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    Ethics Aesthetics and Design

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    Axel Olmos

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    History Theory Criticisir History Theory = Criticism ‘Yoiume 10) Number? Summer 1994 DesignIssues 1 An Eitoria! Statement David Gartman Harley Earl and the Act and Color Section: ‘The Birth of Styling at General Motors Ellen Mazur Thomson 27 Alms for Oblivion: ‘The History of Women in Early American Graphic Design ‘Alain Findeli 49. Ethics, Aesthetics, and Design Susan Sellers 69 Mechanical Brides: the Exhibition Holon Searing 80 Mechanical Brides: the Catalogue Johanna Drucker 84 Black Riders: The Visible Language of Modernism by Jerome McGann Craig Voget 85 The Rise of Big Business by Glenn Porter 88 Books Received Tisisasiok toned orionate apron acne anit ‘Swers eas Fag hbk ‘ates seo Api Secrest “yn ee i Dacre 182 Tete ote ape and peed aor > row nse cewicorens Targa Fc pb i 18 ‘Tans a ta Feet by Jom los srdorsedy be aur A tebe by sree Tsar yo as Gee es aa re ub Taso amb he ‘ertvere dota tea of epee 3 2. Suna 9 1-2 ‘rar Suna 191 90, 12 These pope extend op lay éxunens tr vee ta eo hay 1,18 he ey Montel ant hose racsegs ave eer ity aor a Prine cli te gue rgereaiié pesinmseen dee, atl ne 158 To et ‘art he esas ahitetae andrprasing wean wort weauter Ethics, Aesthetics, and Design Alain Findeli For in the final analysis iti sprit alome that animates technology.” Goethe When Goethe wrote the phrase that serves as an epigraph for this ‘essay, he was thinking about artistic practice, Bu its truth seems to fit our present context so obviously that don’ thesitate to hazarel aa analogy, im itself always a delicate maneuver. Moreover, during, the course ofthis paper, I will tun tothe originality of Goethe's vision once again, this time to evoke certain specifie points of his episte- mology and methodology. But for the moment, its the relations of Iumankind to technology that engages us, more precisely, the ethi- cal questions arising from the unprecedented technological devel- ‘opments in the Western world over the past few decades. To that ‘general problematic, concerning which some philosophers of tech nology have coined the neologism “technoethics,” is associated another of a practical kind: many professions—medicine, law; engi neering, journalism, ete ate currently caught in unprecedented conflicts forthe most pat also the result of accelerated technologi- cal development, which their respective professional code of ethics didn’t foresee and are unable to resolve, This isthe case with design aswell. ‘The two questions that 1 just raised were the topic of a colle tive research project called, “Prométhé Eclairé (or Prometheus Enlightened): Ethics, Technology and Professional Responsibility in Design,” carried out at the School of Industrial Design at the University of Montreal. The project was part of a vast program, devoted to applied ethics, designated as “strategic” by the Canadian ‘Council for Research in the Human Sciences: We set ourselves the task of establishing the general problematic of design ethics, in the broad context of technological ethies oF “technoethics,” and to ‘examine in this light the manner in which the responsibility of designers can be reevaluated. This paper presents some partial conclusions that [believed were worth drawing, They most directly concern design theory, the practice and teaching of design, but in some respects they touch equally on aesthetics. But before present- sng these conclusions, I wish to make two clarifications on the use of the words “technoethics" and “design.” ‘© Conyint yA Fs ig sie: Volune Nan? Sanre 854 o T Wound Tow wooanor stray wie by oma wits Gita acing” eas a he st psi sonanti legge acre in "eh res coe tatiana _aabicst a whl tara, thas tpt tedocentra rely Soh gmetin "Vor bee he pote essen, sean (ne eh rap ata eg tel Surmer 1959-2 rte nko Came apes Hote, 9, ars La contin an rgntopars ashe soe a: “artes tons pt at pail esters tase arse thon er tye be tate ped an ska ext wy 2. Sano carne worcester ade Kost, Pong Ar roto to Soe of ct Aco Pg Pst, 1, eet Son he Seer Artelanksdye MTR. 93, Deal Seer ho teri Pectin Ne a Ba Bes Mo spar, nds Des Te Panis ‘Sher: Page ast: ersten 184 Prize en, Sr ace atic! ei ie ‘moi de ction Pa Dad, PIE leotards 88 regina rene arson ar Pres Uv ac, 1198 ‘The term “technoethics” was coined by analogy with “ioothics.”- It designates that portion of ethies which deals with questions arising from technological development and activities. ‘More precisely, technoethics deals with moral questions governing cr resulting from the conception, production, distribution and the use of artifacts or technological systems. In this sense it then ‘embraces bioethics, insofer as the emergence of the latter results from decisive technological innovations that have enlarged the range of medical practice and possiblities and consequently of the ‘traditional medical codes of ethics. Technoethics deals with all professional acts mediated by ever more complex, powerful and sophisticated artifacts, tools, and techniques. One thinks immed ately of computer science and the way in which its altering teach- ing and pedagogy, the management of business and local communities, or the practice of law. Technoethics just as greatly challenges al professionals who plan and make these artifacts and tools and, more generally, all our built environment, the "teclnos- phere:” engineers, designers, architects, manufacturers, artists, ee Finally, since the proliferation of these artifacts modifies, sometimes radically, our daly activities, including our relationships with others (affective, communicational, et} it is eadily understood that tech- rngethics finds ample cause to reflect on these matters also. The least fone can say is that the range of application of technoethics under- stood in this extended sense is quite vast. For this reason, I wil limit myself to the field of product design. In the most restricted current sense that we're familiar with, the word “design” refers to that more or less well-identified cate- _gory of specialists who claim to improve the quality of the everyday ‘objects that surround us: furniture clothing, domestic and leisure appliances various vehicles, advertising images, all the way to the _most apparently useless gadgets. While itis generally the aesthetic appearance and the novelty of produets that capture the attention of the public, one associates their “practical” properties with the inter vention of designers fanthropometry, ergonomy, maneuverability, and safety). Whenever possible, designers strive to dispel this reductive vision oftheir profession, deploring the perception ofthe public and, worse, of manufacturers and engineers, who fail to grasp the complexity and specificity of thei tasks. The recognition ‘and acceptance they so much desire could well come to them by other routes, through a much more general definition of the word “design,” which is current inthe disciplines of aetificial intelligence and expert systems and designates the processes inherent in any activity of conception or project making, “Conceptual sciences,” “sciences of the artificial,” “design sciences,” “praxeclogy:” how many synonyms for a new discipline appeared in the 603? In this sense, design encompasses the sct of operations organized so as £0 fill the objectives of a project, and is no longer just concerned with the above listed professionals and objects but with most professions: usin sues. Yen 1, Noe 2 Sura iraleteve arden ee, dsr a inalg lo ee Ges Pr Raarscion rcs. Siar Hera Le paaone athe Buse Ce oadtumne, 1982) fe wo vrei architects, urban planners, engineers, lawyers, doctors politicians, corporate leaders, ete: One could even widen this definition to include all the specifically human operations that we carry out intentionally on a daily basis. It then becomes somewhat analogous {o the Greek metis, so well analyzed by Marcel Detienne and Jean- Pierre Vernant, who note that its embodied ia “the principal types of individuals in Greek society fom the coachman tothe politician, passing through the fisherman, the blacksmith, the orator, the weaver, the pilot, the hunter, the sophist, the carpenter and the strategist." Just as previously with technoethics, we notice that our field of investigation has wiclened considerably. FiLlimit myself for the time being to considering, in the field of design, only those professionals who are called on to design material objects, that is, principally industrial and product designers, architects, engineers, artists, artisans, and manufacturers. Finally, a few general words on the methodology that has guided us throughout this study, It was in a multidseiplinary perspective that the preparatory deliberations were made toward the construction of a problematic of design ethics. For this final stage, however, we strove to reach transdiceplinarity and thus 10 sive as general a validity as possible tothe resulting concepts and hypotheses’ Moreover, and parallel tothe theoretical reflection, we explored the possibility of introducing ethical reflection into the teaching of design. Many initiatives originated at the School of Industrial Design in Montreal: the creation of a course on design ethics the organization of a studio on applied ethics in design focus- ing on the topic of money and banking: design projects with a strong ethical component (the evaluation of products, coo products, the social impact of new products, “intelligent” products and ethics) ethics and project oriented teaching. An intensive semi hhad also been held at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Création Industrielle in Paris based on the notion of scenario as exposed by Ezio Manzini in his writings, and its possible integration with c’thics, These pedagogical experiments ead me to test a number of hhypotheses and models derived from earlier analyses and, in return, to better tackle the most important issues. As such, they acted as permanent interactive lab within the main research project, ‘Three Provisional Conclusions “The perspectives opened by the project Prométhge Eel vast consequences that it is hard to grasp all aspects, given the present state of our reflection. They equally concern design theory, ‘design methodology, assessment of products and of their impact, as ‘well as professional codes of ethics (usbanism, architecture, indus- twial design, graphic design, engineering), Rather than with defini- tive conclusions, we ended up with a program af inquiry into some specific questions, Such a result conforms, afterall, tothe very idea of what 2 general problematic is. For this reason, this paper takes g have such Daeg tna: Vole 0 Numb? Sm 888 Bo Fosiaral ts benalen, ne my ine fling dense ein Doig as Ensen ‘Sips ast fe colon rgd Cuter he vege ot sya ya aero Gare Pr 890 A epee {he Reef ngiasng ean sedate ey ESE. (Eagoeirg asin! Seon fr alien Eaten an Lente Wiener, 19 on Ley nd Al et, rte Ro th ena fea Basi Hry epost ore eet W180 Pe Sore eat” S89 Popa at Bho ery Tos Even. 1821 Daze of asi Pops or ove nrg Canis Po (eth Camage Vln ves, 1982, Oy poe! ois more 0 ‘end eel! eg, omar sewalinituton coma rovnart tons sight anspse'guesoo isuaies sind many ‘sore coat metas an yasosonal wr, oberon incoet prasacaceig jis “aremar cane ith ing ‘te pe: uote it 1 Ronen tat ve rr 3 Yee le eto ‘air aeopd os aaj, arenes wth onan ree Ts otto 8 Noosa aces inte wads algo atl jects sx as chi paysite ms 2 cdot shape ath ene tome nerd arcane Ie ‘est ats at ats fatal nae ese jos, hay Csiro a gre ecb oronitanies 97 ati rasa eset teen Pe Wilt es igo) rors tater ae netep sing ele we cals” ins uy Ses The Moanin o Tangs: Danese St ad Sit (Cari Carte Una as, 18 57 wd Aen 0, 0-718, Teme pesarator cate tun opie rime erurcous wets tyson, serra of re ‘ay. Toc ent. ve the form ofa research note, and should be considered as a work-in- progress rather than a set of definitive results, The three questions that I sketch out here have been intentionally chosen for their bear- Ing on the teaching and pedagogy of design. This choice i justified in the current context where many enginecring and design schools are seeking a thorough reform of their own curriculum: 1. The Unification ofthe Design Field through the Mapping out ofthe World of Artifacts From the user's point of view, the space of artifacts stretches between two distinct poles. One may use an object for its strictly instrumental or utilitarian oF “fonctional” qualities. There are ‘numerous situations of this nature every day. On the other hand, ‘one may just as well use objects for their symbolic ritual or sump- tuary qualities. These occasions also mark our everyday lives” It ‘even happens occasionally that the same object answers now, for ‘one, now for the other purpose, but more frequently itis difficult to clearly distinguish between these two functions that analytical reason has separated. So, a frst sight, it seems possible to arrange all technological objects along a line stretching between a “purely instrumental” pole and a “purely symbolic” pole Most tools, specialized instruments (fr instance used in surgery or measuring), ‘machines, weapons, et, tend toward the first pale whereas works of at or cult objects tend toward the second (Figure 1). However, in ‘onder to take into account the previous observations ie. the exis- tence of artifacts being both functional and symbolic, iis necessary ‘to move from one-dimensional space (the segnent) to two-dimen- sional space (the plane), thus moving from a polarity of an exclusive type to a possible complementarity. The principal advantage of so simple a model is that it represents the word of abjecis as a contin: ‘uous space, thus suggesting the possiblity of describing itby means cf a unified theory. Such a scheme allows the consideration of objects that have both a great symbolic and instrumental value as well as banal objects, lacking any significant symbolic ot instru ‘mental value, but nonetheless necessary. This “cartography” makes ‘clearer why, historically, designers have believed themselves assigned the mission of reconciling those two poles that the Wester rind stubbornly continues to oppose to one another, both concep- tually (in philosophy for example with the oppositions rational/ irrational, matter/mind, et.) and practically (the oppositions theo- ry/ practice, architect/engineet, ec.) The most noteworthy histor cal example of this is the Bauhaus, which, four years after its founding and upon the occasion of its frst important public exhibi- tion in 1923, adopted as its motto: “Art and technology, a new unity” Is appropriate to mention here that the space created in this way is not as ideal and isotropic as Cartesian space. In fact, the two poles are not “commensurable,” in thatthe instrumental qual Design isa Wire 0 Nuntr? Sonar 66 aver ie intanentymbali laity fon at icing gest tana sce of sates ‘ian vles wropesenetit ae ‘ey nh wr, aging wth Tor ces cbt i Liana 1572 ne eenaten atte segs "Poon lara, seth pnt oases French eed hp was “aaFuse" 9 n9poe bo w0r9 ot object. re Fes the min Yes Orfog ovt ita onee ate rose Sysa Camper, 185, oreo, isresonatn tte sou remen es*Gike ons referadon Sow Pe To Coens hla siz ascaeneniecet a 2 eis toot to Sane. cna Aiea, 18, ity of an object results mainly in internal technological logic, while its symbolic quality is assigned to it by external human representa tions (ie, the object is only the signifier ofa signified). This kind of space is, however, currently used in the humanities and social sciences (factorial analysis), which justifies my recourse to it here. symbatic tact e srotets — instar ‘symbole ‘aeran sity fonctions! ra ‘nero Pursuing the analysis allows us to better investigate and Interpret this space. To do so, let's plunge it into the field of the techno-economical rationality ofthe designers ofthese objects. Fach time one turns toa designer, itis specifically to confer a symbolic and/or instrumental value upon an object, to avoid the trap of banality or uselessness, to make the object safe and aesthetic. Moreover, we've seen that it is practically difficult if not impossible, to clearly separate the two principal functions of objects in other words, to isolate a purely symbolic or instrumental object. These considerations may be translated in the following way: in order for the designed and manufactured object to have a certain meaning for its users, the product of its utilitarian value and symbolic value must be greater than a certain limit, the “threshold of significance” (curve 5). To this first condition is added 2 second well-known, condition resulting from the fac thatthe manufacture of any artifact is effected within the framework of budgetary and technological constraints that vary according to the project. This may be viewed in the following manner: in order for an artifact to be viable, i is necessary that the sum ofthe investment of money and means of developmental research, design, manufacture and distribution necessary to guarantee the users its expected instrumental and symbolic values be less than a limit called “the budgetary ceiling” (6traight line B), If we reproduce these conditions in our previous space, we get the following figure, in which three distinct areas appear (Figure 2. Finally, ecalling remarks made earlier, we notice that itis ‘easy to represent, in this space, the diverse practices and professions responsible for the conception and production of artifacts (Figure 3). This space has many remarkable topological properties, whose pedagogical value must not go unnoted. Thus, the relative Deeg: ra Nar? So 5 Fave 200) espe aes ‘means bal rec as 2 acsing wits 3 wopanronse pots ‘onse” Fin ea an poesia shee se nia, symole Nd Ss iene positions of curve S and line D result from conditions peculiar to cach individual project ie. from specific design criteria; the range of actually existing or possible objects (area 2) can increase, shrink, or even disappear depending on circumstances, It would be possible to make this simple model more complex by adding supplementary dimensions. Thus the moral dimension could be introduced by a third axis deployed along the polarity “necessary /superfluous,” the ecological dimension by a temporal axis, that is by 2 dynamic or genetic perspective. In this last case, one could follow the evolution ofthe properties or fune- tions of an object during its life cycle; so certain trajectories would bbe inevitable (diminution of the instrumental valve through wear ‘and tear, deterioration or technological absolescence), others possi- bie (a utilitarian object becoming symbolic, such asa souvent), and others still improbable (a banal object becoming useful). ‘This space has also a fractal structure. Figure 2 is indeed valid whatever scale we consider within the space. The above schemata use the very largest scale, one which allows us to take in ata glance the complete set of objects. But one could as well, with a moderately sized scale, consider only a single class or type of object, such as books, pictures, clothes, or buildings. Let’s consider chairs, for example: atthe top on the left, we find a sovereign’s throne, a chairman's chair, or a chair by Joseph Beuys: at the bottom to the right, we find an airline pilot's seat, a dentist's chair, or a wheel- chair; in the upper center ace located living or dining room chairs: at the lower center, workplace chairs (office, cashier, etc:) One could ‘wonder where the electric chair, the barber's chair, or some chairs by postmodern designers fit. Using a stil smaller scale, the topolog- ical properties ofthis space are applied to an individual object thus, 1 secretary's chair has atthe same time instrumental and symbolic value (aesthetic, affective, etc.) This last seae is that ofthe design project in general, the one designers are most familiar with Desi suns Yuva 10 Nun? Sanrer at ‘Tre nacen Tee Beran omencrty pacha werk ings. woe eset petertinDeteony Das Fret, og, a Dameron inbesqn aie Osegn ue? a sng eS} 2 bam am hs se fins” seedy fot U.P Gait at lous iden ann sr es steps Ca HN. ay Foal Tachi Tete semis ‘sins barman 9 Man, Tne deftones Ciszonnay oa Racer eno! eign a.H ave wedhen ier? sto. oa Finally, note thatthe technical impossibility of reprusenting or making images ofa space of more than three dimensions (four i cone considers cinematographical, video, theatrical, and choreo- graphic techniques) should not prevent us from imagining such spaces. Likewise, the extreme simplification of the reality of the world of objects affected in the above model must not keep ts from considering an iniportant consequence: the possibility of unifying, conceptually at least, the space of artifacts, Actually, itis the design ‘process urcderlying all artifacts that makes this unification possible and plausible. Itis, in other wores, what should allow an engineer and a composer, for example, to hold a fundamental dialogue on ‘their respective experiences of eeation, and (0 enrich, by so doing, the field of design theory. {A final remark: nothing a priori prevents us from extending, ‘he model to immaterial objects and acts, Le. “politcal” objects such as a garbage collecting system or a film festival. This perspective ‘would lead us to consider design as a “generalized thetori,” a hypothesis already considered by some authors? 2. The Arifct as Medittor. Consequences for Design Methodology “After having considered the artifact per se, its appropriate toexam- ine it fom the standpoint of its relations with the environment (the latter in the phenomenological sense of the Gurman concept Umwelt). tis convenient, in this regard, to divide this environment into different “worlds,” cosmos, systems, or spheres. Fach sphere ‘could be characterized according to the ter nology of systems theory, Le. according to its structure, organization, morphology, mode of operation, function, purpose, ee. Inthe present framework propose to distinguish four worlds: the tochnocosm, the biocosm, the sociocosm, and the semiocosm, The frst isthe world of artifacts that we just examined, ie. the built environment, The second is the natural environment, that of ecologists it includes the world of physical geography (mountains, rivers, seas, clouds, ete.) and the plant and animal worlds. The thitd is that of human geography, of ethnology and sociology, ie. the whole of human collectivities. The fousth includes the symbolic world, that of meanings, ie. the world cof culture in the broad sense, of, more precisely, the religious world in the most secular sense ofthe term." One easily understands that any production ofa new artifact (acellular phone, for example) will disturb each of these worlds. Iti precisely these disturbances that ‘must be taken into account within the design process. Some of them are wanted (they are part of the design criteria), others unwanted (the designer ties then to minimize thom), Within the framework of the current ecological criss, an increasingly large consensus seems tehave formed on this very general mode) f notin practice atleast in principle, However, its actual operational and pedagogical appli ‘cation conceals difficulties that have yet to be overcome, On ts et Smt o figmee The relaterstip eter sia ee espe andthe enone mesic ‘hos he is, eae ten ftecoig eet [As such, this model is stil lacking, fr it propagates the most deep-rooted prejudice of the “natural philosophy” of positivism and its underlying theory of knowledge: the separation of subject/object ‘and, implicitly, the existence of a universal and perfectly “objective” knowing subject. This paradigm that has characterized modernism since a least the seventeenth century is now being challenged in the name of a “new paradigm.” for which many qualifiers are being proposed: holistic, constcuctionist, systemic, postmodern, etc. | prefer to call it “relativst,” a qualification that is at the same time more descriptive and closer to the scientific tradition that imposed its ewentieth century physics. What this zelativism implies, among, ‘other things, is that the observer's point of view is no longer exte ror tothe system, but is an essential component of the total system; in other words, thatthe opposition subject/object is neither possible nor acceptable, epistemologically speaking. As will be seen, this ‘very fundamental principle applies not only tothe theory of knowl- edge, but also to ethics and aesthetics, "Among the various possible viewpoints, two are essential for ‘our purpose: that ofthe user, on the one hand, and of the designer, ‘on the other (Figure 4 illustrates the general model.) \ / ntact 4 ~~ ES: COR a In order to extend its validity I found it necessary to distin- _guish, at the interior of each individual, several “worlds,” spheres ‘or centers that are analogous to those ofthe environment, so that the ‘observer can be viewed as a kind of mirror-image ofthe environ ment, a microcosm within the macrocosm, A fundamental antheo- pology (or ontology) is sketched out here, as an answer tothe claims lof many contemporary ethicists and philosophers of technology. The development of such an anthropology, that is, the detailed description of the nature ofthe human technocosm, biocosm, socio: ccosm, and semiocosm, substantially goes beyond the scope of this asi es: Yoo 1, Nuke 2 Sumer 188 a Gene orpee ancl rode wih aus Hosters raga, Cus ater tein a ogee gic i he saree 0 ae le ‘edo Ue use Pan, Feiss pinareers waned several raga atl tema ‘wenang mis, T aly ise ‘hon be sedate taenen sansies na rasindarstne cmt om, bya pe phi rors Unease eo ane ot pon sd ropesed anal Baht 0 dort ly Sa. Se. fr inaee, ora aes “Tent eno Degree 1a 1931) 55-48 uy, Agito sort That Not” Casio ses 2S 182 1 ‘essay: To guide one’s own thoughts, suggest that itis a matter of recognizing the ways in which the essence of the human being, participates simultaneously in the mineral, vegetal, animal and spir. itual aspects of existence." The study ofthe relationships between the object, the environment and the four human spheres call on several disciplines: anthropology, ergonomy, semiotics, mythology, sociology, epistemology, technology, psychology, ete; it is an absolute necessity to bring these disciplines together inthe perspec tive of a general science of design. From the view point of such a science, itis the disturbances af the global system which embrace the user /abject/environment which must be considered in priotty; those are usually expressed in terms of needs, desires, aspirations, intentions. This point of view results from a fundamental humanist position, which considers technological production as a means to increase human well-being. Iam aware here of touching on ane of the most crucial problems of philosophy—and of ideolagy—of design, which will necessitate an in-depth revision of the notion of “needs.” Given the present state of this research, can neither fur ther refine the model presented here nor propose a general theory of ‘needs. This study is currently part of a further research project The considerations discusted above have important conse- ‘quences for the methodology of design. As presented in numerous theoretical writings and practical works in design, the “traditional” view, reviewed and corrected in the light of an often confused systemic paradigm, is the following: one considers the system formed by the interactions between one or several individuals and their environment, the latter being frequently reduced to the built ‘environment; any disturbance ofthe system, usually identified by the term “need,” Isa potential problem for the designer; the inter vention ofthe latter consists of proposing a “solution” tothe prob- Jem, thus reestablishing the equilibrium ofthe system according to the following interventionist diagram: Problem > intervention > end of problem (solution) ‘Tocortect the perspective shown above ie. design viewed as a prob- Jem-solving activity it is necessary to modify radically the diagram, thus: state 1 of the system > intervention > state 2 ofthe system, This new manner of seeing has considerable theoretical and me- ‘hodologieal consequences. It implies that + we abandon the ideat ofa system in equilibrium in favor ‘of a dynamic conception of systems; + we radically revise our current notion of needs (see above); + we modify our “interventionist” model of design, replae- ing it by a “regulator” vision. negra: Vou? Sune 84 a toute f technologist ore) gues Cone scene fre hanes rent stem ee suteen ter (aaland posite airs 1G. Ge Marcin resented states inna pasate he moan “Prete els suring wal Ne vo Ase es ts si ete Rl Ea 4 1980) He tok tapi Pretoe gut: ip de atic resins oe23r" fe 1.2 Sore 20, 2-209 frolvananed icra “aramotasf he rey Te Eat Area ete Casters spots Ceson es ro S182 5-20, ‘These conditions fulfilled, it then becomes possible to complete the model to take account ofthe distinctions discussed above (the four worlds). Although it is stil too early to draws conerete results from such a new point of view, Ezio Manzini's hypothesis proposing that the designer become a “conceiver of scenarios” (and not just of products) was explored with some degree of success at an intensive workshop held at the Ecole Nationale de Création Industrielle in Paris titled, “The Design System: Theoretical Aspects.”” Ultimately, this model implies that we imagine the possibilty ofa technology that greatly goes beyond the materialist viewpoint inherited from the nineteenth century (as a guideline, think of the technique or art of gardens, the att of bring ing up children, all the “tochniques” that address themselves to living and human beings, such as they az). 3, Comparative Phenomenology of the Technological Act and the Ethical Decision Here we touch on one ofthe most critical points of our conclusions Lets recall first of all the mast common position concerning the zelations of technology to ethics: the former is supposed to be ‘concerned exclusively with means, leaving the definition of ends to the second. In other words, an engineer or designer doesn’t have to bbe preoccupied with the moral oF political ends assigned to the usage of the objects that they are commissioned to design. Their skills restrict them to the technological domain and their responsi- bilities are defined by the professional code of ethics, Now let us take up, regardless ofits imperfections, one of the small models described above, whichis laid outin the manner shown in Figure 5: ‘This is how it reads: a problem arises whenever a distur- bance occurs in the global system or at the interface of the ‘human/environment system (strictly speaking, the individual really should be placed inside the envircnment). As was seen, a designer Jntervenes to set this state of affirs right, acting upon the built envi- ronment (or technocosm} to modify or to restore it, generally by introducing a new artifact into the interface. Acting on the individ: ual (or group of individuals) is vitually never considered in design since such action does not inhere in the designer's prerogatives and abilities (but rather in those of law oof politics, et.) If we now consider the question from the viewpoint of the user facing a problem, ewe “solutions” are equally possible: either to use an artifact to “solve" the problem, or to change one’s own behavior to “dissolve” the problem. The first alternative relies on technology, the second on morality (in the sense that it derives from ‘manners, morals, and customs), Lets illustrate this by taking some examples: Deeg Ses: Voir 1 Nonber2 Summer Ye 1 Wena tena die, abled tain has 185 alae by ise inthe cache is tok, op py acs ve Sraon A dene ncaa: Mees ‘oreo 865 (2) Two alternatives are conceivable for the prevention of AIDS: to use condoms (the technological solution) or to modify ‘one's sexual behavior (the moral solution). Only in the fist case is a designer requested, () The increasing number of meetings, appointments and engagements assailing us pose a problem of organization and plan- ring of daily, weekly, monthly and annual activities; several possi- bilities are available: to use an electronic engagement-book (the technological solution); to increase one’s memory by training (the moral solution) orto diminish the activities by setting a hierarchy of priorities (another moral solution). (©) A small city in the United States is having trouble with ‘garbage collection, Rather than enlarging its dumping grounds oF constructing a treatment facility (technological solutions), the city chose to require that is citizens dispose of their household garbage in only standard garbage bags sold at $3 a piece (twenty times more than conventional bags ofthe same size) color-coded by the munic- ipal authorities. The conventional bags will no longer be accepted by the garbage collectors (the moral, i.e, political solution). The amount of domestic waste diminished by half during the first week (of operations (modification of behavier). ‘These examples invite us to cansider what we use to call “the technological solution” as a particular attitude toa problem that we ‘contrast to another attitude, the moral one. This implies that choos- ing the technological mediation is a matter of ethics, not technol copy: in other words, designing an artifact is acting in the field of ethics, not of technology alone. In classical philosophical terms, one ‘would say that technology is not associated with doing (poiesis) but with acting (praxis). Lev’ note that unlike the polaity insteurmen- tal/symbolic discussed earlier, the polarity evoked here seems to be ofan exclusive nature: choosing the technological way exeludes the moral way, just asthe exercise ofthe moral Way exempts from acti= vating the technological way. Inthe first case, one decides to resolve the problem under the pretext that it arose from an expressed or identified technological need; in the other, one accepts the fact that in some way the need isn't really a need or extends the notion of ‘need. Thus one understands why a theory of need is so necessary. According to this model there is a great temptation to suggest the image of a scale in which cach half represents one of the {wo possible “solutions.” When one rises, the other descends. More prosaically still, we could claim that one “solution” always hides ‘nother. That image helps us also to understand why technology, which solves a problem in its own sphere, can readily create new ‘ones outside its own limited domain. The increasingly generalized public debates about decisions bearing on urbanism only confirm. this model. If this apparent antinomy between the two poles even tually finds a solution as far as the user is concerned, as the above ‘examples suggest, this isnot the case with designers, who experi- Das ies: Vlone 4 Nurer 2 Sune BE Bo Deg n mercial onto age! Sari, crac of Catron, nc ti arty any dcr n rein cag betray “hare wo conker qpot te rape cutaasa an tse who spirally gem logical then They sig ehaoeg calnoansepa caestin oncning mein ion as ence a sense of powerlessness in thatthe problem has gone beyond their professional capabilities. My own experience with students has, confronted me with numerous examples ofthis situation. As such, the model was empirically confirmed within the framework of a design workshop organized around the theme of design ethics After inviting a group of students to propose a prioritized list of pressing contemporary problems, I proposed that they suggest ways in which industrial design could contribute to remedying these problems. The group thus found itself facing the dilemma noted above: in most cases, the solution to the problems didn't, they admitted, belong to technology, ie. address their professional ‘competence. Nonetheless, and itis revealing and encouraging for those of us who subscribe to a widened and unified science of design, the group affirmed, intuitively, that the method practiced habitually in design was quite appropriate to explore vaster ques- tions. ‘That last observation led me to examine in a comparative manner the ustal methods of exploring a design problem, on the ‘one hand, and a problem of applied ethics, on the other. Many texts ‘on methodology, both in design and in ethics, eal with these ques- tions, and the fist thing to strike the reader, isthe formal and struc tural analogy of the graphical models and diagrams used to illustrate the approach. The process usually follows the standard cycle: setting the problem > analysis > proposed solution > evalua- tion. In the most complex cases the process needs to be reiterated and resumed! several times before deciding on a final decision, Even taking account of the numerous variations proposed and of the sometimes very complex methods requited by the various phases of the process (especially concerning analysis and evaluation), this ‘elementary structure seems to turn up everywhere. This might seem te lead to the conclusion that ethical deliberation isnot very differ- ent from any other decision-making process If structurally speak ing, this appears to be true, a more fundamental analysis reveals that it differs from others on one fundamental point: the way or the rhetoric in which the final decision is legitimated. Contrary to the technological decision which always rests on “scientific” reason- ng—at leas, this is what is required from technology on theoretical sgrounds—and thus upon a whole complex of norms universally shared by the actors and exterior to them, the ethical decision always requires total moral engagement on the actor’s part. In epis- temnological terms, as we have seen, the former rests on the postu late of a radical separation between the subject and the object ofthe deliberation while the latter requiees the involvement of the subject inits object." The main consequence is thatthe ethical decision must begin anew for each individual case (there is no universal truth, ‘each case is particular, subjectivity is constitutive and necessary), while similar conditions authorize similar decisions in the techno logical domain, so that objectivity constitutes its ideal horizon, Caeen tse: Ver Numer? Sumner 68 a ‘Mss ce is eta ‘py spr et erat syste ney mel, xl Nm ave. and nat or tsa ets Ree, Ges lay tea, Erase spire eres Nisin 1, ifort "lamest sce in Oars pantera ein, ed Tnesocaes dso os ets a cer ing ih hagein easy arin econ eon manenaicararl ‘St, Seite piers res Aassane Poses Rance, fons, 185 Furthermore, practitioners of ethics recommend that the final deci sion be publ justified, infront of all who are concemed by it, by a thorough reasoning "toward the goal of eaching 2 collective final solution."* Asall practitioners know from daily experience, the episte- -mologieal crux of the entte design process is located at the moment of passing from a descriptive to a normative procedure, that is, at the moment of decision-making, All efforts of design methodology and design theory tend to let us believe that there exists between the two distinct phases a logical sequence and implies the search for it Ever since Poincaré, we have known that nothing euthorizes us to ‘establish such a link.” We are entitled to state that, in any case, itis, absolutely impossible to explain such « course analytically (and, for ‘example to simulate it on a computer). Thus, ts an illusion to even wish to require the objectivity characteristic of rationalism or posi- tivism in this matter. More simply stated, the criteria for choice in esign do not arise as in science, from truth: solution is never true for false; itis more or less appropriate, more or less acceptable, correc, satisfactory and thus depends on an evaluative judgment of an essentially qualitative or hetorical type. For their part, the prin- ciples of ethical deliberation show that subjectivity that is, the delib- erate involvement of the subject into the object, which rationalism, considers a its major epistemological obstacle, should be accepted as the key for the course of action mentioned above. It is that atti tude alone which permits the overcoming ofthe aporia and dilem- mas thst confront all decision-making after the initial period of ‘analysis has correctly posed options for action. Now we can more cleaely understand the usefulness, from the designer's point of view, of the anthropological model of four worlds prosented in Pigute 4, For when I mention the “total” involvement ofthe subject {this means not only an intellectual involvement, but an involvement fon al four levels ofthe anthropological structure: “mineral,” “vege- ‘al," “animal,” and “spiritual.” Itis noteworthy thatthe so-called “multieriteria” approach in design curzently considered as the ulti- mate in design methodology aims to go beyond the incommensura- bility and incompatibility of the mumerous contradictory objectives that condition decision-making by the use of interactive methods ‘based on communication among the several intervening actors of a design project, namely, by a moral action." In conclusion, Tsuggest that the different stages of moral deliberation, as described, for Instance, in the book by Louis Racine etl (see note 16), the formu: lation of the problem, the identification and classification of the values at stake, the setting up of a hierarchy of values, the making ‘of a decision, the justification and explanation of the position adapted, the search for a collective solution, serve as a paradigm for the technological decision and thus for the design process. ‘These observations on the intimate nature of ethical deliber- ation raise difficult pedagogical questions, and here is why. Similar Des ies: Voume 1. Number Sn 88 o 19 ar Fae pena Fevers Peses Uren Fae, awe he, gs or Done Fees Heys ow 5 2 seeewm Moss smcetearanin gs ‘keeninns to, oni te Soran” nm ne 120) 28-37 hos tx enon te rmncn tte conap of we ena ampzses woud ethan tow oes Hana treatin cuter eres Speen eer, Csi Mok ops ats ebjers tuFeabe see at Inna a et wold eer crenemrve dinate ‘hata ste atest rd eign ni 8 serie Ba seven cole ake ey mebothf: ne irae cpr loge res, in ae om ‘eral, tanneries ‘ovine eal eda ‘wert. hay ne mn asst intrest taney Mee ‘serine Pepto Fast tras Ar iy one Fans of Mor Pi the Thay Vin ee 8, EhesiaPong aes: he Sa ies ra. 26-1 web ay Garmerern Campin Apis n Pa ere gy anos iy a ae i Ut Ps 385 685, 10 the cognitive or logical development, a child's moral develop- sent also seems to passthrough a numberof stages, each of which {is characterized by a specific level of structural complexity, as has been shown by studies of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg.” ‘Since our primary and secondary education centers principally, ot exclusively, on logical and rational development, there i8 a strong chance that most adults are partially “literate” from the moral point of view, This would be true for aesthetics as well ‘According to Lawrence Kohlberg, who identified six stages of moral development, most adults don’t reach beyond the third stage, and only @ very small minority ever achieve the final two stages. ‘Considering the esults, the quality of ethical decisions that we are led to make in our daily lives and professions dispenses with ‘commentaries. That's why all the text hooks on applied professional this insist that the teachers operate on two Teves: that of general ‘morality (macroothics) and that ofthe elhics specific to the profes- sion being considered (microethics). All the above general observa tions tend to diseredit, to a considerable degree, the thesis of a possible “echnicization” of the ethical decision (for example, by artificial intelligence or expert systems) and moreover justify the fears expressed By some authors at the general use of the term “technoethies” ‘Some Pedagogical Consequences By reason of the principle of non-separabilty that has guided us ‘through this text, we understand that some ofthe following recom- mendations, which ar inspired by considerations discussed above in the field of design, are addressed to professional teaching in ‘general ic to medicine, law, architecture, design, engineering, bus ress, etc. Nevertheless, given the framework of this essay, it is design education that I will address specifically. 1. My first conclusion led us to considera continuous space ‘of artifacts, A general theory of artifacts then should be possible in ssuch a space, As far a the design of objects is concerned, its neces- sary to reexamine the functionalist bis arising from rationalism, not necessarily to reject it as the postmodernists wish, but rather to ‘widen its scope” This means we reach beyond the materialistic and mechanistic definition of "function” and of “functionalism” to ‘extend it tothe symbolic realm, The notion of usefulness, which is ‘endowed with a clearer moral connotation than that of function, should thus be reconsidered and altered just as radically a5 that of need. Ifa degree of consensus on these points seems tobe attained nowadays, their practical adoption runs up against the dificult of reasuring these new variables, a necessory operation in onder to treat them with conventional methods (Le. cost-benefit, mulicrite a,c) Dacor fe Vee Nmber? Same 58 2 ‘ia dion nal sai” wes proposed y Bera Paar ina ta eit, aspects ‘ystnive nas lai, 5256-1 (ore run a cacy satya te stew he ‘ht nd aces wanes ryt fm ie ‘istaan ese hion ta pores sonaig at iil "ois hah" st ps sone les" owen oa. Tiscoest coral ove stra of Goote, wale i “stuns tara eager re tin me In the design studio these theoretical considerations will be usefully suppor space of artifacts, conducted both analytically case studies) and in actual design projects, s0as to reach a phenomenological apprehen= sion ofthat space and of its continuous character Itis only upon the completion of such exercises that one may eventually introduce fundamental concepts of semiotics, for example, while not losing. sight of the inco complementary viewpoints to be considered, that of reception (the user's point of view) and that of conception (the designer's point of view), od by practical exercises of the exploration of the 2. In my second conclusion, I considered the impact of the artifacts on the various worlds constituting its environment, as well 4s its interaction with the corresponding human worlds, whether at the moment of use or of design. The complexity of the relationships thus manifested encourage us to broach these questions on theoret- ical and methodological levels by a systemic approach." The more than abundant literature devoted to this topic over the past decade should at least exempt me from supplementary commentaries. Nonetheless, atthe risk of pedantry, Twish to make some observa tions whose importance was confirmed by numerous pedagogical ‘experiences. All treatises on systemics approach their subject analyt- ically (of necessity, given the nature of language), which isin Funda- mental contradiction with one of the founding principles of systemics, In the strictest sense, the systemic apprehension of a complex reality arises from intuition. Now itis well known tht this word suffers from disfavor and confusion, especially in design education. Moreover, this prejudice is quite understandable when we consider how intuition is most often defined, in spite of the rigorous studies devoted to itby philosophers and scholars of epis- temology (Dilthey, Weber, Bergson, Poincaré, Bachelard, etc). Inui tion is no morea given than is analytical reasoning and, as with the latter, it is necessary to train it.I believe that an aesthetic education is most apt to develop intuition in rigorous, progressive manner, provided the nature ofthis education is well defined. Most design schools offer one of more courses with purely artistic content. Though those can be considered as a kind of aesthotic practice, itis rarely a matter of aesthetic education. In this, realm, as with logic and reason or mathematics, one rust start with ‘extremely simple problems before very gradually increasing thelr ‘complexity. In this regard, the apparently simplest work by abstract painters (like Malevich, Mondrian, Moholy-Nagy) are already ‘extremely complex for the aesthetic iliterates that most of us are, With aesthetics as with logic, it is necessary to begin with compost tion assignments of very simple forms, and to complexify them,

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