1. Caffco International Ltd. v.
Office of the what is reasonably demanded by the actual
Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No.
76966, [August 7, 1992]
When an employer decides to reduce the number
of its personnel in order to prevent further losses,
he is exercising his right to retrench employees to
prevent losses in his business operations. On the
other hand, where for purposes of economy, a
company decides to reorganize its departments by
imposing on employees of one department the
duties performed by the employees of the other
department, thus rendering unnecessary the job of
the latter, the services of the employees whose
functions are now being performed by the others,
may be validly terminated on the ground of
redundancy.
Xxx
Article 283, LC: Three (3) requirements are
necessary for a valid cessation of business
operations, namely: (a) service of a written notice
to the employees and to the MOLE,
(b) at least one (1) month before the bona fide in
character; and (c) payment to the employees of
termination pay amounting to at least one-half
(1/2) month pay for every year of service, or one
(1) month pay, whichever is higher.
Xxx
Thus, the retrenchment of the employees in the
Vinyl Department was legal, and under the
aforementioned provision of the Labor Code, they
are entitled to a separation pay equivalent to one
month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher, and not,
one (1) month pay for every year of service, as
erroneously ruled by the MOLE in its Order dated
December 22, 1987.
2. Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82249,
[February 7, 1991]
The Court has satisfied itself that indeed petitioner
had serious financial difficulties before, during and
after the termination of the services of private
respondent. xxx
What the letter was in effect saying was that
because of financial losses, retrenchment was
necessary, which retrenchment in turn resulted in
the redundancy of private respondent's position.
We do not believe that redundancy in an
employer's personnel force necessarily or even
ordinarily refers to duplication of work. That no
other person was holding the same position that
private respondent held prior to the termination of
his services, does not show that his position had
not become redundant. x x x Redundancy exists
where the services of an employee are in excess of
requirements of the enterprise.
x x x It is of no legal moment that the financial
troubles of the company were not of private
respondent's making. Private respondent cannot
insist on the retention of his position upon the
ground that he had not contributed to the financial
problems of Wiltshire. The characterization of
private respondent's services as no longer
necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly
terminable, was an exercise of business judgment
on the part of petitioner.
3. Soriano, Jr. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 165594, [April 23,
2007]
ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND
REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. – The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee
due to the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the
closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of
this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker
and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In
case of termination due to the installation of labor
saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected
thereof shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at
least one (1) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher.
Redundancy exists when the service capability of
the workforce is in excess of what is reasonably
needed to meet the demands of the business
enterprise. A position is redundant where it is
superfluous, and superfluity of a position or
positions may be the outcome of a number of
factors such as over-hiring of workers, decrease in
volume of business, or dropping a particular
product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.
PLDT had sufficiently established the existence of
redundancy in the position of Switchman.
The fact that respondent PLDT hired contractual
employees after implementing its redundancy
program does not necessarily negate the existence
of redundancy. As amply stated by the respondent
PLDT, such hiring was intended solely for winding
up operations using the old system. x x x It has the
recognized right and prerogative to select the
persons to be hired and to designate the work as
well as the employee or employees to perform it.
This includes the right of the respondent PLDT to
determine the employees to be retained or
discharged and who among the applicants are
qualified and competent for a vacant position. The
rationale for this principle is that respondent PLDT
is in the best position to ascertain what is proper
for the advancement of its interest. Thus, this
Page 1 of 7
Court cannot interfere in the wisdom and
soundness of the respondent PLDT's decision as to
who among the Switchmen should be retained or
discharged or who should be transferred to vacant
positions, as long as such was made in good faith
and not for the purpose of curbing the rights of an
employee.
4. Veritas Maritime Corp. v. Gepanaga, Jr.,
G.R. No. 206285, [February 4, 2015]
Actually, Gepanaga's filing of his claim was
premature. The Court has held that a seafarer may
have basis to pursue an action for total and
permanent disability benefits, if any of the
following conditions is present:
(a) The company-designated physician failed to
issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in
sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the
120-day period and there is no indication that
further medical treatment would address his
temporary total disability, hence, justify an
extension of the period to 240 days;
(b) 240 days had lapsed without any
certification issued by the company designated
physician;
(c) The company-designated physician
declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-
day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his
physician of choice and the doctor chosen under
Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary
opinion;
(d) The company-designated physician
acknowledged that he is partially permanently
disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his
own and jointly with his employer, believed that his
disability is not only permanent but total as well;
(e) The company-designated physician
recognized that he is totally and permanently
disabled but there is a dispute on the disability
grading;
(f) The company-designated physician
determined that his medical condition is not
compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC
but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor
selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC
found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
(g) The company-designated physician declared
him totally and permanently disabled but the
employer refuses to pay him the corresponding
benefits; and
(h) The company-designated physician declared
him partially and permanently disabled within the
120-day or 240-day period but he remains
incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after
the lapse of said periods.
In this case, when Gepanaga filed his complaint
with the arbitration office on March 25, 2009, he
had yet to consult his own physician, Dr. Villa.
Indeed, the Court has observed that when
Gepanaga filed his complaint, he was armed only
with the belief that he had yet to fully recover from
his injured finger because of the incident that
occurred on board the M.V. Melbourne Highway. It
was only on June 9, 2009, a few days before he
filed his position paper on June 15, 2009, that
Gepanaga sought the services of Dr. Villa.
Xxx
Let it be stressed that the seafarer's inability to
resume his work after the lapse of more than 120
days from the time he suffered an injury and/or
illness is not a magic wand that automatically
warrants the grant of total and permanent disability
benefits in his favor. Both law and evidence must
be on his side.
5. Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services,
Inc., G.R. No. 172933, [October 6, 2008]
Every seaman and the vessel owner (directly or
represented by a local manning agency) are
required to execute the POEA Standard
Employment Contract as a condition sine qua non
prior to the deployment for overseas work. The
POEA
Standard Employment Contract is supplemented by
the CBA between the owner of the vessel and the
covered seamen.
As these provisions (Article 92(c)(1) LC and its IRR)
operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his
vessel, must report to the company-designated
physician within three days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the
seaman is on temporary total disability as he is
totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage
during this period until he is declared fit to work or
his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or
totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract and by applicable
Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is
exceeded and no such declaration is made because
the seafarer requires further medical attention,
then the temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to
the right of the employer to declare within this
period that a permanent partial or total disability
already exists. The seaman may of course also be
declared fit to work at any time such declaration is
justified by his medical condition.
Thus, upon petitioner's return to the country for
medical treatment, both he and the respondent
company acted correctly in accordance with the
terms of the POEA Standard Employment Contract
and the CBA; he reported to the company-
Page 2 of 7
designated doctor for treatment and the latter
properly referred him to an ophthalmologist at the
Chinese General Hospital. No dispute existed on the
medical treatment the petitioner received, to the
point that the petitioner executed a "certificate of
fitness for work" based on the
assessment/certification by the company-
designated physician.
Problems only arose when despite the
certification, the petitioner sought second
and third opinions from his own doctors.
Based on these opinions, the petitioner
demanded that he be paid disability and
sickness benefits which the company refused
to grant.
As we outlined above, a temporary total disability
only becomes permanent when so declared by the
company physician within the periods he is allowed
to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum
240-day medical treatment period without a
declaration of either fitness to work or the
existence of a permanent disability. In the present
case, while the initial 120-day treatment or
temporary total disability period was exceeded, the
company-designated doctor duly made a
declaration well within the extended 240-day
period that the petitioner was fit to work. Viewed
from this perspective, both the NLRC and CA were
legally correct when they refused to recognize any
disability because the petitioner had already been
declared fit to resume his duties. . . .
Whose medical pronouncement should be
followed given that the company-designated
physician had declared the petitioner fit for
work with a certification of fitness duly
executed by the latter, while the petitioner's
physicians gave qualified opinions on his
medical situation?
The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the
CBA clearly provide that when a seafarer sustains a
work-related illness or injury while on board the
vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be
determined by the company-designated physician.
If the physician appointed by the seafarer
disagrees with the company-designated physician's
assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and the
seafarer to be the decision final and binding on
them.
Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a
second and even a third opinion, the final
determination of whose decision must prevail must
be done in accordance with an agreed procedure.
Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this
procedure; hence, we have no option but to
declare that the company-designated doctor's
certification is the final determination that must
prevail.
6. INC Shipmanagement, Inc. (now Inc
Navigation Co.) v. Rosales, G.R. No. 195832,
[October 1, 2014]
It is the doctor's findings which should prevail over
the simple lapse of the 120-day period. (see
Vergara case)
The law and this pronouncement make it clear that
INC is obligated to pay for the treatment of
Rosales, plus his basic wage, during the 120-day
period from repatriation while he is undergoing
treatment; he could not work during this period
and hence was on temporary total disability.
Permanent disability transpires when the inability to
work continues beyond one hundred twenty (120)
days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use
of any part of his body. In comparison with the
concept of permanent disability, total disability
means the incapacity of an employee to earn
wages in the same or similar kind of work that he
was trained for, or is accustomed to perform, or in
any kind of work that a person of his mentality and
attainments can do. It does not mean absolute
helplessness.
In disability compensation, it is not the
injury that is compensated; it is the
incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of one's earning capacity.
Thus, while Rosales was entitled to temporary total
disability benefits during his treatment period
(because he could not totally work during this
whole period), it does not follow that he should
likewise be entitled to permanent total disability
benefits when his disability was assessed by the
company-designated physician after his treatment.
He may be recognized to be have permanent
disability because of the period he was out of work
and could not work [in this case, more than one
hundred twenty (120) days], but the extent of his
disability (whether total or partial) is determined,
not by the number of days that he could not work,
but by the disability grading the doctor recognizes
based on his resulting incapacity to work and earn
his wages.
Non-referral to a third physician, whose
decision shall be considered as final and
binding, constitutes a breach of the POEA-
SEC.
This referral to a third doctor has been held
by this Court to be a mandatory procedure as
a consequence of the provision that it is the
company-designated doctor whose
assessment should prevail. In other words,
the company can insist on its disability rating
even against a contrary opinion by another
doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his
disagreement by asking for the referral to a
third doctor who shall make his or her
Page 3 of 7
determination and whose decision is final
and binding on the parties.
7. Millares v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110524
[March 14, 2000]
Petitioner was not constructively dismissed and
therefore not entitled to the benefits due an
illegally dismissed employee. Under Article 295 of
the Labor Code, seafarers are considered
contractual employees. Their employment is
governed by the contracts they sign every time
they are rehired and their employment is
terminated when the contract expires. Their
employment is contractually fixed for a certain
period of time. They fall under the exception of
Article 280 whose employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the
time of engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of
the season.
8. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Ramos,
G.R. No. 184256, [January 18, 2017]
Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain
that it has occasioned, but to the loss or
impairment of earning capacity. There is disability
when there is a diminution of earning power
because of actual absence from work. This absence
must be due to the injury or illness arising from,
and in the course of, employment. Thus, the basis
of compensation is reduction of earning power.
Section 2 of Rule VII of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation provides:
(c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a
result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers
a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of
his body.
Permanent partial disability occurs when an
employee loses the use of any particular
anatomical part of his body which disables him to
continue with his former work.
In this case, while petitioners' own company-
designated physician, Dr. Dolor, certified that
respondent was still fit to work, the former
admitted in the same breath that respondent's left
eye could no longer be improved by medical
treatment. As early as 13 April 2002, Dr. Dolor had
in fact diagnosed respondent's left eye as
permanently disabled. . . .
x x x The curability of the injury "does not preclude
an award for disability because, in labor laws,
disability need not render the seafarer absolutely
helpless or feeble to be compensable; it is enough
that it incapacitates him to perform his customary
work.
9. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. v. De
Leon, G.R. No. 199977, [January 25, 2017]
Claimants for disability benefits must first discharge
the burden of proving, with substantial evidence,
that their ailment was acquired during the term of
their contract. They must show that they
experienced health problems while at sea, the
circumstances under which they developed the
illness, as well as the symptoms associated with it.
There must be a reasonable causal connection
between the ailment of seafarers and the work for
which they have been contracted. x x x Logically,
the labor courts must determine their actual work,
the nature of their ailment, and other factors that
may lead to the conclusion that they contracted a
work-related injury.
De Leon failed to show before the labor tribunals
his functions as a seafarer, as well as the nature of
his ailment. Absent these premises, none of the
courts can rightfully deduce any reasonable causal
connection between his ailment and the work for
which he was contracted.
The proximity of the development of the injury to
the time of disembarkation does not automatically
prove work causation. x x x Here, the courts a quo
merely speculated that because respondent worked
for 22 years, it then follows that his injury was
caused by his engagement as a seafarer. This
blanket speculation alone will not rise to the level
of substantial evidence. Whilst the degree of
determining whether the illness is work-related
requires only probability, the conclusions of the
courts must be still be based on real, and not just
apparent, evidence.
Since De Leon failed to prove all the requirements
for compensability, this Court deletes the grant of
USD60,000 for permanent and total disability
benefits.
10. Manarpiis v. Texan Philippines, Inc., G.R.
No. 197011, [January 28, 2015]
Closure or cessation of business is the complete or
partial cessation of the operations and/or shut-
down of the establishment of the employer. It is
carried out to either stave off the financial ruin or
promote the business interest of the employer.
Closure of business as an authorized cause for
termination of employment is governed by Article
28323 of the Labor Code, as amended.
If the business closure is due to serious losses or
financial reverses, the employer must present
sufficient proof of its actual or imminent losses; it
must show proof that the cessation of or
withdrawal from business operations was bona fide
in character. A written notice to the DOLE thirty
(30) days before the intended date of closure is
also required, the purpose of which is to inform the
employees of the specific date of termination or
Page 4 of 7
closure of business operations, and which must be
served upon each and every employee of the
company one month before the date of effectivity
to give them sufficient time to make the necessary
arrangement.
The ultimate test of the validity of closure or
cessation of establishment or undertaking is that it
must be bona fide in character. And the burden of
proving such falls upon the employer.
Manarpiis was dismissed without just or authorized
cause, and that the announced cessation of
business operations was a subterfuge for getting
rid of petitioner.
We have laid down the two elements which must
concur for a valid abandonment, viz.:
(1) the failure to report to work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a
clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor
being manifested by some overt acts.
Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal
requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of
the employee to perform his employment
responsibilities. Mere absence or failure to
work, even after notice to return, is not
tantamount to abandonment.
Here, loss of confidence was belatedly raised by
the respondents who initiated an investigation on
the alleged irregularities committed by petitioner
only after the latter had questioned the legality of
her earlier dismissal due to the purported company
closure. As correctly observed by the NLRC,
assuming to be true that respondents had not yet
actually dismissed the petitioner, the notice of
cessation of operations (memo dated July 27,
2000) addressed to all employees never mentioned
the supposed charges against the petitioner who
was also never issued a separate memorandum to
that effect. Moreover, the turnover of company
properties by petitioner on the same date as
demanded by respondent Rialubin-Tan belies the
latter's claim that she verbally instructed the former
to continue reporting for work in view of the audit
of the company's finances. Indeed, considering the
gravity of the accusations of fraud against the
petitioner, it is strange that respondents have not
at least issued her a separate memorandum on her
accountability for the alleged business losses.
To prove the dishonesty imputed to petitioner,
respondents submitted before the NLRC a letter
dated August 4, 2000 from one of TPI's suppliers
advising the company of a supposed double
payment made in February and March 2000.
However, there is no showing that such payment
was made or ordered by petitioner, and neither
was it shown that this overpayment was reflected
in the account books of TPI. Respondents likewise
failed to prove their accusation that petitioner put
up a competing business while she was still
employed with TPI, and their bare allegation that
petitioner divulged confidential company matters to
customers. As to the supposed failure of petitioner
to account for funds intended for "under the table"
transactions at the Bureau of Customs, the same
was never raised before the labor tribunals and not
a shred of evidence was presented by respondent
to prove this allegation.
The normal consequences of petitioner's illegal
dismissal are reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights, and payment of back
wages computed from the time compensation was
withheld up to the date
of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no
longer viable as an option, separation pay
equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service should be awarded as an alternative. The
payment of separation pay is in addition to
payment of back wages. Given the strained
relations between the parties, the award of
separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.
11. Construction & Development Corporation
of the Philippines v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. Nos.
L-64207-08 (Resolution), [November 25,
1983]
W/N under the environmental circumstances, the
175 employees whose services were terminated by
petitioner are entitled to separation pay.
What the law considers as a just cause for
terminating an employment without a definite
period is the closing or cessation of operation of
the establishment or enterprise of the employer
and not merely the closing or cessation of
operation of any particular division or department
of the employer's business.
At bar, what is involved is the closure of a
particular division or department under the
CDCP umbrella of organizations due to the
termination of a lease contract brought about by
serious business reverses. This constitutes
retrenchment by, and not closure of, the enterprise
or the company itself as CDCP has not totally
ceased operations but is still an on-going concern.
Here, the CBA clearly provides that in case of
retrenchment initiated by the employer to
prevent losses, employees are entitled to
termination pay. Article 284 of the Labor
Code likewise provides for separation pay in
cases of retrenchment to prevent losses.
Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel. - The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation or operation of the establishment or
Page 5 of 7
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving
a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof. ... ... ... In case
of retrenchment to prevent losses and in case of
closures or cessation of operations of establishment
or undertaking not due to serious business losses
or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-
half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
12. Capitol Medical Center Inc. v. Meris, G.R.
No. 155098, [September 16, 2005]
The phrase "closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking" includes a partial or
total closure or cessation.
. . . Ordinarily, the closing of a warehouse facility
and the termination of the services of employees
there assigned is a matter that is left to the
determination of the employer in the good faith
exercise of its management prerogatives. The
applicable law in such a case is Article 283 of the
Labor Code which permits 'closure or cessation of
operation of an establishment or undertaking not
due to serious business losses or financial
reverses,' which, in our reading includes both the
complete cessation of operations and the
cessation of only part of a company's
business.
And the phrase "closures or cessation ...not
due to serious business losses or financial
reverses" recognizes the right of the
employer to close or cease his business
operations or undertaking even if he is not
suffering from serious business losses or
financial reverses, as long as he pays his
employees their termination pay in the amount
corresponding to their length of service.
From the letter of Dr. Clemente to Dr. Meris, it is
gathered that the abolition of the ISU was due to
the "almost extinct demand for direct medical
service by the private and semi-government
corporations in providing health care for their
employees;" x x x The records of the case,
however, fail to impress that there was indeed
extinct demand for the medical services rendered
by the ISU.
The termination of the services of Dr. Meris not
having been premised on a just or authorized
cause, he is entitled to either reinstatement or
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable,
and to backwages.
Reinstatement, however, is not feasible in case of a
strained employer-employee relationship or when
the work or position formerly held by the dismissed
employee no longer exists, as in the instant case.
Dr. Meris is thus entitled to payment of separation
pay at the rate of one (1) month salary for every
year of his employment, with a fraction of at least
six (6) months being considered as one (1) year,
48 and full backwages from the time of his
dismissal from April 30, 1992 until the expiration of
his term as Chief of ISU or his mandatory
retirement, whichever comes first.
13. Philippine National Construction Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 85323, [June 20, 1989]
The point in issue is whether or not the private
respondent was a member of the work pool,
therefore, considered a regular employee (Art. 280,
Labor Code), or a project employee, whose
employment was co-terminus with the projects to
which he was assigned.
Members of a work pool from which a construction
company draws its project employees, if considered
employee of the construction company while in the
work pool, are non-project employees or
employees for an indefinite period. If they are
employed in a particular project, the completion of
the project or any phase thereof will not mean
severance of employer-employee relationship.
A project employee is one whose employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
In finding that Porciuncula was a regular employee,
the Labor Arbiter noted that it was the petitioner's
practice to re-hire him after the completion of
every project and this re-hiring continued
throughout Porciuncula's 13 years of employment
in the company.
SC upheld both LA & NLRC in reinstating
Porcunciula with backwages on the ground that he
was not a project employee but a member of the
work pool and that he was illegally dismissed on
April 20, 1986.
Page 6 of 7
DOLE Order No. 19-93
Classification of employees in the construction
industry
1. Project employees are those employed in
connection with a particular construction project or
phase thereof and whose employment is co-
terminus with each project or phase of the project
to which they are assigned.
2. Non-project employees are those employed
without reference to any particular construction
project or phase of a project.
Indicators of project employment – Either one
or more of the following circumstances, among
others, may be considered as indicators that an
employee is a project employee.
a) The duration of the specific/identified
undertaking for which the worker is engaged is
reasonably determinable.
b) Such duration, as well as the specific
work/service to be performed, is defined in an
employment agreement and is made clear to the
employee at the time of hiring.
c) The work/service performed by the
employee is in connection with the particular
project/undertaking for which he is engaged.
d) The employee, while not employed and
awaiting engagement, is free to offer his services
to any other employer.
3. Casual employees are those employed to
perform work not related to he main line of
business of the employer. Casual employees who
are employed for at least one year, whether
continuous or broken, shall be considered regular
with respect to the activity in which they are
employed and their employment shall continue for
as long as such activity exists, unless the
employment for a just or authorized cause, or
voluntarily by the employee.
Article 280. Regular and casual employment.
The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and
the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is
not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That any employee who has rendered at least one
year of service, whether such service is continuous
or broken, shall be considered a regular employee
with respect to the activity in which he is employed
and his employment shall continue while such
activity exists.

e) The termination of his employment in the

particular project/undertaking is reported to the
DOLE Regional Office having jurisdiction over the
workplace within 30 days following the date of his
separation from work, using the prescribed form on
employees’ terminations/dismissals/suspensions.

f) An undertaking in the employment contract

by the employer to pay completion bonus to the
project employee as practiced by most construction
companies.

Types of non-project employees

1. Probationary employees are those who, upon

the completion of the probationary period, are
entitled to regularization. Upon their engagement,
probationary employee should be informed of the
reasonable standards under which they will qualify
as regular employees.

2. Regular employees are those appointed as

such or those who have completed the
probationary period or those appointed to fill up
regular positions vacated as a result of death,
retirement, resignation or termination of
employment of the regular holders thereof.

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