MODULE 3: SEPARATION OF POWERS into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without
any force and effect.
3.1. Basis/Purpose
 Each of the 3 branches of government has exclusive cognizance
of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere
Legislature: Enact laws
Executive: Enforce laws
Judiciary: Apply/interpret laws
 “Independence”
 Purpose: Secure action, forestall overaction, prevent despotism
and obtain efficiency
Q: Describe the relationship of the three departments.
1. The three departments are interdependent of one another.
2. They are co-equal and coordinate.
3. They allow for checks and balances.
3.2. Blending of Powers (Articles VI, VII and VIII)
 It is a situation where there is a sharing of two or more
departments in the performance of a given constitutional task.
One department acts in a manner complementary or
supplementary to another.
 Powers are reposed in more than 1 department so they may
better collaborate with, and in the process check, each other for
the sake of a good and efficient govt
 Enactment of general appropriations law – begins with the
preparation by Pres of the budget which becomes the basis of the
bill adopted by Congress and subsequently submitted by it to
Pres who may then approve it. Congress cannot increase
appropriations recommended by Pres
 Grant of amnesty by President – requires concurrence of a
majority of all members of Congress
 Deputization by COMELEC of law-enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of govt – must be done with consent of Pres
 NOTE: Ratification of treaties vested in Executive branch, not
blending of power. Senate by a vote of at least 2/3 merely
concurs. The concurrence is properly checks and balances
3.3. Check and Balances (Articles VI, VII and VIII)
 One branch is given the power to restrain another to prevent
them from exceeding their authority. One department is
allowed to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to
rectify mistakes or excesses committed by other
departments
 E.g. President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment.”
3.4. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered
3.5. Justiciable vs. Political Questions
Under the "political question" doctrine arising from the principle of
separation of powers, the Judicial Branch cannot decide questions "in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government" (Tañada vs. Cuenco
103 Phil.1068). In the matter of the power of appointment, there is no
question that it is executive in nature (Gov’t vs. Springer 50 Phil. 259).
It is essentially a discretionary power of the president performed
according to "his best lights". (Luego vs. CSC 143 SCRA 327).
A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being
decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that
there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers
conferred on a political branch of the government.
Justiciability refers to the types of matters that a court can adjudicate.
If a case is "nonjusticiable," then the court cannot hear it. Typically to
be justiciable, the court must not be offering an advisory opinion, the
plaintiff must have standing, and the issues must be ripe but neither
moot nor violative of the political question doctrine. Typically, these
issues are all up to the discretion of the court which is adjudicating the
issue.
Cases:
1. Agcaoili vs. Fariñas (G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018)
FACTS: The House Rules railroaded to initiate the inquiry. Referral of
House Resolution No. 882 from the Committee on Rules to the
Committee on Good Government and the scheduling for hearing on 02
May 2017 all took place on 16 March 2017, without the conduct of
preliminary determination before the Committee on Rules (for
determination of whether it is the proper subject of legislative inquiry)
and before the respondent Committee on Good Government (for
determination of jurisdiction over the subject matter). The subpoena
ad testificandum for petitioners Ilocos 6 to appear at the hearing
scheduled on 16 May 2017 were only served on them on 15 May 2017
- one (1) day prior to the scheduled hearing, instead of at least three
(3) days as required under Section 8 of the House Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Despite lack of sufficient
notice, the Committee of Good Government and Public Accountability
cited petitioners Ilocos6 in contempt for failure to appear at the 16 May
2017 hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject legislative inquiry on House
Resolution No. 882 may be enjoined by a writ of prohibition?
RULING: NO, Under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the remedy of
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, but while there is no question
that a writ of prohibition lies against legislative functions, the Court
finds no justification for the issuance thereof in the instant case.

In this case, co-petitioner Marcos primordially assails the nature of the
legislative inquiry as a fishing expedition in alleged violation of her right
to due process and to be discriminatory to the Province of Ilocos Norte.
However, a perusal of the minutes of legislative hearings so far
conducted reveals that the same revolved around the use of the
Province of Ilocos Norte's shares from the excise tax on locally
manufactured virginia-type cigarettes through cash advances which
co-petitioner Marcos herself admits to be the "usual practice"
2. Mamiscal vs. Abdullah [761 SCRA 39 (2015)]
FACTS: Mamiscal and Adelaidah decided to have divorce repudiated
Adelaidahs (talaq) embodied in an agreement (kapasadan) but later
on they reconciled. Despite such, Adelaidah still filed the Certificate of
Divorce (COD) with the office of Abdullah for registration. Albeit the
same was not signed by Mamiscal it was annotated in the certificate
that it was executed in the presence of two witnesses and in
accordance with Islamic Law. Abdullah then issued the Certificate of
Registration of Divorce finalizing the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mamiscal had validly effected a divorce from
his wife is a matter that must first be addressed by the Shari'a Circuit
Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code),enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court ruled that they do not have jurisdiction
to impose the proper disciplinary action against civil registrars. Shari’a
Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code) enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to
resolve disputes relating to divorce. The civil registrar is the person
charged by law for the recording of vital events and other documents
affecting the civil status of persons. The Civil Registry Law embraces
all acts of civil life affecting the status of persons and is applicable to
all persons residing in the Philippines. The test of jurisdiction is the
nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender. The fact
that the complaint charges Abdullah for "conduct unbecoming of a
court employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that what
controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited
in the complaint. Unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some
legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.
3. Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr. [710 SCRA 1 (2013)]
History of Pork Barrel in the Philippines
Act 3044, or the Public Works Act of 1922, is consideredas the earliest
form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the
utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-
enactment legislator approval. In 1950, the mechanics of the public
works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators.
By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item
in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local
Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to
Local Government Units". Based on reports, it was under the SLDP
that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators
began, with each assemblyman receivingP500,000.00.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration
of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in
the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas
Development Fund". The clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding prompted the creation of the
"Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the
1990 GAAwith an initial funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover "small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects."
It has been reportedthat by 1992, Representatives were
receivingP12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were
receivingP18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and
that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure
projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such
as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
In 1993, under the administration of President Ramos,the GAA
explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon
the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among
others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article
included an allocation for the Vice-President. As such,
Representatives were allocatedP12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
Senators,P18 Million each, and the Vice-President,P20 Million.
It was under President Estradas administration where Priority
Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The
requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative
of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000
PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category
was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be
used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.
In 2005,the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund
priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the
national government and shall be released directly to the implementing
agencies." Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent
with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and
identification of PDAF projects to be funded.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal
participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government projects were introduced. In the
Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for
school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate.
Under the present administration, 2012and 2013PDAF Articles states
that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to priority list requirement. However, as practiced, it
would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify
the project from the said priority list.
HELD: Yes.
Political Law - Legal requisites for Judicial Inquiry
Actual case or controversy
The questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication
since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their
utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the
Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and operational; hence,
there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result
of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best
position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them
in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such,
"urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."
The Court must deny respondents submission. To a great degree, the
1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. With the new provision, however, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing
Share
CASE DIGEST: BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR.
JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES
SAN DIEGO,Petitioners,v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented
by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT
and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,
Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
History of Pork Barrel in the Philippines
Act 3044, or the Public Works Act of 1922, is consideredas the earliest
form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the
utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-
enactment legislator approval. In 1950, the mechanics of the public
works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators.
By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item
in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local
Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to
Local Government Units". Based on reports, it was under the SLDP
that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators
began, with each assemblyman receivingP500,000.00.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration
of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in
the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas
Development Fund". The clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding prompted the creation of the
"Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the
1990 GAAwith an initial funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover "small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects."
It has been reportedthat by 1992, Representatives were
receivingP12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were
receivingP18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and
that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure
projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such
as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
In 1993, under the administration of President Ramos,the GAA
explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon
the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among
others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article
included an allocation for the Vice-President. As such,
Representatives were allocatedP12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
Senators,P18 Million each, and the Vice-President,P20 Million.
It was under President Estradas administration where Priority
Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The
requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative
of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000
PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category
was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be
used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.
In 2005,the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund
priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the
national government and shall be released directly to the implementing
agencies." Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent
with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and
identification of PDAF projects to be funded.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal
participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government projects were introduced. In the
Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for
school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate.
Under the present administration, 2012and 2013PDAF Articles states
that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to priority list requirement. However, as practiced, it
would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify
the project from the said priority list.
Provisions on legislator allocations as well as fund realignmentwere
included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the
Vice-President, which was pegged atP200 Million in the 2011 GAA,
had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed
LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the
technical capability to implement the projects. Legislators were also
allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent
patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided
that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended
outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House
History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
The term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and
the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the
terms usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,issued by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law,
Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify,
strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.
The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding
facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is
sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.
Controversies in the Philippines
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the
PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was
dismissed.
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of someP10 Billion over the past 10
years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers
and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet
Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for
an entire decade.
After its investigation, criminal complaints were filed before the
Ombudsman charging several public officers and NGO presidents with
Graft and Corruption, Bribery and Malversation.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and
the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. These cases were consolidated by the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Pork Barrel System is unconstitutional.
HELD: Yes.
Political Law - Legal requisites for Judicial Inquiry
Actual case or controversy
The questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication
since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their
utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the
Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and operational; hence,
there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result
of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best
position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them
in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such,
"urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."
The Court must deny respondents submission. To a great degree, the
1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. With the new provision, however, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing
Locus Standi
Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question
the validity of theexisting "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes
they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that
petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional
usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Moreover, as citizens,
petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that
the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest.
Political Law - Separations of Powers
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the
GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and
properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. Thus,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the
implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as
well as any other appropriation law.
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related
to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as Guingona,
Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of
powers principle.
Political Law - Non- delegability of Legislative Power
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article,
insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in
Congress.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are
given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have
been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as
well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the
similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
Political Law - Checks and Balances
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount ofP24.79 Billion only
appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be
further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after
the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item
veto.
4. Ongsiako Reyes vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not
Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed
winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of
petitioner submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner
could be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there
basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution
dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of candidacy. The
proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without
any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court
questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013
COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013
did not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Was Reyes denied of due process?
HELD: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence"
without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion
as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her
right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity
to question and present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly
adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of
evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the
fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel
certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly
discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.
5. Vinuya vs. Romulo (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010)
FACTS: The petitioner Malaya Lolas is an organization established
for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese
military forces in the Philippines during World War II. Malaya Lolas filed
a petition to compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice and other international tribunals.
According to them, the general waiver of claims by the Philippine
government in the peace treaty with Japan is void.
ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court decide as to whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against Japan.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination
by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
6. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Reyes [621 SCRA 511
(2010)]
7. Silverio vs. Republic [537 SCRA 373 (2007)]
Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel
Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate
in the RTC of Manila, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged
that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and
acts like a female. The RTC ruled in his favour, saying that it is in
consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA,
alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex
alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change in the “name” and “sex” entries in
birth certificates are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
RULING: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may
be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonour, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually
used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the
change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with
the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court
says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows
the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of
sex reassignment.
8. Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita [488 SCRA 1 (2006)]
Executive privilege may only be invoked by the President. The
President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
While it is discretionary for executive officials to show up during
question hour, it is mandatory for them to show up during inquiries in
aid of legislation.
Facts. The Committee of Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Dept. to be the resource speakers in
a public hearing on the North Rail Project. The Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security likewise invited AFP officials to appear
on its own hearing on various issues. Exec. Sec. Ermita requested for
the postponement of the hearing in order to afford the officials ample
time to prepare for the issues; however, Sen. Pres. Drilon replied by
saying that the Senate cannot accede to the request as the letter was
sent belatedly.
Meanwhile, Pres. Arroyo issued EO 464100 which prohibits officials of
the Executive Dept. from appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation without the consent of the President. Whereupon, Ermita
informed the Senate that the officials invited to the hearing cannot
attend without the consent of the President pursuant to EO 464.
Nonetheless, despite the communications sent by Ermita, 2 officials of
the AFP attended the Committee on National Defense and Security
hearing. As a result, the 2 were relieved from service and were made
to face court martial. The Senate filed a petition before the SC praying
that EO 464 be declared unconstitutional for being violative of Secs 21
and 22 of Art VI, among others.
Issue. Is EO 464 unconstitutional for contravening the power of inquiry
vested by the Constitution in Congress?
Held. Yes, partially. The legislative’s power of inquiry during question
hour (under Art VI, Sec 22) is different from its power of inquiry in aid
of legislation (under Art VI, Sec 21). The deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission reveal that while attendance was meant to
be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Hence, in view of Section 1’s specific reference to Art
VI, Sec 22 of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to
inquiries in aid of legislation (pertaining to that in Art VI, Sec 21),
Section 1 of EO 464 is valid but it can be invoked only during question
hour. Verily, Section 1 of EO 464 cannot be applied to appearances of
dept heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Section 3 and section 2(b), which is related to the former, are invalid.
Section 3 in relation to section 2(b) evinces that the determination by
a head of office [that such official invited for appearance in the
legislative inquiry is covered by executive privilege underlies the
consent to be given by the President prior to appearance before such
inquiries. Thus, this determination by such heads of office then
becomes the basis for the officials not showing up in the legislative
investigation. However, executive privilege is an extraordinary power
as it constitutes an exemption to the high prerogative of Congress to
conduct legislative inquiries. As such, it may only be invoked or
wielded by the highest official of the executive hierarchy—the
President. The President may not authorize her subordinates to
exercise such power. In view thereof, Sec 2(b) and 3 must therefore
be declared invalid.
9. In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the
Attendance of Court officials and Employees as Witnesses Under
the Subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the Various Letters for
the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25,
2012, 14 February 2012
10. Mendoza vs. People [659 SCRA 681 (2011)]
Facts: Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer
convicted for violating a special law known as the Social Security
Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the Social Security
Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal
in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he
acted in good faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and
apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex).
The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term.
Considering the circumstances, the court the Court transmitted the
case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and
RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.
Issue: Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme
Court recommend to the President, the grant of executive clemency to
a convict?
Ruling: The Court the discretion to recommend to the President
actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its power when it
considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is clearly stated in the
Revised Penal Code which provides; “Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which
is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made
the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as
may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.”
11. Daza vs. Singson (G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989)
Political questions may still come within the powers of the Court to
review under its expanded jurisdiction (Art VIII, sec 1, par. 2, 2nd
clause).
Facts. Petitioner Rep. Daza represents the Liberal Party (LP) in the
Commission on Appointments (CA). When Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, the political realignment resulted in the
swelling of the number of LDP members to 159 and diminishing that of
LP to 17. The House consequently revised its representation in the CA
giving Daza’s seat to respondent Rep. Singson as additional member
from the LDP. Daza now challenges his removal. Singson, in
response, argues, among others, that the question raised by Daza is
political in nature and thus beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
Issue. Is the issue raised beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court?
Held. No. What is involved is not a discretionary act of the House of
Reps that may not be reviewed by the Court because it is political in
nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act
of that chamber in removing the Daza from the CA. The issue
presented is justiciable rather than political, involving as it does the
manner of filling the CA as prescribed in the Constitution [and not the
discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives]. Even if the
question were political in nature, it would still come within the powers
of review of the Court under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
it by Art VIII, Sec 1 of the Constitution which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the govt.
12. In re: Manzano (A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RT, October 5, 1988)
There is NO exception to the norm set forth in Sec 12, Art VIII if a judge
is to be expected to be confined to the task of adjudication.
Facts. RTC Exec. Judge Manzano, was designated as a member of
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice pursuant to EO 856
as amended by EO 326. On examination of foregoing presidential
issuances, it was revealed that among the functions of the Committee
is to receive complaints against any apprehending officer xxx who may
be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and
to refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action. Another
function is to recommend revision of any law or regulation which is
believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.
Furthermore, the Committee was to be under the supervision of the
Secretary of Justice.
Issue. May Judge Manzano accept his appointment without violating
Art VIII, Sec 12 of the Constitution?
Held. No. It is evident from the herein stated functions of the
Committee that it performs administrative functions, which are defined
as those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules
and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature. While
the doctrine of separation of powers is not to be enforced with pedantic
rigor, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to
assume a position non-judicial in character. It is indispensable that
there can be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is to be
expected to be confined to the task of adjudication. He is not a
subordinate of an executive or legislative official. Request to be
authorized to accept the appointment denied.
13. Casibang vs. Aquino (G.R. No. L-38025, August 20, 1979)
A purely justiciable question implies a given right xxx, an act or
omission violative of said right, and a remedy granted xxx by law, for
said breach of right.
Facts. Yu was proclaimed elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in
the 1971 local elections. His rival, petitioner Casibang, filed an election
protest with the CFI. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu
moved to dismiss on the ground that the CFI no longer had jurisdiction
over the issue, that, in view of the ratification of the 1973 Constitution,
a political question outside the range of judicial review has intervened.
He relied on Sec 9 of Art XVII and Sec 2 of Art XI of the new
Constitution which granted incumbent officials of the govt a privilege
to continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President, and
which conferred unto the National Assembly (NA) the power to enact
a local govt code. This, he avers, states clearly the new form of govt
that was to be enforced. CFI ruled in favor of Yu hence this petition.
Issue. Is the issue in the electoral protest a political question?
Held. No. The only issue in the electoral protest case xxx is who
between protestant (Casibang) and protestee (Yu) was the duly
elected mayor xxx and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges xxx
appurtenant thereto xxx. That is the only consequence of a resolution
of the issue therein involved – a purely justiciable question as it implies
a given right, xxx an act or omission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted xxx by law, for said breach of right. Any judgment to
be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with xxx
Sec 9 Art XVII of the new Constitution xxx.
Neither does Sec 2 of Art XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral
protest case with a political color. For simply that section allocated unto
the NA the power to enact a local govt code. Petition granted.
14. Tañada vs. Cuenco (G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957)
The term “political question” connotes xxx a question of policy. It refers
to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the xxx branch of the
govt.
Facts. Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an
election protest filed by members of the Citizens Party (CP) who lost
to members of the Nacionalista Party (NP). The Senate was at the time
composed of 23 members of the NP and 1 of the CP — petitioner Sen.
Tañada. When the SET was being organized, Sen. Tañada, in behalf
of the CP, nominated himself alone. Sen. Primicias, a member of the
NP, then nominated “not on behalf of the [NP] but on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of the Senate” Sens. Delgado and respondent
Cuenco “to complete the membership of the Tribunal”. This he claims
is the mandate of the Constitution which reads: “xxx Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court xxx and the remaining six shall be
Members of the [House] who shall be chosen by each House, three
upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and
three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
xxx.” Over the objection of Sen. Tañada, Sens. Delgado and Cuenco
were chosen to sit in the SET. Sen. Tañada now contests them in
Court. Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no
jurisdiction on the matter as the issue is a political question and not
judicial.
Issue. Is the issue a political question beyond the ambit of judicial
inquiry?
Held. No. The issue at bar is not a political question for the Senate is
not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice of members
of the SET. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the
judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in
connection therewith. We have not only jurisdiction, but also the duty
to consider and determine the principal issue53 raised by the parties
herein.
15. Sanidad vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)
Political questions are associated with the wisdom and not the legality
of an act.
“[A constitutional amendment] proposed today has relation to the
sentiment and felt needs today, and that, if not ratified early while the
sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded as
waived…”
Facts. In 1976, Pres. Marcos submitted to the people in a referendum
plebiscite two questions:
“(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?;
“(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you
approve the following amendments to the Constitution? xxx”
Petitioners now seek to declare void the presidential decrees which
submitted the aforementioned issues to the people in a plebiscite
referendum.
They aver that the incumbent President has no constitutional grant of
constituent power to propose amendments to the Constitution;
consequently, the referendum-plebiscite has no legal basis. They now
seek to enjoin COMELEC from holding such plebiscite.
Issues.
(1) Is the nature of the question on the constitutionality of the assailed
presidential decrees political or justiciable?
(2) Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe
the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments
sufficient and proper?
Held.
(1) The question is justiciable. The constitutional amending in this case
is in the form of a delegated and hence a limited power so that the SC
is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits. Political questions are neatly associated
with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. [In the case at bar,]
what is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom but the Constitutional
authority of the President to perform such acts or to assume the power
of a constituent assembly. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the Judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can
declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was
valid or not.
16. Angara vs. Electoral Commission (G.R. No. 45081, July 15,
1936)
Doctrine of implication – the grant of an express power carries with it
all other powers that may be necessarily inferred from it.
Facts. The Electoral Commission was created pursuant to Art VI sec
4 of the 1935 Constitution (now sec 17) which conferred to it the power
to “be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
The National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution confirming the
election of petitioner Angara as member of the NA on Dec 3, 1935. On
Dec 9, 1935, the respondent Electoral Commission formally organized
for the first time and resolved to fix the same date as the final day of
filing of election protests. Ynsua, a candidate vying for the Angara’s
position, filed his election protest before the Electoral Commission on
the same date.
Angara sought to prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further
cognizance of the Ynsua’s motion Angara argues: the Constitution
excludes from the Commission’s jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of such election contests. Morever, the Commission can
regulate the proceedings of election protests only if the NA has not
availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings.
Issues.
(1) Does the Electoral Commission have the constitutional power to
promulgate rules of procedure (such as fixing a deadline for filing
election protests) relating to election protests notwithstanding the lack
of express conferment of such power in the Constitution?
(2) Does it have the power the promulgate such rules notwithstanding
the resolution of the NA?
Held. (1) Yes. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred.
In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
(2) Yes. The purpose of the of the creation of the Electoral Commission
was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members,
to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging [in the
now Art VI, sec 17] of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the NA. If the NA is
permitted to claim the power to regulate proceedings of election
contests, then the grant of power to the Commission would be
ineffective for such power would be xxx subject at all times to the
regulation of the NA. The purpose of the framers of our Constitution
would be frustrated.
 MODULE 4: DELEGATION OF POWER
4.1. Basis, Rule and Maxim
 The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.
 GR: Legislative power may be delegated (Reason for
delegating: Increasing demand for legislation)
 Permissible delegations: TEPLA
1. Tariff powers to Pres
2. Emergency powers to Pres
3. Delegation to people at large
4. Delegation to local govt
5. Delegation to adm bodies – doctrine of subordinate
legislation
1. Sema vs. Commission on Elections [558 SCRA 700 (2008)]
2. NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) vs.
National Power Corporation (NPC), 845 SCRA 487 (G.R. No.
156208, 21 November 2017)
3. People vs. Vera (G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937)
A law must have a sufficient standard to guide the exercise of the
delegated legislative power.
A law delegating legislative power must be complete. Nothing must be
left to the judgment of the delegate.
Facts. Respondent Unjieng was convicted. Under the Probation Act
(Act No. 4221), he later applied for probation. Judge Vera granted the
probation.
Petitioners filed this action to the end that Unjieng may be forthwith
committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of
conviction.
Petitioners aver, among others, that said Act is unconstitutional as it is
an invalid delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards. The
challenged provision thereof reads: “[t]his Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals x x x”
Issue. Does the Probation Act constitute an invalid delegation of
legislative powers?
Held. Yes. Act No. 4221 is thereby unconstitutional and void. The
effectivity of the Act was made to depend upon an act to be done by
the provincial boards, that is, the appropriating of funds for the salary
of the probation officer. But the Act does not xxx fix and impose upon
the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of this
discretionary power. What is granted is a “roving commission” xxx. It
thus leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the Act upon the
provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is
absolute and unlimited. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power
to them.
4. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA (G.R. No. L-76633, October
18, 1988)
Administrative agencies, such as POEA, are vested with two basic
powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. This in itself is not
violative of due process.
Facts. POEA was created by EO 797 which mandated it to protect
OFWs to "fair and equitable employment practices.” Saco who was
married to private respondent was killed in an accident while employed
as Chief Officer of the vessel owned by petitioner Eastern Shipping
Lines (ESL). Private respondent sued for damages. ESL argued that
the complaint was not cognizable by the POEA but by the SSS. POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the private
respondent in accordance with POEA MC No. 2. MC No. 2 prescribed
a standard contract to be adopted by shipping companies. ESL went
to this Court to move for dismissal. It contests the validity of MC No. 2
stating that it is violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
powers, contending that it represents an exercise of legislative
discretion. It further avers that it has been denied due process because
the same POEA that issued MC No. 2 has also sustained and applied
it.
Issues.
(1) Is MC No. 2 a violation of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative powers?
(2) Did MC No. 2 deny the petitioner of due process?
Held.
(1) No. Because of the increasing complexity of the task of the govt
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its attention, specialization in legislation
has become necessary and thus delegation of legislative power is in
many instances permitted. The “power of subordinate legislation” or
the authority to issue rules (supplementary regulations) to carry out the
general provisions of the statute given to administrative bodies has
become more and more necessary. MC No. 2 is one such
administrative regulation. There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.50 The power of
POEA in requiring the contract prescribed by MC No. 2 is not unlimited
as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate (POEA) in the
exercise of said authority. That standard is discoverable in the EO itself
which, in creating the POEA, mandated it to protect the rights of OFWs
to "fair and equitable employment practices.”
(2) No. Administrative agencies, such as POEA, are vested with two
basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first
enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and
the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Such
an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern
governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as
long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations are observed.
5. Demetria vs. Alba (148 SCRA 208) 6. Chiongbian vs. Orbos (245
SCRA 253)
The President may NOT indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department of the Executive Dept to any program of any department
without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made.
– Art VI, Sec 25(5)
Facts. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PD 1177 (Budget
Reform Decree of 1977). Par 1 of Sec 44 thereof provides “the
President shall have the authority to transfer any fund appropriated for
the different xxx agencies of the Executive Dept, which are included in
the GAA, to any program xxx included in the GAA or approved after its
enactment.” They argue that this overrides the safeguards prescribed
by the Constitution designed to forestall abuse in the expenditure of
public funds.
Issue. Does par 1, Sec 44 of PD 1177 override the safeguards
prescribed in Art VIII (now Art VI) of the Constitution with respect to
use of public funds?
Held. Yes. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 is unconstitutional. It unduly
overextends the privilege granted under Art VIII, Sec 16(5) [now Art VI,
Sec 25(5)] of the Constitution. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one dept xxx or agency of the
Executive Dept to any program xxx of any dept xxx included in the
GAA xxx without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred
are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken,
or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item
to which said transfer is to be made. It also violates the requirement of
specifications in Sec 16(2) [now Art VI, Sec 25(2)].
4.2. Permissible Delegation (Exceptions)
DOCTRINE OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
- IRRs
- Reason for delegation to adm bodies: Proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems
“SOVEREIGNTY RESIDES IN THE PEOPLES AND ALL GOVT
AUTHORITY EMANTES FROM THEM”
- Go back to meaning of sovereignty
- Sovereignty means supreme power; possession of
sovereign power (Saguisag v. Ochoa)
- Manifestations of sovereignty:
1. People ratify consti:
a. What the powers of govt should be
b. What the limitations are
c. How people who are to exercise the powers of sovereignty
are to be chosen
d. What the extent and limits of their power are
2. People elect leaders
NON-REDELEGATION OF POWER
- What has been delegated cannot be delegated anymore
- But who delegated what to whom? The people assigned the
sovereign powers to 3 branches of govt. “Sovereignty resides in
the people and all govt authority emanates from them”
- Hence, the 3 branches cannot redelegate powers delegated unto
them unless allowed by Constitution
4.2.1. Delegation to the Executive Department (President)
a. Emergency powers to the President, Article VI, Section 23 (2);
Article XII, Section 12
SECTION 23. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
SECTION 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
measures that help make them competitive.
b. Tariff powers to the President, Article VI, Section 28 (2)
SECTION 28. (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
Cases:
1. Ampatuan vs. Puno [651 SCRA 228 (2011)]
2. David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
3. Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers
Association of the Philippines, 465 SCRA 532 (2005)
4. Garcia vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992)
Facts. The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) states that in the interest
of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, the
President, subject to limitations therein provided, may increase xxx
existing protective rates of import duty xxx when necessary. Pursuant
to the TCC, the President issued EO 475 and 478 imposing an
additional duty of 9% ad valorem to imported crude oil and other oil
products, and a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and
P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
Rep. Garcia contests the validity of the foregoing EOs averring that
they are violative of Sec 24, Art VI of the Constitution which provides:
All xxx revenue or tariff bills shall originate in the House of
Representatives xxx. He also argues that said EOs contravene the
TCC because the latter authorizes the President to, according to him,
impose additional duties only when necessary to protect local
industries.
Issue. Are said EOs unconstitutional?
Held. No. There is explicit Constitutional permission to Congress to
authorize the President to, “subject to such limitations and restrictions
as [Congress] may impose”, fix “within specific limits tariff rates xxx
and other duties or imposts xxx.”54 Moreover, Garcia’s argument that
the “protection of local industries” is the only permissible objective that
can be secured by the exercise of the delegated authority—that which
was provided in the TCC to be exercised by the President in “the
interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national
security”—is a stiflingly narrow one. We believe, for instance, that the
protection of consumers is at the very least as important a dimension
of the “the interest of national economy, general welfare and national
security” as the protection of local industries.
5. Rodriguez vs. Gella (G.R. No. L-6266, February 2, 1953)
Emergency powers of the President are necessarily fixed in the law
itself. It is unconstitutional for its duration to be dependent on arbitrary
will of either Congress or the President.
Facts. Notwithstanding the ruling in Araneta v. Dinglasan, Pres.
Quirino continued to exercise his emergency powers under CA 671,
promulgating EOs 545 and 546 appropriating public funds for public
works and the relief of victims of calamities. Petitioners seek to
invalidate said EOs.
Issue. Are the foregoing EOs invalid?
Held. Yes. More or less the same considerations that influenced the
pronouncements in Araneta v. Dinglasan are and should be controlling
in the case now. [Reiterating], to be constitutional, CA 671 must be
construed to be for a limited period fixed or implied therein. Express
repeal of the same is unnecessary; otherwise it would be
unconstitutional since it may never be repealed by Congress, or if
Congress attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This in
fact happened when the President vetoed House Bill 727, repealing all
Emergency Powers Acts. This is a clear repugnance of the Art. VI, Sec
26 (now 23) which expressed such power to be limited in period,
necessarily fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary
will of either the Congress or the President. The President cannot set
aside funds for special purposes, since the Congress has been
approving appropriation acts. If the President had ceased to have
powers with respect to general appropriations, none can remain in
respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may do indirectly what
he cannot do directly.
6. Araneta vs. Dinglasan (G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949)
Any law passed in virtue of the emergency powers of the President
should be for a limited period only. An emergency is necessarily
temporary otherwise it cannot be an emergency.
Facts. In view of the state of world war in 1941, CA 671 (Emergency
Powers Act) was enacted by the National Assembly (NA) which
authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet
such emergency. CA 671 did not expressly fix the term of its
effectiveness, although Sec 3 thereof provides “the President x x x
shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress x x x
report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under
the powers herein granted.” Then Pres. Quezon later wrote in his
autobiography describing the circumstances obtaining when he called
the NA for a special session and recommended the enactment of CA
671: “[I issued the call for a special session of the NA] when it became
evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it
was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942.” True enough,
Congress met in regular session only on May 25, 1946.
Subsequently, by authority vested by CA 671, then Pres. Roxas issued
EO 62 which provided for the regulation of the rentals of residential lots
and buildings. By the same authority, his successor, Pres. Quirino
issued EOs 192, 225 and 226 providing for the appropriation of public
funds in the operation of the national govt and the conduct of the 1949
elections, and the control of exports. Petitioners, being prosecuted
under the foregoing EOs, question the validity of the same averring
that CA 671, by virtue of which said EOs were issued, has ceased to
have any force and effect.
Issue. Has CA 671 ceased to have force and effect?
Held. Yes. CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular
session, thus EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority
of law. Art VI, Sec 26 (now Sec 23) of the Constitution, provides that
any law passed byvirtue thereof should be “for a limited period.” These
words are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. An
emergency xxx “must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an
emergency.” More anomalous is that fact that there would be two
legislative bodies operating to legislate concurrently and xxx mutually
nullifying each other’s actions.
Furthermore, it is clear from the language of Sec 3 of CA 671 that the
legislature intended to limit the duration of the Act when it provided that
there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President
was to give an account of his trusteeship. Moreover, giving much
weight on
the statements of Pres. Quezon in his autobiography (considering his
part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law), it was held that
CA 671 was enacted with the specific view of the inability of the NA to
meet.
Hence, the sole raison d’être for the enactment of CA 671 was the
inability for the Congress to function; such emergency period should
thus end with the convening of that body
5 4.2.2. Delegation to the Judicial Department (Rule-making
power to the Supreme Court, Article VIII, Section 5 (5)
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
4.2.3. Delegation to the Constitutional Commissions [Article IX-A,
Section 6; Article IX-C, Section 3; Article IX-D, Section 2 (2)]
SECTION 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices.
Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.
SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
4.2.4. Delegation to Commission on Human Rights, Article XIII,
Section 18
SECTION 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the
following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations
of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony
or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by
law.
4.2.5. Delegation to Administrative Bodies
1. NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association vs. NAPOCOR [503
SCRA 138 (2006)]
(See previous)
2. Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia Jr. (G.R. No.
115381, December 23, 1994)
3. Philippine Interisland Shipping Association vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 100481, January 22, 1997)
4. Tablarin vs. Gutierrez (G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987)
Facts. Petitioners Tablarin et al. sought admission into schools of
medicine for SY 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did
not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education thereby rendering them
unqualified/disqualified for admission to medical school under RA
2382 (Medical Act of 1959).
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of said RA as amended
averring, among others, that it unduly delegated legislative power to
the Board of Medical Education.
Issue. Is the Medical Act of 1959 an invalid delegation of legislative
powers?
Held. No. The necessary standards are set forth in Sec 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: “the standardization and regulation of medical education”
and xxx the body of the statute itself. These considered together are
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation
principle.
5. Cruz vs. Youngberg (56 Phil. 234)
4.2.6. Delegation to Local Government Units (Article X)
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
SECTION 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.
SECTION 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share
in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national
wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law,
including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct
benefits.
SECTION 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
SECTION 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have
sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law.
SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
SECTION 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and
legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority
that will hereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination.
SECTION 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law,
and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting
for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province.
The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters
contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote
for elective provincial officials.
SECTION 13. Local government units may group themselves,
consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for
purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law.
SECTION 14. The President shall provide for regional development
councils or other similar bodies composed of local government
officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices,
and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen
the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and
social growth and development of the units in the region.
Autonomous Region
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
SECTION 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted
by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
SECTION 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities,
and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
SECTION 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall,
within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses,
pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras.
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people of the region.
SECTION 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions
shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with
applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.
a. Ordinances as subordinate legislation
This means that the enabling law must define legislative policy, mark
its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the administrative
agency to apply it.
b. Fundamental Powers of the State and General Welfare Clause
GWC: SECTION 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy
i. Police Power
Police power is the power of the State to regulate liberty and property
for the promotion of the general welfare. The impairment clause must
yield to the police power whenever the contract deals with a subject
affecting the public welfare.
The police power is lodged primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a
valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the
President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies
on all municipal levels, including the barangay.
The question of the validity of legislative enactment as determined by
the criterion of their conformity to the Constitution is essentially
justiciable and may be validly decided by the court of justice.
The tests to determine the validity of a police measure are as follows:
1. The interests of the public generally require the exercise of the
police power (lawful subject). It means that the subject of the measure
is within the scope of the police power, that is, that the activity or
property sought to be regulated affects the public welfare.
2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals (lawful means).
The lawful objective must be pursued through lawful method; that is,
both the end and the means must be legitimate. Lacking such
concurrence, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. V.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 US 328, it was ruled that a law
prohibiting certain types of ads is valid if it was adopted in the interest
of the health, safety and welfare of the people.
ii. Eminent Domain
This power enables the State to acquire private property, upon
payment of just compensation, for some intended public use.
Under existing laws, the following may exercise the power of
expropriation:
1. Congress
2. President
3. Local legislative bodies
4. Certain public corporations.
5. Quasi-public corporation like the PNR.
The rule is, the power of eminent domain should be interpreted liberally
in favor of the private property owner. The judiciary has assumed the
power to inquire into whether the authority conferred upon such
delegate has been correctly or properly exercised by it. Condemnation
of property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine necessity therefor of a public character.
Property already devoted to public use is still subject to expropriation,
provided this is done directly by the national legislature or under a
specific grant of authority to delegate. A mere general authority may
not suffice.
Taking may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner,
material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the
ordinary used for which the property was intended. Nevertheless, not
every taking is compensable, as it may be justified under the police
power.
The requisites of taking in eminent domain are as follows:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property.
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period.
3. The entry must be under a warrant or color of legal authority.
4. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected.
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
Public use means any use directly available to the general public as a
matter of right. This original meaning has now been broadened to
cover uses which, while not directly available to the public, redound to
their indirect advantage or benefit. As held in Phil. Columbian
Association v. Panis, 228 SCRA 668, the acquisition of private
property for socialized housing is for public use and the fact that only
a few and not everyone will benefit from the expropriation does not
detract from the nature of the public use. However, in Manotok v. NHA,
150 SCRA 89, the expropriation of a commercial center so that the
profits derived from its operation can be used for housing projects is a
taking for a private purpose.
Just compensation is described as a full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from the private owner. However, the compensation, to
be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the expropriator.
To ascertain just compensation, the court should determine first the
actual or basic value of the property. Where the entire property is not
expropriated, there should be added to the basic value the owner’s
consequential damages after deducting therefrom the consequential
benefits arising from the expropriation. The basic or market value is
the price that may be agreed upon by parties willing but not compelled
to enter into a contract of sale. Among the factors to be considered in
arriving at the fair market value are the cost of acquisition, the current
value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in particular
case of lands, their size, shape or location and the tax declaration.
Although it has been held in many cases that the just compensation
must be paid in money and no other, this traditional view was not
followed in the CARP case, (Assoc. of Small Landowners v. Sec. of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343) where the Supreme Court adopted
a more pragmatic stance and relaxed the strict orthodox requirement
in favor of practical method of payment devised by the legislature. As
held in NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542, in accordance with Art. 2209 of
the Civil Code, the legal interest should be 6% a year in the
computation of interest on just compensation. CB Circular No. 416,
which increased the legal interest to 12% a year is not applicable to
the expropriation of property and is limited to loans. It is the ministerial
duty of the judge to issue the writ of possession upon deposit of the
provisional value of the expropriated property with the National or
Provincial Treasurer. (See NPC v. Angas, Supra)
The property taken should be assessed as of the time of the taking,
which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings. Where entry precedes the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the assessment should be made as of the time of entry.
The owner is entitled to payment of interest from the time of the taking
until just compensation is actually paid to him. Title to the property shall
not be transferred until after actual payment of just compensation is
made to the owner.
iii. Taxation
WHAT ARE THEY
1. Police power
2. Eminent domain
3. Taxation
NATURE
- Inherent
- Not textualized in the Constitution (And need not be so for
such powers to be in existence)
MANIFESTATIONS
POLICE POWER EMINENT DOMAINTAXATION
Art II Sec 5 – The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy Art III Sec 9 – Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. Art VI Sec 28(1) –
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
- Police power (Only that eminent domain is being used as an
implement of police power)
- Reason: Taking of private property is not for public use,
instead such property is being given to the tenants (But note expanded
concept of public use – which includes indirect public benefit)

WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER

- GR: State through legislature (by making laws) LAW MANDATES MALLS TO PROVIDE FREE PARKING AND
LOADING SPACES; PROHIBIT COLLECTING OF FEES
- XPN: It may be delegated to –
- Police power
1. President

2. Administrative bodies
WHO MAY EXERCISE EMINENT DOMAIN
3. Lawmaking bodies of LGUs (Hence, despite a contrary
directive from the national government, a municipal ordinance may still - GR: Congress
prevail or take effect)
- XPN: By delegation –

1. President
BASIS OF POLICE POWER
2. Administrative bodies
- General welfare
3. LGUs

4. Private enterprises performing public services (Unlike PP

POLICE POWER v. TWO OTHER POWERS and T)

- It affects not only property but also life and liberty (persons)

- The other powers affect only property ELEMENTS

- Hence PP is the most pervasive among the three powers 1. Private property

2. Taking – or by merely imposing a burden on the private

property
ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON ALL FORMS OF GAMBLING
3. For public use
- Invalid exercise of police power
4. Payment of just compensation
- Not all forms of gambling are unlawful

- Basis: Police power addresses evil that undermines the

social, moral and economic growth of nation; police power entails PURPOSE OF TAKING
regulation not absolute prohibition; due process property
- Must be for public use

TAX ON CIGARETTES
“PUBLIC USE”
- In the nature of exercise of police power
- Includes indirect benefit or advantage to the public
- Purpose: To discourage use of cigarettes
- Does not necessarily mean direct benefit to public
- Reason: Cigarettes have deleterious effects to public health
which is within the scope of police power

- ***Basis: Taxation power may be used as an implement of PRIVATE OWNER OFFERED OWN PROPERTY
police power - Expropriation proceedings will not prosper

- Reason: The premise of expropriation is that the private

AGRARIAN LAND REFORM: POLICE POWER OR EMINENT owner does not want to part with his private property despite offer by
DOMAIN? the government
- See next comment 4.2.7. Delegation to the People (Initiative and Referendum)

NATURE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 4.2.8. Tests for Valid Delegation of Power

- Expropriation is an involuntary sale where the landowner is a. Completeness Test - A law is complete when it sets forth therein
practically an unwilling seller the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate

- Expropriation proceedings would not be necessary should
the parties agree to the sale
VALID AND DEFINITE OFFER
- State: Not required to give out an offer first
- LGU: Required before expropriation proceedings may be
initiated
b. Sufficient Standard Test - A law lays down a sufficient standard
when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot
Cases:
1. Southern Luzon Drug Corporation vs. DSWD (G.R. No. 199699,
April 25, 2017)
2. Gerochi vs. Department of Energy (G.R. No. 159796, July 17,
2007)

INVERSE CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS 3. Jaworski vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004)

- Filed by private owner whose private property was taken by 4. Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA (243
State for public use without payment of just compensation SCRA 666)

5. Lozano vs. Martinez (146 SCRA 323) 6. U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho
(43 Phil. 1)
WHAT IS “TAKING”
7. Ynot vs. IAC (G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987) 8. Pelaez vs.
1. Actual taking Auditor General (G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965)
2. Imposing burden on the private property (e.g. constructing Facts. Petitioner Ynot had transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to
electric transmission lines above one’s property) Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander for
violation of EO 626-A which prohibits interprovincial movement of
carabaos and carabeef.
REMEDIES OF AGGRIEVED PRIVATE OWNER
The EO also provides for the forfeiture of the carabao/carabeef
1. JC not paid in full from time of taking – legal interest should unlawfully transported and its subsequent disposition to charitable
be paid from the time of taking until payment in full institutions. Ynot 57 The legislature cannot delegate its power to make
a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some
2. Expropriator abandons the project – expropriator must return fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
the property to owner, if the owner desires to re-acquire it. Otherwise, its own action to depend. (US v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1) now petitions
the judgment of expropriation will lack the element of public use for review averring that said EO is unconstitutional for, among others,
invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Cases:
Issue. Is EO 626-A an invalid delegation of legislative powers?
1. Sema vs. COMELEC [558 SCRA 700 (2008)]
Held. Yes. EO 626-A authorized the property seized “to be distributed
(See previous)
to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
2. US vs. Salaveria (39 Phil 102) of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case
of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
3. Fernando vs. St. Scholasticas College [G.R. No. 161107 (2013)] of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.” The phrase
“may see fit” is xxx extremely generous and dangerous xxx. One
4. Ermita–Malate Hotel & Motel Operators vs. City Mayor [20
searches in vain for the usual standard xxx, the limitations that the said
SCRA 849 (1967)]
officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none.
5. City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G. R. No. 118127, April 12, Definitely, there is here a “roving commission” xxx, a clearly xxx invalid
2005) delegation of powers.

6. Ferrer vs. City Mayor Bautista (G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015) 9. Lorenzo vs. Director of Health (50 Phil 595) 6
MODULE 5: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
5.1. History and Background
The Philippines has had a total of six constitutions since the
Proclamation of Independence on June 12, 1898. In 1899, the Malolos
Constitution, the first Philippine Constitution—the first republican
constitution in Asia—was drafted and adopted by the First Philippine
Republic, which lasted from 1899 to 1901.
5.1.1. The Philippine Revolution and the Malolos Constitution
The Philippines had long been used as a trading port in Asia, and this
led to their colonization by the Spanish and later by the Americans.
The Spanish converted most of the population to Catholicism and the
religion remains the dominant one in the country. During the later part
of more than 300 years of Spanish rule, nationalist sentiment began to
grow among groups of Indios (which was how the Spanish referred to
the Filipinos), fuelled in large measure by the writings of national hero
Jose Rizal (later executed by the Spanish authorities) and other
ilustrados (the Filipino intellegensia). A revolution was launched
against Spain and the revolutionaries declared Philippine
independence in Kawit, Cavite on June 12, 1898. What became known
as the Malolos Congress was convened on September 15, 1898 and
the first Philippine Constitution, called the Malolos Constitution, was
approved on January 20, 1899, ushering what is called the First
Philippine Republic. In the Spanish-American War of 1898, the
revolutionaries sided with the Americans, hoping that, with the defeat
of Spain, independence would be granted by the US to the Philippines.
This, however, did not happen. After Spain ceded (or sold) the islands
to the United States in the Treaty of Paris, the US immediately
proceeded to brutally suppress the Philippine independence
movement.
5.1.2. Organic Laws under the American Period
During the American Occupation, the Philippines was governed by the
laws of the United States of America. Organic Acts were passed by the
United States Congress for the administration of the Government of
the Philippine Islands. The first was the Philippine Organic Act of 1902,
which provided for a Philippine Assembly composed of Filipino
citizens. The second was the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which
included the first pledge of Philippine independence. These laws
served as constitutions of the Philippines from 1902 to 1935.
In 1934, the United States Congress passed the Philippine
Independence Act, which set the parameters for the creation of a
constitution for the Philippines. The Act mandated the Philippine
Legislature to call for an election of delegates to a Constitutional
Convention to draft a Constitution for the Philippines. The 1934
Constitutional Convention finished its work on February 8, 1935. The
Constitution was submitted to the President of the United States for
certification on March 25, 1935. It was in accordance with the
Philippine Independence Act of 1934. The 1935 Constitution was
ratified by the Filipino people through a national plebiscite, on May 14,
1935 and came into full force and effect on November 15, 1935 with
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Among its
provisions was that it would remain the constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines once independence was granted on July 4, 1946.
a. McKinley’s Instructions (1900)
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they
are authorized to prescribe, the commission should bear in mind that
the government which they are establishing is designed not for our
satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the
happiness, peace, and prosperity or the people of the Philippine
Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent
consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of
just and effective government.
…there are certain great principles of government which have been
made the basis of our governmental system which we deem essential
to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of
which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience
possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of
government which we have found to be essential to the preservation
of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles
and these rules of government must be established and maintained in
their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness….
It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the Philippine Islands
fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they
will inevitably within a short time command universal assent.
In the words of William H. Taft, President of the Second Philippine
Commission, the policy expressed by these Instructions is that of “The
Philippines for the Filipinos.” (David P. Barrows, History of the
Philippines, rev. ed., 1926, p.283)
Earlier, President McKinley himself had declared: “The Philippines are
ours not to exploit but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the
science of self-government.” (House Document No. 511, 67th
Congress, 4th Session, 13. See W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine
Islands, New York, 1928, v. 2, pp. 342-343)
b. Spooner Amendment (1901)
MARCH 2, 1901. – The Spooner Amendment to Act of March 2, 1901,
was approved. This amendment provided that “all military, civil, and
judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands… shall,
unless otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and
persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the
United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government
and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the
free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion….” This
amendment marked another step toward completion of the
establishment of civil government in the Philippines. (W. Cameron
Forbes, The Philippine Islands, New York, 1928, v. 2, 448.)
c. Philippine Bill of 1902
JULY 1, 1901. – The Philippine Bill was approved. This Act of
Congress, providing for the administration of the affairs of civil
government in the Philippine Islands, is the first organic law for the
government of the Philippines under the United States by virus of this
Act the government of the Philippines was made to rest upon the
highest constitutional authority, the Congress of the United States.
Congress established for the people of the Philippines their civil rights,
protecting such rights from arbitrary action and furnishing through
them the legal basis of the people’s liberties.
Furthermore, Congress provided for the establishment of the
Philippine Assembly, which was to be the lower house of the
legislature, and was to be composed of representatives elected by the
people. The Philippine Commission was to act as the upper house.
The legislature was also empowered to send two resident
commissioners to the United States.
The law also provided for the protection or the natural resources of the
country against foreign exploitation, and for their preservation for the
enjoyment and ownership of the Filipino people.
d. Philippine Autonomy Act or Jones Law (1916)
AUGUST 29, 1916. – The Philippine Autonomy Act, or the “Jones
Law”, providing for Filipino autonomy and future independence was
approved. The Jones Law became the new organic act for the
Philippines, superseding the Act of July 1, 1902. While the Philippine
Bill of 1902 did not make any provision for Philippine independence,
the Jones Law declared that “it has always been the purpose of the
people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the
Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a
stable government can be established.” The Jones Law declared
further that “for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is
desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large
a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without; in the
meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the
people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of
popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better
prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the
privileges of complete independence.”
Under the Jones Law a new Philippine Legislature was organized,
consisting of two houses – a Senate and a House of Representatives.
The members of both houses were elected by the Filipino people.
OCTOBER 16, 1916. – The new Philippine Legislature consisting of a
Senate and a House of Representatives was inaugurated. Manuel L.
Quezon was elected President of the Senate, and Sergio Osmeña
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
MARCH 24, 1934. The Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed by the
Congress of the United States. This was an Act “to provide for the
complete independence of the Philippine Islands, to provide for the
adoption of a constitution and a form of government for the Philippine
Islands, and for other purposes.” (Amended August 7, 1939, q.v.)
This law replaced the Philippine Autonomy Act or the Jones Law of
1916. It authorized the calling of a constitutional convention to frame a
republican constitution for the Commonwealth of the Philippines which
shall be the government of the Philippines until the withdrawal of
American sovereignty.
It fixed the date of recognition of Philippine independence and
withdrawal of American sovereignty on July 4, 1946.
5.1.3. Japanese Occupation
5.1.4. 1935 Constitution
FEBRUARY 8, 1935. – The Constitution of the Philippines was
adopted by the Constitutional Convention elected for the purpose, in
accordance with the Tydings-McDuffie Act. It was approved by the
President of the United States on March 23, 1935, and ratified by the
Philippine electorate on May 14, 1935. Subsequent amendments were
adopted on April 11, 1940, ratified by the people on June 18, 1940,
and approved by the President of the United States on December 2,
1940.
The Constitution provides for a republican form of government with
each of three departmental powers independent of each other. The
executive power is vested in a President of the Philippines; the
legislative power in a Congress of the Philippines, consisting of a
Senate and a House of Representatives; and the judicial power in a
Supreme Court and inferior courts.
The Constitution further provides for a Bill of Rights, and an Ordinance
giving provisions for certain matters pending the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines.
NOVEMBER 15, 1935. – Manuel L. Quezon was inaugurated
President of the Philippines and Sergio Osmeña Vice President.
In 1940, the 1935 Constitution was amended by the National Assembly
of the Philippines. The legislature was changed from a unicameral
assembly to a bicameral congress. The amendment also changed the
term limit of the President of the Philippines from six years with no
reelection to four years with a possibility of being reelected for a
second term.
During World War II the Japanese-sponsored government nullified the
1935 Constitution and appointed Preparatory Committee on Philippine
Independence to replace it. The 1943 Constitution was used by the
Second Republic with Jose P. Laurel as President.
Upon the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, the 1935 Constitution
came back into effect. The Constitution remained unaltered until 1947
when the Philippine Congress called for its amendment through
Commonwealth Act No. 733. On March 11, 1947 the Parity
amendment gave United States citizens equal rights with Filipino
citizens to develop natural resources in the country and operate public
utilities. The Constitution, thereafter, remained the same until the
declaration of martial law on September 23, 1972.
5.1.5. 1973 Constitution
During World War II the Japanese-sponsored government nullified the
1935 Constitution and appointed Preparatory Committee on Philippine
Independence to replace it. The 1943 Constitution was used by the
Second Republic with Jose P. Laurel as President.
Upon the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, the 1935 Constitution
came back into effect. The Constitution remained unaltered until 1947
when the Philippine Congress called for its amendment through
Commonwealth Act No. 733. On March 11, 1947 the Parity
amendment gave United States citizens equal rights with Filipino
citizens to develop natural resources in the country and operate public
utilities. The Constitution, thereafter, remained the same until the
declaration of martial law on September 23, 1972.
5.1.6. 1986 (EDSA) Revolution and the Freedom Constitution
When democracy was restored in 1986, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, suspending certain provisions of
the 1973 Constitution and promulgating in its stead a transitory
constitution. A month later, President Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 9, s. 1986, which created a Constitutional Commission tasked
with writing a new charter to replace the 1973 Constitution. The
commission finished its work at 12:28 a.m. of October 16, 1986.
National Plebiscite was held on February 2, 1987, ratifying the new
constitution. On February 11, 1987, by virtue of Proclamation No. 58,
President Aquino announced the official canvassing of results and
the ratification of the draft constitution. The 1987 Constitution finally
came into full force and effect that same day with the President, other
civilian officials, and members of the Armed Forces swearing
allegiance to the new charter.
5.1.7. 1987 Constitution 5.2. Definition, Nature and Concepts
Constitution is defined by Cooley as: a body of rules and maxims in
accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually
exercised;
Meaning of Constitution In broad sense, the term constitution refers to
“that body of rules and principles in accordance with which the powers
of sovereignty are regularly exercised.” As thus defined, it covers both
written and unwritten constitution.
Nature and Purpose or Function of Constitution
a. Serves as the supreme or fundamental law – A constitution is the
charter creating the government. It has the status of a supreme or
fundamental law as it speaks for the entire people from whom it derives
its claim to obedience.
b. Establishes basic framework and underlying principles of
government – The constitution is also referred to as the organic or
basic law being or relating to the law by virtue of which the government
exists as such.
Meaning of Constitutional Law Constitutional law may be defined as
that branch of public law which treats of constitutions, their nature,
formation, amendment, and interpretation.
5.2.1. Parts, Features, Characteristics and Requisites
The three essential parts of a Constitution are: the bill of rights,
governmental organization and functions, and method of amendment;
Kinds of Constitution Constitution may classify as follows:
1. As to their origin and history
a. Conventional or enacted- One which is enacted by a constituent
assembly or granted by a monarch to his subjects like the Constitution
of Japan in 1889; and
b. Cumulative or evolved- Like the English Constitution, one which is
a product of growth or a long period of development originating in
customs, traditions, judicial decisions, etc., rather than from a
deliberate and formal enactment.
2. As to their form
a. Written- One which has been given definite written form at a
particular time, usually by a specially constituted authority called a
“constitutional convention”; and
b. Unwritten- One which is entirely the product of political revolution,
consisting largely of a mass of customs, usages and judicial decisions
together with a smaller body of statutory enactments of a fundamental
character, usually bearing different dates.
3. As to manner of amending them
a. Rigid or inelastic- One regarded as a document of special sanctity
which cannot be amended or altered except by some special
machinery more cumbrous than the ordinary legislative process; and
b. Flexible or elastic- One which possesses no higher legal authority
than ordinary laws and which may be altered in the same way as other
laws.
The Philippine Constitution may be classified as conventional or
enacted, written, rigid or inelastic. It was drafted by an appointive body
called “Constitutional Commission.”
Advantages and Disadvantages of a Written Constitution
1. It has the advantage of clearness and definiteness over an unwritten
one. This is because it is prepared with great care and deliberation.
Such a constitution cannot be easily bent or twisted by the legislature
or by the courts, to meet the temporary fancies of the moment. Hence,
the protection it affords and the rights it guarantees are apt to be more
secure. Moreover, it is more stable and free from all dangers of
temporary popular passion.
2. Its disadvantage lies in the difficulty of its amendment. This prevents
the immediate introduction of needed changes and may thereby retard
the healthy growth and progress of the state.
Requisites of a Good Written Constitution
1. As to form, a good written constitution should be:
a. Brief. Because if the constitution is too detailed, it would lose the
advantage of a fundamental law which in a few provisions outlines the
structure of the government of the whole state and the rights of the
citizens. It would probably never be understood by the public.
Furthermore, it would then be necessary to amend it every once in a
while to cover many future contingencies;
b. Broad. Because a statement of the powers and functions of
government , and of the relations between the governing body and the
governed, requires that it be as comprehensive as possible; and
c. Definite. Because otherwise the application of its provisions to
concrete situations may prove unduly difficult if not impossible. Any
vagueness which may lead to opposing interpretations of essential
features may cause incalculable harm. Civil war and the disruption of
the state may conceivably follow from the ambiguous expressions in a
constitution.
2. As to contents, it should contain at least three sets of provisions:
a. That dealing with the framework of government and its powers and
defining the electorate. This group of provisions has been called the
constitution of government;
b. That setting forth the fundamental rights of the people and imposing
certain limitations on the powers of government as a means of
securing the enjoyment of these rights. This group has been referred
to as the constitution of liberty; and
c. That pointing out the mode or procedure for amending or revising
the constitution. This group has been called the constitution of
sovereignty.
Constitution Distinguished from Statute
1. A constitution is a legislation direct from the people, while a statute
is a legislation from the people’s representatives;
2. A constitution merely states the general framework of the law and
the government, while a statute provides the details of the subject of
which it treats;
3. A constitution is intended not merely to meet existing conditions but
to govern the future, while a statute is intended primarily to meet
existing conditions only; and
4. A constitution is the supreme or fundamental law of the State to
which the statutes and all other laws must conform.
5.2.2. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
Under this doctrine, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3,
1997)
Justice Isagani A. Cruz eloquently expound the essence of this great
doctrine in this wise:
“The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however nobly
intentioned, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must
ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law.
Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power
debase its rectitude. Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld
as long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest its
disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of the law by the
pretenders to illegitimate power.”
5.2.3. Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing
SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS
- Those which do not need legislations to become effective or
those which when violated can be redressed in courts
- Bill of rights
- Art II provisions generally not self-executing, XPNs:
1. Right to Health Sec 15
2. Right to Balanced and healthful ecology Sec 16
3. Filipino first policy under Art XII Sec 10 par 2
RIGHT TO INFORMATION UNDER ART II SEC 7
- Not self-executing
- Art II Sec 7 merely recognizes right of people to information
of matters of public concern
- FOI difficult to enact: Lawmakers are interested in protecting
their interests
SELF-EXECUTORY
- Provisions of the Bill of Rights are self-executing
- Reason: A contrary rule would place the effectivity of the
rights or limitations under the Bill of Rights subject to the control of the
legislature
Cases:
1. Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 [SCRA 668 (1989)]
The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers enumerated.
Residual unstated powers of the President are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare.
Facts. Only about 3 years after Pres. Aquino replaced Marcos, the
latter, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die. But Pres. Aquino, considering the dire consequences of his
return to the nation at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning
to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar his
and his family’s return. The Marcoses now seek to enjoin the
implementation of the Pres. Aquino’s decision, invoking their
constitutionally guaranteed liberty of abode and right to travel.
Issue. Is the President granted power in the Constitution to prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?
Held. Yes. It would not be accurate to state that “executive power” is
the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well
as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Although
the Constitution imposes limitations of the exercise of specific
powers126 of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of “executive power.” Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. Executive power is more than
the sum of specific powers so enumerated. More particularly, this case
calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the
peace. The President is also tasked with xxx ensuring domestic
tranquility xxx. The demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to
the Philippines xxx must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. There exists factual
basis for the President’s decision. The Court cannot xxx pretend the
country is not besieged from within xxx. xxx the catalytic effect of the
return of the Marcoses xxx may prove to be the proverbial final straw
that would break the camel’s back. With these before her, the
President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously xxx
in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat
to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. The
Court voted 8-7.
2. De Leon vs. Esguerra (G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987)
“The act of ratification is the act of voting [in the plebiscite] by the
people. So that is the date of
Facts. De Leon was the incumbent Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Dolores,
Tagaytay, Rizal whose term was to end in 1988 under the Brgy.
Election Act of 1982.
In memoranda signed on February 8, 1987, OIC Gov. Esguerra
designated respondents as Brgy. Chairman and members of the Brgy.
Council in place of De Leon et al. Esguerra relied on the Provisional
Constitution which provided that “all elective officials xxx under the
1973 Constitution shall continue in office until designation xxx of their
successors if such appointment is made within one year from February
25, 1986.
Issue. Was the designation of respondents to replace petitioners
validly made within the one year period contemplated in the
Provisional Constitution?
Held. No. Article XVIII, Sec 27 of the 1987 Constitution reads: “This
Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions.” The 1987 Constitution was
ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must have been superseded already. Having
been rendered inoperative, Esguerra could no longer correctly rely on
it when he designated the respondents on February 8, 1987
3. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)
4. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (407 SCRA 10)
5. Flores vs. Drilon (G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993)
Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act, and the power to
appoint is, in essence, discretionary. Hence, without the element of
choice, the supposed power of appointment is no power at all.
Facts. This petition challenges the constitutionality of Sec 13, par (d)
of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992) under
which incumbent Olongapo City Mayor Gordon was appointed
Chairman and CEO of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
Said par (d) carries the proviso that “for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall
be appointed as the chairman and CEO of the Subic Authority.”
Petitioners argue on the ground, among others, that said proviso
infringes Sec 16, Art VII of the Constitution since it was Congress
through the proviso (and not the President) who appointed the Mayor
to the subject posts.
Issue. Did Congress, through the subject proviso, encroach on the
prerogative of the President in making appointments?
Held. Yes. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act; and
the power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. Thus, the power of
choice is th heart of the power to appoint. Hence, when Congress
clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at
the same time limit the choice of the Pres. to only one candidate. Even
on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress
may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority of his
discretion to pick his own choice—as when the qualifications
prescribed can only be met by one individual. In this case, the subject
proviso in effect limited the appointing authority to only one eligible
option: the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Such supposed power
of appointment, without the element of choice, is no power at all and
goes against the very nature of the appointment itself. Hence, the
subject proviso is unconstitutional and the appointment of Mayor
Gordon pursuant thereto is invalid and void.
6. Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
Art II, Sec 16 is self-executing and judicially enforceable — J. Feliciano
concurring.
Facts. Concerned over the continued deforestation of the country,
petitioners, all minors represented by their parents, instituted a civil
complaint as a taxpayers’ class suit “to prevent the misappropriation
or impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued
rape of Mother Earth.”
They pray for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements
(TLA) in the country and to order the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) to cease and desist from approving new
TLAs.
On motion of then DENR Sec. Factoran, the RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of a cause of action. Factoran avers that the
petitioners raise an issue political (whether or not logging should be
permitted) which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches. Petitioners, claiming to “represent their generation as well
as the generation yet unborn”, allege their fundamental right to a
balanced and healthful ecology was violated by the granting of said
TLAs.
Issues.
(1) Do petitioners have a cause of action “to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth”?
(2) Do the petitioners have a locus standi to file suit?
Held.
(1) Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. xxx
Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right.43
(2) Yes. The case is a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint
is of common and general interest to all citizens of the Philippines and
the petitioners are numerous and representative enough to ensure the
full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
filing of a valid class suit44 are present. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. We find enough
averments to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights on
which reliefs may be granted. The case cannot be thus said to raise a
political question. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-à-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation.
Petition granted.
7. Imbong vs. Executive Secretary, GR. 204819, April 8, 2014)
The plenary authority of Congress to call a constitutional convention
includes, by necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of such principal power. Implementing details may
be provided by Congress as a constituent assembly or as a legislative
body.
Facts. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly passed resolution
No. 2 which, among others, called for a Constitutional Convention to
be composed of two delegates from each representative district who
shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be
elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with
the Revised Election Code. Congress then as a legislative assembly
enacted RA 4914 implementing Resolution No. 2. Subsequently,
Congress as a Constitutional Assembly passed Resolution No. 4
which amended Resolution No. 2 and provided more details on the
qualifications and apportionment of the delegates but provided that
other details are to be embodied in an implementing legislation.
Congress acting as a legislative assembly thus enacted RA 6132,
implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing RA
4914. Petitioners now assail the validity of RA 6132.
Issue. May Congress, acting as a legislative assembly, enact RA 6132
to implement a resolution passed by the same body acting as a
Constituent Assembly?
Held. Yes. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such
plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue
of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to
the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power
to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of
the delegates as well as appropriation of funds, and other
implementing details indispensable to the convention. While the
authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the
Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, does not
exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly.
Such implementing details are matters within the competence of
Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which
power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary
implication removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling
a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can
enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps.
8. Legaspi vs. CSC (G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987)
Information on civil service eligibility of govt employees in positions
requiring them is a matter of public concern.
Facts. Petitioner Legaspi requested for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Dept. of Cebu City. These govt employees had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians. However, respondent CSC denied the
request. Claiming his right to public information has been denied,
Legaspi now prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
CSC to disclose the information.
Issue. Does Legaspi have the right to compel CSC to disclose the
information?
Held. Yes.48 The information sought is a public concern. Public office
being a public trust, it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied
only by persons who are eligibles. The information sought is not
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
CSC has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which
would limit the Legaspi’s right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. Notably, the names of those who pass the civil
service examinations, as in licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret
about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. In the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the CSC
to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying
the position becomes imperative.
5.3. Interpretation
Francisco vs. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261,
November 10, 2003)
Impeachment proceedings are initiated by filing of a verified
impeachment complaint
Facts. On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint against C.J. Davide, Jr., among others.2 The House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint on 22 Oct 2003
for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to that effect
has not been sent to the House in plenary.
The following day and just nearly 5 months since the filing of the first
complaint, a second impeachment complaint3 was filed by
respondents house representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus against the respondents House of Representatives, et. al.,
(the House) most of which contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5), Art.
XI of the Const. which provides: “No impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.”
The House argues: the one year bar could not have been violated as
the first impeachment complaint has not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the
same is clear in that it is the House, as a collective body, which has
“the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.” “Initiate”
could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Sec. 3 of the
same provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified
complaint for impeachment by any member of the House; or (2) by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at
least 1/3 of all the
5.4. Amendments and Revisions (Article XVII, Sections 1, 2 & 3)
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all
its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the
Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
5.4.1. Quantitative vs. Qualitative
5.4.2. Procedure
a. Proposal
i. Congress (Constituent Assembly)
ii. Constitutional Convention
1. Province of Cotabato vs. The Government of the RP Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain (G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008)
The associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept of association presupposes
that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence.
Facts. On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP)—represented by
its Chairman Rodolfo C. Garcia—and the MILF23—represented by its
Chairman Mohagher Iqbal—were scheduled to sign a Memorandum
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 (the MOA-AD) in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. The MOA-AD has been initialed by the parties. The MOA-
AD mentions, among others, the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to
which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain
and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro. The signing of the MOA-AD
between the GRP and the MILF did not materialize, however, because
the SC, upon motion of petitioners, issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the MOA-AD.
Issue. Does the MOA-AD violate Philippine national territory and
sovereignty?
Held. Yes. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with
the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does
it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily
sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it—which
has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association—runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.
2. Imbong vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970)
The plenary authority of Congress to call a constitutional convention
includes, by necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of such principal power. Implementing details may
be provided by Congress as a constituent assembly or as a legislative
body.
Facts. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly passed resolution
No. 2 which, among others, called for a Constitutional Convention to
be composed of two delegates from each representative district who
shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be
elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with
the Revised Election Code. Congress then as a legislative assembly
enacted RA 4914 implementing Resolution No. 2. Subsequently,
Congress as a Constitutional Assembly passed Resolution No. 4
which amended Resolution No. 2 and provided more details on the
qualifications and apportionment of the delegates but provided that
other details are to be embodied in an implementing legislation.
Congress acting as a legislative assembly thus enacted RA 6132,
implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing RA
4914. Petitioners now assail the validity of RA 6132.
Issue. May Congress, acting as a legislative assembly, enact RA 6132
to implement a resolution passed by the same body acting as a
Constituent Assembly?
Held. Yes. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such
plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue
of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to
the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power
to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of
the delegates as well as appropriation of funds, and other
implementing details indispensable to the convention. While the
authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the
Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, does not
exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly.
Such implementing details are matters within the competence of
Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which
power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary
implication removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling
a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can
enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps
3. Gonzales vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967)
Constitutional amendments may be submitted to the people for
ratification simultaneously with the general elections.
Facts. Congress passed three resolutions simultaneously on the same
date proposing amendments to the Constitution:
(1) RBH8 No. 1: to increase the maximum number of seats in the
House of Representatives from 120 to 180;
(2) RBH No. 2: calling a Constitutional Convention to be held on Nov
1971; and
(3) RBH No. 3: to authorize members of Congress to run for delegates
to the Constitutional Convention and if elected thereto, to authorize
them to be delegates without forfeiting their seats in Congress.
Upon approval by the President, the bill became RA 4913, which
provided that RBH No. 1 and No. 3 be submitted for the ratification of
the people at the general elections on Nov 14, 1967.
Issue. May Constitutional amendments be submitted for ratification in
a general election?
Held. Yes. 1935 Constitution, Art XV, Sec 1 provides: “xxx
[Constitutional] amendments shall be valid xxx when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election9 at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.” There is nothing in the
provision to indicate that the “election” therein referred to is a “special”
election and not a general election. There is no denying the fact that
an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits of the proposed
amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention
usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general
elections. But then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom
of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public
officers. [Though admirable, we] are unable to subscribe to the
contrary view without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what is
not written thereon and what cannot fairly be deduced from the letter
thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer
speculation.
4. Occena vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 56350, April 2, 1981)
A constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing.
Facts. Upon the call of President-Prime Minister F. Marcos, the Interim
Batasang Pambansa convened as a constituent assembly. Acting as
such, it passed 3 resolutions11 proposing amendments to the
Constitution. Occeña et al. challenged the validity of these proposals,
attacking the validity of the 1973 Constitution itself and the validity of
the power of the Int. Batasang Pambansa to propose such
amendments.
Issues.
(1) Is the 1973 Constitution the fundamental law?
(2) Does the Int. Batasang Pambansa have the authority to propose
amendments to the Constitution?
(3) Did the Interim Batasang Pambansa exceed its authority by
allegedly proposing revisions and not merely amendments?
(4) Are the proposals invalid because the allegedly required three-
fourths vote was not complied with?
(5) Were the proposals properly submitted to the people for
ratification?
Held.
(1) Yes. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability
of the 1973 Constitution. The ruling in Javellana v. Exec. Secretary is
authoritative as to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution whose
provisions have been applied in several cases already.
 3. Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipality or brgy law, resolution or
(2) Yes. By express provision of the 1976 Constitutional amendments, ordinance
the Int. Batasang Pambansa has the same powers as the Int. National
Assembly.12 And in Art XVII, Sec 15 of the 1973 Const., the Int.
National Assembly was vested with the power to propose amendments
by special call of the Prime Minister by a vote of a majority of all its INDIRECT INITIATIVE
members. When, therefore, the Int. Batasang Pambansa, upon the call - Exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent
of President-Prime Minister F. Marcos, met as a constituent assembly, to Congress or local legislative body for action
it acted by virtue of such competence.
- “Lobbying”
(3) No. A constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing.
Thus, whether [the Int. Batasang Pambansa acting as a constituent
assembly] will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely
REFERENDUM
overhaul the present Constitution xxx is of no moment because the
same will be submitted to the people for ratification. - Power of electorate to approve or reject legislation through
an election called for the purpose
(4) No. When the Int. Batasang Pambansa is sitting as a constituent
assembly, only a majority vote is needed to propose amendments. A
three-fourths vote is not required in a Constitutional Convention. It is
not a requirement either when, in this case, the Int. Batasang 2 TYPES OF REFERENDUM
Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments.
1. Referendum on statutes – petition to approve or reject an act
Moreover, even on the presumption that the requirement of
or law
threefourths vote applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained.
2. Referendum on local laws – petition to approve or reject a
Where then is the alleged infirmity?
law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local
(5) Yes. Art XVI, Sec 2 of the 1973 Const. provides that the plebiscite legislative bodies
called for the ratification of the amendments shall be held not later than
3 months after the approval of such amendment or revision. The
resolutions were approved on Feb 5 and 27, 1981 and the plebiscite PROHIBITED MEASURES OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
is set on April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day required period. As
for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that by 1. No petition embracing more than one subject shall be
this time the proposed amendments have been intensively and submitted to the electorate
extensively discussed at the Int. Batasang Pambansa, as well as
2. Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of
through the mass media, [so that] it cannot be said that our people are
which is specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be
unaware.
the subject to referendum until 90 days after their effectivity
5. Loomis vs. Jackson, 6 W Va.613)

6. Frantz vs. Autry (91 Pac. 193)

LOCAL INITIATIVE; REQUIRED NUMBER
iii. People (Initiative and Referendum)
- Not less than 2000 registered voters in case of autonomous
INITIATIVE, SCOPE regions

- Power of people to: - 1000 in provinces and cities

1. Propose amendments to Consti (not revisions) - 100 in municipalities

2. Propose and enact legislation through an election called for - 50 in brgys

the purpose
- Where to file: With the Regional Assembly or local legislative
body proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal or amendment of any
law, ordinance or resolution
THREE SYSTEMS OF INITIATIVE

1. Initiative on the constitution – Petition proposing

amendments to Constitution LIMITATIONS ON LOCAL INITIATIVE

2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact national 1. Can be exercised only once a year
law
2. Extends only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the local legislative bodies to enact
3. If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative
body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall
be cancelled (XPN: Those against such action may apply for initiative)
1. Santiago vs. COMELEC [270 SCRA 106 (1997)]
RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate and wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned.
Facts. Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution
by people’s initiative. He proposed to lift the term limits of elective
officials. COMELEC acted on the petition. Santiago et al. now petitions
to prohibit COMELEC from further acting on the petition. They aver
that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative (Art XVII, Sec 2)
has no implementing law yet16 notwithstanding RA 6735, and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it seeks to govern the
conduct of initiative on the amendments to the Constitution, is ultra
vires.
Issues.
(1) Is RA 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act) a sufficient
statutory implementation of Art XVII, Sec 2 of the Constitution?
(2) May COMELEC validly take cognizance of the Delfin Petition?
Held.
(1) No. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate and wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” in
Sec 2 of RA 6735 (section on the “Statement and Policy”) was a
delayed afterthought. It is neither germane or relevant to that section.
While the Act provides subtitles for initiative on national laws and local
laws, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws [only]. RA 6735
merely paid lip service to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution in contrast to the utmost diligence and care exerted in
providing for the details of that for the national and local legislation.
(2) No. The lacunae of RA 6735 on the foregoing substantive matter
(the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution) are fatal
and cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes [the] Act” Therefore, COMELEC Res. No. 2300, insofar as it
promulgates such rules and regulations, is void.
2. Lambino vs. COMELEC [505 SCRA 160 (2006)]
Two elements to be complied with in order to propose constitutional
amendments by initiative:
(1) the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal; and
(2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
Facts. Lambino et al. sought to propose amendments to the
Constitution by People’s initiative through RA 6735. The sheet used to
gather signatures from the people contained only the questions “Do
you approve of the
Amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing
the form of the government from the present bicameral-presidential to
a unicameral-parliamentary system of government in order to achieve
greater efficiency xxx; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions xxx?” The signature sheet further provides a table wherein
the personal data of the person signing shall be indicated.
Subsequently, Lambino et al. filed with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
to ratify their proposal. They have in fact gathered signatures of >12%
of all registered voters with each district represented by 3% at least
(6,327,952 voters).
COMELEC invoked Santiago v. COMELEC and denied the petition.
Issue. Did the Lambino petition comply with Art XVII, Sec 2 of the
Constitution?
Held. No. Firstly, for the amendment to be “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition”, two elements must be
complied with:
(1) the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal (no agent
or representative can sign on their behalf); and
(2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
The deliberations in the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the
framers mean to adopt the American Jurisprudence on the matter
which in particular reveals that the intention is that the people must first
see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and the
people must sign the petition containing such full text. The said
elements are present only if the foregoing has been shown. In the
Lambino petition, the proposed changes were not incorporated with or
attached to the signature sheets.
Secondly, American Jurisprudence outlaws logrolling—when the
initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same
petition. In the Lambino petition, the proposed changes include a
provision empowering the interim Parliament to convene and propose
amendments/revisions to the Constitution, which the Court finds as
logrolling.
Thirdly, a shift from a bicameral-presidential to a
unicameralparliamentary system xxx constitute, beyond doubt, a
revision. It is clear the Constitution only sanctions “amendments” and
not revisions thereto by people’s initiative.
From the foregoing, it is plain that even if RA 6735 is valid, Lambino’s
initiative will still fail. There is no need to revisit the ruling in Santiago
v. COMELEC as the outcome of this case will not be changed thereby.
3. R.A. 6735 b. Ratification Tolentino vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-
34150, October 16, 1971) 7
There must be only ONE plebiscite for the ratification of Constitutional
amendments proposed by ONE constituent body for there to be proper
submission.
Facts. The first Organic Resolution approved by the 1971
Constitutional Convention proposed to reduce the voting age from 21
to 18 years of age. It was also provided therein that the plebiscite to
ratify such partial amendment shall coincide with the local elections in
November 1971 and shall be without prejudice to other amendments
that will be proposed in the future by the same Convention. Petitioners (3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments
now seek to restrain sufficient and proper?

COMELEC on acting on such resolution. Held.

Issue. May amendments to the Constitution be submitted to the
electorate for ratification partially without prejudice to future
amendments that may be proposed by the Constitutional Convention?
Held. No. Art XV, Sec 1 of the 1935 Const. clearly provides that “such
amendments shall be valid as part of the Constitution when approved
by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for ratification”, thus leaving no room for
doubt as to how many “elections” or plebiscites may be held to ratify
any amendment/s proposed by the same Convention. The provision
unequivocally says “an election” which means only one. In order that
the plebiscite xxx may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only
sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature
of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts with
which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the case at bar, the
Convention has hardly started considering the merits of the proposals.
To present to the people any single proposal cannot comply with this
requirement. There is here “no proper submission”
(1) The question is justiciable. The constitutional amending in this case
is in the form of a delegated and hence a limited power so that the SC
is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits. Political questions are neatly associated
with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. [In the case at bar,]
what is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom but the Constitutional
authority of the President to perform such acts or to assume the power
of a constituent assembly. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the Judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can
declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was
valid or not.
2. Lambino vs. COMELEC [505 SCRA 160 (2006)]

5.5. Judicial Review

1. Sanidad vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)

Political questions are associated with the wisdom and not the legality
of an act.

“[A constitutional amendment] proposed today has relation to the

sentiment and felt needs today, and that, if not ratified early while the
sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded as
waived…”

Facts. In 1976, Pres. Marcos submitted to the people in a

referendumplebiscite two questions:

“(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?;

“(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you

approve the following amendments to the Constitution? xxx”

Petitioners now seek to declare void the presidential decrees which

submitted the aforementioned issues to the people in a
plebiscitereferendum.

They aver that the incumbent President has no constitutional grant of

constituent power to propose amendments to the Constitution;
consequently, the referendum-plebiscite has no legal basis. They now
seek to enjoin COMELEC from holding such plebiscite.

Issues.

(1) Is the nature of the question on the constitutionality of the assailed

presidential decrees political or justiciable?

(2) Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to

the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe
the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?