Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155

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Journal of Family Business Strategy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jfbs

Family governance – Literature review and the development of a

conceptual model§
Julia Suess *
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Research Institute for Family Business, Welthandelsplatz 1, A-1020 Vienna, Austria

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: A growing number of articles emphasise the importance of establishing an effective system of family
Received 7 May 2013 governance, and a synthesis of the existing literature on family governance mechanisms (henceforth
Received in revised form 8 February 2014 FGM) seems timely and relevant. Therefore, by focusing on three FGM (family meetings, family councils
Accepted 10 February 2014
and family constitutions), this systematic literature review sheds light on the factors associated with
family governance. Altogether, eight family governance-related factors could be identified, which were
Keywords: then grouped into antecedents, correlates and outcomes and consequently consolidated into a
Family business
conceptual model. The findings reveal substantial heterogeneity in family governance-related topics,
Family governance
Literature review
ambiguity regarding the causality between FGM and related factors, a disregard of theoretical
Conceptual model considerations and an underrepresentation of qualitative research strategies in contemporary family
governance research. The article concludes with an extensive discussion of potential avenues for future
research.
ß 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

1. Introduction governance to a multitude of issues, such as business performance

Family business governance has received an increasing amount
of attention in recent years (Siebels & zu Knyphausen-Aufseß,
2012) and has even been ranked as the primary topic in family
business articles published in this century (Debicki, Matherne,
Kellermanns, & Chrisman, 2009; Yu, Lumpkin, Sorenson, &
Brigham, 2012). In this regard, the governance of the business
family itself plays a particularly important role, as the success of
the family business largely depends on the family, its structures, its
processes and how it copes with disruptions (Olson et al., 2003).
Over ten years ago, Gilding (2000) had already emphasised that
‘‘these processes, institutions and structures [FGM] lie at the heart
of the new family business research’’ (p. 248). Since then, a growing
body of literature has highlighted the relevance of effective family
governance, primarily referring to family meetings, family con-
stitutions or family councils (Mustakallio, Autio, & Zahra, 2002;
Suáre & Santana-Martı́n, 2004). Researchers have linked family
§ Martin, 2001), others evaluate family unity as a precursor for
A previous version of this paper was presented at IFERA 2013 (July 2–5, St.
Gallen).
* Tel.: +43 1 31 336 5417; fax: +43 1 31 336 780.
E-mail addresses: julia.suess@wu.ac.at, julia.suess@gmx.net
(Berent-Braun & Uhlaner, 2012; Fahed-Sreih, 2009; Tower,
Gudmundson, Schierstedt, & Hartmann, 2007), strategic deci-
sion-making (Mustakallio et al., 2002), succession (Blumentritt,
2006; Chittoor & Das, 2007) and family unity (Poza, Hanlon, &
Kishida, 2004). However, despite the growing number of articles
devoted to family governance over the last few years, there is
neither an overview nor a consensus as to why business families
decide to implement FGM, nor how family governance may
improve the functioning of the family and the long-term success of
the business. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to review the
existing literature on FGM by addressing the following research
question: Which factors are associated with family governance? To
provide a clearer picture of this, associated factors are classified as
antecedents, correlates and outcomes and subsequently consoli-
dated into a conceptual model. In the event of ambiguous findings,
the factor is categorised as a correlate rather than an antecedent or
outcome. For instance, while some authors state that family
governance fosters family unity and positively contributes to
conflict resolution (e.g., Brenes, Madrigal, & Requena, 2011;
the establishment of ‘‘effective management practices’’, such as
advisory boards or family meetings (Poza et al., 2004, p. 113). In
this way, any discordance in the literature is accounted for in the

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2014.02.001
1877-8585/ß 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
presentation of the findings and the development of the conceptual
model. From a methodical perspective, this article employs a
systematic, research-oriented literature review following the
procedure recommended by Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart
(2003), which should ensure that extant research is synthesised
in a thorough, rigorous and transparent manner.
This article contributes to the literature on family governance in
at least three ways: (1) To the best of the author’s knowledge this is
the first article that provides an overview of the current state of
research on family governance through an identification and
classification of the factors associated with family governance. (2)
Furthermore, the article at hand develops a conceptual model
designed to structure existing research and provide researchers
with a worthwhile opportunity for further empirical testing of the
propositions deduced. (3) This article ties family governance to the
concept of familiness, as research into the connection between
these two aspects might allow family business researchers to
obtain a deeper understanding of how certain structural pre-
conditions can shape the family’s influence on the business or how
certain types of familiness might support the creation of FGM.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2
presents further background information on family governance
and provides a preliminary definition. Then, the detailed
methodical procedure is outlined in Section 3, followed by a
presentation of the findings and development of the propositions
in Section 4. A conceptual model is introduced in Section 5 to
illustrate the propositions elaborated previously. Finally, Section
6 reviews the main findings and their implications; it provides
suggestions for future research and discloses the limitations of the
article.
2. Family governance: classification, relevance and types
2.1. Classification of governance mechanisms by system
Family governance forms part of a larger system – the family
business governance system – which Gallo and Kenyon-Rouvinez
(2005) describe as ‘‘a system of processes and structures put in
place at the highest level of the business, family and ownership to
make the best possible decisions regarding the direction of the
business and assurance of accountability and control’’ (p. 45). Fig. 1
(see below) provides an overview of governance mechanisms
within the business, family and ownership system and how these
mechanisms might be connected to one another.
Governance mechanisms within the family system fulfil a
particularly important function, as they order and ease the
business family’s relations with the business in general (Berent-
Braun & Uhlaner, 2012; Suáre & Santana-Martı́n, 2004) and
management in particular (Mustakallio et al., 2002). They canalise
and enhance social interaction (Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hamp-
ton, & Lansberg, 1997; Mustakallio et al., 2002) and hence also
strengthen the relationships between members of the business
family (Suáre & Santana-Martı́n, 2004). The fundamental purpose
of family governance is to make the rewards and demands of
family participation in the business clear, to communicate
opportunities for family involvement in the business, to ease
the flow of information to create trust and minimise manipulation
by family members and, above all, to foster a sense of belonging to
the business among the extended family (Gersick & Feliu, 2014).
Based on these reflections, the following preliminary definition of
family governance is introduced: Family governance consists of
voluntary mechanisms established by the business family with the
primary aim of governing and strengthening relations between the
family and the business, as well as the relationships between the
members of the business family itself. This definition emphasises
the voluntary character of FGM. Unlike many mechanisms in the
139
business domain, family governance is not legally obligatory and
enjoys freedom of scope (Koeberle-Schmid, Witt, & Fahrion, 2012).
Thus, there is no ‘‘one size fits all’’ rule for family governance, and
successful business families often create a very unique set of FGM
that broadly depends on family values, the type of business and its
stage of development (Jaffe & Lane, 2004). One of the most
frequently used FGM is the family council – it assumes a central
governance role that extends far beyond the purpose of governing
the family: It engages non-active family members in business
issues, can provide the necessary impetus for the establishment of
a family constitution (Gersick et al., 1997), chair family meetings,
create a nexus among the board of directors, the top management
and the family (Suáre & Santana-Martı́n, 2004), decide on dividend
payments to shareholders (Jaffe, 2005) and provide a vehicle for
family office management (Elstrodt, 2003). In a similar vein, family
meetings, which are typically chaired by the family CEO or the
family council (Neubauer & Lank, 1998), might help to manage the
relationships between the family and the board of directors
(Aronoff & Ward, 2002). Moreover, a family constitution addresses
questions of elementary governance (Suáre & Santana-Martı́n,
2004) and differentiates the roles/relationships of the family
(council), board of directors, CEO and top management. Highly
active families may also create family committees (a type of task
force), such as a family nominating committee, which serves to
appoint candidates for the position of the CEO and to the board of
directors (Neubauer & Lank, 1998).
The most important mechanisms within the business system
are the board of directors and the CEO, together with management.
The board of directors is generally appointed by the owners at the
annual shareholder meeting (Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2005) and
has two primary functions: the exercise of control and the
provision of advice for the CEO and management (Bammens,
Voordeckers, & Van Gils, 2011). Management is responsible for
business performance and must report to the board of directors
(Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2005). The CEO and management
generally lead the annual shareholder meeting at which the entire
group of shareholders is informed about the business’ financial
position and the board of directors is selected (Gersick et al., 1997).
Prosperous business families can also create a family office that
manages wealth, provides professional advice for management
and the shareholder’s meeting (Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2005),
as well as a family foundation that collaborates with the family
office (Amit, Liechtenstein, Prats, Millay, & Pendleton, 2008) to
decide on the donation of family wealth for social purposes
(Ylvisaker, 1990). Although the family office and the family
foundation are situated within the ownership dimension in figure
one, they may equally be classified as FGM, as is the case in some of
the literature reviewed. As depicted in Fig. 1 below, the
connections between the individual governance mechanisms are
numerous and complex and might even be much more intricate.
2.2. Types of family governance
FGM range from rather informal family meetings to heavily
structured, professional bodies such as family offices (Jaffe & Lane,
2004; Ward, 2004), family foundations and family committees
designed for special purposes. Scientific evidence on family offices,
family foundations and family committees is, however, very
scarce. Furthermore, family offices primarily pursue wealth-
management objectives rather than non-financial family gover-
nance ambitions (Amit et al., 2008), and family foundations have
different connotations than family meetings, councils and
constitutions. While family meetings, councils and constitutions
are primarily intended to strengthen the family’s relationship with
the business, family foundations are rather social institutions that
serve a higher, public purpose and set their sights on the fulfilment
140 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
Business
Board of
directors
CEO and
Management
Shareholder‘s
meeng
Family
foundaon
Ownership
Fig. 1. Classification of governance mechanisms by system.
Source: Adapted from Gallo and Kenyon-Rouvinez (2005) and Gersick et al. (1997).
of social needs (Gersick, 2004; Ylvisaker, 1990). Therefore, this
literature review primarily focuses on the following three FGM:
 Family meeting1: This is a recurring assembly of family members
to discuss business and/or family issues (Habbershon &
Astrachan, 1997; Neubauer & Lank, 1998) and constitutes the
simplest and most common form of FGM (Neubauer & Lank,
1998; Martin, 2001). Both family meetings and family councils
can vary considerably in terms of their membership policies,
formality, meeting frequency and the topics covered.
 Family council2: This is a select group of family members – often
including multiple branches and/or generations (Berent-Braun &
Uhlaner, 2012) – who meet on a regular basis to discuss matters
concerning the family’s involvement in the business. Its basic
purpose is the provision of a structured forum that enables the
family to express its needs, expectations and values regarding
the business to develop policies that protect the family’s long-
term interests (Gersick et al., 1997) and the business.
 Family constitution3: This is a normative agreement including
fundamental principles and guidelines according to which the
family organises its relationship with the business (Berent-Braun
& Uhlaner, 2012). It addresses fundamental questions of
governance (e.g., the sale/purchase of shares or hiring/firing
family members) and expresses ‘‘what the family stands for, its
expectations and its fundamental values’’ (Neubauer & Lank,
1
This is also referred to as a ‘‘family assembly’’, ‘‘family forum’’ (Suáre & Santana-
Martı́n, 2004) or ‘‘family reunion’’.
2
This is also referred to as a ‘‘family supervisory board’’, ‘‘inner council’’, ‘‘family
executive committee’’ (Neubauer & Lank, 1998), ‘‘advisory board’’ or ‘‘advisory
council’’.
3
This is also referred to as a ‘‘family code of conduct’’ (Berent-Braun & Uhlaner,
2012), ‘‘family statement’’ (Neubauer & Lank, 1998) or ‘‘family protocol’’ (Suáre &
Santana-Martı́n, 2004).
Family
Family
meeng
Family
council
Family
commiees
Family
constuon
Family office
1998, p. 89). It is usually drafted with the collaboration of a rather
large group of family members and, it should, amongst other
things, reduce the potential for conflict within the business
family (Berent-Braun & Uhlaner, 2012).
2.3. Relevance of family governance
In contrast to publicly held businesses, the sustainability of a
family business depends not only on the success of the business
but also on the functionality of the family (Stafford, Duncan, Danes,
& Winter, 1999). The family can either be a competitive advantage
for the business or an obstacle, e.g., in the event of dysfunctional
conflicts, up to the point of causing the destruction of the business
(Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). Thus, the success of a business is
largely influenced by the way the family organises itself and its
relationship with the business (Olson et al., 2003). Thus, the
business family also needs to be governed – not only because all
human systems might benefit from having structures and
leadership but also because business families need to fulfil tasks
as families, and how effectively and efficiently they cope with
these tasks has direct consequences for the family business, its
financial performance and hence also for family wealth preserva-
tion (Gersick & Feliu, 2014). Therefore, equal consideration and
effort should be devoted to family and business governance
(Lansberg, 1999). However, the importance attached to family
governance might largely depend on the stage in which business
ownership actually resides. While the family’s emotional cohesion,
its relationship with the business and its identification with the
founder’s values might be strong during the founder’s controlling
stage and the sibling partnership stage, these issues might be
subject to attenuation in the cousin consortium and subsequent
stages (Gersick et al., 1997; Labaki, 2011). As the number of family
 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
shareholders grows (including many non-active shareholders),
they are likely to lose their emotional cohesion and interest in the
business, and an increasing number of family shareholders might
be willing to sell their shares, leading to a loss of family control in
the long run. Measures that extenuate the sale of shares (e.g., a
family holding that purchases family shares available for sale or
financial incentives for family members) might not suffice to
maintain family ownership, as they might fail to strengthen the
family members’ relationships with the business. Regular family
meetings or a family council, by contrast, could enhance family
communication, the family’s emotional attachment and its
identification with the business (Labaki, 2011). Moreover, family
businesses are a fertile soil for conflict (Harvey & Evans, 1994).
Examples of potentially destructive family conflicts are multifari-
ous, including isolated, upset family members suing the business,
the family trust or the family (Martin, 2001); the dictatorial
management styles of a single family member leading to
resentment and animosity among other family members (Gersick
et al., 1997); and anger concerning the appointment or promotion
of certain family members within the business (Martin, 2001).
Family governance could mitigate or even avoid such issues. Its
basic aim is to create a tight relationship between the family and
the business and ensure a functioning business-owning family –
one that acts in unison to safeguard the long-term existence and
well-being of the business and does not put the business at risk
through destructive conflicts. A well-functioning family gover-
nance system should strengthen interpersonal relationships
among family members (Pieper & Astrachan, 2008), enable open
communication between family members (Gallo & Kenyon-
Rouvinez, 2005), provide them with a feeling of inclusion and
appreciation, and implement mechanisms for conflict prevention/
resolution (Martin, 2001). With regard to the latter, the family
might specify conflict regulations in the context of a family
constitution. Effective family governance might also assist the
family in coordinating family interests and sustaining the family as
a social entity, e.g., by conducting regular family meetings. In terms
of the business, it can help the family to agree on fundamental
business goals and to speak with one voice, e.g., through
regulations on responsibility assignment within the family
constitution.
In summary, the active use of family governance can have
ample positive implications – not only for the business (in terms of
fostering business sustainability in the long run) but also for the
family (in terms of enhancing family functionality). Yet, despite its
substantial relevance to family businesses and the growing body of
literature over the last few years, an overview and synthesis of
family governance-related antecedents, correlates and effects is
still lacking. The definitions applied for individual FGM are rather
ambiguous, and there is a lack of conceptual clarity that hinders a
cumulative progression in knowledge surrounding family gover-
nance, meaning that there is a definite need to reflect on the
current state of research and avenues for future research.
3. Methods
This review follows the basic procedure for systematic reviews
recommended by Tranfield et al. (2003), which consists of three
main stages: (1) planning the review, (2) conducting the review
and (3) reporting and dissemination. As described in the following,
these stages are divided into three, five and two separate steps,
respectively.
Having stated the need for a review in the introduction (step 0),
a review proposal (step 1), including a preliminary definition of
family governance, the elaboration of the research question and a
brief overview of the field (all stated above), was developed.
Although the formation of a panel of experts that decides, for
141
instance, on criteria for the inclusion/exclusion of publications
would constitute the ideal solution (Tranfield et al., 2003), this was
not feasible; instead external expertise was derived through
comparing selection criteria used in other current, high-quality
literature reviews (Basco, 2013; Jones, Coviello, & Tang, 2011;
Kontinen & Ojala, 2010). Furthermore, in the interests of
objectivity, a review protocol providing information on the search
strategy, the selection criteria for relevant studies and the selected
sample was established (step 2; described in detail further below).
This literature review is restricted to peer-reviewed, English-
language, scholarly journal articles. Conference papers, working
papers and book chapters were not included due to the greater
variability in the peer-review process and their partly limited
availability (Jones et al., 2011). Journal articles, by contrast, are
considered to provide a validated source of knowledge (Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, Bachrach, & Podsakoff, 2005). Instead of limiting the
search approach to journals with a particular impact factor, all
published, accessible journal publications that matched the
selection criteria were considered for review. This approach is
consistent with other literature reviews conducted in family
business research (e.g., Basco, 2013; Kontinen & Ojala, 2010;
Mazzi, 2011). First, a broad article search was performed using two
scientific databases (ABI/Inform Global and EBSCO Business Source
Premier). Following Kontinen and Ojala (2010) and Mazzi (2011),
an additional search was conducted in the Family Business Review
and Journal of Family Business Strategy because these are the most
recognised journals in family business research. To find relevant
articles, the following keywords were drawn from the literature
and then applied as search terms: ‘‘corporate governance’’ and
(‘‘family business*’’ or ‘‘family firm*’’ or ‘‘family compan*’’);
‘‘family business governance’’; ‘‘family governance’’; ‘‘family
management’’; ‘‘family strategy’’; ‘‘family dynasty’’; ‘‘family
institution’’; ‘‘family constitution’’; ‘‘family protocol’’; ‘‘family
code of conduct’’; ‘‘family statement’’; ‘‘family council’’; ‘‘inner
council’’; ‘‘advisory council’’ and (‘‘family business*’’ or ‘‘family
firm*’’ or ‘‘family compan*’’); ‘‘advisory board’’ and (‘‘family
business*’’ or ‘‘family firm*’’ or ‘‘family compan*’’); ‘‘supervisory
board’’ and (‘‘family business*’’ or ‘‘family firm*’’ or ‘‘family
compan*’’); ‘‘family executive committee’’; ‘‘family meeting’’;
‘‘family assembly’’; ‘‘family reunion’’; and ‘‘family forum’’.
Altogether, the search results comprised a sample of 760
articles (step 3), which were subsequently submitted to the
following selection process (steps 4 and 5): Articles were excluded
if (a) the analysis of the abstract revealed that the article did not
even partly address family governance as defined above, or if the
construct under study was labelled as such but actually covered a
different subject. In the event of any ambiguity, the entire article
was scanned before taking the final decision to include or exclude
it; (b) they did not even partly contribute to answering the
research question; or (c) they were not accessible electronically or
through other reasonable means. The screening process resulted in
a preliminary database of 13 articles (marked with an asterisk in
the Appendix). According to Randolph (2009), electronic databases
might only reveal approximately 10% of the articles an exhaustive
literature review is based on, whereas screening reference lists can
be particularly fruitful and ultimately represent up to 90% of the
total results. For the review at hand, 6 further articles could be
identified through reference list scanning, this accounts for 32% of
the final database used in the analysis (N = 19 articles).
The data analysis commenced with the preparation of a data
extraction form (step 6; Appendix). By providing information on
the author, year, journal, focus of research question, FGM analysed,
methodical approach, theory and family-governance-related
results, this form serves as a basis for the data synthesis (step
7) and presentation of findings (i.e., reporting and dissemination)
in the following section.
142 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155

Table 1
Article distribution sorted by year and journal.

Journal Family International Journal of Journal of Journal of Journal of Management Small Business Total
Business Journal of Business Family Small Business Small research news Economics
Review Entrepreneurial Research Business Strategy Management Business
Behaviour & Strategy
Research

1994 1 1
1995 0
1996 0
1997 1 1
1998 0
1999 0
2000 1 1
2001 1 1
2002 2 2
2003 0
2004 2 1 3
2005 1 1
2006 2 2
2007 2 1 3
2008 0
2009 1 1
2010 0
2011 1 1 2
2012 1 1

Total 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 19

4. Findings Business Review; the remaining 7 journals offer one relevant

The final database for analysis comprises 19 articles published
in 9 different journals in the period from 1994 to 2012, with most
articles (68%) emerging from 2004 onwards. As shown in Table 1,
the journal with the largest output (12 articles) is the Family
article each.
The majority of the articles reviewed followed a quantitative
approach (68%), only 5 articles (26%) adopted a qualitative
approach and 1 was a rather conceptual article/commentary
(Martin, 2001). Altogether, 15 differently labelled FGM were found

Table 2
Frequency of FGM in the literature.

FGM Authors Appearance in FGM consolidated Appearance in

the literature the literature
reviewed reviewed
(ordered by type) (ordered by
frequency)

Family council Berent-Braun and Uhlaner (2012), Blumentritt et al. (2007), Brenes 12 Family council 15
et al. (2011), Chittoor and Das (2007), Craig and Moores (2002),
Fahed-Sreih and Djoundourian (2006), Gilding (2000), Jaffe and
Lane (2004), Martin (2001), Mustakallio et al. (2002), Peterson and
Distelberg (2011), and Suáre and Santana-Martı́n (2004)
Advisory board Blumentritt (2006), Feltham et al. (2005), and Poza et al. (2004) 3

Family meeting Astrachan and Kolenko (1994), Gilding (2000), Habbershon and 7 Family meeting 13
Astrachan (1997), Martin (2001), Poza et al. (2004), Suáre and
Santana-Martı́n (2004), and Tower et al. (2007)
Formal family meeting Fahed-Sreih and Djoundourian (2006), Mustakallio et al. (2002), 3
and Peterson and Distelberg (2011)
Informal family meeting Mustakallio et al. (2002) 1
Family assembly Gilding (2000) 1
Family reunion Berent-Braun and Uhlaner (2012) 1

Family protocol Brenes et al. (2011) and Suáre and Santana-Martı́n (2004) 2 Family constitution 6
Family code of conduct Berent-Braun and Uhlaner (2012) and Gilding (2000) 2
Family constitution Berent-Braun and Uhlaner (2012) 1
Family plan Mustakallio et al. (2002) 1

Family office Jaffe and Lane (2004) and Martin (2001) 2 Family office 2

Family retreat Gilding (2000) 1 Family retreat 1

Clear selection and Berent-Braun and Uhlaner (2012) 1 Clear selection and 1
accountability criteria accountability criteria

Formal family Berent-Braun and Uhlaner (2012) 1 Formal family 1

communication system communication system

Total 39 Total 39
 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
Table 3
Theories applied in family governance research.
Basic assumptions
Social capital theory (SCT)
Social capital can be described as a valuable asset or resource embedded in
social relations and networks, focusing either on the individual level of
actors or on the macro level of organisations (Leana & van Buren, 1999).
This means that social capital within family businesses can be divided into
two categories, (a) ‘‘familial social capital’’, which emerges from
relationships and communication among family members and is primarily
valuable for the maintenance and functioning of the business, and (b)
‘‘organisational social capital’’, which results from interactions and
relations among family businesses and external stakeholders, serving to
obtain resources from other organisations (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very,
2007). Trust is the basis on which social capital is built (Bubolz, 2001).
Advantages ascribed to social capital are, e.g., increased access to
resources, improved group communication or efficient collective action
(Leana & van Buren, 1999)
Principal-agent theory (PAT)
It describes a conflicting relationship between two parties to a contract – the
principal and the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). The
principal (owner) delegates tasks to the agent (manager; Eisenhardt,
1989). Both parties strive to maximise their self-interest (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973), act opportunistically, pursue conflicting goals
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and dispose of asymmetric information (Lubatkin,
2007). Expenses resulting from goal alignment and reducing information
asymmetries are subsumed as agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
When applying PAT to family businesses, two types of agency problems
can be identified: Type I agency problems describe problems arising
between owners and managers (Carney, 2005; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004),
while type II problems focus on conflicts between minority and majority
shareholders, proposing altruism and entrenchment as driving forces
(Chrisman et al., 2005)
Stewardship theory (ST)
ST adopts a complementary perspective assuming that agents (‘‘stewards’’)
identify with the business and act in an altruistic, pro-organisational and
cooperative way to guarantee the benefit of the complete organisation,
which they ascribe higher utility than following self-serving behaviour
(Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991;
Hernandez, 2008). ST applies a long-term perspective (Hernandez, 2008),
and in a ST setting, empowerment and autonomy may increase the
steward’s motivation, while control measures may have the reverse effect
(Davis et al., 1997). Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) presume that
stewardship attitudes prevail within family businesses, as executives are
often family members, share a strong commitment towards the corporate
mission, appreciate stakeholders and are highly motivated to foster the
family’s and business’ welfare
in the literature (see Table 2). However, on closer inspection of the
definitions of these FGM, it becomes evident that the authors of the
publications reviewed primarily analysed the same FGM, but
merely label them differently. As depicted in Table 2, the FGM
observed in the literature can be reduced to 7 types (see Table 2);
the 3 most prevalent FGM are the family council (15 times), the
family meeting (13) and the family constitution (6). A further four
FGM were much less prevalent: the family office (2 times), the
family retreat (1), clear selection and accountability criteria (1) and
the formal family communication system (1). Thus, the analysis
primarily focuses on family councils, family meetings and family
constitutions.
Moreover, it was recognised that the vast majority of articles
(68%) did not make any explicit reference to theory. Among those
that applied theory, only three articles explicitly connected their
theoretical reflections to family governance. The theories referred
to most often were social capital theory (2), principle-agent theory
(1) and stewardship theory (1). Table 3 depicts the basic
assumptions of these theories and how they can be connected
to family governance.
The subsequent section presents the detailed findings of the
review (step 8) and introduces a conceptual model that
143
Connection to family governance
FGM can potentially foster the creation of organisational social capital and
‘‘associability’’ (Berent-Braun & Uhlaner, 2012), which assumes the willingness of
actors to place collective actions and goals before their individual ones (Leana & van
Buren, 1999). Mustakallio et al. (2002) argue that FGM foster social interaction
among the business family (i.e., family social capital) that otherwise tends to
decline with increasing family size. Increased social interaction, in turn, can lead to
a shared vision among the business family
Ultimately researchers either regard FGM as a ‘‘precursor of the collective goal
orientation or associability within the business-owning group’’ (Berent-Braun &
Uhlaner, 2012, p. 107) or as a form of social capital (Mustakallio et al., 2002)
PAT primarily focuses on large organisations with dispersed ownership (Lubatkin,
2007). As FGM are primarily applied by mature family businesses (Fahed-Sreih &
Djoundourian, 2006; Suáre & Santana-Martı́n, 2004) frequently facing a higher
complexity regarding the shareholder structure, PAT might be particularly suitable.
These circumstances can lead to higher type I and II agency costs, which can be
potentially mitigated by FGM: The owners can form a family council that takes
strategic business decisions as a collective and regularly communicates with non-
active owners on important business matters. By determining certain rules and
answering delicate questions (e.g., family employment in the business), a family
constitution can help to avoid the problem of intergenerational altruism
(Woywode, Keese, & Tänzle, 2012). With regards to non-family managers, agency
theory emphasises the need to provide a clear direction through the principal. As
mentioned further below, a non-family manager’s chances of success might be
higher if the family speaks with one voice and provides clarity through a family
council (Blumentritt et al., 2007)
Effective family governance enables and fosters stewardship behaviour among
family members, strengthens cohesion, their mutual relationship and their
relationship with the business. Furthermore, it promotes values and facilitates
open communication between family members (Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2005).
FGM, such as family councils or family meetings, bring the business family together
to discuss business- and family-related topics and make important decisions.
Making collective decisions and providing (non-active) family members with a
feeling of inclusion might foster their commitment and identification with the
business and lead to pro-organisational stewardship behaviour. Furthermore, FGM
can help to establish an emotional connection between a non-family manager and
the family, as they enable the manager to understand the family’s preferences,
needs and wants, which can facilitate the formation of commitment and trust
between both parties (Blumentritt et al., 2007)
summarises the elaborated propositions.4 To account for causality,
the factors associated with FGM were grouped into (1) ante-
cedents, (2) correlates and (3) outcomes – each of which will be
elaborated on in a separate subchapter. As shown in Table 4, a total
of eight family-governance-related factors could be identified,
seven deduced from the literature and one derived theoretically
(Proposition 8) and classified as type of post hoc proposition (group
4). In conjunction with the findings and to build a bridge between
research and practice, the author also introduces some conclusions
for practitioners in the discussion section (step 9).
4.1. Antecedents
4.1.1. Business and family complexity
The creation of family councils, constitutions and meetings is
frequently associated with a certain level of business and family
4
The propositions introduced in the following section were either empirically
derived from the articles analysed in the literature review or through theoretical
assumptions made by the author (in the case of Proposition 8). Despite that nearly
all of the propositions stem from empirical insights and corresponding formula-
tions may seem assertive, the propositions are of a preliminary character and
should be subject to further analysis in future research.
144 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
Table 4
Antecedents, correlates and outcomes of family governance.
Antecedents Correlates
– Business and family complexity – Economic business performance
– Open communication, trust, social
interaction and goal alignment
– Family unity and conflict
– Business professionalisation
– Familiness
complexity. First, older family businesses are more inclined to
create FGM than younger ones, a fact that has been stated by
several researchers: Fahed-Sreih and Djoundourian (2006) con-
cluded that mature family business (over 30 years old) are more
likely to take decisions on a participatory basis using advisory
boards and hold more frequent, formal family meetings, whereas
younger family businesses follow more centralised decision-
making practices with decision-making power usually residing
in the CEO. Suáre and Santana-Martı́n (2004) confirm and expand
on these insights. They concluded that FGM, regardless of their
degree of formality, are principally applied by multigenerational
family businesses. As a possible explanation, the authors empha-
sise the stronger dependence of family businesses in the founding
stage on the entire family. By contrast, more mature family
businesses, which frequently involve multiple generations, might
rely to a greater extent on FGM, as a higher number of family
members no longer actively participate in the business (Brenes
et al., 2011) and there is a greater need for information and
coordination. Another reason for the prevalence of FGM in mature
family businesses could be that family members perceive less
common agreement on central business goals (Habbershon &
Astrachan, 1997), as the larger the number of generations in charge
and the larger the family size, the lower the level of social
interaction between family members – a problem that can be
overcome through FGM (Mustakallio et al., 2002). Thus, family
governance might be a fruitful approach to managing increased
business and family complexity emerging due to aspects such as an
increased business age, family size (i.e., a larger number of family
shareholders and non-active family members) or the number of
family generations in charge. However, although the use of FGM
can be observed more frequently in highly complex family
businesses/business families, this should not prevent less complex
entities from using them. As initially stated, the ‘‘one size fits all’’
principle does not apply to family governance. Less complex
business families may also perceive the need to govern themselves
to integrate non-active family members into business concerns
and ensure the continuity of the business – for this purpose, less
formal FGM such as occasional family meetings can be worthwhile
and useful (Suáre & Santana-Martı́n, 2004). With increasing family
and business complexity, business families, however, tend to opt
for the use of more formal FGM such as a family constitution or a
family council.
Therefore, the following proposition is suggested:
Proposition 1. A high level of business and family complexity
increases the likelihood that FGM are developed, and if they are
developed, their degree of formality is likely to correspond to business
and family complexity.
4.2. Correlates
4.2.1. Economic business performance
Mediated by the owning family’s orientation to either preserve/
harvest or increase family wealth, FGM are positively associated
with superior economic business performance (Berent-Braun &
Outcomes
– Succession planning process and succession success
– Work environment and commitment from
non-family managers
Uhlaner, 2012). The authors of this review article measured FGM
on a very broad basis, including ‘‘family constitution, family code of
conduct, clear selection and accountability criteria, family council,
family reunions, [and] formal family communication mechanisms’’
(p. 113). Using ‘‘clear selection and accountability criteria’’ (p. 113)
Berent-Braun and Uhlaner (2012) assume the existence of clear
standards regarding the assignment of leadership roles to family
members. They explain their findings in the light of group
dynamics and organisational social capital theory: Whenever
family members develop a unified team, working together to
achieve a common goal, this is very likely to result in a higher level
of economic performance. Comparably, Fahed-Sreih (2009) also
found a correlation among family governance, business perfor-
mance and business survival. However, this study has certain
limitations, as it does not provide any information on the precise
measurement of family governance and uses causality as a proxy
for correlation, despite that causality was actually not measured in
the survey. In line with these two studies, Astrachan and Kolenko
(1994) indicated that regular family meetings together with other
governance mechanisms (business plans and board meetings on a
regular basis) were positively related to the longevity of the
business and, to a lesser extent, business success. Nevertheless,
they did not analyse family meetings as a single variable in their
own right.
Tower et al. (2007), by contrast, did not detect any significant
performance differences (measured in the generation currently
controlling the business and business revenues) between family
businesses with and without regular family meetings. Compared to
Berent-Braun and Uhlaner (2012) or Astrachan and Kolenko
(1994), the divergence in Tower and colleagues’ (2007) findings
may result from the range of observed governance mechanisms.
While the aforementioned authors accounted for a broader range
of governance mechanisms, Tower et al. (2007) only focused on
family meetings. The implementation of a sophisticated (family)
governance system might indicate a higher degree of professio-
nalisation within the family business, which could consequently be
reflected in improved economic performance. Although Tower
et al. (2007) did not find any general performance differences
between the ‘‘meeting’’ and the ‘‘no meeting’’ groups, they did
observe some performance differences based on who participated
in family meetings. Family businesses with the most inclusive
meeting membership (including in-laws and children) achieved
higher performance outcomes than those that imposed stronger
restrictions on membership.
Altogether, these findings indicate that there is a positive
correlation between family governance and economic business
performance. However, while the studies mentioned in this
context reveal a correlation between FGM and economic business
performance, they do not provide any information on causality.
There are plausible reasons why both FGM and economic business
performance could be considered the outcome. On the one hand,
the use of FGM might have a direct or indirect positive impact on
financial performance; e.g., either because the family aligns its
goals and collaborates more effectively or because the implemen-
tation of FGM is accompanied by other governance mechanisms,
 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
such as a board of directors or strategic planning, that indicate a
higher degree of professionalisation within the business. On the
other hand, superior economic business performance could raise
certain issues such as dividend payout policy, distribution of shares
among family members or the appointment of family members
within the business. These issues might require the family to
conduct regular family meetings to agree on a common solution
and formally document it in a family constitution.
Thus to summarise these reflections, the following two
propositions are suggested:
Proposition 2A. FGM are positively associated with economic busi-
ness performance.
Proposition 2B. This relationship is mediated by the business-owning
family’s orientation to either preserve/harvest or increase wealth.
4.2.2. Open communication, trust, social interaction and goal
alignment
FGM are not only associated with economic value; they are also
connected to a number of non-economic issues such as open
communication between family members. Drawing on social
capital theory, Mustakallio et al. (2002) have shown that the use of
a larger variety of FGM (i.e., informal and formal family meetings,
family councils, and family plans) positively influences the level of
social interaction among the owning family, as these mechanisms
create opportunities to discuss issues and represent the family
members’ interests and needs. A high level of social interaction in
turn boosts a strong shared vision regarding the future of the
business (e.g., desired business fields, growth rates and perfor-
mance) and thus helps to align the goals of the business family. In a
similar vein, Habbershon and Astrachan (1997) developed and
tested an iterative model to demonstrate how family meetings lead
to specific system outcomes: Family meetings as collective
encounters produce collective cognitions, entailing collective
actions that result in specific system outcomes. These findings
might provoke a further evaluation of results and a reassessment of
agreements. These findings are largely congruent with the work of
Mustakallio et al. (2002), as they demonstrate how family
meetings, as a means of communication between family members,
unify perceptions and align goals.
Although its very small sample size means that it has certain
shortcomings, Brenes et al. (2011) generally confirm the conclu-
sions of the aforementioned studies. According to their results, the
implementation of a family council improves communication, as it
is a means to socialise with other family members and address
family issues. Furthermore, the use of a family protocol leads to
more frequent family meetings – resulting in a higher level of
interaction between family members – and clarifies the family’s
role within the business.
Quite similarly, Peterson and Distelberg (2011) provided recent
evidence indicating that unity in values (within the family,
between family and business, between family and employees
and between family and customers) augments the elaboration and
sustainment of formal processes and structures (the board of
directors, family council, formal valuation and strategic plan), as
well as the number of family council meetings. To a lesser extent,
this assumption also holds true for value orientation. The
elaboration and sustainment of formal processes in turn positively
affects business growth. Following Peterson and Distelberg (2011),
family businesses with a family-first focus are more likely to
develop and maintain a family council than family businesses with
a business-first focus. To add some qualitative evidence to these
quantitative studies, Gilding (2000) revealed that the common aim
of FGM lies in facilitating open communication, consequently
creating trust and aligning goals. Similarly, Jaffe and Lane (2004)
145
view the family council as a method to mediate the family
members’ complex and diverging preferences and aggregate them
into a ‘‘collective will’’, communicable to the board of directors.
Martin (2001), by contrast, regards open communication and
trust not as an outcome but more as a basic requirement for the
creation of FGM. Accordingly, an effective family governance
system cannot exist in an environment of distrust and ignorance.
Key financial information, for instance, should not be concealed
from family members, as there is no reason that they should have
less access to financial data than shareholders in a public business.
Moreover, he emphasises the need to subordinate the individual
family member or branch’s needs to overall family needs to ensure
a healthy family business, e.g., the appointment of under-qualified
family members should be avoided.
As five out of the seven abovementioned articles support the
notion that the implementation of FGM results in outcomes, such
as open communication, trust, increased social interaction and
goal alignment, it could be assumed that FGM act as antecedents
in this context. However, as Martin (2001) noted, open
communication and trust could also create the preconditions
for the development of FGM, in which case FGM would be an
outcome rather than an antecedent. To exemplify this using the
example of a family constitution, family members need to trust
one another to a certain degree, communicate openly and
develop similar ideas to be able to create a functioning family
constitution. The implementation process demands enormous
efforts and intensive dialogue among the participating family
members. Therefore, implementing a family constitution is also
likely to increase social interaction and open communication
among family members; it might foster trust and can strengthen
their shared vision. Thus, the relationship between FGM and open
communication, trust, social interaction and goal alignment has a
bidirectional character.
To summarise these reflections, the following proposition is
suggested:
Proposition 3. FGM are positively associated with open communica-
tion, trust, social interaction and goal alignment among the business
family.
4.2.3. Family unity and conflict
Another major purpose of family governance is to create
processes to manage family conflict, as a family business can only
survive for generations if it is able to outlive inevitable family
conflicts (Martin, 2001). To illustrate this assumption, Martin
(2001) provides the following examples: family members should
be treated with respect and not be excluded from family meetings
or other FGM, as this could lead to anger and isolation among
family members and may even provoke legal actions against the
family or the business. The available liquidity and dividend policy
constitute another major issue in family businesses. To avoid
conflicts in this regard, family shareholders should be clearly
informed about the amount of cash they can receive from the
business and when. The same holds true for the appointment or
promotion of family members within the business. To mitigate
anger and jealousy among family members, there need to be clear
values and preferably written standards in favour of competency,
qualification and merit. These standards should also be communi-
cated in family (council) meetings.
Brenes et al. (2011) provide further quantitative evidence
regarding these assumptions: Strongly interlinked with improved
communication, a family council positively contributes to conflict
resolution, and a family protocol provides transparency on
business management and clarity on the ‘‘rules of the game’’ (p.
284). Likewise, the elaboration of a family protocol frequently
146 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
accompanies the establishment of conflict-solving mechanisms
and thus may lead to a higher level of family unity.
Inversely, Poza et al. (2004) found family unity to positively
correlate with ‘‘effective management practices’’ (i.e., family
meetings, advisory boards, performance feedback, planning
activity and succession planning; p. 113). They determined that
family unity, together with a positive interaction between the
family and the business and the perception that a business
opportunity is a precursor, rather than an outcome, of effective
governance and management practices. They embed their results
in principal-agent theory and the resource-based view. Accord-
ingly, the family-business interaction represents a prerequisite
for the formation of governance and management practices,
which are crucial for the reduction of agency costs and may
therefore help to create a competitive advantage and achieve
sustainable business performance. However, caution is advised
in the interpretation of these results, as FGM were not analysed as
a single variable but jointly with other governance and
management practices.
The relationship between FGM and family unity and family
conflict mitigation/resolution could be bidirectional: a high level of
family unity can (together with other factors) act as a precursor for
the elaboration of FGM, as suggested by Poza et al. (2004).
Furthermore, family conflicts may result in the implementation of
FGM, as there will be a need to solve these conflicts. Conversely,
FGM can also lead to increased family unity and conflict
mitigation/resolution, as proposed by Martin (2001) and Brenes
et al. (2011).
To summarise these findings, the author suggests the following
proposition:
Proposition 4. FGM are positively associated with family unity,
conflict mitigation and conflict resolution among family members.
4.2.4. Business professionalisation
In a similar vein, family governance might also be associated
with increased planning activities, as analysed by Tower et al.
(2007). They found significant differences in general planning
activities (i.e., the estate plan, business mission, family mission
and succession plan) between family businesses holding regular
family meetings and those that do not, with the former relying
more heavily on planning measures than the latter. As an
analogous step towards business professionalisation, Martin
(2001) emphasises that an effective family governance system
would require ‘‘demonstrated competence in assigning responsi-
bilities’’ (p. 93). To this end, he proposed that the family should
have written standards to define the qualifications and experience
family members must have to occupy specific posts, to ensure an
effective governance process. Furthermore, family members
should be educated in their sense of responsibility to understand
aspects such as current business performance and address any
challenges the business has to face. As previously mentioned, FGM
positively influence social interaction among family members,
which leads to a more well shared vision. This in turn results in
increased decision quality and a stronger commitment to
decisions (Mustakallio et al., 2002). Accordingly, family gover-
nance indirectly affects decision quality and commitment.
Although Mustakallio et al. (2002) did not investigate whether
there is a direct relationship between FGM and decision quality
and decision commitment, one seems plausible, as the active use
of FGM might ensure that decisions are taken on a common basis
by including a broader circle of family members (or at least more
than one family member); thus by increasing the pool of potential
alternatives for consideration, objectivity would be enhanced,
leading to increased decision quality and consequently to a
stronger commitment to decisions.
Counter-intuitive evidence was provided by Feltham, Fel-
tham, and Barnett (2005), who researched factors associated
with depending on a single decision-maker within a family
business. Surprisingly, the existence of an advisory board or
board of directors did not have any explanatory power in
reducing this dependence. However, the existence of an advisory
board with at least one external member was significantly
related to a higher number of key managers in the business,
which also indicates some degree of progress towards business
professionalisation.
As a common denominator among these four pieces of research,
they all examined indicators of business professionalisation, i.e.,
planning, written standards for family employment in the
business, increased decision quality and a higher number of key
managers. Although, there is no direct evidence regarding causality
in the relationship between family governance and business
professionalisation, there are plausible reasons to assume a
bidirectional relationship. On the one hand, the creation of FGM
could lead the family to initiate a process that should ensure a
healthy, sustainable business. The necessary measures can, for
example, include increased planning, a higher number of external
managers and written standards for family employment in the
business. By taking such measures, the family initiates a process of
professionalisation. On the other hand, if, for instance, the family
decides to hire key managers and advisers in the business, these
managers and advisors could – based on their experience with
other family businesses – advise the family to establish a family
council so as not to discuss clearly family-related topics in business
meetings. Thus, a certain degree of professionalisation within the
family (in the form of FGM) could also be an outcome of business
professionalisation. Improved organisation and higher professio-
nalisation among the family might in turn lead to ‘‘better’’
decisions through goal alignment among family members.
Therefore, the following proposition is suggested:
Proposition 5. FGM are positively associated with business profes-
sionalisation.
4.3. Outcomes
4.3.1. Succession planning process and succession success
Another important issue family businesses have to face is
succession and succession planning. Family governance plays a
crucial role in this regard. To enable the sustainability of the family
business from generation to generation, FGM should create some
form of succession planning (Martin, 2001). As such, the family
council could devise a succession plan, select the most qualified
successor(-s) and ensure adequate preparation for the take-over of
the business. Martin (2001) notes that such a practice might be
particularly difficult if a governing family patriarch/matriarch
refuses to slacken the reins.
Blumentritt (2006) confirms a strong relationship between the
existence of an advisory board and strategic, as well as succession
planning, but he did not find the same relationship with a board of
directors. A potential reason is the distinct role of the advisory
board, as it focuses more on resource provision than on business
governance. Furthermore, boards of directors might differ between
family and non-family businesses. Blumentritt (2006) provides
two possible explanations for these findings: ‘‘Either family
business managers and owners turn into experts when they feel
the need to plan or, once an advisory board is created, it will
prompt a family business to engage in more planning’’ (p. 71).
Drawing on qualitative data, Chittoor and Das (2007) also found
that family councils ease succession by providing the subsequent
generation with space to grow and representing the family’s values
and interests in the management without any interference in daily
 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
business. For this reason, a family council might also be a vital
adjunct for business professionalisation (Chittoor & Das, 2007). In a
quite similar case study conducted by Craig and Moores (2002), the
establishment of a family council had the primary aim of
addressing and hence facilitating ownership succession through
the implementation of a succession plan, which was developed in
conjunction with external consultants.
Despite that succession planning and succession success are
disproportionately linked to the family council (expressed in
Propositions 6B and 6C, respectively), analogous assumptions can
be made for other FGM (Propositions 6 and 6A, respectively). A
family constitution, for instance, which has been developed
through intensive dialogues and with input from a broad group
of family members, can fulfil the same purpose as a succession plan
elaborated and launched by the family council.
Thus5:
Proposition 6. FGM contribute to initiating the succession planning
process.
Proposition 6A. FGM contribute to the success of succession.
Proposition 6B. Family councils are particularly likely to contribute
to initiating the succession planning process.
Proposition 6C. Family councils are particularly likely to contribute
to the success of succession.
4.3.2. Work environment and commitment from non-family
managers
Thus far, this review has concentrated on the benefits of family
governance for family members. Notwithstanding these benefits,
family governance might also be beneficial for non-family
members. Family councils can be vital for the creation of a
favourable work environment for non-family CEOs. They improve
their chances of success, as a council mitigates the potential for
conflicts, aligns different beliefs and aggregates the incoherent
preferences of individual family members into a set of communi-
cable objectives. In so doing, family members have the space to
articulate their convictions and feelings concerning the business,
without entangling a non-family CEO in purely family-related
issues (Blumentritt, Keyt, & Astrachan, 2007).
A family protocol might fulfil a similar role. Brenes et al. (2011)
found that implementing a family protocol provokes a change in
attitudes among the board of directors, resulting in an increased
level of commitment. By way of comparison, Chittoor and Das
(2007) also concluded that the existence of a family council can
prevent any disruptive interference in daily business issues by
individual family members, as it forms a bridge between the
management and the family by unifying and representing the
family’s values and interests in a common body.
Thus:
Proposition 7. FGM increase commitment from non-family man-
agers through the creation of a favourable work environment.
4.4. Post hoc reflections on family governance and familiness
As FGM (1) are strongly connected to numerous governance
mechanisms within the business and ownership dimension (see
Fig. 1), (2) are linked to a large variety of business-, as well as
family-specific factors (see Fig. 2) and (3) create order within the
family and thus enable the family to exert its influence on the
5
The following four propositions refer to the fact that succession is a current
issue and succession planning is often neglected.
147
business much more effectively, it stands to reason that family
governance might be strongly related to familiness.6 The term
‘‘familiness’’ was first introduced by Habbershon and Williams
(1999). They defined it as ‘‘the unique bundle of resources a
particular firm has because of the systems interaction between the
family, its individual members, and the business’’ (p. 11). Since
then, familiness has emerged as a key concept in family business
research (Frank, Lueger, Nosé, & Suchy, 2010). Yet, while numerous
researchers have attempted to further develop the concept of
familiness (for a detailed review, see Frank et al., 2010), its
antecedents and effects remain rather obscure (Sharma, 2008).
Recent evidence (Zellweger, Eddleston, & Kellermanns, 2010)
defines familiness in terms of three dimensions, namely compo-
nents of involvement, essence and identity:
Components of involvement: This dimension describes a family
business by focusing on the family’s influence through governance,
management, ownership and/or succession (Chua, Chrisman, &
Sharma, 1999), which is deemed the minimum threshold for
defining a business as a family business (Pearson, Carr, & Shaw,
2008). There might be a strong relationship between the
components of involvement dimension and FGM, as the latter
can help the family to provide clarity on governance, management
and ownership issues. In the context of a family (council) meeting,
for instance, family members might jointly establish clear rules
and regulations regarding the purchase/sale of shares, dividend
policy, investment and disinvestment strategy, required qualifica-
tions and experience for family managers wishing to occupy a
managerial position within the business, remuneration and bonus
payments for family members and consequently document them
in the family constitution. Regarding succession, the anterior
generation might form a family council that selects the appropriate
candidate, creates a succession plan and provides the successor
with training and advice. To summarise, FGM can clearly shape
governance, management, ownership and succession practices.
From this, it follows that FGM have the potential to exert a strong
influence on the components of involvement dimension of
familiness.
Essence: The essence approach goes one step further than the
components of involvement approach. It additionally demands a
certain distinct behaviour to classify a business as a family
business (Pearson et al., 2008). According to Chrisman, Chua, and
Sharma (2005), this behaviour implies (a) the family’s intention to
retain control over the business (Litz, 1995), (b) the family’s
influence on strategic decision-making in the business (Davis &
Tagiuri, 1989), (c) a certain family-business-like behaviour (Chua
et al., 1999), (d) unique capabilities and resources that arise from
the family’s involvement in the business (Habbershon, Williams, &
MacMillan, 2003) and (e) non-financial goals within the family
business that fulfil the family’s emotional needs (i.e., ‘‘socio-
emotional wealth’’; Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Gomez-
Mejia, Takacs Haynes, Nuñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes,
2007). FGM, which provide clear structures, rules and values for
the family, may constitute particular means to manage and steer
the family’s behaviour. They help to align the business family’s
preferences and goals and thereby provide a clear direction for its
members (Pieper & Astrachan, 2008). The business family might,
e.g., jointly develop a shared vision regarding the future of the
business that approves of certain modes of behaviour while
prohibiting others. Based on this vision, the family can define
common short-, as well as long-term goals for the business and
6
In contrast to the remaining propositions, the author theoretically derived
Proposition 8 in an attempt to provide some initial reflections on the connection
between family governance and familiness. An in-depth operationalisation would
go beyond the scope of the article and should therefore be addressed in future
research.
148 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155

ANTECEDENTS CORRELATES

OPEN FAMILY UNITY AND

BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC COMMUNICATION,
CONFLICT
FAMILY BUSINESS TRUST, INCREASED
MITIGATION/
COMPLEXITY PERFORMANCE SOCIAL INTERACTION,
GOAL ALIGNMENT RESOLUTION

P2A

Family’s focus on
P1 preserving/harve- P3 P4
sng or increasing
family wealth

P2B

FGM

FAMILY
COUNCILS

P5 P6 P6A P6B P6C P7 P8

SUCCESSION INCREASED
BUSINESS
PLANNING PROCESS COMMITMENT
PROFESSIONAL- FAMILINESS
AND SUCCESSION FROM NON-FAMILY
IZATION
SUCCESS MANAGERS

CORRELATES OUTCOMES THEORETICALLY

DERIVED
CORRELATE

P proposion
empirically derived proposion (through literature review)
theorecally derived proposion

Fig. 2. Conceptual model.

record them in the family constitution. To be able to achieve these
goals, the family might consequently develop a step-by-step
implementation plan, and whenever discrepancies occur, a family
(council) meeting can be called to define counteraction. Thus, FGM
can strongly determine and align the business family’s behaviour
and thus might be closely linked to the essence dimension of
familiness.
Identity: Zellweger et al. (2010) introduced family business
identity as a third dimension of familiness, as it ‘‘captures the
family’s perception of the business – ‘Are we a family firm?’ – and
directly recognises those families who are likely to create
familiness’’ (p. 57). The uniqueness and non-replicability of the
family’s identity even helps the family business to develop a
competitive advantage over its non-family counterparts (Sundar-
amurthy & Kreiner, 2008). Indeed, the active use of FGM (particularly
the establishment of a family constitution) has much to do with
identity, vision and values (Gersick et al., 1997). If family members
regularly exchange their points of view and openly communicate on
business issues (e.g., in regular family meetings), they are more
likely to create and maintain a sense of shared vision (Mustakallio
et al., 2002; Sorenson, Goodpaster, Hedberg, & Yu, 2009) and a strong
identification with the business (Pieper & Astrachan, 2008). Sharing
a common vision and a sense of belonging to the business might in
turn result in the creation of an organisational identity as a family
business and thus enhance the familiness of the business.
The relationship between FGM and familiness could be
bidirectional. FGM either constitute particular means to manage,
or even increase, the familiness of a business by providing clarity
on ownership and management issues, shaping a certain behaviour
and consequently a certain family business identity. Conversely, a
certain type of familiness (e.g., one focusing on family-first
aspirations) could also favour the establishment of FGM.
 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
Therefore, the following proposition is suggested:
Proposition 8. FGM are positively associated with familiness.
5. Conceptual model
The following model provides an overview of the propositions
elaborated in the previous section. As initially stated, the findings
on the antecedents, correlates and outcomes of family governance
were partially ambiguous and mixed. In cases in which the related
constructs could be considered to act as either an antecedent or an
outcome (or possibly even both), a single, bi-directional arrow was
drawn to emphasise the binary nature of this focal construct.
The first part of the model presents the antecedents related to
family governance, followed by correlates and, finally, outcomes.
As depicted in the model, the majority of the propositions express a
correlation, whereas only two and three propositions refer to
antecedents and outcomes, respectively. To begin with the
antecedents, Proposition 1 emphasises that a high level of business
and family complexity favours the development of FGM, as these
might be a fruitful approach to managing increased business and
family complexity emerging from, e.g., firm age, family size and the
number of family generations in charge. Furthermore, the degree of
formality of FGM implemented by business families might depend
on the level of family and business complexity, which means that
less complex business families are more likely to opt for less formal
FGM.
Regarding the correlates, six propositions have been conceived:
Proposition 2A predicts a positive relationship between FGM and
economic business performance, which may result from the fact
that FGM help the family to develop a unified team that
collaborates to achieve a common goal. This relationship is
mediated by the business-owning family’s focus on either
preserving/harvesting or increasing family wealth (P2B).
Proposition 3 predicts correlation among open communication,
trust, increased social interaction and goal alignment among the
business family on the one hand and family governance on the
other. FGM can require a certain level of openness, interaction,
trust and shared goals to be effective, but they are also measures
that foster communication, socialising with other family members
and the development of shared ideas. In a similar vein, family
governance is linked to family unity, conflict mitigation and
resolution among family members (P4), as well as to business
professionalisation (P5), i.e., planning, written standards for family
employment in the business, increased decision quality and a
larger number of key managers. Furthermore, in line with the fact
that family governance is associated with a wide range of family-
and business-related factors, it is likely that FGM are also positively
related to familiness (P8). Family governance helps to create order
within the family, thereby allowing the family to exert influence on
the business much more effectively; this proposition has been
theoretically derived and requires further operationalisation, as
well as future empirical testing.
In terms of outcomes, family governance can activate a
succession planning process and contribute to the success of
succession (in the event that succession planning is lacking and
succession is a current issue; P6 and P6A). In this context, family
councils are particularly likely to contribute to succession planning
and success (P6B and P6C), as they help successors to develop the
necessary competences and represent the family’s values and
interests. Moreover, family governance can help to increase the
commitment of non-family managers (P7).
Whereas economic business performance, business professio-
nalisation, a favourable work environment for non-family man-
agers and their enhanced commitment constitute factors that
149
largely relate to the business sphere, open communication, trust,
increased social interaction and goal alignment among the
business family are situated in the family sphere. Business and
family complexity, familiness and succession, however, are factors
that refer equally to both spheres. This demonstrates that family
governance is connected to a wide range of family- and business-
related issues that can be considered rather beneficial in both
regards (e.g., conflict mitigation within the family and business
professionalisation, to name only two).
6. Discussion and conclusion
This article has attempted to identify the antecedents,
correlates and outcomes of family governance by analysing the
existing literature and consequently summarising them in a
conceptual model. To the author’s knowledge, this article is the
first to consolidate the existing literature on family governance by
identifying and classifying the factors associated with family
governance. Furthermore, it is the first article to theoretically link
family governance to the concept of familiness and therefore
provides a valuable contribution to family business research.
The body of literature devoted to family governance has grown
in recent years. However, this literature review has revealed a
seeming lack of consensus concerning the character of family-
governance-related factors (i.e., their role as either antecedents or
outcomes), substantial heterogeneity in family governance-related
topics, a rather low number of references made to theory (only 16%
of the articles reviewed explicitly connected family governance to
theory) and an underrepresentation of qualitative research
strategies (only observed in 26% of the articles reviewed). To
overcome these shortcomings, future research must test the model
presented in this article and elaborate on the direction of the
corresponding relationships between FGM and related factors. In
doing so, longitudinal studies such as case studies, panel studies or
even experiments to examine the changes after the implementa-
tion of FGM seem to be a fruitful approach. However, a focus on
theory-building and qualitative research strategies, to deepen our
current understanding of family governance and allow a cumula-
tive advance in knowledge, seems even more essential. The
question of how appropriate the theories used in family gover-
nance research thus far are (i.e., social capital theory, principal-
agent theory and stewardship theory) should be addressed, as they
might be overly narrow and limited in their explanatory power.
Applying more holistic theories such as new systems theory
(Luhmann, 1995; Von Schlippe & Frank, 2013) to family gover-
nance research might be a fruitful approach, as FGM primarily
constitute measures to balance potentially diverging expectations
between the business and the family system, and new systems
theory is capable of explaining both systems (Simon, 2012). It
could, for instance, uncover how the business and the family are
structurally coupled and the extent to which the family formalises
its relationship with the business. The use of case studies might be
especially suitable, as they not only provide an opportunity for
further theory-building but also for the clarification of causality in
the context of the antecedents and outcomes of FGM. For this
purpose, research could expand on the following question: Why do
business-owning families decide to implement a comprehensive
system of family governance and which family- and business-
specific dynamics and effects does the establishment of such a
system create?
Referring to the conceptual model, it might be of particular
interest to further explore the relationship between familiness and
family governance. As such, FGM can either be specific means to
manage or even augment the familiness of a business, or a certain
type of familiness could also favour the establishment of FGM.
Thus, the effectiveness of the business-owning family as a social
150 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
system in conjunction with the structurally coupled business
system may increase. The article at hand lays the foundation for
future research into the interplay between both constructs;
however, further operationalisation is deemed necessary. In this
regard, future research could, for instance, address the following
question: How are the individual dimensions of familiness (i.e., the
components of involvement, essence and identity) influenced by
the different types of FGM?
Apart from familiness, the conceptual model also proposes that
a high level of family and business complexity acts as an
antecedent for the creation of FGM. While it is evident that older
family businesses are more inclined to create FGM than younger
ones (Fahed-Sreih & Djoundourian, 2006; Suáre & Santana-Martı́n,
2004) and family size and the generation in charge are negatively
associated with social interaction among family members, which
can be overcome by FGM (Mustakallio et al., 2002), it remains
rather unclear what the specific threshold for the creation of
individual FGM is. To shed further light on this issue, future
research could focus on the following question: What is the
threshold, e.g., in terms of family size, the number of generations
working in the business, the number of shareholders, business age
and size, at which business families are inclined to establish
various FGM?
Furthermore, as depicted in the conceptual model, the existing
literature on family governance primarily emphasises the
favourable connotations of family governance such as conflict
mitigation (Brenes et al., 2011; Martin, 2001), eased succession
(Chittoor & Das, 2007; Craig & Moores, 2002) or the creation of a
favourable work environment for non-family managers (Blumen-
tritt et al., 2007; Brenes et al., 2011; Chittoor & Das, 2007).
Nevertheless, the literature reviewed only addresses the fact that
FGM can also have negative effects to a limited extent, e.g., if the
former generation creates a family council and turns it into a
‘‘surveillance council’’ (Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2005) to
control the subsequent generation and maintain their influence
on the business, which could result in substantial family conflicts.
In a similar vein, the establishment of a family constitution can
lead to the emergence of family conflicts whenever, for instance,
not all the members of the business family are included in the
establishment process and agreements are made by certain active
members of the board of directors without the common
agreement of the remaining family members (Labaki, 2011). To
further elaborate on this consideration, a comparative case study
between a family business that has successfully established
certain FGM and another family business that has failed to do so
could be a possible avenue of research.
Another central concept in family business research – and a
potential extension of the model – concerns socioemotional wealth
(SEW), which some argue is the most relevant differentiator of
family businesses, as it could help to explain why these entities
behave differently from their counterparts. However, research on
SEW remains in its infancy, and further research needs to be
conducted to obtain a better understanding of this construct.
Therefore, a potential question for future research would be: How
do FGM influence the formation and preservation of SEW?
(Berrone et al., 2012).
Regarding practical implications, the development of a
functioning family governance system is essential for business
families, as the success of a family business depends largely on the
family itself (Olson et al., 2003). The type of FGM that the family
ultimately selects should, however, match the complexity of the
family, business and ownership dimensions. Informal, occasional
family meetings can be appropriate during the evolutionary stage
(start-up, young business family and controlling owner) to
integrate non-active family members in business issues and plan
for future ownership and participation in the business (Aronoff &
Ward, 2002; Suáre & Santana-Martı́n, 2004). Once succession
approaches, it might be sensible to create a family council, as it can
facilitate succession and improve succession performance. How-
ever, the creation of a family council can be especially helpful in the
collaboration and succession stages, respectively in the sibling
partnership and cousin consortium stage, whereupon the council’s
structure and composition typically evolves over time (Gersick
et al., 1997). Once the business family has reached a size that is no
longer manageable in family meetings, a family council becomes a
worthwhile (Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Suáre & Santana-Martı́n,
2004) and useful addition to family meetings. There is no scientific
evidence indicating the appropriate time to draft a family
constitution, but it can be assumed that its elaboration becomes
increasingly meaningful as the business, the family and the
ownership dimension become increasingly complex. A family
office and a family foundation are usually created by large families
that have passed the transition and accumulated substantial
wealth (Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez, 2005). It remains to say that the
business family should never completely disregard family gover-
nance issues, as dysfunctional conflicts between family members
(Davis & Harveston, 2001; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007) or
uncoordinated interventions in the business by different family
members (Jaffe & Lane, 2004) constitute potential threats to the
business and the family.
This review of the literature is not without limitations: First, it
principally focused on family meetings, family councils and
family constitutions, as these constitute the most frequently
examined mechanisms in family governance research. However,
when including a broader range of literature (e.g., books and
dissertations) and addressing a different research question, it
might also be interesting to research other FGM such as family
foundations and family offices. Second, it was noted that the
family governance literature is dominated by Western countries.
However, given the importance and development of Asian
economies, this gap should be reduced in future studies. Third,
the author acknowledges the small sample of publications
obtained (N = 19), which resulted from the exclusive consider-
ation of English-language, scholarly journal articles. Due to the
limited evidence, the propositions drawn and the model devel-
oped might be limited in their scope.
Finally, family governance constitutes a topic of substantial
practical relevance that still merits much more attention in family
business research, as if the family is able to successfully govern
itself, this also has far-reaching consequences for the business. This
article has opened up numerous future directions in family
governance research. The avenues for future research are still
broad, and many research gaps persist that both family business
researchers and researchers from other disciplines such as
sociology, psychology or law could fill through a further
exploration of this promising field of research.
 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155 151

Appendix A. Data extraction form

Author(s) and Journal Focus of research question FGM analysed Methodical Theory Family governance-related
year approach results

1 Astrachan & Family Business The impact of human
Kolenko, 1994 Review resource management and
professional governance
practices on family
business success and
survival
 Family meeting Quantitative No explicit Significant positive correlation
approach reference to among frequently held family
theory meetings, strategic planning, the
existence of a board of directors
and the longevity of a family
businesses throughout multiple
generations; however, family
meetings were not studied as a
single variable in their own right

2 Berent-Braun & Small Business Impact of family  Family Quantitative Organisational FGM are positively related to
Uhlaner, 2012* Economics governance on financial constitution approach social capital financial business performance,
business performance  Family code of mediated by the owning family’s
conduct focus on either preserving/
 Clear selection harvesting or growing family
and accountability wealth
criteria
 Family council
 Family reunion
 Formal family
communication
systems

3 Blumentritt, Family Business Relationship between  Advisory board Quantitative No explicit Strong relationship between the
2006* Review boards (boards of directors approach reference to existence of an advisory board
and advisory boards) and theory and strategic and succession
planning in family planning in the family business
businesses

4 Blumentritt Family Business Factors that influence the  Family council Qualitative Principle-agent Family councils to create a
et al., 2007 Review success of non-family approach theory and supportive, favourable work
CEOs stewardship environment for non-family
theory CEOs, to improve his/her
chances of success, family
councils to mitigate the
potential for conflicts, align
different beliefs and aggregate
fuzzy individual preferences of
family members into a set of
communicable objectives; they
provide family members with a
space to articulate their
convictions and feelings
concerning the business without
directly involving the non-
family CEO in family issues

5 Brenes Journal of Impact of business and  Family council Quantitative No explicit Greater relevance of family
et al., 2011* Business family governance  Family protocol approach reference to governance for larger business
research structures on family theory families (a larger number of
business performance family members that do not
actively participate in the
business; implementing a family
council leads to conflict solving,
improved family
communication and the
development of family/business
agreements; a family protocol
works towards greater family
unity, improved transparency,
increased commitment from the
board of directors, more
frequent meetings and a clearer
understanding of the family’s
role

6 Chittoor & Family Business Differences in succession
Das, 2007 Review performance with
succession to a family
member compared to a
professional, non-family
manager
 Family council Qualitative No explicit The existence of a family council
approach reference to can ease succession, as it allows
theory the subsequent generation space
to grow; and as it represents the
family’s values and interests in
the management without any
interference in daily business;
the family council is a vital
adjunct for professionalisation
152 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155

Appendix A (Continued )

Author(s) and Journal Focus of research question FGM analysed Methodical Theory Family governance-related
year approach results

7 Craig & Moores, Family Business Professionalisation in the
2002* Review family business,
exemplified using the case
of Australia’s Dennis
Family Corp
 Family council Qualitative No explicit Family council to address
approach reference to ownership succession, the
theory establishment of a succession
plan (guided through external
consultants); the main
discussion topics in family
council meetings are: succession
planning, investment strategy,
dividend policy, philanthropy,
recording and archival storage of
the family history and the
integration of advisors into the
board of directors

8 Fahed-Sreih, Management Relationship between
2009* Research News different governance
configurations and firm
survival, empirical testing
of the four-dimensional
family business model
introduced by Klein (2000)
 Family dimension Quantitative No explicit Positive correlation between
as a whole, but approach reference to family governance and
detailed theory performance/survival of the
measurement not family business
further specified

9 Fahed-Sreih & Family Business Determinants of longevity  Family councils Quantitative No explicit Mature family businesses (over
Djoundourian, Review and success in Lebanese  Formal family approach reference to 30 years old) are more likely to
2006* family businesses meetings theory take decisions on a participatory
basis using advisory boards and
holding more formal family
meetings

10 Feltham Journal of Small The degree of dependence  Advisory board Quantitative No explicit Research on factors associated
et al., 2005* Business of a family business on a approach reference to with dependence on a single
Management single decision maker and theory decision-maker within a family
associated factors business; the existence of an
advisory board or board of
directors did not have any
explanatory power in this
context; the existence of an
advisory board was significantly
related to a larger number of key
managers

11 Gilding, 2000* Family Business Qualitative reflections on
Review family business and family
change, individual
autonomy,
democratisation and new
family business
institutions
 Family retreats Qualitative No explicit The elaboration of family
 Family meetings approach reference to institutions primarily aims at
 Family assemblies theory easing open communication and
 Family codes of negotiation, creating trust,
conduct aligning goals, keeping the next
 Family councils generation connected to the
business, and preventing the
implosion of the family business

12 Habbershon & Family Business Impact of family meetings  Family meetings Development of No explicit Iterative model to demonstrate
Astrachan, 1997 Review on the family business an iterative reference to how family meetings lead to
model and theory (rather specific system outcomes:
initial theory-building) Family meetings as collective
quantitative encounters produce collective
testing cognitions entailing collective
actions that result in specific
system outcomes that might in
turn provoke a reassessment of
agreement

13 Jaffe & Lane, Family Business How to sustain a family
2004* Review dynasty: Governance
structures of complex
multigenerational
business- and investment-
owning families
 Family council Qualitative No explicit The two main challenges a
 Family office approach reference to family dynasty has to face are:
theory (a) the development of wealth-
producing assets and (b) the
elaboration of agreements and
structures to integrate the
family owners’ and
beneficiaries’ voices into the
business. The article presents
and characterises two types of
family dynasties
 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155 153

Appendix A (Continued )

Author(s) and Journal Focus of research question FGM analysed Methodical Theory Family governance-related
year approach results

14 Martin, 2001* Family Business Practices, guidelines and Implicit reference Conceptual No explicit Six-stage process to create a
Review values that effective to: article/ reference to lasting governance plan for
family governance should  Family meetings commentary theory family businesses (p. 91):
follow  Family council 1. Culture and structure of open
 Family office family communication
2. Valuing overall family over
individual family branch needs
3. Importance of demonstrated
competence in assigning
responsibilities
4. Effective generational
succession plan for survival of
family and its wealth
5. Creation of family conflict
management processes
6. Creation and maintenance of
an effective family governance
plan

15 Mustakallio Family Business Effects of relational and  Informal family Quantitative Principle-agent Negative impact of increasing
et al., 2002* Review contractual governance on meetings approach theory for family size and generations on
strategic decision making  Formal family contractual the level of social interaction
meetings governance among family members; a
 Family councils (board of greater variety of FGM fosters
 Family plans directors) and social interaction between
social capital family members; this in turn
theory for enhances their sense of shared
relational vision, which improves decision
governance quality and decision
(family commitment
governance)

16 Peterson & Journal of Differentiating value  Family council Quantitative General systems Value orientation and unity in
Distelberg, 2011* Family Business orientation from unity in  Formal family approach theory, human values indirectly affect business
Strategy values and their impact on meetings ecology theory growth through the elaboration
business growth through (but not and sustainment of formal
formalisation and ethical explicitly processes and structures (board
values connected with of directors, family council,
FGM) formal valuation, strategic plan).
Family businesses with a family-
first focus are more likely to
develop and maintain a family
council than family businesses
with a business-first focus. The
results also indicate a covariance
between ethical values and
formalisation

17 Poza et al., Family Business Interaction between  Family meeting Quantitative Principle-agent Family unity correlates with
2004* Review families and their  Advisory board approach theory, resource ‘‘effective management
businesses and the impact based view, practices’’ (i.e., family meetings,
of this interaction on the systems theory advisory boards, performance
management and (but not feedback, planning activity and
governance practices explicitly succession planning). Family
employed connected with unity, perceived business
FGM) opportunity and a positive
interaction between the family
and the business influence
governance and management
practices and thus constitutes a
source for the creation of a
competitive advantage and
sustainable business
performance

18 Suáre & International Exploration of governance  Family council Quantitative Principal-agent Informal and formal family
Santana-Martı́n, Journal of systems in Spanish family  Family meetings approach theory, governance mechanisms
2004 Entrepreneurial businesses and the extent  Family protocol stewardship (informal family meetings,
Behaviour & to which they follow the theory (but not family council) are more
Research recommendations of the explicitly frequently adopted by multi-
best practices code from connected with generation businesses
both the business and the FGM)
family perspective
154 J. Suess / Journal of Family Business Strategy 5 (2014) 138–155
Appendix A (Continued )
Author(s) and Journal Focus of research question FGM analysed
year
19 Tower et al., 2007 Journal of Small Relationship among  Family meetings
Business family meetings, planning
Strategy processes and economic
performance measures
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