1958 (0) AIJEL-SC 23112

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(BOMBAY HIGH COURT)

Hon'ble Judges:S.R.Das, T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar, B.P.Sinha, S.K.Das and A.K.Sarkar JJ.

Ram Krishna Dalmia, Shriyans Prasad Jain, Jai Dayal Dalmia, Union Of India Versus Justice
S.R.Tendolkarl, Ram Krishna Dalmia, Shriyans Prasad Jain, Jai Dayal Dalmia

CIVIL APPEAL No. 455 of 1957 ; 457 of 1957 ; 656 of 1957 ; 658 of 1957 ; *J.Date :- MARCH 28, 1958

COMMISSIONS OF ENQUIRY ACT, 1952 Section - 3(1) , 3

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Article - 246 , 14 , 12 , 13 , 245

Cases Referred To :

1. Budhan Choudhry And Others V/s. State Of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 : 1955 (1) SCR 1045 : 1955
SCJ 163 : 1955 CrLJ 371 : 1955 AllLJ 309
2. A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar V/s. M. Venkatachalam Potti, Authorised Official And Income-tax
Officer And Another, AIR 1956 SC 246 : 1955 (2) SCR 1196 : 1956 SCJ 323 : 1956 (29) ITR 349 :
1956 SCA 259
3. Ameerunnissa Begum And Others V/s. Mahboob Begum And Others, AIR 1953 SC 91 : 1953 SCR
404 : 1953 SCJ 61 : 1953 SCA 565 : 1952 AIJEL_SC 1110
4. Charanjit Lal Chowdhary V/s. The Union Of India And Others, AIR 1951 SC 41 : 1950 SCR 869 :
1951 SCJ 29 : 1951 (64) MadLW 47 : 1951 (21) CC 33
5. Dhirendra Kumar V/s. Superintendent And Remembrancer Of Legal Affairs To The Government
Of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 424 : 1955 (1) SCR 224 : 1954 SCJ 582 : 1954 CrLJ 1036 : 1954 (2)
MLJ 128
. Habeeb Mohamed-patitioner V/s. The State Of Hyderabad, AIR 1953 SC 287 : 1953 SCR 661 :
1953 SCJ 361 : 1953 CrLJ 1158 : 1953 SCA 789
7. Ham Prasad Narayan Sahi And Another V/s. The State Of Bihar And Others, AIR 1953 SC 215 :
1953 SCR 1129 : 1953 SCJ 267 : 1953 BLJR 318 : 1953 SCA 578
. Kathi Raning Rawat V/s. State Of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123 : 1952 SCR 435 : 1952 SCJ 168 :
1952 CrLJ 805 : 1952 SCA 245
9. Kedar Nath Bajoria, S:o Ramjidas Bajoria And Another V/s. The State Of Westbengal, AIR 1953
SC 404 : 1954 SCR 30 : 1953 SCJ 580 : 1953 CrLJ 1621 : 1953 SCA 835
10. Lachmandas Kewalram V/s. State Of Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 235 : 1952 SCR 710 : 1952 SCJ 339 :
1952 CrLJ 1167 : 1952 SCA 352
11. Matajog Dobey V/s. H. C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 : 1955 (2) SCR 925 : 1956 SCJ 110 : 1956 CrLJ
140 : 1956 (1) MLJ 79
12. Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain V/s. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others, AIR 1954 SC 224 :
1954 SCR 803 : 1954 SCJ 238 : 1954 AllLJ 203 : 1954 SCA 204
 13. Messrs. Pannalal Binjraj And Others V/s. Union Of India And Others, AIR 1957 SC 397 : 1957 SCR
233 : 1957 (31) ITR 565 : 1957 SCA 660 : 1956 AIJEL_SC 20685
14. The State Of Bombay And Another V/s. F. N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318
(Note :-Overruled by Synthetics And Chemicals Limited Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC
1927 ) : 1951 SCR 682 : 1951 SCJ 478 : 1951 CrLJ 1361 : 1951 (2) MLJ 141
15. Syed Qasim Razvi And Others V/s. State Of Hyderabad And Others, AIR 1953 SC 156 : 1953 SCR
589 : 1953 SCJ 151 : 1953 CrLJ 862 : 1953 SCA 742
1 . The State Of West Bengal V/s. Anwar Ali Sarkar And Another, AIR 1952 SC 75 : 1952 SCR 284 :
1952 SCJ 55 : 1952 CrLJ 510 : 1952 SCA 148
17. V. M. Syed Mohammad &company V/s. State Of Andhra, AIR 1954 SC 314 : 1954 SCR 1117 :
1954 SCJ 390 : 1954 (1) MLJ 619 : 1954 (67) MadLW 611

Cited in :

1. (Referred To) :- Harbilas Rai Bansal Vs. State Of Punjab And Haryana, 1996 (1) SCC 1 : AIR 1996
SC 857 : 1995 (6) Scale 717 : 1995 (Supp6) SCR 178 : JT 1995 (8) SC 458 : 1996 AIR SCW 238 :
1996 (1) UJ 464 : 1996 (1) SCJ 160 : 1996 (1) ApexCJ(SC) 94 : 1996 (1) CivCC 110 : 1996 (1)
CivCC 384 : 1996 (1) ICC 603 : 1996 (1) ICC 243 : 1996 (1) LandLR 213 : 1996 (112) PLR 227 :
1996 (112) PLR 528 : 1996 (1) MadLW 362 : 1996 (1) RentLR 1 : 1995 (2) RCR(Rent) 672 : 1996
(3) LJR 823 : 1996 (1) LJR 199 : 1996 (4) CurCC 82 : 1996 (1) CurLJ 158 : 1995 (2) RCJ 641 :
1996 (1) RRR 69 : 1996 SCFBRC 52 : 1996 HRR 1 : 1995 AIJEL_SC 10591
2. (Referred To) :- Satyawati Sharma (Dead) By Lrs. Vs. Union Of India, 2008 (5) SCC 287 : AIR 2008
SC 3148 : 2008 (6) Scale 325 : 2008 (6) SCR 566 : JT 2008 (5) SC 376 : 2008 AIR SCW 5324 :
2008 (3) Supreme 37 : 2008 (65) AIC 1 : 2008 (3) ApexCJ(SC) 208 : 2008 (2) SCT 805 : 2008 (3)
RecApexJ 95 : 2008 LabIC 97 : 2008 (71) ALR 499 : 2007 (4) WLC 789 : 2008 (3) BBCJ(SC) 475 :
2008 (2) DNJ(SC) 479 : 2008 (3) ICC 326 : 2008 (2) BLJR 1811 : 2008 (3) ALD(SC) 147 : 2008 (3)
ARC 1 : 2008 (1) RentLR 449 : 2008 (1) RCR(Rent) 457 : 2008 (148) DLT 705 : 2008 (1) RCJ 252 :
2008 (102) DRJ 393 : 2008 (2) GLH(NOC) 11 : 2012 (2) RajLR 135 : 2008 JX(SC) 854 : 2008
AIJEL_SC 41216
3. (Referred To) :- Sandeep S/o Sadashivrao Kansurkar Vs. Union Of India, 2015 (2) SCC 328 : 2015
(12) Scale 24 : JT 2015 (11) SC 321 : 2015 AIR SCW 6086 : 2016 (2) SLR 1 : 2015 (4) SCT 789 :
2016 (1) AWC 86 : 2015 (4) RSJ 278 : 2015 (5) LawHerald(SC) 3544 : AIRJharHCR 2016 833 :
2016 (1) ALD(SC) 150 : 2015 AllSCR 3613 : 2015 JX(SC) 850 : 2015 AIJEL_SC 57226
4. (Relied on) :- Swami Motor Transports Private Vs. Sankaraswamigal Mutt, AIR 1963 SC 864 :
1963 (Supp1) SCR 282 : 1964 (1) SCJ 530 : 1964 (1) MLJ 146 : 1964 (1) AndhWR 146 : 1962
AIJEL_SC 31256
5. (Referred To) :- Mohd.Hanif Quareshi Vs. State Of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 : 1959 SCR 629 : 1958
SCJ 975 : 1958 MLJ(Cri) 727 : 1958 SCA 783 : 1958 AIJEL_SC 17824
. (Followed) :- State Of Kerala Vs. M.K.Krishnan Nair, 1978 (1) SCC 552 : AIR 1978 SC 747 : 1978
(2) SCR 864 : 1978 (2) SCJ 531 : 1978 SCC(L&S) 76 : 1978 (1) SLR 499 : 1978 LabIC 723 : 1978
SerLC 410 : 1978 SLWR 75 : 1978 AIJEL_SC 28340
7. (Referred To) :- Suresh Kumar Koushal Vs. Naz Foundation, 2014 (1) SCC 1 : AIR 2014 SC 563 :
2013 (15) Scale 55 : JT 2014 (1) SC 27 : 2014 AIR SCW 78 : 2013 (8) Supreme 513 : 2013 (4)
SCC(Cri) 1 : 2014 CrLJ 784 : 2014 (134) AIC 71 : 2014 (1) RCR(Cri) 286 : 2013 (6) RecApexJ 630
: 2014 (84) ACrC 774 : 2014 (1) MLJ 68 : 2013 (4) BBCJ(SC) 401 : 2014 DNJ(SC) 150 : 2014 (1)
CalCriLR 412 : 2014 (2) WBLR 742 : 2014 (57) OrissaCriR 370 : 2013 (3) MadWN(Cri) 537 : 2014
(117) CutLT(SC) 870 : 2013 (4) CurCC 346 : 2014 AllSCR 508 : 2013 (204) DLT 533 : 2014 (3)
KantLJ 10 : 2013 (4) CCR 581 : 2014 (1) KerLJ 120 : 2014 (1) ADR 817 : 2013 JX(SC) 806 : 2013
AIJEL_SC 54726
. (Followed) :- Pathumma Vs. State Of Kerala, 1978 (2) SCC 1 : AIR 1978 SC 771 : 1978 (2) SCR
537 : 1978 (2) SCJ 632 : 1978 AIJEL_SC 20875
 9. (Referred To) :- Danthuluri Ramaraju Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh, 1972 (1) SCC 421 : AIR 1972
SC 828 : 1972 (2) SCR 900 : 1972 (2) SCJ 700 : 1973 (1) MLJ 7 : 1972 SCCriR 528 : 1973 (1)
AndhWR 7 : 1971 AIJEL_SC 7257
10. (Referred To) :- President Of India Vs. Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956 : 1959 SCR
995 : 1959 SCJ 321 : 1958 KerLT 465 : 1959 SCA 450 : 1958 AIJEL_SC 21535
11. (Referred To) :- Mahant Moti Das Vs. S.P.Sahi, The Special Officer Incharge Of Hindu Religious
Trust, The State Of Bihar, The President, Bihar State Board Of Religious Trusts, AIR 1959 SC 942 :
1959 (Supp2) SCR 563 : 1959 SCJ 1144 : 1959 (2) SCA 432 : ILR 1959 Patna 639 : 1959
AIJEL_SC 16562
12. (Referred To) :- State Of Orissa Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 : 1962 (Supp2) SCR
380 : 1962 (28) CutLT(SC) 273 : 1962 SCD 389 : 1961 AIJEL_SC 29093
13. (Referred To) :- R.Venkatakrishnan Vs. Central Bureau Of Investigation, 2009 (11) SCC 737 : AIR
2010 SC 1812 : 2009 (11) Scale 102 : 2009 (13) SCR 762 : JT 2009 (10) SC 597 : 2010 AIR SCW
2195 : 2010 (1) SCC(Cri) 164 : 2009 (3) ApexCJ(SC) 361 : 2009 (4) RCR(Cri) 140 : 2009 (5)
RecApexJ 217 : 2009 (4) AICLR 361 : 2009 (4) CriCC 226 : 2010 (2) ALD(Cri) 208 : 2010 (2)
MLJ(Cri) 545 : 2009 (96) SCL 143 : 2009 CLC 557 : 2009 JX(SC) 989 : 2009 AIJEL_SC 44239
14. (Explained) :- Deepak Sibal Vs. Punjab University, 1989 (2) SCC 145 : AIR 1989 SC 903 : 1989 (1)
Scale 409 : 1989 (1) SCR 689 : JT 1989 (Supp) SC 2 : 1989 (1) UJ 512 : 1989 SCC(L&S) 284 :
1989 (3) SLR 717 : 1989 (2) UPLBEC 1 : 1989 (2) MhLR 1645 : 1989 AIJEL_SC 7447
15. (Referred To) :- Bachan Singh, State Of Punjab And Mal Singh Vs. Union Of India, 1980 (2) SCC
684 : AIR 1980 SC 898 : 1980 SCC(Cri) 680 : 1980 (2) SCJ 475 : 1980 (1) SCJ 51 : 1980 CrLJ 636
: 1981 CrLR(SC) 55 : 1979 CrLR(SC) 259 : 1980 SCCriR 194 : 1980 AIJEL_SC 2414
1 . (Referred To) :- State Of Maharashtra Vs. Indian Hotel And Restaurants Assn., 2013 (8) SCC 519 :
AIR 2013 SC 2582 : 2013 (9) Scale 47 : 2013 (7) SCR 654 : 2013 AIR SCW 4258 : 2013 (4)
SCC(Cri) 345 : 2013 (3) RCR(Cri) 455 : 2013 (6) SLT 434 : 2013 (3) Crimes 364 : 2013 (2)
RCR(Civ) 859 : 2013 (4) RecApexJ 312 : 2013 (5) AllMR(SC) 392 : 2013 (5) BCR 821 : AIR 2013
SC 2066 : AIRBomHCR 2013 222 : 2013 (3) KerLT(SN) 70 : 2013 (2) GLH(NOC) 5 : 2013 JX(SC)
503 : 2013 AIJEL_SC 54312
17. (Referred To) :- Indra Sawhney Vs. Union Of India, 1992 (Supp3) SCC 217 : AIR 1993 SC 477 :
1992 (Supp2) SCR 454 : 1992 AIR SCW 3682 : 1993 (1) SCJ 353 : 1993 (1) SCT 448 : 1992 LabIC
129 : 1993 (1) RSJ 1 : 1993 (1) CurSJ(SC) 196 : 1992 AIJEL_SC 11891
1 . (Referred To) :- Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Air Craft Employees Cooperative Society
Limited, 2012 (3) SCC 442 : 2012 (1) Scale 646 : 2012 (4) SCR 881 : JT 2012 (1) SC 587 : 2012
AIR SCW 2534 : 2012 (1) SLT 455 : 2012 (3) MLJ 84 : 2012 (2) LawHerald(SC) 1199 : 2012 (1)
JLJR(SC) 503 : AIR 2012 SC 1409 : 2012 (5) KantLJ 214 : 2012 JX(SC) 49 : 2012 AIJEL_SC
50885
19. (Referred To) :- State Bank Of India Thr.General Manager Vs. National Housing Bank, 2013 (16)
SCC 538 : AIR 2013 SC 3478 : 2013 (9) Scale 710 : JT 2013 (10) SC 545 : 2013 AIR SCW 4679 :
2013 (7) SLT 1 : 2014 (2) RecApexJ 184 : 2013 (180) CC 15 : 2013 (2) RJ 1740 : AIR 2013 SC
2268 : 2014 AllSCR 1742 : 2013 (4) CompLJ 193 : AIRBomHCR 2013 943 : 2013 (4) BankCas
146 : 2014 (3) BankJ 254 : 2014 (2) DCR 164 : 2014 (2) DRTC 314 : 2013 JX(SC) 485 : 2013
AIJEL_SC 54280
20. (Relied on) :- Dharmendra Kirthal Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh, 2013 (8) SCC 368 : AIR 2013 SC
2569 : 2013 (9) Scale 729 : 2013 (7) SCR 823 : JT 2013 (11) SC 523 : 2013 (5) Supreme 737 :
2013 (4) SCC(Cri) 280 : 2013 (129) AIC 52 : 2013 (4) RCR(Cri) 288 : 2013 (7) SLT 209 : 2013 (5)
RecApexJ 251 : 2013 (83) ACrC 111 : 2013 (8) AD(SC) 568 : 2013 (3) ALT(Cri)(SC) 82 : 2013
AllMR(Cri) 3275 : 2013 (3) CCR 514 : 2013 JX(SC) 486 : 2013 AIJEL_SC 54281
21. (Referred To) :- President Of India Vs. In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978, 1979 (1) SCC 380 : AIR
1979 SC 478 : 1979 (2) SCR 476 : 1979 (2) SCJ 35 : 1978 AIJEL_SC 21528
22. (Referred To) :- C.I.Emden Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 548 : 1960 (2) SCR 592 : 1960
SCJ 368 : 1960 CrLJ 729 : 1960 MLJ(Cri) 228 : 1960 MadWN(Cri) 49 : 1960 MadWN 233 : ILR
 1960 All 373 : 1960 (1) KerLR 413 : 1959 AIJEL_SC 4308
23. (Referred To) :- Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union Of India, 1970 (1) SCC 248 : AIR 1970 SC 564
: 1970 (3) SCR 530 : 1970 (1) SCJ 564 : 1970 KerLT 5 : 1970 (2) SCA 37 : 1970 (1) SCWR 953 :
1970 (40) CC 325 : 1970 (1) CompLJ 244 : 1970 MerLR 42 : 1970 AIJEL_SC 24416
24. (Relied on) :- State Of Punjab Vs. Khan Chand, 1974 (1) SCC 549 : AIR 1974 SC 543 : 1974 (2)
SCR 768 : 1974 (1) SCWR 766 : 1974 CurLJ 138 : 1974 PLJ 29 : 1973 AIJEL_SC 29270
25. (Referred To) :- Supreme Court Advocates-on-record - Association Vs. Union Of India, 2016 (5)
SCC 1 : 2015 (11) Scale 1 : JT 2015 (10) SC 1 : 2015 AIR SCW 5457 : 2015 (8) Supreme 65 : 2016
(3) SCC(Cri) 173 : 2016 (2) SCC(L&S) 253 : 2015 (4) RCR(Civ) 898 : 2015 (5) RecApexJ 350 :
2015 (7) MLJ 753 : 2016 (1) JCR(SC) 169 : 2015 (4) KerLT 121 : 2015 (5) GauLT 12 : 2015
AIJEL_SC 57252
2 . (Referred To) :- Hamdard Dawakhana Vs. Union Of India, AIR 1960 SC 554 : 1960 (2) SCR 671 :
1960 SCJ 611 : 1960 CrLJ 735 : 1960 MLJ(Cri) 358 : 1960 (1) SCA 314 : 1975 (2) FAC 355 : 1960
(1) KerLR 746 : 1959 AIJEL_SC 10475
27. (Referred To) :- Western India Theatres Limited Vs. Cantonment Board, Pune, AIR 1959 SC 582 :
1959 (Supp2) SCR 63 : 1959 SCJ 386 : 1960 (1) SCA 25 : 1959 BLR 950 : 1959 AIJEL_SC 34620
2 . (Relied on) :- Kartar Singh Vs. State Of Punjab And Haryana, 1994 (3) SCC 569 : 1994 (Supp1)
Scale 1 : 1994 (2) SCR 375 : JT 1994 (2) SC 423 : 1994 SCC(Cri) 899 : 1994 CrLJ 3139 : 1994 (2)
RCR(Cri) 168 : 1994 (1) Crimes 1031 : 1994 (2) AICLR 332 : 1994 (1) CurCriR 162 : 1994 (2)
CIVLJ 332 : 1994 AIJEL_SC 14199
29. (Relied on) :- Gopi Chand Vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1959 SC 609 : 1959 (Supp2) SCR 87 :
1959 SCJ 831 : 1959 CrLJ 782 : 1959 MLJ(Cri) 557 : 1959 (2) SCA 94 : ILR 1959 P&H 1040 :
1959 AIJEL_SC 9712
30. (Relied on) :- Moti Ram Deka Vs. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 600
: 1964 (5) SCR 683 : 1964 (2) LLJ 467 : 1964 (2) SCA 372 : ILR 1964 All 717 : ILR 1964 AS 81 :
1963 AIJEL_SC 18201
31. (Referred To) :- Union Of India Vs. Atul Shukla, 2014 (10) SCC 432 : AIR 2015 SC 1777 : 2014 (11)
Scale 370 : JT 2014 (11) SC 203 : 2015 AIR SCW 2169 : 2015 (1) SCC(L&S) 81 : 2014 (6) SLR
421 : 2015 (1) SCT 173 : 2015 LabIC 1820 : 2015 (1) RSJ 431 : 2015 (1) LawHerald(SC) 291 :
2015 AllSCR 127 : AIRBomHCR 2015 486 : 2015 (2) AirKarR 614 : 2015 (3) ADR 341 : 2014
JX(SC) 594 : 2014 AIJEL_SC 55747
32. (Referred To) :- Gauri Shanker Vs. Union Of India, 1994 (6) SCC 349 : AIR 1995 SC 55 : 1994 (4)
Scale 29 : 1994 (Supp3) SCR 244 : JT 1994 (5) SC 634 : 1994 AIR SCW 4059 : 1994 (2) UJ 679 :
1994 (2) RentLR 283 : 1994 (2) RCR(Rent) 474 : 1994 (3) CurCC 436 : 1994 (56) DLT 134 : 1994
(2) RCJ 391 : 1994 AIJEL_SC 9343
33. (Referred To) :- Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair Vs. State Of Kerala, AIR 1961 SC 552 : 1961 (3)
SCR 77 : 1961 (2) SCJ 269 : 1961 KerLT 11 : 1961 (2) SCA 125 : 1961 KerLJ 143 : 1960 AIJEL_SC
15120
34. (Referred To) :- Khandige Sham Bhat Vs. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, AIR 1963 SC 591 : 1963
(3) SCR 809 : 1963 (1) SCJ 140 : 1963 (48) ITR 21 : 1963 (1) ITJ 103 : 1963 KerLJ 196 : 1963
AIJEL_SC 14507
35. (Referred To) :- Justice K.S.Puttaswamy Vs. Union Of India, 2017 (10) SCC 1 : AIR 2017 SC 4161
: 2017 (10) Scale 264 : 2017 (10) Scale 1 : JT 2017 (9) SC 141 : 2017 (178) AIC 1 : 2017 (6) MLJ
267 : 2017 (124) ALR 877 : 2017 (3) LawHerald(SC) 1803 : 2017 (4) KerLT 1 : 2017 (5)
ALLMR(SC) 686 : 2017 (6) BCR 78 : 2017 JX(SC) 579 : 2017 AIJEL_SC 60690
3 . (Referred To) :- Confederation Of Ex-servicemen Associations Vs. Union Of India, 2006 (8) SCC
399 : AIR 2006 SC 2945 : 2006 (8) Scale 399 : 2006 (Supp4) SCR 872 : JT 2006 (8) SC 547 : 2006
AIR SCW 4209 : 2006 (8) Supreme 390 : 2006 (8) SCJ 427 : 2006 SCC(L&S) 2002 : 2006 (4) SCT
128 : 2006 LabIC 3511 : 2006 (9) SRJ 393 : 2007 (4) LabLN 909 : 2007 (2) MLJ 427 : 2006 (4)
PLJR(SC) 258 : 2007 (1) BBCJ(SC) 269 : 2006 (4) RSJ 505 : 2006 DNJ(SC) 1037 : 2007 (1) RajLW
359 : AIRBomHCR 2006 666 : 2006 AIJEL_SC 37757
37. (Referred To) :- Kangshari Haldar Vs. State Of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 457 : 1960 (2) SCR 646
: 1960 SCJ 629 : 1960 CrLJ 654 : 1960 MLJ(Cri) 448 : 1959 AIJEL_SC 13917
3 . (Referred To) :- Subramanian Swamy Vs. Arun Shourie, 2014 (12) SCC 344 : AIR 2014 SC 3020 :
2014 (8) Scale 679 : JT 2014 (8) SC 369 : 2014 AIR SCW 4339 : 2014 (5) Supreme 513 : 2014
(Supp) CrLR(SC) 790 : 2014 (3) ApexCJ(SC) 354 : 2014 (3) RCR(Cri) 797 : 2014 (3) RCR(Civ) 915
: 2014 (4) RecApexJ 463 : 2014 (4) JCR(SC) 107 : 2014 (306) ELT 193 : 2014 (3) MLJ(Cri) 462 :
2014 AllMR(SC) 3376 : 2014 (3) ALT(Cri)(SC) 164 : 2014 (3) BLJud 216 : AIR 2014 SC 1797 :
2014 (2) GLH 743 : 2014 (3) JBCJ(SC) 591 : 2014 (3) KerLT(SN) 23 : 2014 (5) KantLJ 161 : 2014
(3) CCR 483 : 2014 (2) KerLJ 655 : 2014 (4) GauLT 20 : 2014 (5) ADR 721 : 2014 JX(SC) 461 :
2014 AIJEL_SC 55555
39. (Referred To) :- Sadhu Singh Vs. District Board, Gurdaspur, 1969 (1) SCWR 139 : 1969 RCR(Rent)
156 : 1968 AIJEL_SC 52717
40. (Relied on) :- Jyoti Pershad, Mahtab Singh, Surendar Dev Gaur Vs. Administrator, For The Union
Territory Delhi Administration, AIR 1961 SC 1602 : 1962 (2) SCR 125 : 1962 (2) SCJ 58 : 1962 (1)
SCA 311 : 1959 AIJEL_SC 13170
41. (Relied on) :- Kewal Singh Vs. Lajwanti, 1980 (1) SCC 290 : AIR 1980 SC 161 : 1980 (1) SCR 854 :
1980 (1) SCJ 486 : 1979 (2) RentLR 431 : 1980 (1) SCWR 345 : 1980 (1) RCR(Rent) 273 : 1980
RLR 74 : 1980 (1) RCJ 167 : 1980 (12) Lawyer 11702 : 1980 DelhiRentJudgment 1 : 1979
AIJEL_SC 14474
42. (Referred To) :- Namit Sharma Vs. Union Of India, 2013 (1) SCC 745 : 2012 (8) Scale 593 : 2013
(13) SCR 1 : JT 2012 (9) SC 166 : 2012 AIR SCW 5523 : 2013 (1) SCC(Cri) 737 : 2013 (1)
SCC(L&S) 244 : 2012 (6) SLT 769 : 2012 (4) RCR(Civ) 903 : 2012 (4) SCT 590 : 2012 (6)
RecApexJ 59 : 2013 (1) RSJ 60 : 2013 (2) LawHerald(SC) 1501 : 2012 (4) UPLBEC 2945 : 2013
(4) CivLJ 664 : 2012 (6) BCR 380 : 2012 (6) ALD(SC) 145 : AIR 2013 SC 36 : AIRBomHCR 2013 10
: AIRKarR 2013 57 : 2012 (4) KerLT(SN) 49 : 2012 AIJEL_SC 52197
43. (Followed) :- P.J.Irani Vs. State Of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1731 : 1962 (2) SCR 169 : 1962 (1) SCJ
194 : 1961 KerLT 8 : 1962 (1) AndhWR 92 : 1961 AIJEL_SC 20295
44. (Relied on) :- Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj Vs. State Of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638 : 1964
(1) SCR 561 : 1964 (2) SCJ 715 : 1963 (2) SCA 518 : 1963 AIJEL_SC 31999
45. (Referred To) :- Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh Vs. Union Of India, 2009 (2) SCC 1 :
AIR 2008 SC 734 : 2008 (13) Scale 398 : JT 2008 (13) SC 207 : 2009 (1) SCC(Cri) 659 : 2009 (77)
AIC 243 : 2008 CrLR(SC) 903 : 2008 (4) RCR(Cri) 764 : 2009 (1) RCR(Cri) 263 : 2008 (8) SLT 531 :
2008 (6) RecApexJ 104 : 2009 (2) KerLT 37 : 2009 (3) BCR(Cri) 404 : 2009 (4) GLR 3054 : 2009
(1) HinduLR 95 : 2009 (1) AD(Cr) 315 : 2008 JX(SC) 1760 : 2008 AIJEL_SC 42357
4 . (Referred To) :- East India Tobacco Company Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1733 :
1963 (1) SCR 404 : 1962 (2) SCA 695 : 1962 (13) STC 529 : 1962 AIJEL_SC 8466
47. (Referred To) :- Kehar Singh Vs. State Of Delhi, 1988 (3) SCC 609 : AIR 1988 SC 1883 : 1988 (2)
Scale 117 : 1988 (Supp2) SCR 24 : JT 1988 (3) SC 191 : 1988 SCC(Cri) 711 : 1989 CrLJ 1 : 1988
CrLR(SC) 536 : 1988 (3) Crimes 209 : 1988 (2) Crimes 981 : 1988 CriAppR 311 : 1988 BLJR 630 :
1988 CalCriLR 146 : 1988 AllCriLR 575 : 1989 ChandCriC 8 : 1988 (36) DLT 441 : 1988 (2)
KerLT(SN) 47 : 1988 (15) DRJ 114 : 1988 (17) Reports 306 : 1988 AIJEL_SC 14361
4 . (Referred To) :- Maganlal Chaganlal Private Vs. Municipal Corporation Of Greater Bombay, 1974
(2) SCC 402 : AIR 1974 SC 2009 : 1975 (1) SCR 1 : 1974 Mcc 268 : 1974 AIJEL_SC 16465
49. (Referred To) :- P.V.Jagannath Rao Vs. State Of Orissa, AIR 1969 SC 215 : 1968 (3) SCR 789 :
1969 (2) SCJ 41 : 1971 (1) SLR 746 : 1969 (1) SCA 109 : 1969 (1) SCWR 298 : 1968 AIJEL_SC
20497
50. (Referred To) :- T.T.Antony Vs. State Of Kerala, 2001 (6) SCC 181 : AIR 2001 SC 2637 : 2001 (4)
Scale 348 : 2001 (3) SCR 942 : JT 2001 (5) SC 440 : 2001 AIR SCW 2571 : 2001 (5) Supreme 131
: 2001 SCC(Cri) 1048 : 2001 CrLJ 3329 : 2001 CrLR(SC) 633 : 2001 (2) ApexCJ(SC) 24 : 2001 (3)
RCR(Cri) 436 : 2001 (5) SLT 211 : 2001 (3) Crimes 276 : 2001 (3) EastCrC(SC) 261 : 2001 (3)
AICLR 709 : 2001 (2) ACrC 345 : 2001 (7) SRJ 136 : 2001 (3) KerLT 1 : 2001 (3) CurCriR 55 : 2001
 (2) ALD(Cri) 276 : 2001 MLJ(Cri) 961 : 2001 (3) BLJud 380 : 2001 (2) AllCriLR 1510 : 2001 (21)
OrissaCriR 235 : 2001 (3) CalHN(SC) 20 : 2001 (3) LRI 561 : 2001 (2) ChandCriC 186 : 2001 (2)
OrissaLR 235 : 2001 (2) KerLJ 182 : 2001 ChhatLJ 260 : ILR 2001 Ker 629 : 2001 AIJEL_SC
31542
51. (Referred To) :- Sasa Musa Sugar Works Vs. State Of Bihar, 1996 (9) SCC 681 : AIR 1997 SC 188 :
1997 (5) Scale 155 : 1996 (Supp3) SCR 149 : JT 1996 (6) SC 329 : 1996 AIR SCW 4335 : 1996 (5)
Supreme 509 : 1996 (2) PLJR(SC) 170 : 1996 AIJEL_SC 25454
52. (Followed) :- State Of Karnataka Vs. Union Of India, 1977 (4) SCC 608 : AIR 1978 SC 68 : 1978 (2)
SCR 1 : 1978 (2) SCJ 190 : 1977 AIJEL_SC 28209
53. (Referred To) :- Karimbil Kunhikoman, K.Ganapathy Bhat Vs. State Of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 723 :
1962 (Supp1) SCR 829 : 1962 (1) SCJ 510 : 1962 (1) MLJ 213 : 1962 KerLT 42 : 1962 (2) SCA 1 :
1962 (1) AndhWR 213 : 1962 KerLJ 59 : 1962 (1) KerLR 67 : 1962 (40) MysLJ 17 : 1961
AIJEL_SC 14103
54. (Referred To) :- Union Of India Vs. Elphinstone Spinning And Weaving Mills Company Limited,
2001 (4) SCC 139 : AIR 2001 SC 724 : 2001 (1) Scale 157 : 2001 (1) SCR 221 : JT 2001 (1) SC
536 : 2001 AIR SCW 364 : 2001 (1) Supreme 269 : 2001 (1) UJ 496 : 2001 (1) SCJ 537 : 2001 (1)
SLT 583 : 2001 (2) SRJ 277 : 2001 (1) AD(SC) 255 : 2001 (1) JLJR(SC) 793 : 2001 (Supp1) BCR
740 : 2001 (105) CC 309 : 2001 (1) CompLJ 239 : 2001 (1) BLR 763 : 2001 (2) GCD 1130 : 2001
AIJEL_SC 32719
55. (Referred To) :- Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni Alias Moopil Nayar, Ravunniarath Unnimalu
Amma Alias Devaki Ammal, Ravunniarath Rajan Menon, K.C.Gopalan Unni, Thathunni Nair,
P.Kochunni Raja Vs. State Of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725 : 1959 (Supp2) SCR 316 : 1959 SCJ 858 :
1959 (2) MLJ 70 : 1959 (2) SCA 248 : 1959 (2) AndhWR 70 : 1959 KerLJ 464 : 1959 AIJEL_SC
14311
5 . (Referred To) :- Hiral P.Harsora Vs. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, 2016 (10) SCC 165 : AIR 2016
SC 4774 : 2016 (9) Scale 776 : JT 2016 (9) SC 629 : 2016 (7) Supreme 232 : 2017 (1) SCC(Cri) 1 :
2017 CrLJ 509 : 2016 (167) AIC 5 : 2016 CrLR(SC) 1045 : 2017 (1) ApexCJ(SC) 120 : 2016 (4)
RCR(Cri) 433 : 2016 (4) Crimes 91 : 2016 (4) RCR(Civ) 750 : 2016 (6) AWC 5830 : 2016 (5)
RecApexJ 675 : 2016 (4) AICLR 502 : 2016 (97) ACrC 425 : 2016 (119) ALR 462 : 2016 (4)
PLJR(SC) 348 : 2016 (4) LawHerald(SC) 2837 : 2017 (1) CivCC 340 : 2016 (4) KerLT 268 : 2016
(4) JLJR(SC) 252 : 2017 (1) ALD(Cri) 923 : 2017 (1) MLJ(Cri) 348 : 2017 (2) ALT(Cri)(SC) 217 :
2016 AllMR(Cri) 4930 : 2017 (1) BLJud 60 : 2016 (2) SCCriR 1371 : 2017 (1) RajLW 689 : 2016 (6)
BCR 505 : 2017 (2) ALD(SC) 95 : 2016 (5) CalHN(SC) 86 : 2017 (2) MPLJ 20 : 2016 (3)
MadWN(Cri) 360 : 2016 AllSCR 2009 : 2016 (233) DLT 154 : 2016 (4) JBCJ(SC) 384 : 2016 (3)
GCD 2355 : 2017 (2) MhLJ(Cri) 147 : 2016 (3) HinduLR 516 : 2016 (4) WLN 19 : 2016 (4) JCC
2659 : 2016 (3) DMC 438 : 2016 (4) KerLJ 376 : 2017 (3) LW 28 : 2016 (4) JKJ(SC) 1 : 2016 (10)
ADJ 293 : ILR 2016 Ker 179 : 2017 (2) GauLT 1 : 2017 (1) HLT(Cri) 73 : 2016 JX(SC) 690 : 2016
AIJEL_SC 59302
57. (Referred To) :- A.P.Dairy Development Corporation Federation Vs. B.Narasimha Reddy, 2011 (9)
SCC 286 : AIR 2011 SC 3298 : 2011 (9) Scale 688 : 2011 (14) SCR 1 : JT 2011 (10) SC 145 : 2011
AIR SCW 4995 : 2012 (5) RCR(Civ) 831 : 2012 (1) ALD(SC) 108 : 2011 JX(SC) 628 : 2011
AIJEL_SC 50314
5 . (Referred To) :- State Of Bihar Vs. Lal Krishna Advani, 2003 (8) SCC 361 : AIR 2003 SC 3357 :
2003 (7) Scale 524 : 2003 (Supp3) SCR 844 : JT 2003 (Supp1) SC 335 : 2003 AIR SCW 4769 :
2003 (6) Supreme 762 : 2003 (5) SLT 681 : 2003 (6) AWC 4771 : 2003 (3) EastCrC(SC) 188 : 2003
(10) SRJ 500 : 2003 (4) PLJR(SC) 219 : 2003 (4) JLJR(SC) 203 : 2003 (4) AllMR(SC) 1210 : 2003
(3) BLJud 142 : AIRJharHCR 2003 1294 : 2003 (3) BLJR 2020 : 2003 (11) IndLD 551 : 2004 (1)
LW 606 : 2003 AIJEL_SC 27524
59. (Referred To) :- Kumari Chitra Ghosh Vs. Union Of India, 1969 (2) SCC 228 : AIR 1970 SC 35 :
1970 (1) SCR 413 : 1970 (1) SCJ 240 : 1970 (1) SCA 488 : 1970 (2) UmNP 335 : 1969 AIJEL_SC
15072
 0. (Referred To) :- Gopal Narain Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 370 : 1964 (4) SCR 869 :
1964 AllLJ 479 : 1963 AIJEL_SC 9681
1. (Referred To) :- Vikram Cement Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh, 2015 (11) SCC 708 : AIR 2015 SC
2397 : 2015 (4) Scale 533 : 2015 AIR SCW 2528 : 2015 (4) AWC 3411 : 2015 (5) AllMR(SC) 946 :
2015 JX(SC) 377 : 2015 AIJEL_SC 56568
2. (Referred To) :- State Of Kerala Vs. Haji K.Haji K.Kutty Naha, AIR 1969 SC 378 : 1969 (1) SCR 645
: 1969 (1) SCJ 691 : 1969 (1) SCA 371 : 1969 (1) SCWR 633 : 1969 (1) UmNP 264 : 1968
AIJEL_SC 28251
3. (Referred To) :- State Of Jammu And Kashmir Vs. Thakur Ganga Singh For Self And On Behalf Of
Other Shareholders Of Jammu And Kashmir Mechanics And Transport Workers Co Operative
Society Limited, AIR 1960 SC 356 : 1960 (2) SCR 346 : 1960 SCJ 231 : 1960 (1) MLJ 67 : 1960
MLJ(Cri) 180 : 1960 (1) AndhWR 67 : 2010 (6) JKJ(SC) 644 : 1960 (1) KerLR 387 : 1959
AIJEL_SC 28065
4. (Referred To) :- Saurabh Chaudri Vs. Union Of India, 2003 (11) SCC 146 : AIR 2004 SC 361 : 2003
(9) Scale 272 : 2004 (4) Scale 70 : JT 2003 (8) SC 296 : 2003 AIR SCW 6392 : 2004 (1) Supreme
26 : 2004 (1) SLR 287 : 2003 (6) SLT 724 : 2003 (4) SCT 867 : 2003 (5) LabLN 199 : 2004 (2) MLJ
113 : 2004 (1) RSJ 659 : 2004 (1) JCR(SC) 140 : 2004 (1) UPLBEC 279 : 2004 (3) BCR 796 : 2003
(4) CTC 477 : 2003 (4) LRI 532 : 2003 (12) IndLD 486 : 2003 (5) ESC 240 : 2003 (1) DT(SC) 1087 :
2003 AIJEL_SC 25621
5. (Referred To) :- Paradise Printers Vs. Union Territory Of Chandigarh, 1988 (1) SCC 440 : AIR 1988
SC 354 : 1987 (2) Scale 1235 : 1988 (2) SCR 157 : JT 1987 (4) SC 553 : 1988 (1) UJ 365 : 1988
(1) SCJ 50 : 1988 (1) RCR(Civ) 32 : 1988 CivCC 42 : 1988 (1) LandLR 499 : 1988 (93) PLR 400 :
1987 (2) CurCC 764 : 1988 (1) CalLT 8 : 1988 (1) CompLJ 27 : 1988 (1) RRR 12 : 1988 HRR 409 :
1988 (21) Reports 223 : 1987 AIJEL_SC 20709
. (Referred To) :- Nair Service Society Vs. State Of Kerala, 2007 (4) SCC 1 : AIR 2007 SC 2891 :
2007 (4) Scale 106 : 2007 (3) SCR 149 : JT 2007 (6) SC 103 : 2007 AIR SCW 5276 : 2007 (3)
Supreme 598 : 2007 (2) SCT 260 : 2007 (2) RSJ 757 : 2007 (2) KerLT 77 : 2007 (3) UPLBEC 2120
: 2007 (2) GLH 358 : AIRKarR 2007 101 : 2007 (1) KHC 863 : 2007 JX(SC) 169 : 2007 AIJEL_SC
38748
7. (Referred To) :- Kalpana Mehta Vs. Union Of India, 2017 (7) SCC 295 : 2017 (4) Scale 541 : JT
2017 (5) SC 379 : 2017 (4) Supreme 228 : 2017 (3) RecApexJ 649 : 2017 (2) BBCJ(SC) 430 :
2017 (4) ALT(SC) 21 : 2017 AllSCR 968 : 2017 (3) UAD 113 : 2017 JX(SC) 329 : 2017 AIJEL_SC
60094
. (Referred To) :- P.Janardhana Reddy Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh, 2001 (6) SCC 50 : AIR 2001 SC
2631 : 2001 (4) Scale 327 : 2001 (1) SCR 969 : JT 2001 (5) SC 416 : 2001 AIR SCW 2548 : 2001
(5) Supreme 151 : 2001 (5) SLT 204 : 2001 (3) RCR(Civ) 679 : 2001 (3) RCR(Civ) 678 : 2001 (7)
SRJ 127 : 2001 (44) ALR 498 : 2003 (2) ALD(SC) 170 : 2001 (4) ALD(SC) 129 : 2003 (2) ALT(SC)
579 : 2001 (3) LRI 545 : 2001 (2) CLJ(Ser) 97 : 2001 (2) LACC 124 : 2001 AIJEL_SC 20300
9. (Referred To) :- Subramanian Swamy Vs. Union Of India, 2016 (7) SCC 221 : AIR 2016 SC 2728 :
2016 (5) Scale 379 : JT 2016 (6) SC 41 : 2016 (3) SCC(Cri) 1 : 2016 CrLJ 3214 : 2016 (2)
RCR(Cri) 840 : 2016 (2) Crimes 147 : 2016 (3) RecApexJ 329 : 2016 (4) AICLR 309 : 2016 (2)
LawHerald(SC) 1441 : 2016 (3) KerLT 9 : 2016 (2) MLJ(Cri) 542 : 2016 (2) ALT(Cri)(SC) 170 :
2016 (3) RLR 403 : 2016 AllSCR(Cri) 1373 : AIRBomR 2016 Cri 627 : 2016 AIJEL_SC 58708
70. (Referred To) :- J.Pandurangarao Vs. Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission, AIR 1963 SC
268 : 1963 (1) SCR 707 : 1962 (2) SCA 660 : 1962 (2) KerLR 200 : 1962 AIJEL_SC 12184
71. (Relied on) :- Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 : 1976 (2) SCR 347 : 1975
AIJEL_SC 11855
72. (Referred To) :- Lachhman Dass On Behalf Of Firm Tilak Ram Ram Bux Vs. State Of Punjab And
Haryana, AIR 1963 SC 222 : 1963 (2) SCR 353 : 1962 AIJEL_SC 15245
73. (Relied on) :- Delhi Cloth And General Mills Company Limited Vs. S.Paramjit Singh, 1990 (4) SCC
723 : AIR 1990 SC 2286 : 1990 (2) Scale 774 : 1990 (Supp2) SCR 218 : JT 1990 (4) SC 110 : 1991
 (1) RentLR 56 : 1990 (2) RCR(Rent) 629 : 1991 (1) RCJ 90 : 1991 ISJ(Ban) 177 : 2010 (5) JKJ(SC)
899 : 1991 (1) BankCLR 207 : 1990 AIJEL_SC 7506
74. (Referred To) :- Union Of India Vs. P.Sathikumarana Nair, 1997 (10) SCC 663 : AIR 1997 SC 2344 :
1997 (3) Scale 734 : 1997 (3) SCR 1076 : JT 1997 (5) SC 443 : 1997 AIR SCW 2232 : 1997 (5)
Supreme 234 : 1997 SCC(L&S) 1639 : 1997 (4) SLR 244 : 1997 (2) SCT 708 : 1997 (3) RSJ 723 :
1998 (1) CivCC 82 : 1997 (3) ICC 691 : 1997 (2) RLR 313 : 1997 (1) PLJ 379 : 1997 (2) SimLJ
1660 : 1997 AIHC 3435 : 1997 AIJEL_SC 33499
75. (Relied on) :- Raja Narayanlal Bansilal Vs. Maneck Phiroz Mistry, AIR 1961 SC 29 : 1961 (1) SCR
417 : 1961 (1) SCJ 353 : 1961 (1) MLJ 73 : 1961 MLJ(Cri) 208 : 1961 (1) SCA 531 : 1960 (30) CC
644 : 1961 (1) AndhWR 73 : 1961 BLR 251 : 1960 AIJEL_SC 22557
7 . (Referred To) :- Karnataka Live Band Restaurants Association Vs. State Of Karnataka, 2018
JX(SC) 32 : 2018 AIJEL_SC 61559
77. (Referred To) :- Y.Mahaboob Sheriff And Sons Vs. Mysore State Transport Authority, AIR 1960 SC
321 : 1960 (2) SCR 146 : 1960 SCJ 402 : 1960 (1) SCA 346 : 1960 MadWN 104 : 1960 (38) MysLJ
58 : 1959 AIJEL_SC 34775
7 . (Relied on) :- M.M.Ipoh Vs. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1968 SC 317 : 1968 (1)
SCR 65 : 1968 (1) SCJ 106 : 1968 (1) MLJ 32 : 1968 (67) ITR 106 : 1968 (1) SCA 488 : 1968 (1)
AndhWR 32 : 1967 (2) ITJ 885 : 1968 (15) LawRep 569 : 1967 AIJEL_SC 16049
79. (Referred To) :- Subramanian Swamy Vs. Director, Central Bureau Of Investigation, 2014 (8) SCC
682 : AIR 2014 SC 2140 : 2014 (6) Scale 146 : JT 2014 (7) SC 474 : 2014 AIR SCW 2930 : 2014
(4) SLR 739 : 2014 (2) RCR(Cri) 822 : 2014 (3) RecApexJ 269 : 2014 (2) AICLR 385 : 2014 (4)
MLJ 603 : 2014 (2) PLJR(SC) 516 : 2014 (2) RSJ 497 : 2014 (4) RSJ 521 : 2014 (2) JLJR(SC) 530
: 2014 (2) ALD(Cri) 1017 : 2014 (3) BLJud 11 : 2015 (1) CalCriLR 507 : AIR 2014 SC 1411 : 2014
AllSCR 2379 : 2014 (2) JBCJ(SC) 371 : 2014 (Supp2) CutLT(Cri) 529 : 2014 (2) KerLT(SN) 65 :
2014 (127) SCL 93 : 2014 (5) GauLT 1 : 2014 (4) ADR 237 : 2015 (1) GauLJ 1 : 2014 JX(SC) 368 :
2014 AIJEL_SC 55480
0. (Referred To) :- Ganga Sugar Corporation Limited Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh, 1980 (1) SCC 223 :
AIR 1980 SC 286 : 1980 (1) SCR 769 : 1980 (45) STC 36 : 1980 SCC(Tax) 90 : 1979 (55) Taxation
165 : 1980 UPTC 174 : 1979 AIJEL_SC 9266
1. (Referred To) :- Binoy Viswam Vs. Union Of India, 2017 (7) SCC 59 : AIR 2017 SC 2967 : 2017 (6)
Scale 621 : JT 2017 (6) SC 520 : 2017 (4) Supreme 673 : 2017 (4) MLJ 703 : 2017 (396) ITR 66 :
2017 (240) DLT 277 : 2017 (249) Taxman 290 : 2017 (3) HLT 1 : 2017 AIJEL_SC 60513
2. (Referred To) :- Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra Vs. State Of Orissa, 2014 (4) SCC 583 : AIR 2014
SC 1716 : 2014 (2) Scale 589 : 2014 (2) SCR 1031 : JT 2014 (3) SC 244 : 2014 AIR SCW 1894 :
2014 (2) SCC(L&S) 54 : 2014 (3) SLR 496 : 2014 (2) SCT 304 : 2014 LabIC 1655 : 2014 (3) RSJ
583 : 2015 (1) WBLR 399 : AIR 2014 SC 1155 : 2014 AllSCR 1693 : 2014 (1) ESC 79 : 2014
JX(SC) 102 : 2014 AIJEL_SC 54900
3. (Referred To) :- Mohan Kumar Singhania Vs. Union Of India, 1992 (Supp1) SCC 594 : AIR 1992 SC
1 : 1991 (2) Scale 565 : 1991 (Supp1) SCR 46 : JT 1991 (6) SC 261 : 1992 SCC(L&S) 455 : 1992
(1) SLR 77 : 1992 (1) RCR(Civ) 546 : 1991 LabIC 2334 : 1992 (1) RSJ 242 : 1992 (19) ATC 881 :
1991 AIJEL_SC 17975
4. (Referred To) :- Delhi Transport Corporation Limited Vs. D.T.C.Mazdoor Congress, 1991 (Supp1)
SCC 600 : AIR 1991 SC 101 : 1990 (Supp2) Scale 1 : 1990 (Supp1) SCR 142 : JT 1990 (3) SC 725
: 1991 SCC(L&S) 1213 : 1990 (5) SLR 311 : 1991 (1) SCT 675 : 1991 LabIC 91 : 1991 (1) LabLN
613 : 1991 (1) LLJ 395 : 1991 (1) RSJ 152 : 1991 (1) SLJ 56 : 1991 (79) FJR 1 : 1991 (1) CompLJ
1 : 1990 AIJEL_SC 7585
5. (Followed) :- B.Banerjee Vs. Anita Pan, 1975 (1) SCC 166 : AIR 1975 SC 1146 : 1975 (2) SCR 774 :
1976 (1) SCJ 274 : 1975 (1) RCR(Civ) 293 : 1975 RCR(Rent) 293 : 1975 RC 7 : 1974 AIJEL_SC
2113
. (Referred To) :- Tika Ram Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh, 2009 (10) SCC 689 : AIR 2010 SC 805 :
2009 (12) Scale 349 : JT 2009 (12) SC 1 : 2009 AIR SCW 6465 : 2009 (4) ICC 199 : 2010 (1) AllLJ
 196 : 1974 MLJ(Cri) 380 : 2010 (1) LandLR 139 : 2009 (4) SCC(Civ) 328 : 2010 (1) RJ 13 : 2009
JX(SC) 1079 : 2009 AIJEL_SC 44428
7. (Relied on) :- Press Trust Of India Vs. Union Of India, 1974 (4) SCC 638 : AIR 1974 SC 1044 :
1975 (3) SCR 499 : 1974 SCC(L&S) 363 : 1974 (29) FLR 67 : 1974 LabIC 716 : 1974 (2) LabLN 88
: 1974 (45) FJR 509 : 1974 SerLC 337 : 1974 AIJEL_SC 21551
. (Referred To) :- State Of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR 1960 SC 1125 : 1961 (1) SCR
14 : 1961 (2) SCJ 334 : 1960 CrLJ 1504 : 1961 (2) MLJ 90 : 1960 AllLJ 733 : 1961 (2) MLJ(Cri)
554 : 1960 (2) SCA 371 : 1960 AllCriLR 361 : 1960 MadWN(Cri) 186 : 1961 (1) AndhWR 90 : 1960
MadWN 640 : ILR 1960 All 431 : 1960 (2) KerLR 368 : 1960 AIJEL_SC 29878
9. (Referred To) :- Deena Alias Deen Dayal Vs. Union Of India, 1983 (4) SCC 645 : AIR 1983 SC 1155
: 1983 (2) Scale 340 : 1984 (1) SCR 1 : 1983 SCC(Cri) 879 : 1983 CrLJ 1602 : 1984 CrLR(SC) 73 :
1983 CrLR(SC) 585 : 1983 (2) Crimes 770 : 1983 (8) RajCriC 401 : 1983 AIJEL_SC 7425
90. (Relied on) :- State Of Jammu And Kashmir Vs. Triloki Nath Khosa, 1974 (1) SCC 19 : AIR 1974
SC 1 : 1974 (1) SCR 771 : 1974 (1) SCJ 366 : 1974 SCC(L&S) 49 : 1974 (1) SLR 536 : 1974 LabIC
1 : 1974 (1) LLJ 121 : 2010 (6) JKJ(SC) 531 : 1974 SLWR 121 : 1975 AllServRep 383 : 1973
AIJEL_SC 28066
91. (Referred To) :- L.N.Mishra Institute Of Economic Development And Social Change, Patna Vs.
State Of Bihar, 1988 (2) SCC 433 : AIR 1988 SC 1136 : 1988 (1) Scale 582 : 1988 (3) SCR 311 : JT
1988 (1) SC 635 : 1988 (2) UJ 32 : 1988 SCC(L&S) 577 : 1988 (2) SLR 210 : 1988 PLJR(SC) 45 :
1988 BLJud 793 : 1986 BLJR 587 : 1988 SLC 158 : 1988 AIJEL_SC 15204
92. (Referred To) :- Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal Etc. Vs. State Of Bihar, 2016 (3) SCC 183 : AIR 2016 SC
1474 : 2015 (13) Scale 508 : JT 2015 (12) SC 501 : 2016 (2) SCC(Cri) 1 : 2016 CrLJ 2129 : 2016
(1) RCR(Cri) 735 : 2016 (1) RecApexJ 244 : 2016 (1) LawHerald(SC) 411 : 2016 (2) JBCJ(SC) 161
: 2016 AllSCR(Cri) 776 : ILR 2016 Cut 804 : 2015 JX(SC) 1007 : 2015 AIJEL_SC 57797
93. (Referred To) :- Heena Kausar Vs. Competent Authority, 2008 (14) SCC 724 : AIR 2008 SC 2427 :
2008 (7) Scale 331 : 2008 (6) SCR 967 : 2008 AIR SCW 3699 : 2009 (3) SCC(Cri) 587 : 2008 CrLJ
3024 : 2008 (Supp) CrLR(SC) 448 : 2008 (2) ApexCJ(SC) 428 : 2008 (2) RCR(Cri) 775 : 2008 (2)
Crimes 223 : 2008 (4) EastCrC(SC) 159 : 2008 (3) AICLR 25 : 2008 (2) CriCC 745 : 2008 (3) RAJ
232 : 2009 AllMR(Cri) 1254 : 2008 (3) LRC 8 : 2009 (1) BCR(Cri) 481 : 2008 (2) PCCR(SC) 254 :
2008 JX(SC) 1031 : 2008 AIJEL_SC 41423
94. (Relied on) :- S.P.Mittal Vs. Union Of India, 1983 (1) SCC 51 : AIR 1983 SC 1 : 1982 (2) Scale 1001
: 1983 (1) SCR 729 : 1983 (1) SCJ 45 : 1982 AIJEL_SC 24695
95. (Followed) :- Rehman Shagoo Vs. State Of Jammu And Kashmir, AIR 1960 SC 1 : 1960 (1) SCR
680 : 1960 SCJ 172 : 1960 CrLJ 126 : 2010 (6) JKJ(SC) 590 : 1959 AIJEL_SC 24158
9 . (Relied on) :- Anant Mills Company Limited Vs. State Of Gujarat, 1975 (2) SCC 175 : AIR 1975 SC
1234 : 1975 (3) SCR 220 : 1975 TaxLR 1540 : 1975 GLR 418 : 1975 AIJEL_SC 1265
97. (Referred To) :- State Of Jammu And Kashmir Vs. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad, AIR 1967 SC 122 :
1966 (Supp) SCR 401 : 1967 (1) SCA 1 : 1966 (2) SCWR 304 : 2010 (6) JKJ(SC) 857 : 1966
AIJEL_SC 28038
9 . (Referred To) :- Bachan Singh Vs. State Of Punjab And Haryana, 1982 (3) SCC 24 : AIR 1982 SC
1325 : 1982 (1) Scale 713 : 1983 (1) SCR 145 : 1982 SCC(Cri) 535 : 1982 CrLR(SC) 337 : 1983
MLJ(Cri) 175 : 1980 AIJEL_SC 2415
99. (Referred To) :- Union Of India Vs. A.Sanyasi Rao, 1996 (3) SCC 465 : AIR 1996 SC 1219 : 1996
(2) Scale 280 : 1996 (2) SCR 570 : JT 1996 (2) SC 425 : 1996 AIR SCW 1251 : 1996 (2) AD(SC)
401 : 1996 (219) ITR 330 : 1996 (132) CTR 81 : 1996 TaxLR 357 : 1996 (85) Taxman 321 : 1996
(132) Taxation 509 : 1996 AIJEL_SC 32522
100. (Referred To) :- Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union Of India, 1990 (1) SCC 613 : AIR 1990 SC 1480 : 1989
(Supp2) SCR 597 : JT 1989 (4) SC 582 : 1990 (1) CompLJ 125 : 1989 AIJEL_SC 4945
101. (Relied on) :- D.S.Nakara Vs. Union Of India, 1983 (1) SCC 305 : AIR 1983 SC 130 : 1982 (2) Scale
1213 : 1983 (2) SCR 165 : 1983 UJ 217 : 1983 (1) SCJ 188 : 1983 SCC(L&S) 145 : 1983 (2) SLR
246 : 1983 (47) FLR 42 : 1983 LabIC 1 : 1983 (1) LabLN 289 : 1983 (1) LLJ 104 : 1983 (1) SLJ
 131 : 1983 UPLBEC 378 : 1983 BLJR 122 : 1983 (1) SCWR 390 : 1983 KerLJ 153 : 1983 (15)
Lawyer 51 : 1982 AIJEL_SC 7100
102. (Referred To) :- Dharam Dutt Vs. Union Of India, 2004 (1) SCC 712 : AIR 2004 SC 1295 : 2003 (10)
Scale 141 : 2003 (Supp6) SCR 151 : 2004 AIR SCW 147 : 2004 (2) Supreme 12 : 2004 (3) SLT 267
: 2004 (13) IndLD 743 : 2004 (22) LCD 1408 : 2003 AIJEL_SC 7874
103. (Referred To) :- Motor General Traders Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh, 1984 (1) SCC 222 : AIR 1984
SC 121 : 1983 (2) Scale 513 : 1984 (1) SCR 594 : 1984 UJ 6 : 1983 (2) RCR(Civ) 579 : 1984 (1)
ARC 93 : 1983 (2) RentLR 713 : 1984 (1) RCJ 145 : 1983 AIJEL_SC 18218
104. (Referred To) :- His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripada Galvaru Vs. State Of Kerala, 1973 (4)
SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461 : 1973 (Supp) SCR 1 : 2012 (4) SLT 481 : 1973 AIJEL_SC 11285
105. (Relied on) :- State Of Bihar Vs. Bihar Distillery Limited, 1997 (2) SCC 453 : AIR 1997 SC 1511 :
1996 (8) Scale 768 : 1996 (Supp9) SCR 479 : JT 1996 (10) SC 854 : 1997 AIR SCW 259 : 1997 (1)
Supreme 121 : 1997 (1) EastCrC(SC) 239 : 1996 (9) AD(SC) 153 : 1997 (2) BLJud 640 : 1997 (1)
BLJR 551 : 1996 AIJEL_SC 27473
10 . (Referred To) :- Sammbhu Nath Jha Vs. Kedar Prasad Sinha, 1972 (1) SCC 573 : AIR 1972 SC
1515 : 1972 (3) SCR 183 : 1972 SCC(Cri) 337 : 1972 UJ 629 : 1973 CrLJ 453 : 1972 PLJR(SC)
277 : 1972 CriAppR 135 : 1972 SCCriR 232 : 1974 BLJR 305 : 1972 (1) SCA 574 : 1972 (2) UmNP
371 : ILR 1974 Patna 150 : 1972 AIJEL_SC 25110
107. (Relied on) :- Dinnapati Sadasiva Reddi Vice Chancellor, Osmania University Vs. Chancellor,
Osmania University, AIR 1967 SC 1305 : 1967 (2) SCR 214 : 1967 (2) SCJ 230 : 1967 (2) MLJ 44 :
1967 (1) SCA 546 : 1967 (2) ALT(SC) 319 : 1967 (1) SCWR 422 : 1966 (11) LawRep 786 : 1966
AIJEL_SC 8088

Equivalent Citation(s):
AIR 1958 SC 538 : 1959 SCR 279

JUDGMENT :-

S.R.Das, J.

1 These six several appeals are directed against a common Judgement and order pronounced on
29.04.1957, by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in three several Miscellaneous Applications
under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, namely, No. 48 of 1957 filed by Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia
(the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 455 of 1957), No. 49 of 1957 by Shri Shriyans Prasad Jain and Shri
Sital Prasad Jain (the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 456 of 1957) and No. 50 of 1957 by Shri Jai Dayal
Dalmia and Shri Shanti Prasad Jain (the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 457 of 1957). By those
Miscellaneous Applications the petitioners therein prayed for an appropriate direction or order under
Art. 226 for quashing and setting aside notification No. S. R. O. 2993 dated 11.12.1956, issued by the
Union of India in exercise of powers conferred on it by sec. 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act (LX
of 1952) and for other reliefs. Rules were issued and the Union of India appeared and showed cause.
By the aforesaid Judgement and order the High Court discharged the rules and dismissed the
applications and ordered that the said notification was legal and valid except as to the last part of cl.
(10) thereof from the words "and the action" to the words "in future cases" and directed the
Commission not to proceed with the inquiry to the extent that it related to the aforesaid last part of cl.
(10) of the said notification. The Union of India has filed three several appeals, namely, Nos. 656, 657
and 658 of 1957, in the said three Miscellaneous Applications complaining against that part of the
said Judgement and order of the Bombay High Court which adjudged the last part of cl. (10) to be
invalid.

2 The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) received the assent of the
President on 14.08.1952, and was thereafter brought into force by a notification issued by the Central
Government u/s. 1 (3) of the Act. As its long title states, the Act is one "to provide for the appointment
of Commissions of Inquiry and for vesting such Commissions with certain powers". Sub-sec. (1) of
sec. 3, omitting the proviso not material for our present purpose, provides:

"The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall, if a
resolution in this behalf is passed by the House of People or, as the case may be, the Legislative
Assembly of the State, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for
the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing
such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission
so appointed shall make the Inquiry and perform the functions accordingly."

Under sub-sec. (2) of that section the Commission may consist of one or more members and where
the Commission consists of more than one member one of them may be appointed as the Chairman
thereof. Sec. 4 vests in the Commission the powers of a civil Court while trying s suit under the Code
of Civil Procedure in respect of the several matters specified therein, namely, summoning and
enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath, requiring discovery and production of
any document, receiving evidence on affidavits requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from
any Court or officer, issuing commissions for examination of witnesses or documents and any other
matter which may be prescribed. Sec. 5 empowers the appropriate Government, by a notification in
the Official Gazette, to confer on the Commission additional powers as provided in all or any of the
sub-ss. (2), (3), (4) and (5) of that section. Sec. 6 provides that no statement made by a person in the
course of giving evidence before the commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any
civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement provided
that the statement is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer or
is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. The appropriate Government may u/s. 7 issue a
notification declaring that the Commission shall cease to exist from such date as may be specified
therein. By sec. 8 the Commission is empowered, subject to any rules that may be made, to regulate
its own procedure including the time and place of its sittings and may act notwithstanding the
temporary absence of any member or the existence of any vacancy among its members. Sec. 9
provides for indemnity to the appropriate Government, the members of the Commission or other
persons acting under their directions in respect of anything which is done or intended to be done in
good faith in pursuance of the Act. The rest of the sections are not material for the purpose of these
appeals.

3 In exercise of the powers conferred on it by sec. 3 of the Act the Central Government published in
the Gazette of India dated 11.12.1956, a notification in the following terms :

MINISTRY OF FINANCE

(Department of Economic Affairs)

ORDER

New Delhi, the 11.12.1956

S. R. O. 2993 - Whereas it has been made to appear to the Central Government that :

(1) a large number of companies and some firms were promoted and/or controlled by Sarvashri
Ramkrishna Dalmia, Jaidayal Dalmia, Shanti Prasad Jain, Sriyans Prasad Jain, Shital Prasad Jain
or some one or more of them and by others being either relatives or employees of the said
person or persons, closely connected with the said persons :
 (2) large amounts were subscribed by the investing public in shares of some of these
companies ;

(3) there have been gross irregularities (which may in several respects and materials amount to
illegalities) in the management of such companies including transfers and use of funds and
assets :

(4) the moneys subscribed by the investing public were in considerable measure used not in the
interests of the companies concerned but contrary to their interest and for the ultimate personal
benefit of those in control and/or management; and

(5) the investing public have as a result suffered considerable losses.

And Whereas the Central Government is of the opinion that there should be a full inquiry into these
matters which are of definite public importance both by reason of the grave consequences which
appear to have ensued to the investing public and also to determine such measures as may be
deemed necessary in order to prevent a recurrence thereof :

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 3 of the Commission in Inquiry Act
(No. 60 of 1952), the Central Government hereby appoints a Commission of Inquiry consisting of
the following persons, namely : Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, Judge of the High Court at Bombay,
Chairman. Shri N. R. Modi of Messrs A. F. Ferguson & Co., Chartered Accountants, Member. Shri
S. C. Chaudhuri, Commissioner of Income-tax, Member.

(1) The Commission shall inquire into and report on and in respect of :

(1) The administration of the affairs of the companies specified in the schedule hereto;

(2) The administration of the affairs of such other companies and firms as the Commission may
during the course of its enquiry find to be companies or firms connected with the companies
referred to in the schedule and whose affairs ought to be investigated and inquired into in
connection with or arising out of the enquiry into the affairs of the companies specified in the
schedule hereto;

(3) The nature and extent of the control, direct and indirect, exercised over such companies and
firms or any of them by the aforesaid Sarvashri Ram Krishna Dalmia, Jaidayal Dalmia, Shanti
Prasad Jain, Sriyans Prasad Jain, their relatives, employees and persons connected with them ;

(4) The total amount of the subscription obtained from the investing public and the amount
subscribed by the aforesaid persons and the extent to which the funds and assets thus obtained
or acquired were misused, misapplied or misappropriated ;

(5) The extent and nature of the investments by and/or loans to and/or the use of the funds or
assets by and transfer of funds between the companies aforesaid ;

(6) The consequences or results of such investments, loans, transfers and/or use of funds and
assets ;

(7) The reasons or motives of such investments, loans, transfers and use and whether there was
any justification for the same and whether the same were made bona fide in the interests of the
companies concerned ;
 (8) The extent of the losses suffered by the investing public, how far the losses were avoidable
and what steps were taken by those in control and/or management to avoid the losses ;

(9) The nature and extent, of the personal gains made by any person or persons or any group or
groups of persons whether herein named or not by reason of or through his or their connection
with or control over any such company or companies ;

(10) Any irregularities, frauds or breaches of trust or action in disregard of honest commercial
practices or contravention of any law (except contraventions in respect of which criminal
proceedings are pending in a Court of Law) in respect of the companies and firms whose affairs
are investigated by the Commission which may come to the knowledge of the Commission and
the action which in the opinion of the Commission should be taken as and by way of securing
redress or punishment or to act as a preventive in future cases;

(11) The measures which in the opinion of the Commission are necessary in order to ensure in
the future the due and proper administration of the funds and assets of companies and firms in
the interests of the investing public.

SCHEDULE
1.  Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd.
Dalmia Jain Aviation Ltd., (now known as Asia
2.
Udyog Ltd.)
 Lahore Electric Supply Company Ltd., (now known
3.
as South Asia Industries Ltd.)
4.  Shri Shapurji Broacha Mills Ltd.
5.  Madhowji Dharamsi Manufacturing Company Ltd.
6.  Allen Berry and Co., Ltd.
7.  Bharat Union Agencies Ltd.
 Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Company Ltd.,
8.
(now known as Delhi Glass Works Ltd.)
9.  Vastra Vyavasaya Ltd.
Ordered that the Order be published in the Gazette of India for public information. (No. F. 107
(18-INS/56). H. M. Patel Secretary.

It should be noted that the above notification did not specify the time within which the
Commission was to complete the inquiry and make its report.

4 On 9.01.1957 the Central Government issued another notification providing that all the provisions of
sub-ss. (2), (3), (4),and (5) should apply to the Commission. As the notification of 11.12.1956 did not
specify the time within which the Commission was to make its report, the Central Government on
11.02.1957, issued a third notification specifying two years from that date as the time within which
the Commission of Inquiry should exercise the functions conferred on it and make its report. On
12.02.1957, three several Miscellaneous Applications were filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of
India questioning the validity of the Act and the notification dated 11.12.1956 on diverse grounds and
praying for a writ or order for quashing the same.

5 It will be convenient to advert to a few minor objections urged before us on behalf of the petitioners
in support of their appeals before we come to deal with their principal and major contentions. The first
objection is that the notification has gone beyond the Act. It is pointed out that the Act, by sec. 3,
empowers the appropriate Government in certain eventualities to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for
the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and for no other
purpose. The contention is that the conduct of an individual persons or company cannot possibly be a
matter of public importance and far less a definite matter of that kind. We are unable to accept this
argument as correct. Widespread floods, famine and pestilence may quite easily be a definite matter
of public importance urgently calling for an inquiry so as to enable the Government to take appropriate
steps to prevent their recurrence in future. The conduct of villagers in cutting the bunds for taking
water to their fields during the dry season may cause floods during the rainy season and we can see
no reason why such unsocial conduct of villagers of certain villages thus causing floods should not be
regarded as a definite matter of public importance. The failure of a big bank resulting in the loss of the
life savings of a multitude of men of moderate means is certainly a definite matter of public
importance but the conduct of the persons in charge and management of such a bank which brought
about its collapse is equally a definite matter of public importance. Widespread dacoities in particular
parts of the country is no doubt, a definite matter of public importance but we see no reason why the
conduct, activities and modus operandi of particular dacoits and thugs notorious for their cruel
depredations should not be regarded as definite matters of public importance urgently requiring a
sifting inquiry. It is needless to multiply instances. In each case the question is : is there a definite
matter of public importance which calls for an inquiry ? We see no warrant for the proposition that a
definite matter of public importance must necessarily mean only some matter involving the public
benefit or advantage in the abstract, e.g., public health, sanitation or like or some public evil or
prejudice, e.g., floods, famine or pestilence or the like. Quite conceivably the conduct of an individual
person or company or a group of individual persons or companies may assume such a dangerous
proportion and may so prejudicially affect or threaten to affect the public well-being as to make such
conduct a definite matter of public importance urgently calling for a full inquiry. Besides, sec. 3 itself
authorises the appropriate Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry not only for the purpose of
making an inquiry into a definite matter of public importance but also for the purpose of performing
such functions as may be specified in the notification. Therefore, the notification is well within the
powers conferred on the appropriate Government by sec. 3 of the Act and it cannot be questioned on
the ground of its going beyond the provisions of the Act.

6 Learned counsel for the petitioner immediately replies that in the event of its being held that the
notification is within the terms of the Act, the Act itself is ultra vires the Constitution. The validity of
the Act is called in question in two ways. In the first place it is said that it was beyond the legislative
competency of Parliament to enact a law conferring such a wide sweep of powers. It is pointed out
that Parliament enacted the Act in exercise of the legislative powers conferred on it by Art. 246 of the
Constitution read with entry 94 in List 1 and entry 45 in List 3 of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution. The matters enumerated in entry 94 in List 1, omitting the words not necessary for our
purpose, are "inquiries....for the purpose of any of the matters in this List," and those enumerated in
entry 45 in List 3, again omitting the unnecessary words, are "inquires... for the purposes of any of the
matters specified in List 2 or List 3." Confining himself to the entries in so far as they relate to
"inquiries," learned counsel for the petitioners urges that Parliament may make a law with respect to
inquiries but cannot under these entries make a law conferring any power to perform any function
other than the power to hold an inquiry. He concedes that, according to the well recognised rule
construction of the provision of a Constitution, the legislative heads should be construed very liberally
and that it must be assumed that the Constitution intended to give to the appropriate legislature not
only the power to legislate with respect to the particular legislative topic but also with respect to all
matters ancillary thereto. Indeed the very use of the words "with respect to" in Art. 246 supports this
principle of liberal interpretation. He, however, points out that the law, which the appropriate legislature
is empowered to make under these entries must be with respect to inquiries for the purposes of any
of the matters in the relevant lists and it is urged that the words "for the purpose of" make it
abundantly clear that the law with respect to inquiries to be made under these two entries must be for
the purpose of future legislation with respect to any of the legislative heads in the relevant lists. In
other words, the argument is that under these two entries the appropriate legislature may make a law
authorising the constitution of a Board or Commission of Inquiry to inquire into and ascertain facts so
as to enable such legislature to undertake legislation with respect to any of the legislative topics in the
relevant lists to secure some public benefit or advantage or to prevent some evil or harm be falling the
public and thereby to protect the public from the same. But if an inquiry becomes necessary for, say,
administrative purposes, a law with respect to such an inquiry cannot be made under these two
entries. And far less can a law be made with respect to an inquiry into any wrong alleged to have been
committed by an individual person or company or a group of them for the purpose of punishing the
suspected delinquent. This argument has found favour with the High Court, but we are, with great
respect, unable to accept this view. To adopt this view will mean adding words to the two entries so as
to read "inquiries... ...for the purpose of future legislation with respect to any of the matters in... .." the
List or Lists mentioned therein. The matter, however, does not rest here. A careful perusal of the
language used in entry 45 in List 3, does, in our view, clinch the matter, Entry 45 in List 3, which is the
Concurrent List, speaks, inter alia, of "inquiries... .for the purpose of any of the matters in List 2 or List
3". Under Art. 246 read with this entry, Parliament as well as the Legislature of a State may make a law
with respect to "inquiries for the purpose of any of the matters in List 2." Parliament, under Art. 246,
has no power to make a law with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 2. Therefore, when
Parliament makes a law under Art. 246 read with entry 45 in List 3 with respect to an inquiry for the
purposes of any of the matters in List 2, such law can never be one for inquiry for the purpose of
future legislation by Parliament with respect to any of those matters in List 2. Clearly Parliament can
make a law for inquiry for the purpose of any of the matters in List 2 and none the less so though
Parliament cannot legislate with respect to such matters and though none of the State Legislatures
wants to legislate on such matters. In our opinion, therefore, the law to be made by the appropriate
Legislature with respect to the two legislative entries referred to above may cover inquiries into any
respect of the matters enumerated in any of the lists mentioned therein and is not confined to those
matters as mere heads of legislative topic. Quite conceivably the law with respect to inquiries for the
purpose of any of the matters in the lists may also be for administrative purposes and the scope of
the inquiry under such a law will cover all matters which may properly be regarded as ancillary to such
inquiries. The words "for the purposes of" indicate that the scope of the inquiry is not necessarily
limited to the particular or specific matters enumerated in any of the entries in the list concerned but
may extend to inquiries into collateral matters which may be necessary for the purpose, legislative or
otherwise, of those particular matters. We are unable, therefore, to hold that the inquiry which may be
set up by a law made under these two entries is, in its scope or ambit, limited to future legislative
purposes only.

7 Learned counsel then takes us through the different heads of inquiry enumerated in the notification
and urges that the inquiry is neither for any legislative nor for any administrative purpose, but is a clear
usurpation of the functions of the judiciary. The argument is that Parliament in authorising the
appointment of a Commission and the Government in appointing this Commission have arrogated to
themselves judicial powers which do not, in the very nature of things, belong to their respective
domains which must be purely legislative and executive respectively. It is contended that Parliament
cannot convert itself into a Court except for the rare cases of dealing with breaches of its own
privileges for which it may punish the delinquent by committal for contempt or of proceedings by way
of impeachment. It cannot, it is urged, undertake to inquire or investigate into alleged individual
wrongs or private disputes nor can it bring the supposed culprit to book or gather materials for the
purpose of initiating proceedings, civil or criminal, against him, because such inquiry or investigation
is clearly not in aid of legislation. It is argued that if a criminal prosecution is to be launched, the
preliminary investigation must be held under the Code of Criminal Procedure and it should not be
open to any legislature to start investigation on its own and thereby to deprive the citizen of the
normal protection afforded to him by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This line of
reasoning also found favour with the High Court which, after considering the provisions of the Act and
the eleven heads of inquiry enumerated in the notification, came to the conclusion that the last portion
of cl. (10) beginning with the words "and the action" and ending with the words "in future cases" was
ultra vires the Act and that the Government was not competent to require the Commission to hold any
inquiry or make any report with regard to the matters covered by that portion of cl. (10), for such
inquiry or report amounts to a usurpation of the judicial powers of the Union or the State as the case
may be.

8 While we find ourselves in partial agreement with the actual conclusion of the High Court on this
point, we are, with great respect, unable to accept the line of reasoning advanced by learned counsel
for the petitioners, which has been accepted by the High Court for more reasons than one. In the first
place neither Parliament nor the Government has itself undertaken any inquiry at all. Parliament has
made a law with respect to inquiry and has left it to the appropriate Government to set up a
Commission of Inquiry under certain circumstances referred to in sec. 3 of the Act. The Central
Government, in its turn has, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act, set up this
Commission. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Parliament or the Government itself has
undertaken to hold any inquiry. In the second place the conclusion that the last portion of cl. (10) is
bad because it signifies that Parliament or the Government had usurped the functions of the judiciary
appears to us, with respect, to be inconsistent with the conclusion arrived at in a later part of the
Judgement that as the Commission can only make recommendations which are not enforceable
proprio vigore there can be no question of usurpation of judicial functions. As has been stated by the
High Court itself in the latter part of its judgment, the only power that the Commission has is to inquire
and make a report and embody therein its recommendations. The Commission has no power to
adjudication in the sense of passing an order which can be enforced proprio vigore. A clear distinction
must, on the authorities, be drawn between a decision which, by itself, has no force and no penal
effect and a decision which becomes enforceable immediately or which may become enforceable by
some action being taken. Therefore, as the Commission we are concerned with is merely to
investigate and record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them,
the inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of
judicial function properly so called and consequently the question of usurpation by Parliament or the
Government of the powers of the judicial organs of the Union of India cannot arise on the facts of this
case and the elaborate discussion of the American authorities founded on the categorical separation
of powers expressly provided by and under the American Constitution appears to us, with respect,
wholly inappropriate and unnecessary and we do not feel called upon, on the present occasion, to
express any opinion on the question whether even in the absence of a specific provision for
separation of powers in our Constitution, such as there is under the American Constitution, some such
division of powers - legislative, executive and judicial - is, nevertheless implicit in our Constitution. In
the view we have taken it is also not necessary for us to consider whether, had the Act conferred on
the appropriate Government power to set up a Commission of Inquiry with judicial powers, such law
could not, subject, of course, to the other provisions of the Constitution, be supported as a law made
under some entry in List I or List II authorising the setting up of Courts read with these two entries, for
a legislation may well be founded on several entries.
9 Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, who are appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 456 and 457
of 1957, goes as far as to say that while the Commission may find facts on which the Government
may take action, legislative or executive, although he does not concede the latter kind of action to be
contemplated, the Commission cannot be asked to suggest any measure, legislative or executive, to
be taken by the appropriate Government. We are unable to accept the proposition so widely
enunciated. An inquiry necessarily involves investigation into facts and necessitates the collection of
material facts from the evidence adduced before or brought to the notice of the person or body
conducting the inquiry and the recording of its findings on those facts in its report cannot but be
regarded as ancillary to the inquiry itself, for the inquiry becomes useless unless the findings of the
inquiring body are made available to the Government which set up the inquiry. It is, in our judgement,
equally ancillary that the person or body conducting the inquiry should express its own view on the
facts found by it for the consideration of the appropriate Government in order to enable it to take such
measure as it may think fit to do. The whole purpose of setting up of a Commission of Inquiry
consisting of experts will be frustrated and the elaborate process of inquiry will be deprived of its
utility if the opinion and the advice of the expert body as to the measures the situation disclosed calls
for cannot be placed before the Government for consideration notwithstanding that doing so cannot
be to the prejudice of anybody because it has no force of its own in our view the recommendations of
a Commission of Inquiry are of great importance to the Government in order to enable it to make up
its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil
found or to implement the beneficial objection it has in view. From this point of view, there can be no
objection even to the Commission of Inquiry recommending the imposition of some form of
punishment which will, in its opinion, be sufficiently deterrent to delinquents in future. But seeing that
the Commission of Inquiry has no judicial powers and its report will purely be recommendatory and
not effective proprio vigore and the statement made by any person before the Commission of Inquiry
is, u/s. 6 of the Act, wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings, civil or criminal, there
can be no point in the Commission of inquiry making recommendations for taking any action "as and
by way of securing redress or punishment" which, in agreement with the High Court, we think, refers, in
the context, to wrongs already done or committed, for redress or punishment for such wrongs, if any,
has to be imposed by a Court of law properly constituted exercising its own discretion on the facts
and circumstances of the case and without being in any way influenced by the view of any person or
body, howsoever august or high powered it may be. Having regard to all these considerations it
appears to us that only that portion of the last part of cl. (10) which calls upon the Commission of
Inquiry to make recommendations about the action to be taken "as and by way of securing redress or
punishment", cannot be said to be at all necessary for or ancillary to the purposes of the Commission.
In our view the words in the latter part of the section, (sic) namely, "as and by way of securing redress
or punishment", clearly go outside the scope of the Act and such provision is not covered by the two
legislative entries and should, therefore, be deleted. So deleted the latter potion of cl. (10) would read -
"and the action which in the opinion of the Commission should be taken ... to act as a preventive in
future cases".

10 Deletion of the words mentioned above from cl. (10) raises the question of severability. We find
ourselves in substantial agreement with the reasons given by the High Court on this point and we hold
that the efficacy of the notification is in no way affected by the deletion of the offending words
mentioned above and there is no reason to think that the Government would not have issued the
notification without those words. Those words do not appear to us to be inextricably wound up with
the texture of the entire notification.

11 The principal ground urged in support of the contention as to the invalidity of the Act and/or the
notification is founded on Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. In Budhan Choudhry V/s. The State of
Bihar, a Constitution Bench of seven Judges of this Court at pages 1048-49 (of S C R) : explained the
true meaning and scope of Art. 14 as follows :
 "The provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India have come up for decision before this
Court in a number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal V/s. Union of India, State of Bombay V/s. F. N.
Balsara, State of West Bengal V/s. Anwar Ali Sarkar, Kathi Raning Rawat V/s. State of
Saurashtra, Lachmandas Kewalram V/s. State of Bombay, Qasim Razvi V/s. State of Hyderabad,
and Habeeb Mohammad V/s. State of Hyderabad. It is, therefore, not necessary to enter upon
any lengthy discussion as to the meaning, scope and effect of the article in question. It is now
well established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible
classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be funded
on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together
from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on
different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is
necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the
Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Art. 14
condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but by a law of procedure."

The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases. The
decisions of this Court further establish -

(a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individuals if, on account of
some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that
single individual may be treated as a class by himself ;

(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the
burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the
constitutional principles ;

(c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the
need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and
that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds ;

(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to
those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest ;

(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into
consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the
times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of
legislation ; and

(f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are
to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances
brought to the notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as
based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding
that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or
corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.

The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the Court when it is called upon, to
adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal
protection of the laws.

12 A close perusal of the decisions of this Court in which the above principles have been enunciated
and applied by this Court will also show that a statute which may come up for consideration on a
question of its validity under Art. 14 of the Constitution may be placed in one or other of the following
five classes :-

(1) A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to
apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of the
statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or brought to the
notice of the Court. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the Court has to
examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some
differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of
the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply
only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where the
Court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the Court will uphold the validity of the law,
as it did in Chiranjitlal V/s. Union of India. State of Bombay V/s. F. N. Balsara, Kedar Nath Bajoria
V/s. State of West Bengal, V. M. Syed Mohammad & Company V/s. State of Andhra, and Budhan
Choudhury V/s. State of Bihar.

(ii) A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or things or to several
individual person or things but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the fact of it
or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances; or matters of common knowledge. In such
a case the Court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination, as it did in
Ameerunnissa Begum V/s. Mahboob Begum, and Ram Prasad Narain Sahi V/s. State of Bihar.

(iii) A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of
applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify
persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of the validity
or otherwise of such a statute the Court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no
classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make
the selection or classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid
down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in
the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny the Court will strike down the
statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the
Government in the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides
for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to
discriminate between persons or things similarly situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is
inherent in the statute itself. In such a case the Court will strike down both the law as well as the
executive action taken under such law, as it did in State of West Bengal V/s. Anwar Ali Sarkar,
Dwarka Prasad V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh, and Dhirendra Kumar Mandal V/s. Superintendent
and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs.

(iv) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying
its provisions and may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the
person or things to whom its provisions are to apply but may at the same time lay down a policy
or principle for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of
such selection or classification; the Court will uphold the law as constitutional, as it did in Kathi
Raning Rawat V/s. The State of Saurashtra.

(v) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things to whom their provisions are
intended to apply and leave it to the discretion of the Government to select or classify the
persons or things for applying those provisions according to the policy or the principle laid down
by the statute itself for guidance to the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of
such selection or classification. If the Government in making the selection or classification does
 not proceed on or follow such policy or principle, it has been held by this Court e.g., in Kathi
Raning Rawat V/s. The State of Saurashtra that in such a case the executive action but not the
statute should be condemned as unconstitutional.

In the light of the foregoing discussions the question at once arises : In what category does the
Act or the notification impugned in these appeals fall ?

13 It will be apparent from its long title that the purpose of the Act is to provide for the appointment of
Commissions of Inquiry and for vesting such Commissions with certain powers. Sec. 3 empowers the
appropriate Government, in certain circumstances therein mentioned, to appoint a Commission of
Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and
performing such functions within such time as may be specified in the notification. It seems clear -
and it has not been controverted - that on a proper construction of this section, the functions the
performance of which is contemplated must be such as are ancillary to and in aid of the inquiry itself
and cannot be read as a function independent of or unconnected with such inquiry. That being the
position, as we conceive it to be, the question arises as to the scope and ambit of the power which is
conferred by it on the appropriate Government. The answer is furnished by the statute itself, for sec. 3
indicates that the appropriate Government can appoint a Commission of Inquiry only for the purpose
of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and into no other matter. In other
words the subject-matter of the inquiry can only be a definite matter of public importance. The
appropriate Government, it follows, is not authorised by this section to appoint a Commission for the
purpose of holding an inquiry into any other matter. Learned Solicitor-General, in the premises,
submits that the section itself on the face of it, makes a classification so that this statute falls within
the first category mentioned above and contends that this classification of things is based on an
intelligible differentia which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by it, for a
definite matter of public importance may well call for an inquiry by a Commission. In the alternative
the learned Solicitor-General urges that in any case the section itself quite clearly indicates that the
policy of Parliament is to provide for the appointment of Commissions of Inquiry to inquire into any
definite matter of public importance and that as there is no knowing when, where or how any such
matter may crop up Parliament considers it necessary or expedient to leave it to the appropriate
Government to take action as and when the appropriate moment will arrive. In the tempo of the
prevailing conditions in modern society events occur which were never foreseen and it is impossible
for Parliament or any legislature to anticipate all events or to provides for all eventualities and,
therefore, it must leave the duty of taking the necessary action to the appropriate Government. This
delegation of authority, however, is not unguided or uncontrolled, for the discretion given to the
appropriate Government to set up a Commission of Inquiry must be guided by the policy laid down,
namely, that the executive action of setting up a Commission of Inquiry must conform to the condition
of the section, that is to say, that there must exist a definite matter of public importance into which an
inquiry is, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, necessary or is required by a resolution in that
behalf passed by the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of the State. If the preambles or
the provisions of the statutes classed under the first category mentioned above could be read as
making a reasonable classification satisfying the requirements of Art. 14 and if the preamble to the
statute considered in the case of Kathi Raning Rawat could be construed as laying down sufficiently
clearly a policy or principle for the guidance of the executive, what objection can there be to
construing sec. 3 of the Act now under our consideration as also making a reasonable classification
or at any rate as declaring with sufficient clarity the policy of Parliament and laying down a principle
for the guidance of the exercise of the powers conferred on the appropriate Government so as to bring
this statute at least in the fourth category, if not also in the first category ? On the authorities, as they
stand, it cannot be said that an arbitrary and uncontrolled power has been delegated to the
appropriate Government and that, therefore, the law itself is bad.
14 Learned counsel for the petitioners next contends that if the Act is good in the sense that it has
declared its policy and laid down some principle for the guidance of the Government in the exercise of
the power conferred on it, the appropriate Government has failed to exercise its discretion properly on
the basis of a reasonable classification. Art. 14 protects all persons from discrimination by the
legislative as well as by the executive organ of the State. "State" is defined in Art. 12 as including the
Government and "law" is defined in Art. 13 as including any notification or order. It has to be conceded,
therefore, that it is open to the petitioners also to question the constitutionality of the notification. The
attack against the notification is that the Government has not properly implemented the policy or
followed the principle laid down in the Act and has consequently transgressed the bounds of the
authority delegated to it. It is pointed out that in March, 1946, one Shri Tricumdas Dwarkadas, a
solicitor of Bombay, had been appointed an officer on Special Duty to indicate the lines on which the
Indian Companies Act was to be revised. He made a report which was, however, incomplete in certain
particulars. Thereupon the Government appointed Shri Thiruvenkatachori, the Advocate-General of
Madras to make further inquiry. The last mentioned gentleman submitted his report and on the basis
of that report it is said, a memorandum containing tentative proposals was prepared and circulated to
elicit the opinions of various organisations. On 28.10.1950 a Committee called the Indian Company
Law Committee- popularly known as the Bhaba Committee was appointed. That Committee went
round and collected materials and made its comprehensive report on the basis of which the new
Indian Companies Act has recently been remodelled. As nothing new has since then happened why, it
is, asked, should any further inquiry be made ? The conclusion is pressed upon us that there can, in
the circumstances, be no definite matter of public importance which can possibly call for an inquiry.
We find no force in this argument. In the first place the Bhaba Committee at p. 29 of its Report
recommended that further inquiries may, in future, have to be made regarding some matters relating
to Companies and, therefore, the necessity for fresh inquiry cannot be ruled out. In the next place the
appropriate Government empowered to appoint a Commission of Inquiry if, in its opinion, it is
necessary so to do. The preamble to the notification recite that certain matters enumerated under five
heads had been made to appear to the Central Government in consequence of which the Central
Government had come to the conclusion that there should be a full inquiry into those matters which, in
its opinion, were definite matters of public importance both by reason of the grave consequences
which appeared to have ensued to the Investing public and for determining such measures as might
be deemed necessary in order to prevent a recurrence thereof. Parliament in its wisdom has left the
matter of the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry to the discretion of the appropriate Government
and if the appropriate Government has formed the opinion that a definite matter of public importance
has arisen and calls for an inquiry the Court will not lightly brush aside the opinion.

15 Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that granting that the question as to the necessity for
constituting a Commission of Inquiry has been left to the subjective determination of the appropriate
Government the actual setting up of a Commission is conditioned by the existence of some definite
matter of public importance. If there be no such definite matter of public importance in existence then
no question of necessity for appointing a Commission can arise. Reference is then made to the first
preamble to the notification and it is pointed out that all the matters alleged to have been made to
appear to the Central Government relate to some supposed act or conduct of the petitioners. The
contention is repeated that the act and conduct of individual persons can never be regarded as
definite matters of public importance. We are unable to accept this argument as sound, for as we have
already stated, the act or conduct of individuals may assume such dangerous proportions as may well
affect the public well-being and thus become a definite matter of public importance. We do not,
therefore, agree that the notification should be struck down for the absence of a definite matter of
public importance calling for an inquiry.

16 The point which is next urged in support of these appeals and which has given us considerable
anxiety is that the petitioners and their companies have been arbitrarily singled out for the purpose of
hostile and discriminatory treatment and subjected to a harassing and oppressive inquiry. The
provisions of Art. 14, it is contended, protect every person against discrimination by the State, namely,
against the law as well as the executive action and this protection extends to State action at all its
stages. The petitioners' grievance is that the Government had started discrimination even at the
earliest stage when it conceived the idea of issuing the notification. Reference is made to the
Memorandum filed by the Bombay Shareholders' Association before the Bhaba Committee showing
that the same or similar allegations had been made not only against the petitioners and their
companies but against other businessmen and their companies and that although the petitioners and
their companies and those other persons and their companies were thus similarly situate, in that
allegation had been made against both, the Government arbitrarily applied the Act to the petitioners
and their companies and issued the notification concerning them but left out the others from its
operation. It is true that the notification primarily or even solely affects the petitioners and their
companies but it cannot be overlooked that Parliament having left the selective application of the Act
to the discretion of the appropriate Government, the latter must of necessity take its decision on the
materials available to it and the opinion it forms thereon. The appropriate Government cannot in such
matters be expected to sit down and hold a judicial inquiry into the truth of the materials brought
before it, and examine the informants on oath in the presence of the parties who are or may be likely
to be affected by its decision. In matters of this kind the appropriate Government has of necessity to
act upon the information available to it. It is the best judge of the reliability of its source of information
and if it acts in good faith on the materials brought to its notice and honestly comes to the conclusion
that the act and conduct of the petitioners and the affairs of their companies constitute a definite
matter of public importance calling for an inquiry with a view to devise measures for preventing the
recurrence of such evil, this Court, not being in possession of all the facts will, we apprehend, be slow
to adjudge the executive action to be bad and illegal. We are not unmindful of the fact that a very wide
discretionary power has been conferred on the Government and, indeed, the contemplation that such
wide powers in the hands of the executive may in some cases be misused or abused and turned into
an engine of oppression has caused considerable anxiety in our mind. Nevertheless, the bare
possibility that the powers may be misused or abused cannot per se induce the Court to deny the
existence of the powers. It cannot be overlooked that Parliament has confided this discretion, not to
any petty official but to the appropriate Government itself to take action in conformity with the policy
and principle laid down in the Act. As this Court has said in Matajog Dobey V/s. H. C. Bhare, "a
discretionary power and is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be
easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official." We feel
sure, however, that if this law is administered by the Government "with an evil eye and an unequal
hand" or for an oblique or unworthy purpose the arms of this Court will be long enough to reach it and
to strike down such abuse with a heavy hand. What, then, we inquire are the salient facts here ? The
Central Government appointed investigators to scrutinise the affairs of three of the petitioners'
concerns. Those investigators had made their reports to the Central Government. The Central
Government had also the Bhaba Committee Report and all the Memoranda filed before that
Committee. It may also have had other information available to it and on those materials it formed its
opinion that the act and conduct of the petitioners and the affairs of their companies constituted a
definite matter of public importance which required a full inquiry. Up to this stage there is no question
of legal proof of the allegations against the petitioners as in a Court of law. The only question is: do
those allegations, if honestly believed, constitute a definite matter of public importance ? We are
unable to say that they do not.

17 Reference is again made to the several matters enumerated in the five clauses set out in the first
preamble to the notification and it is urged that those matters do not at all disclose any intelligible
differentia on the basis of which the petitioners and their companies can be grouped together as a
class. On the part of the Union of India reference is made to the affidavits affirmed by Shri H. M. Patel,
the Principal Secretary to the Finance Ministry of the Government of India purporting to set out in
detail as the background thereof, the circumstances which led to the issue of the impugned
notification and the matters recited therein and the several reports referred to in the said affidavit.
Learned counsel for the petitioners take the objection that reference cannot be made to any
extraneous matter and that the basis of classification must appear on the face of the notification itself
and reliance is placed on certain observations in the dissenting judgments in Chiranjitlal Chowdhury's
case and in item (2) of the summary given by Fazl Ali J., in his Judgement in F. N. Balsara's case. In
Chiranjitlal Chowdhury's case the majority of the Court read the preamble to the Ordinance which was
replaced by the Act which was under consideration there as part of the Act and considered the
recitals, reinforced as they were by the presumption of validity of the Act, as prima facie sufficient to
constitute an intelligible basis for regarding the company concerned as a class by itself and held that
the petitioner there had not discharged the onus that was on him. The dissenting Judges, after
pointing out that the petition and the affidavit did not give any indication as to the differentia on the
basis of which the company had been singled out, went on to say that the statute also did not on the
face of it indicate any basis of classification. This was included in cl. (2) of the summary set out in the
Judgement in F. N. Balsara's case. Those observations cannot, therefore, be read as meaning that
classification must always appear on the face of the law itself and that reference cannot be made to
any extraneous materials. In fact in Chiranjilal Chowdury's case parliamentary proceedings, in so far
as they depicted the surrounding, were referred to. In Kathi Raning Rawat's case the hearing was
adjourned in order to enable the respondent to put in an affidavit setting forth the material
circumstances. In Kedarnath Bajoria's case the situation brought about by the war conditions was
taken notice of. The same may be said of the cases of A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar V/s. V.
Venkitachalam Potti, and Pannalal Binjraj V/s. Union of India. In our judgment, therefore, there can be
no objection to the matters brought to the notice of the Court by the affidavit of Shri H. M. Patel being
taken into consideration along with the matters specified in the notification in order to ascertain
whether there was any valid basis for treating the petitioners and their companies as a class by
themselves.

18 Learned counsel for the petitioners next urges that even if the matter referred to in Shri H. M.
Patel's affidavit and those appearing on the face of the notification are taken into consideration one
cannot deduce therefrom any differentia which may be taken to distinguish the petitioners and their
companies from other persons and their companies. The qualities and characteristics imputed to the
petitioners and their companies are not at all peculiar or exclusive to them put are to be found equally
in other persons and companies and yet they and their companies have been singled out for hostile
and discriminatory treatment leaving out other persons and companies which are similarly situate.
There is no force in this argument. Parliament has confided the task of the selective application of the
law to the appropriate Government and it is, therefore, for the appropriate Government to exercise its
discretion in the matter. It is to be expected - and, until the contrary is proved. It is to be presumed -
that the Government, which is responsible to Parliament, will act honestly, properly and in conformity
with the policy and principle laid down by Parliament. It may well be that the Central Government
thought that even if one or more of the particular qualities and characteristics attributed to the
petitioners and their companies may be found in another persons or company, the combination of
those qualities and characteristics which it thought were present in the petitioners and their
companies was of a unique nature and was not present in any other person or company. In its
appreciation of the material facts preparatory to the exercise of the discretion left to it by Parliament
the Central Government may have thought that the evil was more pronounced in the petitioners and
their concerns than in any other person or concern and that the need for an inquiry was more urgent
and clear in the case of the petitioners and their companies than in the case of any other person or
company. What is the gist and substance of the allegations against the petitioners and their
companies ? They are that a small group of persons had from before 1946 acquired control over a
number of companies including a banking company and an insurance company; that some of these
companies were private companies and the others were public companies in which the public had
invested considerable moneys by buying shares; that the financial years of some of these companies
were different from those of the others; that the funds of the limited companies were utilised in
purchasing shares in other companies having large reserve funds with a view to get control over them
and to utilise those funds for acquiring shares in other companies or otherwise utilise those funds for
the personal benefit of these individuals; that the shares were acquired on blank transfer deeds and
were not registered in the names of the companies with whose funds they were purchased so as to
permit the same shares to be shown in the balance sheets of the different companies having different
financial years; that after 1951 several of these companies were taken into voluntary liquidation or
their assets were transferred to another company under some pretended scheme of arrangement of
re-organisation; that after getting control of a company they appointed some of themselves as
managing director or selling agent on high remuneration and after a while cancelled such appointment
on paying fabulous amounts as and by way of compensation; that funds of one company were
transferred to another company to cover up the real financial position. It is needless to add other
allegations to explain the matter. The question before us is not whether the allegations made on the
face of the notification and in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India are true but whether the
qualities and characteristics, if honestly believed to be found in the petitioners, are so peculiar or
unique as to constitute a good and valid basis on which the petitioners and their companies can be
regarded as a class by the themselves. We are not of opinion that they do not. It is not for us to say on
this application and we do not in fact say or even suggest that the allegations about the petitioners
and their concerns are at all well founded. It is sufficient for out present purpose to say that the facts
disclosed on the face of the notification itself and the facts which have been brought to our notice by
the affidavit afford sufficient support to the presumption of constitutionality of the notification. There
being thus a presumption of validity in favour of the Act and the notification, it is for the petitioners to
allege and prove beyond doubt that other persons or companies similarly situate have been left out
and the petitioners and their companies have been singled out for discriminatory and hostile
treatment. The petitioners have, in our opinion, failed to discharge that onus. Indeed nowhere in the
petitions is there even an averment that there are other persons or companies similarly situate as the
petitioners and their companies. It has to be remembered that the allegations set forth in the
memorandum submitted by the Bombay Shareholders' Association to the Bhaba Committee have not
been proved by legal evidence. And further that report itself contains matters which may be taken as
calculated to lend support to the view that whether regard is had to the combination of a variety of
evils or to their degree, the petitioners may quite conceivably be grouped as a class by themselves. In
our Judgement the plea of the infraction of the equal protection clause of our Constitution cannot be
sustained.

19 The next contention is that the notification is bad, because the action of the Government in issuing
it was mala fide and amounted to an abuse of power. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
who is the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 455 of 1957, makes it clear that no personal motive or ill will
against the petitioners is imputed to any one, but he points out that the Bhaba Committee had been
set up and the Companies Act has been remodeled and therefore, the present Commission was not
set up for any legitimate purpose. The main idea, according to learned counsel, was to obtain
information which the Government could not get by following the ordinary procedure under the Code
of Criminal Procedure and this ulterior motive clearly makes the governmental action mala fide. This
point has been further emphasised by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, who are
appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 456 and 457 of 1957. He has drawn out attention to the affidavit filed
by his clients and contends that it was well-know to the Government that none of them was concerned
in promoting or managing any of the companies and their position being thus well-known to the
Government, their inclusion in the notification was both outside the power conferred by the
Government and also constituted a mala fide exercise of the power conferred on it. No substantial
ground in support of this point has been brought before us and we are not satisfied that the
circumstances referred to in the notification and the affidavits filed on behalf of the Union of India,
may not, if true, be the basis of a further inquiry into the matter. It will be for the Commission to inquire
into the allegations and come to its own findings and make its report containing its recommendations.
It is not desirable that we should say anything more on this point. All that we need say is that the
charge of mala fides has not been brought home to the Government.

20 A point was taken that the original notification was defective in that it did not fix the time within
which the Commission was to complete its report and that a subsequent notification fixing a time
could not cure that defect. We do not think there is any substance in this too. The third notification
quoted above amended the original notification by fixing a time. There was nothing to prevent the
Government firm issuing a fresh notification appointing a Commission and fixing a time. If that could
be done, there was no reason why the same result could not be achieved by the combined effect of
two notifications. In any case the amending notification taken together with the original notification
may be read as a fresh notification within the meaning of sec. 3 of the Act, operative at least from the
date of the later notification.

21 It is feebly argued that the notification is bad as it amounts to a delegation of essential legislative
function. Assuming that there is delegation of legislative function, the Act having laid down its policy,
such delegation of power, if any, is vitiated at all, for the legislation by the delegate will have to
conform to the policy so laid down by the Act. Lastly a point is raised that the notification is bad
because it violates Art. 23 of the Constitution of India. It is frankly stated by the learned counsel that
this point is rather premature at this stage and that he desires to reserve his client's right to raise it in
future.

22 No other point has been urged before us and for reasons stated above the appeals Nos. 455, 456
and 457 of 1957 are dismissed with costs. Appeals Nos. 656, 657 and 658 of 1957 succeed only in
part, namely, to the extent that only the words "by way of redress or punishment" occurring in the latter
portion of cl. (10) will be deleted so that the latter potion of cl. (10) will read as; "and the action which
in the opinion of the Commission should be taken ... to act as a preventive in future cases" as
indicated above. We make no order as to the costs of these three appeals.