The Forqan Group of Iran

Revolution Under Attack
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Revolution Under Attack
The Forqan Group of Iran
Ronen A. Cohen
REVOLUTION UNDER ATTACK
Copyright © Ronen A. Cohen, 2015.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-50249-0
All rights reserved.
First published in 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
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ISBN 978-1-349-69952-0 ISBN 978-1-137-50250-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-50250-6
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cohen, Ronen.
Revolution under attack : the Forqan Group of Iran / Ronen A. Cohen.
pages cm
ISBN 978–1–137–50251–3 (e-book)—
1. Guruh-i Furqan. 2. Iran—History—Revolution, 1979.
3. Iran—History—1979–1997. I. Title.
DS318.81.C64 2015
955.0542—dc23 2014040606
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Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: April 2015
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To Yael
My comfort and home
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xv
List of Abbreviations xvii
1 Theological Approaches 1
2 The Emergence of the Forqan Group 21
3 The Fundamental Ideology of the Forqan 33
4 Acts of Terror and Assassination—The Trojan Horse
Inside the Islamic Revolution 79
5 The CIA, SAVAK, and Mossad Connections with the Forqan 101
6 The Termination of the Forqan Group 115
7 “SATJA”—Sazman-e Enqelabi-e Todehay-e Jomhory-e
Islami-e Iran—The People’s Revolutionary Organization
of the Islamic Republic of Iran 123
Conclusions 137
Notes 147
Bibliography 171
Index 183
Preface
A
few years before the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in
Iran—in February 1979—a shadowy, anti-clerical Islamist
group named The Forqan Group emerged, who became
much better known just after the revolution, especially when they
embarked on a series of assassinations beginning with that of General
Qarani, Khomeini’s new army Chief-of-Staff. The main reason for
these assassinations was that the Forqan rejected the ayatollahs for
being “reactionary clerics” who represented “radical Islam,” The
above assassination was followed on May 1st 1979 with the assas-
sination of Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari, who was the Chairman of
the Revolutionary Council and Khomeini’s closest friend and advi-
sor among the clerical circle—but there was another reason why the
Forqan killed Ayatollah Mutahhari. This was not only because he
was close to Khomeini, but also because he “saw them (the Forqan)
as a dangerous group who were distorting the Quran by disseminat-
ing ‘materialistic expositions of this text’.”1 In addition, they were
also responsible for other assassinations, such as that of the Ayatollah
Moffateh and others.
The Ayatollah Mutahhari, one of the revolution’s ideologists
and founders, attacked the ideology of Marxism and those—like
the Fadaian-i Khalq and the Forqan—who believed in it. Some fur-
ther investigation is required to uncover how it was possible for the
Forqan, at one and the same time, to be both anti-Marxism and
allegedly (according to the Ayatollah) also Marxist. The Forqan also
opposed other social sectors such as the “wealthy bazaaris,” the “lib-
eral politicians,” and the “Marxist atheists” who, in their view, “were
plotting to betray the Islamic Revolution.” 2 Despite all the above,
the Forqan, because they were fighting the clerics, can be seen as a
group that was against this revolution and its aims.
x M Preface
Very soon after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of

Iran, the militant and religious Forqan group was eliminated by the
regime, because they were threatening the revolution’s high-level
political leaders and ayatollahs. Indeed, the group had various ideo-
logical differences with the revolution’s founders and leaders and,
because they were thus seen as opponents of the new order, they
attracted much attention from the Iranian government, which ener-
getically dedicated itself to their elimination.
From its inception, the Islamic Republic made great efforts to pro-
tect itself from other revolutionary groups such as the Mojahedin-i
Khalq, the Fadaian-i Khalq, and other such revolutionary groups
who sought to share in the political leadership, but were denied this
through the regime’s use of arms and ideology.. This was also true
for apolitical groups such as the Hojjatiyeh, Arman-e Mostadhaa’ fin,
and the Forqan, who believed that the clergy should stay out of poli-
tics and concentrate on their religious studies in the seminars and
madrasas. Their orthodox Shi’a religious beliefs posited that only
the governance of the Hidden Imam (the Twelfth Imam) was legiti-
mate and, without it, any government, even one ruled and led by the
clergy, was illegitimate and had to be opposed. The main common
denominator for all these opposition groups was their belief that
the clerics should be excluded from politics. Unlike the Hojjatiyeh,
the Forqan posed a real challenge to the regime since they fought
using terror and assassination, but the Islamic Regime maintained
the upper hand despite the Forqan’s efforts.
Twenty-seven years after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it seems
that the Forqan Group declared a comeback with its attempt to imple-
ment a series of terror attacks, which were frustrated by the Iranian
regime. Iranian radio and TV alleged that it was the Wahhabi regime
of Saudi Arabia that was behind the revival of this group, in order to
initiate an armed conflict with Iran. 3 The motives for this and the
backgrounds of the Wahhabi Regime and the Forqan Group, how-
ever, remain unclear. While the attempt to ignite an armed conflict
between Saudi Arabia and Iran has failed to date and the Forqan
Group has not only disappeared much faster than it emerged but
has seemingly left no significant mark, its connection to the Islamic
Revolution, either by association alone or other means, makes the
clarification of two issues important: first, the history of the group’s
activities during the Islamic Revolution; and second, the role played
Preface M xi
by its revival and its goals during the 1990s. The roles played by the
group in the Iranian Revolution and its reappearance during the
1990s have also shed light on the existence of other terrorist groups
inside Iran, who surface from time to time in order to fight the
Iranian regime.
These efforts by the Forqan Group, although generally pathetic
and useless, still have had enough significant meaning to be included
in its historical background, along with their reemergence during
the 1990s. These events, despite the time that has passed between
them, show that the Forqan Group may not have had a strong struc-
ture and basis, but has imprinted a historical memory that affects
the new revolutionaries that, from time to time, also embark upon
revolutionary actions.
Historians claim that the mysterious Forqan group was inspired
by Shari’ati’s ideology, i.e., that it was “a group which opposed the
involvement of the clergy in politics.”4 Members of this group mostly
came from the lower middle class, and most of its members came
from Qolhak, a neighborhood located in northern Tehran near the
Husseiniyeh Centers. The Forqan’s leader, Akbar Goodrazi, who was
executed by the Islamic regime, was the son of a lower class gro-
cery shop owner and was born in 1955 in Iran’s Lorestan Province.
In 1971, he moved to Khansar in order to complete his seminary
studies and later moved to Qom and Tehran, where, in 1976, he
began teaching Tafsir and Quran classes and started to recruit stu-
dents. From this year on he started publishing political pamphlets
and opposing the Shah’s regime. In the last stages of the revolution
(mostly in 1978), Goodrazi and his followers gathered weapons from
military bases that they had managed to conquer and engaged in a
full-scale military campaign against the regime and the clergy in
order to establish their own position in the new political arena.5
Western research has completely overlooked the Forqan’s history,
and it appears that no documentation or academic research exists
on it whatsoever, so it seems that the group’s role in the Islamic
Revolution has never been investigated. This book will be the first
to cover the Forqan’s history and ideology, and will allow readers to
achieve a better understanding of the real forces that were active in
Iran during the Islamic Revolution and afterwards. This revolution
brought about a real change in the Middle East and, subsequently,
a global shift in attitudes toward Islam and Iran, and the proposed
xii M Preface
book aims to “shake the dust” off this virtually unknown revolu-
tionary group that took part in this most important revolution—the
Islamic Revolution of Iran.
This book will provide the first academic study of this militant
Islamic group—its origins, ideology, and activities during the Islamic
Revolution and its seemingly mysterious but short-lived revival
during the 1990s. The research will also deal with the connection
the Forqan had with the Sazman-e Enqelabi-e Todehay-e Jomhory-e
Islami-e Iran (SATJA) and the Sazman-i Jonbesh-hay-i Azadibakhsh-i
Jahan-i Islam (SAJAJI), two other revolutionary groups that were
also anti-clerical yet fought in the name of religion. Through an
examination of primary sources, that is, interviews with retired
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers, books and
other primary sources from Iran, reports of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the Dept. of State, the National Archives and Records
Administration (NAR A), and the Israeli Archives, the research aims
to fill a gap left in contemporary knowledge about this understudied
opponent of the Islamic Revolution and its relationship with the
revolution’s leadership. As such, it has the potential to allow the con-
struction of a new paradigm regarding the factions and components
that comprised the Iranian Revolution and offer a new outlook on
one of the most significant popular revolutions of the twentieth cen-
tury. Moreover, this paradigm will provide a better understanding of
the various revolutionary organizations that took part in the Islamic
Revolution, their aims, agendas, and religious perspectives.
This book will also identify the Forqan’s ideologies and activities
in the period before and during the revolution, thereby dispelling
some common beliefs held by the general public about the revolu-
tion. For example, the general public today commonly believes that
Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers were the main entities respon-
sible for initiating and leading the revolution, while other groups
have been ignored and given no historical credit for their part in
this important revolution. Khomeini and his followers exerted great
efforts to claim exclusivity for their success in the Islamic revolution,
and set aside the achievements of all the other revolutionary groups
and movements who also played a significant role before and during
the revolution. It appears that this was possible in Iran because the
regime could exert much control over the minds and hearts of the
people, and thus control the historiography of the regime as well.
Preface M xiii
This book will provide a different and unique perspective and his-
tory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, while relying carefully on the
books and sources that are available (unfortunately not always) in
Iran.
Another common misconception, particularly among the gen-
eral public, is that the various religious revolutionary forces of Iran
were not separate, distinct entities with clear differences. My recent
research on the Hojjatiyeh Society, 6 for instance, has revealed that
there were religious groups and movements who disagreed with the
Ayatollah Khomeini’s agenda of the Velayat-i Faqih, that is, the
jurisprudence of the clerics. Since the establishment of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the regime has done whatever it could to under-
mine and deny the Hojjatiyeh and other religious groups such as
the ForqanThis book seeks to address the role played by the Forqan
in the revolution, their fight against the religious leadership that
led the revolutionary forces, and their fight against the revolution’s
underlying ideology. The Iranian Republic has tried to pretend that
the religious community, with all its factions and wings, supported
and led the revolution—but this seems to be misleading.
The important purpose of this book is to reveal the history of yet
another unknown Iranian religious-reactionary, but still revolution-
ary, group that not only played a significant role in both shaking and
shaping the Islamic Revolution and the Iran we know today—but
that has been little dealt with by western scholarly research. The rev-
elation of new knowledge and the development of a new understand-
ing of the forces that made the Islamic Revolution possible will not
only enable us to more clearly and precisely understand the founda-
tions of the Islamic Revolution, but more importantly—the founda-
tions of those who wished to crush and destroy this revolution.
Acknowledgments
I
think that if I had to describe the help I received from each
of the following people, I would have to ask the publisher to
add another chapter to this book. Still, I am sure that you will
get the chance to encounter the contributions made by these people
in the future, whether through academic pursuits or in some other
way. The first to be thanked is Prof. David Wolf, retired Head of
the Authority for Research & Development at Ariel University. Prof.
Wolf has always stood by me with a big smile and a pat on the back,
and you can see in the acknowledgements made in my previous
books that Prof. Wolf has always held a place of honor. I wish him a
long life and good health. I would also like to express my gratitude
and appreciation to Prof. Alexander Bligh, the Acting Dean of the
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities and the Director of the
Middle East Research Center at Ariel University. He has always sup-
ported my research and me.
My beloved wife, Mrs. Yael Keinan-Cohen, deserves special
thanks since, besides taking care of me, supporting me, and loving
me, she has contributed to this book with her professional abilities in
Arabic, which have helped me to better understand the Hadith and
the suras of the Quran. My beloved kids, Orianne and Yair, always
inspired me with their questions about who the Forqan were and
why I was doing research on these bastards.
I could not ask for more than the helpful assistance I received
from the three lovely students who are my research assistants. It must
be said that I feel blessed to have this wonderfully helpful team, and
I would like to thank them for their consideration and devotion:
Ms. Sigal Voltmer, for rummaging through the Stasi Archives in
Berlin, Germany, and for supplying me with a professional trans-
lation from Dutch to English; the talented, efficient, and diligent
xvi M Acknowledgments
Mrs. Mor Jamal and Ms. Roni Shulman, who also went through the
Israeli Archives and were available for and attentive to any missions
(sometimes even impossible ones) assigned to them. Their contribu-
tion was valuable and significant.
I would like to give special thanks to my professional editor, Mr.
Samuel Beris, who is a blessing to me as he is always a welcom-
ing, efficient, and informative advisor. I wish for many years of
cooperation with him and for him, I wish for good health and a
long life. Many thanks are also to be given to my editor at Palgrave
Macmillan—Prof. Farideh Koohi-Kamali, who put her trust in me
by believing in my very specific topic and me. I am aware of the risks
she has taken by recognizing the importance of such narrow issues,
but from this, we can see her breadth of knowledge, love, and desire
to promote new research. For me, and for the market, this is not
an obvious thing, and therefore she must be applauded—and even
cherished—for her courage. Gratitude and thanks are also given to
the professional team at Palgrave Macmillan; Ms. Sara Doskow and
Ms. Alexis Nelson, who helped in the publication of this monograph
with much care and devotion.
Finally, I would like to mention that in this field of research,
especially when you open a window onto new material involving
a new movement, organization etc., the knees sometimes go weak
from excitement and fear. The excitement comes from the oppor-
tunity to share this knowledge with the academic community and
the fear comes from the possibility that I might not have presented
the knowledge in a sufficiently clear and effective manner. I want
to believe that this book will provide the group studied with its real
place in the history of the Iranian revolution and will shine a light
upon the dynamics of the revolution.
In the Bible, The Book of Proverbs, 2:6–7 is written, “For the
Lord gives wisdom; from His mouth (comes) knowledge and discern-
ment. He lays up sound wisdom for the upright, a shield for those
who walk in integrity.” Mistakes are not welcome, but I believe that
I cannot dismiss it. The above-mentioned colleagues and friends,
family, and relatives are the ones to receive any credit, while the
criticisms should be directed at me.
Abbreviations
AMAL al-Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniye (Lebanese

Resistance Regiments)
BBC The British Broadcasting Corporation
BStU Bundesarchiv- Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und
Massenorganisationen
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DPA Deutsche Presse Agentur
IFM [The] Iranian Freedom Movement
IRDC [The] Islamic Revolution Documents Center
IRGC [The] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—also: Army
of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution—(Sepāh-e
Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi)
IRI [The] Islamic Republic of Iran
IRP [The] Islamic Republican Party—(Hezb-e Jomhuri-ye
Eslami)
ISA [The] Iranian Students Association
ITA Iranian Teachers Association
MKO Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (also: MeK, MKO)
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
R AF Red Army Faction
SAJAJI Sazman-i Jonbesh-hay-i Azadibakhsh-i Jahan-i
Islam—‘The Organization of the Liberation
Movements of the Islamic World’
SATJA Sazman-e Enqelabi-e Todehay-e Jomhory-e Islami-e Iran—
The People’s Revolutionary Organization of the Islamic
Republic of Iran
SAVAK Sāzemān-e Ettelā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar—(Organization
of Intelligence and National Security)
xviii M Abbreviations
USA United States of America

USD USA Department of State
VAVAK Vezarat-e Ettela’at Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran (The
Ministry of Intelligence and National Security
of the Islamic Republic of Iran (MISIRI))
CHAPTER 1
Theological Approaches
Introduction
Genesis 2:19 reads, “And [God] brought [the animals] unto Adam to
see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living
creature, that [was] the name thereof.”
Verse 20 says, “And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of
the air and to every beast of the field; but for Adam there was not found
an help meet for him.”
The only way this verse can be interpreted is that God wanted
humanity to be a part of his creation of the world—and share in that
creation. In other words, giving humankind the ability and oppor-
tunity to choose names for all the other beings created by God made
him a partner with God. Moreover, this specific verse also tells us
that the names that were chosen and given to the animals and other
subjects influenced the character that these animals displayed.
The Bible is not lacking in these kinds of examples that empha-
size the connections between the names given to relevant beings and
their behavior and deeds; and some of these names were given as the
consequences of specific events, thoughts, and promises. Examples
of this are the names that Adam and Eve gave to their children and
those that Jacob gave to most of his sons—which became the names
of the 12 tribes. Others were changed as the consequences of their
actions, as we see in the change of Abram to Abraham, Sarai to
Sarah, and Jacob to Israel.
We can also find instances of names being used to signify a lead-
er’s personality in the Arab and Islamic world; especially in names
2 M Revolution Under Attack
that derive from the tribes’ power—its horses, camels, and tools (for
example, I’nan for bridle, Hassan for horse, Jamal for camel, Faras for
the horse’s rider, Rassan for the reins or halter, etc). It also expresses
the wishful hope that babies so named will be strong and powerful,
such as in the use of Nimer for a tiger, Lith or Assad for a lion, Dhib
for a wolf, Fahad for a panther, Saqer for a falcon etc. National and
religious movements/organizations/institutes have also followed and
adopted this method by giving themselves names with powerful and
religious meanings such as Fatah for glorious victory; Ansar for the
followers; Muwahidun—the followers of God Unity and Oneness;
Ahl al-Hadith—the Hadith House; Mojahedin—the Holy Warriors;
Fadaiyan—the devotees (of Islam); Islamiyun—the fundamentalists;
etc. The above is presented in this specific chapter in order to point
out the etymological and interpretational importance of names and
to emphasize their connection with the material presented in other
chapters.
This chapter deals with the names of the Forqan group—the
Forqan and Kahf—and tries to explain what the group’s intentions
were in choosing these names; since choosing a name for a religious
group that purports to represent a religious ideology and practice
is not a thing that we should ignore. Religiously, the name exerts a
fundamental influence on the inner circles of the group, the outlook
of the public it addresses, and its rivals. Thus the Forqan, being an
extreme fundamentalist religious Shi’i group that claims to represent
real Islam and the real message of the Quran, could not have found
a better name than the Forqan, whose literal interpretation/meaning
is “the Quran.” The following chapter presents primary sources and
well known Hadith and Hadith scholars (Sunni as well as Shi’i, and
both classical and modern) that refer to what is understood to be
the meaning of Forqan. These explanations and interpretations will
help us, in the following chapters, to better understand the Forqan
group’s motivations and deeds.
The Religious Meaning and Interpretations of the Name Forqan

The word forqan, which appears seven times in the Quran,1 seems
to have more than one acceptable meaning and interpretation, but
the notion of forqan is always related to as something prestigious
and honorable, with a whole sura named for it. Surat al-Forqan—the
Theological Approaches M 3
25th sura in the Quran—is composed of 77 verses (ayat), and was

given in the Makkah (Makkiya). The immediate explanation for why
this sura was given in the Makkah is obvious, since it mainly dis-
cusses the sources of real belief and provides examples of them. The
suras of the Quran, like the Makkiyan suras, however, generally deal
with Forqan according to its literal meaning, which is “criterion” or
“standard.” Vehr’s dictionary, on the other hand, defines Forqan as
proof or evidence.
The theological and religious meaning as defined above relates it
to the very word, quran; that is, the Forqan, like the Quran itself,
represents the real truth and the real faith 2 as it appears in Surat
al-Imran (the family of Imran) where the meaning of Forqan is seen
as equal and synonymous with the Quran. Surat al-Imran (sura 3),
verse 4 states: “Before, as guidance for the people. And He revealed the
Qur’an [Forqan in the Arabic text]. Indeed, those who disbelieve in the
verses of Allah will have a severe punishment, and Allah is exalted in
Might, the Owner of Retribution.”3
According to Fred M. Donner, in his article “Qurani Furqan,”
the word “ furqan” means a form of revelation that relates to some
other revealed text such as “the Book,” “the Torah,” “the Gospels,”
and so on, but he also offers a second opinion when he says that the
“furqan is not a form of revelation, but rather constitutes the intent
or purpose of revelation—just as guidance (huda) . . . is the goal or
purpose of the Qur’an.”4
Uri Rubin, in his interpretation of this specific verse in Quran
3:4, says that Forqan is one of the names of the Quran and, accord-
ing to him, the Muslim ulama seem to have adopted the explanation
that perhaps this word—forqan—comes from the root of F.R.Q,
which means “depart,” or something that is between truth and false-
hood.5 Donner also examines this word etymologically and says that
forqan comes from the Arabic root F.R.Q, which means, “to split,”
“to separate,” “to distinguish,” but could also mean “discriminating
or something that discriminates.” Donner also cites Mohammad Ibn
Jarir al-Tabari’s tafsir and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (mafatih al-ghayb)
who also provide etymological contributions to this word and say
that the root of forqan, F.R.Q, in some way refers “to God’s sepa-
rating, or distinguishing between, truth and falsehood . . . ”[,] and
“In some cases they argue that furqan was a reference to the Quran
itself.”6
Rubin suggests another possible etymological interpretation that

relates this word to Aramaic, where it means “redemption” or “sal-
vation” ( furqana). Rubin concludes that, according to many other
Muslim ulama, forqan refers to the all the religious writings that
separate truth from falsehood.7 Donner also examines this word
through the etymological lens and says that “in Persian, the word
forqan has come to have the following meanings: the ‘distinction
between truth and falsehood’, ‘the Quran’, or ‘scripture’” He also
says that Western scholars consider forqan to be an Aramaic word
(as Rubin suggests) that comes from purqana (salvation) and was
borrowed from Arabic. 8 Donner suggests another possible interpre-
tation, according to which the Aramaic word purqana (which means
“salvation”) came from the Syrian word puqdana (commandments).
For him “It is possible that in some way the Quranic furqan, in those
passages that refer to something revealed to Moses, is actually derived
from the Aramaic puqdana, ‘commandment’.” 9 However, it seems
that a possible antecedent Hebrew contribution to this understand-
ing has been neglected, as the word—pequda—“commandment,”
and its root, P.Q.D, appears in the Old Testament 150 times and
much before the appearance of the Syrian Puqdana, Purqana, or
Furqana.10
In the aforementioned “Qurani Furqan,” Donner provides us
with a list of Hadith and Tafsir writers that contribute their under-
standings of the word forqan. Its earliest appearance is in Qatada
ibn Di’ama from the seventh century, the century when Islam first
appeared (d. 679). Di’ama says that Forqan is the Quran and noth-
ing else. The next contribution is made by Rabi’a b. Anas (d. 756),
who also refers to the word forqan in Quran 3:3 as the Quran itself;
as something “which divides . . . between truth and falsehood.”
Here, b. Anas also provides an explanation for why Forqan is the
Quran. Ibn Ishaq (d. 757), who quotes Muhammad b. Ja’far b. al-
Zubayr, also follows the path of the previous contributors and refers
to the word forqan in Quran 3:3 as the separation between truth
and falsehood, but mostly “regarding those things about which the
‘parties’ (al-ahzab) disagree in the matter of Jesus and other issues.”
Al-Tabari (d. 923 ad) says that the Forqan is not the Torah and
this opinion is supported by Ibn Zayd “who identified furqan in
Q. 21:48 not with the Torah, but with the truth (al-haqq) which
God brought to Moses and Aaron.” Al-Baydawi (early 1400s), by
referring to Quran 3:3, tries to return to the earliest understand-

ing of the word and says that the word forqan seems to be “things
that distinguish between truth and falsehood.” But, in Quran 8:41,
in relation to the words “day of Furqan” he says that it seems to
be “the day of Badr, for on it (that day) truth was distinguished
from falsehood.”11 In this series of respectable Tafsir and Hadith
writers that Donner presents, we can see their effort to pinpoint
the exact understanding of the meaning of forqan. In the coming
paragraphs, we will present other Hadith and Tafsirs scholars that
not only see this word like the earlier scholars did, but also provide
new interpretations.12
The Forqan sura deals with the Prophet’s message to the Muslim
community about Islam’s conflict with polytheism and polytheists
and the bad consequences of hypocrisy and idolatry. In the sura,
which is divided into three unequal parts, the first part tries to
refute the logic of paganism and explain the punishment of Allah
for idolatry in the past; the second part talks about Allah’s existence
and power in the universe; and the last part deals with the question
of who the real believers and servants of Allah are. Muslim religious
philosophers hold that when you combine and correlate all these
parts together into one exact understanding, what you have will be
the Quran, and that is why this sura was named the Forqan—the
ability to distinguish between both truth and falsehood, and good
and evil.13
We can also find support for Rubin’s interpretations in the
Hadith and tafsirs. In the modern Shi’i scholarly interpretation of
the Quran by Sheikh Nasser Makaram al-Shirazi, Tafsir al-Amathal
fi Kitab Allah al-Manzal (The Complete Interpretation of Allah’s
Book [the Quran]), he treats the Forqan not only as the Quran itself,
but as both a divine creed that will enable humankind to separate
evil from good and falsehood from truth and also as the Israelite
Torah—as a creed that was given to the Bani-Israel for the same
reason.14 Moreover, on page 517, al-Shirazi writes “shahar ramadhan
aladhi inzal fiha hadi lilnas wa bint min alhadi walfurqan”—“the
Quran was given to Mohammad the Prophet] during the month of
Ramdhan, [and within it, He] gave him the instructions and the
criterion [Forqan—the instructions about how to separate truth and
false],”15 and “Ma’ iyar maa’rafat alhaq walbatil ”—“the basic knowl-
edge of right and wrong.”16
When, however, we go back in time to the famous and well-known

tafsirs and Ahadith, we find basic, but also innovative thinking
about the words forqan and sura. In the Hadith Sahih al-Bukhari,
that is, related to the Persian scholar, Mohammad al-Bukhari
(d. 870 ce), in volume 59—Kitab Fadhail al-Quran (The Book of
the Virtues of the Quran), Bab 2—Unzila al-Quran a’ la saba’ hi
ahrufin (Chapter Two), we find that the Quran could be recited in
seven different ways, but we hardly find any arguments regarding the
Suart al-Forqan. The story that al-Bukhari narrates deals with the
way the Prophet’s Sahaba (inner circle of friends) recited the suras.
In this case, Umar bin Al-Khattab is angry at Hisham bin Hakim
because the latter did not recite the Surat al-Forqan correctly that
is, in the same way that al-Khattab knew how to recite it. Umar bin
Al-Khattab not only argued with Hakim, but also subjected him to
an informal trial in front of the Prophet. At the end, the Prophet told
them that there is no one way to recite this sura and its message, but
seven ways.17 From this story in al-Bukhari, we can learn about the
message that the Prophet wished to be passed on—that it does not
matter how you tell the story when the message is correctly transmit-
ted. The debate between the two does not show any argument about
the essence and message of the sura, but about the manner in which
they both seemingly recited it incorrectly—but for the Prophet, it
was acceptable because the meaning remained unchanged.
A different version of the abovementioned story can also be found
in al-Tabari’s Tafsir—Jama’ al-Bayan fi Taawil al-Quran. In volume
one, article 15, al-Tabari writes that the Forqan, as written in al-
Bukhari (they are both from the ninth century), can be recited in
seven different ways but, in contradiction to al-Bukhari, al-Tabari
provides us with another aspect of the Forqan. A Hadith that he
presents says, “sama’atu Hashim bin Hakim iqraa’ surat al-Furqan fi
hayatu rasul-Allah [ . . . ], fasama’tu liqraatua fadha hu iqrauha a’ la
haruf kathira lam yuqriniha rasul Allah [ . . . ], fakadit asawarahu fi
alsala, fatasabbarat hata sallim. Filam sallim libbatuhu biradaa’ hu
fiqalat: mi aqraak hadha alsura alati sama’tuki taqriuha? Qal: aqraniha
rasul Allah [ . . . ]! Fiqaltu: kadhabit, fiwallah an rasul allah [ . . . ] lihu
iqrani hadhihi alsura alati samaa’tuki taqriuha! . . . thuma qal rasul
allah [ . . . ]: an hadha alquran inzal a’ la saba’ ahruf, faqaraua ma
tisar minha”—“I have heard Hasim bin Hakim praying and he was
reciting it [the surat al-Furqan] in different ways [not as the Prophet
used to pray], and I almost stopped him in the middle of his prayer;
and I waited in patience [till he recited] the Salim (the end of the
prayer when the prayer moves his head from right and left). When
he finished I held him by his clothes and said, ‘Who called out this
sura that I just heard you reciting?’ He said, ‘The Prophet said it!’
[so I] told him ‘Liar, there is no way the Prophet said it, [since] he
said it to me [differently] from the way I heard you say it’; [all in all],
the prophet said: ‘This Quran was given [descended] in seven signs
[words, i.e.,—ways] and read it as you [best] can’.”18
However, in the Shi’i Tafsir of Hashim ibn Sulayman Bahrani
(d. 1696), in his Kitab al-burhan fi tafsir al-Qur’an, he finds the
Forqan to be an addition to the Quran and not the Quran itself. In
the Hadith that relates to Abdullah bin Sanan, the Prophet him-
self distinguishes between the Quran and the Forqan as two differ-
ent things: “al-Quran: Jumla: a’n al-Quran wa al-Furqan? Qal [the
Prophet: the Quran]: al-Kitab, wa Akhbar ma Ikun, wa al-Furqan:
al-muhkam aladhi Yaa’mil biha wa kul Muhkam fihu Forqan”—“The
Quran sentence: What is it the Quran and the Forqan? [the Prophet
said: Quran is] the book and the news (i.e., Hadith/Ahadith) for
what will be, and the Forqan is the tool the judge, [the Ulama or
Mujtahed] works with [in order to interpret the Quran] and every-
thing he judges he calls Furqan.”19 To re-interpret the above, we
can conclude that the Forqan is the last version of the Quran, and
that the Ulama should make Ijtihad (their judgments) using this
version.
In the Tanwir al-Miqbas min Tafsir Ibn Abbas, attributed to
Abdullah ibn Abbas (d. 687) and considered to be one of the most
prominent Sunni Tafsirs of the ninth century, Ibn Abbas seems to
treat the first verse of the al-Forqan sura like most Hadith collec-
tors and tafsir writers of his time. Ibn Abbas’ interpretation for the
meaning of forqan is, “the Forqan is the Criterion—of right and
wrong. Allah sent Jibril (Gabriel the angel) with the Qur’an so that
Mohammad the Prophet will be a Messenger warning the people,
the jinn, and the human beings with the Quran.”20
Another tafsir of the late ninth century that refers to the words
al-Forqan and sura is the Tafsir al-Tustari, which is attributed to Abu
Mohammad Sahl bin Abdullah bin Yunis bin Rafi’ al-Tustari (d. 896
ce). Al-Tustari understands the first verse of surat al-Forqan like
this: “It was Allah who gave Mohammad the Prophet the privilege
by revealing the Criterion (Furqan) to him, so that he might distin-

guish truth from falsehood, friend from foe, and he who is close to
Allah from the one who is remote from Allah; . . . so that the prophet
might be like a lamp and a light, to guide the people to follow the
Quran.” 21
In the fifteenth century, we have the Tafsir al-Jalalayn (Tafsir
of “the two Jalals”), of the Sunni-Shafi‘i Scholars: Jalal al-Din
Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Mahalli (d. 1459 ad), and his student-
colleague, Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman bin Abi Bakr al-Suyuti
(d. 1505 ad). In their tafsir, we can find a few references to the literal
and conceptual meaning of the word forqan. In their interpretation
in Surat al-Imran (sura 3), verse 4, for example: “min qablu hadi-
yin lilnas waanazala alfurqana ina aladhina kafaruu biaa’ti allahi
lahumm,” and for this specific verse they write: “’waanazala alfurqana’
bimaa’ni alkitab alfurqa bin alhaq walbatil wa dhakarahi baa’ d dha-
kar althalatha lia’m ma a’ daha”—“and He revealed the Criterion
(al-furqan), meaning of the Scriptures that discriminate between
truth and falsehood. He mentions this [Criterion] after He has
mentioned the three Scriptures so that it encompasses all [revealed
Scriptures] besides these.” 22
As for their interpretation in the surat al-Forqan itself, we can
find it in the first verse of the sura, “tabaraka aladhi nazala alfurqan
a’ la a’ bdihi liyakuna lila’ lamina nadhiran” which, according to their
interpretation, is “’tabaraka’ taa’ li ‘aladhi nazala alfurqan’ alquran
alaniha faraq bin alhaq qalbatil”—“Blessed, is He [Allah] who
revealed the Criterion (al-furqan), the Qur’an, as it distinguishes
between truth and falsehood.”23
The Jalalayan also gave another interpretation to the word forqan in
surat al-A’nkabut (29) verse 27: “wawahabuna lahu ishaq wa yaa’quba
wajaa’ luna fi dhuriyatihi alnubuata walkitaba.” The Jalalayan, for
this verse says “’walkitaba’ bamaa’ni alkitab ay altorah walinjil, walz-
abur walfurqan”—“and the Scripture, meaning, the [Holy] Books,
the Torah, the Gospels, the Psalms and the Criterion (al-furqan).” 24
The last reference to the Forqan in Tafsir al-Jalalayn is in sura
57, surat al-Hadid, verse 26: “walaqad arsalna nuha wa Ibrahim wa
jaa’ lna fi dhuryatihima alnubuata walkitab.” For this saying, the
Jalalayan interpretation is—“yaa’ni alkitab alrabaa’: alturah walinjil
walzabur walfurqan fainiha fi dhariyat Ibrahim ‘ faminhum muhta-
din wa kathir minhum fasiquna”—“the Scripture, meaning the four
books: the Torah, the Gospel, the Psalms and the Forqan, all of
which have been [revealed] to the seed of Abraham; and some of
them are [rightly] guided, and many of them are immoral.” 25
There are other more comprehensive interpretations for Forqan
among the modern Shi’i Tafsir scholars—(modern Shi’i Mujtaheds)
that not only understand this word literally, as most of the Sunni
and Shi’i Ulama have understood it, but also metaphysically and
conceptually. For example, the Iranian Mujtahed Mohammad Sadeq
Tehrani, in his comprehensive book al-Furqan fi Tafsir al-Quran bal-
Quran (The Discriminating Book in a commentary on the Quran by
means of the Quran), sees the Forqan as a complete understanding
of the Quran. For him, learning or interpreting the Quran can be
done in two major ways, al-Balaghly and al-Furqanally, that is, either
the delivery of a message or a comprehensive message—each, both
practically and spiritually. For Tehrani, as one who is representative
of the practices of the Shi’i Ijtihad, the Quran is filled with con-
tradictions and inconsistencies. Therefore, the important function
of Ijtihad is to interpret the message; not just to translate it from
Arabic to other languages or to provide a basic understanding of it.
For him, the Hadith of the Sahih (which is the most authentic and
reliable one), is no less important than the Quran itself. Moreover,
the Hadith itself is not to be used as an interpretation, since only
the Prophet and the Imam from Ali’s bloodline have the right to
interpret the Quran and the Hadith. Tehrani examines the Quran
and the Hadith according to the Forqanic conceptualization and, by
using the most exact interpretations, enables the Mujtaheds to make
the Quran/Hadith accessible to believers.
The Forqanic way is not only to separate evil from good and truth
from falsehood, but is the way to arrive at the most refined under-
standing of Islamic sources using Ijtihad to reveal the real way and
understanding of the Quran to the believers in a practical way—by
explaining the right way to carry out the religious commands (of the
doctrine), and how to understand spiritual Islam, the wholeness of
Allah, the universe, and the mission of humankind on earth. In this
respect, Tehrani understands the Forqan as the Shi’i way. 26
Based upon our review of the entire (both ancient and modern),
best known, and authentic, Sunni and Shi’i Hadiths and Tafsirs, we
can come to two basic conclusions: the Forqan is the whole meaning
of the Quran—literally, practically, spiritually—and is, especially,
the major and most basic tool that the Mujtaheds-Ulama use in
order to issue Fatwas or provide interpretations of the knowledge
that is hidden within the Quran. The practice of Ijtihad, in any way,
be it Sunni or Shi’i, means forqan.
The contradictions that do exist between the ancient and mod-
ern scholars of both the Sunni and Shi’i schools are minor and do
not turn the meaning of the Forqan into some other concept. In
both ancient and modern Shi’i scholarship, however, we can see that
the meaning of forqan has a greater wholeness and completion than
in Sunni scholarship. The Shi’a understanding of it can be better
understood when one looks at modern Shi’i scholarship that still
uses the practice and method of the real meaning of the Forqan in
both ways—firstly in the use of the wholeness of the Quran, which
means we can find everything in the Quran from practice to mysti-
cism; and secondly, but no less importantly, when the Forqan is used
as a tool for Ijtihad. We can see that the Shi’a have never abandoned
the Ijtihad method in order to improve religious life and to provide
suitable religious solutions for cases not dealt with in the Quran and
the Sunnah.
In most of the scholarship shown above, the Forqan is used to
arrive at “the last word” or the final understanding of a text, accord-
ing to the Mujtahed/Ulama’s comprehension of the divine mes-
sage. While the Shi’a look at it as a tool and the Sunni look at it
as wholeness, they both still maintain the same position that the
Forqan is the supreme religious source. When a religious scholar
uses a Furqanism, it means that he is providing the people with the
ultimate understanding of the current issue and matter according to
the basic understanding and practices of the Ijtihad. This is the case
whether this is done by Sunnis—who rarely use Ijtihad, as the Ijtihad
gates were closed by the religious scholar Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn
Ali ibn Isma’il al-Shashi Qaffal, al-Shafi’i (d. 975 ce)—or by the
Shi’is, who never closed these gates. Both agree that the Forqan is
both the knowledge and the ability to distinguish between evil and
good, right and wrong, etc.
Now that we have briefly, albeit superficially, discussed the mean-
ings of Forqan, we should ask ourselves why a group that is religious,
or purports to be religious, would call itself the Forqan. In the fol-
lowing chapters, we shall try to answer this question and understand
the religious meaning the Forqan Group wanted to convey. In past
years, including during the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in

Iran—when the Ayatollah Khomeini pronounced authentic, but still
revolutionary, interpretations of the holy texts to the Shi’a—in its
message to the people, the group uses the word Forqan as its own
name, and this fact should enlighten us about the religious debate
that was taking place between the different religious groups who,
together, were revolutionizing the country.
The Exit of the Forqan from the Cave—the Evolution

of the Cocoons
Before dealing with the ideology and practices of the Forqan group
during the last years of the Pahlavi Monarchy—the Islamic revolu-
tion in Iran and the early days of the Islamic Republic of Iran—we
have to fully understand the deep-rooted motivation that explains
the choice of their name. The name of an organization usually
reflects its agenda and beliefs, and this seems to be the case with
the Forqan. The name Forqan, however, was not the first name of
the organization, which was The Kahfis, 27 meaning “the People
of the Cave.” The connection between the two names: Forqan and
Kahfis will be explained, but first we need to recount the story of
the People of the Cave.
In the Quran 18: surat al-Kahf, we have the story of the cave but,
more exactly, the story of the people who were in the cave. The story,
like many other stories in the Quran, was not originally Muslim, but
was adopted, in this case, from Christianity. The story was adopted
by Mohammad the Prophet after a test he underwent in order to
demonstrate the extent of his knowledge and intended to challenge
him, metaphysically, to see if he knew God’s wonders and secrets.
The Kafir (Infidel/non-believer) who challenged Mohammad knew
this story, but wanted to challenge, or perhaps expose, Mohammad’s
ignorance and probable “humanity” by attempting to demonstrate
that he was not familiar with the secrets of this story.
As already mentioned, the original story was adopted from the
Christians and is known as “The Seven Sleepers of Ephesus.” The
origin of this story in Christianity was from the Greek version told
by Symeon Metaphrastes in the “Life of the Saints,” after which it
traveled to the area of Syria, where a local version developed, and
from then it appeared in other Eastern nations and languages. There
is no official version of this story since, as is the case with any reli-
gion or language, the story develops its own particular shape and
narrative form. The accepted version, as appears in the Catholic
Encyclopedia, is the following. During the third century, when the
Roman Empire was in its decline, the Emperor Decius, who reigned
between 249–251, came to the city of Ephesus (nowadays known as
the Selçuk, Izmir Province, Turkey) in order to defeat Christians
and Christianity. During his pursuit of the Christians, he found
seven of them (Maximillian, Jamblichos, Martin, John, Dionysios,
Exakostodianos, and Antoninos) to whom he offered the choice of
conversion or death, but also gave them time to consider this till he
returned to Ephesus. The seven men decided to accept their fate and
suffer death for their religion. They sold their property, converted it
to money (coins), and went to a cave on Mount Anchilos in order to
pray and prepare themselves for their expected death at the hands of
Decius. While they were praying, Decius came back and asked to
see the seven Christians. When he came to the cave he found them
sleeping deeply after their last prayers and, in response, he ordered
his men to block the entrance of the cave with huge stones and bury
them alive. After this, other Christian believers wrote the names of
the seven men outside the blocked cave, as was the practice for mar-
tyrs. This is the first part of the story.
The second part of the story starts when the Roman Empire had
ceased to exist and, instead, there was a Christian Empire that replaced
the paganism of the Roman Empire during the reign of Theodosius
(the sources are divided if this was Theodosius the Great [379–395]
or the Younger [408–450]). In any event, according to the Catholic
narrative, the seven men did not wake up until a debate about the
resurrection of the body arose between the Christian devotees and
heretics in Ephesus. When the debate died down, Adolios, the owner
of the cave, opened the cave to use it as a stall for his cattle, and so
awoke the seven Christians, after which one of them, Dionysios, was
sent to buy some food so they could prepare themselves for the death
that Decius had declared for them. While Dionysus was trying to
buy food, the sellers noticed that the coins Dionysius was carrying
belonged to the time of the reign of Decius, which was a very long
time ago. Dionysus then noticed the change in religion of the place,
which he had known to be pagan—as Decius had wanted—but,
now, was under the influence of Christianity, with many churches
and crosses. After Dionysius told his story (which was perfect since
it supported the “resurrectionists” in the debate), he returned to the
cave with the bishops and joined his friends in a last prayer, after
which they all died. 28
As earlier noted, this story found its way into many other lan-
guages, nations, and religions in the regions that chose to adopt it
for their internal and external purposes—of religion and for cul-
tural and folklore. Apparently, it also found its way into the Quran,
which contains its own version of the story. The editor of the Quran
chose to give Sura 18 the name of the story—the Kahf (the cave)—
but inside the sura itself, the story is told within verses (ayat) 9 to 26,
while the sura itself is composed of 110 ayat.
Basically, the Muslim version parallels the Christian one, except
for a few details that disappeared while the story survived. In the
following verses from the Quran, there are both additions to—and
the absence of—information from the Christian version. In general,
the two main things are that, in the Muslim version, the number of
people is missing—and the Prophet says it could have been three,
five or seven, but only God knows how many (verse 22)—and it
includes a dog that is missing from the Christian version. The sec-
ond thing is the number of years the people were sleeping. In the
Christian version, we can conclude that the period was from Decius’
reign to the time of one of the Theodosiuses, but the Quran gives the
exact number of 300 years, and then nine more years.
In the following verses from Sura 18, the Kahf or the Cave, we
are able to see the additional details the Prophet Mohammad has
provided, while still emphasizing the Christian version of the story.
In verse (aya) 9 the following is written: Am hasibta anna ashaba
alkahfi waalrraqeemi kanoo min ayatina AAajaban—“Do you think
that the people of al-Kahf and ar-Raqim were a wonder among our
signs.” The word ar-Raqim could be the name of the aforementioned
dog, or perhaps the copper plate where people inscribed the names of
those sleeping in the cave, or it could even be the name of the moun-
tain where the cave was. 29 However, Sahl bin Abdullah al-Tustari
(d. 896), in his tafsir, says that al-Raqim was the name of the leader
of the group who was named “the dog,” but in fact, they did not
have a dog. Al-Tustari presents other interpretations for this; I’krima
(one of the Makkah leaders during the Prophet’s time) says that
al-Raqim is the word for inkwell in the Byzantine language, Hasan
says al-Raqim is the valley in which the cave is located, and Kaa’b
says it was the lead tablet upon which the names of the sleepers and
the short history of the event were written.30
In his book from 1833 entitled Die Siebenschläferlegende—ihr
Ursprung und ihre Verbrei—The Legend of the Seven Sleepers—Its
Origin and Expansion, John Koch tries to present a broader view
of the legend of the Seven Sleepers and also, though not in par-
ticular, discusses the Muslim version. Koch criticizes this, perhaps
not on purpose, but by describing the detailed web of the story.
According to him, the Prophet Mohammad took this legend and
both added to and omitted some details from it, thus creating his
own version. Koch compares the Christian text with Muslim sources
to clarify what the origin of these distortion/changes were and to
see, both, how this legend crossed deserts and seas till its appearance
in the Quran and how the Hadith and tafsir scholars dealt with the
distortion/changes.
Koch presents Beidhawi’s tafsir for verse 8, which deals with the
name al-Riqam that appears in the sura. For him it could be the
name of the place of the cave, the city nearby, the dog, or the lead
tablet that was outside the cave with the names of the sleepers. Koch
thinks it is the name of the dog as he finds a philological connection
between the name of the dog and the word bite, but does not find
any connection between al-Raqim and the names of places around
the cave.31 With regard to verses 11; 24–25—where the Prophet talks
about the years and then the number of years the people in the cave
were sleeping—Koch does not find any logic in these numbers, but
does have some hypotheses about why the Prophet mentions these
numbers.32
Koch continues to move from one verse to another to refute
the Muslim version(s), and what we can learn from Koch’s inves-
tigation of this legend is the Muslim scholar’s realization that the
Quranic version of this story does not match the original Christian
version of the story. Koch starts first with Ibn Qutaybah (d. 889)33
and his Kitab al-Maa’rif, which Koch says is the earliest source
that mentions this story (which we have already proved not to be
true). Ibn Qutaybah says that these people were Greek youths who
entered the cave before the time of Christianity and because of
that, he accepts the Christian narrative that says the same (and not
Mohammad’s).34
The second Muslim scholar that Koch refers to, this time more
broadly and in greater detail, is al-Tabari (d. 922). For Koch, Tabari’s
version is probably the most accurate, and is close to being what
might explain Mohammad’s changes. Tabari’s version goes like this:
there were some youths, probably six of them, during the time of
Desyasnos (probably from the Hellenic era) before the occupation
by the Romans, and these six youths were pious in their belief in
the oneness of God and so refused to bow down before the pagan
statues. All these six came from respected families and were chal-
lenged by the local king or emperor, who asked them to abandon
their beliefs and bow down according to the pagan ritual.
Since they refused, they felt that they had to run away to a moun-
tain next to the city of Yahlos, where they met a shepherd called
Antonius and asked for shelter. He asked them who they were and
they told him their story. He took them to a cave nearby and joined
them. Up until now, the story could match the Christian version,
but then the Muslim version begins to appear. Tabari continues the
story and tells us that the shepherd’s dog also joined them and, as
they were afraid that the dog might reveal their hiding place, they
tried to drive him off but the dog started to talk and asked them
why they were beating him, since he also believed in God. He stayed
with them and, as is written in the Quran, all the company was put
to sleep by Allah.
In the meantime, the Greek emperor sent a delegation to find the
youths and to bring them to trial but, since they could not find them,
the delegation stopped its search after one month. The youths and
the dog were left there for another 309 years, and every week God
sent an angel to turn over their sleeping bodies so that they would
not be destroyed by the soil. The years went by and the Romans
replaced the Greeks as the regional empire. During the period of the
first Roman Emperor, Jesus appeared and told the Jews about the
seven saints, that God would awaken them, and that those who did
not believe in the resurrection would then believe in it.
309 years after they had gone to sleep, the whole Roman and
Syrian region began to believe in the oneness of God.35 From this
point onward, the rest of Tabari’s story matches the original version,
with only a few harmless changes. Koch tries to examine Tabari’s
story from several directions. He, first of all, tries to correlate it with
the original version, and then examines the terminology that Tabari
uses to portray his version.36 All in all, Koch’s conclusions are more
technical and philological than conceptual. He does not deal with
the question of whether this story is necessary for Muslim use or
whether it is just a plagiarism of the original version. Koch did, how-
ever, carry out a long and useful study that helps us understand this
story’s origin and expansion. His contribution to our study is in his
ability to compare the versions, as it helps us understand the inten-
tions behind the Prophet’s desire to present this story as it appears
in the Quran.
In the sura, in verse 10, it is written: Ith awa alfityatu ila alkahfi
faqaloo rabbana atina min ladunka rahmatan wahayyi lana min
amrina rashadan—“When the young men fled for refuge to al-Kahf.
They said, ‘Our Lord! Bestow on us mercy from Yourself, and facilitate
for us our affair in the right way!’” Asking for mercy from the Lord
could be the last prayer of the seven youths (in the Christian ver-
sion), after which they fell asleep. In verse 11, the following is writ-
ten: Fadarabna AAala athanihim fee alkahfi sineena AAadadan—“So
We sealed up their ears in the cave for a number of years.” Although
the Prophet Mohammad is telling us that a number of years have
passed, he still sticks to the Christian version that does not specify
the number of years.
In verse 12, it is written: Thumma ba athnahum lina alama ayyu
alhizbayni ahsa lima labithu amadan—“Then we raised them up, that
we might test which of the two parties was best at calculating the time
period they remained there.” This could refer to the two parties that
were involved in the debate about resurrection. In verse 16, the follow-
ing is written: Waithi ia tazaltumoohum wama ya abudoona illa Allaha
fawoo ila alkahfi yanshur lakum rabbukum min rahmatihi wayuhayyi
lakum min amrikum mirfaqan—“And now when you have withdrawn
from them and from that which they worship beside Allah, then seek
refuge in the Cave; your Lord will reveal to you His mercy and will
provide for you comfort in this affair of yours.” At the end, Alla
bestowed His mercy on these people and saved them because of their
fundamental devotion; and in verse 25, we find Walabithoo fee kah-
fihim thalatha miatin sineena waizdadoo tisaaan—“And they stayed
in their cave three hundred years, adding nine.” So we are finally told
how many years the people were in the cave.
In order to broaden the Muslim understanding of this story, we
shall try to present other Tafsir and Hadith interpretations of it.
The Jalalayans (fifteenth century) sees verse 22 according to Ibn

Abbas, the Hadith messenger from the time of Mohammad the
Prophet, who says, “qal ibn Abbas, ana min alqalil wa zakarahum
saba’, fala tumar tujadil fihim ila maraa’ zahira wala tastatfi fihim
tatlub alfutya ‘minhum’ min ahl alkitab alyahud ‘ahadan’ wasaluhu
ahl mak a’n khabar ahl alkahf faqal akhirkum buhi radan wa lam
yaqul in shaa’ allah fanazala.”—“I am [one] of those ‘few’ [the ‘few’
in the verse—ila qalil fala tumari fihim],” and he mentions that they
were seven [as in the Christian version]. He continues: “So do not
contend concerning debate about them except in an outward manner
[of contention], and [except] with that which has been revealed to
you, and do not question them; do not ask for opinions [from] any
of them, [from] the People of the Scripture, the Jews. The people of
Mecca asked him [the Prophet] about the story of the People of the
Cave, and so he said to them, ‘I will tell you about it tomorrow,’ but
without adding [the words], ‘If God wills’ (insha’a’ Llāhu).” 37 In Ibn
Abbas’ Tafsir of the same verse, we can find a different interpretation
and other details: “(ma ya’ lamuhum ila qalil) min almuaminin qal
ibn Abbas razi allah anhuma ana min zalak alqalil huma thamanieh
suy alkalb (fala tumari fihim) fala tajadil maa’ hum fi a’ dadhum (ila
miraa’n zahiran) ila an taqra alquran a’ lihum zahira (qala tastafti
fihim minhum ahadan) la tas’al ahadan minhum a’n a’ dadhum yukfik
ma bin allah lak”—“Ibn Abbas, may Allah be pleased with him and
with his father, said, ‘I am among those few [as Jalalayan noticed]:
they were eight young men [but Jalalayan says Ibn Abbas says they
were seven], and the dog.’ (So do not debate about them) so do not
argue with them about the number of the sleepers of the Cave, unless
you recite the Qur’an to them outwardly, (and ask not any of them to
pronounce concerning them) do not ask any one of them about their
number; it is enough that Allah has clarified this for you.”38
Conclusions
The choice of the name, the Kahfis(the People of the Cave), by the
Forqan group, as their initial name, provides a hint about their fun-
damental cause and agenda. It seems that they saw themselves as
those who maintain the right path and Din—religion—who were
sacrificing themselves on the altar of Allah, and finally “awakening”
at the right time—during the outbreak of the Islamic revolution—in
order to improve or, at least, live during the right time—when Allah’s
religion was again ruling. The ending of the story was probably not
too glorious or significant, and we can assume that they wanted not
only to wake up at the right time in order to finally see that they
were right and that the religion of Allah is the right path, but that
they wanted to continue their mission, not only as the people who
represent the will to sacrifice themselves for Allah, but as part of
those who were the motivators and leaders of their religion.
The choice of an organization’s names from the Quran, first the
Kahf and then Furqan, is not something that is accidental or random.
A strong and broad connection can be established between these two
suras, since their main issue and theme is the value of righteous-
ness and religious purity. In both cases, the Forqan group wanted
to present itself as the most pious and devout believers in Islam in
general and the Shi’a school in particular. They depicted themselves
first, and metaphorically, as the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, as those
who have been asleep for ages (i.e., the Shi’a and its believers who
are waiting for the right time), and as those who will awaken when
the hypocrisy and repression of the Shah (who could easily be a
metaphor for the Roman emperor Decius) is finally exposed by the
people. They saw themselves as those who have symbolically awak-
ened from generations upon generations of oppression and hiding
(Taqiyyah) and were now entering into a reign in which religion had
begun to blossom.
In the original Christian and Greek sources of the story of the
Seven Sleepers of the Cave, however, the story ends with their death
after the completion of their mission. The new reign of a most
devoted Christian emperor intended to immortalize their unearthly
and mysterious story, which gives Christianity immortality and righ-
teousness. Finally, and only after their deaths, do they come to the
Emperor Theodosius in his dreams and ask him not to immortalize
them, as he wanted to do with golden tombs in the cave, but only
to bury them in the ground inside the cave. If we try to find paral-
lels between this story and the group under research, the Kahfis,
we can assume they were, unwillingly and forcibly, treated by the
Ayatollah Khomeini like the Seven were treated by Theodosius. In
this case, however, they preferred to give up the honor and remain
active in the revolutionary game. They preferred to change the name
of their group to the Forqan, which was something that was more
representative of and reflected in their agenda. In the following

chapters, we shall see if the Kahfis, by changing their name into the
Forqan, succeeded in their ideology and practice, together with Shi’a
interpretations, to achieve the wholeness—both philosophically but
also practically—of the Quran’s message.
CHAPTER 2
The Emergence of the Forqan Group
Historical Background—the Coming of the Revolution

When dealing with clandestine and mysterious movements, it is often
difficult to put one’s finger on the exact time when groups like the
Forqan first emerged, and the difficulty becomes greater when such
a group does not create any documentation about its establishment.
This common problem has forced us to use testimonies and other
sources to approximate the point in time when the Forqan group was
first seen in the modern history of Iran in general, but particularly,
in tracing the history of the Islamic revolution in Iran.
Amazingly, in a different place, on May 29, 1978, Uri Lubrani
was sitting in the Israeli Embassy in Tehran, and was, in his own
way, describing the current situation to his bosses in the Israeli
Foreign Ministry. In his letter that refers to the first paragraph (just
a day before Turgeman’s letter from Washington—see following
paragraphs), Lubrani writes: “In general, [we] should not find in
Turgeman’s words that he has a different assessment than ours from
Griffin.” It needs to be noted that, at this time in mid-1978, Gary Sick
and George Griffin were working for the US Department of State and
had tight relationships with the Israeli Embassy in Washington. As
we shall see anon, each provided assessments regarding the turmoil
in Iran, which were contradictory to that of the Israeli embassy.
Lubrani’s letter, in reference to paragraph C, expresses differ-
ent things like “from our correspondence with the US Embassy
here (Tehran), we get the impression that they are not of the same
mind in their estimation of the events, while the general intention
is, naturally, to reduce the importance of the American consider-

ations.” So far, nothing is too striking, but Lubrani continues to
report, “We are all of the same mind that the Shah’s regime is not in
danger, but it is obvious that his prestige and credibility have been
damaged.” Another interesting point that Lubrani’s letter reveals is
the following: “from (our? my? [Lubrani’s hesitation]) conversations
with the central SAVAK officers, it turns out that, despite the fact
that their canceled powers have been restored by the Shah, . . . neither
the SAVAK nor the police can reverse the situation and act as they
could in the past.”
As the person actually sitting in Teheran, Lubrani rejects Griffin’s
assumptions and sees the events close up. More than that, Lubrani
supplies us with some interesting information about the religious
circles and their independence and makes the point that their sep-
aration from the government has increased both their power over
the people and their wealth. According to Lubrani, this power has
attracted many of the younger generation to join the religious circles.
He goes on to say that the SAVAK once tried to take control of the
religious institutions by introducing its own men into the “younger
clergy” and that “as far as we know this attempt has failed and some
of the people that were inserted have abandoned the SAVAK and are
cooperating with the religious leadership.”1
In a report dated May 30, 1978 that was compiled by David
Turgeman, the Israeli ambassador to Washington, and filed from
the Israeli Embassy in Washington, we are told about a conversa-
tion he had with Commander Gary Sick from the National Security
Council, (who was the deputy to William Quandt). In the report
Turgeman writes that Sick’s impression from the events in Iran is
that the Iranian clerics have no intention to rule Iran instead of
the Shah and that the Shah has made several concessions in order
to satisfy the religious circles, which should lead to a weakening of
their protests. Sick distinguishes the clerics in the cities from those
of the Qom School, with those from Qom having a more militant
approach and being motivated by private reasons and those from
the big cities having adopted a quieter approach. Finally, according
to Sick, as time has passed, he has come to the conclusion that this
negative phenomenon is certainly not endangering the monarchy,
and that he is, therefore, not too worried about the situation in Iran. 2
Within a year of Sick’s assessment Khomeini would overthrow the
The Emergence of the Forqan Group M 23
Shah, topple the Pahlavi Monarchy, and establish the IRGC. It is,
however, worth mentioning that Mr. Turgeman made the following
comment in his report: “There is a difference between the outlook
and assumptions of Commander Sick and those of George Griffin in
MAHMA”D/INR, See telegram no. 400.”3
The Israeli Ambassador to Tehran, Uri Lubrani, filed a secret
report with the Foreign Ministry and other agencies in Israel, in
which he provides details about the then current situation in Iran.
The actual date is not mentioned in the file but, from a letter dis-
tributed by Elyaqim Rubinstein (of the Foreign Ministry) to other
agencies, we can conclude that the date is around July 11–13, 1978.
In his report, Mr. Lubrani writes that it is very hard to estimate
any range of time for significant change, and all that he could say
was that “considering the current problems of Iran,” he estimated
that “it could take five years to topple the Shah and to establish
another regime.” Moreover, it was not clear to Mr. Lubrani as to
who would take control, but that, in the first stage, it could be the
army officers.4
A memo sent from one of the Israeli representatives in Tehran,
Mr. Yoram Shani, to the Foreign Ministry in Israel, reveals that in
talks he had with Prof. Sepehr Zabih, he learnt that the Ayatollah
Khomeini issued a Fatwa (a religious decree) three weeks before (late
June 1978), that called for the replacement of Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi’s monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic
of Iran.5
While the Iranian shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was strug-
gling to save his monarchy and, while doing so, was limiting the
Israeli-Iranian relations in favor of the Mullahs, the Israeli Foreign
Ministry began looking for allies—in preparation for the day after
the predicted fall of the Shah. In a letter from Yael Vered, the head of
the Middle East Desk of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, to Mr. Karni
from the Israeli Embassy in Tehran, she provides a detailed assess-
ment, compiled by herself and Prof. Netzer, regarding the possible
allies that Israel should seek out in order to be ready for the “day
after.” Among the people that Israel was considering maintaining
contact with were Ali Dashti a cleric (Akhund )—who later became
an anti-religious intellectual but still remained in touch with the
religious circles—and Prof. Afshar, a mullah himself—who had rela-
tions with clandestine groups. 6
In a special, private, and restricted report prepared by Prof.

Amnon Netzer of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and submit-
ted to Yael Vered on August 1, 1978, there was a review made of
the political-religious and secular factors affecting the Iran situa-
tion. In this report, the religious groups were divided into three: the
leaders—none of whom were older than 45; the lower-rank religious
leaders—who were less religiously educated and looking to find
broader audiences among the Iranian people in the big cities, but
whose influence was enormous; and the younger generation—who
were either bachelor graduates of the religious seminars or were still
students there. This group was highly militant and had close rela-
tions with the first group of religious leaders.7
A top-secret report dated August 3, 1978, from the Israeli ambas-
sador in Tehran to the Mossad office in Israel, suggests that the
opportunity for the religious and secular opposition groups to replace
the current order was approaching and, therefore, they were keeping
up the pressure on the government. 8
Griffin, in his report, also argues that the events of the previous
weeks, since the imposition of the military government, had just
worsened the situation,9 that this situation could deteriorate to the
collapse of the Shah’s regime, and that the imposition of the military
government had been interpreted by the opposition as the move of a
weakened king—something that had ignited their struggle against
the Shah. Griffin, in his talks with his Israeli counterparts, made the
comment that his colleagues in Washington were of the same mind
about the situation in Iran, while the American diplomats in the US
Embassy in Tehran saw it very differently.10
In a top-secret file from the Israeli consul in Tehran sent to Yael
Vered on November 29, 1978, the consul informed her about the
crucial meeting that he and Ambassador Lubrani had with Mr.
(Sultan Hassani) Sanandaji11 of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, CEO
of the Asia and Africa Desk. They reported that, for Sanandaji, the
situation in Iran had worsened, was a disaster and, according to him,
all the protests had been orchestrated by the Soviets, who wanted to
drive the United States out of Iran. The amazing thing that Sanandaji
said, according to the report, was that the religious factor in these
events was only a tool in the hands of the Communists and, there-
fore, as has been evident since September 8, 1978 (the imposition
of the military government), the clerics were not a factor anymore.
He made the prediction that the Shah would flee Iran during the
Ashura (that would have taken place in December 1978) and that
the Mullahs would emerge to form a provisional government that
would only last for a short time, until the communists and their lead-
ers would take the government for themselves. The letter’s author,
Mr. Moshe Gilboa, was certain that Mr. Sanandaji was neither
manipulating him nor trying to use the Israelis in order to send
a message to the United States about the urgency and severity of
the situation in Iran.12 Whatever Mr. Gilboa thought, the descrip-
tion of the conversation shows that Sanandaji was manipulating the
Israelis for his needs, and that the real situation in the field was far
from being orchestrated by the communists. The attempt to frighten
the United States and the Israelis just demonstrates the participants’
fundamental lack of knowledge about the factors in Iran, the com-
position of its society, and, especially, its opposition groups.
A communication sent from the Israeli embassy in Tehran to the
Israeli Foreign Ministry referred to a story by Mr. Din Fischer, the
Times’ office director in Jerusalem, that reported that, in Iran, in
November 1978, there were 60 well-equipped militant groups that
had received their weapons from Germany (he could not say which
of the Germanys), and when the “time was right,” the foreigners
would be their first targets.13
In a report from the Israeli Embassy in Washington to the Israeli
Foreign Ministry, there is a detailed explanation of Prof. Zonis’s visit
to Tehran and his impressions of the talks he had there with oppo-
sition groups and their leaders. Among other things, he concluded
that none of the opposition groups really knew what method of gov-
ernment would exist in Iran after the Shah’s monarchy collapsed.14
The view taken by the Israeli Foreign Ministry about the Iranian
crisis provides us with an optimistic explanation for the situation in
Iran at that time, as well as a summary of the activities the Forqan
were involved in and were responsible for. From the Foreign Ministry’s
confidential report, dated January 15, 1979, we find the following:
“At this stage the opposition cannot be presented as a real alternative
to the [monarchy] regime, and there is no organized group that can
establish new one. The opposition has no acceptable national leader
who has the ability to establish a government . . . However, because
of the wide popular character of the national protest movement and
due to the fundamental splits between the opposition groups, there
is no one mind about the optimal character of the next regime, and
they have no idea how they are going to govern, if they get into the
government.”15
In a report made from the Israeli Embassy in Washington to
the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the consul gives detailed information
about a meeting that took place between Prof. Richard Cottam16
of Pittsburgh University and the Ayatollah Khomeini. The inter-
esting points in this report are that Cottam came to the conclu-
sion that not only did Khomeini wish to expand his revolution
beyond Iran’s borders as the first step in fulfilling his ambition
to Islamize the globe, but that he (Khomeini) did not see any dis-
tinction between the Sunna and the Shi’a. Moreover, he reports,
Khomeini’s field man, Ayatollah Beheshti, saw Khomeini’s dream
even more pragmatically as something true, which meant that
the revolutionaries would first do a better job in Iran before they
expanded elsewhere. Another shadowy man that Cottam learned
about during his meeting with Khomeini was Amir Entezam, an
unknown businessman17 (the one who the Forqan promised to
assassinate).
Bertham H. Gold’s memoir describes a meeting that took place
with Shahriar Ruhani (Ibrahim Yazdi’s son-in-law) and Mr. Reza
Sadri, who were Khomeini’s representatives in the United States dur-
ing the Islamic Revolution and who represented Khomeini before
the US government and press, in which some very interesting issues
came up. The meeting that took place on February 10, 1979, the day
before Khomeini’s arrival in Tehran, revealed that Khomeini had
established a “five man committee called The Interim Committee
to Oversee the Activities of the Iranian Diplomatic Corps in the
United States.”18
A communication sent from the Israeli embassy in Washington
to the Israeli Foreign Ministry noted that, in the Israeli delegation’s
talks with Prof. Mervin Zonis of Chicago University, a few issues
arose that Israel needed to be informed about. The first was that the
Iranian Left was weak and insignificant; second—the middle-class,
the intellectuals, and the liberals were disappointed with Khomeini
and were withdrawing their support for the revolution; third—that
whenever Khomeini felt that he was losing control over the situation,
he created fictional enemies like the Zionists and the United States
in order to inflame the Iranian mob.19
A file from the US Department of State (USD) dated June 14,

1979, four months after the outbreak of the Islamic revolution, tried
to provide some understanding of the revolutionary forces that were
taking part in the movement. The USD file went back into modern
Iranian history and examined the religious group that existed from
1906–1921 and which forced the Shah’s government to “include
in the new constitution a clause setting up a Supreme Religious
Council.” This council functioned until 1921, when the Pahlavis
gained power in the country. 20
This USD file examined the mullahs of Iran in contrast to their
colleagues in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia and con-
cluded that the difference between them was that the “Iranian mul-
lahs have traditionally adopted a critical stance toward the ruling
establishment, operating in effect as a theological opposition,” 21
while this was not the case with the other Islamic countries.
At the same time that the USD’s report was issued on June 14,
1979, the USD returned to the current revolution and very clearly
identified the existence of revolutionary forces that were struggling
against Khomeini’s intention to control and influence the creation
of a new constitution that would remove all his rivals of both the left
and right wings from any positions of power. The USD doubted the
possibility that Khomeini would cooperate with either the leftists
or rightists and believed that this would increase the activity of the
political and revolutionary forces that were “critical of the aims of
the revolution.” 22
According to the USD report, the younger generation in Iran saw
itself as the force that had brought about the success of the revolu-
tion and were therefore demanding the reward of receiving a “greater
voice in consolidating the revolution’s gains than they believe they
are now (were) being given.” 23 The ambitions and frustrations that
the younger generations were experiencing were actually causing an
increase in terrorist uprisings against the religious groups, among
whom was the Forqan Group that claimed responsibility for several
terrorist actions against the mullahs. 24
In contrast to other clandestine and revolutionary groups in
Iran—meaning those that had emerged quite a long time before the
revolution such as the Mojahedin-i Khalq and Fadayan-i Khalq of
the 1960s (but mainly after the 1963 riots that brought Ayatollah
Khomeini to the forefront of the Shah’s rivals)—the Forqan group
was a brand new group that allegedly had only developed a few years
before the revolution. The earliest year that we can estimate for its
emergence is 1975, just after the double split within the Mojahedin
and the Fadayan ranks. Since the Forqan were allegedly associated
with the Mojahedin, the belief is that they emerged immediately
after the split within the Mojahedin’s two factions—one Marxist
and the other Islamist.25 Other sources say that the Forqan emerged
in October–November 1977, 26 which is not only more logical and
probable, but is even supported by reliable sources.
There is, however, another belief that the Forqan was formed in
1975, when the Mojahedin announced their conversion to Marxism
and numbered no more than 60 members and supporters.27 According
to Iranian historian Ervand Abrahamian, the Forqan released exten-
sive publications intermittently from 1977 until 1979 and saw them-
selves as the “true followers” of the Qur’an and Ali Shari‘ati.” The
group’s leaders, who were former seminary students, also denounced
the liberals, the “bazaar intellectuals,” and other rival groups, and
were also very anti-leftist, denouncing Marxism as “an international
atheistic conspiracy that was engaged in scheming to dominate the
Muslim world.” 28
According to the USD, the Forqan was established in 1975 “as
a small purist religious group with no previous history of violence”
and “it is believed to be politically leftist.” The Forqan’s main target
was to fight against the intention of the clerics to control the new
Iranian government. 29
As the CIA saw it in a research paper published in 1979 on inter-
national terrorism, there were terrorist groups in Iran that included
Fedayeen, The Iranian People’s Strugglers (IPS: Mojahedin-e
Khalq), The Iranian Students Association (ISA), The Moslem
Liberation Front, The National Front Forces of Iran, The Reza Rezai
International Brigades, and the Forqan Group—that was also on
this list.30
Since we know that the Forqan had already been acknowledged
by the Americans and the revolutionary religious leaders during
1979, it is still unclear exactly when they emerged. The following
sub-chapter will try to clear the fog about the Forqan’s emergence
and ideology, examine what their ambitions and motives were in
establishing this group, and which direction their actions took to
achieve their goals.
The Emergence of the Forqan Group

In a secret report dated February 14, 1977, sent by the Israeli
Consulate in Tehran to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, in a file titled,
“Iran—Clandestine Activity,” we are told about a clandestine group
whose name had never previously been mentioned and that this
group had especially been acting against Iranian and American fig-
ures and not against the army or police stations and units. It goes
on to say that this group had been active over the previous two years
(i.e., from 1975) and that all they seemed to wish to achieve (since
the group’s targets and aims were unknown) was to be publicized in
the media and the newspapers in order to gather more and more sup-
porters for their cause of fighting the Shah and his agents.31
According to Rassul Jafarian, who has written about the political
and religious movements from the Pahlavi period till the outbreak
of the Islamic Revolution, Akbar Goodarzi, the Forqan’s leader, was
born in Lorestan, Duzan, near Aligoodarz (between Khomein and
Aligoodarz), in 1957 (1335). He studied in the Madrasat Alamie of
Khansar from 1973–1974, completed another year in Qom (1975),
and then moved to Tehran to the Madrasat Chehel-Sotoon which
he later left for the Madrasa of Haj Sheikh Abdul Hossein where, in
1976, he was already wearing the uniform of the seminar students.
During the same year he gave lectures in different places within
Tehran, such as Nazi-Obad, Salesbil, and Qolhak,32 and taught in
several Mosques of Tehran, including Masjad Alhadi of Shush Street,
Mosque Fatimeh Khazane, Mosque Ravan of Atabak Street, Mosque
Sheikh Hadi, and Mosque Khamseh Qolhak.33 Other sources say
that Goodarzi, who was named “the good son of the shepherd,” was
born in 1955, started his studies in 1971 at the Khansar seminary,
and finally settled in Qom. Supposedly, it was during these sessions
that Goodarzi formed the Forqan Group (probably in 1976) and
entered politics, fighting on the frontlines in the battle over the
interpretations of the Tafsirs and Quran Suras. Goodarzi also tried
his luck at publishing his writings in Europe, and went to Pakistan
to advance this, but he did not succeed in publishing anything.34
Even Jafarian cannot tell us the exact date that the Forqan
emerged, but believes that it was during the time he was giving these
lectures about the Tafsir and the Quran at the beginning of 1976. In
a footnote in his book, Jafarian quotes some testimonies of people
who studied at the same places where Goodarzi taught. According
to these testimonies, they left Goodarzi’s lectures as they thought he

was giving distorted interpretations of the Quran and the Tafsirs.
The most interesting point in these testimonies is that they saw that
Goodarzi had an Amameh on his head, and wondered who could have
turbanized him. Finally, they came to the conclusion that Goodarzi
had put the turban on himself and pretended to be religiously autho-
rized by the Mullahs as one who was traditionally acceptable to the
Madrasas’ Sheikhs. During this period, however, Goodarzi wanted
to expand his group of students and influence other circles, so he left
for Pakistan and then went to Europe.35
According to Ali Kordi, the Forqan officially appeared in Asfand
1356—which is March 1978.36 The one problem with this is regard-
ing what is meant by “officially?” How could a shadowy, clandestine,
and terroristic group announce its establishment officially?
There were a few others who joined Goodarzi in leadership and
created cells of assassins. Among them were Said Wahed, Mohsen
Siyahpoosh, Hamid Niknam, Ali Asadi, Bahram Teymoori,
Mohammad Motahedi (who was responsible for the assassination of
Qazi Tabatabai), Abbas Askari (who was the commander of Kamal
Yasini and Said Merat), Hassan Aqerlu (who was the commander
of Abdoreza Rezwani), and Amir Fale-nutashand.37 The second in
command to Goodarzi was Abbas Askari.38
The organizational structure was built on the system of separate
cells; with each cell containing three members, each of which was
responsible for three other members. Goodarzi, as the group’s leader,
was, in general, responsible for all the members, but he was directly
responsible for Said Vahed, Mohsen Siyahpush, Hamid Niknom, Ali
Asadi, and Behram Taymuri. Abbas Asgari was the head of the cell
containing Said Merat and Kamal Yasini, who was the head of the
cell containing Morteza Vahidi, Amarallah Amaralahi, and Hassan
Azizi. Azizi was the head of the cell containing Hossein Hosseini,
Ali Akbar Mansuri, and Majid Azizi, while the third cell’s head
was Hassan Aqerlu, with fellow members Hassan Hosseini, Amir
Faale-Notash, and Abdul Reza Razvani. There was also a man called
Mohammad Motahedin—who was not a member of any cell, but
his role is unclear and mysterious.39 All in all, the total number of
members belonging to the Forqan was 49.40
After gathering together several members and supporters, not to
mention audiences to listen to his new interpretations, Goodarzi
started the Forqan’s formal sessions. He applied a new method of inter-

preting the Quran that was his own innovation, in which he ignored
the Imams’ sermons. Although Goodarzi’s interpretive method was
based on his personal, subjective taste, he succeeded in exerting an
important influence on young people’s thoughts and ideas.
Goodarzi started his activities in the mosques of south Tehran in
1355 (1975), but his main base was the “Khamseh Qolhak” mosque.
He started as an interpreter of the Quran and gave classes where he
taught a new method for interpreting the Quran, in which he hardly
used the Imams’ teachings but still managed to gain the attention of his
young pupils.41 Despite this, Goodarzi was considered by the Islamic
Republic to be someone who belonged to the clerical circles, as if the
“Forqan Group was under the leadership of a seminary student. The
irony is that Akbar Goodarzi actually belongs to one of the most nota-
ble groups that broke ranks with the clergy and even opposed it.”42
As for the activity within the Forqan, captured members of the
Forqan claimed that they “did not have any contact with Goodarzi
directly, but we heard that Goodarzi used very poisonous and ugly
words in describing Motahhari.” They, however, continued to obey
Goodarzi and helped him to publish a statement after the assassina-
tion of Motahhari, which was published in the Ayandegan newspaper
and started with a Quran Surat al-Tawbah (The Repentance), verse
12: “ faqatilu aimata alkufri inahum la aimana lahum”—“(And if
they break their oaths after their treaty and defame your religion,
then) fight the leaders of disbelief, for indeed, there are no oaths
(sacred) to them; (fight them that) they might cease.43
The Forqan meetings were held secretly, and each time the address
given was different. The commitment to the group was absolute, and
if a member decided to resign from his membership of the group he
was not eliminated, but there was no way he was able to reconnect
since there was no way he could know the new address of the next
meeting. At this point in time, the group was still open to recruit-
ing more members, so they tried to present themselves as being open
minded and flexible.44
The Forqan’s number of members and followers never exceed more
than 70–80 and, just after the revolution, this number decreased,
as many of its members were hunted down by the new regime
while many others ran for their lives. Some also chose to side with
Khomeini and left the Forqan for ideological reasons.45
CHAPTER 3
The Fundamental Ideology of the

Forqan
The Ideologue Ali Shariati and His Influence on the Forqan

Ali Shariati was born in 1933 in Kahak (a village in Mazinan), which
was a suburb of Sabzevar located in the Khorasan Province of Iran.
His mother was the daughter of a rural family and his father, a devot-
edly religious and spiritual man, was Mohammad Taqi-Shariati.1
The religious, but also intellectual, influence that Shariati’s father
had upon him was remarkable in its effect upon him 2 and Shariati,
the boy, gained most of his religious knowledge in the religious cen-
ters that his father established and which, at that time, were consid-
ered to be reformist.3
In 1953, Shariati was one of the protesters who fought for
Mossadeq and six years later, in 1959, he was arrested and jailed for
eight months for his participation in illegal political activities.4 After
his release, he decided to take a break from political activity and
went to study in Paris at the University of Sorbonne.5 During the
early years of the 1960s, France was deeply involved in the war for
independence in Algeria and the revolutionary atmosphere that sur-
rounded him on the campus deepened his revolutionary and political
awareness and understanding. Despite his Iranian identity, he chose
to take part in protests against the French interference in Algeria.6
During this time, an organization named The Liberation
Movement Front (Nehzat-i Azad-i Iran) was formed, and Shariati
joined the ranks of its supporters.7 The main purpose of this organi-
zation was the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a
moderate regime that would combine soft-Shia Islam with socialism.

The movement was active until 1963, when the Shah destroyed all
the political and opposition movements and organizations in Iran. 8
During his studies in the Sorbonne, Shariati became increasingly
familiar with, and influenced by, the philosophers and intellectuals
who were active at that time and the situations that arose from the
major problems that politics and philosophy were dealing with. The
first philosopher that influenced him was Frantz Fanon, who actively
supported third world societies that were trying to free themselves
from imperialism and colonialism and believed that such societ-
ies had to abandon religious life in order to promote their struggle
against imperialism. Despite the fact that Shariati was deeply influ-
enced by Fanon, he actually thought the opposite—that these soci-
eties must adopt religion as a spiritual motivator so that they would
not lose their basic identities, since he believed that maintaining
one’s beliefs and religion would better help one in the fight against
imperialism.9
George Gurevich was the second philosopher that influenced
Shariati. Gurevich was a Marxist sociologist who argued that history
does not derive from the struggle between classes, but only from the
struggle that takes place among those who have a sense of conscious-
ness about who they are. Gurevich was confident enough to choose
what elements to take from Marx’s ideology, but maintained that
this consciousness, as he saw it, did not derive from economic inter-
ests but from symbols and religious beliefs.10
The third intellectual that influenced Shariati was the orientalist
Louis Massignon—who dealt with Islamic myths—and he considered
Massignon’s books, which dealt with medieval Muslim scholars who
had died because of their religious beliefs,11 to be valuable enough to
be translated. Shariati also discovered other equally respected think-
ers to satisfy his intellectual hunger and curiosity for philosophical
solutions to the major problems that interested him. These thinkers
included Che Guevara (Guerilla Warfare), Frantz Fanon, Jean Paul
Sartre, Guardi, and Raymond Aron.12
As soon as Shariati returned to Iran in 1964, he was arrested by
the SAVAK because of allegations that he had been politically active
in anti-Shah activities in Paris. This time his internment was shorter
than the previous time and, after he was released, he found his place
in academia and started to teach at the University of Mashhad.13
The Fundamental Ideology of the Forqan M 35
From his return and until the end of the 1960s, Shariati remained
in the shadows and attracted no attention among his political and
philosophical counterparts who were, at this time, busy founding
new, although still clandestine, organizations that would, in their
first stages, philosophically challenge the Shah’s monarchy—but
this was something that would later become violent.
“Being in the right place for another opportunity” could be a good
way of describing Shariati’s rising star since his move to Tehran, to
the Hosseiniyeh Ershad institute that, more than any other, marked
his greatest career achievements.14 Shariati taught in this institute
from 1969–1972 to devoted students, and his speeches and lectures
became most popular and created a real buzz among the younger
generation.15 These good things could, however, not last forever
and in 1972, the SAVAK closed this institution because the regime
feared the combination of young and enthusiastic people and charis-
matic teachers with revolutionary, political-religious ideas. However,
there was yet another reason and this would later be reflected in the
hatred the Forqan Group expressed toward religious figures from
this institution.
Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari, who was one of the institution’s
leading figures, thought that Shariati’s philosophy, which was critical
of the Shia religion and its traditions, was too critical and even pejo-
rative. For him, Shariati’s learning was based upon and dominated
by western influences and agendas,16 and Shariati soon became a
target of both the religious institution and the regime’s secret police
who, each for its own institutional reasons, hounded Shariati for
insulting religion or for having contacts with the Mojahedin and
expounding Marxism.17 Although he could still take part in public
life and continue with his writings and publications, his life became
more and more impossible and he decided to leave Iran for Britain
in 1977.18 A month after his arrival in London, he passed away from
a heart attack on June 9, 1977; his followers claim that the SAVAK
was responsible for his death.19
Shariati did not live to witness the revolution he had so awaited,
but his writings and philosophy allegedly fueled the spiritual flames
of the militants and revolutionary groups. Since he used a large
number of different ideological terminologies, it is difficult to iden-
tify him as one thing—religious, Marxist, liberal, nationalist, or
something else. He was interested in any idea that was linked to
revolutionary thinking and therefore, many academic scholars have

connected him with some agenda or the other. More than anything
else, however, Shariati dealt with Marxism in order to better under-
stand the forces that motivated social life in general and that of Iran
in particular.
Shariati wanted to diagnose the ills of Iranian social life through
the lens of Marxism, but only wanted to deal with elements of it,
without accepting Marxism as a binding reality and agenda. For
him, the act of dividing society into two main levels was not enough,
since he thought that one could influence the other and, although
society has the power to demand change, it is only that upper level
of society, which is involved in politics and has an agenda, that can
do this successfully. Only a dominant ideology, he believed, can best
serve the needs of the people, despite the existence of civil organiza-
tions that try to enter politics in order to gain influence and promote
their own agendas. Those, he believed, who dominantly control the
ideology—control the whole system.20 This literally means that the
lower level of society, by virtue of the very natural basis of its own
ideologies, cannot necessarily fight the upper level’s dominance of
what the right ideology should be. The upper level is there because
of its ideological dominance.
In regard to religion, Shariati says that Shia Islam, because of its
fundamental nature, is a revolutionary religion. For him the then-
current situation of the Shia religion as a motivator of society was
not enough, since it needed to construct itself as an overall ideol-
ogy that would exert control over the other ideologies that it was
competing with in the political arena. 21 The only way he saw to save
the Iranian people from imperialism was the Shia religion, since he
believed that it was the most natural and organic form of belief for
the Iranians. 22 Therefore, he believed, only the Shi’is had the power
to confront imperialism because the religion had the right spiritual
tools to provide the people with what they needed—something that
imperialism could never give them.
Shariati, like Khomeini, used Shia religious symbols and tradi-
tions in order to present Shia Islam as a form of activism and not
passivism. He provided a new interpretation of Shia history through
these symbols, but more importantly, he used them as tools to
understand the future in better and more realistic ways. 23 Shariati
believed in an equal and just society led by the Prophet Mohammad’s
way—Nizam-i Tawhid—the rule of the Unity of God (something

that can easily be related to the Tawhid message that the Forqan
emphasized). For Shariati, and this is the way he believed the Shia
sees it, the real successors of the Prophet were the Imams and not the
Rashidun (except for the Imam Ali), and it was they who fought for
socialism and an equal society. 24 Despite placing the Shia religion
above all current ideologies and agendas, Shariati also believed that
the clerics should stay out of the political scene. For him, the source
of the current problems and distortions within the Shia commu-
nity were originally orchestrated during the Safavid era (1501–1722),
when the clerics, who had been welcomed by the new monarchy,
took part in the new administration. This distortion led to a division
of the Shias into two main groups: the Red and Black Shias. The Red
group represented the classical and real way of the Imam while the
black represented the institutional and feudal Shia, which dealt with
archaic and irrelevant questions only to justify its intellectual merits
and to provide a self-image. According to him the Black Shia did
not deal with the real questions concerning their current situations25
and so had become part of an oppressive administration that was not
only in contradiction of Shia principles, but also provided legitimacy
to the regime. 26
The Forqan and Shariati—From Adoration and

Devotion to Distortion
A brief study of Shariati’s religious and social ideologies can provide
us with a good understanding of why the Forqan might admire and
follow him. There are several sources that connect the Forqan with
Shariati, 27 but some of them are doubtful, and before discussing the
reasons for this doubt, we need to learn about how much the Forqan
admired Shariati, and what sort of ideology they took from him.
Akbar Goodarzi, who was the Forqan leader, was allegedly influ-
enced by Shariati’s message as, probably, were many other leaders of
organizations at that time, such as the early leaders of the Mojahedin-i
Khalq, who were affected by him. Under the influence of Shariati’s
revolutionary thinking and interpretations, Goodarzi wrote about
20 interpretations of the Quran as a “monotheistic ideology”28 —just
as Shariati had suggested—in order to present a new and contem-
porary interpretation of its message. Goodarzi, however, went one
step further than Shariati—and perhaps a little too far—in order

to present his similar interpretation of the role of the clerics in reli-
gious life at that time in general, and in politics in particular. Ali
Shariati did want an Islamic system (probably as the Pakistani cleric
Mualana Mawdudi described it) but without clerical intervention,
and the Forqan was one of the flourishing organizations of the 1970s
that adopted this vision. 29
The Forqan, however, being an independent revolutionary group,
had no interest in the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO), who had been
designated as “Islamist Marxists” by the Shah. The secular outlook
of the MKO caused the Forqan to distance themselves from them,
because most of the Forqan members were basically religious and
associated with the mosques and seminars of south Tehran. The
Forqan admired the Mojahedin for their revolutionary zeal, but did
not admire their religious point of view.30
Rassul Jafarian, who wrote the Jaryan-ha va Sazman-ha-ye
Madhhabi-Siyasi-ye Iran—1320–1357—The Religious-Political
Movements of Iran—1940–1977, claims that the Forqan were actu-
ally Shariati’s followers (not just allegedly), and used his ideological
terms and thoughts in their writings. As Shariati become more and
more known as being close to the Forqan, other similar oppressed
groups started to follow him—but only after he left Hosseiniyeh
Ershad.31 This is very likely since the Forqan only emerged during
1975 while he left the Hosseiniyeh Ershad in 1972, but these groups
become more and more associated with him just after his death in
1977.
Ali Kordi, who wrote the book Goroh-e Forqan—the Forqan Group,
published by the Markaz Asnad Enqelab-e Eslami—The Center for
Islamic Revolution Documents, in 2009,32 provides us with another
view of the relationship between the Forqan and Shariati’s ideology.
We must bear in mind that Kordi was like others within the Islamic
Republic that were writing about Shariati and against the Forqan
through the Markaz Asnad Enqelab-e Eslami. Thus, on the one hand,
we might expect admiration of Shariati, but on the other hand, a
very critical approach toward the Forqan.
Kordi writes that the Forqan were not followers of Shariati (as
Jafarian claims), but its enemies, and concludes that they used
“Shariati’s thoughts for their own mistakes,” in other words,
they misused Shariati’s writings to promote their ideology. These
“mistakes” were made by using his ideological approach eclecti-

cally, so that when the Forqan carried out a violent act they could
“attribute their coercive activities to Shariati’s thoughts.” For Kordi,
“Shariati’s intellectual courses had specific characteristics” and he
was “developing a route to religious enlightenment whose religious
aspects were more vigorous than previous ones.” From all this, Kordi
concludes that the Forqan chose “the idea of contention instead of
peace and friendship.”33
According to this “contention perspective,” society is built on a
systematic composition that is “a complex of antithesis and perpet-
ual clashes among groups and social classes.” All these groups within
the society have (naturally) different objectives and interests so, in
order to construct a strong social order, the interests and the aspira-
tions of the intellectuals and the rulers should be imposed upon the
oppressed people. Somehow, Kordi believes that the Forqan adopted
this “contention perspective” from Shariati and for them, “in order
to disorganize this order, conflict and contention is inevitable.” The
adoption of this notion and ideological approach and using dis-
torted interpretations could only lead to one result: “a radicalism
that wishes to bring about rapid and fundamental changes in the
social institutions.” Extremism, it appears, was a well-known and
even welcome approach to be used by followers of intellectuals such
as Shariati.34 Using this method, according to Kordi, and identifying
themselves as extremists, inevitably “colored” the other rival groups
as “Mohafazehkar, Miyanehro va Martaj’a,” which means “conserva-
tive, moderate and reactionary.”35
Kordi’s devotion to the Islamic revolution led him to issue a state-
ment that claimed that the Islamic Revolution, and the creation of
the Islamic Republic, was the result of “tens of years of revolutionary
struggle by Muslim leaders and their followers.” The Forqan, surpris-
ingly, opposed the revolutionary system that the Islamic revolution’s
leaders wished to establish, and this led them to assassinate the main
exponents of this ideology. This misconception of using terror moti-
vated by the ideology of Shariati, even though it had been mistakenly
understood, was approved of by the Forqan’s leader, Goodarzi, who
explained their motives for assassinating the leaders of the clerics by
saying, “The issue of terror is rooted in our position against the revolu-
tion. From our perspective those who have been assassinated were capi-
talists and owners of wealth, clergy and dissemblers or militarists and
holders of power.”36 Kordi is sorry for the “tafsir nadorust”—“wrong

interpretations” that, sorrowfully, led to the assassinations of promi-
nent and well-known religious figures during the revolution. 37
Kordi goes more deeply into Goodarzi’s confession about the
Forqan, its motives and basic ideology, and shows that his devotion
to and admiration of Shariati is obvious, as evidenced in the follow-
ing: “I respect Shariati and his thoughts and, as a Muslim fighter who
has been fighting for his ideas, I have a right to defend him. Defending
a Muslim fighter is not crime that deserves punishment.” Regarding
the Forqan-Shariati connection, Goodarzi says, “[the] Forqan also
tried to propagate Shariati’s thoughts as well. If this means continuing
Shariati’s way, yes we are followers of the Shariati direction.” However,
when Goodarzi has needed to justify the Forqan’s terrorist actions
as seen through the lens of Shariati, he says, “If Shariati’s aim is to
struggle against oppressive and tyrannical regimes who distort religion,
this is exactly what we believe too, and terror is a tool of opposition to
such regimes (“terror nui’ ebraz-e mokhalefat ba chonin nezamhaee mi-
bashod”).”38 Kordi goes on to wonder why, if the Forqan was really
following Shariati’s ideology, did the Forqan not act against the
Shah’s regime? Kordi’s question cannot be left unanswered, and he
says that “the idea that an Islamic regime is oppressive and tyranni-
cal is under question because most of the fighters against the regime
of the shah, who was tyrant, are the founders and defenders of the
Islamic republic. Yet, the dictatorship of the shah’s regime has not
been accepted by all of fighters and strugglers.” 39 Kordi continues,
say that “based ingon his (Goodarzi’s) logic, the struggle against the
shah’s regime is compulsory and inevitable since all of the opponents
have agreed that the shah’s regime is tyrannical, but there was no
such consensus about the Islamic regime.” He, however, goes on to
say that “Shariati himself had no such hostile idea even against the
shah, even though he was against the shah’s regime and was sen-
tenced to prison for 18 months.”40 This defense of Shariati by Kordi
could be misleading since Shariati was indeed in jail for 18 months,
the Hosseiniyeh Ershad seminar was indeed closed due to his revolu-
tionary preaching there, he was monitored by the SAVAK, and he
finally left Iran for the United Kingdom as he couldn’t tolerate the
Shah’s reactionary system any more. This is why, in the presence of
so many good reasons for hostility, Kordi’s defense of Shariati’s non-
hostility toward the shah’s regime is confusing and misleading.
Shariati’s ideology was, however, also used to convince other

potential followers to join the ranks of the Forqan, and this was
done by providing Shariati’s books to young people and presenting
themselves as his followers: “We are followers of Shariati. A revolu-
tion that is not based on Shariati’s thoughts is therefore not based on
Islamic ideology and will not be successful.” And, “We were committed
to Shariati and his thoughts to the extent that we thought we must kill
the opponents of Shariati.”41
Kordi tries to go further with the use the Forqan made of
Shariati’s writings, claiming that it inspired the Forqan, and mainly
Goodarzi as their principal ideologue, to adopt some phrases and
terminology that are only references to Shariati. One of Shariati’s
famous slogans that was commonly used by the revolutionary
fighters: “zar, zor va tazvir” (gold, power, and deception),42 is an
example of this, and such slogans were used to justify their terrorist
actions. In one of the confessions made by Hassan Aqarlou (one of
the Forqan members who were executed), he explained the connec-
tion between the Forqan and Shariati’s justification of terrorism by
saying that “the three triangles of gold, power and deception are the
roots of deviation.” He also claimed that viewing this triangle as an
ideology had led them to use it as a guideline for who they should
assassinate and for what reason: “Qarani was the first to be assas-
sinated by us for having power (Zor); Motahhari was assassinated
for his deception (Tazvir), which is indeed type of a monopolistic
clergy; Rafsanjani, Razi Shirazi and Dashtbaneh (were assassinated)
for both reasons (Zor va Tazvir); Lajevardi, Tarkhani, and Mahdian
(were assassinated) for having gold (Zar) and Mofatteh for decep-
tion (Tazvir).”43
The term “Akhondism” was not actually Akbar Goodarzi’s inven-
tion since he confessed that this term, which had been published in
Forqan publications, was taken from Shariati’s writings.44 Taking
terms such as Akhondism from Shariati was, however, not enough,
and they gave it a Forqanist interpretation and essence. For them,
Akhondism (which meant clericalism) “is an all-covering cloth of
deception,” which meant that the Forqan believed that “Akhondism
played a seductive colonialist role and was the source of stagnation
for an oppressed people” and therefore, “it doesn’t allow them (the
oppressed people) to develop, it stifles the voices of opposition and
justifies the pillage of oppressed people by plunderers.”45
Kordi discusses the Forqan’s reference to the connection between

Akhondism, the West (Europe and the United States), and with
colonialism. For Goodarzi, the Forqan’s leader, “the competition
between America and colonial Europe is one of the fundamental
causes that has led to the political and economic crisis in Iran and,
as long it is continues, it enables the regime to act against the people
as the puppet of America and bow (Iran’s) head (before America).
The regime and their Akhondism are degenerate and act as the pup-
pet of Europe (and that will be the situation) till the uprising of the
approaching Tawhidi revolution.”46 Goodarzi blamed Europe and
the United States for being silent about the Shah’s crimes in Iran
and claimed that, without their help and backup, the Shah would
not have gone so far with the suppression of the people and his use-
less reforms. The Shah enabled the CIA (Sazman-e Jasusi CIA) to
operate and to place Iran under siege.47
The Forqan members admitted that “the Forqan preached (in
favor of ) a revolutionary Islam and was against the majority of cler-
ics.” More than that, “the Forqan expanded upon some of Shariati’s
thoughts and remarks like ‘Eslam-e farda, Eslam-e mulla nakhahad
bud ’—‘The Islam of tomorrow will not be The Mullah’s Islam’ or
‘Hamantor ke Mossadeq eqtessad bedune naft ra matrah kard, ma
Eslam menha-ye ruhaniat ra tarvij mi-konim’—‘As Mossadeq intro-
duced (the idea of ) an economy without oil, we preach Islam without
Mullahs.’” These members also confessed that “before the revolu-
tion they accepted (as probable religious leaders) figures like Imam
(Khomeini), (and the Ayatollahs), Taleqani and Montazeri as open-
minded.” Despite the above, “Goodarzi’s falling out with Motahhari
was because of Goodarzi’s Marxist ideas which were common at that
time in the society.”48
While only dealing with the connections between the Forqan and
Shariati, Kordi tries to present them from the one sided, very narrow
point of view of being motivated by deception. Later, Kordi tries to
understand how the Forqan used Shariati’s view of ruling without
the clerics and writes, “Shariati himself was from a family of clerics
and his ambition was (to prepare) young religious students at semi-
naries (to be ready for the struggle against the shah). According to
Kordi, “(Shariati) was critical of traditional and non-revolutionary
clerics”; he developed and expanded on the Tashayo Alavi, Tashayo
Safavi notions, which were academic ideas, “in order to prepare the
younger generation for a better understanding of their part in the

revolution.” Kordi, however, goes on to say, “Eslam-e farda, Eslam-e
mulla nakhahad bud ”—The Islam of the future is not the Mullah’s
Islam and “by referring to Shariati’s critical remarks the Forqan has
generalized these ideas to all of the clergy.”
Actually, as Kordi later explains, Shariati was referring to the “tra-
ditional and conservative mullahs that are not part of the social and
political developments.” The Forqan made the (probably) intentional
mistake of not differentiating between the clerics, and tarred them
all with the same brush indiscriminately. “By using Akhondanism,”
says, Kordi “we got a “Forqanism” that involves itself with “daraye
bardashthaye efrati-ye ideolozhik, siyasi, ejtama’ i, tarikhi va eqtesadi
bud ”—“extreme ideological, social, political, historic and economic
perceptions.”49
Shariati and Goodarzi were not, however, the only ideologues
who inf luenced the Forqan’s ideology and actions. There was
another figure whose name was Habibollah Ashory, who played
an effective role in the Forqan’s ideological deviation. Mr. Ashory
was a traditional cleric who led a traditional life, and who was dis-
enchanted with other members of the clergy. Ashory came from
Mashhad and was “well-known for being impolite, confrontational
and for expressing his extremist interpretations outspokenly.” Like
others, however, he also wrote about the Tawhid, and thus attracted
the clergy’s attentions and criticism. In 1979, when the revolution
was already underway, he met the Ayatollahs Motahhari, Falsafi,
Beheshti, Mahdavi-Kani, Davani, Anvari, and Mofatteh, at the
home of the Ayatollah Emami Kashani. The topic of conversation
was Ashory’s book, which, one could say, “drew fire,” especially
from Ayatollah Motahhari, who objected to the book (just as he had
too many others, especially Shariati’s and Goodarzi’s). According
to Kordi, Emami Kashani and the others “believed that this book
has perverted many things especially in regard to the Twelfth
Imam’s Appearance Day, Ma’ad and Qeyamat.”50 Kordi argues that
the Forqan’s specific ideological view of the Tawhid is “exactly the
same as in Ashory’s Tawhid book,” with the addition of some of
the “writings and booklets of Goodarzi extracted from Shariati’s
works.” Like other books that the Forqan wanted to promote in
order to inf luence the younger generation, they also used Ashory’s
Tawhid book, for “missionary” purposes.”51
According to Hojjat ulIslam, Ali Davani, an ayatollah who prac-

ticed and taught in the religious seminars of Tehran and who was
close to the inner circles of Khomeini’s religious cadre, provided
his overview of the relations between the ayatollahs themselves and
between them and their followers. In this regard, he also gave also his
impression about the Forqan’s religious credibility and leaders. He
referred to the Ayatollah Motahhari’s references about the Forqan
and its leaders and said that the connection between Goodarzi and
Sheikh Ashori says a lot about the Forqan religious concepts, since
Ashori “is so deviated and . . . I have heard that he has fallen into the
trap of atheism.” More than that, Ashori’s book on the Tawhid and
Shariati’s books on the same theme were actually being used by the
Forqan as religious guides and sources of inspiration.52
Let us return to Rassul Jafarian, who claims that, on December
14, 1977 (Azar 23, 1356), after a meeting that took place between
Shariati’s apparent rivals, Motahhari and Bazargan, Goodarzi not
only published a statement that, in general, threatened the opponents
of Shariati, but also specifically attacked Motahhari and Bazargan,
who had rejoined the Coalition Front. For Goodarzi, this reunion
led to the “distortion of the real ends of our martyrs and would
not achieve their true goals.”53 Goodarzi described this meeting as
“the outcome of this obnoxious and inhuman collaboration on the
eve of the martyrdom of our Martyrs . . . to achieve the goals of the
hypocrites of history.” More than that, Goodarzi stressed that “the
demagoguery and conniving attitude of these instruments (would)
become apparent from another part of their proclamation.”54
After Goodarzi made this statement, the Forqan issued another
one as a response to the public uprisings in Qom and Tabriz, which
they saw as “paying tribute to the souls of the innocents.” They con-
cluded that these actions were meant to be a way to “return the rule
(to the) clergy.” The Forqan put all politeness aside and proclaimed
that these uprising led by the Mullahs were examples of the “wild
interference of the clergy,” and were a “big disaster” in political life.
They saw the clergy’s revival as a “disaster,” and accused the grand
mullahs and high jurists of being “apostates and Wahhabis who were
instructing the people not to read the real message of Islam.”55
After the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979,
they published a pamphlet called “Zikr” (that was actually published
between 1977 and 1979), that called for leadership by the Forqan,
declared their aspiration to grow into a large organization and, from

March 1979 onward, started to publish a pamphlet called Forqan.
Although the ideological and theoretical works of the Forqan were
published until the end of 1979, they then focused their publications
upon political analyses of world affairs and the strategy of armed
confrontation with the new order and its ideology.56
According to Goodarzi, the clerics would confront Shariati with
accusations, calling him “an apostate and Wahhabi,” and instructing
people not to read his work.57 Goodarzi’s prophecy was not too far
from reality since, from this point on—especially after the Islamic
Revolution—Ali Shariati was regarded as an Islamic reformist who
had many disagreements with the Ulama, including Motahhari in
Hosseiniyeh Ershad, where the two gave sermons.58
Other targets of the Forqan, as with Shariati, were the Marxist
and the leftist organizations. The Forqan denounced the liberals
such as the Mehdi Bazargan group (The National Front) whom they
called “Bazaar intellectuals,”59 as well as the leftists and Marxism,
which they saw as an “international atheistic conspiracy that was
engaged in scheming to dominate the Muslim world.”60
However, during this time in the mid-1970s, when Shariati was
well known and very famous, the Mojahedin-e Khalq claimed
Shariati as their very own.61 It is believed that during the split within
the Mojahedin in 1975, Ali Shariati sided with the Islamic faction
and not the Marxist faction.62 Just like the Mojahedin, Goodarzi
also used Shariati’s writings to improve and shape their ideology 63
and, at this point and not necessarily connected with this split, the
Forqan started to emerge, and this was due to the influence Shariati
had on these revolutionary groups.
The Extent of Shariati’s Philosophical Influence on the Forqan

In her extraordinary article, “‘Shariati and the Notion of Tawhid:
Re-exploring the Question of God’s Unity,” Elisheva Machlis tries to
give us a better understanding of the notion of Tawhid in Shariati’s
writings. One could argue about whether or not Shariati’s writings
contributed to the initiation of the Islamic revolution in Iran, but
surely we can explore his understanding of Tawhid to help us under-
stand the Forqan’s own interpretation of Tawhid, and try to see if
we can find any traces of influence and correlations between the
understanding of Tawhid by Shariati and the Forqan.
Machlis opens her discussion on Tawhid with several questions,

one of which can contribute to our research into the reading of the
Forqan. The question Machlis asks is, “Why did Shariati choose
to promote social justice and political change through the concept
of Tawhid, the most fundamental and agreed upon principle of
Islam?” For her, Shariati’s Tawhid “is in essence a belief in ‘true’
monotheism.”64 More than that, Shariati’s view of Tawhid is divided
into three main approaches, which, all in all, describe the ultimate
relations between human beings and their God. These three are the
rational-philosophical, the puritanical-literal, and the mystical-sym-
bolic approaches.
Shariati explains Tawhid by drawing a link between “Islam, poli-
tics and society,” since, for him, Islam is a “total way of life.” Thus
Tawhid is not only a concept of theological meaning, but a “com-
plete system of Islam that incorporates the material and the spiri-
tual world, this world and the hereafter.”65 In the light of this,
we still have difficulty in fully understanding the Forqan’s anti-
politics, since Shariati claimed that the worlds of both Sunni and
Shi’is “lamented the moral decadence of society and called for a return
to Islam through education and political action.”66 Shariati, however,
also advanced the “Shi’i acceptance of freedom of choice”67 and this
probably helped the Forqan not to choose politics as their way.
After the elimination of the group in the early 1980s, some rem-
nants of the group published a paper that described Goodarzi as
someone who had made efforts to “go into the heart of the Quran
and the main texts” over the previous decade (1970–1980). In 1975,
they wrote that only after five years of deep study did Goodarzi
succeed in seeing the results of his efforts and start to publish his
interpretations of the Quran; and it was probably this action that led
to the formation of the Forqan.
Mention has also been made of Goodarzi’s book: Tawhid and All
Its Aspects (published under the pen name of Sadeq Dawoodi), which
was written because of the Forqan’s need to show that the “worst
weakness of all revolutionary organizations from the time of the
constitutional movement was their lack of ideological awareness.”
Goodarzi saw this book as something that was really needed at this
time, and as something to fill the vacuum of awareness and proper
leadership.
In this book—Tawhid and All Its Aspects— Goodarzi argued that

the weakness of all the revolutionary movements from the time
of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1907) lay in their lack of
ideological awareness. 68 This book, however, mainly deals with the
issue of Tawhid—the unity of God—and in it, Goodarzi writes that
Tawhid is the worldwide war of all creatures to solve all the con-
flicts and struggles in their lives and, in this way, reach “the highest
maturity.” This definition implies that Tawhid is the “gradual evo-
lution of all creatures” and Judgment Day is considered to be “the
day of full realization of capacities.” In other words, resurrection on
Judgment Day will be the point in time when all creatures’ efforts
and struggles come to realization. In addition, “from a social point
of view the bloody battle of pro-Tawhid revolutionaries will be the
final, most widespread and highly constructive revolution of Tawhid
and the origin of all historical revolutions.”69 A deeper insight into
this fundamental pillar of monotheistic religions (Judgment Day)
might show that, just as the Druze and Baha’ use it (Judgment Day)
as their main pillar of belief, Goodarzi also emphasizes it here to
distance his group’s methods from those of the other religious groups
that took part in the Islamic Revolution.
Since Goodarzi saw himself as a religious leader, he felt that he
must deal with fundamental issues such as the Tawhid that could
express the real meaning of Islam. For Goodarzi, “the briefest def-
inition of Tawhid is the external worldwide war of the beings to
find a solution for every conflict and confrontation and reach the
highest level of maturity” and “Tawhid is the thinking that defines
the path of the beings through all these conflicts towards the final
point of maturity which is in Allah.” 70 Before continuing with our
discussion of Jafarian, it is important to mention that this method
of using the Tawhid as the fundamental basis for the creation of a
cosmological theology was also used with the foundation of the sub-
groups of Islam—the Druze, the Baha’is, the Ahmadis, and other
fundamental sects. These religions and sects tried to re-identify the
whole religious system via the spectrum of the Tawhid issue. Even
modern-fundamental and revolutionary movements and ideologies,
(such as Mawlana Mowdudi and Said Qutb) have renewed this con-
cept as a fundamental need to understand real Islam. Because of
this, and this needs to be said, the paradigm of radical Islam has
been unmistakably created as the result of a misconception and lack

of understanding of the fundamental basis of the message of Islam.
According to Jafarian, however, “accepting this definition (of
Tawhid ) means a gradual evolution for all beings.” Goodarzi con-
cludes, “By way of an overall and natural overview, we (the real
believers) could say that resurrection is the stage when the human
beings’ efforts and struggles come to realization.” For him, Tawhid
“is the final, most widespread and highly constructive revolution of
Tawhid and the source of all historical revolutions.” 71
Goodarzi and his followers tried to present their religious activi-
ties and efforts as a mission that needed to be revealed and pro-
claimed on the eve of the revolution. Goodarzi’s interpretation of
the Quran and the Tafsir were described by Forqan members as “dar
jahat-e rahai-ye Azadane be Quran va matun-e Asli”—“going to the
real meanings of the Quran and the principle texts” that Goodarzi
himself had invented.72 So far, as long as Goodarzi kept his teaching
restricted to the inner circles, he did not experience any criticism,
but when he started to publish his lectures in pamphlets and books,
the material came to the notice of other mullahs and clerics—who
simply rejected Goodarzi’s “nonsense.”
Shariati also touched upon another very sensitive issue especially
in the atmosphere of revolution that then prevailed. He attacked the
clerics and accused them not only of distorting the real meaning
of the Quran, but of giving the people a narrow understanding of
the real message of the Quran in order to control their minds and
preserve their monopoly of power. The only way to free the people’s
mind, he argued, was to free the Quran from the distorted interpre-
tations of the Ulama.73
Another point that can provide us with a better understanding
of the Forqan’s hostility toward the clerics that Machlis touches
on regarding Shariati, although not in any detail, is that “Islam is
multi-dimensional; religion cannot be confined to the clerics, the
traditional bearers of religious knowledge.” 74 For her, Shariati views
man’s mission on earth as the search for God while man himself is
bound by his own limitations. A man cannot be perfect since only
God is perfect. In this way, Shariati rejects the modern Shi’i con-
cept of the insan kamil (the perfect man) and adopts the concept
of insan tamam (the complete man).75 According to this concept,
since man can only serve as khalifat allah (God’s vicegerent),76 the
Imams themselves are only human beings—not any closer to God,

nor above man.77 Therefore, we can conclude from this that Shariati,
and later the Forqan, maintain that the clerics are not the holders
of divine knowledge and are not above ordinary man—but merely
nueb-e-Imam—vice-Imams.
Ervand Abrahamian has a different outlook on Shariati’s approach
to the clerics during this period, which, although critical and even
sarcastic, was still direct. According to him, “Shariati accused the
‘ulama,’ of becoming an integral part of the ruling class, of ‘institu-
tionalizing’ revolutionary Shi’ism and thereby betraying its original
goals.” 78 He also rejected the ulama’s demands for the “blind obedi-
ence” of the people and for a “monopoly” over the religious texts
because, in this way, “they prevented the public from gaining access
to true Islam.” The change that would lead to accessing true Islam,
he claimed, would come from the intelligentsia (Rushanfekran) and
would not be led by the clerics because the clerics look backward and
not forward, like the intelligentsia do. Shariati’s logic, according to
Abrahamian, implies that revolutionary Islam is equal to true Islam;
therefore, the pseudo-Islam that the clerics represent is false. It is not
enough to know and understand Islam, as the clerics claim they do;
one has to be a real believer, and such believers are represented by
the revolutionaries who fight for Islam and understand it better than
the ulama.79
Let us, however, return to the Forqan and Shariati’s influence on
them, especially his strong influence upon Goodarzi—the Forqan
leader and one of the early founders of the MKO—who was try-
ing to write a materialistic and revolutionary interpretation of the
Quran in which he presented his insights as a “monotheistic ideol-
ogy” to his admirers. In the view of the MKO founders, many of
the personalities who were taking part in the spiritual revolution
were, themselves, symbols of pretense and deception and, based
on their ideology, which was a combination of force and division,
separation was inevitable. Goodarzi believed that the clergy had
donned the costume of deception and, according to him, “the clergy
plays the role of colonialism.” By using this word, he was suggesting
that the clerics dominated everything just like the colonialists had
and he goes on to say that the clergy “has undergone a metamorpho-
sis that distorts the religion and ideology (and that) . . . the Forqan
targeted the clerics who were the factor that stimulated the masses.”80
The members of the Forqan, who were strongly influenced by the

writings of Shariati, had novel interpretations of Islamic teachings.
For example, they viewed God as absolute evolution—as opposed to
the usual teachings of Islam where God is absolute perfection. 81
The Forqan Versus the Clerics

With the outbreak of the Islamic revolution, Goodarzi and his fol-
lowers started to fight the clergy. During the last years of the Shah’s
monarchy, they had been silent—at least in regards to the cler-
gy—but once the clergy started to lead the revolution, the Forqan,
and especially Goodarzi, began to fight them—especially their
Akhundism: the clergy’s inf luence and ruling. 82 During the Islamic
Revolution—especially during the period between when it began
in February 1979 until the group’s elimination in early 1980—the
Forqan adopted an aggressive and even violent policy against the
revolution. The deep hatred that the Forqan felt toward the cler-
ics also led them to adopt the method of assassination of Islamic
figures—mainly the clerics who ref lected the values of the revolu-
tion in their writings and deeds. 83 This hatred, however, was not
because they felt like they were being left out of the leadership cir-
cles, but because of the Forqan’s fundamental fear that the Ayatollah
Khomeini was going to turn Iran into a religious dictatorship,84 and
this proved to be a fear that was valid, especially during the first
days of the revolution.
The Forqan went one step further in their clash with the cler-
ics, when they tried to destroy the very solid base that these clerics
stood upon. For example, the Forqan claimed that the Shi’a religion,
as interpreted by the clerics, provided a way and possibility to grab
people’s property. The Forqan saw its mission to be the representa-
tion of real Islam in general and the Shi’a faith in particular, and
that the punishment of these clerics could only be carried out in one
way—with bullets (golule-haye surbin); that is, execution by shooting
them. 85
Goodarzi also refers to the despotism of Khomeini’s Islamic gov-
ernment and argued that “basically, (the) nature of clericalism is
based on religious despotism (Estabdad ), and this issue has been clear
during recent years.” By “recent years,” it seems that Goodarzi meant
the years that preceded the Islamic revolution and the clerics’ role
within it, but what was more important for him was that “this issue
whereby the clerics made themselves the people’s masters, misused
the people’s religious emotions and introduced themselves as the
source of all movements and struggles, was religious despotism.” 86
Goodarzi also views this through his own political logic when he
writes, “in manteghi nist ke beguim chun ruhaniyat dar jame’e taraf-
dar darand, pas bayad hokomate eslami ra edareh kunand ”—“it is not
rational to say that since the clerics have followers in society, that
they, therefore, have to govern the Islamic regime.” 87 Goodarzi also
writes, “I believe (that) the current regime is anti-monotheism (zede
tawhidi) and against people (zade mardomi) and, based on this, it is
governing by oppression (Zulm).”88
Hatred of the clerics and their ideologies was fundamental to
the Forqan’s ideology, and one of the main reasons was the identi-
fication of their (the clerics’) ideologies as “tyrannical Akhondism”
(Dictatori-ye Akhondism). Evidence of this hatred can be found in
the writings of Sayyed Mera’at, a member of the Forqan, who criti-
cized the clergy by saying, “It is impossible to find incorruptible
(clean) clergy among other clergies, because, if they were incorrupt-
ible, they would emphasize Islam instead of other things and, since
Islam is against clericalism, no one who believes in Islam can accept
clericalism.”89
As a result of this an anti-clerical ideology, which basically was
greater than their hatred of the Shah’s regime, the Forqan started to
terrorize the clergy, and this can be clearly shown by way of a search
done on their writings, in which one can find many anti-clerical
terms and attacks upon “tyrannical Akhondism,” which they saw as
worse than the “tyrannical Shah’s regime.” Even though the Forqan
understood that the Shah’s monarchy had ended its historical mis-
sion and had led the way to the coming of the clerics’ rule, during
the last days of the shah’s regime, they warned of the threat of the
clergy’s extremism. They believed that the threat of the clergy was
far worse than the shah’s treatment of the people, their faith, peace,
and wealth.90 As though to continue the Forqan’s argument about
the real place that the clerics ought to hold, the Ayatollah Taleqani,
on June 1, 1979, claimed on Tehran Radio that “the place of the
real mullahs is the mosque and not politics.” According to him, the
mullahs should not take on any governmental responsibility or fill
any posts.91
Kordi, in chapter one of his book on the Forqan Group, deals

with the Forqan’s ideology and its roots. According to Kordi, just
before creating their ideology, Goodarzi, the leader of the Forqan,
was studying the Quran and Tafsir and, very soon, without any
authorized qualifications, started teaching others, and some of these
students eventually became Forqan members. The main theme of
Goodarzi’ lessons was “Eslam Menah-ye Ruhaniyat”—“Islam with-
out the clerics” 92; a theme that would lead the way for the Forqan to
directly embark upon a doubly deadly course—the choice of assas-
sination as a way of fighting the clerics, which also led to their own
termination. Also, in documents that were captured by the revolu-
tionary students while capturing the US Embassy, it was written
that “(The) Forghan (sic) is a small group dedicated to Islam without
Ulema. It has chosen terrorism as its preferred means of political
expression.” 93
Kordi could not find any real religious framework and method in
the Forqan’s ideology, nor could he identify what the relevant sys-
tems they belonged to were. As he saw it, the Forqan created a new
world outlook and an a-revolutionary approach, which he named
Forqanism. By adding the suffix—ism to their name, he wanted
to reflect their innovative ideology and methodology. For Kordi,
Forqanism is far removed from real Islam and the Imams’ creeds 94
and, in order to emphasize his point about Forqanism, Kordi cites Ali
Abul Hosseini Mandhur’s understanding of Forqanism95: “Jaryani ke
be tasrih Qoran, dar zaman-e khod-e payambar (S) niz ba shoare ‘ ketab
menha-ye payambar’, ‘ma anzalu allah manha-ye rassul’ va ‘Qoran
Manha-ye sunnat’ ”—“As the Quran itself noted this too is a cur-
rent of thought that also existed at the time of the Prophet himself,
under the slogan of ‘Quran but not (the) prophet,’ ‘Ma Anzal allaho
without (the) prophet,’ and ‘Quran without Sunna.’ During the last
years of Mohammed’s life, and particularly after his death, this was
established under the slogan of ‘Hasbuna Kitabullah’—God’s Book
is Sufficient for us.” 96 In his use of this interpretation, Kordi is loyal
to his own notion of calling the Forqan Khawarej, and this also cor-
relates with his understanding Forqanism as voluntary exclusion
from the main party of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
To sustain this argument, Kordi needed to do more than just make
assumptions about the Forqan’s new names: Khawarej and Forqanism,
in order to strengthen his accusations against the Forqan’s ideology
and actions. To do this and to explain the Forqan’s ideology and its
roots, Kordi had to understand the motives that the members of the
Forqan had for standing up to the clerics. We learn from the admis-
sions of some members of the Forqan, in writings that Kordi exam-
ined, that they chose to declare themselves the authority regarding
religious convictions, and this is expressed in their words as follows:
“va man mi-khastam dar khedmat-e din basham, na dunya”—“and (I)
wanted (to be responsible) for my own religion, not their (the clerics)
world.” 97
Kordi enumerates several causes that together shaped the Forqan’s
ideology and provided it with its anti-clerical and anti-revolutionary
conception. The first is the Forqan’s tafsirs on the Quran, which
are, on the whole, erroneous and distorted. The way Kordi sees it,
the Forqan abandoned the old well-known system and the impor-
tant tafsirs and religious books that had acted as the basic platform
that allowed the current clerics of the time to investigate and clarify
their revolutionary course of action. Being opposed to this path, the
Forqan chose to interpret the primary sources, such as the Quran
and Nahjul Balaghe, by themselves—which they were unauthorized
to do so since they were not Mujtaheds and had never undergone
the appropriate religious training.98 For example, Kordi criticizes
Goodarzi’s ability to interpret and place himself above the Quran
and the religion. For Kordi, the fact that Goodarzi had changed sev-
eral Hawzas in a short period of time and then abandoned them did
not make him a cleric or even something close to it, as he had never
really settled down to really study in any very famous Hawza or sat
at the feet of any prominent cleric.99 For Kordi, while the Forqan
used the Quran for ideological purposes and as a political map, they
ignored all the Shi’a concepts and interpretations of it.100
In the eyes of Kordi, the Forqan seem to be like the Khawarej,101
who fought Ali for the cause. They did not want to be associated
with Ali because, like his other rivals, they fought each other, not for
Islam, but for themselves and for political power and influence. In
the situation under discussion, the Forqan saw themselves as the ones
who were excluding themselves from the corrupt race for power that
Khomeini and the rest of the clergy seemed to be involved in before,
during, and mainly after the Islamic revolution. Notwithstanding
this, Kordi’s interpretation and his calling the Forqan Khawarej has
its origin in the Shi’i narrative that sees the Khawarej as traitors
who abandoned Ali when he was experiencing great difficulty and

was stubbornly trying to stabilize his reign over the Muslim com-
munity. Here again, Kordi tries to suggest that, like the Khawarej,
the Forqan were the real traitors of the revolution, while Khomeini
(like Ali) was trying to stabilize the fragile revolution and steer the
revolutionary forces into a safe harbor.
Kordi says that the Forqan started to act against the Ruhaniyat—
the clerics—only after the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution. They
assassinated Ayatollah Motahhari, Doctor Mofatteh, Ayatollah
Qadhy Tabatabai, and Haj Mehdi Iraqi. They also tried to assas-
sinate Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Rabani Shirazi, and Hossein
Mehdian. Kordi says that there were other clerics that were killed—-
not directly by the Forqan, but—by the Mojahedin, probably as a
result of the same hatred and spiritual leadership. Still Kordi, with-
out actually saying it directly, flatters the Forqan as the prototype of
the Mojahedin’s terrorist actions against the same clerics. He men-
tions the possibility that the Mojahedin, perhaps as the result of
the momentum caused by the Forqan’s actions, adopted the same
method of killings and assassinations against the clerics and against
the Ayatollahs Beheshti and Bahonar, and others.102 Kordi raises the
subject of Goodarzi’s writings against the clerics and the possibility
that the clerics might establish an Islamic Republic. For Goodarzi
“the clerics’ dictatorship is against the real Muslims and against free-
dom . . . their knowledge of the Tawhid and the Quran is distorted
and . . . (and) they behave like the Wahhabis, the communists and
the Marxists.”103
Kordi also tries to understand the Forqan’s ideology and religious
methods from the sociological and, perhaps, psychological points
of view. For him, it is clear that there are basic but clear differences
between religions, just as there are between human societies. Kordi
argues that such differences need not be related to the Forqan, since
they see the Quran and the religious texts solely as texts—albeit
sacred ones. As these texts are only texts and not Allah’s actual words
and din, it is possible to read them in different ways, and adopt-
ing this method necessarily creates a platform for distorting the real
meaning of the Quran and the holy texts. Kordi asks a few critical
questions and expresses doubts about issues that are probably under
investigation in every Hawza. These questions are also relevant to
other religions, since they are fundamental and philosophical. For
him, the opening up of the possibility of re-interpretation to unau-

thorized religious men who pretend to be clerics, and the possibil-
ity that they will provide to answers to some questions that many
prominent clerics have sacrificed their whole lives to answer, is unac-
ceptable. Kordi asks how Goodarzi could know how to solve these
quandaries or decide what is true or false. Relating to the Quran as
merely a book denies the notion of Khatmiyat-e Nobovat—the final-
ity of the prophecy—and thus, the religion of Islam itself.104
In every revolution, the flourishing of ideologies and new agendas
is used by rivals to recruit supporters and followers, and this was the
same for the Islamic Revolution. The Forqan obviously were not too
innovative about suggesting their own merchandise, but the differ-
ence between them and the other groups was that they projected an
anti-revolutionary approach while using the climate of revolution to
spread their ideology.
Prof. Mervin Zonis of Chicago University divides these Shi’i rev-
olutionary groups into four sub-groups:
1. AMAL—the Shi’i Lebanese militia of Musa al-Sadr who, sup-

posedly, had a close relationship with the PLO (which was not
true and, in fact, the opposite, since AMAL fought the PLO
and did not support it).105
2. The Islamic revolutionaries that associated themselves with
the Fadā’iyān-i Islam Organization (of the 1940s–1950s).106
According to Zonis, this group was related to Qadhafi (which
is also not true since the Fadā’iyān-i Islam was eliminated by
1955) and to the ideals of exporting the revolution and the
establishment of an Islamic state. Its leaders were Ayatollah
Khalkhali, Ayatollah Montazeri, Hojjatul Islam Sheikh
Mohammad Montazeri, and Iraqi (who was murdered by the
Forqan).
3. The third group was the Civil Group, whose main leaders were
students during the 1960s. The main figures of this group
were Ibrahim Yazdi (the IR’s Foreign Minister), Qotbzadeh,
and Abul Hassan Bani-Sadr (the IRI’s first president).
4. The fourth and the last group was Motahhari’s Group. In this
group, we can find Ayatollah Mofatteh, the Dean of Theology
in Tehran University. His main role during the revolution was
to maintain contact between the revolutionary council and
the universities. The other figures were, Dr. Beheshti, the IRP
chairperson and deputy of the Experts Assembly, and Ayatollah
Bahonar. This group’s main approach was that Islam should
have a modern face and adapt itself to the twentieth century.
All the members of this group were students in schools of the-
ology in the universities, not in Qom’s seminars, and all were
members of the Revolutionary Council107 (and many were
assassinated by the Forqan and the MKO).
The distinctions Prof. Zonis makes between the groups are approxi-
mate, largely inaccurate, and colored by the views of religious revo-
lutionary factors of a similar nature. The Forqan, the Hojjatiyeh,
and other semi-religious groups were not included in his classifi-
cation, and were totally ignored. More than that, Zonis views all
these groups as serving one large vision—the establishment of an
Islamic state, and does not relate to the rivalry and struggles amongst
them.
We can relate to Prof. Zonis’s division as one side of the coin and
concentrate on the other side, which is that of the internal fight
between the religious factions that opposed the revolution and its
leaders. Regarding the Forqan, we need to ask why they acted vio-
lently against the religious figures and not only ideologically. The
reason for this could be because they were “a small group that
had no real public support . . . a group that (was) virtually alone
(and) . . . although it was meant to be a part of the religious leadership
group, the Forqan wished to find its way within the new political
creation that arose after the downfall of the Shah.”108 Nonetheless,
the main idea in the Forqan’s ideology was its opposition to the cler-
ics and the clergy itself (which is reminiscent of the Baha’i issue),
since they wished to see Islam flourish without the influence of the
clergy. Either way, the Forqan, like the Hojjatiyeh (but for different
reasons), had no ambition to be part of the new political scenario,
and even fought against politics among the clerics.
In order to better understand the Forqan’s fight against the cler-
ics in general (and, in particular, against a few of them such as
Motahhari, Moffateh, and Beheshti), some of whom would become
deadly targets due to their beliefs, we need to describe what was
common to the religious developments within the clerical circles in
order to shed light upon them. Apart from the moves directly made
by Khomeini himself, who had been in exile (in Turkey, Iraq, and
then France) since 1964 till the outbreak of the revolution in 1979,
there were actions taken by his representatives who either received
orders directly from him or were indirectly driven by the “command-
er’s spirit” and by other religious groups that confronted the rival
groups’ religious ideologies. The religious community at this time
was, in general, moving along a short but consistent path (especially
after the death of the Marja’ Taqlid—Ayatollah Borujerdi in March
1961), and this was a path that was ultimately led by the clerics but
had only begun with the establishment of the Islamic Republic in
January 1980.
The Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat, which is the Office for Strengthening
Unity (OSU), was established by Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti,
(the Head of Iran’s Supreme Judicial System), under the auspices of
Ayatollah Khomeini.109 The main reason for Beheshti wanting to
establish the OSU was in order to organize the Islamist students and
counter the rising influence of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which was
most active among university students.110
While Beheshti put his effort into fighting the Mojahedin
and similar groups, another religious group called the Hojjatiyeh
Society appeared, which ref lected another element of religious
thinking. The Hojjatiyeh, offered a different outlook on politics
at that time but, without really intending to, it helped to reshape
Khomeini’s political ideology.111 The Haqqaniya School—among
whose founders were Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, Ayatollah Behesthi,
Ayatollah Jannati, and Ayatollah Sadouqi—had a new reason for
establishing this school, and the idea was to combine religious
and secular curricula in order to train clerics for modern life and
its challenges.112 These ayatollahs, despite the fact that they came
from fundamental orthodoxy, found their way into the central
stream that would later be the first to provide the main cadres for
the Islamic Revolution; and then later, for the Islamic Republic.
The idea behind this stream was that the people should be a part of
the government and that the Shia clerics were not only supposed to
be governing on behalf of Allah and the Imams, but also on behalf
of the people.113
The combination of secular and religious studies, however, “helped
the seminaries and theological schools to go out and find their
way into real public life and, especially, into politics.” The leading
proponents of this practicum were Ayatollahs Murtaza Motahhari,

Mohammad Beheshti, Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, and Mohammad
Mofatteh,114two of whom—Motahhari and Mofatteh—were later
assassinated by the Forqan, while Beheshti and Bahonar went on to
become the victims of the Mojahedin.
Three of the respected ayatollahs, Bahonar, Beheshti, and
Mofatteh, were already very active by the early 1950s, and had joined
secular organizations like the Iranian Teachers Association (ITA) in
order to fight the influence of the Tudeh Party.115 This could be con-
sidered to be true until the Mossadeq Crisis, when the clerics, led by
Ayatollah Kashani, withdrew their support from Mossadeq, and this
caused him, albeit unwillingly, to consider accepting the Tudeh’s
support for his government.
While the clerics were doubtful about their role in politics, the
process could not be stopped because, on the other side of the map,
the secular groups such as the Iranian Freedom Movement (IFM) led
by Mehdi Bazargan, offered its format of combining religion with
secular studies through the creation of an “Islamic Society for the
Social Sciences.” This movement, which was led by clerical circles
and secular intellectuals, proposed that “the society would guide
politics by remaining separate from it, politics would ensue through
showra (consultation) and democracy, it being “the duty of every
Muslim to . . . intervene in politics.”
The idea of being politically influential while not being directly
involved in politics found an attentive ear among the reformist
Ayatollahs such as Motahhari, Taleqani, and Beheshti. Beginning in
the 1960s, under the auspices of Ayatollah Motahhari, the reform-
ist clerics held meetings in Tehran, and what was discussed at these
meetings would later be the source material for the publication
named the “Monthly Lectures,” written by Ayatollah Motahhari,
in which he (and the other Ayatollahs) presented their outlook on
politics.
Just after Boroujerdi’s death in March 1961,116 the above three
ayatollahs and other clerics “issued a volume of essays in which they
made two significant recommendations.” The first recommenda-
tion was “(to establish) an autonomous consultative clerical com-
mittee, or showra-ye fatva . . . (in order) . . . to replace the institutions
of the marja’-e motlaq.”117 The second recommendation was, “that
the Quranic injunction (of ) Amr-e be ma’ruf wa nahy-e az munkar
(enjoining the good and forbidding evil) should henceforth be the

principle for expressing the public will.”118
Although Khomeini, who was a great believer in the Velayat-e
Faqih, was not too involved in these sessions or in the writing or
authorization of the essays, he “assimilated the ideas of the Islamic
Left during his years in Iraq.” It was Motahhari who “was the most
important member of this group,” that included Beheshti, Taleqani,
and others that were mentioned above. Motahhari’s relationship
with Ayatollah Khomeini began in1945, “when they read mystical
texts together.” From then on, they became closer and closer, until
Motahhari became “a leading theologian and philosopher in his own
right” (which was quietly authorized by Khomeini) and “Khomeini’s
sole representative in charge of collecting taxes during his exile in
Iraq and then Paris (1965–79).”119
In 1964, a popular institute, the Hosseiniyeh Ershad Institute,
emerged. The full name of this institute was—Mo’aseseh-ye Tahqiqat
va Amouzesh Hosseiniyeh-ye Ershad—The Hosseiniyeh Ershad
Research and Educational Institute.120 When Ali Shariati returned
to Iran (1965) together with Ayatollah Motahhari, they found a place
to submit their philosophies and religious and intellectual agendas.
The central speaker until 1969 was Ayatollah Motahhari, but soon,
Shariati would turn the tables on him and would become the main
leader of this institute, whose main purpose was to bridge the gap
between the radical religious approach of the clerics and the Islamic
left, and thus facilitate a fertile dialogue.121 The classes were led by
Shariati and Motahhari, and the combination of the very religious
figure of Motahhari and the religious, intellectual, and charismatic
reformer, Ali Shariati, attracted “as many as five thousand students,”
with Shariati’s book sales “reaching two million by the mid[-]sev-
enties.” One could say that “by 1972 Shariati’s ideological Shi’ism
became the common discourse through which lay intellectuals and
radical clerics debated Iran’s future.”122
Together with the Hojjatiyeh and some unknown clerics that
saw the Ayatollah Khomeini’s theoretical agenda—the Velayat-i
Faqih—as an irrelevant theoretical solution to their difficulties
and problems, the Forqan also joined the choir protesting against
Khomeini’s old-new agenda. The Forqan not only spoke out vigor-
ously against this idea, but also became one of its main ideologi-
cal opponents. For example, Akbar Goodarzi, the Forqan leader,
declared, after his capture and in one of his confessions, that the
Forqan believed that the Faqih should have priority (Awlaveyat-e
Faqih) over Velayat-e Faqih. In Goodarzi words, “I do not believe
in Velayat-e Faqih, in the way that has been mentioned in the con-
stitution (which was approved in December 1979), but I believe in
the priority of Faqih and religious expertise.” Goodarzi believed, in
contrast to how Khomeini saw it, that Velayat-e Faqih and political
governance were two separate issues, and therefore “he is like the
other people in the society that have a right to govern, but still, have
no prior privilege.” Goodarzi goes further and says that, “not only
does Velayat-e Faqih have no (religious or equivalent) foundation in
the Quran . . . it is contrary to humanity and its noble features.” For
him, the “Velayat-e Faqih negates the freedom of man and this idea
(of Velayat-e Faqih) is equal to creating another Imam instead of the
12th Imam.” Goodarzi concludes his confession, by very general say-
ing that he “believes in the Hidden Imam (and) not (in the) Velayat-e
Faqih.”123 Opposition to the Velayat-e Faqih without presenting any
controversial agenda would not have been enough for Goodarzi to
recruit sufficient supporters and followers to the Forqan, but it was
still an expression of opposition to Khomeini. Goodarzi had to sug-
gest an alternative or equivalent to the Velayat-e Faqih for the Forqan.
Regarding the need for an Islamic system, Goodarzi believed that
“due to the nature of the clerics which is monopolistic, tyranni-
cal and religiously despotic as well as their distorting of facts and
disregarding the people’s rights, especially in Kurdistan, Khuzestan
and Torkman Sahra, this system (of the Velayat-e Faqih) is profane
(Kafar Amiz) and against Islam.” Goodarzi believed that “the cur-
rent system (the Velayat-e Faqih) was based on idolatry (Shirk) and
the idolization of religious figures.”124
The Forqan and Motahhari—the Struggle between

Materialism and Spirituality
On May 1, 1979, Mutahhari, was assassinated by the Forqan.125 The
main reason for the Forqan choosing him as their primary target
and fundamental nemesis was because, of all the religious figures at
that time (the mid-1970s), Ayatollah Motahhari was the Mujtahed
best known for dealing with the issues of Marxism and materialism,
and had a confident approach to and knowledge of the subject.126
He had, in addition, marked the Forqan as more dangerous than

the Fadā’iyān and the Mojahedin because of their “techniques of
distorting Qur’anic verses and giving materialist expositions for such
texts.”127
Motahhari felt that it was his religious responsibility to confront
the organizations that were only pretending to present knowledge
and an understanding of very delicate issues like Marxism and
Materialism. He felt that explaining these issues by using wrong
interpretations of the Quran was causing real damage to Islam and
the Shi’a faith. In his preface to the book The Reasons for a Tendency
towards Materialism, he strongly rejected all the Forqan’s interpreta-
tions of the Quran.128
During the 1970s, the Forqan considered three groups—the rul-
ing Pahlavi family, the clergy, and the communists—to be Iran’s
main enemies to be defeated and eliminated. In June 1977, Ayatollah
Motahhari published his comments about materialism in Iran, in
which he criticized the unauthorized so-called religious movements
that dealt with these sensitive issues, especially the Mojahedin-e
Khalq and the Forqan. In regard to the latter, he referred to the
Forqan’s ideology as gullible materialism, which angered Forqan
members.129 This conflict with Motahhari came to a head when
“Goodarzi read his (Motahhari’s) writings and his speeches,” after
which “Motahhari called Goodarzi’s thoughts ‘dissenter Materialism’
and said (that) the danger that threatens our society is materialism
cloaked in Islam.”130
Ironically, being attacked by a very well-known religious figure
such as Motahhari and eliciting a response was a “real achievement”
for the Forqan, but the ideological struggle that took place, both
before and during the revolution—over the passing on of the revolu-
tionary message—forced the Forqan to introduce a “high-ranking”
ideological figure into the fray. The figure chosen by the Forqan
in 1979 as their role-model ideologue, although already dead for
the past two years, was Ali Shariati, because his living ideology still
pumped in the hearts of his followers.
The first and most vehement criticism of Goodarzi came from
Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari and was principally directed toward
Goodarzi’s book, Tawhid va Aba’ d-e Gunagun-e An—the Tawhid and
its Diverse Meanings. In this book, Goodarzi says, “Kholasehtarin
taa’rif-e Tawhid in ast ke jang mian-e ensanha vojod darad bara-ye hal
tazad-ha va residan be takamal bartar va balatar”—“the minimalis-

tic definition of the Tawhid, is that there is a war between human
beings that appears ex-worldwide of the creatures (and that in order)
to give solution for every conflict and confrontation and that (also)
in order to reach the most high maturation (of a human being). The
Tawhid, is the definition of the creatures’ path in these conflicts,
(and that in order) to get into the final stage of knowing God.” Once
this definition is acceptable, so it means the creatures got their ulti-
mate evolution, which is—realization of Allah.131 Referring this con-
ception into the current days of the pre-revolution period, it meant
to Goodarzi, as he viewed himself and his mission, “va dar rabate ba
paykar khunin-e enqalbion-e tawhidi, bayad an ra nahai-ye tarin va
damene dar tarin va feragirtarin va sazandetarin enqelab-e tawhidi,
va marge’ hameye enqelabha-ye tarikh be hesab avard ”—and regard-
ing the bloody fight of the pro-tawhidi revolutionaries, it is (this
realization) the outmost wide and highly build-up revolution of the
Tawhid and the main source to all the revolution in the history.”132
Motahhari, in his book Dalayel va tamayolat-e madi-gari—The
Causes and Tendencies of Materialism—attacked the Forqan’s inter-
pretations and Tafsirs of the Quran. In this criticism, Motahhari
was joined by another cleric, Ayatollah Naqashiyan, and, together,
they fought against the Forqan’s publications. After the assassination
of the Ayatollah Motahhari, Naqashiyan went to Qom to visit the
“Imam” (Jafarian’s reference to Khomeini) who told him, “Shoma ke
in Ettelaa’t ra darid beravid va jama’shan konid ”—“Since you have
the information (about the Forqan), go and arrest them.” When he
returned to Tehran, Naqashiyan did whatever was necessary to stop
the Forqan.133
As mentioned before, the Ayatollah Motahhari was very familiar
with the Forqan group and their ideology and sometimes looked
for ways and opportunities to debate them. In contrast, the Forqan
and its leader looked for ways to evade Motahhari and avoid these
debates. Goodarzi’s logic for his lack of interest in these debates
was expressed when he said, “First of all, (Ayatollah) Motahhari,
even before he knew about us and our methods, introduced us as
materialist,”134 and it was probably this invective and offense that led
to Goodarzi’s unwillingness to debate Motahhari.
If one is to judge the Forqan according to its historical develop-
ment and publications, we can see that this hatred of the clerics did
not explode during the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution. According

to Abrahamian, the Forqan was a “small religious group convinced
that ‘reactionary clerics’, ‘wealthy bazaaris’ and ‘liberal politicians’,
not to mention ‘Marxist atheists’, were plotting to betray the Islamic
Revolution.”135 In this respect, it is indeed very difficult to say what
the words “Islamic” and “Revolution” that Abrahamian refers to here
meant precisely, as the Forqan themselves could not clearly identify
the targets of the then current turmoil that later became a revolu-
tion. It seems to be more accurate to say that the Forqan feared that
the religious circles would abandon the Shi’i belief, that the clerics
should stay out of politics since this belief held that any government
that is not led by the Hidden Imam is illegitimate. The belief goes
even further and says that being part of such a government will pre-
vent the appearance of the Hidden Imam.
The Forqan’s campaign against the Mullahs was not a new episode
spearheaded by the Forqan but, because it was deeply rooted in the
framework of Islamic awareness, it awoke during the years before the
Islamic Revolution. The Forqan, which, we believe, emerged before
the Islamic revolution and so saw itself as “a fundamentalist sect,”
stressed the basic teachings of Islam but was opposed to “the dicta-
torship of the mullahs.” The battle between the Forqan and the cler-
ics during the Islamic Revolution could be seen as an internal fight
for power, especially after the assassinations of key figures of the
Islamic Revolution. Some rumors claimed that these killings were
promoted by a Revolutionary Council faction that wanted to silence
prominent figures that had influence over Khomeini, and remove
them from decision-making circles. However, some mullah factions
claimed that the left was responsible for these assassinations—not
only the Forqan—because they wanted “to bring Marxism to Iran
under the cover of Islam.”136 Kordi, however, says that the Forqan
just imitated the Marxists’ groups and tried to compete with them
on the political agenda.137
Goodarzi referred to his criticism of and opposition to the cler-
ics as Akhundism138 and, on another occasion, the Forqan described
it as “the struggle against Mullahism.”139 Goodarzi saw the clerics’
interference in public life in general, and especially during the events
that preceded the Islamic Revolution, as a “great disaster” and called
it “the wild interference of the clergy” and the “return of the ruling
clergy.”140 The Forqan—and other revolutionary groups—believed
that the Mullahs should stay out of politics, and that this had a
historical precedent. Revolutionary events such as revolutions and
social protests that have taken place in Iran have always—and con-
sistently—been subject to religious intervention. This was the case
with the Tobacco Boycott (1890), the Constitutional Revolution
(1905–1907), and the Mossadeq Crisis (1953)—where, even though
the clerics participated, they never saw themselves as those who
should be part of the political system. Therefore, during the Islamic
Revolution, it was assumed that the clerics would behave as they had
before and stay out of politics.
In addition to the above, the Forqan saw the clerics as “corrupt
and vain from the roots.” Their fight against the mullahs—and the
possibility of creating a new Islamic state—arose from the fear of los-
ing the “real values of the Red141 Shi’ism of Imam Ali,” and was also
seen as an effort “to set the Islam of Imam Ali free from the cage of
Akhundism.”142 Abrahamian emphasizes that the Forqan called for
an “Islam without mullahs” and denounced the political order that
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had wanted to create on the ruins of
the Pahlavi Monarchy. They called it “a reactionary and clerical dic-
tatorship that had betrayed the principles of egalitarian Islam.”143
The Forqan were not only seen as the clerics’ nemesis, but were
also called an “anarchist anti-clerical organization.”144 In reference
to Khomeini’s enemies after the outbreak of the revolution, it was
said that “the moderate’s dissent is only one of the many splits that
divide today’s Iran and is less dramatically damaging to Khomeini’s
men than, say, the fanatical group called Forqan which has assas-
sinated two of the revolution’s senior figures.”145
Decades after the Islamic Revolution, the Forqan has left behind
them a remarkable memory and fear, and even the current admin-
istration and its functionaries in Iran continue to use the historic
events that took place during the Islamic revolution as a platform
to understand the current situation in Iran. For example, Professor
Mohsen Rahami, in an interview with ISNA,146 reflected that even
three decades after the elimination of the Forqan, the memory of their
remarkable fear-mongering still existed, and that “some movements
such as Forqan are again turning their attention towards Iran . . . the
Forqan (is a) group which was against some of the decisions of the
Islamic Republic and assassinated a number of leading figures at the
beginning of the revolution.” He also said that “Sepah-e Sahabeh (the
Army of the Sahabeh) in Pakistan was very similar to that group (i.e.,
the Forqan)” and that “such groups were again intent on attacking
Shi’is and officials in Iran.”147 Another point of view regarding the
bitter memory that the Forqan left on the Islamic leadership since
the Islamic Revolution is held by Hashemi Aqajari, a member of the
Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization, who said, “There are
fundamental differences between being an Islamic revolutionary and
a religious fundamentalist since fundamentalism depends on being
Salafi (traditionalist) and relies on returning to the hostile and vio-
lent methods of the past. Unfortunately, we see today the emergence
of groups that, although they are not called Forqan ( . . . ), their way
of thinking and methods of approach are similar to that group’s.”148
In current Iranian politics, the word and name of the Forqan repre-
sents anti-clerical movements and actions,149 and the mentioning of
Monafeqin in reference to the Mojahedin and hypocrites, or Hojjatis,
is used to refer to them as the revolution’s enemies.
The Forqan’s Fragmented Ideology—Eclecticism and Confusion

The use made of Shariati’s ideas, although unofficially, and as an
enduring ideologist and spiritual leader, gave the Forqan leader the
ability and confidence to present his agenda to the people. Goodarzi
started to collect the sermons he had given in the Niavaran Mosque
(in northern Tehran) where he was probably well-known among the
local people and preachers, having also presented his philosophy in
other places such as in the Qoba Mosque, Khamseh Mosque (both
in northern Tehran), and in the Roudaki neighborhood in central
Tehran.150 However, Ali Kordi suggests that Goodarzi started his reli-
gious activity in 1977 (probably after Shariati’s death), in a mosque
in southern Tehran. There, although he started to present his inter-
pretations of the Quran and other religious texts, he hardly ever used
the religious texts of Ahul-Bait; that is, the Imams’ writings.151
In chapter one we already dealt with the first organizational name
of the Forqan—the Kahfis, but it is important to mention here that,
during the Shah’s period, although his secret police were aware of the
groups’ activities, they chose whom to fight according to the extent
of their threat to the regime. After the incidents of 1976, the SAVAK
was responsible for the weakening of a great number of political
movements. One of these groups was the Kahfis, but it is believed
that the SAVAK did not write any important reports or disseminate
any information regarding the Kahfis’ activities, which were mostly
limited to Quran sessions.152 It is possible that the Kahfis changed
their name to the Forqan as a deceptive and misleading option used
to make it more difficult for the SAVAK to pursue them.
Before the group was known as the Forqan, however, they, as
mentioned before, used another name: the Kahf is—meaning the
People of the Cave. The regime started to use the SAVAK to moni-
tor their activities during 1977, but most of their activities involved
meetings to teach tafsir and Quran—as evidenced by one of the
Savak’s remaining reports that indicated that they were active in the
‘Khamseh mosque near Dowlet street, where Goodarzi was giving
lessons in which he interpreted Quranic and Tafsir texts. During
these meeting, especially at the Khamseh Mosque, the pupils—the
Kahf member (i.e., the Forqan) presented Goodarzi as an Akhund—a
cleric and as the Kahf ’s leader.153 The main members and cadre of
Goodarzi’s Kahf group were Abbas Askari, Kamal Yasini, and Ali
Hatami.154
In these sermons, Goodarzi presented Shariati’s Deuteronomy,
which espouses principles such as the existence of God as tabsolute
evolution, Salat (prayer) as the instrument through which there is
connection with the people; the Ghaiba and Shahadat (the invisible
and visible worlds) as the hidden and exposed stages of the struggle
for revolution, and Akhirat (the world to come) as the socio-political
system of a spiritually better world. Goodarzi also borrowed termi-
nology from the Mojahedin, who had borrowed it from Shariati, such
as the theory of class antagonism and class conflict.155 Although they
borrowed terminology from Shariati’s writings and the Mojahedin,
the Forqan still had an innovative approach, which bore no resem-
blance to the traditionalists,156 and they wanted to distance them-
selves from any similarity that could, even mistakenly, lead the
people to think that they resembled the traditionalists.
The Forqan ideology that Goodarzi wished to distribute aimed at
defending the Mostaza’ fin (poor people) and targeting capitalism as
the blight of Iranian society. Despite Goodarzi’s good intentions, it
seems that this was not enough, as his knowledge of Marxism and
socialism was poor and eclectic.157 Since Goodarzi did not have the
academic abilities to distinguish between the philosophies that he
encountered, he chose the relevant elements that might contribute to
his overall ideology. He not only took Shariati’s references to Marxism

and capitalism without deeply investigating their components and
sources, and made many references to Abu-Zar (Mohammed’s close
friend), whom he saw as a socialist model just as Shariati did, but
also wrote about him and gave these publications the name of Abu-
Zar. Of course, the selective approach used by Goodarzi ignored
Shariati’s important expressions regarding the clerics, such as “there
is no signature of any cleric on colonial agreements” while emphasiz-
ing other expressions such as “Islam without clerics.”158
Goodarzi’s ideology and revolutionary thought was shaped ini-
tially when he was studying at Qom—where he also became familiar
with the ideas of his opponents. He became familiar with the writings
of Amir Nasrodin Amirsadeqi especially his Naqde Ruhaniat (criti-
cism against the clerics (Ruhaniat)) and Naqde Hawzeh (criticism of
the Seminary). These books—and the preaching of the Ayatollahs
Tabatabai and Ashori—had a great impact on him, and he borrowed
elements from them that could help him to present his ideology. All
in all, although Goodarzi’s ideas and opinions were eclectic, they did
serve to develop his ideological framework.159
Forqan Ideology on the Wane

When one deals with the fragility and eclecticism of the Forqan’s
ideology, one has to bear in mind the fact that Goodarzi never went
through all the usual religious training one would expect; but this did
not stop him from interpreting texts and creating his own religious
agenda and ideology. The Forqan were also influenced by Marxist
ideology, and they adopted several of its principles. According to
Kordi, unlike the Mojahedin-e Khalq—who had adopted a historical
materialistic outlook—the Forqan did not adopt materialistic values
in the debate and chose to establish their ideology based mainly on
the Quran.160
When Goodarzi talked about other ideologies such as Marxism,
however, he had no other choice but to use the ideas and interpre-
tations of other theologians and intellectuals when he related to
the non-religious content in their philosophies. Kordi, although he
researched the Forqan’s ideology by reading their books and pam-
phlets, also used other sources that provided him with evidence of
the Forqan’s megalomania in introducing themselves as a group that
could deal with hard-core ideologies and provide solutions for the
most crucial problems of Iranian society. For example, Kordi writes
that the Forqan’s leader, Goodarzi, in his books frequently discussed
issues like “antithesis, evolution, mutation and changing of quantity
to quality” (Tazad, Takamol, Jahesh va Tagheerat-e Kami be Kaifi),
all of which derive from Marxist terminology. Kordi presents us with
the protocol of Goodarzi’s interrogation (after his capture in early
1980) to point out that the latter had no idea about what he was
writing, and he did this to emphasize Goodarzi’s weak grip on ideol-
ogy. Kordi concludes that Goodarzi had no expertise on matters that
were outside the field of religion and so had to use the books and
writings of others, since he himself has not been educated in these
issues. During the interrogation, Goodarzi could not elaborate on
these themes and sent his interrogators to carefully read his books
and other writings, defending himself by saying, “I nowhere was
talking about mutation ( Jahesh), but the elaboration on what others
said can be found in my writings, and you (referring to his interroga-
tor) may read them if you need to.”161
Goodarzi’s interrogators tried to better understand from where
Goodarzi took these expressions and terms and originally thought
that Goodarzi had either forged them himself or, perhaps, had bor-
rowed them from other sources. Although Goodarzi insisted that
“these (terms) are very common in the Farsi and Arabic languages
and I took them from Farsi and Arabic literature,” he never gave the
names of these literary sources. Goodarzi went further and explained
how he understood the use of these themes as “basically literature
and literary expressions (that) are . . . primary substances available for
everyone, and it is the people and their use of these ideas and expres-
sions that make their purpose clear and give them political, eco-
nomic, ideological and theological meaning. These expressions have
their own literal meaning until they are used for specific ideas or
science.”162 In other words, Goodarzi tried to say that these expres-
sions are open to debate and to any relevant interpretation, and so
can be used by theoreticians and ideologues.
When Goodarzi was asked to explain the use of some of the
Marxist themes and ideas, he said that he was not a Marxist who
had the ability or the right to explain these notions. Goodarzi con-
tradicted himself here, as he himself had said that these notions were
open to criticism and could be used by others, as mentioned above.
When pushed by his interrogator, however, Goodarzi replied, “I

have a shallow grasp of . . . (Marxism’s) perspective towards antith-
esis.” Goodarzi, despite this shallowness, explained this “antithesis,”
saying, “They believe that objects are in permanent conflict with
each other and each substance creates its own opposite. Then the
relationship between thesis, antithesis and synthesis comes to the
fore and, based on this, they evaluate historical events and social
developments.”163
There were other Forqanists that were captured and interrogated
besides Goodarzi, and thus we can reveal another dimension of him
as a person and leader of the Forqan from their confessions and
responses to the interrogators. For them “Goodarzi was an intelli-
gent man who was under the influence of Shariati like other people
who were also affected by Shariati’s ideas before the revolution.” This
was the reason that “the Forqan directed its remarks to those who
were interested in a new type of modern and revolutionary Islam.”
This conception came from the assumption that although “the ideas
of Khomeini himself and Ayatollah Taleqani were available too, the
reason that people were inclined towards the Forqan was its new
interpretation of Islam.”164
The interrogations can provide us with more information about
how the Forqan understood the very delicate issues that all together
relate to their revolutionary thinking. It seems that the use of
Marxism, even without any full understanding of the fundamental
meaning of its themes, combined with Islamic notions, aimed at pre-
senting a unique—but still sophisticated—ideology that was mainly
directed at the younger revolutionaries. The combination of these
ideas was not something that could be recognized by unsophisti-
cated groups like the Mojahedin-e Khalq and the Fadā’iyān, among
others, since they always used to combine Islamic and modern revo-
lutionary writings the way Shariati himself did.
Goodarzi could not explain—neither briefly nor conceptually—
the ideas and themes he used in his own books. When asked to
explain Marxism’s notion of antithesis, he said, “I have done no study
on the other schools but in Islamic sources, especially the Quran and
Nahjul-Balaghe, I haven’t seen antithesis expressed as an absolute.”
In regard to the explanation of evolution (Takamol ) he said “You
(referring to the interrogator) should understand that the issue of
absolute evolution has not been under our consideration. But we
looked at this issue in keeping with Quranic verses that talk about
the complete nature and flawlessness of creatures.” In the explana-
tion of his understanding of the “shift from quantity to quality”—
Tagheerat-e Kami be Kaifi165 —he said that “this issue was also not
under consideration as an absolute. We expressed this issue only in
regard to certain issues.”166
Goodarzi was asked to explain his understanding of other ideo-
logical matters such as “phenomena” and their changes during move-
ment, how to identify a phenomenon, how to evaluate its quantity
and then to show its quality and explain the reasons for the new
change, the new movement, and the evolution. Goodarzi replied,
“First, you (the interrogator) have to explain (to me) what phenom-
enon and movement are, (and only) then will I explain the rest.”
Finally, Goodarzi was asked if he was “knowledgeable in philosophi-
cal, scientific, social and political issues and was in the position to
give an opinion about these issues?” His answer was, “I can express
my ideas at the level that my study allows me to. Basically, every-
body can give an opinion. I mean has the right to express his/her
ideas.”167
Kordi summarizes this interrogation by saying, “Akbar Goodarzi,
the head of the Forqan Group, who claimed he could interpret Quran
and Nahjul-Balaghe as well as theoretical and philosophical science,
was unable to answer the simplest philosophical questions.” More
than that, he continues, “Although Goodarzi claimed he believes in
a monotheistic movement he maintained that it was Marxism and
its ideology that explained what the freedom of mankind is. He was
bewildered to the extent that he portrayed the Imams Khomeini,
Motahhari and Mofatteh as King Qaboos, and Anwar Sadat and
King Hossein of Morocco as monarchs who depended upon arrogant
systems” and therefore “believed in pagan ideologies.”168
Despite the above, Kordi “praises” Goodarzi and gives him credit
for inventing a new way of thinking, new research, and a new ideol-
ogy. Of course, by using the word “credit,” Kordi is mocking both
Goodarzi’s and the Forqan’s ideology. For Kordi, this “new theory”
(Nazari-ye jadid ) of Goodarzi suggests the idea that the Marxists
supported the Islamic regime in Iran and quotes him as saying,
“Regarding the leftists that you just mentioned (referring to his
interrogator), if you meant Marxists and communists, I would like
to remind you that, based on our observations and studies, they are
fully supporting the regime and participating in the elections; and,

if they have objections, this doesn’t mean they oppose the regime.”
For Kordi, the reason that Goodarzi made such an allegation was “to
say that the Islamic government is not monotheistic and Islamic but
is being supported by the Marxists.”169
Khomeini’s Ideological Position Regarding the Eclecticism

of the pseudo-Religious Movements
As readers, it is obvious to us that Kordi wants to protect the Islamic
Revolution’s leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and tell us what an out-
standing genius he was in his religious confrontation with the vari-
ous misled religious organizations and movements such as the Forqan
and others. For Kordi, it was Khomeini who saved real Islam from
their erroneous, naïve, and mixed interpretations and, as he says,
“Prevailing on crises, particularly ideological crises which appeared
during the years after the revolution, was the man feature of the
leadership of Imam Khomeini.”170 During the revolutionary process,
“some misled political groups who also used the same sources made
the work of the Imam tough, but he (Khomeini) liked defending
his leadership and the true Islam which in his own words, was pure
Islam.” For Kordi, “the Imam (Khomeini) did not consider the situ-
ation of ideological crisis a proper subject for discussion and dispute
but saw it as an act of opportunism by political groups seeking influ-
ence that needed a particular approach that had to be confronted.”
Khomeini’s method was to warn society about the misleading ideas
and thoughts of such groups and, as he used to say, “Tavajoh konid
inha mi-khahand khun-e shoma ra hadar dahand, ejtema’at-e inha bar
zed-e eslam ast”—“Be careful of these groups that want to spill your
blood (by misleading you). Their gatherings are for the purposes of
opposing Islam.”171
In response to the demand made by the Forqan to constitute a
monotheistic society, Khomeini said, “maa’ni-ye jama’-ye tawhidi in
tori ke in ashkhas monharef dar inha elqa kardand, ma’nayash yek
jamaa’-ye haivani ast”—“the meaning of a monotheistic society as
interpreted by such people looks like a bestial society . . . This is indeed
a deviant idea.”172 In his 1980 Nowroz message, Khomeini declared
that “all of you have to know that this way of thinking betrays Islam
and Muslims and the result of such thinking will be become clear in
the future. Unfortunately, sometimes we see that some groups and

people [such as the Forqan], due to a lack of clear understanding,
have mixed Islam with Marxism and have arrived at an outcome that
is not compatible with the modern rules of Islam.”173
Khomeini in his speeches, both during the revolution and after-
ward, made sure to warn the Iranian people in the following way:
“Look at those people who beat their breasts for Islam and see what
they are doing. They want to destroy Islam! And those who direct
such claims are thieves . . . We should not be deceived by their claims,
but we should look at their background and history. And we should
see how their books and works are written.” Khomeini accused the
Forqan and Monafeqin174 of using the Quran and the Nahjol-Balaghe
(book of the Imam Ali) to justify themselves, and claimed that they
did this because they wanted to “destroy us with (their erroneous
interpretation of the) Quran and Nahjol-Balaghe.” Khomeini refers
to a historical event to emphasize his fear, and says that this was
“just like at the time of Hazrat-e Amir (referring to Imam Ali’s fight
against Mua’wiya) when they placed the Quran on the spearhead
and announced that the Quran was base.”175 Khomeini goes on to
say, “Islam has always been tied up by such people. During the pri-
mary years of Islam, at the time of the Hazrat-e Amir ruling (by
Imam Ali), there were a lot of these people. At the time of the revered
Prophet (Mohammad) there were also a lot. And throughout history
Islam has been complicated by such people and issues.” Khomeini’s
target audiences were mainly the younger generation, who were
flexible enough to welcome new and modern ideologies such as the
Forqan’s. His message to this generation was, “Dear young high
school and university students, be aware that leaders of such groups,
in the name of Islam, want to destroy its pillars, have no idea and
little knowledge about Islam and its rules and regulations. They
read some verses from the Quran and their incorrect interpretations
cannot be Islamist . . . their grasp of Islam and the Quran is indeed
destructive.”176
Khomeini, aware of the Islamic hue that these movements and orga-
nizations had adopted and that it was confusing the younger genera-
tion, described them thus: “Their face is Islamic; they come to pray;
they fast; but their nature is un-Islamic and against Islam. Knowing
them is difficult and this is why our youngsters are being deceived by
them.” Khomeini directly accused the Forqan when he said, “Qiam
bar zed-e hokumat-e eslami, khlaf-e zarurat-e eslam ast . . . In hokumat

hokumat-e eslami ast. Qiam kardan alayeh-e hakumat-e eslami Ashade
mojazat ra be donbal khahad dasht”—“(the Forqan’s) rising against
an Islamic government is both against what Islam needs and Islam
itself. The current government is Islamic and any revolt against it
should be followed by a great punishment. Rising against an Islamic
government is equal to infidelity. It is worse than every sin on earth.
Mua’wiyeh rose against an Islamic government and Hazrat-e Amir
(Imam Ali) ordered the death punishment for him. Rising against an
Islamic government is not a simple thing.”177
The Forqan’s Publications

Before the revolution, the Forqan also published a weekly newspaper
titled “Nedaye Haq” (the voice of truth) that targeted young people
and answered their religious needs. At the beginning, however, this
newspaper did not publish political issues, since the Forqan thought
that Iranian youth “were looking for Jihadi Islam.” The Forqan also
believed that they needed to prepare an underground option for the
youth to make it possible for them to commit acts involving sui-
cide. When Goodarzi decided to go into politics, however, his stance
against the Islamic order became tougher and, apart from the assas-
sinations of the clerics, which the Forqan group committed, he also
prevented the Forqan members from voting in the referendum for an
Islamic Republic on December 1979.178
After the revolution, from 1977–1979, the Forqan published
a pamphlet called Zikr (a name that was also used for the group
as a whole), which claimed to be “the organ of the students of the
organization”179; but even before the assassination of General Qarani,
the Forqan, and especially Goodarzi, started to publish pamphlets.
Apart from writing about the tafsirs, Goodarzi also wrote about the
suras of the Quran and about the Imam Hossein, the Arafa—Mystics,
and the Tawhid (Unity of God).180 The Forqan, like some other
religious movement at that time, used the Quran and Imam Al’s
Nahjul-Balaghe interpretations in order to create revolutionary ide-
ologies.181 The Forqan’s publications on the Quran were The Message
of the Quran; Nahjul-Balaghe’s Explanations of the Arafa Prayer
(mysticism) also called The Message of Hossein; The Light of Nahjul-
Balaghe (in two volumes and written by Sadeq Dawoodi); Tawhid
and Its Different Aspects; another book by Mohammad Hossein al

Yasini entitled Prayers: the Embodiment of the Godliness of the Human
Being—which was an exposition of Sahifiye Sajjadieh; and another
book by Dawood Qasemi called The Principles of Quranic Thought,
which deals with the “general principles of anthropology, faith, revo-
lution and anti-revolution taken from Quran.”182
The main writer and ideologist of the group was Goodarzi, who
was responsible for writing about 20 interpretations of 20 Suras
of the Quran, and also two volumes of Sahifeh Sajjadiye. He also
wrote about the Arafa prayer in another pamphlet called “The Imam
Hussein’s Good Sermon,” and about Tawhid and its aspects.183
Ayatollah Motahhari criticized this specific book by Goodarzi and
his criticism, published under the pen name of Sadeq Dawoodi, was
titled Tawhid and All Its Aspects.
Muhammad Sahimi says that in Motahhari’s description of
Materialism-e Tarikhi—The History of Materialism (in Iran)184 he
refers to the MKO and the Forqan’s ideology as “gullible materi-
alism.” The use of this critical term made the Forqan angry, and
this was one of the reasons why they finally murdered him in May
1979.185
Under the leadership of Goodarzi, the Forqan felt much more
confident about releasing several publications of much higher sen-
sitivity; such as several volumes of interpretations of the Quran
called The Message of the Quran. These interpretations dealt with the
Suras al-Noor (24), al-Forqan (25), al-Ankaboot (29), al-Rum (30),
Luqman (31), al-Sajdah (32), al-Ahzab (33), Saba (34), Fatir (35),
Y.S (36), al-Mu’min (40), Fussilat (41), al-Shura’ (42), al-Zokhrof
(43), al-Dukhan (44), al-Jathiyyah (45), al-Ahqaf (46), Muhammad
(47), al-Fat’h (48), al-Hujurat (49), and al-Najm (53).186 All in all
there were 21, five of which were Surat Madina while the remaining
16 were from Makkian,187 which means more suras that explain the
beliefs, rather than practical suras.
Despite the fact that Goodarzi claimed to be the Forqan’s ideolo-
gist and spiritual leader, it seems that there was someone else with
another pen name that took responsibility for these publications. The
pseudonymous author called himself Najmoddin Shakib, but other
interpretations were also written under different pseudonyms like
Hussein Sadeqi, who “offered” his interpretation of al-Anbia (21),
Javad Saber of Sura al-Baqara (2), Hassan Qaemi of Suras Maryam
(19) and Taha (20), Ehsan Kamali of Suras al-Tawba (9), al-Shu’ara
(26), al-Naml (27) and al-Qasas (28), Muhammad Al Yasin and
Ehsan Kamali of Sura Yusuf (12) and the third part of the Quran,
Najmoddin Montazer of Suras al-Muzzammil (73), al-Moddathir
(74), al-Qiamah (75), al-Insan (76), al-Mursalat (77), al-Kahf (18),
al-Dhariyyat (51), and Qaf (50).
Other publications included The Light of Nahjul-Balaghe (two
volumes), which provided explanations for the Arafa Prayers and a
section of Nahjul-Balaghe; Tawhid va Aba’ d Gunagun An—Tawhid
and Its Different Aspects, whose pseudonymous author was Sadeq
Dawoodi; Ebadat: tajali-e khodaguni-ye Ensan—Prayers: The
Embodiment of the Godliness of the Human Being, which provided
explanations for Sahifeye Sajjadieh and was written under the pseud-
onym of Muhammad Hussein Ali Yasin. Most of these books dealt
with the analysis of revolutionary and anti-revolutionary matters.
188
The Forqan also published other books with a strong emphasis on

revolution and anti-revolution, which were meant to be more reli-
gious than political. One of them was the book titled Usul-e Tafakor
Qurani—The Principles of Quranic Thought, which was published
under the pseudonym of Dawood Qasemi (and was the second part
of the Tawhid and its different aspects). This book dealt with the
general principles of anthropology, the Shi’i faith, and revolution-
ary and anti-revolutionary thinking taken from the Quran. In this
book, the Forqan wanted to reveal how they understood their real-
ity by using the original sources of Islam such as the Quran and,
for this, they used the second verse of Sura Baqara, which contains
the belief in the Unseen—which was something that was obviously
related to the beginning of revolutionary thinking prior to the revo-
lution.189 For the Forqan, all the interpretations they made led to the
development of revolutionary awareness and a readiness to carry out
a revolution as understood from their religious sources.
The Forqan also tried to show their understanding of the role of
the Imamate and the Imams’ mission as the real interpreters of the
Quran and Hadith. For them, the Wahy—the inspiration (Wahy—
dar Taa’rif Koly-e An) that belonged to the Imams, carried with it
the real knowledge and understanding of the way the revolution
should be carried out.190 Jafarian concludes his review of this book,
the Wahy, and the Usul Tafaker Qurani, by stating, “Wahy—bedon-e
shak in ketab, ketabist baraye efshaye maheyat-e bi paye neveshteya-ye

Forqan”—“It must be said that this book (Wahy) is no doubt (the
book) that reveals the baseless nature of the Forqan’s literature.”191
Conclusions
Initially, it is easy to assume that the Forqan, their followers, and
supporters, like others among the revolutionary forces during the
Islamic revolution, were an ephemeral phenomenon that should be
ignored. Moreover, its existence before and during the revolution
also leaves us with the impression that their ideological contribu-
tion also hardly existed or, if it did, it was not at all part of the first
league of the revolutionary ideologies that greatly developed dur-
ing the revolution. This chapter has tried to show that, despite the
group’s small size and its leader’s religious shallowness, when one
takes into account all the ideological ingredients and factors, one
can see that this group had an ideological framework that, although
eclectic, was innovative.
While other groups were also influenced by Shariati, the Forqan’s
ideological borrowing of his ideas should raise the question of why
they chose only certain elements from Shariati’s ideology as their
own and not the whole body of teachings of Shariati? Apparently, it
seems that they did and they did not. Shariati’s roles as a revolution-
ary ideologue has been (and still is) under debate, especially his con-
tribution to the revolution. The religious factors say he was not their
driving inspiration and that only Khomeini and the religious leaders
were, while the semi-religious and several secular oriented groups did
see him as their moral guide. Seeing the Forqan as one group that
were influenced by him and still remained religious could serve to
help us understand that they were against the current revolution, of
the clerics, but probably supported some other kind of revolution—
but without telling us what kind of revolution. Many groups used
Shariati’s revolutionary thinking since he suggested an overwhelm-
ing revolutionary framework, and the Forqan were not too different
from other groups in this regard. I argue that they forced themselves
to use Shariati’s ideology since it suited their fight against the clerics.
They wanted to identify themselves with someone as prestigious as
Shariati, and so strengthen their own fragmented ideology by using
his ideology to instrumentally allow them to develop a combined
interpretation suited to the revolutionary situation. Unfortunately

for them, they used these tools in an amateurish fashion and dam-
aged themselves.
The Forqan’s ideological fight against, and hatred of, the cler-
ics while they themselves—and this is especially true of their own
leader, Goodarzi, who never went through real religious training—
still presented themselves as clerical should raise some questions
about the real attitude of the Forqan toward the clerics. All in all,
the mixture that Goodarzi suggested in his ideology, starting with
new interpretations of the Quran and Nahjul-Balaghe, and later the
combination of Marxist themes within this, left the impression that
Goodarzi was trying to both appease and conquer the hearts of the
younger generation, before and during the revolution.
In the next chapter, we will see that the Forqan, under the leader-
ship of Goodarzi, had deadly plans for the respected and well-known
religious figures taking part in the revolution.
CHAPTER 4
Acts of Terror and Assassination—

The Trojan Horse Inside the Islamic
Revolution
A
mong the most curious things that took place during the
Islamic Revolution of Iran were the actions carried out by the
Forqan against prominent Mullahs during its first year from
1979–1980, when all the revolutionary organizations and groups were
trying to find their way and place in the new political scene. When
one examines the actions of the Forqan at this time, one cannot help
but be amazed by the urgency of these actions and their predictions for
what awaited. On the one hand, we have the Forqan’s ability to react
in real time politics to the processes being developed by Khomeini and
his followers and, on the other, their ability to also understand the
steps Khomeini was willing to take in the new political scenario.
The way that the Forqan chose was not unique—not in Islamic
history nor in Iranian politics. Using the method of assassination has
been well-known and frequently used since the Nizaris’ time, under
the leadership of the Old Man of the Mountain with the Hashashinis,
and, in the Iranian politics, starting from the Qajari shahs through
to the Pahlavis, the Fadayan-e Islam, and then, but more intensively,
against Mohammad Reza Shah and his ministers up until the last
minute of the Islamic Revolution and even afterward.
There is a wide range of motives for choosing this method of
assassination rather than just killing or murdering some figure. The
assassin’s motive, as it appears in all the Forqan’s assassinations, is
based on hatred, a sense of mission, a fundamental religious belief,
and desperation. Although the Forqan were fully aware that these
assassinations would neither bring about the complete collapse of
Khomeini’s ideology nor his new form of politics, they were totally
committed to carrying out all the assassinations, professionally and
devotedly, apparently just to declare their disobedience and to stand
firmly against the mainstream.
Within the period of one year, the Forqan carried out the assas-
sinations of the General Chief of Staff Qarani, the Imam Jomeh of
Tabriz,1 Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari, Ayatollah Dr. Mohammad
Mofatteh, Ayatollah Ghazi Tabatabai, and Haj Mehdi Iraqi (also
Iraghi/Eraqi/Eraghi). 2 They also tried to assassinate Hashemi
Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Rabani Shirazi; Hossein Mahdian; Haj Taghi
Tarkhani (Khomeini’s supporter)3 and, in their publications, prom-
ised to assassinate other political and religious figures. The most
devastating fact about all these assassinations was that all of them
were carried out using one single method: gunmen “shooting from
speeding motorcycles.”4 Like most of the armed revolutionary forces
during the Islamic revolution, the Forqan, according to rumors—
unsupported by evidence—also obtained their weapons from military
bases that had been abandoned before and during the revolution.5
This method of “firing from speeding motorcycles” should raise
some questions and speculations since, unlike other revolutionary
terror groups like the Mojahedin-e Khalq and the Fedayeen-e Khalq,
SATJA, SAJAJI, and others who used a number of sporadic, but well
planned, terror methods of action against the targets they chose, the
Forqan, who were the most active of them all, chose only one way
and this defined them.
The first time that we know of in which this particular method
of assassination of “shooting from speeding motorcycles” was used
was on March 9, 1921, in Madrid, Spain, and it was described thus:
The assassins who were riding a motorcycle “increased its speed and
approached the side of the Premier’s automobile . . . the driver of the
machine opened fire upon the Premier” The murdered figure was the
Spanish Premier and Minister of Marine Affairs—Eduardo Dato. 6
There are probably other cases that took place during WWII, but
another civilian assassination was carried out in 1977 when West
Germany’s Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback (and two others who
were in his car) was shot dead from a speeding motorcycle (a Suzuki
GS 750). The Baader-Meinhof 7 gang, who were the extreme leftists
Acts of Terror and Assassination M 81
of the Red Army Faction (R AF) in Germany, were the perpetra-

tors; more specifically, R AF member Verena Becker—who claimed
to be the shooter on the motorcycle.8 The next time this method of
shooting from a speeding motorcycle was used was by the Forqan.
Apparently, this method of assassination will not disappear as it,
allegedly, has become a common method used by the Israeli Mossad
to kill Palestinian terrorists—such as PLO official Mamoun Meraish
in Athens in August 1983.9 Other instances of this method being
used by, allegedly, the Mossad and the CIA, are the assassinations of
Iranian nuclear program specialists, professors, and engineers.
The “shooting from speeding motorcycles” method of assassina-
tion made a comeback recently with several cases between January–
November 2010, in July 2011, between January–March 2012 and
in October 2013, when Mossad or CIA agents allegedly shot dead
the following physicists and nuclear scientists in Iran: Darioush
Razaie,10 Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan,11 the nuclear scientist Massoud
Ali Mohmmadi,12 and Fereydoun Abbasi, an adviser to the Defense
Ministry and a professor at Imam Hossein University (who survived
the ambush by motorcycle assassins). Another nuclear expert, Majid
Shahriari,13 however, was killed, as were two army officers—Raza
Ali Fimani, who was shot dead by two motorcyclists,14 and Mojtaba
Ahmadi.15
It is rumored that the professional assassinations that have been
attributed to the Forqan might have been carried out by foreign pro-
fessional agencies such as the Israeli Mossad—that may also have
killed a highly placed Iranian cleric during the Islamic revolution.16
Rumors aside, the fact is that the Forqan was the group that claimed
responsibility for these assassinations and kept promising to con-
tinue them and threatened Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and
high-ranking figures from the United States, the Soviet Union, and
China as optional targets.17 It is worth noting that all these rumors
and facts that have been gathered about the Forqan Group could not
have been collated together into one framework unless the Forqan
itself supplied the facts about the deadly assassinations.
The main thing that led to this initiation of terrorist actions by
the Forqan was the idea that the clerics were going to establish a
religious republic. The Forqan saw this as “arzesh-haye rastin tashii’
sarkh alavi bud ”—“abandoning the path of the Shi’ism of Imam
Ali” and also because of the desire “Azad sakhtan Islam Ali az asarat-e
Akhundanism”—“to free the Islam of the Imam Ali from the cage of
Akhundanism.”18
In chapter 3, we tried to locate exactly when the Forqan emerged
and in what ideological framework. To one group of the Iranian
people, it was clearly seen as a revolutionary group that was pioneer-
ing and respectable, while other groups merely noted its existence.
It can, however, be said that unless the Forqan had chosen to put
aside verbal action and take up the sword against the Mullahs, we
would never have heard about them. Even the United States, which
had many interests in Iran and very closely scrutinized everything
about the revolutionary events of 1978–1979, was not able to iden-
tify the appearance of the Forqan in the revolutionary field, and the
first time they heard about them was when this group claimed credit
for the assassination of General Mohammad Vali Qarani,19 who had
been appointed chief of staff of the army by Khomeini, 20 on April 23,
1979 (although Ali Kordi says that he was murdered on Tuesday the
4 Ardibehesht 1358—April 24, 1979). 21 Mark Gasiorowski suggests
the following theory about the assassination, according to which
Qarani resigned from his post in early April 1979 probably because
he opposed the Islamic government led by Bazargan that was then
being established and the Forqan, “may have thought he was plotting
against the Islamic government.” 22 This, however, seems to be con-
tradictory to the real interests of the Forqan, who themselves were
against an Islamic government led by the clerics.
Despite Gasiorowski’s theory, it seems that Qarani was shot as
an act of revenge since “he had been sentenced to a revolutionary
execution for his treason during the Shah’s regime and for the hard
line he adopted in crushing the Kurdish revolt in Sanandaj in March
(1979).” 23 The Forqan believed that Qarani was responsible for the
killing of “innocent people” during the fighting in March 1979 in
northwest Iran—between the Iranian army and the Kurdish tribes
who were fighting for their independence and freedom. In addition
to this, he was also seen to be “a part of the ousted royal regime.” 24
In an East German newspaper, Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA),
the political Editor Gerd Rainer Neu claimed that, although the
Forqan had emerged late in 1977, it was only exposed after the assas-
sination of General Qarani on April 23, 1979. After his murder, a
statement—that was probably a message from the Forqan—was left
in one of the rooms of the hotel that was located in front of Qarani’s
house. It started with Bismillah (In the Name of God) and was a
translation of the Sura 101 (i.e., al-Qari’ah—the Calamity). Neu
provides information about an Iranian debate regarding the use of
this sura by the group, in which one side to the debate argues that it
represents radical Islam and acts against the Shi’i mullah’s involve-
ment in politics while the other side argues that this sura represents
the need to take religious action against evil (which according to the
Forqan seems to be the same).
In a telegram sent from the German Democratic Republic’s
embassy in Tehran after the assassination of General Qarani, it
was reported that the Forqan had published a letter in the Iranian
newspaper Ayandegan in which they accused Qarani not only of
cooperating with the mullahs’ dictatorship, but also of being pro-
American and supporting the pro-American revolutionaries. The
newspaper report concluded that the Forqan group belonged to the
leftist factions that do not support the revolution and are against a
religious revolution in Iran. 25 After the assassination of Motahhari,
Ayandegan published another article based on the Forqan’s litera-
ture, which described the Forqan as a fanatical Muslim group that
opposes the clerics and is evidence of a religious schism in Iran.26 An
anonymous caller to Ayendegan asserted that it was the little-known
Forqan group that had claimed responsibility for the assassinations
of the former armed forces chief of staff of Khomeini’s revolutionary
regime and Motahhari just the previous month.27
The Forqan did not wait too long until the next assassination of
another prominent figure from among the revolutionary mullahs,
and this time they kept their promise to hit a high-ranking figure
and so strike a devastating blow against the revolution. The mul-
lah chosen to be the right mullah in the wrong place was Ayatollah
Murtaza Motahhari, who was the chairman of the Revolutionary
Council and Khomeini’s closest advisor among the clergy. Murtaza
Motahhari, who was born in Fariman, joined the Iranian Islamic
Movement in 1963, was first imprisoned by the SAVAK on June 5,
1963, 28 and then several times more. Motahhari was a disciple of
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and a leading member of the Islamic
Revolutionary Council that was set up to govern Iran during the
transition from the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to the
Islamic Republic in 1979.29 During these years, he was engaged in
explaining the role played by Islamic culture in society, but he was
re-apprehended by the SAVAK and then banned from public speak-

ing in 1972. This indefatigable combatant, and eminent scholar
of jurisprudence, was assassinated by the Forqan group on May 2,
1979.30
Motahhari also served as the link between Khomeini’s cleri-
cal circle and lay politicians such as Bazargan.31 This link actually
had two purposes, the first being to transfer Khomeini’s orders to
Bazargan’s government and the second, to establish the provisional
revolutionary council that could sideline Bazargan’s provisional gov-
ernment’s decisions.
The Forqan assassinated Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari the same
way they had assassinated Qarani when he was leaving “the home of
Yadollah Shahbi, the Minister of State for Revolutionary Projects.”
He was shot three times in the head, and this was described as an act
that was carried out “to further their ideals.”32 Iranian officials, how-
ever, say that Motahhari was assassinated when he left a dinner party
in Tehran.33 According to Ali Kordi, Motahhari was murdered on
Tuesday, the 11 Ardibehesht 1358—May 1, 1979. He was shot out-
side the door of Dr. Sehabi’s house in Fakharabad Street in Tehran.34
Just one day after this assassination, the Forqan stated that there
were other revolutionary figures that they were going to assassinate,
such as Ibrahim Yazdi, Mehdi Hadavi (Chief Public Prosecutor),
Sadeq Qotbzadeh, Abbas Amir Entezam, and “the entire member-
ship of the Revolutionary Council.”35
In an official paper issued by the German Democratic Republic’s
embassy in Tehran, it was reported that most of the Forqan mem-
bers were probably Sunnis and they were responsible for the assas-
sination of Ayatollah Motahhari and were planning to assassinate
four more religious figures: Abbas Amir Entezam, Ibrahim Yazdi,
Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and Abul Hassan Bani-Sadr, who were all part
of Khomeini’s shadow government.36 According to the Forqan,
Motahhari was murdered because he was the “Head of the Secret
Revolutionary Council” that was founded by Khomeini, which was
also responsible for the executions of opponents of the revolution.37
It seems, however, that the Forqan had other reasons for assassinat-
ing Motahhari that were more fundamental and ideological. They
chose Motahhari since he, more than any other cleric except for
Khomeini of course, was the person who first had “the idea of the
rule of the clergy and (made) the organizational preparations . . . in
[the] distant past, even before Khordad in 1962 (1342 lunar year).” 38
We can find another justification for the assassination of Motahhari
in Kordi’s book on the Forqan, where he presents the testimonies
of several Forqan members, from which we can learn about what
motivated them. For example Ali Hatami, one of the Forqanists, said
that “Motahhari terror shod Chun kami ba doctor Shariati ekhtelaf
dasht”—“Motahhari has been assassinated because he had a little dis-
agreement with Shariati.”39
Choosing Motahhari as a main target was not accidental, since
they saw him as the main force leading the rest of the clerics in the
idea that they could establish a regime based on religion and rule
Iran. For them “in tasavor bar in bod ke be qodrat rasidan diktaturi-ye
akhundinism va amade sazi-ye tashkilati an moddat-ha qabl, hata qabl
az khordad 62’ az tarf-e O’ tarh shode bud ”—it was “the conception
that the clergy (could reign) and the preparations he (Motahhari)
had made to achieve this goal in the past, even before Khordad in
1962.”40
The Forqan also claimed that Motahhari was head of the secret
Islamic Revolutionary Council set up by Khomeini, which, among
other things, supervised the revolutionary courts that sent 164
people to the firing squads.41 In early May 1979, just after the
assassination of Motahhari, the Forqan announced that “the group
would kill all members of the Revolutionary Council and a number
of top government officials” and made the very important proph-
ecy at that time that “Iran is slipping into a dictatorship of the
clergy.”42
In a CIA file dated May 2, 1979, a day after the assassination of
Ayatollah Motahhari, there is a report that says that this murder of
well-known and much respected religious figures such as Motahhari
was being seen by the Iranian government as a plot, but that they
could not connect it to any one revolutionary group that was acting
against religious leaders. This file also reports that, after the assassi-
nation, the Forqan spokesman announced that Motahhari had been
murdered because he was taking part in the Islamic Revolutionary
Council—a council “whose membership has never been revealed—
that was responsible for Iran’s ‘parallel government’.” This file also
characterized Motahhari as a “modern theorist among the Iranian
Shia Muslin clergy,” and that his “influence with Khomeini prob-
ably was based on an ability to combine his traditional Islamic tenets
with leftist concepts of a modern secular Iranian philosopher who

had strongly influenced the anti-Shah movement.”43
After the assassination, the East German newspaper FAZ also
reported that the Forqan had published a statement in an Iranian
newspaper that announced that they would also assassinate four
other key figures: the Deputy Interior Minister Entezam, the Foreign
Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, the Radio/TV manager Ghotbzadeh, and
an economic researcher Bani-Sadr—all of whom were very close to
Khomeini and probably hated by the people. For the FAZ reporter, it
seemed very odd that the Forqan were able to publish this statement
in a national newspaper, and believed that this fact only reflected
how weak the new government was. At this moment in time, how-
ever, the identity of the Forqan was unclear, as some thought they
were Marxists while others thought they belonged to some religious
faction. Either way, they gained much sympathy for their struggle
against Khomeini.44
As mentioned above, the Forqan claimed credit for the assassina-
tions of Motahhari and Qarani and were “enjoying” the momentum,
which not only made them feel more confident and successful, but
also able to declare their next targets: Yazdi, Entezam, and Qotbzadeh
(this source does not include Bani-Sadr). The US Embassy diplomats
in Tehran made formal reports in which they said that the Forqan
consisted of only 16 members, who had joined together in order to
eliminate “the unholy cancer of the murdering mullahs.” At this
stage, the US diplomats in Tehran could not say for sure who the
leader of the group was, and believed that “(the leader) is someone
connected to the old regime.” The reason why the US diplomats
thought the Forqan were ex-members of the old regime was due to
the fact “that many of our religious contacts have been very difficult
to find over the past 35 hours” (part of this is a natural involve-
ment with the funeral). They then go on to say “leftists and radi-
cal Moslems are likely to see this as further evidence of Khomeini’s
thesis about the U.S. and others still meddling in Iran. If this view
gains widespread currency . . . the mission’s security situation could
again be tight.”45
Ayatollah Khomeini denounced Motahhari’s assassination and
called it “a great shock for Islam.” The act took place when “the
little-known (at that time) member of Iran’s shadowy but powerful
Revolutionary Council was gunned down on a Tehran street after
leaving a house where he reportedly met with Prime Minister Mehdi

Bazargan.”46 After the establishment of the IRI, the Islamic Republic
chose May 2 as Teacher’s Day, on which day Iran would commemo-
rate Ayatollah Motahhari’s memory and denounce his assassination
by the Forqan Group.47
In a DPA newspaper, the political editor Mr. Gerd Rainer Neu tried
to explain the problematic situation caused by the turmoil in Iran due
to the last assassinations carried out by the Forqan Group. The most
interesting claim that Neu makes is that more than anybody else in
Iran, the Forqan knew the most about the Iranian religious leaders.
This assumption that Mr. Neu makes is based on the fact that after
Mothahhri’s assassination, the assassins published information about
his role in Khomeini’s Islamic Revolutionary Council. If this is true,
as Neu claims, the significance of Motahhari’s role in this council is
important since, as leader of this council, he had been able to act as
the head of the Court of the Revolution that had already sentenced
180 people of the toppled regime of the Shah to death.
Another East German newspaper—The Morgen Post, published an
article regarding the several assassinations in Iran on May 3, 1979.
This article claimed that a secret organization, named the Forqan,
had succeeded in assassinating two religious figures within eight
days. Just after the assassination of Ayatollah Motahhari, the group
announced that they were only acting against the religious group
surrounding Khomeini, and that Motahhari was the chief execu-
tioner who had decided the fate of the ex-members of the Shah’s
regime.48 Based on this, we can assume that the US diplomats’ paper
about the possibility that the Forqan were ex-members of the SAVAK
could be a real possibility.
After this assassination, Khomeini announced on national radio
that the Forqan were the messengers of colonialism and imperial-
ism and the agents of the Shah. At this point in May 1979, no one
really knew who the Forqan were and whether they were leftists or
a real religious group. Other rumors claimed that they were trying
to initiate a war between the circles around Khomeini, Taleqani,
and Shariatmadari, and that the assassination of Motahhari could
have been retaliation for the arrest of Taleqani’s son by Khomeini’s
guards.49
As a result of Ayatollah Motahhari’s assassination by the Forqan,
both the Iranian government of Bazargan and Khomeini himself
declared that this act had been carried out against the people’s
revolution and was an imperialistic act. Therefore, the government
declared a national day of mourning and asked the people to be alert
and cautious.50
As mentioned before, the assassination of Motahhari initiated
an “after shock” wave among the foreign embassies and newspa-
pers that were anxious to know the identities of the killers of this
respected figure, and the US Embassy in Tehran, for example, sent
a telegram that said, “Ayatollah Motahhari was assassinated last
night by unknown assassins. It was reported that he was shot in the
head three times. The assassin was reported to have accomplished
this even though Motahhari had very (unreadable word) security.
Motahhari was the head of the central revolutionary committee and
a very close friend of Ayatollah Khomeini . . . A source has reported
( . . . ) that the assassination was carried out by the same group that
assassinated general Qarany. This secret group is called ‘Forghan’
(distinction between truth and falsehood). The group ( . . . ) had ear-
lier, after the assassination of the general, announced that they will
(be) going to carry out other assassinations. ( . . . ) believes that they
may be the same group.”51
In another telegram from the US Embassy in Tehran after the
assassination of Ayatollah Motahhari, the version of the story was:
“(the) assassination of Ayatollah Motahari sharply increased anxi-
eties among government and religious (unreadable word). The
Forqan group has claimed credit. Says (Ibrahim) Yazdi, Entezam,
and Ghotbzadeh are next. Suspicions of U.S. likely to increase. End
summary.” According to the same source, the religious leaders “have
become visibly more anxious about their own safety in wake of the
assassination which was a thoroughly professional job carried out to
hit a man under substantial security protection.”52
In a CIA file dated May 4, 1979, mention is made that the reli-
gious leaders and the Iranian government (maybe this refers to the
provisional government) “fear for their lives following the assassi-
nation of Ayatollah Motahhari . . . the identity of the killers is still
unknown, but if they turn out to be backers of the Shah, many
officials will believe the US was involved.” The line following this
statement in the CIA file informs that the group that has taken
responsibility for this assassination is the Forqan group, who were
also responsible for the assassination of Qarani. According to this
file the Forqan claimed that they would assassinate other official
and religious figures such as Foreign Minister—Ibrahim Yazdi,
Deputy Prime minister Entezam, Radio-TV Director Ghotbzadeh,
Bani-Sadr—the Islamic economic theorist and other members of the
Islamic Revolutionary Council.53
At this point, the CIA could not say what the identities of the
Forqan members were but that they believe that, as long as their
identities remained secret, the Iranian officials would think that
these assassins were supporters of the Shah, “aided or encouraged by
the US.” The CIA report says that if it were true that these people
were related to the Shah, it would heighten the suspicious toward
the US Embassy that will then become a target for violence.54 The
possibility exists that one of the reasons the US Embassy in Tehran
was taken over was because the revolutionaries really thought that
the embassy was a “house of spies.”
In a CIA report, dated May 14, 1979, that partly deals with
the situation in Iran—especially with the Jewish and Baha’i
minorities—the Forqan’s identity is examined from a different angle,
when it states that “the alleged slayers of Ayatollah Motahhari, the
Forqan, are described in one account as a Baha’i-led group respon-
sible to Israel and to Western imperialism.”55 What can be seen from
this is that the Forqan, unwillingly, or maybe very willingly, may
have aroused the imagination of the foreign agencies.
In an internal report from the Middle East Desk of the Israeli
Foreign Ministry written by Yoram Shani, there is a description of
the mourning procession after Motahhari’s murder, in which the
clerics protested against the left, the communists, and against all
factions that showed any resistance to the Velayet-e Faqih concept,
and warned that Iran might face increased terrorist activity due to
the murders of Qarani and Motahhari.56
In May 1979, the assassinations of Qarani and Motahhari by the
Forqan group, which (at that time) was an unknown revolutionary
group, were considered by Khomeini’s circle to be the herald of more
terrorist actions against political and religious figures.57 As previ-
ously noted, this consideration and fear was fueled by the Forqan
themselves, who promised to continue their deadly actions against
the mullahs.
This promise was almost completely realized by another assas-
sination attempt against one of the most prominent figures of the
Iranian revolution—Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In the same

month in which Motahhari was killed, on May 25, the Forqan went
on with their plans and promises. The next target, despite their
practice of declaring who their targets were before the assassination
attempts, was Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was not included in the
first list,58 but was “a hardline anti-Communist religious leader.”
Two gunmen shot him and wounded him seriously. The reason the
Forqan chose Rafsanjani as a target was that he, like Motahhari,
was a member of the Revolutionary Council and was very close to
Ayatollah Khomeini.59
Hashemi Rafsanjani had just left his house in Tehran when he
was shot twice in the stomach, but he survived this assassination
attempt. Although the Forqan were blamed for this attack, in this
specific case they did not take any responsibility except for their
general statement at the beginning of May 1979 that they would kill
all the Revolutionary Council members and top members of the gov-
ernment.60 Despite this, other sources claim that it was the Forqan
who were responsible for the assassination attempt on Rafsanjani. 61
According to Ali Kordi, however, on Friday, the 3 Khordad 1358—
May 24, 1979—three assassins shot Rafsanjani. Two of them were
the assassin team while the third man spread propaganda pamphlets
in the street. Two bullets hit and wounded Rafsanjani, but this time
the terrorists were using a BMW car and not motorcycles.62
One could have concluded that the Forqan were trying to frighten
Khomeini and bring about the collapse of his religious alliance, but
the Iranian mullahs blamed the United States for sponsoring these
leftist organizations in order to bring about the failure of the religious
effort to create an Islamic state. Khomeini also contributed to this
message against the United States by claiming that “America an(d)
the other super powers must know . . . that they cannot assassinate
our revolution with these foolish efforts.”63 Ayatollah Taleqani was
more specific and, probably as a reaction to the scene, also blamed
the Forqan for being responsible for this attempt and accused them
of being agents of the CIA and the SAVAK.64
As was the case with the previous assassination, the CIA file of
May 26, 1979 also informs us about the assassination attempt against
Hashemi Rafsanjani, and expresses the belief that the Forqan were
behind this attempt. The file does not offer any reason for this assas-
sination attempt but just states that Rafsanjani “has been reported
to have been the party’s link with the Revolutionary Guard Corps,”
which had just been formed that month, and was “one of the signers
of the declaration of the founding of Khomeini’s Islamic Republican
Party.”65 The US official agencies, in this case as previously, could
not exactly identify either who the factors behind the assassins were,
nor what their motives were. For the United States, this deadly game
was neither something that was their concern nor something that
they should support or condemn. The United States never denied or
investigated the Forqan’s part in these assassinations and Ayatollah
Khomeini’s accusations fell on deaf ears, which led to Khomeini’s
circle assuming that the United States was behind these actions.
The accusation made against the United States and the Forqan just
demonstrate what impact the latter’s actions had upon the revolu-
tionary circles. The successes and near successes of the actions taken
against Khomeini’s circle only increased the Forqan’s motivation to
try harder, and next time shoot with more deadly accuracy. In order
to exploit this momentum, the Forqan took another step to escalate
their actions. On June 11, 1979, nearly two weeks after the failed
assassination attempt against Rafsanjani, the Forqan announced
that they would soon assassinate Brigadier General Noureddin Most
Ahedi, the Director General of the Army Medical Services. 66 The
Forqan did not say what the reason to assassinate him was, and never
carried out any action against him. The probable reason for this was
that he was neither a member of Khomeini’s Revolutionary Council,
nor even anything close, and therefore they wanted to find some-
one who, by virtue of his actions and association, represented what
Khomeini stood for better than others.
This was the reason that the Forqan, under the pressure of time
and in order to exploit the momentum created by the killings, tried
to carry out actions that would keep the fire of their revolution-
ary fervor burning; and so they carried out such an action in July
1979. The weekend summary of the East German embassy in Tehran
reported that the assassinations of religious figures were not stopping
and that during the night between Saturday and Sunday (July 7–8),
another religious leader by the name of Taqi Haj Tarqani had been
murdered. Tarqani was an unknown figure in Iran and it was not
clear why the Forqan had targeted him but, according to the Interior
Minister, Zabagian, Tareqani was the Shah’s enemy. The assassins
shot him while riding on motorcycles and left several flyers around
the killing area that explained the assassination of someone called

Haj Ali Asghar Tareqani. 67 An anonymous telephone call claimed
that the attack was the work of the Forqan, 68 but the Ettelaa’t newspa-
per claimed that the Forqan had been confused by the similar names
of two people and had killed an innocent man—Taqi Haj Tareqani,
a businessman whose name was close to that of the real person they
wanted to assassinate—Haj Ali Asghar Tareqani. 69 Kordi just men-
tions that the Forqan murdered Haj Taqi Tarkhani on Saturday, 16
Tir-Mah 1358—July 7, 1979, when two assassins riding motorcycles
shot him three times and killed him on the spot.70 Kordi does not
mention any confusion with names by the Forqan.
Mistake or not, at this time no one could stop the Forqan from
carrying out more assassinations. As time passed, the reality of the
revolution was seen to be doomed by Khomeini’s leadership, which
had become even more religious than what people had previously
expected. The Forqan, who admitted to fighting the clerics and their
attempt to establish a religious republic, had to increase their actions
and move more directly against prominent and well-known religious
figures related to Khomeini. The three actions that had been taken
in late May, June, and July indicated that the Forqan’s actions were
actually decreasing in number, and that their profile was being low-
ered. The Forqan knew that they were being hunted and pursued by
Khomeini’s forces, which meant that they had to be more cautious
and selective of their targets so as to be more efficient and effective.
Success came on August 26, 1979 when the Forqan assassinated
Hajj Mahdi Iraqi, another close associate of Ayatollah Khomeini
and a leading member of the Mu’talifih-yi Islami.71 Other source
claims that Iraqi and his son were murdered by the Forqan group
on September 4, 197972 and not on August 26. For some reason, it
was reported in a website dedicated to the memory of Mr. Iraqi that
he was murdered in September 1979,73 which is obviously wrong
since the Associated Press had already published the announcement
of his death on August 26, 1979, along with the information that
Iraqi had been a member of the Islamic Coalition Party and an aide
of Khomeini’s.74 Iraqi was allegedly also one of the Fadayan-i Islam
members who accompanied him into exile in August 1941 and, after
the revolution, was appointed to be head of the Qasr Prison.75 Kordi
says that Haj Mehdi Iraqi and his son, Mohammad Hosam Iraqi,
were shot to death on 4 Shahrivar 1358—August 26, 1979—when
the father and son were standing outside the house of Hossein
Mahdian (the Manager of the Keyhan Newspaper) and mentions
that Mehdi Iraqi was the manager of a financial institute in the
capital.76 It appears that Kordi provides a different version of Iraqi’s
profession although the date is still accurate.
In the process of targeting Iraqi and his son, the Forqan also
wounded a third man called Hossein Mahdian, who was the pub-
lisher of the biggest Iranian newspaper at that time—Keyhan. Iraqi
was a member of the newspaper’s staff, but was also a member of the
central committee of Khomeini’s Islam Republic Party,77 and was
one of Khomeini’s “organizational kingpins.” 78
The above success led to another success that came sooner than
on previous occasions. An East German embassy file reported that
on Tuesday, September 18, 1979, a blast shook the city of Qom.
This time, the Forqan’s targets were the houses of Sharitmadari and
Rouhani and, according to Tehrani newspaper Bamdad, the Forqan
assassins fled (again) on motorcycles. Since the Shah’s fall, they had
(until that point) carried out ten attempts to kill religious figures, six
of which had been successful.79
The occurrence of one operation after another led the foreign
intelligence agencies in Iran to try to discover who was behind the
assassinations that had been directed at the high echelons of the
religious circles. The most interesting intelligence reports origi-
nated from the CIA, The US State Department, STASI from the
East German Republic, and the Israeli diplomatic and intelligence
archives, all of whom participated in debates and discussions about
the Forqan and the ramifications of any success they might have had
with their mission to suppress or eliminate the religious cadres sur-
rounding Khomeini and, in this way, prevent him from establishing
a religious regime.
An example of such an internal report came from the Israeli
Embassy in Washington to the Middle East Desk in the Israeli
Foreign Ministry. The author of the report, Mr. David Turgeman,
includes notes he took from a conversation he had with Prof. Marvin
Zonis, of Chicago University. According to Turgeman, Zonis made
a very clear distinction between the religious wings surrounding
Khomeini, and considered the divisions and rivalries within this fac-
tion to be enormous. The recent political assassinations carried out
by the Forqan group were, according to him, all about these rivalries,
and the Name Forqan was only a cover name for all these factions.
The incredible thing that Zonis emphasizes is that “behind all these
murders there are no opposition groups outside the regime, but they
all come from the regime itself.”80 All in all, these semi-academic
overviews and arguments only present a superficial understanding of
the religious factions in Iran, including who the Forqan really were,
and are sometimes far removed from reality.
While the foreign intelligence agencies were busy reporting on
their assumptions and presenting their views of the situation, the
Forqan were busy continuing their mission to stop the clerics and
their supporters. In the following case, the Forqan, for the first
and last time, chose a foreign target that, for them, represented for-
eign influence and intervention in Iran. It must be said that this
action was not motivated by their ideological beliefs, despite their
hatred and rejection of the West. In this, they were different from
the Mojahedin-e Khalq and other revolutionary groups that acted
against foreign embassies and agencies, since they did not see their
fight against foreign elements as their real and main purpose.
The East German newspaper Die Wahrheit, dated October 13,
1979, published a report that the Iranian Forqan group had assas-
sinated a German working for the MerckCompany in Tehran. The
newspaper claimed that this group was part of the SAVAK, and was
linked to foreign agencies that had been responsible for the murders
of several key figures during the last year (1979). 81 The murdered
figure was a 32-year-old West German businessman from Munich
called Hans Joachim Leib. We really do not know what the sources or
facts this newspaper relied on were when it claimed that the Forqan
was a proxy of the SAVAK. The SAVAK had ceased being efficient
and had actually been disbanded by the end of 1978 or early in 1979,
so it could be that the newspaper was recycling the clerics’ accusa-
tions that the Forqan was actually a SAVAK proxy. Because of the
Forqan’s successes in the series of assassinations it had carried out,
however, this could have been based on a rational conclusion.
The formal agencies of the East German Republic were, how-
ever, more cautious about making accusations against the SAVAK
or any other official Iranian agency. In a formal paper issued by the
East German Republic’s embassy in Tehran, it was reported that the
Forqan Group was responsible for the murder of Hans Johachim Leib,
a German citizen. On October 22, 1979, the Ettelaa’t newspaper
published a report that the Forqan had taken responsibility for the
murder of Mr. Leib because, according to the Forqan, he worked for
the Merck Pharmaceutical Company. The Forqan claimed he was a
German secret agent who had come to Iran using different identities,
but what Mr. Leib’s crime had been was not made clear either by the
Ettelaa’t newspaper or by the Forqan publications. 82
The East German embassy in Iran reported that the Forqan had
left a pamphlet at the murder scene that declared their responsibility
for the assassination of Leib among other killings of Iranian reli-
gious and government leaders. The reason the Forqan provided for
killing Leib was that “he was not a Moslem and was connected with
western capitalism” and did not believe in the oneness of God. 83
The series of assassinations was not halted, as one could assume
it would have been after the last action. The break that the Forqan
took was probably because of internal problems, and not for the
lack of targets. At this point, the IRGC was already established (in
May 1979) and was already pursuing the opponents of the clerics,
whether they came from the Mojahedin, the Fedayeen, or whoever
else was trying to sabotage the revolution. The main rivals of the
clerics were, however, the old elites of the Shah’s time—from the
army or economic circles. Among these rivals were the SAVAK and
the secret services that the IRGC had meticulously hunted down to
settle accounts with, and since the clerics suspected the Forqan group
of being a SAVAK proxy, the attention paid to them kept growing.
Despite all of this, the Forqan had to slow down their activity
and select their next target carefully, and this time it was a cleric.
On November 1 1979, in Tabriz, the Forqan assassinated the Friday
Prayer Leader—Ayatollah Qazi Tabatabai—“who is reputed to be
a member of the secret Islamic Revolutionary Council that con-
trols Iran.”84 He was also Khomeini’s representative to northern
Azerbaijan.85 Ali Kordi claims that Tabatabai was shot to death
on Aban 11, 1358—November 2, 1979—by the Forqan member
Massoud Taqi-Zadeh. 86
It seems that the Forqan chose targets outside the capital wher-
ever the IRGC were working intensively to arrest and execute the
opponents of the clerics. Places like Tabriz and northern Azerbaijan
were places the IRGC were less familiar with, and so had a smaller
presence there, and the Forqan knew this so they chose to carry out
their actions there, far from the capital.
The primary, and most important, events were taking place in the
capital, where the Forqan were emerging and where they felt at home.
Carrying out actions outside the capital did not serve their desire to
make the people conscious of their ideology and goals whereas, in the
capital, they could earn the people’s acknowledgment. Apart from
this, the leading clerics were living in Tehran so, in order to topple
the new order, they had to act in the capital and nowhere else. Their
next action took place on December 19 in Teheran, when Ayatollah
Dr. Mohammad Mofatteh, the Head of the Faculty of Theology at the
Teheran University (sometimes referred to as the Teheran College),
was shot dead by two men who made their escape on a motorcycle
(again). The responsibility for this act was claimed by the Forqan, 87
but another source says that the date was December 18.88 Kordi pres-
ents another view of this murder by saying that before he was mur-
dered, the Forqan called Dr. Mohammad Mofatteh and threatened
his life. He was shot on 27 Azar 1358—December 18 1979, by Kamal
Yasini, Mahmoud Kashani, Mohammad Nuri, and Hassan Nuri. He
was shot outside the college and limped into the campus, while the
assassins ran after him and finished him off inside the college.89
In an East German embassy file, it was reported that on Tuesday
December 13, 1979 (neither 18 nor 19 as mentioned in the above
sources), Ayatollah Mofatteh and his two bodyguards were assassi-
nated in another motorcycle assassination by the Forqan Group, but
that Moffateh’s companions were only injured and ran to look for
shelter in the Theology Department building in Tehran University
and, or so it was said, the assassins ran after them into the university
and killed them.90 Khomeini blamed the United States for being
responsible this event.
The East German newspaper The Morgen Post published a
report that the Forqan Group had assassinated Ayatollah Mofatteh,
and also claimed to know the reason he was killed. The main rea-
son was not for just being a cleric, but for being a member of the
Revolutionary Council and the leader of Komite 5, which was a little
known committee that was active during the revolution. Khomeini
again blamed the United States for being the chief sponsor of this
group, and alleged that they wanted to weaken the enthusiasm of
Iranian youth for the revolution.91
In another East German embassy file, it was reported that the
Forqan Group had called the Keyhan newspaper and said that they
had left a letter in an envelope explaining the reason for their killing
of Mofatteh and claiming responsibility for the assassination of four
(or five) people from Khomeini’s inner circle.92
Prior to Ayatollah Mofatteh’s assassination, the Forqan had sent
him a letter threatening his life and, just before the assassination,
Dr. Mahdizadeh, the deputy dean of Mofatteh’s faculty, brought him
an envelope and said they had sent another letter. Ayatollah Mofatteh
read the letter in which the following words had been written in
capital letters and red ink “FORQAN! We killed Motahhari (upon)
these Quranic verses and Hadiths, and we will kill you soon.” 93
Although the Forqan were eliminated by the Islamic Republic in
January 1980 (at least that is what the IRI claims), they were still
suspected of carrying out other actions that were allegedly associated
with them, such as the attempt to kill Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili,
the Prosecutor General in December 1980, and, in March 1981, the
attempt to assassinate the Ayatollah Rabbani Shirazi, Khomeini’s rep-
resentative in the southern province Fars, who was finally wounded
by the Forqan members who had attacked him. The Ettelaa’t newspa-
per wrote that the Forqan had taken responsibility for this attack,94
even though not all of the targets had been eliminated.
Ali Kordi also strengthens this claim by saying that Ayatollah
Abdul Rahim Rabani Shirazi was shot by the Forqan on Saturday
the 8 Farvardin 1360— March 28, 1981—in the city of Shiraz
where he lived. Here too, the assassins were riding motorcycles, and
this murder was the Forqan’s message that they would continue their
fight against the clerics.95
In another assassination attempt carried out on June 27, 1981,96
the Forqan allegedly tried to assassinate Ali Khamenei who was at
that time the Imam’s representative to the High Council of Defense
and the Friday Imam of Teheran’s Abuzar Mosque. Khamenei was
seriously wounded on the right side of his body as a result of a bomb
exploding. On a piece of the tape recorder in which the bomb had
been concealed (that survived) was written, “The Gift of the Forqan
Group.” 97
Not all the sources agree about the Forqan’s responsibility for the
assassination attempt made on Khamenei, and one source says that
despite the Forqan’s note “they supposedly had no team operating in
Iran at that time (of the assassination attempt).”98 After the assas-
sination attempt on Khamene’i, the regime suspected that it was the
work of the Forqan but then said it could also be the United States
or the leftist MKO.99
The Forqan never recovered or reemerged after the termination in
January 1980 and the execution of its members. The Islamic Republic
carried out a total cleansing operation since they knew, because of
the profound threat to their very existence, that the Forqan, with
their professional assassinations, could do even more damage if the
Islamic Republic authorities did not completely uproot this group.
The republic and its religious leaders were less afraid of the religious
and political views of the Forqan than of their violence, since the
Forqan’s credentials and reputation among the religious circles, not
to mention the Iranian people, was little known; nor was it anything
that could be considered to be a well-organized religious creed.
The profound religious and political trauma that the Forqan left
among the revolution’s leaders left its mark and remained as a stigma
for decades after the Forqan’s termination. In the fragile period dur-
ing the Iran–Iraq war, and afterwards, during the normalization and
especially when the IRI tried to stabilize its credibility and legiti-
macy in the field of foreign affairs, the IRI become more cautious
and alert in their battle against domestic and foreign powers that,
consistently and persistently, tried, to harm and harry the IRI and
bring it down in any possible way. The IRI vigorously fought back
by calling its domestic enemies by the names of old and non-existent
groups without checking them out thoroughly in order to demon-
strate, to itself and the Iranian people, that the old enemies of the
revolution still existed. The main aim of the IRI was to frighten
these groups as it had done during the last days of the revolution and
the first days of the IRI. It seems that the IRI, more than believ-
ing in the Hidden Imam’s return, had, first and foremost, come to
believe in the resurrection of its enemies.
The Forqan was the first of the IRI’s imaginary groups of old ene-
mies to be resurrected. According to the Iranian press agency IRNA,
on January 2, 1999, Reza Amini, the Security and Disciplinary
Advisor to Iran’s Judiciary chief said, after several killings had taken
place in Iran (of two writers: Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad
Puyandeh, and a veteran political activist Daryush Foruhar along
with his wife Parvaneh, who were killed in December 1998), that
“Technical studies have indicated that the organized crime is typi-
cal of the terrorist ‘Forqan Group’ and a group attributed to Mehdi
Hashemi.” From this report, it is not clear if the Forqan had actually
re-organized and started with a new series of killings or that this
assertion was referring to the methods the group had used during
1979–1982.100 One needs to remember that Mehdi Hashemi was the
leader of the SATJA (see chapter 7) and that there were no relations
between the two groups, so the aforementioned advisor should have
been more careful in his use of Iran’s revolutionary history.
Other events that took place during 2004–2005 increased the
IRI fears of domestic terrorism. The first was in 2004, and the
Interior Minister of the IRI proclaimed that the recent explosions
(not mentioned where and why) were caused by the Forqan group.101
Another event took place on June 14, 2005 with a series of explo-
sions in Qom, Tehran, Marivan and Zahedan, and Mohsen Razaei,
who was a presidential candidate, declared that the Salafist group
of the Forqan was responsible for these explosions. The use of the
name “Salafist” in this case indicates that the Forqan were consid-
ered to be a Sunni radical group “such as al-Qaedah.” The Iranian
newspaper—Baztab—reported that the Forqan were a “semi-profes-
sional terrorist organization” that had been involved in terror actions
[against the IRI] in the last two years.102
The IRI “suffered” two years of blessed peace from the “imagi-
nary enemy called the Forqan” but in January 2006, this silence
was shattered with the claim that “nine Iranian border guards were
kidnapped by the terrorist group Forqan in the vicinity of an Iran-
Pakistan border checkpoint last week. Kidnappers demanded the
freeing of 16 members of their group they allege to have been arrested
by the Iranian government.”103
To conclude this chapter, it is clear that, after the outbreak of the
Iranian Islamic Revolution, inner conspiracies against the Islamic
system increased in number. The Forqan, as one of the groups that
was trying to take advantage of the chaotic situation, looted weapons
and ammunition from deserted army posts and started to assassinate
revolutionary clergymen.104
CHAPTER 5
The CIA, SAVAK, and Mossad

Connections with the Forqan
D
uring the deadliest period—in Iran’s history—for cler-
ics, between April and December 1979, the clerics regu-
larly accused the Forqan of having connections with other
domestic and foreign intelligence services such as the SAVAK, the
Israeli Mossad, and the American CIA. These accusations mainly
arose from the reputations of these agencies, the fear they raised
among the clerics, and the knowledge that the above agencies were
not only professional, sophisticated, and efficient but that, probably,
only they could have carried out such professional and deadly opera-
tions against such prominent religious figures as the Forqan alleg-
edly had done.
As we have seen in the previous chapter that dealt with the
Forqan’s assassinations, they were carried out with the assassins rid-
ing on motorcycles. All the six were successful and the only attempt
that failed was carried out when the gunmen were driving a car.
If we look at these attempts as one cohesive pattern of events, we
could come to the conclusion they could not have been carried out
by unprofessional revolutionaries, no matter how much they hated
the religious clerics, how devoted they were to the mission, and how
determined they were to get rid of the elite group of clerics. The
harried clerics, who for years had fought the Shah, his agencies, and
his allies in the United States and Israel—and had also chanted and
preached against the connections the Shah had maintained with
these agencies—also came to this conclusion, and it made them
frantic and suffer from phobias concerning the SAVAK, the CIA,
and the Mossad. Over the years, they had also seen several respected
clerics taken away at night by the SAVAK, who had never returned
to their families and their community. Now, they assumed that the
Shah, in cooperation with his intelligence allies, would try to settle
accounts with those clerics who had initiated the Iranian people’s
uprising and his fall. The Forqan could not evade these accusations
since the fears and anxieties of the clerics did, in fact, have a basis
in history.
Since the Mossadeq crisis in August 1953, the US’s presence
in Iran had only increased. During the decade between 1953 and
1963, up till the declaration of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s White
Revolution, it was important to the Shah and the United States to
quickly strengthen their relations—strategically, militarily, and,
no less important, culturally-spiritually. On the other side of the
political map were the National Front of Mossadeq and the Ulama
“traitors” led by Ayatollah Kashani, who had abandoned Mossadeq
and sided, although unwittingly, with the Americans and who had
chosen to see the toppling of Mossadeq as a real interference by the
United States in Iranian politics and, no less, a harmful infringe-
ment of their sovereignty.
During the period between the end of WWII and the Mossadeq
crisis, the Mojtaheds, led by Marja’ Taqlid Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi,
maintained a kind of dual relationship with the Shah and his gov-
ernment. After the exile of Reza Shah to South Africa by the British,
the religious circles knew that his reforms, the secular process, and
modernity would have to wait, or just be dissolved. The crowning
of his son did not change anything for the ulama, since they saw
him as a weak and untalented Shah that would do whatever the
British and the Russians told him to do. More than that, they were
sure that he would also have to listen to the clerics and suspend all
his father’s programs, especially those that were inappropriate to the
Shia religion.
Notwithstanding his inexperience in politics, however, the young
Shah wanted—and this time aggressively—to renew his father’s
reforms for Iran and, considering the current political situation,
he understood the difficulties he would face in order to re-intro-
duce them. The Mossadeq Crisis, as far as it was a real concern
to the Shah, found the Shah experienced enough, although with
American help, to use it as a platform to increase his influence in
The CIA, SAVAK, and Mossad Connections M 103
the government and the country. From that moment on until 1963,
when the White Revolution took place, he would increase his power
incrementally—at the expense of the religious circles.
The emergence of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1963 and his pro-
test against the White Revolution’s reforms was a shift that was
expected from the religious circles that now felt that there would be
no other opportunity to fight the Shah’s reforms on a very funda-
mental basis. For them, “the compromise of today will be the norm
of tomorrow” and therefore, Khomeini, the Ayatollah who saw him-
self as ready to confront this situation, gathered enough courage to
stand up against the Shah, not only for himself, but mainly for the
Iranian people.
It is very interesting to note that, at the same time that Khomeini
was initiating his propaganda against the Shah and his govern-
ment—mainly against the core issues of the White Revolution—he
also chose to flavor it with fundamental resistance to the United
States and Israel. To him, their presence on Iranian soil was harmful
for the soul and sovereignty of the Iranian Muslim. For Khomeini,
the Shah’s effective persecution of the clerics was only due to the
help that he was getting from the CIA and the Mossad in the cre-
ation of the SAVAK—the Shah’s secret police.1 The methods used
to maintain control, not to mention the torture and interrogation
methods, were all the results of the good ties that existed between
the Shah, the United States, and Israel. The agony and suffering of
the clerics were, in his eyes, all due to the United States and Israel’s
desire to control Iran, no more and no less.
The closer Khomeini got to his revolution, the more he inflamed
hatred toward the United States and Israel and their agents in Iran—
the CIA and the Mossad, respectively. This belief, which was prob-
ably not too far removed from reality, seeped into the mindset of the
last mullah in Khomeini’s circles. The well-known theological-polit-
ical agenda of Khomeini, the Velayat-i Faqih system, could not have
been so precise and accurate without blaming the United States and
Israel for Iran’s troubles—in all fields of life. In the waking stage of
the Islamic revolution, during its process of gestation and from then
until nowadays, Khomeini’s religious Ulama and supporters have
truly believed that the goal of the presence of the CIA, the Mossad,
and the SAVAK agents in Iran was to sabotage and destroy the his-
toric Islamic Revolution and so control religion in the country.
Let us return to the Forqan, whose activities during the revolution

raise doubts and questions about any affiliation they may have had
with the CIA, SAVAK, and perhaps the Mossad. The first assassina-
tions that the Forqan carried out against the high-ranked mojtaheds,
especially those very close to Khomeini and those in Khomeini’s
top-secret institutions, suggests that this group, whoever they were,
were not representative of the regular and well-known revolutionary
groups acting during the time of the revolution. This assumption
that the Forqan belonged to some well-trained and well-organized
organization—and it could have been any of the current secret orga-
nizations that were well established in Iran at the time—apparently
became a more and more realistic possibility when their method of
assassination—firing at their victims from a speeding motorcycle
and then running away, brought to mind, especially to people in the
high revolutionary echelons, that this was a method used by the very
familiar and secretive organizations—the Mossad and the CIA.
The first time we find a reference regarding the possibility that the
Forqan were not actually a Muslim group but rather a secret organi-
zation sponsored by the Shah is not in any thing emanating from the
religious circles in Iran, but from an East German newspaper. Just
after the assassination of Ayatollah Motahhari on May 1, 1979, the
political editor, Gerd Rainer Neu, reported rumors that the Forqan
were actually members of the SAVAK who, after the downfall of the
Shah, had secretly gathered together to act against the religious revo-
lutionaries because of the part they had played in the fight against
the ex-members of the Shah’s regime.2
Another source that also published these rumors immediately
following the Motahhari assassination, claimed that he had learned
that “the fanatical Forqan group which claimed responsibility (for
Motahhari’s death) represents itself as being even more Islamic fun-
damentalist than the clerics it opposes.” This source, which does not
inform us who the clerical circle suspects were goes on to say that
the Forqan group is “only a cover for disruption by the left or, alter-
natively, by remnants of (the) SAVAK.”3
During May, 1979, however, when the Islamic revolution was in
turmoil and boiling over, the fog covering the identity of the Forqan,
despite the fact that they had taken responsibility for their crimes,
still allowed the surfacing of rumors that inflamed the imagination
of the clerics and the people about who they were and what they
wanted—as did the Forqan’s targets. Since they were lacking any
formal or credible information, the clerics believed that the Forqan
Group was composed of two separate groups: the Forqan (the main
group) and the Red Twilight—both of which were said to be directed
by the SAVAK and the CIA. It was allegedly believed that most of
the groups’ members had, like most of the active revolutionaries
from all political circles, been in the Shah’s prison.4
On May 29, 1979, the revolutionary committee (a revolutionary
court) declared that the United States, by using a clandestine branch
of the CIA, was behind the Forqan’s activities. Apart from Khomeini
accusing the United States and Zionism of sabotaging the revolu-
tion, the revolutionary court, which had been asked to investigate
the recent events involving the Forqan, was now also accusing the
United States of being involved in the recent assassinations in the
country. The Islamic court declared that Richard Helms, who after
serving as the head of the CIA was appointed US ambassador to
Iran, was the person responsible for forming the Forqan Group.5 The
court said, “Some years ago (the CIA) created the anarchist Forghan
group to encourage opposition to the religious leadership on the one
hand and the leftist group on the other.”6 Accusing the US govern-
ment and the CIA of having relations with the Forqan would become
a regular practice after each assassination that the Forqan commit-
ted. In the case of Hans Joachim Leib, a West German businessman
from Munich who had been shot by the Forqan, the revolutionary
court declared that “the Forqan may be connected also to the CIA
and the SAVAK.” However, this cautious usage of the words “may
be connected also to the CIA” did not impress foreign experts, who
believed that the Forqan, although it could be “a fundamentalist
Islamic organization or a left-wing group with religious tenets,” 7 was
certainly not associated with foreign agencies like the Mossad, the
CIA, or the former SAVAK.
This belief that the Forqan had no connections with the above-
mentioned agencies might have sounded logical and understandable
to foreign experts or may have been disinformation, but this was
not the case inside Iranian society. One other group that probably
shared the same belief as the clerics was that of the Iranian intellec-
tuals (and it is very hard to say who these intellectuals were) “since
their (the Forqan’s) participation in great Islamic demonstrations the
intellectuals have regarded the Furqan as an agent of the outlawed
SAVAK.” More than that, the intellectuals believed that the Forqan
were the agents of imperialism and the Zionists, 8 just as the SAVAK
were, at least in the eyes of Khomeini’s circle.
The East German embassy in Tehran translated a file from July
23, 1979 (from The Action Center of the Tudeh Party, no. 44) that
included an open letter from the Tudeh party, which was originally
addressed to the Iranian people, all the parties, organizations, and
groups that supported the revolution, the provisional government
and the leader of the revolution—Khomeini. The file is divided into
chapters, some of which provide a general description of the process
of the revolution. What is important in this file is a chapter that
deals with the politics of enmity expressed toward the Communists,
and describes the enemies of the Communists in Iran—starting with
the Shah’s regime and other revolutionary groups that were targeting
them—as the revolution’s greatest enemy. According to the Tudeh
party, many revolutionaries had joined some of these groups out of
ignorance or because of their association with Zionism and imperi-
alism. More than that, the Tudeh claimed that, using the name of
Forqan, the agents of the CIA, the Mossad, and the SAVAK were
assassinating religious figures and ultimately, had turned the spot-
light onto the Communists and blamed them for these actions in
order to weaken them and cause conflict between them and the reli-
gious factions.
The Tudeh also claimed that
the Forqan, finds ways and methods to link the Maoists and SAVAK
agents who have allegedly returned to Islam together with Tehrani
[the full name does not appear], and this is done in order to cause con-
f lict between the right and left parties. At the same time they [i.e., the
Forqan] place bombs in a mosque in Khoramshar and carry out a propa-
ganda campaign against famous people like Ayatollah Montazeri. . . . The
SAVAK and Mossad agents [i.e., the Forqan] smuggle weapons in very
creative ways through Arab and Muslim states (like Pakistan) and these
are the same weapon that Israel used against Egypt in Sinai. The Soviets
supplied these weapons to Nasser in order to fight imperialism and
Zionism but the Soviet weapons that the imperialist agents smuggled
into Iran do not come from the Soviets. All this is done in order to blame
the Soviets and communists. In conclusion the Zionists and imperialists
and members of the Shah’s regime are working together and have joined
forces against the revolutionaries and supporters of the anti-revolution-
ary forces [and in this respect, this includes the Forqan].9
During the Islamic revolution, which we can consider to have

started with the 1963 events and continued until the establishment
of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini was consistent with his propa-
ganda against the Shah and his supporters from the United States
and Israel. This propaganda was so deeply rooted and well estab-
lished that, while ignoring the real facts, the clerical circles, the
intellectuals, and even the Iranian people, were all convinced that
imperialism, with its modernity and abilities, was doing everything
possible to make the revolution fail. The clerics and the Iranian
people will probably never forget the US-CIA intervention in the
Mossadeq Crisis and the backing they gave the Shah in helping him
to re-establish his tyrannical regime.
With their realization of the historical trauma, the clerics and
intellectuals were too hurt and much too sensitive to countenance
any intervention in their revolution. As was clearly apparent, no
single faction could agree with another faction, but all of them were
deeply convinced that, whatever the results of this revolution, it
should be the product of the Iranian people’s wishes and not those
of foreign forces. Thus, when the Iranian people saw that unknown
groups were acting very professionally and provocatively against
well-known figures among the clerical circles, they surely believed
that such groups as the Forqan, were an extension of that US organi-
zation whose aim was to harm the revolution’s leaders and especially
the clerics.10
According to the late Barry Rubin, the domestic enemies dur-
ing the Islamic revolution were only a secondary problem, since the
real threat was the West in general and the United States in par-
ticular. Moreover, the non-religious factors and the so-called reli-
gious factors like the leftists, the Forqan Group, the liberals, and the
Azerbaijani and Kurdish autonomists—were all seen as movements
that were extensions of the United States, the country that was try-
ing to weaken the Islamic revolution. For Rubin, “Autocracy alone
had not brought Iran to its sorry state, explained the Khomeinists;
this was rather due to an autocracy which was created by foreigners
and functioned in their interest.”11
Although basing himself on no documented fact or source, Rubin
is convinced that the Forqan and other anti-revolutionary groups
were backed by the forces of foreign powers led by the United States.
He believes that the new Iranian politics that formed itself just after
the revolution “had (not) much experience with international politics

and with the workings of embassies” and that this not only “made
their analyses of the United States Embassy’s operations inaccurate
but that the anti-Khomeini Islamic terrorist group Forqan was proof
that the United States was in contact with these movements, if not
directing them.”12
This belief became a real fact for Gunter Bathel, who claimed that
“the Forqan had connections with the CIA.”13 The veteran Iranian
newspaper Kayhan also claimed that, after the revolution, the
American government supported many anti-revolutionary groups in
Iran including the Forqan.14
The scholar Mohsen Milani in his article “Harvest of Shame:
Tudeh and the Bazargan Government” also believes that the Forqan
was a part of a US conspiracy in Iran, and that they operated the
Forqan for their deadly purposes so that they could carry on their
political battle with the religious and other sectors fighting in the
revolution. According to him, “in the most provocative language,
the Tudeh lambasted the PRG (Mehdi Bazargan’s Provisional
Revolutionary Government) for not dismissing US advisors who
have ‘supported and financed various assassination plots against the
revolutionaries’. It called the Forqan which was charged with assas-
sinating such prominent figures as Ayatollah Motahhari, a front for
US advisors.”15
Even Mahmood Davari in his brilliant book: The Political Thought
of Ayatullah Mmurtaza Mutahhari: An Iranian Theoretician of the
Islamic State, says that “in his preface to Shariati’s Marxism and Other
Western Fallacies Algar has mentioned that it is probable that the
Furqan was ultimately under the command of persons owing their
allegiance to the former regime, and possibly also to the American
patrons of that discredited tyranny.” For Davari, Algar “consid-
ered the interest of American officials in the ‘anti-clerical’ work of
Shariati, and also in the destabilizing activities of the Furqan, as
remarkable.”16
Dilip Hiro in his book: Iran under the Ayatollahs, says the
Forqan had connections with the SAVAK and the CIA, but Ervand
Abrahamian, in his review of Hiro’s book, says that in the Forqan
publications, which were influenced by Shariati, we can find anti-
American, anti-Shah, and anti-clerical expressions.17 In other words,
they were not necessarily connected with the Americans. In general,
the Forqan were against most of the powers, including the declin-
ing powers of Iranian society. Abrahamian’s claims neither support
nor deny the possibility that the Forqan had connections with the
Americans.
Another event that attracted the clerics’ attention regarding the
possibility that the Forqan was working for the United States was the
seizure and occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran, which took
place from November 4, 1979 until January 20, 1981—for 444 days.
Ali Kordi also refers to the Forqan’s reaction to this development
and, in his book on the Forqan, also uses the formal name of Tasgir-e
Lane-ye Jasusi-ye Amrica—The seizure of the Americans’ spy nest (US
Embassy). For Kordi, the Forqan considered the seizure of America’s
spy nest as no less than a crisis. They believed that the regime was
responsible for this and had carried it out to dominate and cover its
domestic challenges and exploit the opportunity to disarm oppo-
nents, to strengthen the bases of the government, to launch a brutal
crackdown on the protesters, to launch a campaign of demagogic
fabrication against their opponents, and to dominate the competi-
tion that existed between rival factions.18
Kordi criticizes the Forqan’s attitude and defends the Islamic
Republic’s actions, even though they never admitted their respon-
sibility for this event. Interestingly, Kordi tries to understand the
Forqan’s responses to this event from a psychological point of view
and asks “which rational system makes adventurism and makes
greater problem for itself in order to overcome its domestic prob-
lems at such a high price?.” Kordi provides his own answer and says,
“When a political system is involved in severe domestic challenges, it
is logical to avoid foreign issues as much as possible in order to solve
domestic issues.” In other words, Kordi tries to say in his defensive
proclamation that the “seizing of America’s spy nest was not an easy
task to be done in order to reach domestic objectives.” These objec-
tives finally caused the United States to respond to this crisis by
blocking Iran’s assets, introducing economic sanctions, launching
military operations (Delta operation), encouraging internal groups
to fight the regime, and supporting the Iraq war against Iran.19
Kordi rejects the Forqan’s accusations, saying that the carrying out
of this action—the seizure of the embassy—did not serve the clerics
and was not planned by them or done intentionally, as it could never
have been consistent with rational political practice. Kordi claims
that “this seizing of America’s spy nest by 400 students of Tehran

universities was a response to the 25-years of American crimes in
Iran. Hence, it appears that the Forqan’s inexperienced experts,
instead of limiting this action to achieving some small goals, should
have paid attention to the historical roots of the conflict between the
US and Iran.” 20
The interrogation of Akbar Goodarzi—especially his analysis
of the event of the embassy’s seizure, however, can provide us with
a deeper understanding. For Goodarzi, “the current situation (he
was captured while the students were still occupying the embassy)
was not in line with his aspiration for independence and the real
struggle against America’s imperialism, but it was a symbolic move-
ment carried out by those who were dependent on the current regime
and who, at the same time, were against the interim government (of
Bazargan) with its western orientation. By their action the students
provided the grounds for the government’s collapse and strength-
ened their own position.” 21
Kordi, however, insists on claiming that “Goodarzi, like in
his other biased analyses, devalued this into just being a slogan:
‘American imperialism still continues its treacherous policy, and the
issue of seizing the embassy and the hostage crisis is only continuing
so as to provide daily slogans’.” This means that Goodarzi, according
to Kordi, in his “inaccurate analysis believes that the action taken
in seizing the U.S. embassy by the Muslim student followers of the
Imam’s line could be translated to favor western countries.” 22
The fact that there were rumors and accusations emanating from
highly placed clerics during and after the Islamic Revolution is insuf-
ficient to conclusively decide that there was some connection between
the Forqan and foreign espionage agencies. There does, however,
seem to be some evidence that these rumors and accusations might
have been justified. There is certainly doubt that the clerics had
any reliable and updated information, even though their assump-
tion/accusations sounded real. The accusations that the Forqan had
connections with the US embassy would have seemed just as true if
made against any other group that opposed the clerical circle around
this period. Despite the above, there does seem to be some evidence
that the Forqan had connections with the US Embassy in Tehran.
For example, it has been claimed that Mr. Victor Tomseth, one of the
US embassy political officers, was informed by the Forqan members
about their activities. It is worth mentioning that Mr. Tomseth was

one of the three US embassy diplomats who were held in custody at
the Iranian Foreign Ministry, 23 probably not accidently.
The US State Department denied the Iranian accusation that
Victor Tomseth had any links with the anti-clerical group, the
Forqan. Thomas Reston, the State Department spokesman, made
the statement, “We expect Iranian authorities to respect that immu-
nity.” (a diplomat, has immunity under international law from
involvement in any legal proceedings) and added that “(neither)
Tomseth nor any other US official knowingly had any contact with
the Forqan group.” 24 Tomseth, it is claimed “signed a diplomatic
cable that quoted an Iranian professor as saying some of his former
students belonged to the Forqan and were ‘mixed-up kids’.” 25
On March 2, 1980, the Iranian prosecutor general, in a mes-
sage to the Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Qotzbadeh, said that
the members of the Forqan had, during an investigation, revealed
some evidence that connected them to the US intelligence agencies.
Subsequently, the prosecutor general’s office, led by Ayatollah Abdul
Karim Musavi Ardebili, requested that Mr. Tomseth, the US hostage,
be handed over to the office of the Islamic Revolution’s public pros-
ecutor. 26 Foreign Minister Qotzbadeh, refused to transfer Tomseth
to the prosecutor general, after a decision was made by Khomeini
and the Revolutionary Council 27 to leave him in custody.
In the struggle for power between the foreign minister and the pros-
ecutor general, however, the latter said, in response to Qotbzadeh’s
letter on March 4, 1979, that “he hoped that Mr. Tomseth . . . would
be sent to the prosecutor’s office so that he could be brought face to
face with members of the Forqan (G)roup in connection with the
revelations made by the students holding the embassy hostage.” 28
This conflict over the detaining of Tomseth for investigation by
one of the factions led to Khomeini’s aide, Hashemi Rafsanjani, who
would later himself be attacked by the Forqan, to refer to a situa-
tion in which a US diplomat was accused of having contact with
Forqan members. According to Rafsanjani, the imprisoned US dip-
lomats had been “conspiring in Iran as spies and not ordinary spies
at that . . . we have discovered their footmark in the assassination
attempts by the Forqan (G)roup.” 29
The Embassy crisis and the Tomseth incident only increased the
tensions between the factions surrounding Khomeini, while the
latter orchestrated them as he wished. A few months after the termi-

nation of the Forqan, and the dissolution of the Iran Hostage Crisis
(November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981), both of which took place
during the same month—January 1980—Mr. S. M. H Adeli, Charge
d’Affairs of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada,
wrote a letter to a Canadian newspaper confirming that “hundreds
of documents (that were) found in the former U.S. Embassy in
Tehran are solid evidence of hostile action (that has been) taken by
the United States (against the Islamic revolution). These documents
revealed many facts, (and) among them are: a. The so-called funda-
mentalist group (Forghan) had had relations with the U.S. Embassy
on a regular basis and got advice from it.” 30
Although the Islamic Republic managed to terminate the Forqan
Group and was involved in the deadly business of the Iran–Iraq war,
the remarkable imprint that the Forqan left did not disappear and
the fundamental fears of the clerics and Khomeini remained. On
February 6, 1982, in an address commemorating the fourth year of
the Islamic Revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini declared, “It must
not be forgotten that that there are foes of the Iranian revolution—
from the liberals . . . the Americans with close contacts with the
Forqan counter-revolutionary and terrorist group . . . the Americans
who are protecting and directing these grouplets and gangs and
other rightist and leftist organizations in order to sow discord, esca-
late blind terrorism, and even launch a civil war”. 31
On May 12, 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini also attacked the
Ayandegan newspaper and accused them of “misquoting” when they
printed some remarks about “the shadowy Forghan guerrilla group
which has claimed responsibility for two political assassinations in
the past month.” Following Khomeini’s accusations, Iranian radio
and television stations also accused this newspaper of being “coun-
ter-revolutionary and Zionist-controlled.”32
In an interview carried out by Eric Roulo of Le Monde with
Ayatollah Khomeini, the latter accused the CIA and the United
States of being responsible for Qarani’s and Motahhari’s assassina-
tions. For him, “those people (the CIA), that served the Shah, are
those who are hiding behind the Forqan, a pseudo-religious (group).
We discovered that the members of this organization know nothing
about Islam.” Roulo tried to challenge Khomeini about this accu-
sation by saying that, if the Americans were guilty, why did some
people—and among them Rafsanjani—during the funeral of Qarani

and Motahhari, accuse the communists and not the Americans?
Khomeini replied, “The Left is one of the political trends in our
country, (and) they have had no part in those crimes. Rafasanjani
did not attack the communists but those who pretended to be the
Left in order to serve American Imperialism (in Iran).” An inter-
pretation of Khomeini’s unclear message was offered by Khomeini’s
grandson, Seyyed Hossein, who expanded on his grandfather’s mes-
sage, “Ayatollah Rafsanjani—like all Islam devotees was hostile to
communist principles. The mistake, however, that Rafsanjani made,
was by turning this ideological hostility into a political one. With
these crimes the CIA was clearly trying to distort the core of our
anti-imperialist struggle and to create internal conflicts [and that
in order] to deflect us from the principal path—to free our country
from American control.”33
In a confession made by Hassan Sana—the security advisor of
Parviz Sahbati, the deputy commander of the SAVAK and the social
and economic advisor of General Moqadam—Mr. Sana told foreign
journalists who had come to visit Evin Prison about the SAVAK’s
relations with other intelligence agencies in Germany, Britain,
Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Pakistan, and especially with the CIA and the
Mossad. He said that not only did the latter two agencies and the
SAVAK have relations and cooperation, but that this was especially
true for field operations. For example, the CIA was active inside
Iran, especially in Tehran, and transferred information they had
gathered to the SAVAK in order to help them act and operate. The
special relations, however, were with the Mossad. These relations
were tidy and sequential, and the Mossad helped the SAVAK with
psychological warfare.34
When we research Persian sources on the Forqan, such as those
of Ali Kordi, Goroh-e Forqan (Markaz Asnad Enqelab-e Eslami,
Tehran, 1387), however, we find several references that cast doubt
upon the clerics’ accusations about the connections the Forqan
had with the SAVAK. In pages 98–99 of this book, Kordi says, “va
Akbar Goodarzi bedun hich vahame-ay az SAVAK va dastegah-e polis-e
rezhim-e shah be Iran baz dasht”—“And Akbar Goodarzi without any
fear of the SAVAK and the police apparatus of the Shah—(finally)
returned to Iran.”35 We can understand this sentence in several ways.
We might believe that Kordi was innocently saying that Goodarzi
did not fear the SAVAK because he was probably talking with the
arrogance and self-confidence of a young cleric—and not because he
was one among them.
We shall cite more of Kordi’s book on the Forqan to support this
possibility. He makes more references to the attention the Forqan
paid to the Shah, the police, and the SAVAK. After the assassination
of the Ayatollah Qazi Tabatabai, the Forqan published a statement
about their motives and plans and, of course, the victim’s crimes and
the justice dispensed to him and the Iranian people. However, as
part of their contention, the Forqan published a six point pamphlet
in the third of which they wrote, “Komitebazi baray-e tahkim paya-
ha-ye rezhim-e polis va fashisti va tadavam bakhshidan be jenayat-
ha-ye SAVAK ”—“Pretending that they themselves (the clerics) are
making efforts to consolidate the pillars of the fascist regime by sup-
porting the SAVAK.”36 It seems that the Forqan chose to strike out
at the clerics instead of fighting the SAVAK and the Shah. This
confusing and misleading message of the Forqan does not actually
clarify whether they belonged to the SAVAK or that they were fight-
ing against them. What is really confusing is that they accuse the
clerics of not fighting the SAVAK and of condoning the SAVAK’s
crimes while doing the same thing the clerics did.
Kordi refers to the SAVAK here and there, but never says the
Forqan were part of the SAVAK or fought against them. As some-
one who published this book with the help of Markaz-e Asnad
Enqelab-e Eslami—The Center for Islamic Revolution Documents
of Tehran—we would expect clearer and proven evidence about
whether the Forqan were part of the SAVAK or any other foreign
intelligence agencies or not. We can conclude that the Forqan were
alleged to be part of the SAVAK, especially when the clerics were
driven by their fundamental fears and their historic memories, in
which they believed the Forqan belonged to the SAVAK. These fears
were never proven true or false.
CHAPTER 6
The Termination of the Forqan Group
T
he end of the Forqan came very quickly after its appearance
during the Islamic Revolution and, as we have already men-
tioned, we cannot pinpoint the exact date of its emergence.
Nevertheless, despite its brief existence it was seen, at least by the
heads of the revolution, as a real threat to the revolution itself. Many
other revolutionary groups tried to fight the revolution and its lead-
ers, but only the Forqan was dealt with so intensively during the
period of the revolution as to be uprooted and wiped out.
Evidence of this was found in the Islamic Revolution Documents
Center (IRDC) in Tehran. This is a center that documented the
revolution’s progress and development and published the following
conclusions in its website: “(a)fter the series of assassinations the
Forqan group was infiltrated by members of the Islamic Revolution
Organization and all its members, including Goodarzi, were cap-
tured and executed” . . . and “(t)he remnants of this group continued
their publications till the beginning of 1980.”1
The amazing thing about the IRDC’s claim is that we have not
yet been able to find any documentation that shows that the “Islamic
Revolution Organization” infiltrated the ranks of the Forqan in
order to track their activities and pursue their activists. The next
claim they made might be more reasonable and acceptable than the
previous one: “As the first warden of Evin Prison after the victory of
the Islamic Revolution, Mohammad Kachouei played a decisive role
in dismantling the terrorist Forqan Group and guiding its members
to repentance.” 2
Previous to the revolutionary leaders being able to make up their

minds and agree about how to fight the Forqan, they had, despite
the anarchy throughout the country during the first months of the
revolution, tried to do this. For example, on July 9, 1979, the East
German Embassy in Tehran made a formal report that the news
agency Pars had printed a story about a Forqan Member who had
been arrested in Marega (East Azerbaijan) while he was distributing
the group’s flyers.3 Another report sent from this embassy said that in
October 1979, the Revolutionary Guards had discovered the identity
of the Forqan leader and revealed him to be Akbar Goodarzi, aged
29, who had been impersonating a mullah and been trying to infil-
trate the circle of the religious leaders of the Islamic Revolution. This
report shed light on some hitherto unknown facts about Goodarzi
who had become known to the Revolutionary Guards just after the
assassination of General Qarahni but, after interrogating him, they
learned that the Forqan had emerged in 1976 and had probably had
a relationship with the Shah’s government and the SAVAK.4
The Forqan was finally terminated in January 1980 when the new
regime was well established, just before the first presidential elec-
tions that were to take place following the approval of the constitu-
tion by Khomeini in December 1979. The Revolutionary Guards did
whatever was needed to remove the Forqan ideology and, of course,
its members, from the path of the revolution. On January 8, 1980,
the East German embassy again reports that “some shots were heard
in Tehran after which Goodarzi, the Forghan leader, and another
fifteen members were arrested.” The Revolutionary Guards, who
had been pursuing the Forqan, had found “a list of twenty names
of people the Forghan meant to assassinate,” in what had been their
main headquarters. All in all, the Revolutionary Guards found
more than twenty of the Forqan’s safe houses and were planning to
arrest another 20 members of the group.5 Another source revealed
the exact location of the Forqan’s headquarters in Jamalzadeh Street
in Tehran 6 ; a street that is very central in Tehran and very close
to Tehran University and the city center. The exact address of this
house was 23 Akhavan Alley, and the owner was Mohsen Siahpoosh,
a member of the Forqan.7 Goodarzi and other members were arrested
on January 8, 1980 (Dey 18, 1358), and were executed together with
another five members of the Forqan on May 24, 1980 (Khordad 3,
1359). 8 Despite the above, however, there are many sources that give
The Termination of the Forqan Group M 117
us different dates for the elimination of the Forqan organization in

January 1980.9
The various sources are divided over how many members of the
Forqan were arrested, with some saying 15, others 20, and some even
claiming 50.10 We do know the names of some of the arrested Forqan
members such as Kamal Yasini who assassinated Dr. Mofatteh, Hassan
Nuri who murdered Javad Bahman, the bodyguard of Mofatteh,
and Mohammad Nuri who murdered Afsar Ne’mati, Dr. Mofatteh’s
driver.11 Also arrested were Ali Hatami, Abbas Asgari, Said Torab,
Ali Reza Tabrizi, Hassan Aqai’d Torab, Ali Reza Tabrizi, and Hasan
Aqerlu.12 What is very unusual is that while the safe-house owner
Mohsen Siahpoosh was not among those arrested, those Forqan
members who were arrested were convicted of murder and executed
within days.13
Rassul Jafarian says that the Forqan had ceased to exist by January
8, 1980 (Dey 18, 1358), but the executions of its members took place
on May 24, 1980 (Khordad 3, 1359), probably in Tehran or nearby.
Other members of the Forqan who were also executed were Sai’d
Meraat, Abbas Asgari, Alireza Shah Bababik, and Hassan Aqerlu,
while Ali Hatami committed suicide in jail.14 There were other
members of the group that were under the personal guidance and
supervision of Goodarzi, such as Sa’id Vahed, Mohsen Siyahpoosh,
Hamid Niknam, Ali Asadi, and Behram Taymuri (arrested), and
there were more members in other places like Mohammad Motahadi
of Urmiyah and Tabriz (who was responsible for carrying out the
assassination of Qazi Tabatabay), Abass Asgari (who was the cell’s
chief of Kamal Yasini and Sai’d Mraat), and Hassan Aqerlu (who
was the cell chief of Abdulreza Razvani).15
One month after the elimination of the Forqan, several associates
of the Forqan’s victims demanded clear information about the group’s
activity. The first were the East Germans who, on February 6, 1980,
officially asked the Islamic Republic’s Foreign Minister, Ibrahim
Yazdi, about an article that was published in an Iranian newspaper
dated January 24, 1980, which reported that a man aged twenty
had been arrested and was probably the assassin of the German cit-
izen—Hans Johachim Leib. The German embassy requested more
information about the investigation and wanted the Iranian Foreign
Ministry to let Mr. Leib’s family representative participate in the
trial of the arrested man.16
The termination of the activities of the Forqan that was alleg-

edly completed in January 1980, however, seems to have been just
a declarative action since more and more Forqan members were
pursued, captured, and executed during the following months. For
example, on March 7, 1980, another four members of the Forqan
were executed, bringing the total number of Forqan members exe-
cuted during February–March 1980 to 15.17 On March 4, 1980, the
East German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel provided different numbers
for the executed members of the Forqan in March 1980, and, accord-
ing to them, only seven members were executed for their part in the
1979 assassinations.18
The Islamic Republic, despite its deeply rooted hatred and deter-
mined pursuit of the Forqan, could not eliminate them completely.
According to some sources, some remnants of the Forqan contin-
ued with their activities even after its supposed elimination but this
time, in an even more clandestine manner. The Forqan also took
responsibility for the assassinations carried out by the Mojahedin-e
Khalq Organization, and used this as an opportunity to promul-
gate their doctrine19 and demonstrate that they still existed. Another
source says that the Forqan survived until 1982, when they allegedly
carried out an assassination attempt upon a member of the Supreme
Defense Council. 20
Re-emergence?
The history of the Forqan ends with its formal termination in
January–May 1980. The fact that some cells were discovered dur-
ing 1980 and some took responsibility for the MKO’s assassinations,
does not necessarily represent any consistent continuation of the
group’s activity. The main ideologue and leaders were executed, and
what was left of the Forqan was their name, the fear they struck, and
their legacy. The Islamic Republic, as it had consistently done with
other groups, pursued the Forqan, but also immortalized them by
calling the republic’s oppositionists Forqanists, Monafeqin (i.e., the
Mojahedin-e Khalq), and Hojjaties.
Unlike the Mojahedin, who had a long history before the Islamic
revolution and an even longer history after the revolution, the other
two opposition groups, the Forqan and the Hojjatiyeh, were dissolved
during the first years of the revolution. The Forqan left its legacy
as Hashashinis—assassins—who were fearless in their targeting of

famous and central figures of the revolution. They struck fear into
the hearts of the key clerics of the Islamic Revolution, who trembled
and felt traumatized at the very sound of their name. The republican
government, on the other hand, wanted to immortalize its very own
existence by fighting its enemies, whoever they were and, especially
when there was a clash of ideologies.
The trauma can be seen in the Revolutionary Guards corps mes-
sage broadcast on Tehran Radio, and this is a message that speaks
for itself: “(The) Forqan, (is) a distorted course of thought, has been
casting its shadow over the thoughts and actions of some of our
children and young people for many years and the elimination of its
harmful effects will, therefore, require a fundamental and ideologi-
cal confrontation, following the discovery of its dens of conspiracy
and the arrest of its criminal organizers.”21
The Forqan does not exist in Iran today, but its name still inflames
the imagination of the clerics—who still claim to see the existence of
the remnants of the Forqan whenever they witness the activities of
individuals and semi-clandestine movements that act in similar ways
against the regime, whether these be acts of terrorism, propaganda,
or activity in the blogosphere. Even reformist politicians and jour-
nalists are called Furqanists to brand them as anti-clerics and anti-
revolutionaries, not to mention anti-patriots and traitors.
In 1999, for example, Reza Amini, a security and disciplinary
advisor to Iran’s judiciary chief, in a discussion about the “mysteri-
ous killings” of a number of writers and activists in Tehran, argued
that “technical studies have indicated that the organized crime is
typical of the terrorist ‘Forqan Group’ and a group attributed to
Mehdi Hashemi.” 22 It is unclear from the report whether Amini
intended this statement to be an assertion of the current existence of
the Forqan, or was being used to compare the methods used by the
Forqan during its activities between 1979 and 1982 and those used
in the recent murders. 23
Furthermore, Ali Motahhari, a member of the Majles and the son
of the late Ayatollah Murteza Motahhari, compared the so-called
“Coup d’états Government” (of Ahmadinejad’s) to the Forqan
Group, which had assassinated his father when he said that, for him,
“in terms of their sense of self-sufficiency in their knowledge of Islam
(of the Iranian government), those associated with the Coup d’état
Government resemble the Forqan Group.” Motahhari explains that

the government at that time was “also similar to the Forqan in terms
of their self-reliance and their disregard for the clergy.” 24 That is con-
sistent with the accusation made by Amir Taheri that Ahmadinejad
could be a member of the Forqan Group. 25
Some high ranking figures in Iranian politics in 2001 believed
that some members of the Forqan had escaped to nearby countries
and were publishing material about internal affairs in Iran, and
that some of this material had been published on several expatriate
news websites. Apart from this, some Iranian politicians believed
that during the presidential elections that had taken place in June
2004 (Khordad of 1384 lunar year), there had been several explo-
sions which were associated with this group.26 In 2005, the Baztab
website seemed to truly believe that the Forqan had re-emerged, and
was the first to report it and that “no reports on the activities of the
group have been monitored since 1979,” 27 which, as noted above, is
not true.
Since the original Forqan Group did not take out a formal patent
on their name, there were, and still are, many fundamental groups
that have used this specific name for their own purposes. The con-
nection between them and the original Forqan is only by use of
its name and nothing else. For example, the Pakistani Forqan led
by Abdul Jalil Qanbarzehi, (known as Mowlavi Salaheddin, who
was killed on April 7, 2012), was located on the Pakistani border
while trying to smuggle a bomb into Iran. This group was set up by
“Wahhabi-affiliated elements” on March 21, 1996, all in order to
involve themselves in the armed conflict against Iran. 28 This spe-
cific group is Sunni, as are the other groups in this area that use
this name. Some of these groups are involved in actions against the
Iranian government, but do so from a national, rather than a reli-
gious, perspective, despite their probably being Sunnis.
As noted in chapter 1, the word Forqan is another name for the
Quran, and therefore, many Islamic groups that declare their agenda
to be their will to return to real Islam, that is, to the Quran and its
message, sometimes use religious names in order to declare their real
aims and goals. Like the names of the Mojahedin, the Fadayan, and
the Jihadists, etc., which are all movements and organizations that
flourish day to day in the Middle East, the Forqan is also a common
name that has been, and probably still is, in use, and will inevitably
rise again in the future. All in all, this specific Forqan, in the Iranian
case, carried out many more influential actions during the Islamic
Revolution than all the other revolutionary groups together.
The elimination of the Forqan was seen by the revolution’s found-
ers to be a vital mission that needed to be carried out and fulfilled
as soon as possible. Initially, this task was seen as a mission of rescue
and relief, but the new regime, despite striving and struggling to rise
higher and faster than the heads of the revolutionary groups, could
not climb as quickly as the Forqan who, like an antiaircraft unit,
could always find the vulnerable points of the leading clerics and
launch their missiles at the leaders of the revolution, in the hope that
the assassination of these leading clerical figures would slow down
their race to establish a theocracy in Iran. Thus, the elimination of
this group was a fundamental necessity to the leading clerics, which
would provide them with the space, time, and ability to advance
their religious mission.
CHAPTER 7
“SATJA”—Sazman-e Enqelabi-e
Todehay-e Jomhory-e Islami-e
Iran—The People’s Revolutionary
Organization of the Islamic
Republic of Iran
A
s is well known, the Forqan were not the first group to fight
Khomeini and his revolutionary colleagues at the outbreak
of the revolution. The SATJA, another minor group barely
known to the academic world, and probably even to the Iranian
revolutionary groups at that time, also emerged during the Islamic
revolution. They also did not see eye to eye with Khomeini’s politi-
cal aims, but did not fight him as the Forqan did. The real dispute
between these two groups took place under the surface and reflected
another outlook on the revolution and its aims. A study of the
SATJA—Sazman-e Enqelabi-e Todehay-e Jomhory-e Islami-e Iran—
The People’s Revolutionary Organization of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and its appearance at the time that Khomeini was trying to
navigate his revolution to a safe harbor, could provide us with more
insight and source material that could help us understand the revo-
lutionary currents and forces that were acting side by side often, as in
this case, unknowingly, to steer the ship of state that Khomeini was
trying to navigate in the right direction.
While the Forqan fought against the very existence of the religious
order under the leadership of Khomeini, or any other religious figure
at the time, the SATJA’s leader—Mohammad Montazeri—directed
his revolutionary energy and the activities of his brand-new orga-
nization SATJA against Khomeini in all matters concerning Mehdi
Bazargan’s interim government and the Liberal Left. In response to
this move Khomeini declared that “(T)he interim government is the

government of ‘Imam-e Zaman’ (the Mahdi, the 12th Shi’a) and (any)
opposition to it is absolutely Haram (forbidden by the Shari‘a).”1
Finding new material and information about SATJA is virtually
impossible, especially since few academic researchers deal with it so,
in order to develop some kind of comprehensive view of this organi-
zation, it was necessary to go to the primary sources to look for any
evidence that could help us arrive at a genuine understanding of who
they were. In order to get this information, I carried out an interview
with an IRGC officer through a third party, in order to try to find
out if the Forqan were connected to SATJA and, understandably
in light of the circumstances, he preferred to remain anonymous.
The interview led to one basic piece of evidence regarding this issue:
that the Forqan and SATJA were both against some of the aims of
the Islamic revolution, but he made it clear that this revolution had
more than one father. To quote this IRGC officer, “I do strongly
believe that there was a relationship between those two (Forqan and
SATJA) but (The SATJA’s leader) Mohammad Montazeri, had his
own specific faith and ideology, and especially his own operational
method.” 2
The IRGC officer claimed that “At that time (before the outbreak
of the revolution) there were large differences among the Iranian
(revolutionaries) who were in Lebanon, like Seyyed Sadeq, Seyyed
Saleh Hosseini, Qotbzadeh, Jalal-e din Farsi, Ibrahim Yazdi, Miss
Dabagh, and others.” In answer to the question of which group,
Forqan or SATJA, had left a real mark on the revolution he replied,
“(the) Forqan which is a very complicated group whose doctrinal
and operational origins are still unknown.” and then went on to say
“(T)his small and seemingly trivial group (Forqan) rained heavy
blows on the revolution during the very first days of the revolution
and was the first terrorist group to begin operating after the revolu-
tion.” As we know it continued to operate until its termination in
the early 1980s.
In our search to discover what the SATJA’s role in the revolu-
tion was, we found that their brief presence left a long trail that is
even expressed in the current sensitive political-religious situation in
Lebanon. This information will provide us with another approach
to the examination of the implications that these groups, Forqan
and SATJA, had for Khomeini’s doctrine and revolution. Perhaps,
“SATJA” M 125
without meaning or wanting to, they probably assisted Khomeini to

create or choose a different path than what he had meant to take.
Thus the part they played in the revolution can be seen as something
remarkable and most significant.
From the very first days of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in
1979, the West tried to deal with its regional and international
consequences. The main issue that the West was especially trying
to cope with was the terrorist actions that the Iranian regime was
allegedly carrying out against its internal and external opponents,
and, in this respect—also against the Forqan (see the chapter four
that deals with the Forqan assassinations). According to this IRGC
officer, “The West, especially the United States tried to appease
Iran and find compromises while, on the other hand, Iran’s intel-
ligent moves succeeded in promoting its Islamic agenda ‘under the
radar’ of the West and American intelligence agencies. The intel-
ligence agencies, along with the US administration, tried to invent
a new and legal method that would help them find the Iranian
government terrorist’s smoking gun.” This search for the “smoking
gun” within the terrible mess that these terror actions left was both
pathetic and naïve especially when seen in the light of the fact that
Iran was playing a different game from what was considered accept-
able by the West.
Iran, for its part, was smart enough to build up a multi-branched
yet discreet mechanism of proxies that exported the Iranian agenda
without actually naming Iran in their actions. This left Iran free of
guilt and caused the intelligence agencies to busy themselves with
ephemeral and clandestine groups, some of which were not conscious
of the fact that they were promoting the Iranian agenda and terror-
ist operations all over the globe. This agenda was established by the
Ayatollah Khomeini and a few other theoreticians like Ali Shariati,
Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari, and others who inspired the revo-
lutionary organizations to export the revolution. Two of Shariati’s
books “Shahadat” (Martyrdom) and “Pas az Shahadat” (After
Martyrdom) contained the essential spiritual material that provided
the philosophy, justification, and practical ways for the export of
the revolution. These two books were in fact made up of Shariati’s
speeches, which had been printed and now played a significant role
in promoting and encouraging the acts of holy death (and suicide)
and Islamic Shiite martyrdom.3
From the outset of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, the West,

and especially the United States, began an elaborate program of
“extensive propaganda” against the Islamic Republic, which pre-
sented Iran as a threat to the countries of the region. It has been
alleged that the US government created a dark space for Iran by
creating a regional alliance against it and that this pushed Iran into
creating a system of terrorist proxies and branches that would help it
to break this alliance. According to this theory, the strong support
the Islamic Republic provided to the jihadi groups was the only, and
appropriate, option facing the policy makers of Iran.4 This may be
true, but history tells a different story, since the American govern-
ment had been supporting the Shah up to the outbreak of the revolu-
tion and had been unable to predict the victory of the Islamic forces
in this revolution. The surprising thing was that no one predicted,
or could have predicted, this revolution. Iran, however, did not wait
for the siege imposed by the Americans and their allies in order to
find a way to “break” through the wall. The Iranian revolutionar-
ies had probably devised a comprehensive plan to topple the Shah’s
regime for internal reasons and used these reasons as a platform to
export their success to other countries in the region—especially to
their Shi’i communities.
There are many examples and pieces of evidences that attest to the
use Iran made of international terrorism just after the establishment
of the Islamic Republic. Missing, however, are the fundamental ele-
ments that Iran created, used, and probably also abused in order to
promote its dual aim: to export the revolution and to threaten its
enemies be they the Iranian exiles and diaspora or other regional and
global threats such as the United States, Israel, and other “satans.”
Taking this into account, we can see how the intention behind the
establishment of SATJA was to export the Islamic revolution while
still fighting Khomeini’s way of “exporting the revolution.” In many
ways, this was SATJA proposes another and different way to do the
above—just as Khomeini himself had done.5
As earlier noted, SATJA was established during the period of
Bazargan’s interim government (February–December 1979), and part
of the purpose of this organization’s operations was to export the rev-
olution and to deliver oil money to Libya and Lebanon. Interestingly,
there was yet another sub-group called the SAJAJI—Sazman-i
Jonbesh-hay-i Azadibakhsh-i Jahan-i Islam—“The Organization of
“SATJA” M 127
the Liberation Movements of the Islamic World” which was under

the leadership of Mahdi Hashemi and, like SATJA and other groups,
it operated under the coverage of governmental support. 6
The founder and first leader of the SATJA was Mohammad
Montazeri (the son of Ayatollah Montazeri), who was the Ayatollah
Khomeini’s spokesman and trusted advisor. The idea to cre-
ate this organization was first formed during Khomeini’s exile in
Iraq and more intensively during his short exile in France where
the Revolutionary Council, of which Mohammad Montazeri was a
member, transformed his vision into a reality. The real debate over
deciding what the available possibilities and connections were that
would make the formation of this group possible, however, come
mainly after the outset of the revolution. The veteran prisoners who
had supported Khomeini met their religious cellmates who were
now, not surprisingly, the Ayatollah Khomeini’s politicians in the
new government. Mohammad Montazeri’s aim was to establish an
armed political party whose purpose would be to export the revolu-
tion beginning, although Khomeini provided no logical or practical
reason for this, with Lebanon. This group, however, would be unlike
the Revolutionary Guards whose role was to protect the revolution-
ary institutions.
The SATJA was first established in a house in Takht-i Jamshid
Street in Tehran with around 40–50 young people, all of whom were
armed and ready to go to Lebanon in order to fight.7 At this stage,
the leader and his militia did not know how long they were going
to stay in Lebanon, against whom they would be fighting, and for
what reason.
It is claimed that the SATJA’s center was located in the building
of The Ministry of Immigration Office on Shahr Ara Street and,
during the early days of the revolution, Libya’s government was
incredibly interested but the issue of Mousa al-Sadr’s disappearance
in Libya distanced Libya and Khomeini from each other and created
obstacles; otherwise Libya could have been on the front line backing
Iran. Despite this issue, Mohammad Montazeri maintained signifi-
cant connections with Libya’s leaders, especially Qadhafi and Abdul
Salam Jollod, Qadhafi’s Prime Minister,8 all of which had been set
up during the previous decade before the Islamic Revolution. During
that decade, Mohammad Montazeri had been very active in Libya,
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan in order to gain the support of
the revolutionaries but, more importantly, to sow the seeds for future
cooperation. Most of the financial support for this came from several
Arab states and exiled-Iranians, but the main source of support was
Libya’s Qadhafi. Montazeri, along with Mohsen Rafiqdost, Mahdi
Hashemi (who was later executed), and some others (most of whom
later became the first leaders and founders of the Islamic regime and
the IRGC) founded and united the “Liberation Movements” within
the IRGC.
In May 1979, in the same month that Khomeini announced the
establishment of the IRGC, SATJA members, together with Mohsen
Rafiqdust, and in opposition to the wishes of the Bazargan interim
government, used force in order to capture Mehrabad Airport and
then brought Abdul Salam Jolod, Qadhafi’s premier, to meet the
Ayatollah Khomeini. On June 10, 1979, Montazeri, along with Jalal-
e-din Farsi,9 Hassan Ayat,10 Mohammad Mofatteh,11 Mohammad
Hasan Rahimian,12 Mahdi Shahabadi,13 Doctor Esrafilyan,14 Asghar
Jamali Fard,15 Dr. Vahid Dastgerdi,16 and Reza Zavarehei,17 tried to
visit Tripoli, even though most of them did not have a valid pass-
port.18 They probably wished to go there under the cover of being
a diplomatic mission, which was to become the Islamic Republic’s
mode of operation for smuggling terrorist groups and assassins into
South America and Europe.
What may have led Mohammad Montazeri to create such an
organization and to continue his activities was probably his admi-
ration for Libya’s “Center of the World’s Liberation Movements.”
Montazeri, who knew and identified Colonel Gadhafi as an extrem-
ist revolutionary, also had a close relationship with the tribal par-
ties and leftists in Lebanon and SATJA published the magazine of
Omid-i Iran (Hope for Iran) as part of this activity. The major activ-
ity of this organization and the magazine was to promote Qadhafi
and insult Chamran and Mousa al-Sadr, and his Shi’ite organiza-
tion, called AMAL, in Lebanon. Notwithstanding Dr. Chamran’s
opposition, Montazeri brought Abdul Salam Jolod to Iran to meet
Khomeini and occupied the Mehrabad airport in order to facilitate
the landing of Jolod’s aircraft.
Khomeini was not content with Qadhafi or Jolod’s visit to Iran
and insisted that if they were going to come to Iran they had to
bring Imam Mousa al-Sadr with them, otherwise he would not meet
them and, in fact, Abdul Salam Jolod never met Khomeini despite
“SATJA” M 129
being in Qom for a month. All of these moves were initiated and
coordinated by Sa’ad Mojber, Qadhafi’s ambassador, and Hani al-
Hassan, Yassir Arafat’s ambassador to Tehran. Even though there
was a significant disagreement between Qadhafi and Arafat over
the Palestinian issue, the two ambassadors fully coordinated their
actions because they both had the same goal, which was to prevent
any pursuit of the Mousa al-Sadr issue. It is claimed, however, that
Sa’ad Mojbar and Hani al-Hassan managed to penetrate Bazargan’s
interim government with the help of Mahdi Hashemi.19
Bazargan’s interim government believed that “exporting the
revolution” was against the principles of “non-intervention in the
domestic affairs” of other countries, based on accepted international
norms and regulations. Bazargan believed that, instead of focusing
on the “exporting of the revolution,” it would be more logical to
build a new and ideal, sophisticated, model Iranian society based
upon religion and nationality. Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the interim government,
announced that “we are not going to export our revolution” and this
was obviously a different approach from Khomeini, the leader of the
revolution who announced the opposite by saying, “We will export
our revolution to the whole world.” This sensitive issue of exporting
the revolution was a matter of deep conflict between the interim
government and Mohammad Montazeri who obviously sided with
Khomeini’s Line. 20
After the death of Montazeri, the organization turned to the lead-
ership of Mahdi Hashemi, from the SATJA, who continued to foster
a relationship with the Libyan government and got their financial
support. The most significant activity of this organization was
the production of publications whose main function was to publi-
cize Colonel Qadhafi and abuse Mousa al-Sadr and Dr. Moustafa
Chamran. 21 In regard to this, we need to be cautious and ask our-
selves why this organization, in the name of the Ayatolla Khomeini,
cooperated with Qadhafi, the one who had been accused of playing a
part in the disappearance of Mousa a-Sadr in Libya in August 1978.
Mention should be made of the well-known tension that existed
between al-Sadr and Qadhafi, when Mousa al-Sadr was the main
opponent of the Palestinians and the PLO in Lebanon and had been
under attack by the Libyan government who were supporting the
Palestinian resistance against Israel.
In the IRGC interview with me, the interviewee said that one of
Mohammad Montazeri’s followers had been Abu Hanif, whom he, at
first, could not identify but it seems that he was a young man around
the age of 25–26, and that his nickname had been given to him by
his friends and followers. In the evening, Abu Hanif came to life
when members of the IRGC found him in the “Lane-ye Jasosi” door
(Spy house)—which was also a nickname given to the US Embassy
during the Islamic Revolution—and the first impression they had of
him was that he was either Lebanese or Palestinian. When the crowd
was demonstrating in front of US Embassy to support the students
of the Imam’s Line (Daneshjoyan-i Khatt-i Imam), Abu Hanif had
turned to one of the crowd’s leaders and loudly cried out Montazeri’s
declarations and, by making use of this method of loudly calling out
his message, he was able to attract others.
According to the IRGC officer, Montazeri was one of the Ayatollah
Beheshti’s opponents and Abu Hanif, on behalf of his mentor
Montazeri, had cried out “Beheshti; US Mercenary,” but sometimes,
Abu Hanif also discussed things and challenged the leftists. In gen-
eral, the position he adopted toward Ayatollah Beheshti was not
positive, but the only man who could challenge and oppose him was
Biok Mirzapour. Biok Mirzapour was a member of the Revolutionary
Guards (IRGC). He was also the so-called ideologue of a few semi-
clandestine and new revolutionary organizations, especially those
who fought the Mojahedin-e Khalq (Like Arman-e Mostaza’ fin). He
died during the Iran–Iraq War in Khoramshahr. However, both Abu
Hanif and Biok did not value Bazargan, Madani, and their group,
and Biok, in his speeches, even tried to expose them; but when Abu
Hanif spoke, he tried to equate Beheshti with Bazargan and Madani,
and this placed him in their school of thought.
While Biok was standing on the street curb and shouting out his
protests against Massoud Rajavi and the Mojahedin-i Khlaq (who
had been branded as—Monafeqin—hypocrites), suddenly Abu Hanif,
with a declaration in his hand, started chanting the slogan “Beheshti
and liberals, America’s mercenaries.” Biok became nervous when he
saw him but kept quiet because Abu Hanif was wearing religious
garb and, more importantly, he was from Montazeri’s group. When
Biok came into the tent he was very pale and agitated and repeatedly
said, “I don’t know what I must do with this guy (Abu Hanif ) . . . If
“SATJA” M 131
the Monafeqin said such insulting things to Beheshti . . . I would kill

them, but I don’t know what to say to this guy.”
Since the MKO were aware both of the unity of the SATJA mem-
bers and the differences and disagreements that existed among the
comrades in the tent (he—The interviewee—meant the people who
were in the tent in front of US Embassy), they were happy about the
friction and differences that existed and their members would often
join Abu Hanif and provoke him by telling him to focus on Beheshti
and the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). Consequently, he later turned
toward Biok and his comrades and harshly insulted Beheshti.
Abu Hanif and the SATJA group focused their efforts on the
Ayatollah Beheshti, liberals, and Bazargan’s interim government,
instead of expressing hostility toward the MKO, the Tudeh Party,
the Marxists, and the Fada’ian guerillas. The Forqan, at this
time, were just about to emerge and were against politics anyway
and the SATJA’s enmity toward the liberals was welcomed by the
“Daneshjoyan-i Khatt-i Imam.” 22 In the early days when the front
gate of the Spy House (the US Embassy) was taken control of, a plac-
ard was put up that called on the youth who were interested in going
to fight Israel along with their “Palestinian brothers” to do so. Those
interested had to register at the SATJA group’s central office located
in Jomhuri-e Islami Street and soon afterward, they would be dis-
patched to Lebanon.
According to the IRGC officer, the slogan and the general atmo-
sphere attracted him to go and fight Israel. “The names of the
Palestinian guerrillas always reminded me of the stories my father
told me years ago,” he said. Very close to the parliamentary election,
Abu Hanif posted a picture of one of the candidates on the wall and,
surprisingly, it was a picture of himself underneath which was writ-
ten, “Ali Asghar Jamali Fard known as Abu Hanif.” And this was
how his real name was revealed.
Dispatching the Troops to Lebanon

Mohammad Montazeri, who created the SATJA as a political group for
himself, 23 sent many of the SATJA members to Lebanon and Syria to
fight Israel. He went to the Mehrabad Airport with his armed forces,
mostly young boys and girls, and volunteered to fight alongside the
Palestinian guerrillas against Israel, after which he boarded the plane

and went to fight Israel. This was the reason Mohammad Montazeri
was called “Ringo” (the famous western movies gunman) or rather
“Mammad Ringo” by the anti-revolutionaries. 24
On Tuesday, September 18, 1979 (Shahrivar 27, 1358), Ayatollah
Montazeri published a letter in the press,25 in which he called for
the detention of his son for treatment as a result of the actions at the
Mehrabad Airport—when he took command of an airplane in order
to fly fighters to Lebanon and Syria. He wrote that the capture and
torture his son had endured under Ayatollah Khomeini drove him to
his extreme actions: “Most days he did not eat, sleep or rest (for the
sake of revolution), and consequently, because of all this, he devel-
oped a kind of severe nervous disease and condition. This disease
caused him to think that he could achieve his goals by behaving in
such a wild way.” Montazeri added that he had unsuccessfully tried
to get his son treatment for his apparent mental instability, and asked
the public to help his son “recuperate, return to the stage of struggle
and once again become the servant of religion and the government.”
Montazeri ended the letter by declaring that if, after investigation,
his son was found guilty in the airport incident, he should be held
fully accountable under Islamic law.
After the declaration made by Ayatollah Montazeri about his
son, the irregular dispatching of troops to Lebanon and Syria was
stopped. It is not clear what the fate of those troopers who left Iran
for Lebanon and Syria was. Apparently, most of the youngsters,
including boys and girls who were sent to Syria and Lebanon by
SATJA, went to live in other countries, while some of them stayed in
Lebanon and became involved in business.
The main reason why SATJA was eliminated by the regime was
the assassination of Mohammad Montazeri along with Ayatollah
Beheshti, when a bomb exploded in the IRP Headquarters on June
28, 1981 (Tir 7, 1360). Although this action led to the group’s eradi-
cation, the intellectual and practical ideas expressed by them con-
tinued to exist and be promoted by Seyyed Mahdi Hashemi, the
brother of Hadi, Montazeri’s son-in-law—who was the head of the
Liberation Movement at the IRGC, and who was later dismissed
from it and executed for committing crimes. He was the main per-
son who caused Montazeri to deviate from the conventional revolu-
tionary line.
“SATJA” M 133
The IRGC officer claimed that it is very unlikely that official

figures in the current regime have a similar ideology to SATJA (i.e.,
exporting the revolution) and he said that the reason for this is that,
with the execution of Mahdi Hashemi, all their fanatical ideology
was destroyed. Even all of those who had been in the IRGC went
to jail or were isolated like Mansur Kuchak Mohseni and Davood
Karimi. Moreover, the IRGC officer believes that SATJA, although
unintentionally, caused damage to the Islamic Revolution and added
that “Maybe they thought that they were serving the revolution but,
to my mind, they were not, because the way they acted and behaved
was never according to Imam [Khomeini’s] thoughts and ideol-
ogy . . . and they did some unusual things independently.” And that
“they had their own specific and radical thoughts and ideology and
they did not need the Imam’s leadership and guidance.” According
to him, at that time, Khomeini was against the armed struggles,
against Israel, and this was not welcomed by SATJA. Then there
were all those people who went to fight in Syria and Lebanon and
did not return to Iran, specially the girls—who had fallen into pros-
titution, sex work, or had sought asylum in other countries, and
this was significant damage that had been done to the revolution by
them.
In regard to the relationship between Hezbollah’s operations chief
I’mad Mughnieh and SATJA, the IRGC officer said that only from
1983 was I’mad Mughnieh connected to Iran and Hezbollah, but
Mughnieh never had any relationship with SATJA since they had
already been abolished during 1979, and this connection could never
have existed anyway because SATJA had close connections with
Qadhafi and Libya and this was not welcomed by the Lebanese.
Mohammad Montazeri (whose ideology is being spread by Abu Hanif
nowadays) also suspected that Mousa al-Sadr and Dr. Chamran were
American spies, and this issue led to hostility between SATJA and
the others. 26
In a message broadcast on Monte Carlo Radio by the Iran People’s
Revolutionary Organization of the Islamic Republic (SATJA) on
December 4, 1979, it was announced that a thousand Iranian vol-
unteers would be sent to Lebanon to join the PLO fighters in their
war against Israel, and that they would be a pioneer mission followed
by another ten thousand that would also be sent. According to this
announcement, the mission was to be carried out as an example of
Khomeini’s desire to help the Palestinians in their fight against the

Zionists. 27
The storm around Montazeri’s declarations were a slap in the face
to the Lebanese politicians, who were doing whatever they could
in order to prevent these fighters coming to Lebanon. The Shi’is
in Lebanon were skeptical about the possibility of this coming to
fruition while the other sectors in Lebanon (probably because they
feared this would change the balance of power in Lebanon) were
furious about the idea of Iranian volunteers not joining the Shi’is in
Lebanon but the foreign forces of the PLO.28
The relations between the religious circles around Khomeini and
the PLO forces in Lebanon existed long before the Islamic revolution,
but from this moment onward, they become stronger and stronger.
When dealing with the question of whether Montazeri’s forces would
join the PLO in Lebanon or not, Israeli intelligence said that such
relations had long been established as some of Khomeini aides and
clerics had already been trained in Lebanon in the Fatah and PLO
training bases. These relations were mutual, as some of the PLO
fighters had gone to Iran to be trained while some of the Iranians
had come to Lebanon to be trained.29 This relationship ultimately
led to dual consequences: the establishment of the IRGC and then
the Lebanese Hezbollah.
On December 4, 1979, Mohammad Montazeri announced that
thousands of Iranian volunteers would join the Palestinian ranks
in Lebanon in order to join their fight against Israel. Montazeri
promised that Syria had already agreed to the passage of these vol-
unteers and said that, if Lebanon opposed this mission, the fight-
ers would infiltrate forcibly into Lebanon. Pierre Jumail, and Kamil
Shamu’n of Lebanon, however, rejected Montazeri’s offers and said
that Lebanon would prevent any foreign forces from entering the
country. The Shia community in Lebanon also rejected Montazeri’s
offer and said that this move was being made without the permis-
sion of the Iranian government. The conclusion drawn by Israeli
intelligence was that in regard to this issue (and others of course)
there was real confusion in Iran. The revolution was suffering from a
multitude of different streams and factions that were pulling in dif-
ferent directions and among them were those, like Montazeri, who
wanted to export the revolution. The religious circles in Iran tried
to prevent this mission, as they needed these holy warriors in Iran to
defend the revolution.30
“SATJA” M 135
The Middle East Desk Chairperson (of the Israeli Foreign

Ministry’s Political Research Center) Asher Goren said, in regard
to the Iranian volunteers going to Lebanon, that Mohammad
Montazeri, the son of the Ayatollah Montazeri, was known in Iran
as being crazy and one who was involved in questionable adven-
tures. His nickname in Iran was Ringo (as said before—one of
the famous figures of the Wild West movies) and, in the report
made by the chairperson the conclusion reached was that, what-
ever Montazeri’s intentions were, he would make trouble for Israel
in Lebanon since he saw his war against Zionism as a holy war
(Jihad). 31 After pressure was exerted by Khomeini’s government
on the Syrian leader Hafez al-Asad, he permitted the passage of
Iranian volunteers from Iran through Syria and finally to Lebanon
to join the Palestinian units in their fight against Israel.32 The
French Foreign Ministry informed the Israeli embassy in Paris that
seventy thousand Iranian volunteers had registered in the PLO’s
office in Tehran and that they were waiting to be called to fight
Israel in support of Palestine. 33
In a top-secret telegram from the Israeli ambassador in London—
Shlomo Argov—to Hanan Bar-On regarding the PLO leader Yasser
Arafat, Argov said that, according to a (British) government source,
Yasser Arafat was playing a critical role for the Americans by provid-
ing them with “an important service” and by acting as a mediator
between them and Khomeini. Arafat’s did his job efficiently and pas-
sionately in order to increase his value in the eyes of the Americans
and pave the way to becoming a welcomed leader in Middle East
affairs in the eyes of the Americans. 34 Arafat, however, was playing
his usual game and was probably both working for the American and
also promoting his own business with Khomeini. While acting as a
mediator, Arafat’s representative in Tehran, Hani al-Hassan, told a
group of Iranian students that “the Palestinian forces (in Tehran)
had been placed at Khomeini’s disposal.”35
Conclusions
Although there is no immediate connection that can be made between
the Forqan Group and SATJA/SAJAJI, there are other connections
that, in toto, give us the impression that there were anticlerical
movements that were fighting both for and against the revolution.
There were, of course, other groups that fit this description, but their
contribution of being either for or against the revolution, was too

minor to be noticed.
The revolutionary forces that flourished during the revolution,
even though the Forqan, like the SATJA, actually began before the
revolution, moved in different ways, as each of them hoped to influ-
ence the revolution in its particular ideological way. Within the
storm of the revolution, the SATJA and the Forqan had the same
ideological nurturing, but each chose to emphasize different things.
The Forqan, who were anticlerical, wanted to pull back the creation
of the revolution while the SATJA wanted to push it forward beyond
its fundamental Iranian territory—into the land of Lebanon.
The Ayatollah Khomeini saw these movements as parts of one
body that was trying, each in its own special way, to destroy his revo-
lution; one from lack of enthusiasm and interest, and the other from
over-enthusiasm and hyperactivity. The picture that these movements
give us is a picture of three dimensions, with each dimension provid-
ing us with a different story that is not entirely unconnected to the
other dimensions. There is no incontestable proof that the Forqan
Group, which held an anticlerical and anti-revolutionary ideological
approach, contributed to the revolution—but in a backward fash-
ion. The SATJA also contributed their “exporting the revolution”
agenda, and Khomeini also wanted this but he wanted to implement
it in a different way.
Finally, Shariati’s writings were used as an ideological platform by
both the Forqan and the SATJA. The latter took Shariati’s books—
Shahdat and Pas az Shahadat—as an excuse to export the revolution,
but never dealt with the other ideological insights of Shariati’s agenda
and only chose to use the one that served their aspiration to export
the revolution. The characters of the leaders also played a real role
in the activation of these movements; with Goodarzi, who wanted to
be a cleric himself, fighting them in the Forqan because he had been
rejected by the people he wanted to be part of. Mahdi Hashemi and
Mohammad Montazeri were hyperactive people who thought that
the revolution could not reach to its ultimate goal without being
exported. Either way, those leaders were two sides of the same coin
and Khomeini used this coin to pay the price of the revolution.
Conclusions
A
fter having made the attempt to reach the goals set in the
introduction and worked on in the chapters, that is, to
research and reveal who the Forqan Group were in Iran,
we have to admit that the mission has not been completely accom-
plished, mainly because the circumstances did not allow any thor-
ough and complete research into the workings of this group. What
I think has, however, been accomplished, mainly through the use of
our primary and secondary resources, is the presentation of a bet-
ter picture, and thus a better understanding, of the Forqan. To do
this we have had to rely on the available facts and interpretations
about the Forqan’s history and ideology, whether they came from the
Forqan itself, from their rivals, or from both objective and subjective
observers. Taking into consideration all the limitations placed upon
our ability to carry out the research as thoroughly as we would have
wished, I think it can be said that this research provides a fairly clear
picture of the Forqan, its ideas, motives, and activities.
The Forqan, like other revolutionary groups and movements that
have tried to exert their influence before and during a revolution,
tried to leave its mark on the history of the revolution and actually
prevent this revolution from taking place the way it eventually did.
The Forqan Group was similar to the Hojjatiyeh Society that also
rejected the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Velayat-i Faqih doctrine and was
also an apolitical religious faction, but the Hojjatiyeh Society finally
joined the ranks of the revolutionaries while the Forqan, who also
rejected the doctrine, never saw itself having a similar political role.
On the other hand, they did whatever they could, both ideologi-
cally and violently (only the Forqan though), to topple the clerical
junta and stop it from creating a regime headed by the Ayatollah
Khomeini (which is what the clerics wanted) and consolidating
themselves in the political functions and frameworks of the new

state government.
Akbar Goodarzi, the leader of the Forqan, had a religious his-
tory and development that seems to have been very ordinary, and
not something that would account for him having any real religious
authority and influence. This, in fact, was the case with many of his
kind during the revolutionary era, who also could not be considered
to be religious geniuses, talented politicians, or revolutionary war-
riors. Although he stopped his religious training on the eve of the
revolution, he started to function as an Akhond—a (self-appointed)
cleric, and began to promote his religious agenda and interpreta-
tions as merchandize in the market of views. As a result, he soon
found himself fighting for a place for himself, and the Forqan, in the
coming revolution. We cannot really say that Goodarzi predicted
the coming of the revolution and that turned him into a rapturous
fanatic, especially about being anti-Khomeini and anti-revolution,
but, although he refused to agree to the clerics leading the revolu-
tion and establishing their religious order, he did continue present-
ing himself as a religious figure.
Choosing an organizational name, first the Kahf and later the
Forqan, both of which come from Quranic suras, is more than just
a religious declaration. The basic meanings and interpretations of
these suras are too limited in meaning for a revolutionary group to
use. The essence of these suras is their declaration of religious funda-
mentalism; first, as the People of the Cave (Kahfis) meaning the peo-
ple who were preserved and who now preserve the real path—Allah’s
path, and the Forqan, literally the truth, but with the general and
accepted meaning being the Quran—since the Quran is itself both
the Truth and the way to distinguish between truth and falsehood.
It is not clear when and why the Kahfis changed their name to the
Forqan, but this was probably done on the eve of the revolution when
many religious and non-religious revolutionary groups emerged, and
this led the Kahfis to feel that they had to make their presence felt
among the other groups with well-known, meaningful names in order
to attract potential followers and recruit members. Surprisingly, the
Forqan chose to fight the cleric, who presented themselves as repre-
senting the way of the Quran, that is,—the Forqanic way.
Goodarzi and the Forqan did not fight against Akhondism sim-
ply because they saw themselves as those who should lead the new
Conclusions M 139
politics instead of those who were actually doing this, but because
they were against the very concept and believed that the religious
circles should stay out of politics and concentrate on their historic,
albeit temporary, role—to lead the Shi’a community until the twelfth
Imam—the Mahdi re-appeared. Until his return, they believed, the
clerics’ role was to prepare the Shi’a community to renew and re-
shape their Shi’i life and that the people should rely on the clerics
as their guides and leaders and practice the Akhbar of the Imams.
Because the clerics had begun to participate in impure politics, they
had begun to contaminate the Shi’i religion, and this led the Forqan
to condemn the clerics to death—and to execute their sentences.
It was the revolutionary state of mind that dictated the rhythm
of the Forqan and, although they saw themselves in the minority of
opinions, they fought for acknowledgment and honor. They stud-
ied, and perhaps even followed, Shariati’s ideology, and it must be
said that they, like many other revolutionary groups, truly tried to
understand their current circumstances through the lens of religious
interpretation and diligently prayed to heaven like Shariati and oth-
ers. The paradoxical combination of their frustration, sophistication,
simplicity, naivety, wickedness, ambition, enmity, and belief, led
them onto the one way road of fighting something that was greater
than their meagre abilities allowed them to deal with.
Perhaps it is worthwhile to look at another revolutionary figure
to better appreciate the climate of revolution that developed over the
decades in which Khomeini lived. It is not difficult to contrast and
compare Akbar Goodarzi with Navvab Safavi, the Fadayan-e Islam’s
leader since, despite living in very different periods of Khomeini’s
life, these two young religious trainees still had much in common
despite their differences. Both wrote religious essays and attracted
younger people around them who had a thirst for learning and a
desire to do something important for Allah and their country.
Both led deadly groups that carried out assassinations against the
“enemies of Allah”, Navvab—against the secular theoreticians and
political figures that they saw as doing damage to their religion, and
Goodarzi—against religious figures that, in his eyes, seemed to both
stand for secular Shi’a and also did damage to the religion as well.
Both suggested new interpretations of Shi’i Islam with Navvab writ-
ing the Barnameh—an eclectic program for how create an Islamic
state and Goodarzi suggesting innovative and new interpretations
of the Quran and Shi’i Islam in order to understand the new revo-
lutionary era while still remaining connected to the old frameworks
and classical Shi’a. Both had a very circumspect approach to politics,
with Navvab wanting to enlarge the number of clerics in the cur-
rent politics and Goodarzi wanting to remove them from politics.
Both had vague relations with the Ayatollah Khomeini, with the first
being ignored (or even dismissed) by him and the latter hunted by
him, but with neither achieving any religious recognition either from
Khomeini or the religious circles. Finally—both were executed, the
first for fighting the Shah and the second for fighting Khomeini.
There are another two theoreticians, each of whom contributed
and influenced their religious associates. The first is Ahmad Kasravi
who lived during the 1940s when the Fadayan-e Islam and Navvab
Safavi were fashioning their ideology in contradiction to what
Kasravi was offering. The second was Shariati, who was the model of
a classical theoretician for the Forqan in matters regarding what was
needed to build a revolutionary generation. Both expressed revolu-
tionary thoughts, the first against classical Shi’a dogma and the lat-
ter offering innovative interpretations of Shi’a based on the classical
literature. Both carried on a dialog in sign-language, with the first
being assassinated when the clerics had finally had enough of his
anti-Shi’a approach, and the latter being excluded from Hosseiniyeh
Ershad, when the clerics had had enough of his innovative religious
approach. Both wanted to build a new Iranian society with Kasravi
using a secular approach and Shariati seeking symbiosis of the old
and the new while combining the classical and the modern inter-
pretations of the Quran and Nahjul Balagheh. Both influenced and
triggered responses in the younger revolutionaries, but in different
directions. Both finally died before seeing their ideologies change
the country, but it was the first who motivated the Shah’s regime
against the clerics, and the second who motivated the revolutionary
groups within the religious circles against the Shah’s regime.
When one takes all these similarities and differences into account
and summarizes them, we see that the Forqan, as a young group
among other more established revolutionary groups, was in gen-
eral not too different from the others but, despite this, it did have
a unique place in the history of the Islamic revolution. The signifi-
cance of the group’s actions did not actually deflect the “revolution-
ary ship” from its path, even though this path was paved with blood
Conclusions M 141
and misconceptions, and the final goal of the revolution, which was
the establishment of a religious state, was finally achieved. Whether
there were 20, or even 80, members of the Forqan, they performed
the fundamental task of drawing this ship into deep water and killed
many of the ship’s navigators and captains. Although they were never
were able, nor probably would have ever been able, to stop the prog-
ress of the revolution and change its consequences, they apparently
did divert the revolutionary ship by reducing the number of religious
ideologies and circles it contained. What would the reality of the
revolution have been during its first year if Ayatollahs Motahhari
and Mofatteh had taken part in the political and decision-making
process in the new Islamic Republic of Iran? Although this research
does not deal with assumptions and conspiracies it is still interest-
ing to imagine what the religious leadership would have done if the
intervention of the Forqan and their “innovative” politics had not
taken place.
Although the Forqan Group was considered by Khomeini and his
close advisors to be insignificant in revolutionary terms, Khomeini
did consider them to be significant in matters concerning the path
the revolution should take, what the real Shi’a is, and what the right
path for the Iranian people to embark upon should be. The Forqan
did not put forward any relevant political program for governing the
Iranian people, hardly dealt with any national agenda, nor offered
any information about how they could participate in politics.
It is hard to claim that the Forqan were apolitical and anti-polit-
ical, but we can positively say that they were anti-Khomeini. They,
like Khomeini, wanted to see a different Islam and the differences
between their innovative approaches are too narrow to allow us to
decide which of them wanted to preserve the classical Shi’a follow-
ing and its approach toward politics more. Their different under-
standings of the current situation on the eve of the revolution led
them both into a broad and fierce struggle for what each considered
to be its truth and path. Indeed, Khomeini fine-tuned the notion
of Velayat-i Faqih at the beginning of the 1970s and went a long
way until it was established during and after the Islamic revolution.
The Forqan, who saw Khomeini leading the Shi’a into strange terri-
tory and an unfamiliar reality, wanted to conserve the classical path
but they wanted a new understanding of the current reality. They
advocated Shariati’s method of testing, diagnosing, and examining
the Shi’a and its ability as the authentic form of the real religion to
adapt and suit itself to the younger generation. This was what guided
the Forqan in their war against Khomeini’s Velayat-i Faqih agenda
which, ironically for them, was both too innovative and too static.
They first chose a very common way to present their merchandise
to the younger generation who attended the Madrasas and mosques
with the very naïve belief that, in a world where every semi-educated
ulama could sell his religious product, so could they. All of this col-
lapsed when they had to face the reality that the religious circles
had the real power over the minds of the people and took a firm and
stubborn stand against any upstart quasi-clerics who thought they
could take the place of the old entrenched religious establishment.
The Forqan, after learning from very personal experience and
thus gaining real understanding of the real power of the clerics—
especially where fields of knowledge were concerned—finally
decided to adopt an aggressive way of presenting their agenda. The
Forqan realized that real control of the Iranian society would not
come from the younger generation alone but from the respected,
well-known religious figures that had, throughout the generations,
been the political and religious backbone of Iranian society. The
Forqan thought that, since they were a young group who wanted
to consolidate the old and the new, they would be able to have the
ability to gain the power to lead the younger revolutionaries—but all
this was illusion and delusion.
We can learn a lot from the way the Forqan progressed in many
spheres. They emerged as a religious group at the time when Iranian
society was overflowing with too many religious groups that were
all fighting each other in order to establish themselves within the
population—and this was a bad decision. They did not emerge in
order to promote the revolution but quite the opposite—to fight
the revolution. The other sphere was the Forqan’s reactions to the
developments taking place around them when they realized that
they were fighting too little and too uselessly, but they could not
stop and did not want to stop. As every revolutionary fighter knows,
once you fight you fight forever. The act of placing the revolution
under attack, although it had a minor impact on the revolutionary
forces, caused other groups to reconstruct and modify their political
agendas and activities. Fighting Khomeini’s approach and getting a
mirror reaction from the IRGC and the revolutionary circles made
Conclusions M 143
the Forqan one of the most significant revolutionary groups, but

being revolutionary without a revolution is only a model for those
who contribute their part to the revolution by being anti-revolution-
aries. Unlike the Hojjatiyeh and the Tudeh, the Forqan, who did not
fight the Shah but also never sided with Khomeini, finally joined
his new political order. After completing their historical role in the
new regime, however, they were forced out in 1983 after they pro-
tested against the government and were never seen in Iranian politics
again, at least not officially nor visibly. The other revolutionaries—
the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Fadayan-e Khalq, the National Front
and others, who did fight the Shah but were never part of the Islamic
Republic, however, can be called revolutionary fighters because their
activities, before, during and even after the revolution helped shape
the Islamic Republic’s new politics.
The historical Hashashins never really became a major problem
to the medieval regimes, but they were always in the regime’s mind
as a real threat, and troublesome fighters who were not afraid to be
killed in the attempt to achieve their goals. The new-modern ver-
sion of the Hashashins—the Forqan, were also a source of annoy-
ance to Khomeini’s circles, who truly feared being targeted by the
Forqan and so they were removed from taking any real part in the
revolution.
The trauma that the Forqan caused to the leadership of the reli-
gious revolutionaries caused them to react strongly and stubbornly,
especially when there were allusions made to the possibility that
the Forqan’s actions were being orchestrated by the CIA, the Israeli
Mossad, and the SAVAK. The professionalism with which the assas-
sinations were carried out led to the assumption that these actions
must have been carried out by professional agencies. The fact that
six assassinations were carried out by assassins riding on speeding
motorcycles makes it fairly clear that someone very professional and
well-trained was operating behind the scenes and the combination of
many factors and forces that emerged during the revolution created
confusion and chaos and led the Ayatollah Khomeini’s circles to con-
clude that foreign powers were trying to destroy their revolution.
The Ayatollah Khomeini’s success in this revolution made him
curious to see how this revolution was being accepted amongst the
other Shi’i communities in the Middle East, and even before com-
pleting the task of installing an Islamic government instead of the
Shah’s, Khomeini wanted to expand the circle of revolution in the

Middle East. Khomeini’s successful revolution, especially since it
had a utopian vision and a global outlook, that is, the establishment
of Islam as the world’s religion, impelled him to initiate uprisings
and turmoil within the other Shi’i communities.
The SATJA and SAJAJI—Sazman-e Enqelabi-e Todehay-e
Jomhory-e Islami-e Iran—The Revolutionary Organization of the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s People; SAJAJI—Sazman-i Jonbesh-hay-i
Azadibakhsh-i Jahan-i Islam—“The Organization of the Liberation
Movements of the Islamic World” were the two unofficial forces of
the new upcoming regime, whose task it was to develop strategies
to expand the revolution’s power. Despite there not being any direct
connection between the Forqan and SATJA/SAJAJI—the latter’s
contribution to this mission was their different approach to groups
that, in spite of being part of the revolution and their great desire to
export it, still saw eye to eye, despite their difference over fighting
the religious leadership and Khomeini’s close circle as a threat.
There were many organizations, movements, and groups that
fought Khomeini, but this does not necessarily mean that the
Forqan, as one of them, took the right path. The existence of a vari-
ety of groups whose common denominator was fighting Khomeini,
but each in a very different way, projected a variety of possibili-
ties for the image of the Forqan as a movement but, in contrast to
the other semi-revolutionary, shadowy, clandestine and religious
groups—the Forqan had a religious basis and agenda. They fought
Khomeini using his own terminology and touched upon very sensi-
tive and delicate issues that flourished before and during the revolu-
tion and the existence of a religious competitor, even one with poor
religious credibility but one that could influence the people, made
Khomeini’s people uncompromising, unforgiving, and impatient.
The contribution of the Forqan to the Iranian revolution was
minor when compared to other revolutionary groups, but their real
contribution was their exposure of the real face of the Ayatollah
Khomeini and his intention to establish a theocratic Shi’i Islamic
state. The Forqan were like the child crying out “the king is naked,”
and this made the religious circles afraid that their secret ambi-
tions to create an Islamic state would be exposed. It seems that the
Forqan’s prediction could not have been more accurate and real when
one looks at the current regime that was established because of the
Conclusions M 145
Velayat-i Faqih ideology. This prediction and semi-prophecy was not

able to serve the Iranian people as long as the Forqan were attached
by their umbilical cord to the old religious frameworks, since this
attachment left the religious circles with all the power, and this has
proven to be true from the Occultation up till today; and will prob-
ably remain so.
Notes
Preface
1. Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State, Khomeini and the making of new
Iran (London, 2003), p. 79.
2. Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam – The Iranian Mojahedin (London,
1989), pp. 51–52.
3. W. Michael Reisman and Eric E. Freedman, “The Plaintiff ’s Dilemma:
Illegally Obtained Evidence and Admissibility in International
Adjudication”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 76, No.
4 (Oct. 1982), p. 749. BBC, “Security expert” says Salafi group prob-
ably behind Iran blasts,” BBC Monitoring Middle East [London] 14 June
2005: 1. “Iran TV says “terrorist” leader killed at Pakistan borders,” BBC
Monitoring Newsfile [London] 07 Apr 2012.
4. Martin, p. 79.
5. “Akbar Goodarzi and the Formation of the Terrorist Group of Forqan,”
Islamic Revolution Document Center, <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777
/print.aspx>, accessed July 2, 2012. “About Goodarzi and Furqan Group”,
<http://www.teror-victims.com/en/index.php?Page=definition&UID=292
0374>, accessed August 6, 2012.
6. Ronen A. Cohen, The Hojjatiyeh Society in Iran: Ideology and Practice from
the 1950s to the Present (USA: Macmillan Palgrave, 2013).
1 Theological Approaches
1. Fred M. Donner, “Qurani Furqan,” Journal of Semitic Studies, LII/2
(Autumn 2007), p. 279..
2. Mohammad Ratab Nabulsi, Tafsir al-Qaraa’ al-Karim—Surat al-Furqan,
p. 23, <www.nabulsi.com>, retrieved: July 3, 2013.
3. Quran, 3:4, source and translation in: <http://quran.com/3>.
4. Donner, p. 280.
5. See also Mohammad bin Jarir bin Yazid bin Kathir bin Ghalab al-
Amali, Abu Jaafar al-Tabari, Jama’ al-Bayan fi Taawil al-Quran, Vol. 1,
article 116.
148 M Notes
6. Donner, p. 281.
7. Uri Rubin, Quran (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2005), p. 43.
[Translation of the Quran].
8. Donner, p. 286.
9. Ibid., p. 290.
10. In other Hebrew and Aramaic religious writings (except the Bible) the root
P.Q.D appears more than 17,000 times.
11. Donner, pp. 281–283.
12. Though the order is not chronical but thematic the aim is to surround this
word with new and old interpretations, both Sunni and Shi’i.
13. Surat al-Forqan, al-Taba’ liHawaza al-hadi lil-Darasat al-Islamiyyah, <http://
www.hodaalquran.com/rbook.php?id=4674&mn=1>, June 29, 2008,
retrieved: July 2, 2013. Riadh Mahmmoud Qassem, Hadi Rashid Jad-Allah,
“Tafsir Surat al-Furqan bial-Qarat al-A’sher al-Mutawatira,” Majalat al-Jama’a
al-Islamiyyah, Vol. 16, No. 1, (January 2008), p. 211.
14. Nasser Makaram al-Shirazi, Tafsir al-Amathal fi Kitab Allah al-Manzal (The
Complete Interpretation to Allah’s book [Quran]) (Musadar al-Tafsir ind
al-Shi’a), pp. 224–226; 517.
15. Ibid., p. 517.
16. Ibid., p. 520.
17. Sahih al-Bukhari, 59:2.
18. Mohammad bin Jarir bin Yazid bin Kathir bin Ghalab al-Amali, Abu Jaafar
al-Tabari, Jama’ al-Bayan fi Taawil al-Quran, Vol. 1, article 15.
19. Tafsir al-Barhani, Vol. 1, Article 162:5; 167:10.
20. Abu Tahir Muhammad ibn Yaqub al-Fayruz Aabadi (collector), Abdullah ibn
Abbas, Tanwîr al-Miqbâs min Tafsîr Ibn ‘Abbâs, surat al-Furqan, verse 1.
21. Abu Mohammad Sahl bin Abdullah bin Yunis bin Rafi’ al-Tustari, Tafsir
al-Tustari, Surat al-Furqan, verse 1.
22. Jalāl al-Dīn Mu ḥammad bin A ḥ mad al-Ma ḥallī, Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Ra ḥ mān
bin Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭ ī, Tafsir al-Jalālayn, Surat al-Imaran, verse 4.
bin Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭ ī, Tafsir al-Jalālayn, Surat al-Furaqn, verse 1.
bin Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭ ī, Tafsir al-Jalālayn, Surat al-A’nkabut, verse 27.
bin Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭ ī, Tafsir al-Jalālayn, Surat al-Hadid, verse 26.
26. Mohammad Sadeqi Tehrani, al-Furqan fi Tafsir al-Quran bal-Quran (Qom:
Manshurat al-Thqafat al-Islamiyyah, 1407 [1986]).
27. Islamic Revolution Center, “Akbar Goodarzi and the formation of the terrorist
group of Forqan”. <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>, retrieved:
February 21, 2013.
28. Adrian Fortescue, “The Seven Sleepers of Ephesus.” The Catholic Encyclopedia,
Vol. 5 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909). <http://www.newadvent
.org/cathen/05496a.htm>, retrieved: August 6, 2013.
Notes M 149
29. Rubin, The Quran, p. 236. Rubin’s interpretations of verse 9.

30. Sahl bin ‘Abdullāh al-Tustarī, Tafsir al-Tustari, Surat al-Kahf, verse 9.
31. John Koch, Die Siebenschläferlegende—ihr Ursprung und ihre Verbrei (Leipzig,
Verlag von Carl Reissner, 1833), pp. 101–102.
32. Ibid., p. 102.
33. Abū Muhammad Abd-Allāh ibn Muslim ibn Qutayba al-Dīnawarī al-Marwazī
known as Ibn Qutaybah. Other sources say he lived between 828–885 ce.
34. Koch, pp. 123–124.
35. This could easily correlate with the conversion process that this region went
through 309 years after Jesus’ appearance at the beginning of the first cen-
tury, but it does not correlate with the original story of the Seven Sleepers of
Ephesus that took place between 249–251 ce.
36. Koch, 123–130.
bin Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭ ī, Tafsir al-Jalālayn, Surat al-Kahf, verses 12, 22.
38. Ibn Abbas, Tanwir al-Miqbas min Tafsir Ibn Abbas, Surat Al-Kahf, verse 22
(Jami’ alhuquq mahfuza, Beirut, Lubnan, 1992), altabaa’ alawali (first edi-
tion), p. 310.
2 The Emergence of the Forqan Group

1. Hetz—7234/13, “Turgeman’s Telegram NR-200 dated 25/5/78 about the
Islamic Opposition in Iran,” Israel Representation—Tehran, No. 105.1/668,
May 29, 1978. Hetz—7234/13, “Protests in Iran,” Israel Representation—
Tehran, No. 105.1/587, May 15, 1978.
2. Hetz—7234/13, “Iran—the Islamic Protest Movement,” Israel Embassy to
Washington, May 30, 1978.
3. Ibid.
4. Hetz—7234/14, “Iran—Assessments and Suggestions,” Uri Lubrani’s letter to
the Israeli Foreign Minister, July 13 [?], 1978.
5. Hetz—7234/14, “Prof. Sepehr Zabih,” Israeli Representation—Tehran, No.
101.21/946. July 17, 1978.
6. Hetz—7234/7, “Clerics that are known to A. Netzer,” July 21, 1978.
7. Hetz—7304/9, Private (on the letter paper of the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem), Amnon Netzer to Yael Vered, August 1, 1978.
8. Hetz—7304/9, Top Secret, August 3, 1978.
9. The military government was established in Teheran and 11 other cities on
September 8, 1978 for six months.
10. Hetz—7234/15, Top Secret, Report 243 from the Israeli Embassy in
Washington to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, October 17, 1978.
11. Mr. Sultan Hassani Sanandaji was the second secretary of the Iranian Embassy
to London, UK.
12. Hetz—7235/1, Top Secret, Moshe Gilboa to Yael Vardi, “Assumption of the
CEO of Asia and Africa Desk, Mr. Sanandaji on the deteriorating situation in
150 M Notes
Iran,” Israel Representative to Tehran, No. 1503, November 29, 1978. Hetz—
7235/1, Secret, “Harmelin Tehran,” No. 335, November 28, 1978.
13. Hetz—7235/1, “Conversation with Din Fischer of Times,” from the Israeli
Embassy in Tehran to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, No. 363, November 30,
1978.
14. Hetz—7234/5, The Israeli Embassy in Washington to the Israeli Foreign
Ministry, “Conversation with Prof. Mervin Zonis of Chicago University,”
December 11, 1978.
15. Hetz—6706/1, Confidential, 85/03/30, January 15, 1979.
16. Richard Cottam, it must be noted, was the CIA agent active during the
Mossadeq crisis and the one who predicted that Khomeini would be the leader
of the revolution. (Hetz—7235/6, “Iran,” Consulate General of Israel in Los
Angeles, February 15, 1979.)
17. Hetz—7235/9, “Iran—the Meeting between Cottam and Khomeini,” Israeli
Embassy—Washington, No. 240, January 16, 1979.
18. Hetz—6706/1, Top Secret, No. 47, 289, February 16, 1979.
19. Hetz—7235/6, “Iran—Tal with Prof. Zonis,” Israel Embassy—Washington,
May 30, 1979.
20. Stefanie C. Stauffer, “Threat Assessment: Iran,” Threat Analysis Group,
Department of State, Office of Security Secrets. Approved by: Bowman H.
Miller, Sid T. Telford—632–2412, June 14, 1979, p. 127.
21. Ibid., p. 128.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 131.
24. Ibid., p. 132.
25. Muhammad Sahimi, “The Power Behind the Scene: Khoeiniha,”
Frontline, October 30, 2009, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline
/tehranbureau/2009/10/power-behind-the-scene-khoeiniha.html>, retrieved:
February 21, 2013.
26. Philip Dopoulos, The Associated Press, April 24, 1979.
27. Mahmood T. Davari, The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari:
An Iranian Theoretician of the Islamic State (New York: Routledge Curzon,
2005), pp. 82–84.
28. Ervand Abrahamian, “Answers: Forqan”. <http://www.answers.com/topic
/forqan>, retrieved: January 6, 2014.
29. Stauffer, p. 141.
30. CIA, International Terrorism in 1979, A Research Paper, Top Secret,
C03291989, PA 80–10072U, April 1980.
31. Hetz—8492/8, “Iran—Clandestine Activity,” Secret, No. 105.1/247, February
14, 1977.
32. Rassul Jafarian, Jaryan-ha va Sazman-ha-ye Mazhabi-Siyasi-ye Iran—1320–
1357 (Tehran: Intesharat-e Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Islami, 1390),
(Jafarian, Rassul The Religious-Political Movements of Iran—1940–1977
Notes M 151
(Tehran: The Center for Publication of Islamic Revolution Documents,

2011)), p. 775.
33. Ibid.
34. Akbar Goodarzi and the Formation of the Terrorist Group of Forqan,
Islamic Revolution Center, <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>,
retrieved: February 21, 2013. Terror Victims Information Base about Goodarzi
and the Forqan Group, <http://www.teror-victims.com/en/index.php?Page=
definition&UID=2920374>, retrieved: May 3, 2011.
35. Jafarian, p. 775, n1.
36. Ali Kordi, Goroh-e Forqan (The Forqan Group), Intesharat-e Markaz-e
Asnad-e Enghelab-e Islami (The Center for Islamic Revolution Documents),
(Tehran, 1387), (Tehran, 2009), p. 100.
37. Akbar Goodarzi and the Formation of the Terrorist Group of Forqan, Islamic
Revolution Center, <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>,
retrieved: February 21, 2013.
38. Ibid.
39. Kordi, pp. 99–101.
40. Ibid., pp. 157–158.
41. Terror Victims Information Base, About Goodarzi and the Forqan Group,
74>, retrieved: May 3 2011.
42. Akbar Goodarzi and the Formation of the Terrorist Group of Forqan,
Islamic Revolution Center, <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>,
43. Payga-e Majalat-e Takhasosi-ye Nur, “badana-ye guruh az barnameh-ye terror
bi khabar bud! ‘pendar va kerdar-e Forqan az nama-ye nazdik’ dar mizgerd-e
yadavar ba se tan az a’za-ye sabaq-e in guruh”. <http://www.moormags.com
/view/fa/articlepage/828309>, retrieved: April 28, 2014.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
3 The Fundamental Ideology of the Forqan

1. Assef Bayat, “Shariati and Marx: A Critique of an ‘Islamic’ Critique of
Marxism,” Journal of Comparative Poetics: Marxism and the Critical
Discourse, Vol. 10 (1990), p. 20.
2. Ervand Abrahamian, “Ali Shari’ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution,”
MERIP Reports, Vol. 102 (1982), pp. 24–25.
3. Mehbi Abedi and Mehdi Abedi, “Ali Shariati: The Architect of the 1979
Islamic Revolution of Iran,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 19 (1986), pp. 229–230.
4. Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin (London: I.B.
Tauris & Co Ltd, 1989), pp. 105–106.
152 M Notes
5. Abrahamian, “Ali Shari’ati,” p. 25.

6. Ibid., pp. 24–25.
7. Ibid.
8. Ervand Abrahamian, “The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963–1977,” MERIP
Reports, Vol. 86 (1980), p. 9.
9. Abrahamian, “Ali Shari’ati,” p. 25.
10. Abrahamian, Radical Islam, pp. 107–108.
11. Ibid., pp. 106–108.
12. Bayat, pp. 20–21.
13. Mehbi Abedi and Mehdi Abedi, p. 231.
14. Brad Hanson, “Westoxication of Iran: Depications and Reactions of Behrangi,
al-e Ahmad, and Shariati,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. 15, No. 1 (1983), p. 13.
15. Ibid. Abrahamian, “Ali Shari’ati,” p. 25.
16. Ibid., p. 109.
17. Ibid.
18. Mehbi Abedi and Mehdi Abedi, p. 232.
19. Ibid.
20. Behrooz Ghanari-Tabrizi, “Contentious Public Religion: Two Conceptions
of Islam in Revolutionary Iran: Ali Shari’ati and Abdulkarim Soroush,”
International Sociology, Vol. 19 (2004), pp. 510–511.
21. Abrahamian, “Ali Shari’ati,” pp. 26–27.
22. Hanson, p. 17.
23. Ibid., pp. 13–14.
24. Abrahamian, Radical Islam, p. 112.
25. Hanson, pp. 17–18. Abrahamian, Radical Islam, pp. 112–113.
26. Ghanari-Tabrizi, pp. 511–512.
27. Iran: Update to IRN4254.E of 16 March 1990 on a group called Forqan (Forgan,
Forghan), Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Islamic Republic of
Iran, 1999. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,IRN,,3ae6ac
3347,0.html>, retrieved: February 21, 2013. BBC Monitoring International
Reports. Iran security “expert” holds “Salafist” Forqan group responsible for
blasts. Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2005. <http://www.accessmylibrary.com
/article-1G1–137092726/iran-security-expert-holds.html>, retrieved: February
21, 2013. Muhammad Sahimi, “The Power Behind the Scene: Khoeiniha,”
Frontline, October 30, 2009. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline
/tehranbureau/2009/10/power-behind-the-scene-khoeiniha.html>, retrieved:
February 21, 2013. Soharb Bahdad, “A Disputed Utopia: Islamic Economics
in Revolutionary Iran,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 36,
No. 4 (October 1994), p. 781n.
28. Terror Victims Information Base, “About Goodarzi and Furqan Group,” 2011.
74>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
29. BBC, Anonymous, “Iran speaker slams reports cleric-leadership rifts as ‘mis-
chief ’,” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 2, Tehran, [in Persian],
October 19, 2010.
Notes M 153
30. Payega-e Majalat-e Tahsesa-ye Nur, “badna-ye goroh az barnameh terror bi

khabar bud! ‘pandar va kardar-e Forqan az nema-ye nazdik’ dar mizgard yado-
var ba se tan az ea’za-ye sabaq in goroh” <http://www.moormags.com/view/fa
/articlepage/828309>, retrieved: April 28, 2014.
31. Rassul Jafarian, Jaryan-ha va Sazman-ha-ye Mazhabi-Siyasi-ye Iran—1320–
(Rassul Jafarian, The Religious-Political Movements of Iran—1940–1977
2011)), p. 785.
32. Another Persian book about the Forqan Group (which, unfortunately, could
not be used for this research because it was unavailable) is Mohammad Hassan
Ruzitalab, Tarkib Eltaqat va Terror: Barresi-e Amalkard va Asnad-e Goroh-e
Forqan (Mix of Terror and Eclectic: A Study on the Practice and Documentation
on the Forqan Group) (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1392
(2013)).
(Tehran, 1387), (Tehran, 2009), p. 31.
34. Ibid., p. 31.
35. Ibid., p. 32.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 33.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 34. Shariati was a Muslim intellectual who believed in a kind of cul-
tural approach to enlightenment and struggle.
41. Ibid.
42. The term “gold” refers to those who have capital and are wealthy; “power”
refers to those who have power against oppressed people; and “deception”
refers to clergymen that try to seduce people to make them followers.
43. Kordi, p. 35.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 36.
46. Ibid., p. 176.
47. Ibid., pp. 177–178.
49. Kordi, p. 37.
50. Ibid., p. 38.
51. Ibid., p. 39.
52. Ali Davani, “Namaee az andisheh va a’mal-e Goroh-e Forqan: Hojjat ulIslam
va almuslemin Ali Davani” (An overview of practice and thoughts of Forqan
Group); Hojjatol Islam Ali Davani,” Yadavar, May 2010. <http://www.noormags
.com/view/fa/articlepage/828280>, retrieved: May 1, 2014.
154 M Notes
53. Akbar Goodarzi and the formation of the terrorist group of Forqan. Islamic
Revolution Center. <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>, retrieved:
February 21, 2013.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. BBC, “Iran talks but enemies block talks—Friday prayer cleric,” Voice of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, (in Persian), April 27, 2007.
59. Ervand Abrahamian, “Gale Encyclopedia of the Mideast & N. Africa: Forqan”
<http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1–137092726/iran-security
-expert-holds.html>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
60. Ibid.
61. For further details see: Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam—The Iranian
Mojahedin (I.B. Tauris, 1989), who disagrees with this conception.
62. Hanson, pp. 5–10.
63. Kordi, p. 15.
64. Elisheva Machlis, “‘Alī Sharī‘atī and the Notion of taw ḥ īd: Re-exploring the
Question of God’s Unity,” Die Welt Des Islams, Vol. 54 (2014), p. 186.
65. Ibid., p. 190.
66. Ibid., p. 195.
67. Ibid., p. 202.
68. Islamic Revolution Center, “Akbar Goodarzi and the Formation of the
Terrorist Group of Forqan” <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>,
69. Ibid.
70. Jafarian, p. 775. Islamic Revolution Center, “Akbar Goodarzi and the Formation
of the Terrorist Group of Forqan” <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print
.aspx>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
71. Ibid.
72. Jafarian, p. 778.
73. Abrahamian, Radical Islam, pp. 119–121.
74. Machlis, p. 189.
75. Ibid., p. 206. Ali Shariati, Islam Shenasi (Islamolgy), Jild Yek, (Dars Aval va
Dovom), (Tehran, 1969), pp. 47–48.
76. Machlis, p. 203.
77. Ibid., p. 206.
78. Abrahamian, “’Ali Shariati,” pp. 27–28.
79. Ibid., p. 28.
80. Terror Victims Information Base, “About Goodarzi and Forqan Group”
74>, retrieved: May 3, 2011.
81. Sahimi, “The Power Behind the Scene: Khoeiniha.”
Notes M 155

83. Terror Victims Information Base, “About Goodarzi and Furqan Group,”
2011. <http://www.teror-victims.com/en/index.php?Page=definition&UID=
84. Thomas Kent, “International News,” The Associated Press, July 8, 1979.
Thomas Kent, “International News,” The Associated Press, July 9, 1979.
85. Kordi, p. 49.
86. Ibid., p. 57.
87. Ibid., p. 58.
88. Ibid., p. 60.
89. Ibid., p. 63.
90. Ibid., p. 64–65.
91. Hetz—8386/3, “Newspapers and Media Brief,” June 2, 1979.
92. Kordi, p. 20.
93. Asnad-e Lanah-e Jasusi-e Amrica (The American Spy-den [in Tehran]
Documents), Vol. 42 (Tehran: Intesharat-e Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e
Islami, [?], Tehran: The Center for Publication of Islamic Revolution
Documents), p. 122.
94. Kordi, p. 21.
95. Ali Abul Hosseini Mandhur was probably the one who invented this notion
about the Forqan in his book: Tabiini az falasefe-ye siyasi, ejtema’ i-ye ekhlaqi
va farhangi-ye forqanism (Qom: Entesharat-e Kothar, [?]).
96. Kordi, p. 21.
97. Ibid., p. 23.
98. Ibid., pp. 24–25.
99. Ibid., p. 27.
100. Ibid., p. 29.
101. Ibid., p. 14.
102. Ibid., p. 15.
103. Ibid., p. 26.
104. Ibid., pp. 28–29.
105. This group’s leaders were Ahmad Khomeini, Khomeini’s son (married to al-
Sadr’s niece); Sadeq Tabatabai, Deputy Premier and the government spokes-
man (also married to one of al-Sadr’s nieces); Mustafa Chamran, the head of
SAVAMI (the replacement of the SAVAK); and Muhammad Abu-Sharif, the
head of the Pasdaran.
106. The Fadayian-i Islam of Navab Safavi.
107. Hetz—7235/7, “The inner split in Khomeini’s camp,” Israel Embassy—
Washington, No. 114, September 21, 1979.
109. See “Rafsanjani: In analyzing council elections results look for realities.”
<www.payvand.com>, August 3, 2003.
156 M Notes
110. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, “Iran and the Rise of its
Neoconservatives. The Politics of Teheran`s Silent Revolution,” Reprinted in
2009 by I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, p. 54.
111. For more details about the Hojjatiyeh, see my book: The Hojjatiyeh Society in
Iran: Ideology and Practice from the 1950s to the Present (New York: Macmillan
Palgrave, 2013).
112. Ehteshami and Zweiri, pp. 64–65. See Shi’ite supremacists emerge from Iran’s
shadows, from a special correspondent Asia Times. <www.mesbahyazdi.org>,
September 9, 2005.
113. Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic
Republic (London: I.B Tauris, 1997), pp. 1; 8–15; 19.
114. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented
Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996),
pp. 80–81.
115. Ibid., p. 92.
116. For more details about Boroujerdi’s opposition to clerics’ involvement in poli-
tics see my book: The Hojjatiyeh Society in Iran: Ideology and Practice from the
1950s to the Present (New York: Macmillan Palgrave, 2013), pp. 34–39.
117. Boroujerdi, p. 122.
118. Ibid., p. 120, n6.
119. Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Dicontent: The Ideological Foundation of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993),
p. 150. Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini- The Struggle for Reform in
Iran (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 75.
120. H. E. Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism—The Liberation
Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1990), pp. 203–204.
121. Ibid., pp. 205–208.
122. Brumberg, pp. 75–76.
123. Kordi, p. 54.
124. Ibid., p. 56.
125. Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 157.
126. Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New
Iran (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), p. 93.
127. Ibid., p. 79.
128. Islamic Revolution Document Center, “Akbar Goodarzi and the Formation
of the Terrorist Group of Forqan,” 1388.02.02 (April 22, 2009). <http://
www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
Notes M 157

132. Ibid., p. 779.
133. Ibid., p. 784.
134. Kordi, p. 62.
135. Iran: Information on a group called Forqan, active around the period of the
revolution. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Islamic Republic
of Iran, 1990. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ad7e1c.html>,
136. Raymound Carrol and Anthony Allaway, “Islam vs. the Left,” Newsweek,
May 14, 1979, p. 66.
137. Ali Kordi, Goroh-e Forqan (Forqan Group), Markaz Asnad Enqelab-e Eslami
(The Center for Islamic Revolution Documents), (Tehran, 1387), (Tehran,
2009), p. 179.
139. William Branigin, “Khomeini Vows Deaths Will Not Hold back Iran,” The
Washington Post, May 2, 1979, p. A25.
141. This notion is explained at the beginning of this chapter, on Ali Shariati’s
ideology.
of the Terrorist Group of Forqan,” 1388.02.02 (April 22, 2009), <http://
143. Ervand Abrahamian, “Answers: Forqan.” <http://www.answers.com/topic
/forqan>.
144. Philip Dopoulos, “International News,” The Associated Press, July 21, 1979.
145. The Economist, “When Ayatollahs disagree; crime and punishment in Iran,”
World Politics and Current Affairs, May 19, 1979, p. 15.
146. Iranian Students’ News Agency.
147. BBC, “Iranian press menu on 2 May 06,” (in Persian), May 2, 2006.
148. BBC, “Iran: Paper reviews lessons from serial killings’ case,” Hayat-e Now
website [in Persian], November 22, 2001.
149. Ahmad Jalali Farahani, A Review of the Prevailing Political Situation in Iran.
Gozaar, 2010, <http://www.gozaar.org/english/articles-en/A-Review-of-the
-Prevailing-Political-Situation-in-Iran.html>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
150. Muhammad Sahimi, Ali Motahari’s Extraordinary Interview. <http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/08/ali-motaharis
-extraordinary-interview.html>.
151. Kordi, p. 14.
158 M Notes
154. Ibid.
155. Mahmood T. Davari, The Political Thought of Ayatullah Mmurtaza Mutahhari:
2005), p. 80.
156. Ibid.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. Kordi, p. 25.
161. Ibid., p. 67.
162. Ibid., p. 69.
163. Ibid., p. 71.
165. Kordi, p. 72.
166. Ibid., pp. 73–74.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid., p. 74.
169. Ibid., p. 75.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid., p. 76.
172. Ibid.
173. Ibid., p. 77.
174. Monafeqin refers mainly to the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO),
but during the primary years of revolution, it was in use to blacken other
opponents too.
175. Kordi, p. 78.
176. Ibid., p. 79.
177. Ibid., pp. 80–81.
Terrorist Group of Forqan” <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print
181. Ibid., p. 781.
Terrorist Group of Forqan” <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print
Notes M 159
183. Ibid.
184. Probably a chapter in his famous book: Naghdi bar Marxism (A critique on
Marxism).
Terrorist Group of Forqan” <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.
aspx>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
187. Makkian: 25; 29; 30; 31; 32; 34; 35; 36; 40; 41; 42; 43; 44; 45; 46 and 53.
Madinian: 24; 33; 47; 48 and 49.
188. Jafarian, pp. 781–782. Islamic Revolution Center, “Akbar Goodarzi and
the Formation of the Terrorist Group of Forqan” <http://www.irdc.ir/en
/content/6777/print.aspx>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
189. Ibid.
190. Ibid.
4 Acts of Terror and Assassination—The Trojan Horse

Inside the Islamic Revolution
revolution. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Islamic Republic
2920374>, retrieved: February 21, 2013. The Associated Press, “International
News,” November 2, 1979. Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious
Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 286
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retrieved: February 21, 2013. Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The Qarani Affair and
Iranian politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No.
4 (November 1993), p. 625. Mahmood T. Davari, The Political Thought of
Ayatullah Mmurtaza Mutahhari: An Iranian Theoretician of the Islamic State
(New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), p. 82.
3. Thomas Kent, “International News,” The Associated Press, July 8, 1979.
Thomas Kent, “International News,” The Associated Press, July 9, 1979.
4. Scheherezade Faramarzi, “Exploding Tape Recorder Wounded Imam,” The
Associated Press, June 27, 1981. “Explosion Injures Khomeini Aide,” Herald-
Journal, June 28, 1981, p. 2. “Ayatollah’s Aide Injured,” Del Rio News-
Herald, Vol. 53, No. 86, June 28, 1981, p. 1. “Booby Trapped Recorder
Explodes,” Ocala Star-Banner, June 28, 1981, p. 4. “Iran,” Gadsden Times,
June 28, 1981, p. 11.
160 M Notes

Terrorist Group of Forqan.” <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>,
6. AP, “Assassins Escape After Killing Dato,” New York Times, March 10,
1921, p. 2.
7. The Baader-Meinhof gang, named after its founders Andreas Baader and
Ulrike Meinhof,
8. The Local (Germany’s news in English), “Motorcycle Used in R AF Killing
Turns up in Private Garage,” October 11, 2010. <http://www.thelocal
.de/20101011/30411>, and <http://sixties-l.blogspot.co.il/2010/10/motor-
cycle-used-in-raf-killing-turns-up.html>, retrieved: September 20, 2013.
9. YNET News, “Agent Livni makes British headlines,”. <http://www.ynetnews
.com/articles/0,7340,L-3550277,00.html>, retrieved: October 3, 2013.
10. Reuters, “‘Iranian nuclear scientist killed in Tehran.’” <http://www.jpost.com
/Iranian-Threat/News/Iranian-nuclear-scientist-killed-in-Tehran>, July 23,
2011, retrieved: January 5, 2014. JPOST.COM STAFF, “‘Der Spiegel’: Mossad
Behind Iran Scientist Assassination.” <http://www.jpost.com/International
/Der-Spiegel-Mossad-behind-Iran-scientist-assassination>, August 2, 2011,
retrieved: January 5, 2014. Randy Kreider, “You’ve Made Our Nuke Scientists
Human Targets, Says Iran,” <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/made-iran-nuke
-scientists-mossad-targets-iran-official/story?id=14983750>, November 18,
2011, retrieved: January 2, 2014.
11. Karl Vick and Aaron J. Klein, “Who Assassinated an Iranian Nuclear
Scientist? Israel Isn’t Telling.” <http://content.time.com/time/world
/article/0,8599,2104372,00.html>, January 13, 2012, retrieved: January 6,
2014. David Williams, “West Blamed by Iran as YET ANOTHER Nuclear
Scientist is Assassinated by Magnetic Car Bomb in the Street.” <http://
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-Ahmadi-Roshan-killed-magnetic-bomb-Tehran.html>, January 12, 2012,
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12. Karl Vick, “Mossad Cutting Back on Covert Operations Inside Iran,
Officials Say.” <http://world.time.com/2012/03/30/mossad-cutting-back-
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January 3, 2014. Nasser Karimi and Brian Murphy, “Iran Nuclear Physicist,
Massoud Ali Mohammadi, Killed by Bomb,” <http://www.huffingtonpost
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13. TIME Staff, “Is the Mossad Targeting Iran’s Nuclear Scientists?” <http://con-
tent.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2033725,00.html>, November 30,
14. Globes News, “Two Shooters on Motorcycles Fired at an Army Officer in
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January 22, 2012, retrieved: January 5, 2014. YNET, “Iran: Two Assassins
Notes M 161
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L-4178680,00.html>, January 22, 2012, retrieve: January 5, 2014.
15. Iran Interlink, “Just Who Has Been Killing Iran’s Nuclear Scientists? (The role
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16. Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 228.
17. Thomas Kent, “International News,” The Associated Press, May 26, 1979.
18. Rassul Jafarian, Jaryan-ha va Sazman-ha-ye Mazhabi-Siyasi-ye Iran—
1320–1357 (Tehran: Intesharat-e Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Islami,
1390), (Rassul Jafarian, The Religious-Political Movements of Iran—
1940–1977 (Tehran: The Center for Publication of Islamic Revolution
Documents, 2011)), p. 780.
20. Baqer Moin, Komeini: Life of the Ayatollah (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd,
2009) Second edition, p. 216. Edgar O’balance, Islamic Fundamentalist
Terrorism, 1979–95: The Iranian Connection (New York: New York University
Press, 1997), pp. 131–132.
(Tehran, 1387), (Tehran, 2009), p. 118.
22. Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The Qarani Affair and Iranian Politics,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 25, No. 4 (November 1993), p. 636.
Department of State, Office of Security, Secret, approved by: Bowman H.
Miller, Sid T. Telford—632–2412, June 14, 1979, p. 141. Philip Dopoulos,
The Associated Press, April 24, 1979. Thomas Kent, “International News,”
The Associated Press, May 3, 1979. Thomas Kent, “International News,” The
Associated Press, May 5, 1979.
24. Richard Tomkins, “International News,” The Associated Press, April 24, 1979.
25. MfS SED-KL/3867, BStU 000541.
26. William Branigin, “Leading Iranian Newspaper Shuts after Attack by
Khomeini,” The Washington Post, May 13, 1979, p. A11.
27. No writer attributed, “Khomeini Aide Killed,” The Harvard Crimson, May
2, 1979. <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1979/5/2/khomeini-aide-killed
-ptehran-iran-one-of/>, retrieved: April 21, 2013.
28. Islamic Revolution Document Center “Assassination of Ayatollah Motahhari
and Teacher Day”. <http://www.irdc.ir/en/calendar/361/default.aspx>,
retrieved: April 21, 2013.
29. Muhammad Sahimi, “Ali Motahari’s Extraordinary Interview.” <http://www
.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/08/ali-motaharis-extraor-
dinary-interview.html>, retrieved: April 15, 2014.
162 M Notes
30. Islamic Revolution Document Center, “Assassination of Ayatollah Motahhari

and Teacher Day” <http://www.irdc.ir/en/calendar/361/default.aspx>,
retrieved: April 15, 2014.
31. Moin, p. 216.
33. “Khomeini Aide Killed,” May 2, 1979.
34. Kordi, p. 121.
36. MfS SED-KL/3867, BStU 000543, May 2, 1979.
37. “Khomeini Aide Killed,” May 2, 1979. Sahimi, “The Power Behind the Scene:
Khoeiniha.” Mehr News Agency, Tehran, “Ayatollah Motahhari’s Ideas Can
Serve as Guide for Nations,” May 2, 2011. Niloofar Kasra, Ayatollah Morteza
Motahhari, Institute Iranian for Contemporary Studies Historical. <http://
iichs.org/index_en.asp?id=1627&doc_cat=16>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>. Islamic Revolution Center, “Akbar
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.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
39. Kordi, p. 35.
41. “Khomeini Aide Killed,” May 2, 1979.
42. Thomas Kent, The Associated Press, May 25, 1979.
43. CIA, National Intelligence Daily, Top Secret, C03015998, May 2, 1979.
44. MfS HA XXII/18537, BStU-000545, [unknown date].
45. Department of State, Foreign Service of the United State of America,
OUTGOING TELEGRAM, AMEMBASSY TEHRAN, “Heightened
Tensions after Motahari’s Assassination,” Confidential, SOC 14–2, 4611.
47. BBC, Anonymous, “President Ahmadinejad Marks ‘Teachers Day’ in Iran,”
IRNA, April 29, 2009.
48. MfS HA XXII/18537, BStU-000544, May 3, 1979.
51. USA Department of State, “( . . . ) Report on Iran,” Confidential, USDAO/
TEHRAN [2]4577/81. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic
Republic (London: The Regents of the University of California, 1993), p. 74.
52. Department of State, Foreign Service of the United State of America,
OUTGOING TELEGRAM, AMEMBASSY TEHRAN, “Heightened
Tensions after Motahari’s Assassination,” Confidential, SOC 14–2, 4611.
54. Ibid.
Notes M 163
56. Hetz—7235/6, “Iran,” No. 532, May 20, 1979.

57. Hetz—8386/3, “Iran Jewry,” Israel Foreign Ministry, No. 341, May 20,
1979.
revolution, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Islamic Republic
retrieved: March 12, 2013.
60. William Branigin, “Ayatollah, Aide of Khomeini, Shot in Iran,” The
Washington Post, May 26, 1979, p. A25. Thomas Kent, “International News,”
The Associated Press, May 26, 1979.
61. BBC, Iran, May 28, 1979, ME/6127/i.
62. Kordi, p. 134.
67. MfS SED-KL/3867, BStU 000534, July 8, 1979.
68. The New York Times, Section A, Page 3, Column 1, Foreign Desk, July 24,
1980.
70. Kordi, p. 139.
71. Davari, pp. 82–83. Sohrab Behdad, “Islamic Utopia in Pre-Revolutionary
Iran: Navvab Safavi and the Fada’ian-e Eslam,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.
33, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 45–48.
72. Index of Memories of Martyr Haj Mahdi Araghi, The Cultural Website of
Martyrdom and Sacrifice, December 12, 1997. <http://navideshahed.com/en
/index.php?Page=definition&UID=84814>, retrieved: May 12, 2014.
73. Ibid.
75. Islamic Revolution Document Center. “Assassination of Haj Mehdi Araghi
and His Son by Forqan group” <http://www.irdc.ir/en/calendar/365/default
76. Kordi, p. 140.
77. Ali Reza Jahan-Shahi, “International News,” The Associated Press, August 27,
1979.
78. Behdad, p. 60.
79. MfS SED-KL/3867, BStU 000536, September 19, 1979.
80. Hetz—7235/7, “The Inner Split in Khomeini’s Camp,” Israel Embassy—
Washington, No. 114, September 21, 1979.
81. MfS HA XXII/18537, BStU-000496, October 13, 1979.
82. MfS SED-KL/3867, BStU 000495, October 22, 1979.
83. BBC, “Forqan claim assassination of West German,” October 16, 1979,
ME/6246/A/9.
164 M Notes
84. Thomas Kent, The Associated Press, May 25, 1979.

85. Davari, p. 82–84. Sahimi, “The Power Behind the Scene: Khoeiniha.”
86. Kordi, p. 144.
87. Edgar O’balance, Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979–95: The Iranian
Connection (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 39.
88. Davari, pp. 83–85.
89. Kordi, p. 147.
90. MfS SED-KL/3867, BStU 000397, December 18, 1979.
91. MfS HA XXII/18537, BStU-000395, December 19, 1979.
92. MfS SED-KL/3867, BStU 000362, December 24, 1979.
93. Ali Davani, “Namaee az andisheh va a’mal-e Forqan: Hojjat ulIslam va almu-
slemin Ali Davani” (An overview of the practice and thoughts of Forqan;
Hojjatol Islam Ali Davani,” Yadavar, May 2010, <http://www.noormags
94. Reuters, “Aide to Khomeini Wounded by 2 Gunmen in South Iran,” The New
York Times, Section A, Page 3, Column 5, March 30, 1981.
95. Kordi, pp. 148–149.
96. The Forqan were terminated at the beginning of 1980 and it is not possible
that they existed on the mentioned date, June 27, 1981, at least in the original
format of the group. It is important to mention that the Islamic Republic
tagged revolutionary cells, especially after the establishment of the republic,
as Forqanists, Monafeqin (i.e.,—the Mojahedin-e Khalq), Hojjaties etc, in
order to place these organizations and movements in disrepute.
97. Islamic Revolution Document Center, “Attempt on Life of Ayatollah
Khamenei,” June 27, 1981. <http://www.irdc.ir/en/calendar/396/default
98. M. Hosseini, 1981 A.D./ June, 27: Plot To Kill Khamenei Failed, The Iranian
History Article. <http://www.fouman.com/Y/Get_Iranian_History_Today
.php?artid=1130>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
99. Faramarzi Scheherezade, “Exploding Tape Recorder Wounded Imam,” The
Associated Press, June 27, 1981. “Explosion Injures Khomeini Aide,” Herald-
Journal, June 28, 1981, p. 2. “Ayatollah’s Aide Injured,” Del Rio News-Herald,
Vol. 53, No. 86, June 28, 1981, p. 1. “Booby Trapped Recorder Explodes,”
Ocala Star-Banner, June 28, 1981, p. 4. “Iran,” Gadsden Times, June 28, 1981,
p. 11.
100. Iran: Update to IRN4254.E of March 16, 1990 on a group called Forqan
(Forgan, Forghan), Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Islamic
Republic of Iran, 1999. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,IR
N,,3ae6ac3347,0.html>, retrieved: February 21, 2013. BBC, “Iran: Judiciary
seeking ‘domestic and external hands’ behind recent killings,” IRNA, Tehran
[in English], January 2, 1999.
Terrorist Group of Forqan”. <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print
Notes M 165
102. BBC Monitoring International Reports, Iran security “expert” holds “Salafist”
Forqan group responsible for blasts, Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2005.
<http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1–137092726/iran-security
-expert-holds.html>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
103. BBC, “Iran’s Fars News Agency offers review of week ending on 7 Jan 06,”
Fars News Agency website, Tehran [in English], January 7, 2006.
104. Islamic Revolution Document Center, “Attempt on Life of Ayatollah
Khamenei,” June 27, 1981. <http://www.irdc.ir/en/calendar/396/default
5 The CIA, SAVAK, and Mossad Connections with the Forqan

1. Ronen A. Cohen, “Iran, Israel, and Zionism since the Islamic Revolution—
From Rational Relationship to Disaster and Threat,” Published in the
Magazine: Iran, Israel and the Shi’ ite Crescent, by the S. Daniel Abraham
Center for Strategic Dialogue, Netanya Academic College (Fall, 2008),
p. 33.
2. MfS HA XXII/18537—BStU-000542, Mai 3, 1979.
3. The Globe and mail, “Iran,” May 19, 1979, p. 9.
4. BBC, “Iran,” May 28, 1979, ME/6127/i.
Miller, Sid T. Telford—632–2412, June 14, 1979, p. 140. Thomas Kent,
“International News,” The Associated Press, May 29, 1979.
6. The Associated Press, “International News,” May 30, 1979.
7. The Associated Press, “International News,” October 14, 1979.
8. BBC, Tehran home service, “The Leader of Forqan,” October 19, 1979,
ME/6249/A/7.
10. Abbas Zamani, (Abu Sharif). Revolutionary Guard Commander: “The Danger
Comes from the US Leftist Organizations.” MERIP Reports, No. 86, The Left
Forces in Iran (March–April 1980), pp. 28–30.
11. Barry Rubin, American Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979–1981.
Iranian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1/4, Iranian Revolution in Perspective (1980),
pp. 307–326.
12. Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 326.
13. Gunter Bathel (ed.), Die Islamische Republik Iran (Akademie-Verlag: Berlin,
1987), p. 216.
14. BBC, “Iran paper calls corps ‘Islam’s greatest guards’, slams US ‘terrorist’
remark,” Kayhan Website, August 23, 2007.
15. Mohsen M. Milani, “Harvest of Shame: Tudeh and the Bazargan Government,”
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 1993), p. 316.
166 M Notes
16. Mahmood T. Davari, The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari:

2005), p. 82.
17. Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1985), p. 114.
(Tehran, 1387), (Tehran, 2009), p. 190.
19. Ibid., p. 191.
20. Ibid., p. 192.
21. Ibid., pp. 192–193.
22. Ibid., p. 193.
23. The Associated Press, “Militants Vow Won’t Free Hostages without Shah,”
February 21, 1980.
24. The Associated Press, “State Department Denies Iranian Charges,” March 3,
1980. The Associated Press, “Iran’s Council Says U.N. Panel Will See Hostages,”
March 3, 1980.
25. William Branigin, “Splits in Iranian Council May Prolong U.S. Ordeal,” The
Washington Post, March 7, 1980, p. A25.
26. BBC, “Prosecutor General on US links with Forqan,” March 4, 1980,
ME/6361/A/13.
27. BBC, “Qotbzadeh’s Response to Request for Surrender of US Hostage,” March
5, 1980, ME/6362/A/6.
28. BBC, “US diplomat and the Forqan,” March 6, 1980, ME/6357/i.
29. The Associated Press, “International News,” August 15, 1980.
30. S. M. H. Adeli, “Iran’s Revolution,” The Globe and Mail, August 25, 1980.
31. BBC, “The USA and Iran: Contacts with Counter-Revolutionaries,” February
11, 1982, ME/6951/A/3.
32. Hetz—8386/3, “Newspapers and Media Brief,” May 12, 1979.
33. Hetz—8386/3, “Newspapers Brief,” Eric Roulo of Le Monde to Haaretz,
[Missing date].
34. Hetz—8408/4, “News Brief,” December 13, 1979.
35. Kordi, pp. 98–99.
36. Ibid., p. 146.
6 The Termination of the Forqan Group

1. Akbar Goodarzi and the Formation of the Terrorist Group of Forqan. Islamic
Revolution Center, <http://www.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>,
2. Habilian Association, “Martyr Mohammad Kochouei,” <http://www
.habilian.ir/en/Terror-Victims/martyrdom-anniversary-of-magnanimous
-mohammad-kachouei.html>, retrieved: May 25, 2014.
Notes M 167
4. MfS SED-KL/3867, BStU 000376, October 17, [1979].

5. MfS SED-KL/3867, BStU 000293, January 8, 1980. MfS SED-KL/3867,
BStU 000234, January 10, 1980.
6. BBC, “Arrest of Forqan Leader in Iran,” Tehran home service, January 12,
1980, ME/6317/A/4.
7. Iraj Mesdaqi, “Forqan dar Aeeneh-ye Tarikh,” <http://irajmesdaghi.com
/maghaleh-441.html>, retrieved: December 12, 2013.
(Tehran, 1387), (Tehran, 2009), p. 15; 213.
9. About Goodarzi and Furqan Group, Terror Victims Information Base, 2011.
74>, retrieved: February 21, 2013. Edgar O’balance, Islamic Fundamentalist
Terrorism, 1979–95: The Iranian Connection (New York: New York University
Press, 1997), pp. 131–132.
10. Jay Ross, “Bomb Blasts Kill 6, wound 100 in Tehran Shopping Arcade,” The
Washington Post, July 24, 1980, p. A28. Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada, Iran: Update to IRN4254.E of 16 March 1990 on a Group Called
Forqan (Forgan/Forghan), date: February 1, 1999, <http://www.unhcr.org
/refworld/country,,IRBC,,IRN,,3ae6ac3347,0.html>, retrieved: April 15, 2014.
11. BBC, “The Forqan in Iran,” January 21, 1980, ME/6324/i.
12. BBC, “Execution of Forqan Leaders,” May 26, 1980, ME/6429/A/2.
13. O’balance, pp. 131–132. Earleen F. Tatro, “Anti-Clerical Factions Struggling
against IRP,” The Associated Press, June 29, 1981. Iran: Update to IRN4254.E
of 16 March 1990 on a group called Forqan (Forgan, Forghan). Immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada, Islamic Republic of Iran, 1999, <http://www
.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,IRN,,3ae6ac3347,0.html>, retrieved:
February 21, 2013.
14. Rassul Jafarian, Jaryan-ha va Sazman-ha-ye Mazhabi-Siyasi-ye Iran – 1320–
(Jafarian, Rassul, The Religious-Political Movements of Iran—1940–1977
2011)), p. 776.
15. Ibid.
16. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Embassy of the federal Republic
of Germany), Tehran, Verbalnote, P 37/80, February 6, 1980.
17. BBC, “Execution of Forqan Members,” March 8, 1980, ME/6365/i.
18. MfS HA XXII/18537—BStU-000274, March 4, 1980.
19. Islamic Revolution Document Center, Akbar Goodarzi and the Formation
of the Terrorist Group of Forqan, 1388.02.02 (April 22, 2009), <http://www
.irdc.ir/en/content/6777/print.aspx>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
20. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Update toIRN4254.E of 16
March 1990 on a Group Called Forqan (Forgan/Forghan). February 1, 1999.
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,IRN,,3ae6ac3347,0.html>,
168 M Notes
21. BBC, “The Forqan in Iran,” January 21, 1980, ME/6324/i.

22. IRNA, January 2, 1999. For more information about Hashemi, see
chapter 7—about SATJA.
23. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Update toIRN4254.E of 16
March 1990 on a Group Called Forqan (Forghan/Forghan). February 1, 1999,
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,IRN,,3ae6ac3347,0.html>,
24. Ahmad Jalali Farahani, “A Review of the Prevailing Political Situation in Iran,”
September 15, 2010, <http://www.gozaar.org/english/articles-en/A-Review
-of-the-Prevailing-Political-Situation-in-Iran.html>, retrieved: February 3,
2014.
25. Amir Taheri, “Impeaching Ahmadinejad,” Wall Street Journal, November 30,
2010, p. 13.
26. Islamic Revolution Document Center, Akbar and the Formation of the
Terrorist Group of Forqan, 1388.02.02 (April 22, 2009). <http:// Goodarzi
27. BBC Monitoring International Reports, Iran security “expert” holds “Salafist”
Forqan group responsible for blasts. Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 2005. <http://
w w w.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-137092726/iran-security-expert
-holds.html>, retrieved: February 21, 2013.
28. BBC, “Iran TV says ‘terrorist’ leader killed at Pakistan borders,” April 7,
2012.
7 “SATJA”—Sazman-e Enqelabi-e Todehay-e Jomhory-e

Islami-e Iran—The People’s Revolutionary
Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran
1. Behzad Nasr, “The Galaxy of Ignorance, the Ocean of Foolishness,” Sunday,
7 Tir 1383 (June 27, 2004).
2. Anonymous IRGC officer. Personal Interview. August 9–12, 2012.
3. Retrieved from: <http://sareg3.blogfa.com/post-38.aspx>.
4. Retrieved from: <http://www.edalatkhahi.ir/000503.shtml>.
5. The son of Ayatollah Montazeri. He died in a bomb blast carried out by the
MKO at IRP headquarters in 1981.
6. Retrieved from: <http://www.edalatkhahi.ir/000503.shtml>.
7. The narrator is probably a member of the Tudeh Party. Retrieved from:
<http://www.rahetudeh.com/rahetude/mataleb/nagofteha/html/nagofteha
-19.html>.
8. Retrieved from: <http://www.ammarha.com/archives/28656.htm>.
9. Jalaleddin was the presidential candidate for the IRP in the first presidential
elections in Iran, he was also a politician, writer and former parliament mem-
ber. He was the presidential candidate for the IRP in the first presidential
election in Iran and afterwards revealed to the public that his nationality was
Afghani so he had to resign from the candidacy. He committed murder in
Notes M 169
1992, but the court found that the murder had been unintentional. He was
one of the Gadhafi’s closest friends in Iran.
10. IRP Member, Member of Assembly of Expert (8–11/1979), Member of
Parliament May ’80-August ’81) was killed by the MKO in August 5, 1981.
11. An Iranian philosopher who was killed probably by the Forqan Group in
December 18, 1979.
12. Khamene’i’s Representative in the Iranian Martyrs Foundation.
13. An Ayatollah—One of the fighters against the Shah’s regime and he died on
front line in the war between Iraq and Iran on April 26, 1984.
14. Dr. Ebrahim Esrafilian, Parliamentary representative in the first round of
Iran’s parliament after the revolution.
15. Abu Hanif—A friend of Dr. Chamran and comrade of Mohammad Montazeri
and from the Tawhid and Adalat Front.
16. Iranian Health Minister.
17. Iranian politician and jurist in the Guardian Council of the Constitution,
and the head of the State Organization for the registration of deeds and
properties.
18. Retrieved from: <http://w w w.irajmesdaghi.com/printm-394.html>.
Dr. Chamran was the commander of paramilitary forces in the Iran Iraq
war. He also was the first Defense Minister of post-revolutionary Iran and a
Member of Parliament. For further information see: <http://bazchamran.ir
/post/720>.
19. Retrieved from: <http://ghalam-blog.blogfa.com/post-195.aspx>.
20. Jamal Yazdani, Sodur-i Enqhelab va Rabeteh-ye An ba Jang, (Tehran:
Intesharat-e Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Islami, Tehran: The Center for
Publication of Islamic Revolution Documents): 2–4, <http://sareg3.blogfa
.com/post-38.aspx>, retrieved: January 9, 2013.
21. Retrieved from: <http://tarikhirani.ir/fa/files/4/bodyView/137/>.
22. The people who were in the tent in front of the US Embassy, but their insults
against Beheshti made them very furious.
23. Like many others in this short time between the outbreak of the revolution
and the first elections in January 1980.
24. In Persian Mammad is an abbreviated version of Mohammad.
25. Abadi, Davood, “Khataret-e Jabha” (Memories from the war front), <http://
davodabadi.persianblog.ir/tag/%D9%85%D8%A D%D9%85%D8%A
F_% D 9 % 85 % D 9 % 8 6 % D 8 % A A% D 8 % B 8 % D 8 % B1% D B % 8 C >,
retrieved: October 15, 2014.
26. Anonymous IRGC officer. Personal Interview. August 9–12, 2012.
27. Hetz—7234/12, “PLO-Khomeini Relations,” IDF Spokesman Unit, December
5, 1979.
28. Hetz—7234/12, “Iranian Volunteers to Lebanon,” Israeli Foreign Ministry,
December 6, 1979.
29. Hetz—7234/12, Secret, “Military Relations between Iran and the PLO,”
Israel Foreign Ministry, December 6, 1979.
170 M Notes
30. Hetz—7234/12, “Iranian Volunteers to Lebanon?,” Report of the Israeli

Foreign Ministry, the Political Research Center, December 7, 1979.
31. Hetz—7234/12, “Iranian Warriors in Lebanon,” Letter from Middle East
Director to Asher Goren, December 9, 1979.
32. Hetz—7234/12, “Iranians in Syria”, Israel Foreign Ministry to Israel European
Embassies, December 10, 1979.
33. Hetz—7234/12, “Iranian Volunteers to South Lebanon,” 345/10P.51,
December 29, 1979.
34. Hetz—7234/12, Top Secret, “Arafat-Iran,” Israeli Embassy in London to
Foreign Ministry, December 20, 1979.
35. Hetz—7234/12, “Arafat-Iran-USA,” Israel Foreign Ministry, December 14,
1979.
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Al-Amali, Mohammad bin Jarir bin Yazid bin Kathir bin Ghalab, and Al-Tabari,
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An interview with IRGC’s officer, August 9–12, 2012. His name is confidential as
for security reasons.
Index
Abbasi, Fereydoun, 81 Baader Meinhof, 80, 160n7

Abrahamian, Ervand, 28, 49, 108 Bababik, Alireza Shah, 117
Ahedi, General Noureddin Most, 91 Baha’is, 47
Ahmadi, Mojtaba, 81 Bahman, Javad, 117
Ahmadinejad, Mohammad, 119–20 Bahonar, Ayatollah Mohammd-Javad,
Ahmadi-Roshan, Mostafa, 81 54, 56, 58
Ahmadis, 47 Bahrani, Hashim ibn Sulayman, 7
Akhondism, 41–2, 51, 138 Bani-Sadr, Abul Hassan, 55, 84, 86, 89
Akhundanismi, 82 Bazargan, Mehdi, 44–5, 58, 81–2, 84,
al-Asad, Hafez, 135 87, 108, 110, 123, 126, 128–31
al-Hassan, Hani, 129, 135 Baztab—Iranian newspaper, 99, 120
al-Qaedah, 99 Behesthi, Ayatollah, 26, 43, 54, 56–9,
al-Raqim, 13–14 130–2, 169n22
al-Sadr, Mousa, 55, 127–9, 133, Borujerdi, Ayatollah, 57, 102
155n105 Buback, Siegfried—West Germany’s
al-Tabari, 3–4, 6, 15 Federal Prosecutor, 80
AMAL, 55, 128 Bukhari, Mohammad, 6
Amini, Reza, 98, 118
Aqerlu, Hasan, 30, 117 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 28,
Arafa (Mystics), 73–5 42, 81, 85, 88–94, 101–14, 150n15
Arafat, Yassir, 129, 135 Constitutional Revolution, 47, 64
Ardebili, Ayatollah Abdul Karim Cottam, Richard, 26, 150n16
Musavi, 97, 111
Aron, Raymond, 34 Dashti, Ali, 23
Asadi, Ali, 30, 117 Dastgerdi, Dr. Vahid, 128
Asgari, Abbas Dato, Eduardo, 80
Asghar Jamali Fard, Ali (known as Abu Davari, Mahmood T., 108
Hanif), 128, 131 Der Tagesspiegel—The eastern
Ashura, 125 Germany Newspaper, 118
Askari, Abbas, 30, 66 Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA),
Awlaveyat-e Faqih, 60 82, 87
Ayandegan—Iranian Newspaper, 31, Die Wahrheit—German Newspaper, 94
83, 112 Donner, Fred M., 3–5
184 M Index
Entezam, Abbas Amir, 26, 84, 86, Imam Hossein University, 81

88–9 Imam Jomeh, 80
Eraqi, Ayatollah Haj Mehdi, 80 Imam-e Zaman, 124
Estabdad—Despotism, 50 Iran Hostage Crisis, 110–12
Ettelaa’t—Iranian Newspaper, 62, 92, Iranian Freedom Movement (IFM), 58
94–5, 97 Iran-Iraq War, 98, 112, 130
Evolution (Takamal), 62 IRNA—Iranian News Agency, 98
Islamic Coalition Party, 92
Fadayan-e Khalq, 27–8, 120, 143 Islamic Republic Party (IRP), 56, 131–2
Fadayan-i Islam Organization, 2, 31, Islamic Revolution Documents Center
79, 92, 139–40 (IRDC), 115
Fanon, Frantz, 34 Islamic Revolutionary Council, 83, 85,
Farsi, Jalal-e-din, 124, 128 87, 89, 95
Fatah, 2, 134 Islamiyum, 2
FAZ—Iranian Newspaper, 86
Fimani, Raza Ali, 81 Jafarian, Rasool, 29, 38, 44, 47–8, 62,
Fischer, Din, 25 75, 117
Forqanism, 43, 52 Jahesh (Mutation), 68
Foruhar, Daryush, 98 Jalalayn, Tafsir al-, 8, 17
Jama’ al-Bayan fi Taawil al-Quran, 6
Gasiorowski, Mark, 82 Jannati, Ayatollah, 57
Gold, Bertham H., 26 Jarir, Mohammad Ibn, 13
Goodarzi, Akbar (The Forqan Jollod, Abdul Salam—Qadhafi’s Prime
Leader), 29–31, 37, 39–55, Minister, 127
59–63, 65–71, 73–4, 77, Jumail, Pier, 134
110, 113, 115–17, 136,
138–40 Kachouei, Mohammad, 115
Griffin, George, 21–4 Kahfis (The Cavemen), 11, 17–19,
Guevara, Che, 34 65–6, 138
Gurevich, George, 34 Kamali, Ehsan, 75
Keyhan—Newspaper, 93, 96
Hadavi, Mehdi—Chief Public Khalkhali, Ayatollah, 55
Prosecutor, 84 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 97
Haqqaniya School, 57 Khattab, Umar bin al-, 6
Hashashinis, 79, 119, 143 Khawarej, 52–4
Hashemi, Mehdi, 99, 119, 127–9, 132, Kitab al-burhan fi tafsir al-Quran, 7
133, 136 Kitab al-Maa’rif, 5, 14
Hatami, Ali, 66, 85, 117 Koch, John, 14–16
Hawza, 53–7 Komite 5, 96
Hazrat-e Amir (Imam Ali), 72–3 Kordi, Ali, 30, 38–43, 52–5, 63, 65,
Hojjatiyeh Society, 56–7, 59, 118, 137, 67, 70–1, 82, 84–5, 90, 92–3, 95–7,
143, 156n111 109–10, 113–14
Hosseiniyeh-i Ershad, 35, 38, 40, 45,
59, 140 Lubrani, Uri, 21–4
Index M 185
Madrasat Chehel-Sotoon, 29 Pahlavi Monarchy, 11, 23, 27, 29, 61,

Mahalli, Jalal al-Din Muhammad bin 64, 79, 83, 102
Ahmad al-, 88 PLO (Palestine Liberation
Mahdian, Hossein, 41, 80, 93 Organization), 55, 81, 129, 133–5
Mandhur, Ali Abul Hosseini, 52, PRG—Mehdi Bazargan’s Provisional
155n95 Revolutionary Government, 108
Manzal, Tafsir al-Amathal fi Kitab
Allah al-, 5 Qarani, Mohammad Vali, 41, 73, 80,
Marja’ Taqlid, 57 82–4, 86, 88–9, 112–13
Markaz Asnad Enqelab-e Eslami, 38, 113 Qasemi, Dawood, 74–5
Marxism, 28, 35–6, 45, 60–1, 63, Qotbzadeh, Sadeq, 55, 84, 86,
66–7, 69–70, 72, 108 111, 124
Massignon, Louis, 34
Mawdudi, Mualana, 38 Rafsanjani, Hashemi, 41, 54, 80,
Mesbah-Yazdi, Ayatollah, 57 90–1, 111, 113
Mofatteh, Dr. Ayatollah Mohammad, Rahami, Professor Mohsen, 64
41, 43, 54–5, 58, 70, 80, 96–7, 117, Rajavi, Massoud, 130
128, 141 Razaei, Mohsen, 99
Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK), 27–8, Red Army Faction—RAF, 81
37–8, 45, 57, 61, 67, 69, 80, 94, 118, Revolutionary Guard Corps, 91, 116,
130, 143, 158n174 119, 127, 130
Mojber, Sa’ad—Qadhafi’s ambassador, Rushanfekran—Intelligentsia, 49
129
Mokhtari, Mohammad, 98 Safavi, Navvab, 139–40
Montazeri, Hussein Ali, 42, 55, 106, Sahifeh Sajjadiyeh, 74–5
123–4, 127–9, 130–6, 168n5, 169n15 SAJAJI—Sazman-I Jonbesh-hay-I
Moslem Liberation Front, 28 Azadibakhsh-i Jahan-I Islam—“The
Mossad, 24, 81, 101–9, 111, 113, 143 Organization of Liberation
Mossadeq Crisis, 33, 42, 58, 64, 102, Movements of the Islamic World,”
107, 150n16 80, 126
Motahedi, Mohammad, 30 Salaheddin, Mowlavi, 120
Motahhari, Ayatollah Murteza, 31, 35, SATJA—Sazman-e Enqelabi-e
41–5, 54–6, 58–62, 72, 74, 80, 83–90, Todehay-e Jomhory-e Islami-e
97, 104, 108, 112–13, 119–20, 125, 141 Iran—The Revolutionary
Organization of the Islamic Republic
Nahjol-Balaghe, 53, 69–70, 72–3, 75, of Iran’s People, 89, 99, 123–9,
77, 140 131–3, 135–6, 144
Nizam-i Tawhid, 37 SAVAK, 22, 34–5, 40, 65–6, 83–4,
Nueb-e-Iman, 49 87, 90, 94–5, 101–16, 143,
Nuri, Hassan, 96, 117 155n105
Nuri, Mohammad, 97, 117 Sepah-e Sahabeh (The Army of the
Sahabeh), 64
Omid-i Iran (Hope for Iran), Magazine Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, The, 11–12,
of, 128 14–18, 149n35
186 M Index
Shariati, Ali, 33–50, 59, 61, 65–7, 69, Velayat-e Faqih, 59–60, 103, 137,
76, 85, 108, 125, 136, 139–40 141–2, 145
Shirazi, Ayatollah Rabbani, 54, 80, 97
Shirazi, Sheikh Nasser Makaram al-, 5 Wahy—the inspiration, 75–6
Sick, Gary, 21–3 White Revolution, 102–3
Siyahpoosh, Mohsen, 30, 117
Yazdi, Ibrahim, 26, 55, 57, 84, 86,
Tobacco Boycott, 64 88–9, 117, 124, 129
Tomseth, Victor, 110–11
Tudeh Party, 58, 106, 108, 131, 168n7 Zonis, Prof. Mervin, 25–6, 55–6, 93–4

The Forqan Group of Iran

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The Forqan Group of Iran

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Revolution Under Attack

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Very soon after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of

AMAL al-Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniye (Lebanese

USA United States of America

The Religious Meaning and Interpretations of the Name Forqan

25th sura in the Quran—is composed of 77 verses (ayat), and was

Rubin suggests another possible etymological interpretation that

referring to Quran 3:3, tries to return to the earliest understand-

When, however, we go back in time to the famous and well-known

by revealing the Criterion (Furqan) to him, so that he might distin-

years, including during the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in

The Exit of the Forqan from the Cave—the Evolution

The Jalalayans (fifteenth century) sees verse 22 according to Ibn

representative of and reflected in their agenda. In the following

The Emergence of the Forqan Group

Historical Background—the Coming of the Revolution

is, naturally, to reduce the importance of the American consider-

In a special, private, and restricted report prepared by Prof.

A file from the US Department of State (USD) dated June 14,

The Emergence of the Forqan Group

to these testimonies, they left Goodarzi’s lectures as they thought he

started the Forqan’s formal sessions. He applied a new method of inter-

The Fundamental Ideology of the

The Ideologue Ali Shariati and His Influence on the Forqan

moderate regime that would combine soft-Shia Islam with socialism.

revolutionary thinking and therefore, many academic scholars have

way—Nizam-i Tawhid—the rule of the Unity of God (something

The Forqan and Shariati—From Adoration and

step further than Shariati—and perhaps a little too far—in order

“mistakes” were made by using his ideological approach eclecti-

holders of power.”36 Kordi is sorry for the “tafsir nadorust”—“wrong

Shariati’s ideology was, however, also used to convince other

Kordi discusses the Forqan’s reference to the connection between

younger generation for a better understanding of their part in the

According to Hojjat ulIslam, Ali Davani, an ayatollah who prac-

declared their aspiration to grow into a large organization and, from

The Extent of Shariati’s Philosophical Influence on the Forqan

Machlis opens her discussion on Tawhid with several questions,

In this book—Tawhid and All Its Aspects— Goodarzi argued that

been unmistakably created as the result of a misconception and lack

Imams themselves are only human beings—not any closer to God,

The members of the Forqan, who were strongly influenced by the

The Forqan Versus the Clerics

Kordi, in chapter one of his book on the Forqan Group, deals

who abandoned Ali when he was experiencing great difficulty and

him, the opening up of the possibility of re-interpretation to unau-

1. AMAL—the Shi’i Lebanese militia of Musa al-Sadr who, sup-

proponents of this practicum were Ayatollahs Murtaza Motahhari,

(enjoining the good and forbidding evil) should henceforth be the

The Forqan and Motahhari—the Struggle between

He had, in addition, marked the Forqan as more dangerous than

tazad-ha va residan be takamal bartar va balatar”—“the minimalis-

not explode during the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution. According

The Forqan’s Fragmented Ideology—Eclecticism and Confusion

his overall ideology. He not only took Shariati’s references to Marxism

Forqan Ideology on the Wane

When pushed by his interrogator, however, Goodarzi replied, “I

fully supporting the regime and participating in the elections; and,

Khomeini’s Ideological Position Regarding the Eclecticism

the future. Unfortunately, sometimes we see that some groups and

bar zed-e hokumat-e eslami, khlaf-e zarurat-e eslam ast . . . In hokumat

The Forqan’s Publications