Umali v. JBC, G.R. No.

228628, 25 July 2017

FACTS: Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, impugns the
present-day practice of six-month rotational representation of Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it
unfairly deprives both Houses of Congress of their full participation in the said body. The aforementioned practice
was adopted by the JBC in light of the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.

As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the practice of having two representatives from both houses of
Congress with one vote each in the JBC, thus, increasing its membership from seven to eight, was challenged. With
that, the Court examined the constitutional provision that states the composition of the JBC, that is, Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
Following a painstaking analysis, the Court, in a Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said practice of having
two representatives from Congress with one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. The Court enunciated that the
use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in the aforequoted provision is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction or interpretation. The same is indicative of the
Framers' intent that Congress may designate only one representative to the JBC.

In light of Chavez, both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month rotational representation in the JBC, wherein
the House of Representatives will represent Congress from January to June and the Senate from July to
December. This is now the current practice in the JBC.

ISSUE: Is this six-month rotational representation in the JBC constitutional? Does it weaken Congress itself as a
bicameral department?

HELD: It is not unconstitutional. It does NOT weaken Congress. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Before delving into the above-stated issues, the Court noted that the Petition was primarily filed because of the
non-counting of the petitioner's votes in the JBC En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 held for the
purpose of determining, among others, who will be the possible successors of the then retiring Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court Perez and Brion, whose retirements were set on December 14 and 29, 2016, respectively.

As a rule, courts do not entertain moot questions. Nevertheless, considering that all the arguments herein once
again boil down to the proper interpretation of the 1987 Constitution on congressional representation in the JBC,
mootness cannot stop the Petition.

Having said that, this Court shall now resolve the issues in seriatim.

On petitioner's locus standi. The legal standing of each member of Congress was also upheld in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez.  It is clear therefrom that each member of Congress has a legal standing to sue
even without an enabling resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers,
prerogatives and privileges of Congress.
On the application of Chavez as stare decisis in this case. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of
adherence to precedents has not lost its luster and continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need to
maintain stability in the law. The doctrine is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where this Court has already settled the issue of interpretation of
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Truly, such ruling may not be unanimous, but it is undoubtedly a
reflection of the wisdom of the majority of members of this Court on that matter. Chavez cannot simply be
regarded as an erroneous application of the questioned constitutional provision for it merely applies the clear
mandate of the law, that is, Congress is entitled to only one representative in the JBC in the same way that its co-
equal branches are.

As the Court declared in Chavez, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is clear, categorical and
unambiguous. Thus, it needs no further construction or interpretation. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly
declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, only application.

Omeña III v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 212686, September 28,
2015

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFQRE, premises considered, the Manifestation/Motion dated March 16, 2016 of respondent TPVI is hereby
GRANTED. The Entry of Judgment is LIFTED. The fa/lo of the September 28, 2015 Decision is hereby amended to
include a directive that the April 30, 2014 Notice of Award in favor of said respondent be REINSTATED, excluding
the portion therein granting to SPC the Right to Top. Respondent PSALM is further directed to execute the NPPC-
APA and NPPC-LLA in favor of respondent TPVI with dispatch. As amended, the fa/lo of said Decision shall read:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for accordingly GRANTED. The right of
first refusal (right to top) granted to Sakon Power Corporation (now SPC Power Corporation) under the 2009 Naga
LBGT-LLA is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Consequently, the Asset Purchase Agreement (NPPC-APA) and Land
Lease Agreement (NPPC-LLA) executed by the Power Sector Assets and · Liabilities Management Corporation and
SPC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Notice of Award dated April 30, 2014 in favor of Therma Power Visayas, Inc.
Is hereby REINSTATED, excluding the portion therein granting to SPC the Right to Top. Respondent PSALM is
directed to execute the NPPC-AP A and NPPCLLA in favor of TPVI with dispatch.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE?

THE POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORP (PSALM) CONDUCTED BIDDING FOR THE SALE
OF NPPC POWER PLANT. BIDDERS WERE THERMA POWER VISAYAS INC AND SPC POWER CORP. THERMA POWER
WON. PSALM ISSUED NOTICE OF AWARD TO THERMA POWER BUT SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT SPC WILL
NOT EXERCISE ITS RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL. THEN SPC EXERCISED ITS RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL BY PROPOSING TO
PSALM THAT IT WILL EXECUTE LEASE AGREEMENT AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT OVER THE NPCC POWER PLANT.
PSALM AND SPC EXECUTED SAID AGREEMENTS AND PSALM CANCELLED THE NOTICE OF AWARD. IN ITS PREVIOUS
DECISION SC RULED THAT THE PROVISION IN THE BIDDING GUIDELINES RE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL OF SPC WAS
ILLEGAL AND THE LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENTS WERE ALSO ILLEGAL. BUT IT WAS SILENT ON THE EFFECT
OF THE DECISION ON THE NOTICE OF AWARD. THERMA POWER THEN ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION WITH PRAYER
TO REINSTATE THE NOTICE OF AWARD. SC IN THIS RESOLUTION REINSTATED THE NOTICE OF AWARD.

WHAT WAS THE BASIS FOR THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE NOTICE OF AWARD?

THE BASIS IS THE SEVERABILITY CLAUSE IN THE BIDDING GUIDELINES WHICH STATES: IF ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE BIDDING PROCEDURES OR ANY PART OF THE BIDDING PACKAGE IS HELD TO BE INVALID,
ILLEGAL OR UNENFORCEABLE, THE VALIDITY, LEGALITY, OR ENFORCEABILITY OF THE REMAINING PROVISIONS WILL
NOT BE AFFECTED THEREBY AND SHALL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.

BUT WAS IT PROPER FOR SC TO AMEND A FINAL JUDGMENT?

YES.

THE COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RENDERING A NUNC PRO TUNC JUDGMENT TO AMEND THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION OF THE SEPTEMBER 28, 2015 DECISION IN ORDER TO TRULY REFLECT THE ACTION OF THE COURT

THE LACK OF DIRECTIVE IN THE DECISION ON HOW TO PROCEED FROM THE NULLIFICATION OF SPC’S RIGHT TO
TOP AND ITS NPPC-APA AND NPPC-LLA CONTRACTS, NOTHING MORE, LEFT THE PARTIES AT A QUANDARY,
PROMPTING THEM TO SEEK JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ANEW.

THE COURT MUST, THEREFORE, SUPPLY HEREIN WHAT WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED IN THE DECISION.
OTHERWISE, A REJECTION OF THE PLEA OF THERMA POWER WILL RESULT TO MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS AND
CLOGGING OF THE COURT DOCKET. THIS CONSEQUENCE IS AGAINST THE ESTABLISHED POLICY OF THE COURT TO
PROVIDE IN ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE A JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE DISPOSITION OF EVERY ACTION AND
PROCEEDING.