account liberalisation, or removing barriers to the flows of capital; and fiscal consolidation… “What the hell
is going on?” asked Dani Rodrik, a Turkish economist who teaches at Harvard University, and is known for his questioning of globalisation’s
benefits, in an interview. “The IMF joins the critique of neoliberalism,” added Robert Went, a Dutch economist with a
more sceptical take on globalisation, via Twitter. Fabio Ghironi, an Italian economist who teaches at the University of Washington, tweeted that
the new paper amounted to a “disservice to many who’ve been working on other policies”. In an interview, Jonathan Ostry, deputy director of
the IMF’s research department and the article’s lead author, said the article was not meant as an attack on “the entire neoliberal agenda or the
Washington consensus”. But he hoped it would set the stage for a broader examination of “neoliberalism” that would come out this year.
A2 Bad 4 Ecuador
1. DL. Even if the IMF’s calculations are wrong, the programs still aim at helping Ecuador. Sayeh 20
explains “Ecuador’s 27-month EFF arrangement was approved by the Executive Board in
September 2020 for about US$6.5 billion or around 661 percent of Ecuador’s quota. The
program aims to support Ecuador’s policies to stabilize the economy and protect lives and
livelihoods, expand the coverage of social assistance programs, ensure fiscal and debt
sustainability, and strengthen domestic institutions to lay the foundations for strong, job-rich,
and long-lasting growth that benefits all Ecuadorians.
2. DL. Focusing on only the failures of Ecuador ignores the IMF’s role is to function as the world's
financial watchdog, it ignores successes like Brazil 2002, Ireland from the Eurozone crisis, and the
Asian financial crisis of 1997-8 according to Masters et al 20 who explains it is often the only
organization equipped for such interventions, and evaluating the fund’s success over the past
seventy-plus years is a difficult task. As Harvard economist Benjamin M. Friedman has said, “We
cannot reliably know whether the consequences of the IMF’s policies were worse than whatever
the alternative would have been.”
Sayeh 20 - ecuador
Sayeh, Antoinette M. (Deputy Managing Director, IMF), “IMF Executive Board Completes First Review of the
Extended Fund Facility Arrangement for Ecuador” International Monetary Fund, STATES NEWS SERVICE,
Dec 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/12/22/pr20387-imf-executive-board-completes-first-review-for-ecuador
Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the first review of the extended arrangement
under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Ecuador. The Board’s decision allows for an immediate disbursement of SDR 1.42 billion (about US$2
billion), bringing Ecuador’s total disbursements for budget support under the arrangement to about US$4 billion.
Ecuador’s 27-month EFF arrangement was approved by the Executive Board on September 30, 2020 (see
Press Release No. 20/302) for SDR 4.615 billion (about US$6.5 billion or around 661 percent of Ecuador’s quota). The
program aims to support Ecuador’s policies to stabilize the economy and protect lives and livelihoods,
expand the coverage of social assistance programs, ensure fiscal and debt sustainability, and
strengthen domestic institutions to lay the foundations for strong, job-rich, and long-lasting growth
that benefits all Ecuadorians.
Following the Executive Board discussion on Ecuador, Ms. Antoinette Sayeh, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following
statement:
“The Ecuadorian economy is showing nascent signs of economic recovery after bottoming out in the second quarter. New COVID-19 infections
and deaths have moderated compared to the high levels seen in the Spring, reflecting the authorities’ decisive actions to contain the outbreak.
Economic activity is now projected to contract by 9½ percent in 2020, which is an improvement over the 11 percent contraction anticipated at
program approval.
“The authorities’ vigilant approach leading up to program approval helped cushion delays in external financing. All end-September quantitative
performance criteria and indicative targets were met with large margins. Moreover, the authorities continued to expand and improve
well-targeted social assistance, bringing in more than 270,000 low-income families into the social safety net since July, ahead of their
end-December goal, and helping to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable groups.
Masters et al 20 - alt worse

Masters, Jonathan ( leads writers and editors who produce wide-ranging content for CFR.org, including Backgrounders, visual stories, and
events. He also writes on foreign policy and national security and his work has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic, and Bloomberg.) “The
IMF: The World’s Controversial Financial Firefighter” CFR, Aug 2020
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/imf-worlds-controversial-financial-firefighter
The IMF is routinely identified with economic hardship and political ferment because it is only in times
of crisis that its services are sought. It is often the only organization equipped for such interventions,
and evaluating the fund’s success over the past seventy-plus years is a difficult task. As Harvard economist Benjamin M. Friedman has
argued, “We cannot reliably know whether the consequences of the IMF’s policies were worse than
whatever the alternative would have been.”
Some economists characterize the fund’s performance in the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 as a success. They argue that the economic
reforms championed by the IMF allowed the countries involved to recover quickly and laid the foundation for sustained growth during the
2000s. Others point to the fund’s role in Brazil in 2002 as positive: an early recovery there after intervention allowed IMF loans to be repaid
ahead of schedule.
A2 Bad 4 Human Rights
1. T. The IMF actually increases human rights because Woo et al 17 finds the IMF is likely to be
more cautious and less likely to give a loan to countries under intense scrutiny for their human
rights abuses request for new IMF programs.
2. T. The IMF boosts human rights by reducing poverty, Pereira 01 reports Since 1999, the IMF has
stressed the central role of poverty reduction in the Fund's strategy for low-income countries
including Rwanda, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Uganda, Tanzania and Vietnam.
3. T. The IMF boosts gender equality. IMF Blog 17 explains they do this in 3 ways:
a. First is analysis and policy advice to increase female labor force participation. The Fund
supported programs with Egypt and Jordan including provisions to improve public
transport safety for women, and gave more child care options to help women seek
work. In Germany, they recommended the expansion of full-time childcare services and
after-school programs.
b. Second is fiscal policy. The IMF has examined, both globally and in the G7, how fiscal
policies can promote gender equality and women’s development, and advised how
governments can then integrate these ideas into the laws, regulations, and practices
governing the budget. Morocco and Afghanistan prioritized budgetary spending in areas
where there were specific targets to improve women’s health care and opportunities for
education and paid employment.
c. Third is research and awareness.
i. A pilot survey in 28 countries by the Fund found that women represent only
two-fifths of total bank account holders and borrowers, and that documents
required by banks may be a barrier to financial access for women. IMF research
shows that widening access to finance, for both men and women, can boost
economic growth by two to three percent.
ii. An IMF study found that while economic development in the Latin America and
Caribbean region has contributed to the increase in labor force participation
rates, there were other factors also at play, including equal legal rights for
women and men. In another study, the IMF noted that in Namibia female labor
force participation rose when the country strengthened women’s legal rights,
including the right to sign contracts and open a bank account.
iii. Another recent IMF paper on the Western Balkans found that women’s
participation in the labor force could increase through improvements in the
education system, more balanced family leave policies, greater availability of
childcare, and lower immigration of male population.
Woo 17 - imf good rights

Woo, Byungwon (Division of Language & Diplomacy Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea) Murdie,
Amanda (Department of International Affairs, School of Public & International Affairs, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA)
“International Organizations and Naming and Shaming: Does the International Monetary Fund Care
about the Human Rights Reputation of Its Client?” DOI Dec 2017
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032321717715397
We make an argument that HRO-publicized human rights conditions could enter the decision-making of the IMF and reduce the possibility of a
new IMF program. The IMF
is likely to be more cautious when countries under intense human rights scrutiny
for their human rights abuses request for new IMF programs. We corroborate our theoretical argument with some
anecdotes of actual cases. Cross-national empirical analysis strongly confirms the implications of our theoretical claim. We demonstrate that
HRO events in a country negatively affect the country’s probability of getting an IMF loan. Moreover, we argue and provide empirical evidence
that the effect of HRO campaigning is strongest when applied toward countries closer to the US. We contribute to both the IMF literature and
the literature on HROs. By showing that information produced by HROs constrains IMF decision-making, w
Pereira 01 - reduce pov

Pereira, Sergio (assistant Director in the IMF's Office in Europe) “The International Monetary Fund and Human
Rights,” IMF Sept 2001 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/leite.htm#author
Since 1999, the IMF has stressed the central role of poverty reduction in its strategy for low-income
countries. Recognizing that growth and macroeconomic stability are not enough to raise living standards, IMF Managing Director Horst
Köhler (2001) has emphasized the participation of the poor in the development process and suggested that governments need to create an
environment in which the poor can protect, sustain, and enrich their livelihoods. This approach, which seeks to strengthen countries' sense of
"ownership" of their economic strategies, is neither very far from, nor incompatible with, a rights-based strategy.
some countries have already provided for human rights concerns in their development strategies. The May 2000 PRSP of Burkina Faso centers
on human security: economic security (access to education, vocational training, and paid employment), health security (access to low-cost
preventive and curative medical care), food security (access to basic foodstuffs and safe water), environmental security (preservation of the
environment), and individual and political security (the rule of law, responsibility, participation, efficiency, and transparency). The Burkinabè
strategy does not promise that human security will be fully achieved during the life of the program, but it places a high priority on human rights
in its development and structural adjustment efforts.
Burkina Faso is not the only example. Nicaragua's September 2001 PRSP proposes measures to demarcate lands belonging to indigenous
communities, assist the poor to meet housing needs, protect children in high-risk conditions, implement programs for the elderly, prevent
domestic violence, strengthen the Office for Human Rights, and protect the rights of indigenous peoples. Rwanda's November 2000 PRSP
includes a framework for good governance that incorporates a human rights program, as well as capacity building for the country's Human
Rights Commission. Other countries
where the poverty reduction strategy deals with human rights include
Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam.
IMF blog 17 - women rights

IMF blog (forum for the views of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff and officials on pressing economic and policy issues of the
day.) “5 Things You Need to Know About the IMF and Gender” International Monetary Fund, Nov 2017
https://blogs.imf.org/2017/11/22/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-imf-and-gender/
1. Female labor force participation: Strengthening analysis and policy advice. IMF supported programs with Egypt and
Jordan include provisions to improve public transport safety for women, and provide more
child care options to help women seek work. In Germany, the IMF recommended the
expansion of full-time childcare services and after-school programs.
2. Financial inclusion: Data collection on access to and use of financial services. A pilot survey in 28 countries found
that women represent only two-fifths of total bank account holders and borrowers, and that documents
required by banks may be a barrier to financial access for women. IMF research shows that widening access to finance, for both men
and women, can boost economic growth by two to three percent.
3. Gender budgeting : Analyzing the fiscal and budgetary impact. The IMF has examined, both globally and in the
G7, how fiscal policies can promote gender equality and women’s development, and advised
how governments can then integrate these ideas into the laws, regulations, and practices governing the budget.
Morocco and Afghanistan prioritized budgetary spending in areas where there were specific targets to improve women’s health care
and opportunities for education and paid employment.
4. Legal barriers: Study and identify the impact of discriminatory laws. An IMF study found that while economic development in the
Latin America and Caribbean region has contributed to the increase in labor force participation rates, there were other factors also at
play, including equal legal rights for women and men. In another study, the IMF noted that in Namibia female labor force
participation rose when the country strengthened women’s legal rights, including the right to sign contracts and open a bank
account.
5. Research and analysis: Conduct further research and publish new studies. An IMF paper on women’s leadership in finance found
that a greater share of women on bank and banking supervision boards could be associated with greater bank stability. Banks with a
higher share of women were associated with higher capital buffers and lower non-performing loan ratios. Another recent IMF paper
on the Western Balkans found that women’s participation in the labor force could increase through improvements in the education
system, more balanced family leave policies, greater availability of childcare, and lower immigration of male population.
A2 Loan Conditionality Bad

1. DL. The IMF is fixing it’s issues. In March 2009, the Fund announced a major overhaul of its
lending framework, including modernizing conditionality, introducing a new flexible credit line,
enhancing the flexibility of the Fund’s regular stand-by lending arrangement, doubling access
limits on loans, adapting its cost structures for high-access and precautionary lending, and
streamlining instruments that were seldom used. It has also speeded up lending procedures and
redesigned its Exogenous Shocks Facility to make it easier to access for low-income countries.
More reforms have since been undertaken, most recently in November 2011.
2. T. Loan conditionality doesn't matter because IMF explains for countries in crisis, IMF loans
usually provide only a small portion of the resources needed to finance their balance of
payments. What IMF loans also do is signal that a country's economic policies are on the right
track, which reassures investors and the official community, helping countries find additional
financing from other sources.
3. LR. The IMF is not a development bank and, unlike the World Bank and other development
agencies, it does not finance projects , so the only way to ensure precautionary finance
measures is through loan conditionality.
IMF - fix issues

IMF () “Lending by the IMF” International Monetary Fund https://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm
While the financial crisis has sparked renewed demand for IMF financing, the decline in lending that preceded the financial crisis also reflected a
need to adapt the IMF's lending instruments to the changing needs of member countries. In response, the IMF conducted a wide-ranging review
of its lending facilities and terms on which it provides loans.
In March 2009, the Fund announced a major overhaul of its lending framework, including modernizing
conditionality, introducing a new flexible credit line, enhancing the flexibility of the Fund’s regular
stand-by lending arrangement, doubling access limits on loans, adapting its cost structures for
high-access and precautionary lending, and streamlining instruments that were seldom used. It has
also speeded up lending procedures and redesigned its Exogenous Shocks Facility to make it easier to
access for low-income countries. More reforms have since been undertaken, most recently in
November 2011.
IMF - loan give inv

When a member country approaches the IMF for financing, it may be in or near a state of economic crisis, with its currency under attack in
foreign exchange markets and its international reserves depleted, economic activity stagnant or falling, and a large number of firms and
households going bankrupt. In difficult economic times, the IMF helps countries to protect the most vulnerable in a crisis.
The IMF aims to ensure that conditions linked to IMF loan disbursements are focused and adequately tailored to the varying strengths of
members' policies and fundamentals. To this end, the IMF discusses with the country the economic policies that may be expected to address the
problems most effectively. The IMF and the government agree on a program of policies aimed at achieving specific, quantified goals in support
of the overall objectives of the authorities' economic program. For example, the country may commit to fiscal or foreign exchange reserve
targets.
The IMF discusses with the country the economic policies that may be expected to address the problems most effectively. The IMF and the
government agree on a program of policies aimed at achieving specific, quantified goals in support of the overall objectives of the authorities'
economic program. For example, the country may commit to fiscal or foreign exchange reserve targets.
Loans are typically disbursed in a number of installments over the life of the program, with each installment conditional on targets being met.
Programs typically last up to 3 years, depending on the nature of the country's problems, but can be followed by another program if needed.
The government outlines the details of its economic program in a "letter of intent" to the Managing Director of the IMF. Such letters may be
revised if circumstances change.
For countries in crisis, IMF loans usually provide only a small portion of the resources needed to
finance their balance of payments. But IMF loans also signal that a country's economic policies are on
the right track, which reassures investors and the official community, helping countries find additional
financing from other sources.
A2 Surveillance Bad
1. T. Lombardi 08 finds IMF’s surveillance policies allow for multilateral economic cooperation,
better market management, and more. Lombardi says The IMF gathers, analyzes, and
disseminates information. This permits governments to reduce uncertainty and therefore to
pursue wider forms of cooperation
Lombardi 08 - surv good

Lombardi, Domenico () Woods, Ngaire () “The politics of influence: An analysis of IMF surveillance.”
Global Economic Governance Program. 26 November 2008.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290802418724
IMF surveillance is typically thought to have effect because it provides useful information to member
countries, because it engages countries in cooperative behaviour or because it piggy-backs the
bargaining power the IMF enjoys in some countries. This article explores IMF surveillance by bringing to bear theoretical
explanations as to why and how these effects might work. The simplest explanation is a rationalist-realist one that the IMF has impact in
countries over whom it has bargaining power: this is borne out by the evidence regarding IMF surveillance in aid-dependent countries.
However, this is not the only condition under which surveillance might work. Rationalist- institutionalists point to the role information plays in
shaping competition and cooperation among states, and this effect is borne out to a limited degree by the impact of IMF-supported
international standards and surveillance activities on the other economies.
...
The argument in favour of strengthening surveillance assumes that the IMF, as a multilateral institution, is capable of influencing the judgments
of all of its members. Theories of international relations suggest different explanations for why the IMF might have influence. The simplest
explanation is a rationalist-realist one, that the IMF’s capacity to coerce at least some of its members results in the institution having direct
influence over their behavior (Stone, 2004; Thacker, 1999). A different strand of rationalism, la- beled institutionalism by some, proposes that
the IMF could have influence through the exercise of its capacity to resolve the collective action problems of its members. Put simply, by
providing information to its members, the IMF can reduce uncertainty about the behavior of other countries, thereby making cooperation
possible, including the acceptance by member countries of mutually agreed upon rules that alter or influence their behavior or patterns of
competition among them (Best, 2005; Keohane, 1982; Simmons, 2000).
...
The IMF has a large, highly trained technical staff that monitors trends in the global economy, follows developments in member countries, and
then feeds this information into discussions among governments about how they might better cooperate in
monetary affairs. It is not alone in this. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), private ratings agencies, the Bank
for International Settlements, the World Bank, international investment banks, various United Nations agencies (including the Counter
Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council) and regional organizations all provide at least some information that
overlaps with the surveillance reports of the IMF. Some experts assert that the IMF is uniquely placed to provide information of a quality and
depth beyond what these other institutions can offer, but they rarely analyze whether or why this is the case (Rodrik, 1995). One obvious reason
for its unique position is that the IMF has access to a truly universal membership of 185 governments, all of which are mandated, as a
requirement of membership, to consult regularly with the organization. The surveillance activities of the IMF in theory permit it to inform policy
makers, giving them better quality information on the basis of which they can make decisions. This can alter or influence government policies in
one of two different ways. Rationalists would highlight that information permits the updating of preferences in light of new information, or
‘Bayesian updating’. The
IMF gathers, analyzes, and disseminates information. This permits governments to
reduce uncertaintyand therefore to pursue wider forms of cooperation
A2 Excessive Risk Taking

1. DL. Phillips et al 2k finds that “While some element of moral hazard [or risky economy behavior]
is a logical consequence of the IMF’s financial support” it is difficult to detect in market reactions
and there is no evidence that such behavior has recently been on the rise.
Phillips et al 2k - no rise in ERTing

Phillips, Steven (Steven Phillips's 10 research works with 909 citations and 595 reads, IMF managing director) Lane, Timothy
(appointed Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, effective February 2009. In this capacity, he is responsible for overseeing the Bank’s
analysis of international economic developments in support of monetary policy decisions. As a member of the Bank’s Governing Council, he
shares responsibility for decisions with respect to monetary policy and financial system stability, and for setting the strategic direction of the
Bank.) “Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?” International Monetary Fund, Oct 2000
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Does-IMF-Financing-Result-in-Moral-Hazard-3824
The view that the IMF’s financial support gives rise to moral hazard has become increasingly prominent in policy discussions, particularly
following the 1995 Mexican crisis. This paper seeks to clarify a number of conceptual issues and bring some basic empirical evidence to bear on
this hypothesis. While
some element of moral hazard is a logical consequence of the IMF’s financial
support, such moral hazard is difficult to detect in market reactions to various IMF policy
announcements and there is no evidence that such moral hazard has recently been on the rise.
A2 US Dominance Bad
1. LR. US Dominance shouldn’t matter because countries are still being provided with finance
support, and the US contributes the most money to the IMF. Annual Report 20 finds the IMF has
provided $91 billion in financing to 80 countries, including $11.3 billion to 48 low-income
countries since the onset of the pandemic in late March and as of September 15, 2020. Out of
this lending*, the IMF channeled $30 billion (equivalent to SDR 21.2 billion) in financing to 69
countries through emergency lending facilities. This is almost half of the countries, or 40% of all
countries under the IMF.
A2 Worse than Alt

1. DL. the IMF is preferable to other institutions because Lawder 20 writes other international
financial institutions including the Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, and
more have a tendency to lend too quickly and actually worsen the debt problem of the
countries.
a. In Pakistan, the Asian Development Bank lent $1.3 billion in loans resulting in debt which
attributed to Pakistan durning to the IMF for $6 billion in loans in 2019.
b. The African Development Bank was doing the same in Nigeria and South Africa as well.
Lawder 20 - alts worse

Lawder, David (Trade and Global Economy Correspondent at Reuters) “World Bank chief: some development banks
worsening poor country debt burdens.” Reuters. Feb 2020
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-worldbank-debt/world-bank-chief-some-development-banks-worsening-poor-country-debt-burdens-idUSK
BN2050HT
Malpass said at a World Bank-International Monetary Fund debt forum in Washington that the Asian Development Bank, the African
Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development were contributing to debt problems. “We
have a
situation where other international financial institutions and to some extent development finance
institutions as a whole, certainly the official export credit agencies, have a tendency to lend too
quickly and to add to the debt problem of the countries,” Malpass said. He said the Asian Development Bank was
“pushing billions of dollars” into a fiscally challenging situation in Pakistan while the African Development Bank was doing the same in Nigeria
and South Africa. A spokesman for the Asian Development Bank could not immediately be reached for commen
he Manila-based development lender in December approved $1.3 billion in loans for Pakistan, including $1 billion for immediate budget support
to shore up the country’s public finances and $300 million to help reform the country’s energy sector. The
loans came as the country
is struggling with billions of dollars in debt to China from Belt and Road infrastructure projects, which
helped cause Pakistan to turn to the IMF for a $6 billion loan program in 2019. Malpass said there needed to be
more coordination among international financial institutions to coordinate lending and maintain high standards of transparency. “And so we
have a very real problem of the IFIs themselves adding to the debt burden and, and there’s pressure then I think on the IMF to sort through it
and look at the best interest for the country,” he said.
A2 Not Transparent
1. T. The IMF actually spreads transparency because it requires it with its loans. Editorial Board 21
finds Since March, more than 100 countries like Lebanon have sought a financial rescue from the
International Monetary Fund - the world's banker of last resort. The aid, however, often comes
with strings attached, including demands for transparency in banking and accountability in how
public money is spent.
2. T. The IMF actually promotes good governance and combat corruption to prevent dictatorships
through transparency. IMF 20 corroborates they do this in two areas
a. the management of public resources through reforms covering public sector institutions
b. the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable economic and regulatory
environment conducive to private sector activities. Several initiatives involve close
collaboration with other international organizations.
c. The IMF encourages member countries to improve accountability by enhancing
transparency in the disclosure of documents, in line with its Transparency Policy .
d. Together with the World Bank, the IMF assesses member countries’ compliance with
international transparency standards in 12 policy areas in the context of its Standards
and Codes Initiative , covering the government, financial sector, and corporate sector.
3. DL. Farnsworth et al 17 writes that greater transparency won’t lead to policy shift. In sum,
neither the crisis, nor nationally nuanced austerity advice nor internal ‘revisionist’ voices
advocating less fiscal consolidation in increased IMF data release will actually signal a pivot to
social policy expansion.
Editorial Board 21 - conditions add transp

Monitor's Editorial Board (independent international news organization owned by church, We are not about promoting any specific
set of policies, actions or ideologies. The founder of the Monitor was convinced that what reaches and affects thought ultimately shapes
experiences and moves our world forward. WHy is CS in the name: It's about honesty and purpose. We do not hide the fact that the Christian
Science church has stood behind this publication for more than 100 years. While some might argue that not having those words would give it
wider appeal, to remove them would mislead people about the organization that supports the Monitor. ) “The graft-busting uses of
COVID-19 aid” CS Monitor, Nov 2020
https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2020/0529/A-grand-cleansing-in-governance
more than 100 countries like Lebanon have sought a financial rescue from the International
Since March,
Monetary Fund - the world's banker of last resort. The aid, however, often comes with strings
attached, such as demands for transparency in banking or accountability in how public money is spent.
For nations in need, the coronavirus emergency could end up being a healer of old wounds. "History shows that crises and disasters have
continually set the stage for change, often for the better," states a new report on post-COVID-19 trends from the corruption watchdog
Transparency International. In early May, a group of 97 civil society organizations sent a letter to the IMF asking it to ensure that its aid is tied to
reforms. Accountability and transparency, the group said, are key "to protecting lives and livelihoods.
Farnsworth et al 17 - transp doesn’t lead to policy

Farnsworth, Kevin Irving, Zoe (both, U. of York, United Kingdom), “Deciphering the International
Monetary Fund’s (IMFs) position on austerity: Incapacity, incoherence and instrumentality” Sage
Journals, Sep 2017
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1468018117729821
p. 237. Masson (2007) highlights the greater ‘transparency’ of the IMF in terms of data release
and public access to discussion papers, but this has to be seen in context of the changing ways in
which discourse is shaped. In the contemporary world of policy-making, the shaping of ‘public understanding’ of economic ‘problems’
(and by association, ‘social problems’) may simply require a more direct and less elite-focused strategy than in the past. Thus, enabling
transparency or alternative ideas, for example, through the regular publication of austerity-sceptic reports by IMF Staffers, including Jonathan
Ostry and colleagues, may not be a benign or neutral act. It can be linked in more complex ways to the operation of the IMF as a politicised
bureaucracy, as part of a strategy to maintain its place and values in the global policy architecture (see also Klein, 2008; Woods, 2006). In
sum, neither the crisis, nor nationally nuanced austerity advice nor internal ‘revisionist’ voices
advocating less fiscal consolidation actually signal a pivot to social policy expansion.
IMF 20 - transp
IMF () “The IMF and Good Governance” International Monetary Fund, Mar 2020
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/The-IMF-and-Good-Governance
IMF initiatives that promote good governance
in two main areas: i) the management of public resources through reforms

The IMF promotes good governance
covering public sector institutions; and ii) the development and maintenance of a transparent and
stable economic and regulatory environment conducive to private sector activities. Several initiatives
involve close collaboration with other international organizations.
The IMF encourages member countries to improve accountability by enhancing transparency in the
disclosure of documents, in line with its Transparency Policy .
Together with the World Bank, the IMF assesses member countries’ compliance with international transparency standards in 12 policy areas in
the context of its Standards and Codes Initiative , covering the government, financial sector, and corporate sector.
For fiscal policy and monetary and financial policies, the IMF has developed codes that set out transparency principles. Especially important is
the Fiscal Transparencey Code.
For application in natural-resource-rich countries, the Fund issued its Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency . A multi-donor Topical Trust
Fund launched in 2011 has enabled the IMF to considerably increase technical assistance in the management of natural resource wealth.
To improve the transparency, quality, and timeliness of data, the IMF encourages its members to subscribe to the Special Data Dissemination
Standard (SDDS) or participate in the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS).
The IMF also emphasizes the need for adequate public financial management. It partners with other international financial institutions and
donors in the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) program, which helps countries measure their performance.
A2 Aids Corruption
1. T. The IMF promotes good governance and combat corruption to prevent dictatorships through
transparency. IMF 20 explains they do this in two areas
2. DL. The IMF has been fixing corruption, with the approval of its enhanced framework for
engagement on governance in 2018, [Anspach 21 reports] the IMF has expanded its surveillance
to transnational aspects of corruption which include focuses on measures designed to prevent
the bribery of foreign officials or providing services that facilitate concealment of corruption
proceeds.
3. DL. Editorial Board 21 finds when the IMF gives loans, it is only after the country's leaders agree
to use the money "effectively, transparently, and through reinforced governance mechanisms.”
a. For example, Guatemala received $594 million from the IMF for emergency assistance -
but only after the country's leaders agreed to use the money transparently. So far this
year, the IMF has disbursed $17 billion to Africa, or more than 10 times than usual. The
aid comes with a string attached requiring transparency in spending the money. A similar
amount of funding has gone to 14 Middle East nations but only after assurances that
they fight corruption as well.
Anspach 21 - enhance fw decr corrupt

Anspach, Rafael (IMF Communications Department) “IMF Executive Board Approves New Framework for
Enhanced Engagement on Governance” International Monetary Fund, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Jan 2021
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/04/21/pr18142-imf-board-approves-new-framework-for-enhanced-engagement-on-governance
On April 6, 2018, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) adopted the policy
framework outlined in a staff paper on “Review of 1997 Guidance Note on Governance—A Proposed
Framework for Enhanced Fund Engagement.” The new framework supplements the policy on governance detailed in “The
Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note,” adopted by the Executive Board in 1997 (1997 Governance Policy). The approach taken in
this paper builds on the July 21, 2017 Board discussion of the staff paper—“The Role of the Fund in Governance Issues—Review of the Guidance
Note-Preliminary Considerations.”
The 1997 Governance Policy was adopted to guide the IMF’s efforts in helping its member countries to address
governance and corruption issues. The July 2017 Board review of the 1997 Governance Policy found that, while considerable progress
had been made in implementing the Policy, there remained several areas in which the IMF’s engagement on governance and corruption issues
could be strengthened. The current paper responds to the Executive Board’s call for further work to strengthen the identified areas of
engagement.
The paper articulates the principles that will continue to underpin the Fund’s engagement on governance issues in surveillance and use of Fund
resources, and provides a framework for enhanced implementation (Framework for Enhanced Fund Engagement). The Framework is designed to
promote more systematic, effective, candid, and evenhanded engagement with member countries regarding governance vulnerabilities,
including corruption, that are judged to be macroeconomically critical.
The Framework consists of four elements:
The first element is designed to enable the Fund to assess the nature and severity of governance vulnerabilities—including corruption. This
includes an assessment of those state functions that are most relevant to economic activity, namely (i) fiscal governance; (ii) financial sector
oversight; (iii) central bank governance and operations; (iv) market regulation; (v) rule of law; and (vi) Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting
the Financing of Terrorism. Given its particularly pernicious impact on a member’s ability to achieve sustainable inclusive growth, the
assessment will also examine the severity of corruption.
The second element will guide the Fund’s assessment of the macroeconomic implications of governance vulnerabilities taking into account the
applicable standards for surveillance and the use of Fund resources. The paper lays out empirical evidence of the negative impact of governance
vulnerabilities on economic performance, which provides a strong basis to determine that these vulnerabilities should be addressed in
surveillance when they are assessed as severe.
The third element provides a framework for policy advice and capacity development support to members where Fund engagement is warranted.
And, the fourth element focuses on measures designed to prevent the private actors from offering
bribes or providing services that facilitate concealment of corruption proceeds.
Editorial Board 21 - condition on fight corrup

Monitor's Editorial Board (independent international news organization owned by church, We are not about promoting any specific
set of policies, actions or ideologies. The founder of the Monitor was convinced that what reaches and affects thought ultimately shapes
experiences and moves our world forward. WHy is CS in the name: It's about honesty and purpose. We do not hide the fact that the Christian
Science church has stood behind this publication for more than 100 years. While some might argue that not having those words would give it
wider appeal, to remove them would mislead people about the organization that supports the Monitor. ) “The graft-busting uses of
COVID-19 aid” CS Monitor, Nov 2020
https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2020/1104/The-graft-busting-uses-of-COVID-19-aid
With only a tenth of the world’s population, Latin America has seen more than a third of the deaths from COVID-19. This has put a spotlight on
the region’s inability to curb the coronavirus or deal with the economic hardship. Experts say per capita income in Latin America will take longer
than any other region to return to pre-pandemic levels.
The economic climb back, however, will require more than money. Outside creditors have put the region on notice that any aid to lift livelihoods
must also lift financial integrity in government. Corruption cannot remain the norm.
In June, for example, Guatemala received $594 million from the International Monetary Fund for
emergency assistance – but only after the country’s leaders agreed to use the money “effectively,
transparently, and through reinforced governance mechanisms.” Guatemala is not alone. So far this
year, the IMF has disbursed $17 billion to Africa, or more than 10 times than usual. The aid comes with
a string attached requiring transparency in spending the money.
IMF 20 - transp

A2 Industr Up Climate Ch Up
1. T. The IMF is actually trying to solve climate change. Sayeh 21 reports the IMF is calling for a
synchronized investment in green and digital infrastructure, as the pandemic starts to come
under control.
2. T. Zhang 20 furthers the Fund will step up its capacity development work on the integration of
environmental concerns into budget processes, including developing capacity with a focus on
green budgeting tools, which will be essential for countries highly vulnerable to climate risks.
The Fund will also support technical assistance on green investment, particularly with regard to
public investment and public policies to promote low-carbon technologies.
3. T. A decarbonization agenda will cause large shifts will occur with unpredictable timing and
impact, endangering global economic and financial stability which the IMF can solve according to
Plant 20. He says No institution is better placed than the IMF to understand the linkages among
the various risks threatening economic growth and stability and to provide guidance on how
these risks can be balanced. It has the talent, scope, and bully pulpit to guide the global
macroeconomic dialogue on carbon taxation, economic transformation, carbon-related financial
incentives and risk taking
Sayeh 21 - invest in green

Sayeh, Antoinette M. (Deputy Managing Director, IMF), “Building the Foundation of a 21st Century Economy”
International Monetary Fund, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Feb 2021,
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/12/15/sp121520-sayeh-rome-investment-forum-keynote
As we take these steps to navigate our way out of this unprecedented crisis, we also have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. An opportunity to
put in place policies that not only strengthen our recovery in the short-term but ensure that we build a solid foundation for a more sustainable,
inclusive economy in the years ahead. Simply returning to the low-growth and high-inequality economy of the past is no longer an option.
Which is why, the IMF is calling for a synchronized investment in green and digital infrastructure, as
the pandemic starts to come under control.
Zhang 20 - integrate green

Zhang, Tao (Deputy Managing Director, IMF) “Sustainable Transformation of Societies – A Green Consensus for
Macro-Fiscal Policies?” International Monetary Fund, Oct 2020
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/10/09/sp100920-sustainable-transformation-of-societies
The IMF's capacity development workstream covers a wide range of critical economic issues. Our experts share knowledge with finance
Fund will step up its
ministries and central banks through hands-on advice, training, and peer-to-peer learning. Looking ahead, the
capacity development work on the integration of environmental concerns into budget processes,
including in Public Investment Management Assessments which is the Fund's key tool for assessing infrastructure governance. This would
include developing capacity with a focus on green budgeting tools, which will be essential for countries
highly vulnerable to climate risks. The Fund will also support technical assistance on green investment,
particularly with regard to public investment and public policies to promote low-carbon technologies. Equally important will be
our work on understanding and better disclosing climate risks.
Plant 20 - IMF solve only

Plant, Mark (Chief Operating Officer of CGD Europe, Co-Director of Development Finance, and Senior Policy Fellow) “What Should
We Ask from the IMF on Climate Change?” Center for Global Development. Apr 2020.
https://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-should-we-ask-imf-climate-change
While the world’s decision makers are now rightly focusing on the COVID-19 crisis and its potentially devastating economic aftermath, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) will be critical to re-establishing financial stability and resetting the growth trajectory for the global economy.
There is another, pressing issue that the IMF can take a position of leadership on, that continues despite the current pandemic: climate change.
The climate change agenda has been moved from the center stage for the moment, but as the world begins to rethink what the post COVID-19
economic order will look like, climate change will again play a key role. And so will the IMF.
The IMF has an important role to play in assessing and dealing with the economic and financial impacts of climate change and decarbonization
as I explain in a new note. When new areas of endeavor are proposed for the IMF, the Executive Board, management and staff ask the question:
“Is this in our core mandate?” When it comes to climate change, many would initially say “No”—their thought being that while climate change
might be a pressing issue for some vulnerable countries and sectors, it does not have the global systemic macroeconomic and financial impact
that merits the Fund’s attention.
But that would be wrong. Whether the global community fights to limit carbon emissions or not, there will be huge systemic implications. If
we pursue decarbonization consistent with the 2015 Paris declaration, we will need a fundamental
restructuring of the world’s production, trade, and finances. Whereas, continuing along the current carbon emission
path will lead to a potentially uncontrollable degradation in global wellbeing and devaluation of assets. Either way large shifts will
occur with unpredictable timing and impact, endangering global economic and financial stability.
And that is squarely in the IMF’s core mandate.
Why the IMF?
No institution is better placed than the IMF to understand the linkages among the various risks
threatening economic growth and stability and to provide guidance on how these risks can be
balanced. It has the talent, scope, and bully pulpit to guide the global macroeconomic dialogue on
carbon taxation, economic transformation, carbon-related financial incentives and risk taking, the
macroeconomic and fiscal impact of adaptation strategies and the macroeconomic costs of inaction on
climate mitigation. It has a wide variety of modeling tools that permit exploration of so called “green swans” and tail risks to predict
when economic tipping points might occur. Over the last decade, Fund staff has integrated financial analysis and stress testing into
macroeconomic analysis, ensuring the links between asset valuation and real economic developments are understood.
A2 Not Represent World

1. T. The IMF is becoming more inclusive and Staff 20 reports the IMF strengthened a 1997 policy in
2018 to promote more systematic, effective, candid, and even handed engagement with
member countries, basically meaning that they are creating more relations with more countries.
2. T. The IMF is committing to help underserved and underrepresented populations such as helping
lower income African countries. IMF Survey quantifies IMF lending to sub-Saharan Africa has
already topped $1.5 billion, double the level in 2008, and has given debt relief to 24 low-income
countries totaling about $6 billion.
3. LR. The IMF may not be governed by the whole world, but it isn’t a democracy in the first place.
Influence is dictated by the quotas you pay and the IMF still helps underrepresented and low
income countries. Annual Report 20 finds the IMF has provided $91 billion in financing to 80
countries, including $11.3 billion to 48 low-income countries since the onset of the pandemic in
late March and as of September 15, 2020. Out of this lending*, the IMF channeled $30 billion
(equivalent to SDR 21.2 billion) in financing to 69 countries through emergency lending facilities.
This is almost half of the countries, or 40% of all countries under the IMF.
Staff 20 - more engag

Staff. “The IMF and Good Governance” The International Mone-tary Fund. IMF Factsheet. Mar 2020.
“Because poor governance is clearly detrimental to economic activity and welfare, the IMF adopted in 1997 a policy on how to
address economic governance, embodied in the Guidance Note “ The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues." To
further strengthen the implementation of this policy, the IMF adopted in 2018 a new Framework for Enhanced Engagement on Governance.
The framework aims to promote more systematic, effective, candid, and evenhanded engagement
with member countries regarding governance vulnerabilities—including corruption—that are critical
to macroeconomic performance.”
IMF Survey - Africa debt relief

Imf Survey Online, "IMF Survey: IMF Steps Up Help to Africa to Combat Crisis," IMF. May. 2009.
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/socar052209a
g more than 100 African ambassadors and diplomats in Washington ahead of his trip, Strauss-Kahn said that Africa was in many respects an
innocent victim of the global crisis. In response, the IMF is stepping up its lending to Africa and other low-income countries. • By end-May 2009,
new IMF lending to sub-Saharan Africa has already topped $1.5 billion, double the level for 2008, and further lending
to other countries is under discussion. • Plans to more than double concessional assistance. The IMF expects to boost concessional assistance in
2009–10 to $3 billion a year to assist low-income countries in dealing with the fallout from the global crisis. • Higher access. Country limits on
access to concessional Fund financing have been doubled. • The Fund is reforming its concessional lending instruments to make them more
flexible and tailored to the needs of low-income countries. • 24 low-income countries have received debt relief from
the IMF totaling about $6 billion.
Annual Report 20 - finance to lots of places

Annual Report () “IMF Annual Report 2020” International Monetary Fund, May 2020
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2020/eng/what-we-do/lending/
$165 billion to 83 countries, including $16.1 billion to 49 low-income countries
About $91 billion in financing to 80 countries, including $11.3 billion to 48 low-income countries since
the onset of the pandemic in late March and as of September 15, 2020.
Out of this lending*, the IMF channeled $30 billion (equivalent to SDR 21.2 billion) in financing to 69
countries through emergency lending facilities.
The IMF provides financing to member countries experiencing actual, potential, or prospective balance of payments problems to help them
rebuild their international reserves and restore conditions for strong economic growth, while correcting underlying problems. The IMF also
provides emergency financing and has massively stepped up such financing to help member countries address the immediate impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
A2 Not Relevant / IMF Failures

1. The IMF has maintained its relevance by adapting to changing conditions
a. Reinhart 16 finds The IMF has reinvented itself on several occasions since its creation
approximately 70 years ago. Under the Bretton Woods system, the IMF oversaw a
network of exchange rates.
b. Reinhart continues that the IMF acts as an international lender of last resort and
remains indispensable. [The high levels of international reserves that we observe today
should not be taken for granted because international commodity prices can change
abruptly and deteriorate over long periods, and so can global financial conditions.] On
the other hand, a domestic lender of last resort faces limitations in emerging markets,
particularly those that are highly dollarized (Calvo 2006). In the past, the US Federal
Reserve has shown a remarkable willingness to provide dollar liquidity in crisis times, for
example when markets froze in 2009. Yet, the Fed’s role and mandate are first and
foremost domestic. Although there are numerous global and regional development
agencies, the world economy lacks a global central force.
2. T. Empirical evidence corroborates The IMF is fixing it’s issues. Since March 2009, the Fund
announced a major overhaul of its lending framework, including modernizing conditionality,
introducing a new flexible credit line, enhancing the flexibility of the Fund’s regular stand-by
lending arrangement, doubling access limits on loans, adapting its cost structures for high-access
and precautionary lending, and streamlining instruments that were seldom used. It has also
speeded up lending procedures and redesigned its Exogenous Shocks Facility to make it easier to
November 2011.
3. DL. The IMF has learned from mistakes of the past and adapted. Reinhart 16 finds The IMF has
reinvented itself on several occasions since its creation approximately 70 years ago.
a. Since it was criticized for not spotting the last financial crisis. Thomas et al 20 finds The
IMF has responded by recently publishing a series of papers analysing how it can
improve surveillance capabilities.
b. IMF reforms have made defaulting, or not being able to repay loans, less likely. Reinhart
16 furthers the increase in IMF program size, coupled with large-scale bailouts by other
official lenders (like the US Treasury or Eurozone institutions like the European Financial
Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism) have made sovereign default
less likely.
4. [EUROZONE CRISES GREEECE] M. Reinhart 16 finds not all programs wer failures, she says
“Looking back, we know that some of the European IMF programs did not fail, in the sense that
the IMF credits were largely paid back in Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal.” [In the cases of Greece
and Ukraine, which remain large-scale debtors, the jury is still out.]
Reinhart 16 - imf relevant

p. 3-4. However, the emergence in 2007–2009 of the deepest and most synchronous financial crisis in the world’s largest
economies since the 1930s put an end to the notion that the IMF was redundant. As Kindleberger (1978) had wisely observed decades earlier,
financial crises are “a hardy perennial.” By practically any metric, the post-2008 IMF programs to several European economies are the largest in
the IMF’s 70-year history. As Figure 1 shows, in 2010 the new programs to the wealthier borrowers brought total IMF commitments, measured
as a share of imports, close to their historical peak in the early 2000s, while as a share of world GDP, IMF commitments hit an all-time peak.
p. 6. While there are numerous development banks, the IMF is the one institution that is sometimes
described as a central bank for countries or lender of last resort to the world (for example, see Fischer 1999 in this journal,
and the essays in Bank of International Settlements 2014).
p. 23: There are further reasons why an international lender of last resort remains
indispensable. The high levels of international reserves that we observe today should not be taken for granted. International commodity
prices can change abruptly and deteriorate over long periods, and so can global financial conditions. Most developing or emerging economies
(and not a few advanced ones) have large stocks of debts in foreign currency. Moreover,
a domestic lender of last resort faces
limitations in emerging markets, particularly those that are highly dollarized (Calvo 2006). In the past, the
US Federal Reserve has shown a remarkable willingness to provide dollar liquidity in crisis times, for example when markets froze in
2009. Yet, the Fed’s role and mandate are first and foremost domestic. Although there are numerous
global and regional development agencies, the world economy lacks a global central bank.
IMF - fix issues
While the financial crisis has sparked renewed demand for IMF financing, the decline in lending that preceded the financial crisis also reflected a
need to adapt the IMF's lending instruments to the changing needs of member countries. In response, the IMF conducted a wide-ranging review
of its lending facilities and terms on which it provides loans.
In March 2009, the Fund announced a major overhaul of its lending framework, including modernizing
conditionality, introducing a new flexible credit line, enhancing the flexibility of the Fund’s regular
stand-by lending arrangement, doubling access limits on loans, adapting its cost structures for
high-access and precautionary lending, and streamlining instruments that were seldom used. It has
also speeded up lending procedures and redesigned its Exogenous Shocks Facility to make it easier to
November 2011.
Reinhart 16 - imf reinvention

p. 4. The IMF has reinvented itself on several occasions and in different dimensions since its
creation approximately 70 years ago. Under the Bretton Woods system, the IMF oversaw a network of mutually pegged exchange
rates. A key challenge of that system was to get the parity “right.” Otherwise, an economy with an overvalued currency would be vulnerable to a
weakening in the balance of payments and international reserve losses.
Thomas et al 20 - analyze itself

Thomas Jr., Landon (covered international finance, emerging markets and the asset management industry for The Times, where he was a
reporter from November 2002 to January 2019) ALderman, Liz (is the Paris-based chief European business correspondent for The New
York Times, covering economic and inequality challenges around Europe) “I.M.F. Asks Rich Nations for Support” NYT Jun
2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/business/imf-lowers-world-growth-forecast-pointing-to-us-as-a-bright-spot.html
The tough tone may well reflect a sense within the fund that this time around it needs to be more forceful in warning of financial trouble spots
before it is too late.
The I.M.F. was criticized for not spotting the last financial crisis. It has responded by recently
publishing a series of papers outlining how it might improve on its watchdog capabilities.
The fund has repeatedly cautioned that investors have become too reliant on very loose monetary policies on the part of global central banks to
bolster their returns.
Reinhart 16 - default less likely
p. 16-17. Finally, the increase in IMF program size, coupled with large-scale bailouts by other official lenders (like
the US Treasury or Eurozone institutions like the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism) have made
sovereign default less likely, as private creditors are repaid with the new official loans. By 2014, fewer than 10 percent of all IMF
lending programs involved a default to private creditors, as shown in Figure 5.
Reinhart 16 - eurozone not that bad

p. 19. Looking back, we know that some of the European IMF programs did not fail, in the sense that
the IMF credits were largely paid back in Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal. In the cases of Greece and
Ukraine, which remain large-scale debtors, the jury is still out.
A2 Helps Dictatorship
1. T. The IMF promotes good governance and combat corruption to prevent dictatorships through
transparency. IMF 20 explains they do this in two areas
d. Together with the World Bank, the IMF assesses member countries’ compliance with
international transparency standards in 12 policy areas in the context of its Standards
and Codes Initiative , covering the government, financial sector, and corporate sector.
e. For fiscal policy and monetary and financial policies, the IMF has developed codes that
set out transparency principles. Especially important is the Fiscal Transparencey Code.
2. DL. Financial assistance is good regardless of who a country’s leader is. It is the mission of the
IMF to ensure the stability of financial systems not political and Gopinath 02 corroborates the
IMF’s goal is to mitigate the negative effects of globalization on the world.
3. LR. When the IMF gives out loans, conditionalities can prevent dictatorships from accessing the
money for inadequate purposes and instead use the money for economic and political
development.
Gopinath 02 - IMF mission
Gopinath, Gita. “Globalization: A Framework for IMF Involvement”. IMF.org. Mar 2002.
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2002/031502.htm#:~:text=The%20IMF%20seeks%20to%20mitigate,capital%20markets%2C%20while%
20reducing%20their
“TheIMF seeks to mitigate the negative effects of globalization on the world economy in two ways: by
ensuring the stability of the international financial system, and by helping individual countries take
advantage of the investment opportunities offered by international capital markets, while reducing their vulnerability to
adverse shocks or changes in investor sentiment. Private capital flows have become the most important source of financing for economic
growth, job creation, and productivity. But they can also be a source of volatility and crisis. To address some of these problems, the IMF is
encouraging its members to increase the transparency of their financial and corporate sectors as a means to reduce financial abuse, such as
money laundering and fraud, and ensure a level playing field for all investors. It is also stepping up its surveillance of international capital
markets, and is improving its ability to predict and preempt crises.
IMF 20 - transp

The IMF contributes to the international efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of
terrorism (AML/CFT). It assesses members' legal and regulatory frameworks, provides technical
assistance on the design and implementation of AML/CFT frameworks, and conducts policy-oriented
research. In 2009, the IMF established a multi-donor Topical Trust Fund for capacity building on AML/CFT.
Finally, the IMF contributes to various working groups and international initiatives, including the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ,
the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group , and the Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) initiative.

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ToContents

A2 Global Econ Stability Up 2

A2 Globalization via Trade Up 5

A2 Global Poverty Reduction 10

A2 Alleviate Econ Crises 15

A2 Food Insecurity Down 17

A2 Sub Saharan Africa 18

A2 Stops Predatory Lending 24

A2 Stops Risky Behavior 24

A2 Worse Econ Long Term 27

A2 Austerity/Cut Spending Bad 29

A2 Bad 4 Human Rights 34

A2 Loan Conditionality Bad 36

A2 Excessive Risk Taking 38

A2 Worse than Alt 39

A2 Not Represent World 46

A2 Not Relevant / IMF Failures 47

Hessler 18 - Mexico Asia failure

Asia crisis made worse

Nagpal 21 - bailouts not insurance

Helfer 98 - moral haz up

ONeill 21 - free trade hurt workers

A2 Globalization via Trade Up

Farrell 20 - glob fragile

Li et al 15 - IMF bailout bad

Welch et al 18 - econ growth hurt enviro

Seabury 20 - aust harms SDG + Paris Climate

Picolotti et al 20 - condit cause cc

Cochrane 20 - not mandate

Leahy 19 - climate ch inev

A2 Global Poverty Reduction

Weisbrot 19 - Ecuador recession

Arendar 20 - COVID loans bad

Li et al 15 - IMF bailout bad

Staff 19 - IMF conditionality bad

Pettinger 21 - support dictatorships

7. Supporting military dictatorships

Walwema 13 - divert funds

Reinhart 16 - western influence

But think of the implications of this claim. In

A2 Alleviate Econ Crises

Li et al 15 - IMF bailout bad

Johnson 97 - IMF incr dependence

The head of policy at the organisation, Tim Jones, said

HRC 20 - UN food insec down

A2 Sub Saharan Africa

Mutize 17 - South Afr

Wilhem 18 - root cause of Afr prob

China opened the playing field

Hauman 18 - benefits unclear

Ratcliff 20 - aust hurts health

Goodman 20 - not enough lending

At the I.M.F., Ms. Georgieva said she

Stubbs 21 - g20 liarz

2.1. The International Monetary Fund

Stubbs 21 - IMF specific

Echenbaum 05 - Portugal surv

Mohan 10 - Greece surv

Gutner 15 - 2008 surv

A2 Stops Predatory Lending

A2 Stops Risky Behavior

Helfer 98 - moral haz up

Bwp 19 - doesn’t reform