64 / World View of India’s Strategic Elite

nate its region, but other than producing rhetorical flourishes, it does
not—perhaps because it realistically cannot—extend its military or eco-
nomic power very far. India’s hawks recognize this. Second, India’s tradi-
tion combines idealist and realist elements. Even the hawks accept that
India first achieved international stature through the leadership of
Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, and not that of the militant
Subhas Chandra Bose or the Hindu Mahasabha. India was respected in
the West, and in much of the non-Western world, as a state that took a
principled stand against the use of force and in favor of negotiation and
compromise as a way of settling international disputes. For the hawks,
however, the moment has come for a renewed emphasis on the use of
force: force not only provides status but also contributes to economic
development because of the respect and deference that gravitates to a
strong country. For the doves and moderates, economic development and
social change come first, with an emphasis on India’s liberal traditions.
The Indian strategic community is an elite divided against itself and
within itself. These divisions do not fall along neat regional, cultural,
economic, or professional lines. Even the military is sensitive to the
demands of development, and the leading advocates of nuclear weapons
do not wear uniforms.
The present diversity in strategic perspectives will be exacerbated by
two trends: the introduction of new military technologies into the Sub-
continent (especially nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles), and the dif-
ficulty of maneuvering in a world of many kinds of states without an
overarching global ordering principle. Some officials may be tempted to
abandon India’s traditional aversion to alliances and learn to cope in a
unipolar world, as many countries are doing. Others, such as the current
BJP-dominated coalition, will attempt to please everyone by forming a
“natural alliance” with some countries (such as the United States), and
“strategic partnerships” with others (such as Russia) while trying to
remain engaged with China. Whatever the case, India will have to over-
haul its creaky decisionmaking system and encourage the circulation of
ideas in the corridors of power, and it will have to adjust its policies
along many dimensions in the face of continued disagreement over pri-
orities and emphasis. Underlying all the disagreement, however, is the
belief that India will, and should, become increasingly engaged in the
world. Even BJP foreign policy intellectuals subscribe to Nehru’s claim
that India is one of the great states of the world, not just the legitimate
and acknowledged hegemon of South Asia, and they may be more will-