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39 Auditor Independence
39 Auditor Independence
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Siriyama Herath
Clark Atlanta University
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Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Austin, E. and Herath, S.K.
(2014) ‘Auditor independence: a review of literature’, Int. J. Economics and
Accounting, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp.62–74.
Biographical notes: Emmanuel Austin is a graduate student in the Master of
Arts in Accounting Program at the Clark Atlanta University in Atlanta,
Georgia. He began his studies in Orlando, Florida at the University of Central
Florida where he received his Bachelor’s degree in Accounting. He has been on
the dean’s list several times for his excellent academic performance at the
university. He is a member of both the Epsilon Gamma Chapter of Beta Alpha
Psi and the National Association of Black Accountants.
Siriyama Kanthi Herath is an Associate Professor in Accounting at the Clark
Atlanta University, USA. She has a PhD in Accounting and a MCom (Hons)
(ACCY) from the University of Wollongong, and an MBA and a BCom (Hons)
from the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. She has published about 40 papers
in refereed journals. She is a member of the editorial boards of several
academic journals.
1 Introduction
In conducting this research we use Ferreira and Merchant (1992) article, ‘Field research
in management accounting and control: a review and evaluation’ as the foundation as
their study followed a very clear way of reviewing published research. Our survey of the
auditor research on auditor independence is based on a review of three accounting
journals which are listed in Table 1. We selected 16 studies for our survey and Table 2
illustrates the chronological citations of these studies published since 1992. These listings
serve the purpose we previously mentioned to examine auditor independence-related
64 E. Austin and S.K. Herath
Research journals:
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
The Accounting Review
Review of Accounting & Finance
2.2 Motivations
We attempted to recognise the motivations for the studies listed in Table 2. Many authors
focused their writings clearly, highlighting the importance of auditor independence
building a strong foundation for their intended contribution to the ongoing development
of the field. Mere description, theory building, and hypothesis testing are the main groups
in which these motivations can be classified.
One motivation of the researchers examined was to give a description of auditor’s
independence. For example, Hudaib and Haniffa (2009) described the construction of the
meanings of auditor independence in an oil-rich autocratic state with an ideology
straddling liberal market capitalism and Shari’ah Islamic teachings in their
article ‘Exploring auditor independence: an interpretive approach’. Another example
is the exploration of the wider view of auditor independence by Sucher and
Kosmala-MacLullich (2004) in ‘A construction of auditor independence in Czech
Republic: local insights’. They explained how further understanding of the social,
economic and cultural context in auditor independence is being realised. Their
comparisons on the IFAC Code, aspects on independence, and local regulation concluded
that there may be a limitation as to how auditor independence is realised in a local
66 E. Austin and S.K. Herath
context. Furthermore, this research indicated that there were many more issues which
could contribute in resolving the issues on auditor independence in transitional
economies such as the Czech Republic.
In going beyond the description and building a new theory, Lee and Gu (1998)
constructed a multi-agent moral hazard model to evaluate the relationship between firm
owner, manager, and the auditor. As a result, Lee and Gu (1998) created ‘the low balling
schemed’ model for external auditing services. With such a new theory and model, it is
concluded that, “the auditor in effect puts up a bail bond with the owner, to be forfeited if
wrong doing is discovered” (Lee and Gu, 1998). On the same subject of low-balling, in a
theory building article, ‘Auditing pricing, low-balling and auditor turnover: a dynamic
analysis’, Kanodia and Mukherji (1994) constructed and analysed an economic model of
audit pricing. Using the static model and the multi-period model, they were able to show
how equilibrium audit prices would sustain rents and low-balling even when clients have
most or all of the bargaining power and are free to change auditors every period (Kanodia
and Mukherji, 1994).
In examining the hypothesis testing related articles, the majority of these were
derived from a very diverse group. The hypothesis scope ranged from categories such as:
audit fees, low-balling, audit firms hiring clients, non-audit services, and litigation and
risks. Strong expectations, assumptions, and an enthusiasm to explore alternative theories
in case the hypothesis testing failed, seemed to be the consensus in the review of the
literature. Description, theory building, and theory testing of new and existing models led
researchers to explore pre-existing theories, at times revealing a lack of support for the
researchers’ hypotheses. This then led the researchers to examine the underlying cause
for the unsupported hypotheses and whether or not there were missing parameters. For
example in an Accounting Review Article, entitled ‘Client importance, nonaudit services,
and abnormal accrual’, the authors used a sample of ‘1,871 clients of Big 5 audit firms in
the investigation of significance and association of client importance (US Revenues and
audit practice office revenues) in relation to the Jones-model abnormal accruals (Chung
and Kallapur’s, 2003). In the testing of Chung and Kallapur’s (2003) hypothesis, their
theory development also suggested that “auditor incentives to compromise independence
should increase with the extent of client opportunities and incentives to manage earnings
and decrease with the strength of corporate governance and auditor expertise” [Chung
and Kallapur, (2003), p.931]. Their research concluded with no ‘statistically significant
association between abnormal accruals and client importance’ [Chung and Kallapur,
(2003), p.931].
In the study, ‘The Effects of Joint Provision and Disclosure of Nonaudit Services on
Audit Committee Members’ Decisions and Investors’ Preferences’, Gaynor et al. (2006)
went to the field, using a site and a source of real data. They selected “one hundred
experienced corporate directors, responding as audit committee members or investors,
participated in an experiment in which we manipulated the effect of the auditors
provision of nonaudit services on audit quality and the fee disclosure requirement”
[Gaynor et al., (2006), p.873]. Gaynor et al. (2006), designed a detailed experiment in the
effort to provide empirical data on three broad questions relating to the “consequences of
these regulations on audit committees’ decisions: (1) First, do audit committees consider
the nonaudit service effects on audit quality in deciding whether to approve the purchase
of nonaudit services from the auditor; (2) Second, to what extent do the mandated
disclosures affect audit committees’ pre-approved decisions?; (3) Finally, to what extent
Auditor independence 67
are audit committees’ decisions regarding the auditors’ joint service provision consistent
with investors’ preferences?” (Gaynor et al., 2006). With this purpose in mind, Gaynor
et al. (2006) conducted detailed interviews in which they divided up the participants by
addressing the three questions to different groups, where the participants assumed roles
of audit committee members and investors. Gaynor et al. (2006) did not directly
manipulate the “perceived effect of the nonaudit service on audit quality (variable of
interest)”, but they “instructed participants that the risk management (human resource
management) nonaudit services will improve (have no effect on) audit quality”.
Specifically, the participants in their experiment included 100 corporate directors who at
some point during 2003 attended a KPMG Audit Committee Institute Roundtable. Eighty
one of the participants were given the first two questions, and assumed the role of audit
committee members. The remaining 19 participants assumed the role of investors and
“asked to indicate which firm they would prefer provide the risk management services”
(Gaynor et al., 2006). As a result, they found that audit committee members were more
likely to suggest joint provision if audit quality improves and is consistent with investor
preferences (Gaynor et al., 2006).
Our analysis of the studies selected shows that the motivation of these published
research projects is dependent on the consistent development of the auditor
independence. The researchers, for the most part, continued on with the study of auditor
independence, which is consistently being developed by the implementation of new
accounting standards. Their observations and descriptions of some of the contributions
pertaining to auditor independence generated very useful recommendations for future
research. As a result, multiple theories or suppositions have been refined and a new
direction to research has been discovered.
The researchers have exemplified multiple areas of motivation, which include
defining a narrow and clear purpose, providing descriptions, and making statements
about the results of tested hypotheses, models and theories. It is common for most
researchers to have multiple purposes and motivations. A great amount of theoretical
significance was reflected on in the researchers’ observations, enabling the researchers to
build new theories and to attempt to construct new models which would enhance the
literature constructed on auditor independence.
At times the researchers modified their motivation and initial topic area. A prime
example is clearly evident in Kanodia and Mukherji (1994). What started out to be a
strong argument, which focused on their key analysis: “(1) clients have bargaining power
that is superior to auditor, at least in setting audit prices, (2) audit contracts are signed
only one period at a time, (3) an incumbent auditor acquires private clients specific
information about the recurring cost of auditing that client, and (4) it is costly for a client
to replace an incumbent auditor” is explored through a static model, which ends with less
specific assumptions. For example, Kanodia and Mukherji (1994) stated in the
conclusion, “Our model does not explicitly incorporate reporting and auditor
independence issues, so there are no formal results on whether low-balling per se would
produce client pressure on the quality of audit reports” (Kanodia and Mukherj, 1994).
Further they summarised that, “the results described in this paper are not restricted to
auditing but would apply to any industry” (Kanodia and Mukherj, 1994). Evidently, this
shows a once focused topic, purpose and motivation, becoming less associated with the
initial analysis’s intent and objectives to a more general association.
68 E. Austin and S.K. Herath
3 Research design
The research design of the selected studies have many similarities and differences in
terms of the characteristics of samples, the methods of sample selections, the methods
used in collecting data, and the timeframe in which the research was conducted.
collection of data, which methods were used, and the period of time in which the
collection process took place. For example, in the article ‘A construction of auditor
independence in the Czech Republic: local insights’, the authors give specific details
about how they conducted their research. The authors stated that the interviews were
undertaken in September 2001, with one in April 2002. In relation to this research, the
interviews consisted of a mix of open-ended, unstructured questions and semi-structured
questions. The interviews lasted between 1 hour and 3 hours and were tape-recorded,
where possible. These specific details provided by Sucher and Kosmala-MacLullich
(2004) gave readers an understanding of the efforts put forth in the researchers findings.
Critics will argue that information about the methods authors use to collect data is
necessary to deem their findings credible.
Not all of the studies we examined are worthy of such credibility. Some of the
researchers’ methods for collecting data were ambiguous. While trying to test their theory
(whether investor selection of auditors impacts auditor independence differently than
manager selection of auditors), Mayhew and Pike (2004), explained the experiment’s
design and purpose. However, the authors do not provide the readers with any
information about the participants the experiment was tested on. The ambiguity leaves
the readers sceptical about the results generated by the experiment. In such cases, any
research that provides the additional information with an opposing view from that of the
authors would be deemed more credible.
Most of the research that was done was cross-sectional. For example, in the article ‘Client
importance, nonaudit services, and abnormal accruals’, Chung and Kallapur (2003) used
the studies of DeAngelo’s model in 1981, Becker findings in 1998, and Frankel findings
in 2002 to motivate their choice of auditor independence measures and sample
participants where independence impairment is more likely to occur (Chung and
Kallapur, 2003). Chung and Kallapur (2003) concluded, “Overall, we do not find
evidence consistent with auditor independence impairment as a function of different
client fee ratios, either in the full sample or even in the subsamples in which, the theory
suggests, auditor’s incentives to compromise independence should be greatest”. The
majority of the studies that were researched used several findings from several different
periods to formulate a conclusion.
4 Evaluation
arguments from the previous researches’ conclusion. The reader can understand the
thought process of the researchers’ approach in discovering a new theory about auditor’s
independence.
The researchers had a thorough understanding of the existing findings as it relates to
auditor independence. The researchers challenge the essence of auditor independence by
using former information along with newly insightful concepts relating to auditor
independence. The researchers are knowledgeable and comprehended prior discussions
on the topic, while following the researcher’s methods of exploration.
5 Conclusions
We acknowledge that there are some limitations in the current research study. In
particular, there is an obvious sample selection bias as we confined our study to a special
time period and also we selected only 16 published research papers as our sample.
Another clear limitation of the current study is the choice of publication sources; we
limited the sources of publication to three accounting journals.
These limitations can be eliminated by conducting a large-scale longitudinal study of
published research on auditor independence. Also, future studies may be directed towards
understanding diverse effects of maintaining auditor independence on company
performance and investor confidence. Another useful area of study may be an evaluation
of auditor independence in relation to multinational enterprises where regulators and
managers have ongoing conflicts related to transfer pricing issues.
Findings from this survey of auditor independence research literature are impressive.
This survey suggests that a wide range of topic areas has been covered by the various
researchers. This learning can be incorporated in revising curricula related to auditor
independence.
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